ÿWPCé ÉJ~|2¸‹u¡YÜtù×L @fcèex¥)JMÓûÔÃö×K;ø¶²þÚòôB_£}Îë¯>rnjxÄýîÔ]á%#‰T²\‰†ÜŠ{Y+¬r+šÓ)‹ìãØüÚXÉB1¤]9Î.+ì·Æ:˜Ã˜€%%D#Ƶ`cŒôž:¯ }úH;RIæžµ»°5’Z kùJY˜¿ñÏyÈ^è»`ÕwF2dÖ¿(©Åî>5]¸çÏ|šmöåHÇöÀD#DJ0df¦â/òÙFã\”;£ˆ1”,ÑaÊ-³yPP×þo’åÛÿÈÕ«ÒºòXÒGì}¨?Ø>,[h*yhÏÒ¸1›¢¬IñÀgÛ%瘺ZÕŸžmÕ›2¥ÀÓ¬ò.¡9>—æéoÖ¸/PnÿÎû[Aó rn/ëvNïäaïzˆk³öÃt8¹þȰmÒDŸÁæò6OÊàW<Ùî°U æR¥©7‰{ Téßkõ‡„¬ò#•6Cûù> þ²ap¿; À+bUN\ %ª 0ˆ°^ 8wD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÁÐ ‘ Æ™ Æ_ Æ% Æë å±N– 0D˜˜EÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜbÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞÞ 0ëææææ BÑÑ 0¤î D3’ D-Å 0Kòò AS=Æ 0¤V 0Dú A«>(ÈhH  Z6Times New Roman Regular»(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Óøˆ-â yG*ÐRN3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4050ÈÈÈÈÈÈÈÈ0 Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 ÛÝ ƒR^$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôŸ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àWe€say€ð ðapparentlyðð€because€the€divorce€decree€is€not€a€part€of€the€record.(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù-(|G2^$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€+¬»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôŸ”ò»»Ô d(|3Gn$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€+¬»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Gn$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€+¬»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€+¬»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼+¬»»»ÔÑ8€cPXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡î í+¬ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼+¬»îî í #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓJune€25,€2002€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XcPX»¼+¬ÔÌò òÔ#†¼+¬»XXcPò#ÔKASIEA€DELAWN€CHANCE,€òòet€al.óó€v.€CARL€DENNIS€GIBSON,€JR.Ô‡XcPX»¼+¬Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€à0 @ àJuvenile€Court€for€Sevier€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€01„M6„469€€€€€€Jeff€D.€Rader,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌFILED€AUGUST€15,€Ô_Ô2002Ô_ÔÐ ¾   Ðà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2001„02836„COA„R3„JVÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€is€a€suit€by€Kasiea€Delawn€Chance,€adult€daughter€of€Kayla€D.€Leonard,€and€Ms.€Leonard,€whoÐ xÈ  Ðjoins€in€the€prosecution€of€this€suit€against€Carl€Dennis€Gibson,€Jr.,€seeking€to€establish€his€paternityÐ d´ Ðas€to€Ms.€Chance€and€recover€support€from€the€date€of€Ms.€Chanceððs€birth,€medical€expensesÐ P  Ðincident€thereto,€and€attorney€fees.€€We€affirm€in€part;€vacate€in€part€and€remand.Ð <Œ ÐÔ#†¼+¬»XXcPu#ÔÔ‡XcPX»¼+¬ÔÌÓ¯ÓÌò òTenn.R.App.P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Juvenile€Court€Affirmed€in€Part€andÐ P ÐVacated€in€Part;€Cause€Remandedó óÐ ì< ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼+¬»àXcP«#ÔÔ‡XcPX.¼+¬ÔHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHerschel€P.€Franks€óó€andÐ Ä ÐòòCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€JJ.óó,€joined.Ð ° ÐÌScott€D.€Hall,€Sevierville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellants,€Kasiea€Delawn€Chance€and€Kayla€D.Ð ˆØ ÐLeonardÐ tÄ ÐÌKeith€E.€Haas,€Sevierville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellee,€Carl€Dennis€Gibson,€Jr.Ð L œ ÐÓ†ÓÌò òOPINIONÐ $"t! ÐÌÌó óÔ#†¼+¬»XXcPµ#ÔÓ  ÓÌÔ€XcPX»¼+¬Ôà  àAt€the€outset,€we€note€that€the€case€of€òòShell€v.