ÿWPCÕ X# àUNë %9 0N?b 0Ù•w@n4®ÂÑ mÓ 0Dê. 0JH 0T’æ†î 0^t 0hÒ 0r: 0|¬ 0†( 0® 1u> 0d³ AQÆh 0D. 0@r 0D² D/ö B% D3BU>uB)³DCÜ AMU*lJ–“àôsv~gvÓå B¸˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ'í€"  Z 6Times New Roman Regular¼(&öy$¡¡Ó  ÓÙñÓ Ù- ù-(‰(2Iù$¤¤Ý ƒöy!ÝÓ  ÓÙñÓ ÙÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€X‘X¼¼ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó gEhiEjkDlemn+oÓ€yzƒ=#( 3|xyÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó Cooner2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ôstephens v. cooner - concurring opinion (todd) Í8 ' IB011C20IB011C2 .   2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdWWWW'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d....7Border 1dd!#/Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial @Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€-ÔÔ€-¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€1ÔÔ€1ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€1XÔÌÌOctober€10,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó ‰Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€-ÔÔ€-¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€-XÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(b)(3)€permits€this€court€to€consider€issues€not€presented€forÏreview€in€order€to€prevent€prejudice€to€the€judicial€process.Ì êÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€-ÔÔ€-¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€-XÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€R.€App.€P.€36(b)€permits€this€court€to€grant€relief€from€final€judgments€forÏerrors€when€an€ð ðerror€involving€a€substantial€right€more€probably€than€not€affected€theÏjudgment€or€would€result€in€prejudice€to€the€judicial€process.ððÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò dÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€-ÔÔ€-¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ „ ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€V¦¼¼ddÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€-„Ô›Þ ÞÌÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEó óÌÌÌÔ€-¼ÔÌPAULA€RENEE€STEPHENS€COONER,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€CircuitÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€83D„265ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01A01„9701„CV„00021̜ـ!ÙßR€02/A1-j| ` ç `€€@ÿRß›GARY€KENT€COONER,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà àà à)ÌÌÌÓ€ÓÔ€-„Ôà@ àœò òòòDISSENTING›€OPINIONóóó óÌÔ€-¼ÔÌà àThis€appeal€involves€a€conviction€for€criminal€contempt€arising€from€aÏdispute€over€the€custody€of€an€adolescent€child.€€After€the€Fourth€CircuitÏCourt€for€Davidson€County€found€the€mother€in€willful€criminal€contempt€forÏdepriving€the€father€of€the€lawful€custody€of€the€child,€the€mother€perfectedÏthis€appeal€challenging€the€adequacy€of€the€notice€of€the€contempt€proceedingÏand€the€evidentiary€foundation€for€the€contempt€petition.ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àPaula€Renee€Stephens€and€Gary€Kent€Cooner€were€divorced€in€AugustÏ1983€in€the€Fourth€Circuit€Court€for€Davidson€County.€€Ms.€Stephens€receivedÏcustody€of€their€2ðð„year„old€son,€and€Mr.€Cooner€was€granted€visitation€andÏordered€to€pay€child€support.€€Ms.€Stephens€subsequently€remarried€and€overÍthe€next€ten€years€returned€to€court€on€several€occasions€to€obtain€orders€toÏrequire€Mr.€Cooner€to€honor€his€child€support€obligation.ÌÌà àFor€reasons€not€apparent€in€this€record,€the€parties€transferred€physicalÏpossession€of€their€son€from€Ms.€Stephens€to€Mr.€Cooner€in€November€1993.