ÿWPC' 4Œ'Çÿùƒ…)× U?Õ"ŽS¸+ê²@ƒ´ÜþÒ²,™S˜ZèøžjVúüžÃ•'L "¿Ç±éŒ£5˜j %f96%x7¹7·$üúÎ΋¾éƒ`”ª‰zðÖH?À­÷Ôv6.«š*n¹=ëÍ>ÑI°mPÏTÿ؉Ki `8^¦û®ú&;Gž©Ñ qUÑGj$¸û/ƒ@¢Åö­̧wcÒôΖ®ÇpŽ*鯵rðŒ§=é—Å[úáS°ÅIþÑuÚô¬fö„s⶘Æ!p‰élûöæ½ÀvÓƒõDJ¯¦,‹“Æ9°¶Z¤°[ÎðîðäY"‡N Ûð*›¸5Û½=¾Yš«‘[õ k¬ŽaK’)¬ÍÎ1pæÄ½Š„äls.^ð¥(åÅ&iÍUÙ¹´4€&ö"ÈÞH0Æü§¹µ3aE¼1ñÄHž-:G30=eä´{¶§’¤K¡4ÖŸ‡tðµójй´ÅÝ£ày€ÎÞÒÅ3ýÓ@U*Œ³³(ýjïW_¶-·¤s,½W€$Åäa<³ƒDwÊ´ÇÐj8À©W ¹\›ø†Ð ,ƒEé#âãÇÄ©ÝÝ?žU¼†SkógÃgóŠêkªX‹º¾ï)# >UNI %— 0(w@Å4( 0l0 0DœUNàF.t1‡ Ƹ,~(ªU:Ò( U:44444444444 AQn B¿ 0DÜ 0D  0Ddd D/¨¨ B× D3ô˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ K L MN£OPDQRÓ€^an~<$3|xa((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman Regular <Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝBrandonððs€principal€place€of€business€was€previously€located€in€Wisconsin.€€BrandonÐ ° Ðapparently€did€not€move€its€headquarters€to€Illinois,€however,€until€after€it€entered€into€theÏagreement€out€of€which€Chaseððs€claim€arises. Ý ƒ üÝÿÝà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝOn€the€face€of€the€contract,€it€appears€to€be€an€agreement€between€Brandon€and€an€entityÐ ° Ðknown€as€Walnut€Grove,€Inc.€(Walnut€Grove).€€From€our€review€of€the€record,€we€are€unable€toÏdetermine€why€the€contract€was€signed€by€Walnut€Grove€rather€than€River€Heights.€€ThisÏinformation€appears€to€be€irrelevant€for€purposes€of€this€appeal,€however,€as€neither€partyÏdisputes€the€existence€of€an€agreement€between€Brandon€and€River€Heights. 'Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€support€of€its€motion€to€dismiss,€Brandon€filed€with€the€trial€court€the€affidavit€ofÐ ° ÐBradley€A.€Keywell.€€Rule€12.03€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€requires€as€follows:ÌÌà8  àIf,€on€a€motion€[to€dismiss],€matters€outside€the€pleadings€are€presented€to€and€notÏexcluded€by€the€court,€the€motion€shall€be€treated€as€one€for€summary€judgmentÏand€disposed€of€as€provided€in€Rule€56,€and€all€parties€shall€be€given€reasonableÏopportunity€to€present€all€material€made€pertinent€to€such€a€motion€by€Rule€56.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÌThis€general€rule€is€inapplicable,€however,€when€the€motion€is€one€involving€jurisdictionalÏissues.€€òòò òSee€Nicholstone€Book€Bindery,€Inc.€v.€Chelsea€House€Publishersóóó ó,€621€S.W.2d€560,€561Ð `  Ðn.1€(Tenn.€1981)€(finding€that€the€trial€court€committed€harmless€error€in€treating€the€defendantððsÏmotion€to€dismiss€for€lack€of€personal€jurisdiction€as€one€for€summary€judgment).€€Thus,Ïalthough€we€recognize€that€the€trial€court€in€the€instant€case€had€before€it€matters€that€wereÏoutside€the€pleadings,€we€nevertheless€conclude€that€the€trial€judge€acted€properly€in€treatingÏBrandonððs€motion€as€a€motion€to€dismiss€rather€than€a€motion€for€summary€judgment.ƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 "Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝThere€are€two€types€of€personal€jurisdiction,€general€and€specific.€€òòò òSee€Shoneyððsóóó ó,€922Ð ° ÐS.W.2d€at€537.€€General€jurisdiction€refers€to€actions€that€are€not€related€to€the€defendantððsÏcontacts€with€the€forum€state€while€specific€jurisdiction€refers€to€actions€that€arise€out€of€or€relateÏto€these€contacts.€€ò òòòSee€id.