ÿWPCv  INŠíGi…§ÒˆDÕ Ô19ÍÖŸV&‹9¬Ïò‹—Üöƒ?Í€•µ¨ˆ‘BÄn½M1Ü×ÖBr¼Œ×åªtÎ…´ Íÿ‚ÕÚÔàvEœ‰Ë޹i±;³lÕçuß ûFóó‡ý T:S7½öÊpŽÝ³¥“KO&pÕŽj”ü[ª ŽFSz?eù"—à:òì2¤S€GE]¶¬0Æ!s"„l“Ѐ!*Ú óF—;v9²Âœê†I\4…LgãÉBý©ã^bXY’žjÌ/gâpÿ€íŒ²±æ¦Àéßà‰ÉÄïjø©SØ/ÌY•IgM~|uk‚ (@Ê·š+0ßñ@ñ°³h) ÿ¹ã#ù"ƒs z“ÝKÙõšfƒ‡Lù†SFV¢±—±ä‘&z­²±­ù®Áýþ@æ+@gSàslY³nÃc^иh'zõ{ßÍ_ÐT2V>S#é—Ã{ ³mÐmO÷¨Ä…‹,GÙø+¼;l^0ÿ, ȶ3ª\ï‚ð€Ðªª¾ö-n¡EÉF×ÛïìH®à=ÁÖm¡$&ó1jà!'ï6ñì‚ØaC»VWd4v¡5{á“ɤ±d¥öZ]1»@N@SÚÚ0ûðd#!xUN™ %ç 0:íb' ^ / w; 4? S b md {  N˜ ˜ Iš U:ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã ã 0V D5s B¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ AQÅ Æ 0VÜ 0D2 ˜HP LaserJet 8000 DN PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0(ÆúI Z‹6Times New Roman Regular»(üœ$¡¡ÔUSUS.,Ô- ù-æ„E'L {Z='¢Ø+003|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Ñ  Ñ  ?Ý ƒb½Þ"ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€»°ï»»»ÔÔ€I…»»°ïÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€Xù]XI…ÔÐ  ÐÌSeptember€29,€1999ÌÌCecil€Ô_ÔCrowsonÔ_Ô,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAŠÔó ó,O²ÀAZ‹"Arial Regular(.3½Þ$££Ý ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  Ý\\\\)ÿÿ!dxdx dabZc[Cþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(.3½Þ$¢¢Ý ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óÝ ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑTR[° AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÒ€°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÑ€ÑÑ8€¼€»»ddÈ8ÑÑ  ÑÑ€ P¸Ñßv€`[@0,j:`  `€€@ÿEô±` 8ttxP,°ð  vßÔ_Ôà@Ÿ Ÿ êàÔ‡ ”e!»»Ôò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@ùù(êàAT€NASHVILLEó óÔ#†»¼€»! ”e¶#ԈРì< ÐÌÌÌCUMBERLAND€BEND€à0 8 àà08T$8T$à)Ð^ ®T$T$ ÐINVESTORS,€L.P.,à0 à àà08àT$àT$àà08T$8T$à)Ðp ÀT$T$ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àPlaintiff/Appellee,à0 8 àà08T$8T$à)Д äT$T$ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à0 è àAppeal€No.Цö èT$èT$ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à0 è à01„A„01„9810„CH„00543и èT$èT$ ÐVS.à0 Ø àà00 Ø T$Ø T$àà0ˆ0 T$0 T$àà0àˆT$ˆT$àà08àT$àT$àà08T$8T$à)à0èT$T$àÐÊ èT$èT$ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à0 è àDavidson€ChanceryÐÜ, èT$èT$ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à0 è à95„3303„IÐî> èT$èT$ ÐAMBROSE€PRINTINGà0 à àà08àT$àT$àà08T$8T$à)ÐPT$T$ ÐCOMPANY,€INC.,à0 à àà08àT$àT$àà08T$8T$à)ÐbT$T$ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àDefendant/Appellant.à0 8 àà08T$8T$à)Ð6†T$T$ ÐÌÌà@TTêàAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYˆÌà@ÞÞ#êàAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEˆÌÌà@t t êàTHE€HONORABLE€IRVIN€H.€KILCREASE,€JR.,€CHANCELLORˆÌÌÌÌNANCY€S.€JONESÌMICHAEL€G.€STEWARTÌWALLER€LANSDEN€DORTCH€&€DAVISÌ511€Union€Street,€Suite€2100ÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219„8966Ìà Ø àAttorneys€for€Plaintiff/AppelleeÌÌANTHONY€J.€MCFARLANDÌBASS,€BERRY€&€SIMS€PLCÌ2700€First€American€CenterÌNashville,€Tennessee€37238„2700Ìà Ø àAttorney€for€Defendant/AppellantÌÌÌÌà@ÒÒ$êàAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDˆÌÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.€ÌÌCONCUR:ÌCAIN,€J.ÌCOTTRELL,€J.Ð š;ê63 ÐÑ P¸Ñâ  âÑ  Ñâ  âÑ  Ñà@°°'êàÔ‡ ”e!»»¼€Ôò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€N€óóó óÔ#†»¼€»! ”eq #ԈР° ÐÌÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àAmbrose€Printing€Company,€Inc.€claimed€a€parking€easement€byÏprescription€or€by€implication€in€a€lot€across€the€street€from€its€office€building.€ÏThe€owner€of€the€lot,€Cumberland€Bend€Investors,€L.P.,€sought€a€declaratoryÏjudgment€on€Ambroseððs€claim.€€The€Chancery€Court€of€Davidson€County€grantedÏsummary€judgment€to€Cumberland€Bend.€€We€affirm.ÌÌà@ŸŸ-êàò òI.ó óˆÐ úJ ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€1976€Ambrose€leased€a€building€in€a€commercial€developmentÏin€Nashville€called€MetroCenter.