€Lawóó,€935€S.W.2d€402€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996),Ð ú%J!% Ðmakes€it€clear€that€there€is€no€longer€an€almost€irrebuttable€presumption€that€a€child€born€to€aÐ æ&6"& Ðmarried€couple€is€presumed€to€be€a€product€of€their€union,€but€may€be€found„„if€the€proof€warrants„„Ð Ò'"#' Ðto€be€the€child€of€a€third€party.Ð ¾($( ÐÌà  àMr.€Gibson€attempts€to€distinguish€the€case€of€òòShell€v.€Lawóó,€on€the€ground€that€the€paternalÐ –*æ%* Ðrights€of€Ms.€Shellððs€husband€at€the€time€of€conception€and€birth,€had€been€terminated.€€We€do€notÐ ‚+Ò&+ Ðfind€that€this€fact€is€critical€to€the€holding€in€òòShellóó.€€Additionally,€we€note€an€affidavit€from€Mr.Ð n,¾', ÐChance€wherein€he€states€that€he€does€not€believe€that€he€is€the€father€of€Ms.€Chance.Ð Z-ª(-ýÿ Їà  àThe€Trial€Court€sustained€Mr.€Gibsonððs€motion€to€dismiss,€which€in€effect€was€converted€intoÐ ° Ða€motion€for€summary€judgment€upon€admission€of€certain€exhibits€at€the€hearing€below.Ð œì ÐÌà  àThe€grounds€relied€upon€by€the€Trial€Court€for€dismissing€the€Plaintiffsðð€suit€were€judicialÐ tÄ Ðestoppel€as€a€result€of€the€pleading€of€Ms.€Leonard€in€a€divorce€action€and€the€later„filed€petitionÐ `° Ðseeking€support,€as€well€as€collateral€estoppel€stemming€from€the€divorce€decree.€€Mr.€Gibson€in€hisÐ L œ Ðbrief€insists€the€Trial€Court€should€also€be€affirmed€under€the€doctrines€of€res€judicata€and€laches.€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àOur€standard€of€review€as€to€summary€judgments€is€succinctly€stated€in€òòStaples€v.€CBL€&Ð  ` ÐAssociates,€Inc.óó,€15€S.W.3d€€83,€89€Tenn.€2000):Ð ü L  ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°ÒThe€standards€governing€the€assessment€of€evidence€in€the€summary€judgmentÐ Ô$  Ðcontext€are€also€well€established.€€Courts€must€view€the€evidence€in€the€light€mostÐ À  Ðfavorable€to€the€nonmoving€party€and€must€also€draw€all€reasonable€inferences€inÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€nonmoving€partyððs€favor.€€òòSee€Robinson€v.€Omeróó,€952€S.W.2d€at€426;€òòByrd€v.Ð ˜è  ÐHallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210„11.€€Courts€should€grant€a€summary€judgment€only€whenÐ „Ô  Ðboth€the€facts€and€the€inferences€to€be€drawn€from€the€facts€permit€a€reasonableÐ pÀ Ðperson€to€reach€only€one€conclusion.€€òòSee€McCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€150,€153Ð \¬ Ð(Tenn.1995);€òòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.1995).Ð H˜ ÐÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àThe€record€discloses€that€Ms.€Leonard€and€her€then„husband,€James€Darrell€Chance,€wereÐ  p Ðdivorced€in€June€1985€and,€apparently,׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€Ms.€Leonard€was€given€full€custody€of€Ms.€Chance,€althoughÐ  \ Ðno€provision€was€made€for€child€support.€€Thereafter,€pursuant€to€a€petition€filed€by€Ms.€Leonard,Ð øH Ðan€order€was€entered€in€March€1989€which€required€Mr.€Chance€to€make€child€support€payments€forÐ ä4 ÐMs.€Chance,€which€he€honored€until€she€reached€her€majority.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€Plaintiffs€appeal€insisting€that€the€Trial€Court€improperly€received€certain€exhibits,Ð ¨ø Ðincluding€the€divorce€petition€filed€by€Mr.€Chance€and€the€petition€seeking€support€filed€by€Ms.Ð ”ä ÐLeonard,€which€had€not€been€certified€by€the€Clerk€of€the€Court€wherein€the€case€was€heard€orÐ €Ð Ðotherwise€authenticated.