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ASy?? 0@ 0D6A AzAHP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5e,,,,0i) (`$.8dd8    ("  Z6Times New Roman Regular~g)bk1C C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|x U2J+M 0_level1  X 2( ` hp x 223  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  ӁLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52G+M 0_level2   /%` ` hp x /23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2D+M 0_level3   ," hp x ,23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2A+M 0_level4  ` ) hp x )23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2>+M 0_level5   &hhp x &23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2;+M 0_level6   #p x #23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  28+M 0_level7  h  p x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  25+M 0_level8   pp x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  22+M 0_level9    x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  2JM 0_levsl1  X 2( ` hp x 223  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2GM 0_levsl2   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2DM 0_levsl3   ," hp x ,23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2AM 0_levsl4  ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2>M 0_levsl5   &hhp x &23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2;M 0_levsl6   #p x #23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  28M 0_levsl7  h  p x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  25M 0_levsl8   pp x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  22M 0_levsl9    x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  2JM 0_levnl1  X 2( ` hp x 223   5+ ` hp x 5  2GM 0_levnl2   /%` ` hp x /23   5+ ` hp x 5  2DM 0_levnl3   ," hp x ,23   5+ ` hp x 5  2AM 0_levnl4  ` ) hp x )23   5+ ` hp x 5  2>M 0_levnl5   &hhp x &23   5+ ` hp x 5  2;M 0_levnl6   #p x #23   5+ ` hp x 5  28M 0_levnl7  h  p x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  25M 0_levnl8   pp x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  22M 0_levnl9    x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  - -0.Normal<:Definition T<AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(''&H1   XXX   (&H2 XXX (&H3 XXX (&H4 XXX XXX(&H5 XXX (&H6 XXX 20Address8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEKM<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXSN\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard KM<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXSN\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted/%  ,Kk %#/KM<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXSN\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/<:zBottom of 7D(X7  ?O%2A`Arial?  XXXSN\  `&Times New RomanS7Z(X7&  d dC)1dxd<:zTop of For7F(X7  ?O%2A`Arial?  XXXSN\  `&Times New RomanS7Z(X7C)2dxd0KS.SampleKM<6X9`(Courier NewKSN\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterKM<6X9`(Courier NewKXXXSN\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  <6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`ArialX[ZA<< c (|G2R$ !.8@dd8         0  X9X(9 Z6Times New Roman Regular(#$  0   d  RR$      1  X9X  _ XX9ԀThetestatorschildrenrelyonBurlesonv._McCary_forthepropositionthataresultingtrustisappropriate.  