€€óóó óThe€Supreme€Court€cases€following€òòò òInternational€Shoeóóó ó€have€appliedÐ €Ð Ðthe€ð ðminimum€contactsðð€test€in€a€more€conservative€manner€when€the€issue€was€one€of€generalÏjurisdiction.€€Unlike€the€cases€involving€questions€of€specific€jurisdiction,€these€cases€hold€that€aÏcourt€cannot€exercise€general€jurisdiction€over€a€non„resident€defendant€unless€the€defendantððsÏcontacts€with€the€forum€state€are€ð ðcontinuous€and€systematic.ðð€€òòò òSee€Helicopterosóóó ó,€466€U.S.€atÐ @  Ð415„16€(citing€ò òòòPerkins€v.€Benguet€Consol.€Mining€Co.óóó ó,€342€U.S.€437,€438,€445€(1952)). Ý ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X¥XXXÔÔ€:XX¥ÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X¥X:ÔÐ  ÐÌò òDecember€9,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôõ‰ôXX¥ÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular Ý ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X ÊXXXÔÔ€|:XX ÊÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X ÊX|:ÔÐ  ÐÌò òDecember€7,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôs¿ôXX ÊÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular!"#%Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ d(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'''÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd 'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝñRñ›ñRñÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓ'°,X°À”X°œX'Óò òñ^ññRñßr€(<,(j 8` `€€@Eȱ` ttx$°ð ÕrßñRññ^ññaññ^ñßr€(<,(j 8` `€€@Eȱ` ttx$°ð Õrßñ^ññRñ›ñRñ›ñaññañßt€(>.*jx*e` `€€@Eò` ttx$*°‚ 9 tß›ñañà@O O ìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE,€ˆÐ ° Ðà@kk%ìàAT€JACKSONó óˆÐ œì ÐÌà@. . ìà_______________________________________________________ˆÌÌà À à)Ìò òCHASE€CAVETT€SERVICES,€INC.ó ó,à À à)à  àShelby€County€Chancery€CourtÐ 8 ˆ Ðà À à)à  àNo.€107615„2Ð ( x Ѐ€€€€Plaintiff/Appellant.à À à)Ð  d Ðà À à)ÌVS.à À à)à  àC.A.€No.€02A01„9803„CH„00055Ð ì <  Ðà À à)Ìò òBRANDON€APPAREL€GROUP,€INC.ó ó,à À à)Ð Ä  Ðà À à)Ì€€€€€Defendant/Appellee.à À à)Ð  ð  Ðà À à)Ì______________________________________________________________________________ÌÌFrom€the€Chancery€Court€of€Shelby€County€at€Memphis.Ìò òHonorable€Floyd€Peete,€Jr.,€Chancellor€ó óÐ <Œ ÐÌÌÌò òDonald€E.€Bourlandó ó,Ð ì< Ðò òKenneth€P.€Jonesó ó,Ð Ü, ÐBOURLAND,€HEFLIN,€ALVAREZ€&€MINOR,€PLC,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€Plaintiff/Appellant.ÌÌÌò òLeo€Bearman,€Jr.ó ó,€Ð |Ì ÐBAKER,€DONELSON,€BEARMAN€&€CALDWELL,€P.C.,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Defendant/Appellee.ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:ÌÌò òREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDó óÐ à&0"% ÐÌÌà À àò òFARMER,€J.ó óÐ ¤)ô$( ÐÌò òCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ó ó:€(Concurs)Ð |+Ì&* Ðò òHIGHERS,€J.ó ó:€œ(Concurs)Ð l,¼'+ ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ 0;€6; ЛñJññIñÓ3°,X°` À”X°,X°À”X3ÓñIññJññKññJñÓ6°,X°` ¸ À”X°,X°À”X6ÓñJññKññLññKñÓ6°,X°` ‚XÀ”X°,X°À”X6ÓñKññLññLñÓ0°,X°` ˜X°,X°À”X0ÓñLññMñÓÓñMññNñÓ  ÓœñNññOñÔ‡ XE³XXXÔà ` àPlaintiff€Chase€Cavett€Services,€Inc.€(Chase)€appeals€an€order€of€the€chancery€courtÐ ° Ðgranting€a€motion€to€dismiss€for€lack€of€personal€jurisdiction€filed€by€Defendant€Brandon€ApparelÏGroup,€Inc.