€€The€owner€agreed€to€furnish€100€parkingÏspaces,€either€adjacent€to€the€leased€building€or€on€the€ownerððs€lot€across€theÏstreet.€€The€owner€elected€to€designate€a€large€lot€across€the€street€whereÏAmbroseððs€employees€could€park,€along€with€the€customers€of€other€businessesÏin€the€area.€€No€particular€spaces€were€designated€for€Ambroseððs€use.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€building€leased€by€Ambrose€and€the€lot€across€the€street€wereÏsubsequently€transferred€to€different€owners.€€In€1980,€in€order€to€facilitate€theÏsale€of€the€parking€lot,€Ambrose€was€asked€to€acknowledge€that€its€parking€needsÏwould€thereafter€be€filled€only€on€a€lot€adjacent€to€its€building€on€the€same€sideÏof€the€street.€€Mr.€Ambrose€executed€a€certificate€acknowledging€that€theÏlandlord€had€designated€another€area€to€fulfill€the€obligation€to€provide€AmbroseÏwith€100€parking€spaces.ÌÐ >8Ž30 Ðà Ø àà 0 àApparently€the€new€parking€spaces€never€materialized,€andÏAmbroseððs€employees€continued€to€share€the€parking€lot€across€the€street.€€InÏ1981€Mr.€Ambrose€wrote€to€the€owner€of€the€parking€lot€about€the€situation.€€HisÏletter€ends€with€this€sentence:€ð ðI€assume€we€can€continue€to€park€there€until€weÏhear€from€you€to€the€contrary.ððÌÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€1982€Ambrose€bought€its€building.€€The€deed€does€not€conveyÏany€property€other€than€the€building€and€the€lot€upon€which€it€stands;€it€does€notÏmention€any€additional€parking€spaces.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àOn€July€13,€1988,€the€owner€of€the€parking€lot€physically€preventedÏAmbroseððs€employees€from€parking€there.€€The€secretary€of€the€AmbroseÏCorporation€wrote€to€the€ownerððs€agent,€asserting€a€right€to€an€unspecifiedÏnumber€of€parking€spaces€in€the€disputed€lot,€based€on€the€original€lease.€€OnÏSeptember€26€of€the€same€year,€the€owner€of€the€lot€expressly€granted€AmbroseððsÏemployees,€guests,€and€invitees€permission€to€park€on€the€paved€portion€of€theÏlot.€€The€owner€reserved€the€right€to€redesignate€the€parking€area€to€another€siteÏon€five€days€written€notice.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€Ambrose€employees€continued€to€park€on€the€lot€despite€minorÏskirmishes€over€the€right€to€do€so.€€Finally,€in€1994€Cumberland€Bend,€which€hadÏpurchased€the€parking€lot€in€1992,€filed€this€action€for€a€declaratory€judgmentÏthat€Ambrose€had€no€right€or€interest€in€the€parking€lot.€€The€Chancery€Court€ofÏDavidson€County€granted€Cumberland€Bend€summary€judgment.ÌÐ 8`30 Ðà@qq-êàò òII.ó óˆÐ ° Ðà@00!êàò òAn€Easement€by€Prescriptionó óˆÐ Ø( ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àAmbrose€claims€a€prescriptive€easement€to€100€parking€spaces€onÏCumberland€Bendððs€lot.€€Contrary€to€Cumberland€Bendððs€argument,€whichÏconsumes€€most€of€its€brief,€Ambrose€does€not€insist€that€it€has€acquired€its€rightsÏby€seven€years€adverse€possession.€€Ambrose€concedes€that€to€affirmativelyÏestablish€an€easement,€the€adverse€holder€must€show€adverse€use€for€a€period€ofÏtwenty€years.€€òòSee€McCammon€v.€Meredithóó,€830€S.W.2d€577€(Tenn.€App.€1991),Ð Ø( Ðand€the€use€must€be€ð ðadverse,€under€claim€of€right,€continuous,€uninterrupted,Ïopen,€visible,€exclusive,€and€with€the€knowledge€and€acquiescence€of€the€ownerÏof€the€servient€tenant,€and€must€continue€for€the€full€prescriptive€period€.€.€.€.ððÏòòHouse€v.€Closeóó,€346€S.W.2d€445€at€447€(Tenn.€App.€1961).Ð h¸ ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àAmbrose€contends,€however,€that€once€the€adverse€use€has€started,Ïthe€ownerððs€right€to€stop€it€will€be€barred€after€seven€years€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ïðð€28„2„103.€€That€Code€section€provides:€ð ðNo€person€or€anyone€claiming€underÏhim€shall€have€any€action,€either€at€law€or€in€equity,€for€the€recovery€of€anyÏlands,€tenements,€or€hereditaments,€but€within€seven€(7)€years€after€the€right€ofÏaction€accrued.ððÌÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€òòShearer€v.€Vandergriffóó,€661€S.W.2d€680€(Tenn.€1983),€ourÐ ¬1ü,* ÐSupreme€Court€applied€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„2„103€to€an€action€to€compel€theÏdefendants€to€remove€a€fence€which€prevented€the€plaintiffs€from€using€anÏeasement.€€In€that€case€the€parties€owned€adjoining€land€with€a€thirty€foot€rightÐ 8h30 Ðof€way€running€between€them.€€The€center€line€of€the€right€of€way€ran€along€theÏproperty€line.€€One€of€the€owners€erected€a€fence€down€the€middle€of€the€right€ofÏway€and€more€than€seven€years€passed€without€any€action€being€taken€to€have€theÏobstruction€removed.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€plaintiffs€argued€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„2„103€did€not€applyÏto€suits€involving€easements,€since€twenty€years€of€adverse€use€was€required€toÏextinguish€the€easement€as€well€as€to€establish€it.€€òòSee€Boyd€v.€Huntóó,€102€Tenn.Ð ¬ü Ð495,€52€S.W.€131€(1899).€€The€Supreme€Court€rejected€this€contention,€however,Ïand€said:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àà ˆ àWe€think€this€reliance€also€misconstrues€theÏinter„relation€of€the€decisional€law€of€prescriptiveÏcreation€and€prescriptive€extinguishment€of€rights„of„¼way€and€the€limiting€provisions€of€T.C.A.€ðð€28„2„103Ïin€suits€thereon.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à*à0  à*à0èT$T$à*à @ àà ˜ àЄ ÔèT$èT$ ÐÌà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àUnder€the€holding€in€òòBoydóó,€a€right„of„way€may€beÐ ¨"ø Ðextinguished€by€twenty€(20)€years€adverse€use.€€UnderÏT.C.A.€ðð€28„2„103,€a€suit€to€abate€this€adverse€useÏmust€be€brought€within€seven€(7)€years€from€the€timeÏthe€cause€of€action€arose€or€the€right€of€action€isÏbarred.€€In€the€interim€period€of€time€between€theÏseven€(7)€years€and€twenty€(20)€years,€if€the€adverseÏholding€ceases,€the€person€who€has€the€right„of„wayÏmay€resume€his€use,€as€the€right„of„way€still€exists.€ÏOn€the€other€hand€he€may€not€bring€an€action€to€abateÏthe€adverse€use€during€that€period€and€if€the€adverseÏuse€continues€for€twenty€(20)€years,€the€right„of„wayÏis€extinguished.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌ661€S.W.2d€at€682.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àAmbrose€argues€that€òòShearer€v.€Vandergriffóó€is€authority€for€itsÐ ì5<1. Ðposition:€that€once€seven€years€has€passed,€the€owner€of€the€servient€tenementÐ 8`30 Ðcannot€interfere€with€the€adverse€use,€which€will€ripen€into€an€easement€afterÏtwenty€years.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWe€think,€however,€that€Ambrose€is€mistaken,€for€two€reasons.€ÏFirst,€subsection€(b)€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„2„103€provides€that€the€adverseÏpossession€shall€not€be€deemed€to€extend€beyond€the€actual€possession€of€theÏadverse€holder€until€some€muniment€of€title€is€recorded.€€òòSee€Moore€v.€Brannanóó,Ð ˆØ  Ð304€S.W.2d€660€(Tenn.€1957).€€Since€Ambrose€has€never€had€actual€possessionÏof€any€particular€part€of€the€parking€lot,€the€statute€does€not€provide€a€defense€toÏthis€action.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àSecond,€beyond€the€obvious€language€of€the€statute,€this€case€is€theÏreverse€of€òòShearer€v.€Vandergriffóó.€€In€òòSheareróó€the€adverse€possession€covered€aÐ `° Ðpart€of€an€òòestablishedóó€easement.€€After€seven€years,€the€statute€operated€to€bar€anÐ „ Ô Ðaction€to€have€the€obstruction€removed.€€Here,€the€action€was€brought€for€aÏdeclaration€that€Ambrose€did€not€have€an€easement€(or€to€prevent€AmbroseððsÏclaim€from€ripening€into€an€easement).€€If€an€action€for€that€purpose€is€barredÏafter€seven€years,€the€time€required€for€establishing€a€prescriptive€easement€hasÏeffectively€been€shortened€from€twenty€years€to€seven€years.€€After€seven€yearsÏthe€adverse€user€would€be€home€free,€so€long€as€he€could€hold€on€for€thirteenÏmore€years.€€We€think€the€distinction€we€make€here€is€implicit€in€the€SupremeÏCourtððs€language€in€òòSheareróó,€where€the€court€referred€to€the€differences€in€ð ðtheÐ ¤1ô,* Ðdecisional€law€of€prescriptive€creation€and€prescriptive€extinguishment€of€rights„¼of„way.ðð€€661€S.W.2d€at€682.€€Thus,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„2„103€is€not€a€bar€toÏthis€action.Ð 8`30 Їà Ø àà 0 àThe€undisputed€facts€in€this€case€show€that€at€least€until€1980ÏAmbrose€was€using€the€parking€lot€with€the€permission€of€the€owner.€€Its€leaseÏprovided€that€the€owner€would€furnish€the€100€parking€spaces.€€In€1980€AmbroseÏacknowledged€that€it€did€not€have€any€right€to€park€on€the€lot€across€the€streetÏ(apparently€on€the€promise€of€the€owner€that€the€additional€parking€would€finallyÏbe€provided€next€to€the€building.)€€Only€after€the€additional€lots€were€notÏprovided€did€Ambrose€claim€a€òòrightóó€to€the€continued€use€of€the€parking€lot.€Ð ˆØ  ÐTherefore,€regardless€of€all€the€other€questions€about€whether€the€use€wasÏpermissive€or€uninterrupted,€€Ambrose€cannot€show€twenty€years€of€adverse€use.ÌÌà@qq-êàò òII.ˆÐ h Ðà@WW!êàAn€Easement€by€Implicationó óˆÐ @ ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àWhen€a€parcel€of€property€is€divided,€an€easement€by€implicationÏpreserves€ð ðall€those€continuous€and€apparent€easements€which€have€in€fact€beenÏused€by€the€owner€during€the€unity€of€ownership€and€possession.ðð€€òòPowell€v.Ð Ô$$  ÐRileyóó,€83€Tenn.€153€at€159€(1885).€€In€òòAllison€v.€Allisonóó,€193€S.W.2d€476€(Tenn.Ð ø&H"  ÐApp.€1945),€the€Court€outlined€the€three€essential€factors€for€an€easement€byÏimplication:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àà ˆ àð ðFirst,€unity€and€a€separation€of€the€title;Ïsecond,€that€before€the€separation€takes€place,€the€useÏwhich€gives€rise€to€the€easement€shall€have€been€soÏlong€continued€and€so€obvious€as€to€show€that€it€wasÏmeant€to€be€permanent;€and€third,€that€the€easementÏshall€be€[reasonably]€necessary€to€the€beneficialÏenjoyment€of€the€land€granted€or€retained.ðð€€òòRollo€v.Ð Ð3 /, ÐNelsonóó,€34€Utah€116,€96€P.€263,€26€L.R.A.,€N.S.€315,Ð â420- Ð324.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌ193€S.W.2d€at€478.ÌÐ *9z41 ЇÓÓà Ø àà 0 àWe€are€satisfied€that€the€undisputed€facts€in€this€case€show€that€theÏfirst€two€factors€are€absent.€€When€Ambrose€purchased€its€building€in€1982,€titleÏto€the€lot€across€the€street€had€already€passed€to€another€owner.€€Ambrose€hadÏdisclaimed€any€right€to€park€on€that€lot€in€order€to€facilitate€the€sale.€€Therefore,ÏAmbroseððs€vendor€was€no€longer€the€owner€of€the€parking€lot,€and€the€need€forÏthe€parking€spaces€on€that€particular€lot€were€not€so€obvious€as€to€show€that€theÏright€to€park€there€would€be€permanent.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€judgment€of€the€court€below€is€affirmed€and€the€cause€isÏremanded€to€the€Chancery€Court€of€Davidson€County€for€any€further€proceedingsÏthat€may€be€necessary.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€appellant.ÌÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à______________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.€ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGE€ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGE€¹ÑX°ÑÑ  Ñò òÔ‡ ”e!»»¼€Ôà@êê.êàó óÔ#†»¼€»! ”eM;#Ô