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThe€statement€of€the€evidence€indicates€that€no€proof€was€introduced€at€the€hearing€beforeÐ D!” Ðthe€Trial€Court,€but€that€the€aforesaid€exhibits€were€presented€and€considered€by€the€Court€over€theÐ 0"€  Ðobjection€of€the€Plaintiffsðð€counsel.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àIt€is€true€that€the€court€documents€were€not€authenticated.€€However,€under€the€facts€of€thisÐ ô$D # Ðcase€in€the€interest€of€judicial€economy,€and€the€further€fact€that€we€are€morally€certain€that€theseÐ à%0!$ Ðexhibits€are€accurate,€we€will€nevertheless€consider€them€as€did€the€Trial€Court.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àHaving€done€so€we€conclude€that€the€Trial€Court€was€not€in€error€in€dismissing€the€suit€ofÐ ¤(ô#' Ðthe€mother,€Ms.€Leonard.€€We€reach€this€conclusion€because€we€are€satisfied€that€she€is€judiciallyÐ )à$( Ðestopped,€in€light€of€her€pleadings€in€the€petition€seeking€support,€to€contend€that€Mr.€Gibson€is€theÐ ° Ðfather€of€the€child.€€The€case€of€òòShell€v.€Lawóó,€935€S.W.2d€402€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996),€states€theÐ œì Ðdoctrine€as€follows€(at€page€408):Ð ˆØ ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Òà Ø àThe€question€regarding€estoppel€requires€a€more€careful€examination.€TheÐ `° Ðdoctrine€of€judicial€estoppel€is€generally€stated€as€follows:Ð L œ ÐÒè€ÒÒè€ÒÌ€€€The€doctrine€of€judicial€estoppel€provides€a€litigant€who€hasÐ $ t Ðdeliberately€taken€a€position€in€one€judicial€proceeding€will€not,€as€aÐ  ` Ðmatter€of€law,€be€allowed€to€advantage€his€or€herself€by€taking€anÐ ü L  Ðinconsistent€position€in€another€suit.€In€òòMelton€v.€Andersonóó,€32€Tenn.Ð è 8  ÐApp.€335,€222€S.W.2d€666€(Tenn.€App.€1948)€this€court€said,€at€669:€€Ð Ô$  ÐÌÒP èÒÒP èÒA€general€statement€of€the€doctrine€of€judicial€estoppel€is€thatÐ ¬ü  Ðwhere€one€states€on€oath€in€former€litigation,€either€in€aÐ ˜è  Ðpleading€or€in€a€deposition€or€on€oral€testimony,€a€given€fact€asÐ „Ô  Ðtrue,€he€will€not€be€permitted€to€deny€that€fact€in€subsequentÐ pÀ Ðlitigation,€although€the€parties€may€not€be€the€same.€(CitationsÐ \¬ Ðomitted.)€€Ð H˜ ÐÌÒ€P ÒÒ€P ÒòòExtine€v.€TRW€Koyo€Steering€Systems€Coóó,€1994€WL€589557€UnpublishedÐ  p Ðopinion€Tenn.€App.€1994.€€Ð  \ ÐÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àIn€reaching€our€conclusion,€we€are€aware€that€in€€òòShellóó€we€found€under€similar€circumstancesÐ ä4 Ðthe€doctrine€did€not€apply.€€The€reason€we€reached€that€conclusion€is€because,€contrary€to€the€factsÐ Ð  Ðof€this€case,€it€was€shown€that€at€the€time€of€the€pleadings€filed€by€the€wife€in€that€case€she€believedÐ ¼  Ðher€husband€was€indeed€the€father€of€the€child€and€did€not€attempt€to€ð ðadvantageðð€herself.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àThe€present€case,€as€already€noted,€is€different€in€that€the€affidavit€of€Ms.€Leonard€shows€thatÐ €Ð Ðshe€believed€at€the€time€she€filed€the€pleadings€in€question€that€her€husband€was€not€the€father€of€theÐ l¼ Ðchild€but,€rather,€Mr.€Gibson€was.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àThe€assertions€of€collateral€estoppel€and€res€judicata€may€be€disposed€of€summarily.€€BothÐ 0"€  Ðof€these€doctrines€require€a€suit€between€the€same€parties€or€their€privities€which€is€not€present€in€theÐ #l! Ðcase€at€bar.€€òòState€ex€rel.€Cihlar€v.€Crawfordóó,€39€S.W.3d€172€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€€2000).