€ÏThey€informed€the€trial€court€of€this€development€during€a€December€1993Ïhearing€on€Ms.€Stephensððs€petition€to€hold€Mr.€Cooner€in€contempt€for€notÏpaying€child€support.€€In€a€February€1,€1994€order,€the€trial€court€noted€thatÌÓÓà8 àà8 àthis€present€agreement€is€made€with€theÏunderstanding€that€the€parties€transferred€physicalÏpossession€of€the€minor€child€to€the€Respondent€onÏNovember€8,€1993,€and€will€be€filing€an€OrderÏchanging€custody€of€the€minor€child€and€setting€anÏamount€of€current€support€for€[sic]€and€after€thatÏdate.€€In€the€event€the€parties€are€not€able€to€agreeÏupon€an€amount€of€current€support,€or€payment€byÏthe€Respondent€on€these€Ô_ÔarrearagesÔ_Ô,€the€parties€willÏfile€a€motion€to€have€the€matter€set€for€furtherÏhearing€on€these€issues.ÌÌÓ€ÓNo€order€was€ever€entered€formally€changing€custody€from€Ms.€Stephens€toÏMr.€Cooner.€€ÌÌà àMr.€Cooner€filed€a€motion€to€set€child€support€after€the€parties€couldÏnot€agree€on€the€amount€of€child€support€Ms.€Stephens€should€pay.€€The€trialÏcourt€entered€an€order€on€June€6,€1994€directing€Ms.€Stephens€to€begin€payingÏchild€support€but€offsetting€Mr.€Coonerððs€arrearage€against€her€obligation.€€InÏthis€order,€the€trial€court€specifically€found€that€ð ðthe€child€.€.€.€is€now€in€theÏcustody€of€Gary€Kent€Cooner.ðð€€ÌÌà àThe€partiesðð€son€apparently€grew€unhappy€about€living€with€Mr.ÏCooner,€and€complained€to€Ms.€Stephens€that€Mr.€Cooner€was€absent€from€theÍhome€a€great€deal€of€the€time€and€that€he€was€being€supervised€by€Mr.ÏCoonerððs€live„in€girlfriend.€€He€also€had€other€complaints€about€Mr.€CoonerððsÏuse€of€drugs€and€possession€of€intimate€pictures€of€himself€and€his€girlfriends.€ÏThe€child€finally€told€his€mother€during€their€scheduled€visitation€over€theÏ1996€Labor€Day€holiday€that€he€wanted€to€move€back€in€with€her.€€EvenÏthough€Mr.€Cooner€was€apparently€out€of€town€at€the€time,€Ms.€StephensÏaccompanied€her€son€to€Mr.€Coonerððs€house€and€helped€him€remove€hisÏclothing€and€furnishings€in€his€room.€€While€in€the€house,€the€boy€showed€Ms.ÏStephens€drug€paraphernalia€and€intimate€pictures€that€he€had€taken€from€Mr.ÏCoonerððs€room.ÌÌà àWhen€he€returned€home,€Mr.€Cooner€discovered€that€his€son€was€gone.€ÏHe€apparently€telephoned€Ms.€Stephens€and€discovered€that€the€boy€was€withÏher.€€When€they€met€later€to€discuss€the€situation,€Ms.€Stephens€informed€Mr.ÏCooner€of€their€sonððs€desire€to€move€back€in€with€her,€and€Mr.€Cooner€repliedÏthat€they€should€think€about€it€for€several€weeks.€€On€September€6,€1996,€Mr.ÏCooner€filed€a€petition€seeking€to€hold€Ms.€Stephens€in€civil€and€criminalÏcontempt€and€also€obtained€an€ex€parte€temporary€restraining€order€to€preventÏMs.€Stephens€from€continuing€to€deprive€him€of€custody€of€his€son.€€While€theÏrecord€does€not€show€when€she€received€notice€of€the€temporary€restrainingÏorder,€Ms.€Stephens€returned€the€child€and€all€his€possessions€to€Mr.€CoonerÏon€September€7,€1996.ÌÌà àMs.€Stephens€filed€an€answer€to€Mr.€Coonerððs€petition€for€contemptÏadmitting€that€Mr.€Cooner€had€custody€of€the€child€but€denying€that€she€was€inÏcontempt€for€assisting€her€son€move€out€of€Mr.€Coonerððs€house.€€She€alsoÏrequested€that€custody€be€changed€from€Mr.€Cooner€to€her.ÌÌà àThe€record€contains€no€indication€that€the€notice€requirements€of€Tenn.ÏÔ_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€R.€42(b)€were€ever€satisfied€or€that€Mr.€Cooner€was€ever€requiredÏto€elect€whether€to€proceed€first€with€his€criminal€contempt€charge€or€his€civilÏcontempt€charge.€€The€transcript€of€the€October€31,€1996€hearing,€likewise,Ïcontains€no€indication€that€the€parties€understood€from€the€outset€the€preciseÏnature€and€purpose€of€the€hearing.