€(Brandon).€€Because€we€find€that€the€chancery€court€may€exercise€personal€jurisdictionÏover€Brandon,€we€reverse€the€ruling€of€the€chancellor.ÌÌà ` àChase€is€a€Tennessee€corporation€with€its€principal€place€of€business€in€Tennessee.€ÏChase€operates€as€a€ð ðfactor,ðð€meaning€that€it€purchases€invoices€from€other€businesses€at€a€discountÏand€subsequently€attempts€to€collect€the€amounts€due€under€those€invoices.€€Brandon,€a€DelawareÏcorporation€with€its€principal€place€of€business€in€Illinois,׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€manufactures€and€distributes€sportswearÐ ° Ðthroughout€the€United€States€using€ð ðmass€merchandisers.ðð€€As€part€of€its€manufacturing€process,ÏBrandon€ships€raw€fabric€to€subcontractors€to€be€sewn€according€to€Brandonððs€specifications.€€ÌÌà ` àIn€November€of€1994,€Brandon€entered€into€a€contract€with€River€Heights,€Inc.€(RiverÏHeights),€a€subcontractor€located€in€Tennessee.׃ T×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Under€the€contract,€River€Heights€agreed€to€provideÐ ` Ðsewing€services€at€its€plant€in€Tennessee€using€raw€fabric€provided€by€Brandon€and€then€ship€theÏfinished€product€back€to€Brandon.€€After€River€Heights€performed€these€services,€Chase€purchasedÏfrom€River€Heights€certain€invoices€representing€amounts€due€to€River€Heights€under€its€contractÏwith€Brandon.€€Brandon€was€then€notified€of€this€purchase€and€began€making€payments€to€Chase€atÏits€office€in€Tennessee.ÌÌà ` àOn€June€5,€1996,€Chase€filed€an€action€against€Brandon€in€a€Tennessee€state€court,Ïalleging€that€Brandon€has€failed€to€make€payments€with€respect€to€five€of€the€outstanding€invoices.€ÏOn€September€30,€1996,€Brandon€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€Chaseððs€claim€for€lack€of€personalÏjurisdiction.€€The€chancellor€entered€an€order€on€February€10,€1998€granting€Brandonððs€motion€toÏdismiss€and€Chase€appealed.€Ð °1-0 Їà ` àThe€sole€issue€on€appeal€is€whether€the€chancellor€erred€in€granting€Brandonððs€motionÏto€dismiss€Chaseððs€claim€for€lack€of€personal€jurisdiction.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€When€considering€a€motion€to€dismiss,Ð à Ðthe€trial€court€will€give€a€liberal€construction€to€the€plaintiffððs€complaint€and€will€assume€that€theÏaverments€contained€in€the€complaint€are€true.€€ò òòòSee€Lewis€v.€Allenóóó ó,€698€S.W.2d€58,€59€(Tenn.€1985);Ð P   Ðò òòòHolloway€v.€Putnam€Countyóóó ó,€534€S.W.2d€292,€296€(Tenn.€1976).€€The€trial€court€is€not€required€toÐ 0 € Ðmake€findings€of€fact€but€must€only€determine€whether€the€plaintiffððs€complaint€has€alleged€factsÏsufficient€to€survive€the€motion€to€dismiss.€€ò òòòSee€S€&€S€Screw€Mach.€Co.€v.€Cosa€Corp.óóó ó,€647€F.€Supp.Ð ð@  Ð600,€605€(M.D.€Tenn.€1986).€€Because€the€issue€presented€on€appeal€is€a€question€of€law,€our€reviewÏof€the€chancellorððs€ruling€is€ò òòòde€novoóóó ó€with€no€presumption€of€correctness.€€ò òòòSee€Lucius€v.€City€ofÐ ° ÐMemphisóóó ó,€925€S.W.2d€522,€524€(Tenn.€1996);€€T.R.A.P.€13(d).€Ð à ÐÌà ` àThe€power€of€a€court€to€assert€personal€jurisdiction€over€a€defendant€is€limited€by€theÏDue€Process€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution.€€ò òòòSee€PennoyerÐ 0€ Ðv.€Neffóóó ó,€95€U.S.€714,€733„34€(1877),€òòò òoverruled€in€part€on€other€grounds€by€Shaffer€v.€Heitneró óóó,€433Ð ` ÐU.S.€186,€206€(1977).€€It€is€well€established€that€due€process€is€not€offended€by€the€exercise€ofÏpersonal€jurisdiction€over€a€defendant€who€is€served€with€process€while€physically€present€in€theÏforum€state,€ò òòòsee,€e.g.,€Burnham€v.€Superior€Courtóóó ó,€495€U.S.€604,€619€(1990),€a€defendant€who€isÐ °"  Ðdomiciled€in€the€forum€state,€ò òòòsee,€e.g.,€Milliken€v.€Meyeróóó ó,€311€U.S.€457,€462€(1940),€or€a€defendantÐ $à" Ðwho€consents€to€being€sued€in€the€forum€state.€€ò òòòSee,€e.g.,€Shaffer,€óóó ó433€U.S.€at€197.€€Absent€one€ofÐ p&À!$ Ðthese€bases€of€jurisdiction,€however,€it€is€also€constitutionally€permissible€to€exercise€what€is€knownÏas€long€arm€jurisdiction€if€there€are€ð ðminimum€contactsðð€between€the€defendant€and€the€forum€state.€Ð 0*€%( Ðò òòòSee€International€Shoe€Co.€v.€Washingtonóóó ó,€326€U.S.€310,€316€(1945).€€Ð ° Ðòòò òÌà ` àóóó óIn€ò òòòInternational€Shoe€Co.€v.€Washingtonóóó ó,€326€U.S.€310€(1945),€the€Supreme€CourtÐ pÀ Ðset€forth€the€standard€for€determining€whether€a€court€may€exercise€long€arm€jurisdiction€over€a€non„¼resident€defendant,€stating€that€this€type€of€jurisdiction€is€appropriate€when€the€defendant€hasÏð ðminimum€contacts€with€[the€forum€state]€such€that€the€maintenance€of€the€suit€does€not€offendÏððtraditional€notions€of€fair€play€and€substantial€justice.ðððð€€ò òòòId.€óóó óat€316€(quoting€òòò òMillikenóóó ó,€311€U.S.€atÐ ð@  Ð463).€€Although€the€Court€did€not€define€the€phrase€ð ðminimum€contacts,ðð€it€did€indicate€that,€in€someÏcases,€a€single€contact€with€the€forum€state€could€support€a€finding€of€jurisdiction.€€ò òòòSee€id.€óóó óat€318.€Ð ° ÐIt€also€suggested,€however,€that€ð ðirregularðð€or€ð ðcasualðð€contacts€with€the€forum€state€are€insufficientÏto€serve€as€the€basis€of€jurisdiction.€€ò òòòSee€id.€ó óóóat€320.€€The€Court€stated€that€the€focus€of€the€ð ðminimumÐ pÀ Ðcontactsðð€inquiry€should€be€the€ð ðquality€and€nature€of€the€activity€in€relation€to€the€fair€and€orderlyÏadministration€of€the€laws€which€it€was€the€purpose€of€the€due€process€clause€to€insure.ðð€€ò òòòId.€óóó óat€319.€Ð 0€ ÐIn€determining€that€a€Delaware€shoe€manufacturer€was€amenable€to€suit€in€the€state€of€Washington,Ïthe€Court€offered€the€following€rationale:ÌÌÓÓà8 ` à[T]o€the€extent€that€a€corporation€exercises€the€privilege€ofÏconducting€activities€within€a€state,€it€enjoys€the€benefits€andÏprotection€of€the€laws€of€that€state.€€The€exercise€of€that€privilege€mayÏgive€rise€to€obligations;€and,€so€far€as€those€obligations€arise€out€of€orÏare€connected€with€the€activities€within€the€state,€a€procedure€whichÏrequires€the€corporation€to€respond€to€a€suit€brought€to€enforce€themÏcan,€in€most€instances,€hardly€be€said€to€be€undue.Ð ` x` x ÐÌÌÌÓ¯"Óòòò òId.óóó óÐ ,`'* ÐÌà ` àThe€proper€application€of€the€ð ðminimum€contactsðð€test€has€been€further€explained€inÏa€number€of€Supreme€Court€cases€following€ò òòòInternational€Shoeóóó ó.€€In€ò òòòMcGee€v.€International€LifeÐ °1-0 ÐIns.€Co.ó óóó,€355€U.S.€220€(1957),€the€Court€upheld€the€exercise€of€long€arm€jurisdiction€by€a€CaliforniaÐ 3à.2 Ðcourt€over€a€Texas€corporation€whose€only€contact€with€the€state€of€California€was€that€it€sold€aÏsingle€insurance€policy€to€a€California€resident.€€òòò òSee€id.€ó óóóat€223.€€In€concluding€that€the€ð ðminimumÐ P7 26 Ðcontactsðð€standard€had€been€satisfied,€the€Court€stated:€ð ðIt€is€sufficient€for€purposes€of€due€processÏthat€the€suit€was€based€on€a€contract€which€had€substantial€connection€with€[the€forum€state].ðð€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€Ð ;`6: ÐIn€òòò òHanson€v.€Dencklaó óóó,€357€U.S.€235€(1958),€the€Court€focused€on€the€ð ðquality€and€natureðð€of€theÐ ° Ðcontacts,€holding€that€the€trial€court€lacked€personal€jurisdiction€because€the€non„resident€defendantÏdid€not€ð ðpurposefully€avail[€]€itself€of€the€privilege€of€conducting€activities€within€the€forum€State,Ïthus€invoking€the€benefits€and€protections€of€its€laws.ðð€€ò òòòId.€óóó óat€253.€Ð P   ÐÌà ` àIn€addition€to€asking€whether€the€non„resident€defendant€has€ð ðminimum€contactsððÏwith€the€forum€state,€a€court€must€also€consider€those€contacts€in€light€of€other€factors€and€determineÏif€the€assertion€of€personal€jurisdiction€comports€with€ð ðtraditional€notions€of€fair€play€and€substantialÏjustice.ðð€€òòò òInternational€Shoeóóó ó,€326€U.S.€at€316.€€Such€factors€include€(1)€the€burden€on€the€defendant,Ð ° Ð(2)€the€forum€stateððs€interest€in€adjudicating€the€dispute,€(3)€the€plaintiffððs€interest€in€obtainingÏconvenient€and€effective€relief,€(4)€the€judicial€systemððs€interest€in€obtaining€the€most€efficientÏresolution€of€controversies,€and€(5)€the€shared€interest€of€the€several€States€in€furthering€fundamentalÏsubstantive€social€policies.€€ò òòòSee€World„Wide€Volkswagen€Corp.€v.€Woodsonó óóó,€444€U.S.€286,€292Ð 0€ Ð(1980).€€In€ò òòòAsahi€Metal€Indus.€Co.,€Ltd.€v.€Superior€Courtó óóó,€480€U.S.€102€(1987),€the€CourtÐ ` Ðconsidered€these€five€factors€and€held€that,€even€if€the€ð ðminimum€contactsðð€inquiry€was€satisfied,Ïthe€assertion€of€personal€jurisdiction€by€the€California€court€over€the€Japanese€defendant€would€beÏunreasonable.€€òòò òSee€id.€óóó óat€114.Ð °"  ÐÌà ` àIn€Tennessee,€jurisdiction€over€a€non„resident€defendant€is€conferred€by€a€long€armÏstatute€which€provides€in€pertinent€part€as€follows:ÌÓÓÌà8 ` à(a)€Persons€who€are€nonresidents€of€Tennessee€and€residents€ofÏTennessee€who€are€outside€the€state€and€cannot€be€personally€servedÏwith€process€within€the€state€are€subject€to€the€jurisdiction€of€theÏcourts€of€this€state€as€to€any€action€or€claim€for€relief€arising€from:Ð ` x` x ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ à(1)€The€transaction€of€any€business€within€the€state;Ð ` x` x Ðà ` àà ¸ à.€.€.€.Ìà8 ` àà ¸ à(5)€Entering€into€a€contract€for€services€to€be€rendered€or€forÏmaterials€to€be€furnished€in€this€state;Ð ` x` x Ðà8 ` àà ¸ à(6)€Any€basis€not€inconsistent€with€the€constitution€of€thisÏstate€or€of€the€United€States;Ð ` x` x ÐÌÌÌÓ—/ÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€20„2„214(a)€(1994).€€Tennesseeððs€long€arm€statute€was€intended€to€reach€to€theÏfull€extent€of€due€process€and€thus€should€be€given€a€liberal€construction.€€òòò òSee,€e.g.,€Masada€Inv.Ð  :p59 ÐCorp.€v.€Allenó óóó,€697€S.W.2d€332,€334€(Tenn.€1985).Ð  #ÔñOñ›