WeagreethatBurlesonisrelevanttotheissuespresentedinthiscasebecauseofthetypeoftransactionsinvolvedand t thecourtsanalysisofresultingtrusts,expresstrusts,andconstructivetrusts.However,wedisagreethatBurleson 8 supportsimpositionofatrustinthecasebeforeus.InBurlesontheSupremeCourtaffirmedthetrialcourtsdecision L toimposearesultingtrustbecausetheweightoftheevidenceclearlysupportedthefindingthatthegrantordidnotintend  fortheappellanttoreceivehisresidenceasherseparateproperty,butthatheintendedthatsheeitherpayhisestatethe  valueofthepropertyorreconveyitsothatitcouldbesoldandtheproceedsequallydividedamongallofthechildren H  athisdeath. SeeBurleson,753S.W.2dat352.Inourcase,thereissimplynoprobativeproofestablishingthatthe  \ testatorintendedMrs._Cammack_Ԁtoholdhisestatesolelyfortheuseandbenefitofhischildren.   (|3NJ$ !.8@dd8     VVVV)!dxdx)!dxdx( $ Figure  1  ^_X`YE<<CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3NJ$ !.8@dd8     ($$   1  X[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK !.8@dd8     _@89XXdd8   @ Wt@INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE  @kk$ATNASHVILLE#@Wt #Ԉ & @&& July6,2000Session L X9X@Ԁ ^  #@XX9#  INRE:ESTATEOFRALPHI.CAMMACK,DECEASEDX9X@  J S@B B  AppealfromtheChanceryCourtforCoffeeCounty  J @x x No.PW999JohnW.Rollins,Chancellor  6 @*AV) ` dE<` A߈   @q q No.M199902382_COA_ԄR3CVFiledNovember9,_2000_Ԉ   AV) ` dE<|` A }   Thisisadisputebetweenthedeceasedtestatorssecondwifeandthetwochildrenofhisfirst x  marriage.Thetestatorandhiswifeexecutedmutualandreciprocalwillswhichpassedthebulkof d theirestatetothesurvivor.Thespousesagreed,andtheirwillsreflected,thatwhenthesurvivordied, P theestatewastogoequallytothetestatorschildren.Inconjunctionwiththewills,thespouses < executedanagreementthattheywouldnotchangetheirwillsevenafterthedeathoftheother.After (x thetestatorsdeath,thewifebegandissipatingtheestate,sellingthefamilyhome,andgivingher d ownchildthetestatorsexpensivegrandfatherclock.#@XX9#X9X@Inanefforttopreservetheestate#@XX9#,X9X@Ԁthetestators P childrencommencedtheunderlyingaction,seekingtoestablisharesultingtrust#@XX9#X9X@.Afterthetrialcourt b grantedthewifesmotionforsummaryjudgment,thetestatorschildrenlodgedthisappeal.Because N testatorswillgavethewifehisestateinfeesimple,sheinheritedtherealpropertyastenantby : entirety,andthereisnoclearandconvincingevidencethatthetestatorintendedhermerelytohold & thepropertyintrustforhischildren,wemustaffirm.     Tenn.R.App.P.3AppealasofRight;JudgmentoftheChanceryCourt  AffirmedandRemanded   O #@X9= #X9X.@PatriciaJ.Cottrell,J.,deliveredtheopinionofthecourt,inwhichBenH.Cantrell,P.J.,M.S., ^!  andWilliamB.Cain,J.,joined. J"! RobertL.Huskey,Manchester,Tennessee,fortheappellants,PollyAnnCammackTravisandFred "$r# Cammack. %^ $ FrankVanCleave,Tullahoma,Tennessee,fortheappellee,MollyM.Cammack,Personal &6"& RepresentativeoftheEstateofRalphI.Cammack. '"#' @66' OPINION #@XX9 #Ԉ )$) X9X@  #@XX9#X9X@  Duringhisfiftyyearmarriagetohisfirstwife,RalphI.Cammack( thetestator)acquired +&+ mostofhisestate.Inthecourseofthemarriage,thetestatorservedinthearmedforcesandtraveled n,', extensively,acquiringmanyinterestingitems.Thetestatorsfirstwifepredeceasedhim.The Z-(- testatorsubsequentlymarriedtheappelleeherein,Mrs.MollyCammack.Thismarriageproduced  nochildren,althoughboththetestatorandhissecondwifehadchildrenfromtheirprevious  marriages.    OnMay12,1994,thetestatorandMrs.Cammackexecutedmutualandreciprocalwills ` whichpassedthebulkoftheirestatetothesurvivor.Uponthedeathofthesurvivor,bothwillsleft L  theestatetothetestatorstwochildren.Inconjunctionwiththewillsthespousesenteredintoa 8  contractinwhichMrs.Cammackagreednottochangeherwillshouldthetestatorpredeceaseher. $ t Thecontractstatedinpertinentpart:  ` 8  Thepartiesacknowledgethat,withtheexceptionofcertainitemsofpersonal  8  property,theestateofthepartieshasbeenaccumulatedbytheHUSBANDpriorto $  themarriageoftheparties.TheHUSBANDdesirestowillvirtuallyallofthisestate   totheWIFEwiththeunderstandingthattheWIFEwilldevisethesameuponher   deathtohischildren.TheWIFEdesirestofulfilltheHUSBANDswishes...    8  TheHUSBANDagreestomakeawillleavinghisentireestate,withtheexception p ofsomeU.S.SavingsBondsandcertainitemsofpersonalproperty,totheWIFEand \ iftheWIFEshouldpredeceasehim,tohischildren.H   8  TheWIFEagreestomakeawillleavingherentireestate,withtheexceptionof  p certainpersonalproperty,totheHUSBANDandiftheHUSBANDshould  \ predeceaseher,totheHUSBANDschildren.H   8  TheHUSBANDalsoagreesthathewillexecute,deliverandrecordaDeedtoCreate   TenantsbytheEntiretygrantingtheWIFEanundividedonehalfinterestinhis   residencelocatedinManchester,Tennessee.   Onthesameday,thetestatorexecutedadeedtocreateatenancybytheentiretyinwhichhe  conveyedanundividedinterestinhisresidencetoMrs.Cammack. l   AccordingtotheattorneywhoassistedtheCammacksindraftingandexecutingthese D! documents,thetestatorwasawareoftheeffectofthesedocuments.Thelawyerassertedthatprior 0"  topreparingthesedocuments,hehadconsultedwiththetestatorandMrs.Cammackaboutvarious #l! legalalternativesthatwereavailabletocarryouttheirdesires. $X"   ThetestatordiedonNovember16,1998atage78.Mrs.Cammackwasappointedexecutrix %0!$ andthewillwasadmittedintoprobateinJanuary1999. &"%   InMay1999,thetestatorstwochildrenfiledtheunderlyingpetitiontoestablishtrustwhich (#' allegedthatMrs.Cammackwasdissipatingtheestateinviolationofhercontractwiththetestator. )$( TheyclaimedthatMrs.Cammackhadtoldthemthatwiththeexceptionofcertainitemsspecified |*%) inthewill,theestatewashers, todowithasshesawfit.TheyalsoallegedthatMrs.Cammack h+&* wasintheprocessofsellingtheabovementionedresidenceinspiteofthefactthatthetestatorhad  assuredthemthathehadfixedthepaperworkinsuchafashionthattheirstepmotherwouldusethe  propertyaslongasshelivedandthenitwouldpasstothem.Thetwochildrentheorizedthat  althoughthecontractwasnotwordedassuch,Mrs.Cammacktookalifeestate,orheldtheproperty t intrustforthem. `   Mrs.Cammackrespondedbymovingforsummaryjudgment.Insupportofhermotion,she 8  providedtheaffidavitoftheattorneywhopreparedthewills,thecontract,andthedeed.Heattested $ t that:  ` 8  Duringthoseconversations,wediscussedtheconveyanceofalifeestateinreal  8  property,includingtherestrictionsthatwouldbeimposeduponalifetenant.I $  specificallydiscussedwithMr.CammackthatwithalifeestatethatMrs.Cammack   wouldnotbeabletosellorgiveawaythepropertyoutright[sic]butonlyherlife   estateinterestandthatwouldinsurethathischildrenwouldhavetherealpropertyat   Mrs.Cammacksdeath.IfurtherexplainedtoMr.Cammackthatcreatingatenancy   bytheentiretieswithMrs.Cammackgaveherapresentinterestinthepropertyand p thatintheeventtheywereeverdivorced,shewouldbeentitledtotakeashareofit \ as maritalpropertyandthatwithoutthedeedshewouldhavenorightstoanyshare H iftheyweresubsequentlydivorced.IexplainedtoMr.CammackthatundertheDeed 4 toCreateTenancybytheEntireties,Mrs.Cammackwouldtakecompletetitletothe  p propertyonhisdeath,nomatterwhatwasinthewillasherinterestwouldpassunder  \ thedeedandnotthewill.Followingthosediscussions,Ipreparedthedeedcreating H atenancybytheentiretyconveyingsaidpropertyinfeesimple...Duringthe 4 discussionswithMollyM.CammackandRalphI.Cammack,Idiscussedintervivos   trustagreementsandtestamentarytrusts,thelimitationsandrestrictionsimposed   uponthebeneficiaryandtheTrusteeofsuchatrust.Followingthosediscussions,I  preparedandRalphI.CammackexecutedtheLastWillandTestamentwhich  conveyedhisresiduaryestatetoMollyM.Cammackoutrightwithoutsubjectingthe  sametoanytrustorotherrestrictions.l     Insupportofthechildrensresponse,thetestatorssonfiledanaffidavitinwhichheattested D! thatMrs.Cammackhadgiventoherownchildren muchofthepersonalpropertywhichhadgreat 0"  attachmenttomyselfandmysisteraswellasourparents.Hestated: #l! 8  Iwassupposedtopickupsomeofmytoolsfrommyfathersshoponeday,but $D # beforeIcouldgetthere,oneofhersonscomeandremovedallofhis[thetestators] %0!$ expensivewoodworkingtoolsandsomeofmyownpersonalproperty...Inaddition &"% forexample,myparentshadanexpensivegrandfatherclockfromGermanywhich '#& hadbeenappraisedaccordingtomyfatherseveralyearsagoatbetween$13,000and (#' $15,000.Iinquiredwhathappenedtothegrandfatherclockandsheadvisedmethat )$( KennethMcMurtree(herson)hadtheclock.|*%)    h+&* ЇThetestatorschildrenarguedthatbecauseMrs.Cammackwasclearlyinbreachofthecontract,they  wereentitledtosummaryjudgment.ThetrialcourtsummarilygrantedMrs.Cammacksmotionfor  summaryjudgment.Thisappealensued.  @)I. `   OurSupremeCourtoutlinedthestandardofreviewofamotionforsummaryjudgmentin 8  Staplesv.CBL&Assoc.,Inc.,15S.W.3d83(Tenn.2000): $ t 8  Thestandardsgoverninganappellatecourt'sreviewofamotionforsummary  L  judgmentarewellsettled.Sinceourinquiryinvolvespurelyaquestionoflaw,no  8  presumptionofcorrectnessattachestothelowercourt'sjudgment,andourtaskis $  confinedtoreviewingtherecordtodeterminewhethertherequirementsofTenn.R.   Civ.P.56havebeenmet.SeeHunterv.Brown,955S.W.2d49,50-51(Tenn.1997);   Cowdenv.SovranBank/CentralSouth,816S.W.2d741,744(Tenn.1991).   TennesseeRuleofCivilProcedure56.04providesthatsummaryjudgmentis   appropriatewhere:(1)thereisnogenuineissuewithregardtothematerialfacts p relevanttotheclaimordefensecontainedinthemotion,seeByrdv.Hall,847 \ S.W.2d208,210(Tenn.1993);and(2)themovingpartyisentitledtoajudgmentas H amatteroflawontheundisputedfacts.SeeAndersonv.StandardRegisterCo.,857 4 S.W.2d555,559(Tenn.1993).Themovingpartyhastheburdenofprovingthatits  p motionsatisfiestheserequirements.SeeDownenv.AllstateIns.Co.,811S.W.2d  \ 523,524(Tenn.1991).Whenthepartyseekingsummaryjudgmentmakesaproperly H supportedmotion,theburdenshiftstothenonmovingpartytosetforthspecificfacts 4 establishingtheexistenceofdisputed,materialfactswhichmustberesolvedbythe   trieroffact.SeeByrdv.Hall,847S.W.2dat215.    8  Toproperlysupportitsmotion,themovingpartymusteitheraffirmativelynegatean  essentialelementofthenon-movingparty'sclaimorconclusivelyestablishan  affirmativedefense.SeeMcCarleyv.WestQualityFoodServ.,960S.W.2d585,588 l (Tenn.1998);Robinsonv.Omer,952S.W.2d423,426(Tenn.1997).Ifthemoving X  partyfailstonegateaclaimedbasisforthesuit,thenon-movingparty'sburdento D! produceevidenceestablishingtheexistenceofagenuineissuefortrialisnot 0"  triggeredandthemotionforsummaryjudgmentmustfail.SeeMcCarleyv.West #l! QualityFoodServ.,960S.W.2dat588;Robinsonv.Omer,952S.W.2dat426.Ifthe $X" movingpartysuccessfullynegatesaclaimedbasisfortheaction,thenon-moving $D # partymaynotsimplyrestuponthepleadings,butmustofferprooftoestablishthe %0!$ existenceoftheessentialelementsoftheclaim.&"%   Ѐ '#& 8  Thestandardsgoverningtheassessmentofevidenceinthesummaryjudgment (#' contextarealsowellestablished.Courtsmustviewtheevidenceinthelightmost )$( favorabletothenonmovingpartyandmustalsodrawallreasonableinferencesinthe |*%) nonmovingparty'sfavor.SeeRobinsonv.Omer,952S.W.2dat426;Byrdv.Hall, h+&* 847S.W.2dat210-11.Courtsshouldgrantasummaryjudgmentonlywhenboththe  factsandtheinferencestobedrawnfromthefactspermitareasonablepersonto  reachonlyoneconclusion.SeeMcCallv.Wilder,913S.W.2d150,153(Tenn.1995);  Carvellv.Bottoms,900S.W.2d23,26(Tenn.1995).t   Staples,15S.W.3dat88-89. L    Inthecasebeforeus,thereisnodisputeofmaterialfact,andeachsidearguesthat,basedon $ t theundisputedfacts,thelawentitlesittosummaryjudgment.  ` @)II.  8    ThechildrenarguethattheevidencedemonstratesthatMrs.Cammackbreachedthecontract   shemadewiththetestatorbydissipatingtheestate,thatthecontractwasvalidandbinding,andthat   theyhavestandingtoenforceitasthirdpartybeneficiaries.    XX  Weagreethatthecontractisvalidandbinding.Unfortunatelyforthetestatorschildren, p however,althoughthecontractisbinding,nothingthereinpreventsMrs.Cammackfromsellingor \ distributingitemsfromtheestate.ThecontractrequiredMrs.Cammacktorefrainfromchanging H herwillafterthetestatorsdeath.Therecordcontainsnoevidencethatshebreachedthatpromise. 4   Inthecontract,thetestatoragreedto makeawillleavinghisentireestate,withcertain  \ exceptions,toMrs.Cammack.Therecordshowsthathedidso.Thetestatorswillcontainsno H languagerestrictingMrs.Cammacksownershipoftheestate.Thewillstates: 4 8  WiththeexceptionofcertainspecificitemsofpersonalpropertywhichIlistedand   designatedthebeneficiariesthereofonawritingattachedheretoandincorporated  herein,Igive,deviseandbequeathalloftherest,residueandremainderofmyestate  ofwhatsoeverkindandwheresoeverlocatedtomywife,MollyM.Cammack,  absolutelyandinfeesimple.l     Aconveyancein feeor feesimplemeansthattheentireproperty,withoutlimitationhas D! beenunconditionallytransferredforever.See,e.g.,Grahlv.Davis,971S.W.2d373,377(Tenn. 0"  1998);Dicksonv.Houston,221Tenn.138,141,425S.W.2d586,587(1968).Thus,theproperty #l! Mrs.Cammacktookunderthewillishers. $X"   Inthecontract,thetestatoralsoagreedtoexecuteadeedgrantingMrs.Cammack an %0!$ undividedonehalfinterestinhisresidence.Therecordshowsthatthetestatorthenexecutedadeed &"% creatingatenancybytheentiretyinfavorofMrs.Cammack. '#&   Atenancybytheentiretyisaformofpropertyownershipuniquetomarriedpersons.See )$( Griffinv.Prince,632S.W.2d532,534(Tenn.1982).Itsessentialcharacteristicisthat"eachspouse |*%) isseizedofthewholeortheentiretyandnotofashare,moiety,ordivisiblepart."Sloanv.Jones, h+&* 192Tenn.400,402,241S.W.2d506,507(1951).Uponthedeathofonespouse,ownershipproperty  heldunderatenancybytheentiretyimmediatelyvestsinthesurvivor,andthelawsofdescentand  distributiondonotapply.SeeNX9XXX9Grahlv.Davis,971S.W.2dat378.Thus,atthetestatorsdeath,Mrs.  Cammackbecamethesoleowneroftheresidence. t   Inreturnforthesepromisesbythetestator,Mrs.Cammackpromisedtoexecute,andnotto L  change,awillleavingherestatetothetestatorschildren.Thatwillwasexecutedatthesametime 8  asthetestatorswill,andthereisnoallegationthatMrs.Cammackhasattemptedtoreviseorchange $ t it.Thetestatorschildrenarguethatthetrialcourtincorrectlyinterpretedthecontractasimposing  ` onMrs.Cammackonlytherequirementthatsheexecuteandleaveunchangedthewill.Weagree  L  withthechildrenthatthatistheimpliedholdingofthetrialcourt.However,wealsoagreewiththe  8  trialcourtthatthatisthecorrectinterpretationoftheunambiguouslanguageofthepromisesmade $  bythepartiestothecontract.   #X9XXNX9K#  Becausethecontractitselfisclearandunambiguousandreflectsthepartiesintent,itmust   beenforcedaswritten.InMunfordUnionBankv.AmericanAmbassadorCas.Co.,15S.W.3d448,   451(Tenn.Ct.App.1999),thiscourtsetouttherulesforconstructionofcontractsasfollows: p 8  Contracts...aretobeconstruedaccordingtothesenseandmeaningoftheterms H whichthepartieshaveused,andiftheyareclearandunambiguous,theirtermsare 4 tobetakenandunderstoodintheirplain,ordinary,andpopularsense.Theruleof  p strictconstructiondoesnotauthorizeaperversionoflanguage,ortheexerciseof  \ inventivepowersforthepurposeofcreatinganambiguitywherenoneexists,nor H doesitauthorizethecourttomakeanewcontractforthepartiesordisregardthe 4 evidence(intention)asexpressed,ortorefineawaytermsofacontractexpressed   withsufficientclearnesstoconveytheplainmeaningofthepartiesandembodying   requirements,compliancewithwhichismadetheconditiontoliabilitythereon.  Neitherdoestherulepreventtheapplicationoftheprinciplethatpoliciesof  insurance,likeothercontracts,mustreceiveareasonableinterpretationconsonant  withtheapparentobjectandplainintentoftheparties.(citationsomitted).l   MunfordUnionBank,15S.W.3dat450(quotingGuardianLifeIns.Co.ofAmericav.Richardson, D! 23Tenn.App.194,129S.W.2d1107(1939)). Wherethereisnoambiguity,itisthedutyofthe 0"  courttoapplytothewordsusedtheirordinarymeaningandneitherpartyistobefavoredintheir #l! construction.Munford,15S.W.3dat451.Theordinarymeaningofthelanguageusedinthe $X" contracthereinplacesnolimitationsonMrs.Cammacksownershipoftheestate. $D #   Thechildrenwouldhaveusdeterminethattheintroductorylanguage, Husbanddesiresto &"% willvirtuallyallofhisestatetotheWifewiththeunderstandingthattheWifewilldevisethesame '#& uponherdeathtohischildren.ThewifedesirestofulfillHusbandswishes...establishesa (#' restrictiononMrs.Cammacksuseanddispositionofthepropertysheinheritedfromthetestator. )$( Suchareadingwouldbecontrarytotheexpresslanguageoftheactualpromisesmadeinthecontract |*%) aswellasthelanguageofthedeedandthetwowills. h+&* Ѐ    Moreover,Mrs.Cammackpresentedevidenceshowingthatthetestatorchosethismeansof  distributinghisestateafterconsideringotheroptions,afactwhichdemonstratesthathisintentto  executethevariousdocumentswasinformed.Thelawyerwhodraftedthecontract,thewills,and t thedeedattestedthathediscussedthevariousmeansofdistributingtheestatewiththetestator.The ` lawyerexplainedaboutlifeestates,intervivostrustagreements,andtestamentarytrusts,andthe L  testatorrejectedthoseoptions.Thus,evenifthetestatorschildrenarethirdpartybeneficiariesunder 8  thecontract,enforcingthecontractwillnotpreventMrs.Cammackfromsellingorotherwise $ t distributingitemsfromthetestatorsestate.Nothingintheplainlanguageofthecontractrestricts  ` Mrs.Cammacksrighttosellorotherwisedistributeitemsfromtheestate.  L    @vv(III. $    Thetestatorschildrenaskthecourttoimposearesultingtrustontheassetsoftheestate,   arguingthatsuchatrustwouldreflecttheintentoftheparties.     InInreEstateofNichols,856S.W.2d397,401(Tenn.1993),ourSupremeCourtadopted p thefollowingasa morecomprehensivestatementregardingthecreationandapplicationofresulting \ trusts: H 8  Theimpositionofaresultingtrustisanequitableremedy;thedoctrineofresulting  p trustisinvokedtopreventunjustenrichment.Suchatrustisimpliedbylawfromthe  \ actsandconductofthepartiesandthefactsandcircumstanceswhichatthetime H existandsurroundthetransactionoutofwhichitarises.Broadlyspeaking,aresulting 4 trustarisesfromthenatureorcircumstancesofconsiderationinvolvedina   transactionwherebyonepersonbecomesinvestedwithalegaltitlebutisobligated   inequitytoholdhislegaltitleforthebenefitofanother,theintentionoftheformer  toholdintrustforthelatterbeingimpliedorpresumedasamatteroflaw,although  nointentiontocreateorholdintrusthasbeenmanifested,expresslyorbyinference,  andthereordinarilybeingnofraudorconstructivefraudinvolved.l   8  Whileresultingtrustsgenerallyarise(1)onafailureofanexpresstrustorthe D! purposeofsuchatrust,or(2)onaconveyancetoonepersononaconsiderationfrom 0"  anothersometimesreferredtoasapurchasemoneyresultingtrusttheymayalso #l! beimposedinothercircumstances,suchthatacourtofequity,shapingitsjudgment $X" inthemostefficientform,willdecreearesultingtrustonaninquiryintothe $D # considerationofatransactioninordertopreventafailureofjustice.However,the %0!