€€Accordingly,€the€only€reasonableÏconclusion€to€be€drawn€from€this€record€is€that€both€the€criminal€and€the€civilÏcontempt€allegations€were€before€the€court€simultaneously.ÌÌà àVery€little€evidence€was€actually€taken€during€the€October€31,€1996Ïhearing.€€Ms.€Stephens€was€the€only€witness.€€She€admitted€that€she€hadÏentered€Mr.€Coonerððs€house€with€her€son€and€that€she€had€helped€her€sonÏremove€his€clothes€and€other€belongings.€€She€also€explained€that€she€ð ðdidnððtÏfeel€it€was€going€to€be€a€problemðð€because€she€believed€that€Mr.€Cooner€wouldÏhonor€their€sonððs€desire€to€move€ð ðparticularly€given€the€incriminating€thingsÏthat€were€found€there.ðð€€She€also€stated€that€she€returned€the€child€to€Mr.ÏCooner€when€she€received€the€temporary€restraining€order.€€The€trial€courtÏfound€Ms.€Stephens€to€be€ð ðin€willful€criminal€contempt€of€the€Orders€of€thisÏCourtðð€and€sentenced€her€to€one€night€in€jail.€€The€trial€court€explained€ð ðherÏactions€are€absolutely€shocking€to€this€Court.€€Anybody€that€would€go€into€aÏmanððs€house€and€take€his€furniture€out€ð!ð€I€mean,€itððs€a€wonder€they€didnððt€getÏcharged€criminally.€€I€cannot€allow€that.ððÌÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌÌà àThe€court€bases€its€decision€to€vacate€the€judgment€for€criminalÏcontempt€on€the€ð ðconstitutional€right€of€due€process.ðð€€The€concept€of€dueÍprocess€is€such€an€elastic€term€that€I€am€compelled€to€point€out€two€specificÏshortcomings€in€these€proceedings€that€require€reversal€of€the€judgment.ÌÌà àThe€first€shortcoming€is€a€substantive€one.€€Criminal€contemptÏproceedings€are€intended€to€vindicate€the€authority€of€the€courts€by€punishingÏpersons€who€willfully€disobey€lawful€court€orders.€€òòState€ex€rel.€Agee€v.ÏChapman,óó€922€S.W.2d€516,€519€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995);€òòÔ_ÔThigpenÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔThigpenÔ_Ô,óóÏ874€S.W.2d€51,€53€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€In€order€to€warrant€a€judgment€ofÏcriminal€contempt,€the€conduct€must€be€specifically€contrary€to€a€court€œorder,›Ïand€the€conduct€must€be€willful€or€intentional.€€This€record€contains€noÏindication€that€an€order€had€ever€been€entered€specifically€directing€Ms.ÏStephens€not€to€accompany€her€son€into€Mr.€Coonerððs€house€without€hisÏpresence€or€permission.€€Accordingly,€notwithstanding€how€inappropriate€orÏunwise€Ms.€Stephensððs€conduct€might€have€been,€it€cannot€support€a€judgmentÏof€criminal€contempt.ÌÌà àMs.€Stephens€could€conceivably€have€violated€the€trial€courtððsÏSeptember€6,€1996€order€directing€her€to€return€the€partiesðð€son€to€Mr.ÏCooner€and€to€refrain€from€interfering€with€Mr.€Coonerððs€custody€rights.€ÏHowever,€it€is€unlikely€that€this€order€could€have€been€the€basis€for€a€petitionÏfor€contempt€filed€contemporaneously€with€the€order€itself.€€Thus,€the€trialÏcourtððs€criminal€contempt€judgment€cannot€stand€if€it€was€based€on€Ms.ÏStephensððs€violation€of€the€September€6,€1996€order.€€Ms.€Stephens€receivedÏno€notice€that€she€was€being€accused€of€violating€the€September€6,€1996€order,Ïand€of€equal€importance,€Mr.€Cooner€failed€to€prove€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt€that€Ms.€Stephens€did€not€comply€with€this€order.ÌÌà àThe€second€shortcoming€is€procedural.€€Civil€and€criminal€contemptÏproceedings€should€not€be€tried€simultaneously€because€of€the€significantÏdifferences€in€the€respective€burdens€of€proof€and€procedural€rights€accordedÏto€the€person€accused€of€contempt.