€€Ð $X" ÐÌà  àAlthough€the€Trial€Court€found€that€Ms.€Chance€was€in€privity€with€Ms.€Leonard€insofar€asÐ à%0!$ Ðits€findings€regarding€collateral€estoppel,€we€will€assume€for€the€purpose€of€this€opinion€it€meant€toÐ Ì&"% Ðlikewise€find€privity€as€to€the€doctrine€of€judicial€estoppel.€€Our€research€has€disclosed€that€privityÐ ¸'#& Ðis€frequently€applied€in€cases€involving€res€judicata€and€collateral€estoppel,€but€we€have€found€noneÐ ¤(ô#' Ðto€suggest€it€would€apply€in€a€case€of€judicial€estoppel€where€one€party€has€pleaded€a€factÐ )à$( Ðâ âdiametrically€opposed€to€that€later€attempted€to€be€asserted.€€We€do€not€believe€it€appropriate€toÐ |*Ì%) Ðextend€that€doctrine€to€a€case€of€this€nature€wherein€Ms.€Chance€was€not€the€party€pleading€the€factsÐ ° Ðattempted€to€be€refuted€and€was€a€minor€at€the€time€the€pleadings€were€filed.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àAs€to€the€assertion€by€Mr.€Gibson€that€Ms.€Chance€was€barred€by€laches,€we€do€not€believeÐ tÄ Ðminors,€who€are€not€able€to€bring€lawsuits€in€their€own€names,€could€be€bound€by€this€doctrine.Ð `° ÐÌà  àIn€our€resolution€of€this€appeal,€we€have€not€overlooked€the€Trial€Courtððs€concern€that€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðchild€would€have€two€legal€fathers€should€the€case€proceed€and€DNA€prove€that€Mr.€Gibson€is€in€factÐ $ t Ðthe€father.€€While€we€concede€this€as€a€rather€anomalous€situation,€we€note€where€an€adoptionÐ  ` Ðoccurs,€the€adopting€father€is€father€by€virtue€of€the€adoption,€while€the€biological€father€is€in€factÐ ü L  Ðalso€the€father.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àFinally€as€to€Mr.€Gibsonððs€argument€suggesting€that€when€a€minor€child€recovers€a€judgmentÐ À  Ðfor€injuries€received€in€a€tort€action,€the€suit€may€not€be€re„opened€after€the€child€becomes€an€adult.€Ð ¬ü  ÐThe€fallacy€of€applying€this€analogy€is€that€in€the€tort€action€above€referenced,€the€child€was€a€partyÐ ˜è  Ðto€the€action,€and€in€the€case€at€bar€Ms.€Chance€was€not€a€party€to€the€divorce€proceedings€nor€theÐ „Ô  Ðpetition€seeking€support.€€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àIn€summary,€we€hold€that€Ms.€Leonardððs€suit€must€be€dismissed€under€the€doctrine€of€judicialÐ H˜ Ðestoppel,€but€the€suit€of€the€daughter,€Ms.€Chance,€may€proceed.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àFor€the€foregoing€reasons€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€affirmed€in€part€and€vacated€inÐ  \ Ðpart€and€the€cause€remanded€for€administration€of€blood€tests€to€determine€whether€Mr.€Gibson€isÐ øH Ðthe€father€of€Kasiea€Delawn€Chance.€€If€he€is€found€to€be€the€father,€the€Trial€Court€shall€then€makeÐ ä4 Ða€determination€as€to€what€monies,€if€any,€should€be€paid€by€Mr.€Gibson€as€child€support,€medicalÐ Ð  Ðexpenses€€incident€to€birth,€attorney€fees,€and€an€appropriate€disposition€of€any€amount€found€to€beÐ ¼  Ðowing,€which€should€include€a€consideration€of€the€payments€made€by€Mr.€Chance€for€Ms.€ChanceððsÐ ¨ø Ðsupport€and€whether€Mr.€Chance€should€be€reimbursed€for€payments€he€has€made.€€Costs€of€appealÐ ”ä Ðare€adjudged€one„half€against€Kayla€D.€Leonard€and€her€surety€and€one„half€against€Carl€DennisÐ €Ð ÐGibson,€Jr.Ð l¼ ÐÌÌòòóóÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________Ð #l! Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àHOUSTON€M.€GODDARD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÐ $X" ÐÌ