$ particularcircumstancesunderwhicharesultingtrustmayarisevariesfrom &"% jurisdictiontojurisdiction.'#&   InreEstateofNichols,856S.W.2dat401(quotingӀ76Am.Jur.2dTrusts166,pp.197-98(1992)). )$(   |*%)   InBurlesonv.McCary,753S.W.2d349(Tenn.1988),SX9XXX9ԀtheSupremeCourtsimilarlynoted   thedifferencebetweenresultingtrustsbasedonthe classicsituationofonepersonpayinga  considerationwhileanothertakestitleandthosebasedongratuitoustransfers.TheBurlesoncase  involvedanailingfathertransferringrealpropertybydeedtohischildtoavoidliabilityofhisestate t formedicalbillswiththeunderstandingthatthepropertyoritsvaluewouldbedistributedamong ` allhischildrenafterhisdeath._W U#  1      _Ԁ L    ThecourtstatedthatthetheoryofresultingtrustinBurlesonwas oneofafailedor $ t frustratedtrustandthatthefactsfitthesituationwhere [_f]requently_,they[resultingtrusts]are  ` imposedwhentheownerofpropertygratuitouslytransfersitandproperlymanifestsanintentionthat  L  thetransfereeshouldholdthepropertyintrust,butthetrustfailsforsometechnicalorevidentiary  8  reason.Burleson,753S.W.2dat353(citingRestatement(Second)ofTrusts411(1959)and $  G._Bogert_,TrustsandTrustees468(2ded.1977)).   8  Resultingtrustsandconstructivetrustsarebothcreatedbycourtsofequityinorder   tosatisfythedemandsofjustice.Oneinstancewhenresultingtrustsareutilized   occursinasituationwheretherehasbeenadeclarationofanintenttocreateatrust p andthetrust,forsomereason,hasfailed.Resultingtrustsgenerallyareimposedin \ accordancewiththeactualorassumedintentionoftheparties.Seegenerally H GibsonsSuitsinChancery#X9XXSX9j#SX9XXX9382(_W.H.Inman_Ԁ6thed.1982)4   Burleson,753S.W.2dat35253.  \ #X9XXSX9s#  Althoughresultingtrusts,bytheirnature,arenormallyestablishedbyparolevidence,see 4 _Smalling_Ԁv._Terrell_,943S.W.2d397,400(Tenn.Ct.App.1996),ahighstandardofproofmustbe   metinordertoimposearesultingtrust.OurSupremeCourthasnotedthatthecreationofaresulting   trustisnotameanstoavoidthelawofinheritanceofjointtenancies.SeeInReEstateof_Nichols_,  856S.W.2dat402.Thesameistrueregardingthelawofothertypesofinheritancesand  conveyances.Onlyundercompellingcircumstancesmayacourtimposearesultingtrustin  contraventionofthelegaleffectofthedocumentsthemselves.Seeid.In_Nichols_,theSupreme l Courtonceagainadoptedthefollowingstatementofthehighstandardofproofuponwhichatrust X  maybeimposed: D!  0"  8  Whileanimpliedorresultingtrustmaybeestablishedbyparolevidence,yetboth  uponreasonandauthoritythecourtswillnotenforceit,unlessitbeestablishedby  themostconvincingandirrefragableevidence.Inotherwords,itmustbesustained  byproofoftheclearestandmostconvincingcharacter.Tosustainaresultingtrust t uponparolevidenceintheteethofthetermsofthewritteninstrument,itisnot ` essentialthattheevidencebeofacharactertoremoveallreasonabledoubt,butonly L  thatitbesoclear,cogentandconvincingastoovercometheopposingevidence, 8  coupledwiththepresumptionthatobtainsinfavorofthewritteninstrument.$ t   InReEstateofNichols,856S.W.2dat402(quotingEstateofWardellexrel.Wardellv.Dailey,674  L  S.W.2d293,295(Tenn.Ct.App.1996)quotingSavagev.Savage,4Tenn.App.277,285(1927)).  8  Thetestimonyofasingle,interestedwitnesstypicallyisinsufficienttoestablisharesultingtrustby $  clear,convincing,andirrefragableevidence.SeeKingv.Warren,680S.W.2d459,461(Tenn.1984);   Tansilv.Tansil,673S.W.2d131,133(Tenn.1984);St.Clairv.Evans,857S.W.2d49,51(Tenn.   Ct.App.1993).     Inthecasebeforeus,thetestatorschildrenessentiallyarguethatMrs.Cammackreceived p therealandpersonalpropertyofherhusband,thetestator,onlytoholdforthebenefitofthe \ testatorschildren,inspiteofthelanguageofhiswilldevisinghisresidualestate absolutelyand H infeesimpleandinspiteofthedeedcreatingatenancybytheentirety.Theyrelyontwopieces 4 ofevidencetosupporttheirargumentforimpositionofatrust.Thefirstisthelanguageofthe  p contract, TheHUSBANDdesirestowillvirtuallyallofthisestatetotheWIFEwiththe  \ understandingthattheWIFEwilldevisethesameuponherdeathtohischildren.TheWIFEdesires H tofulfilltheHUSBANDswishes.Thesecondistheaffidavitofthetestatorsson,whichstates 4 inpertinentpart:   8  Aftermymothersdeathandthenthesubsequentremarriageofmyfather,hetoldme  thathewantedtoseethathisnewwifewascaredfor,butthatallthepropertythat  hadbeenacquiredbyheandmymother,wouldendupwithmysisterandmeafter  herdeath.Hetoldmethathehadmadearrangementsandfixedpaperswherehis l wifewouldhaveuseofallhispropertywhileshewaslivingandthenatherdeath, X  itwouldallcometomysisterandmyself.D!     ThisisinsufficientevidenceonwhichtodeterminethattheintentofthetestatorandMrs. #l! Cammackwasforhertoholdthetestatorsestatesolelyintrustforhischildreninlightofthe $X" languageofthedocumentsdisposingoftheestateandinlightoftheotherparolevidence,the $D # affidavitofthelawyerwhoadvisedthetestator.Thatattorneyexplainedtothetestatorvarious %0!$ methodsforachievingtheresultsthatthechildrennowargueheintended,butthetestatorchosenot &"% toemployanyofthem.Whilethetestatorobviouslyhopedhiswidowwouldfollowhiswishes '#& regardingthepropertyhehadacquiredwithhischildrensmother,hespecificallyrefrainedfrom (#' imposinglimitationsonheruseofhisestate. )$(   |*%)   Thetestatorsexpressionofhiswishesinthecontractcouldbeconsidered precatorywords.   Thequestioninsuchsituationsisgenerallydid thetestatorintendtoimposeabindingobligation  onthedeviseetocarryouthiswishes,ordidhemeantoleaveittothedeviseetoactornotathis  owndiscretion.Spicerv.Wright,211S.E.2d79,81(Va.1975)(quotingSmithv.Baptist t Orphanage,194Va.901,905,75S.E.2d491,494(1953)).Wethinktheevidenceclearlyindicates ` thetestatorschoicenottoimposealegallybindingobligationonMrs.Cammacktokeephisestate L  intactduringherlifetime.Absentlanguageoractscreatingalegallybindingobligation,theonly 8  obligationcreatedbythetestatorswishesisamoralone,somethingthiscourtisnotempoweredto $ t enforce.  `   Thus,weconcludethattheevidencethetestatorschildrenhavepresentedisnotsoclear,  8  cogentandconvincingastoovercometheopposingevidenceortopresentasetofcompelling $  circumstancestojustifyestablishmentofatrust.Norcanwesaythattheimpositionofaresulting   trustwouldbeequitable.Theevidencedoesnotsupportafindingthatthetestatorwouldhave   approvedoftheimpositionofaresultingtrust.Onthecontrary,therecordshowsthathisattorney   offeredhimtheoptionofimposingatrustontheassetsofhisestateandofprovidinghiswidowwith   alifeestateintheproperty.Hechoseinsteadtoexecuteadeedestablishingatenancybytheentirety p onbehalfMrs.Cammack,withfullknowledgethatsuchwouldempowerhertosellordistributethe \ property.Heexecutedawillleavingherhisremainderestateabsolutely. H   Accordingly,thetrialcourtsdecisiontograntMrs.Cammacksmotionforsummary  p judgmentisaffirmed.Thiscaseisremandedforanyfurtherproceedingswhichmaybenecessary.  \ Costsofthisappealaretaxedtotheappellants,PollyAnnCammackTravisandFredCammack. H    `     h     ___________________________________     `     h     PATRICIAJ.COTTRELL,JUDGE