€Proceedings€for€indirect€criminal€contemptÏcannot€be€commenced€without€the€notice€required€by€Tenn.€R.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€P.€42(b).€ÏGiving€this€notice€at€an€early€stage€eliminates€any€possible€confusionÏconcerning€the€nature€of€the€proceeding€and€better€enables€the€allegedÏÔ_ÔcontemnerÔ_Ô€to€invoke€his€or€her€procedural€rights.€€òòJones€v.€Jones,óó€App.€No.Ï01A01„9607„CV„00346,€1997€WL€80029,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Feb.€26,Ï1997)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed).€€ÌÌà àAppellate€courts€review€the€substance€of€contempt€judgments€using€theÏð ðabuse€of€discretionðð€standard€of€review.€€òòHawk€v.€Hawk,óó€855€S.W.2d€573,Ï583€(Tenn.€1993).€€We€are€not€so€deferential€about€adherence€to€proceduralÏrequirements€because€trial€courts€must€comply€strictly€with€the€absoluteÏprovisions€of€the€law.€€òòRobinson€v.€Air€Ô_ÔDraulicsÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔEngððgÔ_Ô€Co.,óó€214€Tenn.€30,€37,Ï377€S.W.2d€908,€912€(1964).€€Strict€oversight€of€the€procedure€employed€byÏtrial€courts€is€necessary€to€ensure€that€courts€wield€their€broad€contemptÏpower€in€accordance€with€the€rule€of€law€and€the€requirements€of€proceduralÏfairness.€€òòSanders€v.€Sanders,óó€App.€No.€01A01„9601„GS„00021,€1997€WLÏ15228,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Jan.€17.€1997)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11Ïapplication€filed).€€ÌÌà àThe€procedure€employed€by€the€trial€court€in€this€case€wasÏfundamentally€flawed€because€of€the€lack€of€notice€required€by€Tenn.€R.ÏÔ_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€P.€42(b)€and€because€the€trial€court€was€apparently€attempting€toÏconsider€Mr.€Coonerððs€petitions€for€criminal€contempt€and€for€civil€contemptÏsimultaneously.€€Even€though€Ms.€Stephens€did€not€frame€the€issue€precisely€inÍthese€terms,€we€should€take€it€up€in€order€to€prevent€prejudice€to€the€judicialÏprocess× ƒ3 ××  ×€and€because€the€procedural€oversight€involved€substantial€rights€andÏmore€likely€than€not€affected€the€outcome€of€the€proceeding.× ƒ4 ××  ×€œÌ›Ìà àThe€substantive€and€procedural€flaws€in€this€contempt€proceedingÏcannot€be€remedied€by€vacating€the€contempt€judgment€and€remanding€theÏcase€for€retrial.€€Thus,€rather€than€taxing€the€parties€and€the€trial€court€withÏadditional,€pointless€proceedings,€I€would€reverse€the€judgment€of€contemptÏand€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€with€directions€to€dismiss€Mr.€CoonerððsÏpetition€to€hold€Ms.€Stephens€in€contempt.ÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌÌà àThe€court€has€not€dealt€with€the€issue€of€whether€Ms.€Stephens€should€beÏrequired€to€pay€the€legal€expenses€Mr.€Cooner€incurred€in€pursuing€hisÏcontempt€petition.€€Trial€courts€may€award€attorneys€fees€in€proceedings€toÏenforce€child€support€decrees€or€in€proceedings€involving€the€custody€orÏchange€of€custody€of€children.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„103(c)€(1996).€ÏHowever,€this€was€not€such€a€proceeding.€€Criminal€contempt€proceedings,Ïunlike€civil€contempt€proceedings,€are€for€the€benefit€of€the€court€not€for€theÏbenefit€of€the€parties.€€òòState€ex€rel.€Agee€v.€Chapman,óó€922€S.W.2d€at€519.€ÏAccordingly,€in€the€absence€of€a€statute€or€rule€enabling€prevailing€parties€inÏcriminal€contempt€proceedings€to€recover€their€attorneyððs€fees,€I€would€holdÏthat€the€trial€court€did€not€have€authority€to€order€Ms.€Stephens€to€pay€Mr.ÍCooner€for€the€legal€expenses€he€incurred€to€pursue€his€criminal€contemptÏpetition.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE