ÿWPCp? k®噎Nü#Ü—W*ÐY‰ö#Þ—ŒâfîíUjAÏÄ•—} GÀ•žSèVÅÞEù5C9­‡œåBÞ5¿Œ |¬^ç×§2ËYx#õÇéÈ@4ý±¬l/ÝÞÑããò“òà#Ô¹v»òâä8÷/ƒkÛÇOC5aÔÆ”¹´xÎ? R»ÆQ^–295,ÖPùmÜxß«‚ˆiúŠ{fLw°°ÎWn?ìx"—ÿ›õè ÙÃÐBu»ùÁsλŸ{p›‚›6F¾­±/ê§µúIACogÄÝ{#b³ö0u˵.4˜2®†3¦ˆn7ЃG¿» <[kŸ:\+§ó$úùÍ8Y !—“œ÷úÑ—Ò‡Þ. *)mÄd††ý“+óQQQòé ãY= |b¥(…w3Ÿ‡éåQþ+frCßЈ°%ç\”¡K~¦¤8aÓèÞ4nLsiP§ŸNL¬‹=ü€\¬M/½qääÜ^÷VíylVA¿0§\Œ ã|u~Äo›kž5Ô1ÙåøÁÒÎ`·C Vâ /ËYcó¬—Jk¤„Z>ª,þ³wu‚xQZ2'ò+£ï;—ti,UÅP²ºj’50÷Iç„b#É\ %% ^ + 0ˆ7 U1N¿ w 4 z% ÒŸ q € m‚ n­™ ÆF Æ ÆÒƘN^N` 1‡b 72éE 1u 72’ 0cÄÄ'U>5Esö¸ë®2™ÉËX”#ì(ð)2ò*$,0&/GV1$2UNÁ5UN6]6¿`8b:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 0D':':':': 0ëk:k:k:k: BV;V; 0¤s; D5< D-L< 0Ky<y< ASÄ<Æ= 0¤Ý= 0D> A«Å>˜\\IB01S01\CLERK1NASÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»’™O1Ï (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularéJE1ê:i¢×+00 ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt"|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ«<þ6X9`("Courier NewTTXXxþ6X@ÉDQX@Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 (5hCEKQW]cioAutoList11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à Ý ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„406€instructs€a€court€to€limit€the€residential€time€for€a€parent€that€has€engaged€inÐ ° Ðcertain€specified€conduct€or€exhibits€certain€traits,€including,€but€not€limited€to:€(1)€willful€abandonment;€(2)€physicalÐ tÄ Ðor€sexual€abuse;€(3)€emotional€abuse;€(4)€neglect€or€nonperformance€of€parental€duties;€or€(5)€an€emotional€or€physicalÐ 8ˆ Ðimpairment€which€interferes€with€parental€responsibilities.€€Neither€party€herein€argues€that€the€trial€court€should€haveÐ üL Ðutilized€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„406€to€limit€residential€time€with€either€parent.€Ð À ÐÔ‡ôî©òòôî©ÔÐ ÐÐ ÐÔ#†ôî©òòôî©#ÔÔ‡ôî©òòôî©ÔÔ‡XEXòôî©ÔÐ ÐÔ#†XEXXXEr#ÔÔ#†ôî©òXXE‘#Ôô\  `‹&Times New Roman ;Ý ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€primary€residential€parent€is€defined€as€ð ðthe€parent€with€whom€the€child€resides€more€than€fifty€percentÐ ° Ð(50%)€of€the€time.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„402(4). Heldman P.J.GatlinburgLentzGaskill t]he AabyAdelspergerMcCalebWhitackerNicholsVarley HassKnightonhad haddispositivecaregiverBarnhillTenn.Ct.AppMimmsLipscombCaudillHeltonThreadgillspousalYountGilliamRaskindAndertonobligorobligeeCampanaliContrerasKirshnerTenn.CodependenteLeiperEldridgeSuttles RegsGallaher ren COACutsingerCamaroBatsonKinardFlanneryAlfordMondell áÝ ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWe€note€that€the€fatherððs€Prayer€for€Relief€did€not€contain€a€request€for€any€such€injunction.€ (Ý ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAgain€we€point€out€at€the€time€of€its€final€order,€the€court€did€not€have€the€benefit€of€the€Supreme€CourtððsÐ ° Ðholding€and€analysis€in€òòHopkinsóó. ¿Ý ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAs€the€trial€court€in€this€case€correctly€observed,€decisions€as€to€custody€are€not€to€be€made€for€the€purposeÐ ° Ðof€rewarding€or€punishing€parents€for€past€behavior.€€òòTurner€v.€Turneróó,€919€S.W.2d€340,€346€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.1995);€Ð tÄ ÐòòBarnhill€v.€Barnhill,óó€826€S.W.2d€443,€453€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.1991).€Thus,€the€fault€a€parent€bears€for€the€breakup€of€theÐ 8ˆ Ðmarriage€is€not€relevant€for€the€purposes€of€a€custody€determination,€except€insofar€as€that€parentððs€conduct€bears€on€hisÐ üL Ðor€her€fitness€for€parental€responsibilities.€€òòSeeóó€òòMimms€v.€Mimmsóó,€780€S.W.2d€739,€745€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€€As€forÐ À Ðany€questions€of€character€and€its€effects€on€parental€fitness€that€arose€from€the€motherððs€adultery,€and€her€subsequentÐ „Ô Ðfailure€to€testify€truthfully€about€it,€the€trial€court€observed€that€ð ðthere€is€no€direct€evidence€that€her€immoral€behaviorÐ H ˜ Ðhas€adversely€impacted€the€infant€child.ðð€The€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€that€finding.€€While€testimony€wasÐ  \ Ðelicited€in€an€attempt€to€question€Mr.€Cummingsðð€character€on€arguably€similar€conduct€before€his€marriage,€there€wasÐ Ð  Ðabsolutely€no€connection€made€to€any€effect€on€the€child. NÝ ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€òòGrayóó,€the€Court€also€held€that€it€is€improper€to€compare€incomes€of€both€parents€under€the€Guidelines.€€TheÐ ° Ðtrial€court€had€considered€each€parentððs€income,€calculated€the€amount€each€would€be€required€to€pay€for€two€childrenÐ tÄ Ðunder€the€Guidelines,€determined€that€the€fatherððs€monthly€obligation€exceeded€the€motherððs€by€$737€per€month,€deviatedÐ 8ˆ Ðdownward€from€that€amount€based€on€the€fact€the€father€was€the€residential€parent€for€greater€than€the€standard€visitationÐ üL Ðset€out€in€the€Guidelines,€and€set€the€fatherððs€support€obligation€at€$600€per€month,€although€the€father€was€designatedÐ À Ðas€the€primary€residential€parent.€€78€S.W.3d€at€882.€€The€Supreme€Court€also€held€that€the€authority€to€deviate€from€theÐ „Ô ÐGuidelines€amount€does€not€include€the€authority€to€re„align€the€obligor€and€obligee.€€€ð ð[T]he€income€of€the€obligeeÐ H ˜ Ðshould€not€be€considered€in€the€calculation€of€or€as€a€reason€for€deviation€from€the€guidelines€in€determining€the€supportÐ  \ Ðaward€amount.ðð€€òòGrayóó,€78€S.W.3d€at€884,€quoting€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.€1240„2„4„.03(2). Ñ e Ñ æÝ ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAccording€to€the€testimony€of€Ms.€Cummings,€her€husband€went€hunting€with€his€friends€two€days€after€GreyÐ ° Ðwas€born.€€Mr.€Cummings€denied€having€done€so.€€We€note€that€this€was€one€of€the€few€factual€matters€about€which€theÐ tÄ Ðparties€and€their€witnesses€testified€in€direct€contradiction€to€each€other.Ð 8ˆ Ð (Ý ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAs€the€Court€noted€in€òòHopkinsóó,€the€guidelines€consider€the€actual€physical€custody,€regardless€of€the€labelÐ ° Ðassigned€to€the€custody€arrangement. øÝ ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔPursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€36,€this€court€may€grant€the€parties€the€relief€to€which€they€are€entitled€and€mayÐ ° Ðenter€any€order€or€judgment€necessary€to€provide€that€relief.€€òòThe€Realty€Shop,€Inc.€v.€R.R.€Westminster€Holding,€Inc.óó,Ð tÄ Ð7€S.W.3d€581,€608€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€€In€their€discretion,€appellate€courts€may€enter€judgments€when€they€reverseÐ 8ˆ Ða€trial€courtððs€judgment€and€may€also€remand€cases€when€issues€are€left€to€be€decided.€€òòFirst€Tenn.€Bank€Natððl€Assððn€v.Ð üL ÐHurd€Lock€&€Mfg.€Co.óó,€816€S.W.2d€38,€40€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).€ &Ý ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThis€figure€was€arrived€at€by€calculating€the€total€indebtedness€($21,397),€subtracting€the€premarital€balancesÐ e Ð($4,563),€subtracting€the€balance€on€one€account€that€the€wife€does€not€request€that€the€husband€assume€($602),€dividingÐ )Ä Ðthe€net€joint€debt€in€half€($8,116€each),€and€subtracting€from€the€husbandððs€half€the€amounts€he€was€previously€orderedÐ íˆ Ðto€pay. =Ý ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔFor€all€our€calculations,€we€have€used€the€individual€figures€from€the€wifeððs€table,€but€have€arrived€at€totalsÐ e Ðdifferent€from€those€used€by€Ms.€Cummings€in€her€brief. Ý ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAt€this€point,€either€counsel€or€the€court,€or€both,€interpreted€Ms.€Cummingsððs€earlier€statements€as€suggestingÐ ° Ða€residential€schedule€of€alternating€six„month€intervals.€€That€confusion€was€cleared€up€in€counselððs€next€question,€ð ðIÐ tÄ Ðthink€I€understand€what€she€was€saying€was€that€you€would€have€a€week,€and€that€she€would€have€a€week,€like€weððreÐ 8ˆ Ðdoing€now,€except€that€on€every€Wednesday€if€it€was€your€week,€she€would€have€that€Wednesday€night,€and€if€it€wereÐ üL Ðher€week,€you€would€have€a€Wednesday€night.ðð€€That€is€how€we€interpret€the€motherððs€earlier€testimony€also.(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular ùÝ ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔFor€example,€Ms.€Cunningham€could€face€criminal€prosecution€or€contempt€proceedings.€€False€testimonyÐ e Ðcan€also€affect€the€trial€courtððs€assessment€of€credibility€as€to€other€testimony.€€The€trial€court€herein€made€no€adverseÐ )Ä Ðcredibility€findings€with€regard€to€the€wifeððs€other€testimony,€much€of€which€was€uncontested€in€any€event. µÝ ƒRÝU$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔOne€problem€that€the€trial€court€encountered€in€dividing€the€property€in€this€case€was€that€the€wifeððs€proposedÐ ° Ðdivision€of€household€furniture€and€furnishings€submitted€to€the€trial€court€did€not€make€a€distinction€between€maritalÐ tÄ Ðproperty€and€her€separate€property.- ù-(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(|G2ÝU$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Vñ»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôî©ò»»Ô d(|3 m$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Vñ»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3 m$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Vñ»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Vñ»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼Vñ»»»ÔÑ8€EXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  ÑÑ€#ïOÑà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îEVñÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼Vñ»îîE#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓFebruary€18,€2004€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XEX»¼VñÔÌò òÔ#†¼Vñ»XXE#ÔCHRISTOPHER€GREY€CUMMINGS€v.€PEPPER€LYNNE€WERNERÐ úJ ÐCUMMINGSÔ‡XEX»¼VñÔó óÐ  ^ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Williamson€CountyÐ  ^ Ðà@@øøìàNo.€28924€€€€€€Russ€Heldman,€ChancellorÐ ú J ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<½` AßÐ ¾  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2003„00086„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€ð!ðó ó€ò òFiled€October€15,€Ô_Ô2004ó óò òÔ_ÔÐ ¹  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<”` AßÐ •å  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÔ#†¼Vñ»XXEš#ÔÔ€XEX»¼VñÔThe€trial€court€granted€the€husband€a€divorce€on€the€ground€of€the€wifeððs€adultery€and€made€variousÐ à Ðrulings€regarding€the€parenting€arrangement€for€the€partiesðð€one€year€old€son,€child€support,€propertyÐ |Ì Ðdivision,€and€award€of€attorneyððs€fees.€€The€parties€have€appealed€most€of€the€those€rulings.€Ð h¸ ÐAlthough€we€affirm€the€equal€sharing€of€residential€placement,€we€find€the€six€month€alternatingÐ T¤ Ðschedule€is€not€in€this€childððs€best€interests.€€We€also€find€other€parts€of€the€plan€must€be€vacated€inÐ @ Ðview€of€recent€holdings€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court.€€Therefore,€we€vacate€the€parenting€planÐ ,| Ðand€remand€for€entry€of€a€new€permanent€parenting€plan€addressing€the€residential€schedule,€theÐ h Ðdesignation€of€primary€residential€parent,€allocation€of€decision„making€authority,€and€child€support.€Ð T ÐIn€the€interim,€we€reinstate€the€trial€courtððs€òòpendente€lite€óóarrangement,€as€modified,€and€establishÐ ð@ Ðinterim€support.€€€We€affirm€the€division€of€property,€modify€the€allocation€of€debt,€and€modify€theÐ Ü, Ðaward€of€attorneyððs€fees.Ð È ÐÓìÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€CourtÐ  ð ÐAffirmed€in€Part,€Modified€in€Part,€Vacated€in€Part,€and€Remandedó óÐ ŒÜ ÐÌòòÓ  ÓPatricia€J.€Cottrell,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòWilliam€C.€Koch,€Jr.,€P.J.,Ð d!´  ÐM.S.óó,€and€òòFrank€G.€Clement,€Jr.,€J.óó,€joined.Ð P" ! ÐÌThomas€F.€Bloom,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Pepper€Lynne€Werner€Cummings.Ð ($x# ÐÌRobert€Todd€Jackson,€Virginia€Lee€Story,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Christopher€GreyÐ &P!% ÐCummings.Ð ì&<"& ÐÓø ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÐ Ä($( ÐÓ  ÓÌò òòòó óóóà  àIn€this€appeal€from€the€trial€courtððs€order€in€their€divorce€action,€the€parties€have€raised€aÐ œ*ì%* Ðnumber€of€issues.€€The€parties€were€married€only€fourteen€months€before€the€divorce€action€wasÐ ˆ+Ø&+ Ðâ âinitiated.€€As€with€many€divorce€actions,€the€parties€view€their€experiences€from€very€differentÐ t,Ä',ý ÐÔ_ Ôperspectives.€€The€wife€tells€a€€story€of€abandonment,€neglect,€and€loneliness.€€The€husbandððs€is€oneÐ ° Ðof€betrayal€and€deceit.Ð œì Ðâ âÌò òÓ  ÓI.€€òòThe€Marriageó óóóÐ tÄ ÐÓXÓÌà  àChristopher€Grey€Cummings€and€Pepper€Lynn€Werner€met€and€began€dating€in€May€of€2000.€Ð L œ ÐMr.€Cummings,€then€thirty„five€years€of€age,€was€unemployed€and€living€in€his€parentsðð€BrentwoodÐ 8 ˆ Ðhome.€€His€future€wife,€who€taught€Interior€Design€at€Watkins€Institute,€was€two€years€younger€andÐ $ t Ðlived€on€a€rented€farm€in€Leiperððs€Fork.€€After€they€had€dated€for€a€while,€Chris€Cummings€left€hisÐ  ` Ðparentsðð€home€and€moved€in€with€Ms.€Cummings,€then€Ms.€Werner.€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àAt€some€subsequent€point,€Mr.€Cummings€bought€a€trash€pick„up€service€and€began€to€devoteÐ Ô$  Ðhimself€to€operating€this€new€business.€€He€demonstrated€energy€and€ambition€in€this€enterprise,Ð À  Ðworking€extremely€long€hours€to€get€his€business€off€the€ground.€€According€to€Ms.€€CummingsððÐ ¬ü  Ðtestimony,€on€some€days€he€worked€from€4:00€a.m.€to€10:00€p.m.,€and€in€some€weeks€he€worked€allÐ ˜è  Ðseven€days.€€Mr.€Cummingsðð€other€interests€included€hunting,€watching€sports,€and€participating€inÐ „Ô  Ðthe€activities€of€his€Masonic€Lodge.€€He€stayed€at€a€hunting€lodge€with€his€long„time€friends€everyÐ pÀ Ðweekend€during€hunting€season€and€two€weekends€a€month€during€the€rest€of€the€year.€€OnÐ \¬ ÐThursdays,€he€went€to€meetings€at€his€Masonic€Lodge.€€These€activities,€combined€with€his€newÐ H˜ Ðbusiness,€meant€Mr.€Cummings€was€rarely€home.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àIn€March€of€2001,€Ms.€Cummings€discovered€that€she€was€pregnant.€€After€Mr.€CummingsððÐ  \ Ðinitially€angry€reaction,€Ms.€Cummings€agreed€to€marry€him€if€he€promised€to€reduce€hours€awayÐ øH Ðfrom€home€and€to€put€an€end€to€his€habit€of€chewing€tobacco€and€leaving€his€spit€cups€all€over€theÐ ä4 Ðhouse.€€He€promised€to€do€both€those€things.€€The€parties€drove€to€Gatlinburg€and€got€married€onÐ Ð  ÐSunday,€May€20,€2001.€€They€returned€home€almost€immediately€because€Mr.€Cummings€had€toÐ ¼  Ðwork€on€Monday.€€Since€there€was€no€honeymoon,€Mr.€Cummings€promised€that€the€couple€wouldÐ ¨ø Ðcelebrate€their€one€year€anniversary€by€taking€a€special€trip.€€That€trip€never€happened.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àAfter€the€marriage,€the€parties€rented€a€home€in€Brentwood€near€Mr.€Cummingsðð€parents.Ð l¼ ÐThey€used€the€furnishings€from€Ms.€Cummingsðð€home€in€Leiperððs€Fork€to€set€up€the€new€household,Ð X ¨ Ðas€Mr.€Cummings€had€none€of€his€own.€€Ms.€Cummings€testified€that€her€husband€did€not€changeÐ D!” Ðhis€ways€after€the€marriage,€despite€his€promises€to€do€so.€€She€herself€had€promised,€at€Mr.Ð 0"€  ÐCummingsðð€insistence,€to€stop€working€after€the€baby€was€born€so€she€could€be€a€stay„at„homeÐ #l! Ðmother.Ð $X" ÐÌÒ°Òà  àMs.€Cummings€gave€birth€to€the€partiesðð€son,€Grey€Cummings,€on€November€21,€2001.׃$×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€EvenÐ à%0!$ Ðafter€the€birth€of€their€child,€Mr.€Cummings€continued€to€divide€his€time€between€his€work€and€hisÐ Ì&"% Ðfriends,€devoting€very€little€time€or€attention€to€his€wife,€the€baby,€or€household€tasks.€€Ms.€Cummings,Ð ° Ðwho€had€few€friends€of€her€own,€gave€up€her€job€in€accordance€with€the€partiesðð€agreement,€andÐ œì Ðbecame€a€full„time€mother€and€housekeeper.€€Mr.€Cummings€continued€to€chew€tobacco€regularly.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àBy€March€of€2002,€the€parties€were€operating€on€entirely€different€schedules.€€Mr.€CummingsÐ `° Ðwas€going€to€bed€at€1:00€or€2:00€a.m.€every€night,€while€his€wife€had€to€go€to€bed€at€9:00€or€9:30€soÐ L œ Ðshe€would€be€able€to€get€up€during€the€night€to€feed€the€baby.€€Ms.€Cummings€testified€that€around€thisÐ 8 ˆ Ðtime,€her€husband€stopped€communicating€with€her.€€Shortly€thereafter,€in€May,€Ms.€CummingsÐ $ t Ðdeveloped€a€friendship€with€Bruce€Thompson,€the€manager€of€a€stable€where€she€boarded€her€horses.€Ð  ` ÐThe€friendship€deepened€after€Ms.€Cummingsðð€mare€gave€birth€to€a€colt€that€died€the€following€day.€Ð ü L  ÐThe€relationship€between€Ms.€Cummings€and€Mr.€Thompson€escalated€in€June€into€a€sexual€affair.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àMr.€Cummings€found€some€photos€showing€his€wife,€Mr.€Thompson,€and€the€baby€together,Ð À  Ðand€he€began€to€suspect€that€his€wife€was€having€an€affair.€€He€confronted€her€with€his€suspicions,€butÐ ¬ü  Ðshe€denied€any€such€relationship.€€Mr.€Cummings€did€not€believe€her.€€He€became€openly€hostile,Ð ˜è  Ðessentially€hounding€his€wife.€€When€their€discussions€became€confrontational,€and€Ms.€CummingsÐ „Ô  Ðwould€attempt€to€walk€away,€her€husband€would€follow,€pointing€his€finger€at€her€and€screaming€thatÐ pÀ Ðshe€was€a€fornicator€and€an€adulterer.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àThe€parties€continued€(tensely)€to€share€the€same€home,€but€Mr.€Cummings€withdrew€financialÐ 4„ Ðsupport€from€his€wife.€€He€stopped€making€payments€on€her€car€and€credit€cards,€and€closed€theirÐ  p Ðchecking€account€without€telling€her.€€Her€checks€bounced,€and€unpaid€bills€accumulated.€€She€wentÐ  \ Ðback€to€work,€taking€two€part„time€jobs€that€generated€about€$800€per€month.€€She€also€enrolled€inÐ øH Ðgraduate€school,€with€the€intention€of€obtaining€a€Masterððs€Degree€in€Business€Administration€toÐ ä4 Ðenhance€her€earning€potential.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àMs.€Cummings€testified€that€on€the€two€days€a€week€when€she€worked€the€opening€shift€at€theÐ ¨ø ÐY.M.C.A.,€she€would€leave€for€work€at€4:00€a.m.€and€return€at€8:00€a.m.€to€find€that€the€baby€had€notÐ ”ä Ðbeen€fed,€bathed€or€clothed.€€Mr.€Cummings€testified€to€the€contrary,€stating€that€on€those€days€heÐ €Ð Ðproperly€cared€for€Grey.€€Ms.€Cummings€also€testified€that€when€she€went€to€work€on€WednesdayÐ l¼ Ðevenings,€her€husband€did€not€himself€take€care€of€the€baby,€but€took€him€to€his€parentsðð€house.€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àAfter€an€initial€hearing€in€the€divorce€action,€the€trial€court€ordered€that€the€parties€shareÐ 0"€  Ðresidential€placement€and€primary€custodial€responsibility€for€Grey€on€an€alternating€week€basis.€€TheÐ #l! Ðparties€continued€to€live€in€the€same€house.€€On€the€weeks€Mr.€Cummings€was€the€parent€withÐ $X" Ðresidential€placement,€he€would€usually€take€Grey€to€his€parentsðð€house€and€live€there€for€the€week.€Ð ô$D # ÐSimilarly,€on€those€weeks€Ms.€Cummings€had€residential€custody,€she€and€Grey€would€often€spendÐ à%0!$ Ðthe€week€with€her€parents,€who€would€travel€from€Missouri€and€set€up€residence€in€their€recreationalÐ Ì&"% Ðvehicle.€€A€number€of€problems€and€difficult€situations€arose.€€Mr.€Cummings€complained€that€Ms.Ð ¸'#& ÐCummings€would€not€tell€him€where€Grey€was€and€that€she€had€sometimes€left€him€at€day€care,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðcontrary€to€Mr.€Cummingsðð€wishes.€€Ms.€Cummings€felt€that€Mr.€Cummings€still€did€not€spend€timeÐ )à$( Ðwith€the€baby,€but€just€left€him€with€his€parents.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà@ 7àò òII.€€òòCourt€ProceedingsóóˆÐ ° Ðó óÌà  àOn€July€10,€2002,€Christopher€Cummings€filed€a€Complaint€for€Divorce€on€the€ground€ofÐ ˆØ Ðadultery,€stating€that€ð ð...Wife€is€carrying€on€an€affair€with€Bruce€A.€Thompson€II€and€the€relationshipÐ tÄ Ðis€blatantly€in€front€of€the€partiesðð€minor€son.ðð€€A€parenting€plan€filed€with€the€Complaint€proposedÐ `° Ðthat€the€father€be€granted€primary€residential€custody€of€Grey.€€On€July€12,€the€trial€court€issued€a€showÐ L œ Ðcause€order,€commanding€the€wife€to€appear€on€August€27,€and€to€show€cause€why€the€fatherððsÐ 8 ˆ Ðparenting€plan€should€not€be€adopted€pending€a€final€hearing.€€A€restraining€order€enjoining€the€motherÐ $ t Ðfrom€having€her€son€in€the€presence€of€Mr.€Thompson€was€issued€on€the€same€day.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àOn€August€7,€Ms.€Cummings€filed€an€Answer€and€Counter„Claim€for€divorce.€€She€denied€thatÐ è 8  Ðshe€was€involved€in€an€improper€relationship€with€Mr.€Thompson€and€asserted€that€Mr.€CummingsÐ Ô$  Ðneglected€his€family,€spending€very€little€time€at€home.€€She€also€claimed€that€he€withheld€financialÐ À  Ðsupport€from€her€and€ð ðfailed€to€pay€the€familyððs€necessary€and€reasonable€living€expenses€in€a€timelyÐ ¬ü  Ðmanner.ðð€Ms.€Cummings€asked€for€a€divorce€on€the€grounds€of€irreconcilable€differences€andÐ ˜è  Ðinappropriate€marital€conduct€and€for€sole€custody€of€Grey,€child€support,€and€alimony.€€She€also€askedÐ „Ô  Ðthat€the€separate€property€she€brought€to€the€marital€home€be€returned€to€her.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àDuring€the€hearing€of€August€27,€Pepper€Cummings€denied€that€she€had€engaged€in€a€sexualÐ H˜ Ðrelationship€with€Bruce€Thompson.€€On€September€19,€the€trial€court€entered€a€temporary€order€givingÐ 4„ Ðthe€parties€residential€custody€of€Grey€on€alternating€weeks.€€Prior€to€the€final€hearing,€Mr.€CummingsÐ  p Ðtook€the€deposition€of€Mr.€Thompson,€during€which€he€admitted€the€affair€with€Ms.€Cummings.€€TheÐ  \ Ðparties€subsequently€filed€a€written€stipulation€that€Mr.€Cummings€would€be€granted€an€absoluteÐ øH Ðdivorce€on€the€ground€of€adultery.€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àThe€final€divorce€hearing€began€on€November€1,€2002,€with€a€second€day€of€testimony€onÐ ¼  ÐNovember€13.€€When€she€took€the€stand,€Ms.€Cummings€admitted€committing€perjury€during€theÐ ¨ø Ðhearing€of€August€27.€€She€apologized€to€the€court,€and€explained€that€she€had€lied€to€her€husbandÐ ”ä Ðbecause€she€was€afraid€that€he€would€become€abusive€if€he€knew€of€her€affair,€and€that€she€had€liedÐ €Ð Ðto€the€court€out€of€fear€that€the€judge€would€take€her€child€away€from€her.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àWhile€the€accounts€of€the€parties€as€to€the€major€incidents€of€their€marriage€were€largelyÐ D!” Ðconsistent€with€each€other,€their€perspectives€were€widely€divergent.€€Chris€Cummings€testified€thatÐ 0"€  Ðhe€did€not€understand€why€his€wife€had€engaged€in€immoral€conduct€or€why€she€had€never€apologizedÐ #l! Ðto€him€or€asked€for€forgiveness.€€For€her€part,€Pepper€Cummings€was€obviously€still€angry€at€herÐ $X" Ðhusband€for€his€failure€to€provide€companionship€and€support€after€the€birth€of€their€baby.€€She€alsoÐ ô$D # Ðtestified€that€he€paid€very€little€attention€to€Grey,€and€routinely€turned€the€child€over€to€his€motherÐ à%0!$ Ðwhen€purportedly€exercising€custody€over€him.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àAt€the€conclusion€of€the€hearing,€the€trial€judge€honored€the€stipulation€of€the€parties€andÐ ¤(ô#' Ðgranted€Mr.€Cummings€an€absolute€divorce€on€the€ground€of€adultery.€€The€judge€also€announced€thatÐ )à$( Ðhe€would€take€all€other€matters€under€advisement.€€The€final€determinations€of€the€court€are€embodiedÐ |*Ì%) Ðin€its€Memorandum€and€Final€Order.€Ð h+¸&* Їà  àThe€Memorandum€invoked€the€maxims€of€equity€and€declared€that€because€of€Ms.€CummingsððÐ ° Ðperjury,€her€ð ðunclean€hands,ðð€it€was€necessary€to€deny€her€claims€for€relief.€€The€court€accordinglyÐ œì Ðsanctioned€Ms.€Cummings€for€her€perjury€by€ordering€her€to€pay€attorneyððs€fees€and€court€costs,€andÐ ˆØ Ðby€denying€her€alimony€and€payment€of€ð ðcertain€debts€and€expenses.ðð€€€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àThe€court€declared€that€it€would€not€punish€the€child€for€the€misconduct€of€its€mother,€butÐ L œ Ðwould€base€its€custody€and€child€support€decisions€on€the€relevant€statutory€factors.€€Finding€that,€onÐ 8 ˆ Ðbalance,€neither€parent€demonstrated€greater€fitness€for€the€assumption€of€primary€custody€over€GreyÐ $ t Ðthan€the€other,€the€court€ordered€that€the€mother€and€the€father€alternate€in€the€role€of€primaryÐ  ` Ðresidential€parent€every€six€months,€with€each€parent€to€exercise€reasonable€visitation€during€the€otherÐ ü L  Ðparentððs€period€of€custody.€Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àThe€court€gave€each€parent€the€power€to€make€day„to„day€decisions€for€Grey€while€the€childÐ À  Ðwas€residing€with€that€parent.€€Decision„making€authority€was€also€temporally€divided€between€theÐ ¬ü  Ðparents€on€matters€of€healthcare,€extracurricular€activities€and€religious€upbringing€with€such€authorityÐ ˜è  Ðgiven€to€the€parent€with€residential€placement.€€The€court€decreed€one€exception€to€this€equal€divisionÐ „Ô  Ðof€decision„making€authority,€however,€declaring€that€the€husband€could€make€the€decisions€regardingÐ pÀ ÐGreyððs€formal€education.€Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àOther€provisions€of€the€Final€Order€included€child€support€(husband€to€pay€$1,100€per€monthÐ 4„ Ðwhen€wife€has€custody,€wife€to€pay€$489€per€month€when€husband€has€custody),€housing€(husband€toÐ  p Ðremain€in€marital€home€and€be€responsible€for€payment€of€rent€and€utilities,€wife€to€leave),€andÐ  \ Ðinjunctions€(husband€to€refrain€from€allowing€ð ðspit€bottlesðð€of€used€chewing€tobacco€and€saliva€to€beÐ øH Ðleft€in€his€home€or€his€car€while€the€child€is€in€his€custody,€wife€to€refrain€from€having€overnight€guestsÐ ä4 Ðof€the€opposite€sex€other€than€family€members€while€the€child€is€in€her€custody).€€The€wife€was€alsoÐ Ð  Ðenjoined€from€ð ðlocating€or€residing€outside€of€Williamson€County€absent€the€express€consent€ofÐ ¼  ÐPlaintiff€or€the€Court.ðð€€This€appeal€followed.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà@7àò òIII.€€òòThe€Parenting€Arrangementóóó óˆÐ €Ð ÐÌà  àBoth€parties€agree€that€the€issues€surrounding€the€parenting€arrangement€of€their€young€childÐ X ¨ Ðare€the€most€important€raised€in€this€appeal.€€Indeed,€decisions€as€to€the€custody€of€a€child€are€amongÐ D!” Ðthe€most€important€that€courts€are€charged€with€making.€òò€Lentz€v.€Lentz,óó€717€S.W.2d€876,€877Ð 0"€  Ð(Tenn.1986);€€òòGaskill€v.€Gaskillóó,€936€S.W.2d€626,€630€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€They€are€also€amongÐ #l! Ðthe€most€difficult.Ð $X" ÐÌà  àBy€statute€as€well€as€case€law,€the€welfare€and€best€interests€of€the€child€are€the€paramountÐ à%0!$ Ðconcern€in€custody,€visitation,€and€residential€placement€determinations,€and€the€goal€of€any€such€Ð Ì&"% Ðdecision€is€to€place€the€child€in€an€environment€that€will€best€serve€his€or€her€needs.€€Tenn€Code€Ann.Ð ¸'#& Ððð€36„6„106(a);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404;€òòEldridge€v.€Eldridgeóó,€42€S.W.3d€82,€85€(Tenn.€2001);Ð ¤(ô#' ÐòòParker€v.€Parkeróó,€986€S.W.2d€557,€562€(Tenn.€1999);òò€Lentzóó,€717€S.W.2d€at€877.€€The€GeneralÐ )à$( ÐAssembly€has€found€that€ð ð[t]he€best€interests€of€the€child€are€served€by€a€parenting€arrangement€thatÐ |*Ì%) Ðbest€maintains€a€childððs€emotional€growth,€health€and€stability,€and€physical€care.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð h+¸&* Ððð€36„6„401(a).€€The€aim€of€a€custodial€or€residential€arrangement€is€to€promote€the€childððs€welfare€byÐ ° Ðcreating€an€environment€that€promotes€a€nurturing€relationship€with€each€parent.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ œì Ð36„6„404(b);€òòAaby€v.€Strangeóó,€924€S.W.2d€623,€629€(Tenn.€1996).Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àTrial€courts€must€exercise€broad€discretion€in€child€custody€matters.òò€€Parkeróó,€986€S.W.2d€atÐ `° Ð563.€€ð ð[T]he€details€of€custody€and€visitation€with€children€are€peculiarly€within€the€broad€discretionÐ L œ Ðof€the€trial€judge.ðð€€òòEldridgeóó,€42€S.W.3d€at€85,€quoting€òòSuttles€v.€Suttlesóó,€748€S.W.2d€427,€429€(Tenn.Ð 8 ˆ Ð1988).€€Like€a€custody€decision,€a€determination€of€the€best€residential€placement€plan€for€a€child€mustÐ $ t Ðturn€on€the€particular€facts€of€each€case.òòóó€€Because€of€the€discretion€given€trial€courts€in€this€area€andÐ  ` Ðbecause€of€the€fact€specific€nature€of€such€decisions,€appellate€courts€are€reluctant€to€second„guess€aÐ ü L  Ðtrial€courtððs€determination€regarding€custody€and€visitation.€€òòNelson€v.€Nelsonóó,€66€S.W.3d€896,€901Ð è 8  Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001);€òòRutherford€v.€Rutherfordóó,€971€S.W.2d€955,€956€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997)€(quotingÐ Ô$  ÐòòGaskillóó,€936€S.W.2d€at€631).€€Accordingly,€appellate€courts€will€decline€to€disturb€a€parenting€planÐ À  Ðfashioned€by€a€trial€court€unless€that€decision€is€based€on€application€of€an€incorrect€legal€standard,Ð ¬ü  Ðis€against€logic€or€reasoning,€or€is€not€supported€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòEldridgeóó,€42Ð ˜è  ÐS.W.3d€at€85;€òòNichols€v€Nicholsóó,€792€S.W.2d€713,€716€(Tenn.€1990);òò€Adelsperger€v.€Adelspergeróó,€970Ð „Ô  ÐS.W.2d€482,€485€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àIn€this€appeal,€Mother€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€establishing€an€arrangement€wherebyÐ H˜ Ðeach€parent€had€primary€custody,€or€residential€placement,€of€this€very€young€child€for€six€months€atÐ 4„ Ða€time.€€She€argues€that€proper€application€of€the€facts€to€the€relevant€statutory€factors,€as€well€as€theÐ  p Ðchildððs€need€for€continuity€and€stability,€lead€to€the€conclusion€that€she€should€be€the€primaryÐ  \ Ðresidential€custodian€of€Grey€for€the€entire€year,€with€Mr.€Cummings€having€reasonable€visitation.Ð øH ÐÌà  àMr.€Cummings€also€argues€against€the€alternating€six€month€schedule.€€However,€he€arguesÐ Ð  Ðthat€he€should€have€been€awarded€residential€placement€for€the€entire€year,€with€Ms.€CummingsÐ ¼  Ðenjoying€reasonable€visitation.€€He€argues€that€the€facts€properly€applied€to€the€applicable€statutoryÐ ¨ø Ðfactors€show€he€is€comparatively€more€fit€than€Ms.€Cummings.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àBefore€trial,€both€parents€had€submitted€proposed€permanent€parenting€plans€in€which€eachÐ l¼ Ðasked€to€have€primary€residential€placement€or€primary€or€sole€custody.€€At€trial,€Ms.€CummingsÐ X ¨ Ðtestified€that€she€was€willing€to€try,€for€six€months€or€so,€the€alternating€week€schedule€that€the€partiesÐ D!” Ðhad€been€following€pending€the€final€divorce€decree.€€However,€she€thought€additional€visitationÐ 0"€  Ðshould€be€given€the€nonresidential€parent,€stating:Ð #l! ÐÌà8  àWhat€we€do€right€now€is€Sunday€to€Sunday,€a€week€on,€a€week€off.€€But€I€believe€thatððsÐ ô$D # Ða€little€bit€long.€€I€would€like€to€see€maybe€perhaps€on€Wednesday€the€opposite€parentÐ à%0!$ Ðhave€Grey€overnight.ÐÌ&"%f!f! ÐÌà  àShe€testified€that€she€thought€such€an€arrangement,€providing€for€additional€visitation€with€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðnonresidential€parent,€would€be€in€the€childððs€best€interest€because,€at€the€childððs€young€age,€a€weekÐ )à$( Ðwas€too€long€to€go€without€visitation€with€the€other€parent.€€However,€her€preference€remained€thatÐ |*Ì%) Ðshe€be€given€primary€custody€with€reasonable€visitation€to€the€father.Ð h+¸&* Їà  àWhen€Mr.€Cummings€was€asked€what€he€thought€about€a€six„month€sharing€arrangement,׃)×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€suchÐ ° Ðas€the€one€ordered€by€the€trial€court,€he€stated,€ð ðBut€six€months?€I€would€think€that€would€be€too€longÐ œì Ðof€a€period.ðð€€When€again€asked€about€that€proposal€by€the€trial€court,€the€father€obviously€struggledÐ ˆØ Ðwith€the€question€of€which€would€be€better€for€the€child.€€He€concluded€that€the€schedule€he€proposed,Ð tÄ Ðwith€him€having€continuous€residential€placement€and€the€mother€having€visitation,€would€be€best.€Ð `° ÐÌà  àMs.€Cummings€expressed€her€objection€to€Mr.€Cummingsððs€proposal€that€he€have€primaryÐ 8 ˆ Ðresidential€custody€as€being€her€concern€that€he€would€not€spend€time€with€the€child.€€Ð $ t ÐÌà8  àI€think€every€time€„€„€the€last€two€weeks€that€Chris€has€had€with€Grey,€when€I€called€toÐ ü L  Ðcheck€on€him,€Chris€is€always€at€work.€€He€doesnððt€make€Grey€his€priority€and€heÐ è 8  Ðdoesnððt€spend€time€with€him.€€And€so,€to€me,€the€issue€is€spending€all€of€his€time€withÐ Ô$  ÐChrisððs€parents.€€When€Chris€wants€him,€he€needs€to€spend€time€with€him.€€Iððm€afraidÐ À  Ðthat€he€wonððt€do€that.Ьü f!f! ÐÌà  àMr.€Cummings€testified€that€the€reason€he€should€have€primary€custody€was€that€Ms.Ð „Ô  ÐCummings€had€had€an€affair€and€lied€to€him€about€it.€€This€caused€him€to€question€her€decision€makingÐ pÀ Ðand€whether€he€could€rely€on€her€to€truthfully€report€to€him€about€Grey.Ð \¬ ÐÌÓ  Óòòò òA.€Residential€Scheduleó óóóÐ 4„ ÐÓÑeÓÌà  àò òòòó óóóTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€36„6„404€requires€every€final€custody€order€to€incorporate€aÐ  \ Ðpermanent€parenting€plan€for€any€minor€children€the€subject€of€a€divorce,€legal€separation,€annulmentÐ øH Ðor€separate€maintenance€action.€€A€parenting€plan€is€defined€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„402(3)€as€ð ðaÐ ä4 Ðwritten€plan€for€the€parenting€and€best€interests€of€the€child,€including€the€allocation€of€parentingÐ Ð  Ðresponsibilities€and€the€establishment€of€a€residential€schedule,€as€well€as€an€award€of€child€supportÐ ¼  Ðconsistent€with€title€36,€chapter€5.ðð€€According€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404(a),€a€permanentÐ ¨ø Ðparenting€plan€shall:Ð ”ä ÐÌà8  à(1)€Provide€for€the€childððs€changing€needs€as€the€child€grows€and€matures,€in€a€way€thatÐ l¼ Ðminimizes€the€need€for€further€modifications€to€the€permanent€parenting€plan;ÐX ¨f!f! Ðà8  à(2)€Establish€the€authority€and€responsibilities€of€each€parent€with€respect€to€the€child,Ð D!” Ðconsistent€with€the€criteria€in€this€part;€Ð0"€ f!f! Ðà8  à(3)€Minimize€the€childððs€exposure€to€harmful€parental€conflict;Ð#l!f!f! Ðà8  à(4)€Provide€for€a€process€for€dispute€resolution,€before€court€action,€unless€precludedÐ $X" Ðor€limited€by€ðð€36„6„406;€.€.€.€Ðô$D #f!f! Ðà8  à(5)€Allocate€decision„making€authority€to€one€(1)€or€both€parties€regarding€the€childððsÐ à%0!$ Ðeducation,€health€care,€extracurricular€activities,€and€religious€upbringing.€€The€partiesÐ Ì&"% Ðmay€incorporate€an€agreement€related€to€the€care€and€growth€of€the€child€in€theseÐ ° Ðspecified€areas,€or€in€other€areas,€into€their€plan,€consistent€with€the€criteria€in€this€part.€Ð œì ÐRegardless€of€the€allocation€of€decision€making€in€the€parenting€plan,€the€parties€mayÐ ˆØ Ðagree€that€either€parent€may€make€emergency€decisions€affecting€the€health€or€safetyÐ tÄ Ðof€the€child;€€Ð`°f!f! Ðà8  à(6)€Provide€that€each€parent€may€make€the€day„to„day€decisions€regarding€the€care€ofÐ L œ Ðthe€child€while€the€child€is€residing€with€that€parent;Ð8 ˆf!f! Ðà8  à(7)€Provide€that€when€mutual€decision€making€is€designated€but€cannot€be€achieved,Ð $ t Ðthe€parties€shall€make€a€good€faith€effort€to€resolve€the€issue€through€the€appropriateÐ  ` Ðdispute€resolution€process,€subject€to€the€exception€set€forth€in€subdivision€(a)(4)(F);€Ðü L f!f! Ðà  à.€.€.€.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àThe€court€is€to€determine€a€residential€schedule,€which€designates€the€primary€residential€parentÐ À  Ðand€designates€in€which€parentððs€home€the€child€will€reside€on€given€days€during€the€year.€€AÐ ¬ü  Ðresidential€schedule€is€defined€as:Ð ˜è  ÐÌà8  à.€.€.€the€schedule€of€when€the€child€is€in€each€parentððs€physical€care,€and€it€shallÐ pÀ Ðdesignate€the€primary€residential€parent;׃×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€in€addition,€the€residential€schedule€shallÐ \¬ Ðdesignate€in€which€parentððs€home€each€minor€child€shall€reside€on€given€days€of€theÐ H˜ Ðyear,€including€provisions€for€holidays,€birthdays€of€family€members,€vacations,€andÐ 4„ Ðother€special€occasions,€consistent€with€the€criteria€of€this€part.€.€.€.Ð pf!f! ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„402(5).€€When€fashioning€the€residential€schedule,€the€court€is€instructed€toÐ øH Ðtake€into€account€the€factors€listed€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404(b):Ð ä4 ÐÌà8  à.€.€.€the€court€shall€make€residential€provisions€for€each€child,€consistent€with€theÐ ¼  Ðchildððs€developmental€level€and€the€familyððs€social€and€economic€circumstances,€whichÐ ¨ø Ðencourage€each€parent€to€maintain€a€loving,€stable,€and€nurturing€relationship€with€theÐ ”ä Ðchild.€€The€childððs€residential€schedule€shall€be€consistent€with€this€part.€€If€theÐ €Ð Ðlimitations€of€ðð€36„6„406€are€not€dispositive€of€the€childððs€residential€schedule,׃×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€theÐ l¼ Ðcourt€shall€consider€the€following€factors:ÐX ¨f!f! ÐÐ D!” Ðà8  à(1)€The€parentððs€ability€to€instruct,€inspire,€and€encourage€the€child€to€prepare€for€a€lifeÐ ° Ðof€service,€and€to€compete€successfully€in€the€society€which€the€child€faces€as€an€adult;Мìf!f! Ðà8  à(2)€The€relative€strength,€nature,€and€stability€of€the€childððs€relationship€with€eachÐ ˆØ Ðparent,€including€whether€a€parent€has€taken€greater€responsibility€for€performingÐ tÄ Ðparenting€responsibilities€relating€to€the€daily€needs€of€the€child;Ð`°f!f! Ðà8  à(3)€The€willingness€and€ability€of€each€of€the€parents€to€facilitate€and€encourage€a€closeÐ L œ Ðand€continuing€parent„child€relationship€between€the€child€and€the€other€parent,Ð 8 ˆ Ðconsistent€with€the€best€interests€of€the€child;Ð$ tf!f! Ðà8  à(4)€Willful€refusal€to€attend€a€court„ordered€parent€education€seminar€may€beÐ  ` Ðconsidered€by€the€court€as€evidence€of€that€parentððs€lack€of€good€faith€in€theseÐ ü L  Ðproceedings;Ðè 8 f!f! Ðà8  à(5)€The€disposition€of€each€parent€to€provide€the€child€with€food,€clothing,€medicalÐ Ô$  Ðcare,€education,€and€other€necessary€care;ÐÀ f!f! Ðà8  à(6)€The€degree€to€which€a€parent€has€been€the€primary€caregiver,€defined€as€the€parentÐ ¬ü  Ðwho€has€taken€the€greater€responsibility€for€performing€parental€responsibilities;Иè f!f! Ðà8  à(7)€The€love,€affection,€and€emotional€ties€existing€between€each€parent€and€the€child;Ð„Ô f!f! Ðà8  à(8)€The€emotional€needs€and€developmental€level€of€the€child;ÐpÀf!f! Ðà8  à(9)€The€character€and€physical€and€emotional€fitness€of€each€parent€as€it€relates€to€eachÐ \¬ Ðparentððs€ability€to€parent€or€the€welfare€of€the€child;ÐH˜f!f! Ðà8  à(10)€The€childððs€interaction€and€interrelationships€with€siblings€and€with€significantÐ 4„ Ðadults,€as€well€as€the€childððs€involvement€with€the€childððs€physical€surroundings,Ð  p Ðschool,€or€other€significant€activities;Ð \f!f! Ðà8  à(11)€The€importance€of€continuity€in€the€childððs€life€and€the€length€of€time€the€child€hasÐ øH Ðlived€in€a€stable,€satisfactory€environment;Ðä4f!f! Ðà8  à(12)€Evidence€of€physical€or€emotional€abuse€to€the€child,€to€the€other€parent€or€to€anyÐ Ð  Ðother€person;м f!f! Ðà8  à(13)€The€character€and€behavior€of€any€other€person€who€resides€in€or€frequents€theÐ ¨ø Ðhome€of€a€parent€and€such€personððs€interactions€with€the€child;Дäf!f! Ðà8  à(14)€The€reasonable€preference€of€the€child€if€twelve€(12)€years€of€age€or€older.€€TheÐ €Ð Ðcourt€may€hear€the€preference€of€a€younger€child€upon€request.€€The€preference€of€olderÐ l¼ Ðchildren€should€normally€be€given€greater€weight€than€those€of€younger€children.€ÐX ¨f!f! Ðà0  à(15)€Each€parentððs€employment€schedule,€and€the€court€may€make€accommodations€consistentÐ D!” Ðwith€those€schedules;€andÐ0"€ ¾#¾# Ðà8  à(16)€Any€other€factors€deemed€relevant€by€the€court.€Ð#l!f!f! ÐÌà  àThese€factors€incorporate€those€set€out€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„106,€the€statute€whichÐ ô$D # Ðguided€courts€in€custody€determinations€prior€to€the€parenting€plan€legislation.€€That€statute€has€notÐ à%0!$ Ðbeen€repealed.€€The€primary€concern€in€determinations€of€a€childððs€residential€placement€remains€theÐ Ì&"% Ðbest€interests€of€the€child,€and€consideration€of€the€factors€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404(b)€stillÐ ¸'#& Ðnecessitates€a€comparative€fitness€analysis.€€Ð ¤(ô#' Ðâ âÐ )à$( Ðà  àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€considered€the€relative€fitness€of€the€parties€for€parentalÐ ° Ðresponsibilities€in€light€of€the€factors€listed€above.׃!×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€court€found€that€the€mother€had€taken€greaterÐ œì Ðâ âresponsibility€for€caring€for€the€child€and€there€were€stronger€emotional€ties€between€the€child€and€theÐ ˆØ Ðmother.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404(b)(2)€and€(7).€€On€the€other€hand,€the€court€also€found€that€theÐ tÄ Ðfather€had€a€stronger€willingness€than€the€mother€to€facilitate€and€encourage€the€parent„childÐ `° Ðrelationship€between€the€child€and€the€other€parent.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404(b)(3).Ð L œ ÐÌà  àThe€court€concluded€that€some€factors€favored€the€mother€and€some€favored€the€father,€but€thatÐ $ t Ðneither€parent€was€clearly€more€fit€for€primary€residential€placement.€€The€courtððs€final€determinationÐ  ` Ðto€establish€the€six€month€alternating€schedule€appears€to€be€based€on€two€conclusions.€€First,€becauseÐ ü L  Ðof€the€childððs€young€age,€ð ðSuch€a€short€amount€of€time€has€passed€while€the€parties€have€been€parentsÐ è 8  Ðand€this€gives€the€Court€little€confidence€that€the€evidence€resoundingly€reflects€and€predicts€whichÐ Ô$  Ðparent€should€be€the€primary€residential€parent.€.€.€.ðð€€Second,€the€court€concluded€that€joint€parentingÐ À  Ðobligations€and€authority€would€not€work€and€would€lead€to€further€litigation.€€ð ðWhat€is€clear€is€thatÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€parents€are€abjectly€incompatible€and€are€not€able€to€parent€jointly.ððÐ ˜è  ÐÌà  àJust€as€the€trial€court€reviewed€the€statutory€factors,€the€parents€have€each€focused€on€thoseÐ pÀ Ðfactors,€argued€how€each€of€them€prevails€on€specific€factors,€and€asserted€that,€cumulatively,€theÐ \¬ Ðweight€of€the€factors€favors€him€or€her€as€the€primary€residential€parent.€€With€regard€to€those€factors,€Ð H˜ Ðthe€evidence€clearly€established€that€the€mother€was€Greyððs€primary€caregiver€and€was€Ð 4„ Ðoverwhelmingly€responsible€for€the€daily€needs€of€the€child€up€until€the€trial€court€established€theÐ  p Ðalternating€week€custody€schedule,€which€was€in€place€for€two€months€before€the€final€hearing.€€Tenn.Ð  \ ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404(2)€and€(6).€€In€addition,€the€factor€of€continuity,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„Ð øH Ð404(11),€would€have€weighed€in€favor€of€placing€primary€residential€care€with€the€mother,€had€the€trialÐ ä4 Ðcourtððs€òòpendente€liteóó€ruling€not€changed€the€equation.€€There€is€also€a€basis€for€the€trial€courtððsÐ Ð  Ðconclusion€that€the€motherððs€conduct€during€the€pendency€of€the€case,€although€not€evidencing€anÐ ¼  Ðattempt€to€obstruct€the€father„child€relationship,€indicated€less€cooperation€with€the€father€as€to€issuesÐ ¨ø Ðregarding€the€child.€€Although€at€trial€Ms.€Cummings€still€had€some€reservations€about€Mr.Ð ”ä ÐCummingsðð€parenting€skills€and€time€commitment€to€his€child,€she€testified€that€she€believed€he€hasÐ €Ð Ðthe€potential€to€be€a€good€parent€and€expressed€a€willingness€to€try€a€plan€that€would€more€closelyÐ l¼ Ðequalize€her€custodial€time€with€his.Ð X ¨ Ðâ âÐ D!” Ðà  àBased€on€the€record€before€us,€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€theÐ ° Ðâ âtrial€courtððs€conclusion€that€the€parents€are€equally€fit.€€That€finding,€however,€does€not€necessarilyÐ œì Ðlead€to€the€conclusion€that€the€parenting€plan€fashioned€by€the€trial€court€is€in€this€childððs€best€interests.€Ð ˆØ ÐRegardless€of€the€parentsðð€interest€in€a€custody€arrangement,€the€overriding€responsibility€of€the€courtÐ tÄ Ðis€to€approve€or€order€a€parenting€plan€that€promotes€the€best€interest€and€welfare€of€the€particularÐ `° Ðchild,€consistent€with€the€childððs€developmental€level,€which€promotes€a€stable€relationship€with€eachÐ L œ Ðparent,€and€that€maintains€a€childððs€emotional€health€and€stability.€€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àThe€child€who€is€the€subject€of€this€custody€dispute€was€one€year€old€at€the€time€of€the€trialÐ  ` Ðcourtððs€final€order€herein.€€Because€of€this€young€age,€the€childððs€developmental€level€is€a€veryÐ ü L  Ðimportant€consideration€in€fashioning€a€parenting€arrangement.€€In€its€early€years,€a€childððs€need€forÐ è 8  Ðstability€and€continuity€is€even€greater€than€in€an€older€child.€€The€extremely€young€childððs€ability€toÐ Ô$  Ðunderstand€the€changes€in€its€environment€and€separation€from€a€primary€caregiver€is€limited.€€TheÐ À  Ðphases€of€early€childhood€development,€the€ability€to€form€strong€bonds,€and€the€ability€to€tolerateÐ ¬ü  Ðseparation€from€those€with€whom€the€child€has€bonded€are€all€central€to€the€young€childððs€emotionalÐ ˜è  Ðhealth€and€welfare.€€The€arrangement€ordered€by€the€trial€court,€whereby€this€very€young€child€residesÐ „Ô  Ðprimarily€with€one€parent€for€six€months€at€a€time€and€then€is€forced€to€undergo€a€sudden€and€drasticÐ pÀ Ðchange€in€that€arrangement,€does€not€reflect€appropriate€emphasis€of€these€factors.€€Neither€parentÐ \¬ Ðsuggested€such€an€arrangement.€€When€asked€about€it€at€trial,€both€expressed€concerns€based€upon€theÐ H˜ Ðchildððs€age€and€the€length€of€time€during€which€one€parent€has€only€limited€visitation.€We€cannotÐ 4„ Ðconclude€that€the€arrangement€ordered€by€the€trial€court€is€in€the€childððs€best€interest.€€€Ð  p ÐÌà  àThat€holding,€however,€presents€this€court€with€a€difficult€dilemma:€whether€to€remand€for€aÐ øH Ðnew€parenting€plan€or€to€modify€the€trial€courtððs€plan.׃&×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€After€careful€consideration,€we€think€theÐ ä4 Ðparents€should€have€the€opportunity€to€reach€agreement€on€a€new€parenting€plan€based€on€theirÐ Ð  Ðexperiences€and€those€of€the€child€in€the€time€since€the€trial€courtððs€final€order.€€We€understand€the€trialÐ ¼  Ðcourtððs€belief€that€these€parties€could€not€cooperate€in€joint€decision„making.€€However,€we€are€hopefulÐ ¨ø Ðthat€the€passage€of€time€has€lessened€the€bitterness€of€the€failed€marriage€and€has€allowed€these€partiesÐ ”ä Ðto€grow€as€parents€whose€main€concern€is€the€welfare€of€their€child.€€If€the€parents€are€able€to€reachÐ €Ð Ðsuch€an€agreement,€they€should€seek€approval€of€the€trial€court.€€If€they€are€not,€they€should€ask€theÐ l¼ Ðcourt€to€impose€a€parenting€plan€after€consideration€of€each€parentððs€proposed€plan€and€the€currentÐ X ¨ Ðcircumstances.€€Ð D!” ÐÌà  àIn€the€interim,€however,€we€decline€to€leave€the€trial€courtððs€plan€in€place€as€is.€Because€weÐ #l! Ðhave€not€reversed€the€trial€courtððs€decision€that€the€parents€are€equally€fit,€we€will€not€modify€theÐ $X" Ðaward€of€equal€residential€time€to€each€parent.€€However,€we€think€the€childððs€best€interest€would€beÐ ô$D # Ðserved,€at€this€point,€by€a€reinstatement€of€the€arrangement€established€in€the€trial€courtððs€òòpendente€liteóóÐ à%0!$ Ðorder€that€the€parties€were€following€prior€to€the€courtððs€final€order,€with€the€amendment€suggestedÐ Ì&"% Ðby€the€mother.€€That€is,€the€parties€shall€have€residential€custody€of€the€child€on€an€alternating€weeklyÐ ° Ðbasis,€and€the€parent€who€does€not€have€the€child€in€a€particular€week€shall€be€entitled€to€overnightÐ œì Ðcustody€on€Wednesday€evening,€from€6:00€p.m.€until€9:00€a.m.€Thursday€morning.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àIn€sum,€we€vacate€the€trial€courtððs€parenting€plan€and€reinstate€the€òòpendente€liteóó€arrangement,Ð `° Ðas€modified.€€We€remand€this€case€to€the€trial€court€for€a€fresh€determination€of€a€permanent€parentingÐ L œ Ðplan€that€will€further€the€best€interest€of€the€child,€in€accordance€with€the€current€circumstances€of€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðchild€and€of€the€parties.€€As€with€any€permanent€parenting€plan€decision,€the€parties€shall€have€theÐ $ t Ðopportunity€to€propose€plans€and€to€attempt€to€agree€on€a€plan.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àThis€remand€is€also€necessitated€by€our€resolution€of€other€issues,€and€those€issues€should€alsoÐ è 8  Ðbe€addressed€in€the€development€of€the€new€permanent€parenting€plan.€€It€does€not€appear€that€anÐ Ô$  Ðactual€permanent€parenting€plan€has€been€filed.€€Such€a€plan€should€be€filed,€and€the€trial€court€shouldÐ À  Ðdirect€the€parties€to€submit€a€permanent€parenting€plan€that€meets€the€requirements€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð ¬ü  Ððð€36„6„404,€is€consistent€with€this€opinion,€and€reflects€any€further€decisions€made€by€the€trial€courtÐ ˜è  Ðafter€remand.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404;€òòHopkins€v.€Hopkinsóó,€No.€M2002„02233„SC„R11„CV,Ð „Ô  Ð2004€WL€2151200€(Tenn.€Sept.€27,€2004).€€Further,€as€discussed€more€fully€below,€the€plan€mustÐ pÀ Ðdesignate€one€parent€as€the€primary€residential€parent,€even€where€residential€time€is€split€evenly.€Ð \¬ ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„402(5);€òòHopkinsóó,€2004€WL€2151200,€at€*3.Ð H˜ ÐÌà@¼ ¼ 7àò òB.€€òòAllocation€of€Decision„MakingóóˆÐ  p Ðó óÌà  àAs€set€out€earlier,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404€(a)(5)€requires€that€a€permanent€parenting€plan:€Ð øH ÐÌà8  àAllocate€decision„making€authority€to€one€(1)€or€both€parties€regarding€the€childððsÐ Ð  Ðeducation,€health€care,€extracurricular€activities,€and€religious€upbringing.€€The€partiesÐ ¼  Ðmay€incorporate€an€agreement€related€to€the€care€and€growth€of€the€child€in€theseÐ ¨ø Ðspecified€areas,€or€in€other€areas,€into€their€plan,€consistent€with€the€criteria€in€this€part.€Ð ”ä ÐRegardless€of€the€allocation€of€decision€making€in€the€parenting€plan,€the€parties€mayÐ €Ð Ðagree€that€either€parent€may€make€emergency€decisions€affecting€the€health€or€safetyÐ l¼ Ðof€the€child;€€ÐX ¨f!f! ÐÌà  àIn€the€case€before€us,€the€trial€courtððs€final€order€included€the€following€provisions€in€regardÐ 0"€  Ðto€decision„making:Ð #l! ÐÌà8  àEach€parent€shall€make€day„to„day€decisions€regarding€the€care€of€the€child€while€theÐ ô$D # Ðchild€is€residing€with€that€parent.€€Each€parent€may€make€emergency€decisions€affectingÐ à%0!$ Ðthe€health€or€safety€of€the€child.€€When€Plaintiff€is€the€primary€residential€parent,€heÐ Ì&"% Ðshall€have€decision„making€authority€regarding€the€childððs€education,€health€care,Ð ¸'#& Ðextracurricular€activities€and€religious€upbringing.€€When€Defendant€is€the€primaryÐ ¤(ô#' Ðresidential€parent,€she€shall€have€decision„making€authority€regarding€the€childððsÐ )à$( Ðeducation,€health€care,€extracurricular€activities€and€religious€upbringing€and€PlaintiffÐ |*Ì%) Ðshall€have€decision€making€authority€regarding€the€childððs€education,€the€Court€findingÐ h+¸&* Ðthat€Plaintiff€is€financially€better€disposed€to€provide€the€child€with€education€thanÐ ° ÐDefendant.€€òòSee€óóT.C.A.€36„6„404(b)(5).òòМìf!f! ÐóóÌà  àThe€trial€courtððs€allocation€of€decision„making€authority€with€regard€to€education,€health€care,Ð tÄ Ðactivities,€and€religious€upbringing€divides€that€authority€temporally.€€This€arrangement€leads€to€theÐ `° Ðpossibility€that€the€child€could€have€two€pediatricians,€two€sets€of€other€health€care€providers,€and€twoÐ L œ Ðdifferent€child€care,€nursery€school,€or€pre„school€placements.€€He€may€be€allowed€to€participate€in€aÐ 8 ˆ Ðparticular€sport€or€activity€while€in€one€parentððs€residential€custody,€and€then€have€to€stop€because€hisÐ $ t Ðresidential€placement€changed.€€This€situation€does€not€promote€continuity;€nor€does€it€ease€theÐ  ` Ðdifficulty€a€young€child€will€experience€in€making€such€drastic€changes.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àThe€General€Assembly€has€stated€its€intent€regarding€the€parenting€plan€legislation.€€OfÐ Ô$  Ðparticular€pertinence€here,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„401(a)€provides€in€part:Ð À  ÐÌà8  àParents€have€the€responsibility€to€make€decisions€and€perform€other€parental€dutiesÐ ˜è  Ðnecessary€for€the€care€and€growth€of€their€minor€children.€€In€any€proceeding€betweenÐ „Ô  Ðparents€under€this€chapter,€the€best€interests€of€the€child€shall€be€the€standard€by€whichÐ pÀ Ðthe€court€determines€and€allocates€the€partiesðð€parental€responsibilities.€.€.€.€The€generalÐ \¬ Ðassembly€finds€the€need€for€stability€and€consistency€in€childrenððs€lives.ÐH˜f!f! ÐÌà  àThe€decision„making€allocation€ordered€by€the€trial€court€does€not€promote€consistency€andÐ  p Ðis€not€in€the€childððs€best€interests.€€Our€reinstatement€of€the€alternating€week€schedule€for€residentialÐ  \ Ðplacement€exacerbates€the€problems€inherent€in€the€trial€courtððs€division€of€decision„making€authority.€Ð øH ÐWe€vacate€the€trial€courtððs€allocation€of€decision€making€on€issues€such€as€education,€extracurricularÐ ä4 Ðactivities,€health€care,€etc.€€Unless€and€until€a€new€permanent€parenting€plan€is€agreed€to€by€the€partiesÐ Ð  Ðand€approved€by€the€court,€or€alternatively€ordered€by€the€court€if€no€agreement€is€reached,€the€partiesÐ ¼  Ðshall€have€joint€decision„making€authority€in€these€areas.€€If€the€parties€cannot€agree,€they€shall€attemptÐ ¨ø Ðto€resolve€the€issue€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404(a)(7).€€Since€the€final€order€in€thisÐ ”ä Ðcase,€the€parties€have€had€time€to€experience€parenting€and€to€recognize€the€benefits€to€their€child€ofÐ €Ð Ðtheir€cooperation€in€working€toward€his€best€interests.€€Hopefully,€their€future€actions€will€reflect€thisÐ l¼ Ðrecognition.€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àMs.€Cummings€has€also€challenged€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€full€decision„making€authorityÐ 0"€  Ðregarding€the€childððs€education€to€Mr.€Cummings.€€This€part€of€the€order€refers€to€actual€school,€notÐ #l! Ðpre„school€care€and€activities€which€are€covered€by€the€general€statement€discussed€above.€€The€trialÐ $X" Ðcourtððs€statutory€reference€is€to€one€of€the€factors€in€the€parenting€plan€statute€which€the€court€isÐ ô$D # Ðdirected€to€consider€when€fashioning€or€approving€a€residential€schedule:€ð ðThe€disposition€of€eachÐ à%0!$ Ðparent€to€provide€the€child€with€food,€clothing,€medical€care,€education€and€other€necessary€care.ððÐ Ì&"% ÐÌòòà  àóóThe€word€disposition,€with€respect€to€a€mental€state,€€means€ð ðan€attitude,€prevailing€tendency,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðor€inclination.ðð€€òòBlackððs€Law€Dictionaryóó€(6th€ed.,€1990).€€The€proof€does€not€show€that€Ms.Ð )à$( ÐCummings€is€any€less€disposed€or€inclined€to€furnish€her€child€with€a€good€education€than€is€Mr.Ð |*Ì%) ÐCummings.€€In€her€own€life,€she€has€shown€far€more€of€an€inclination€towards€educational€endeavorsÐ h+¸&* Ðthan€he€has.€€She€earned€a€bachelorððs€degree€in€four€years,€taught€for€several€years€at€Watkins,€and€isÐ ° Ðnow€pursuing€a€masterððs€degree.€€For€his€part,€Mr.€Cummings€also€earned€a€bachelorððs€degree,€but€itÐ œì Ðtook€him€eleven€years€to€do€so.€€The€proof€shows€that€Mr.€Cummings€is€inclined€to€pay€to€send€hisÐ ˆØ Ðchild€to€a€particular€school,€not€that€he€is€any€better€disposed€to€provide€the€child€with€an€education.€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àThe€testimony€of€the€parties€shows€a€difference€of€opinion€between€the€parties€as€to€the€bestÐ L œ Ðschool€for€Grey€to€attend€when€he€comes€of€age.€€Mr.€Cummings€wants€Grey€to€go€to€David€Lipscomb,Ð 8 ˆ Ða€private€school€where€he€himself€was€educated.€€Ms.€Cummings€does€not€want€Grey€to€go€toÐ $ t ÐLipscomb,€but€to€a€public€school€or€to€a€different€private€school.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àMr.€Cummings€expressed€a€willingness€to€pay€for€Greyððs€tuition€at€Lipscomb,€and€is€currentlyÐ è 8  Ðin€a€better€financial€position€than€his€former€wife.€€These€circumstances€furnished€the€factual€premiseÐ Ô$  Ðfor€the€trial€judgeððs€finding€that€ð ðPlaintiff€is€financially€better€disposed€to€provide€the€child€withÐ À  Ðeducation€than€Defendant.ðð€However,€financial€ability€is€not€the€same€as€disposition,€and€decision„Ð ¬ü  Ðmaking€authority€does€not€depend€on€the€relative€wealth€of€the€parents.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àMs.€Cummings€cites€the€case€of€òòSmith€v.€Smith,óó€220€S.W.2d€227,€629€(Tenn.1949)€for€theÐ pÀ Ðproposition€that€in€matters€of€custody,€including€questions€of€which€parent€is€to€exercise€decision„Ð \¬ Ðmaking€authority€over€different€aspects€of€the€childððs€life,€the€paramount€consideration€must€be€alwaysÐ H˜ Ðthe€childððs€best€interest,€rather€than€which€parent€is€more€financially€capable.€€òòSmithóó€does€notÐ 4„ Ðspecifically€involve€educational€decision„making,€but€we€agree€that€money€should€not€be€theÐ  p Ðdetermining€factor€in€allocating€parental€responsibilities.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àòòóóThe€decision€of€where€and€how€a€child€should€be€educated€is€generally€left€to€the€parents,€andÐ ä4 Ðcourts€are€reluctant€to€interfere€in€issues€so€fundamental€to€the€right€to€rear€a€child.€€However,€whereÐ Ð  Ðparents€divorce€and€are€unable€to€agree€on€the€best€school€for€their€child,€courts€may€have€to€becomeÐ ¼  Ðinvolved.€€In€essence,€that€is€what€the€trial€court€did€here:€choose€a€school.€€When€making€such€aÐ ¨ø Ðdecision,€however,€courts€must€avoid€engaging€in€presumptions€unsupported€by€proof€in€the€record.€Ð ”ä ÐThe€decision€must€be€made€based€on€the€best€interests€of€individual€child€whose€education€is€at€issue.Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àThere€is€no€proof€that€attendance€at€any€particular€school,€or€even€any€particular€type€of€school,Ð X ¨ Ðwill€serve€Greyððs€best€interests€to€a€greater€extent€that€any€other€school,€and€it€does€not€seem€likely€thatÐ D!” Ðany€such€proof€can€be€produced€at€such€an€early€point€in€this€childððs€life.€€While€we€recognize€that€itÐ 0"€  Ðis€the€goal€of€the€parenting€plan€legislation€to€work€out€as€many€details€as€possible€in€order€to€avoidÐ #l! Ðfuture€conflicts,€in€view€of€the€facts€of€this€case,€involving€a€one„year„old€child,€we€cannot€agree€thatÐ $X" Ðthe€childððs€best€interests€are€served€by€the€allocation€of€sole€decision„making€authority€regardingÐ ô$D # Ðeducation€to€the€father€at€this€point.€€Many€things€can€change€in€these€partiesðð€lives€before€Grey€reachesÐ à%0!$ Ðschool€age.€€More€importantly,€Grey€himself€will€have€grown€and€developed;€his€skills,€aptitudes,Ð Ì&"% Ðinterests,€emotional€health,€social€proclivities,€and€his€needs€in€an€educational€environment€will€beÐ ¸'#& Ðmore€identifiable.€€His€best€interests€may€then€be€better€determined,€hopefully€by€his€parents;€if€not,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðby€the€court.Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àWe€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€sole€decision„making€authority€regarding€the€childððsÐ ° Ðâ âeducation€to€the€father€and€direct€that€the€new€permanent€parenting€plan€assign€that€responsibility€toÐ œì Ðthe€parents€jointly,€unless€the€parents€submit€an€agreed€parenting€plan€providing€otherwise€that€isÐ ˆØ Ðapproved€by€the€court.€€Again,€the€plan€should€provide€for€resolution€of€any€future€disagreement€overÐ tÄ Ðthis€issue€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„404(a)(7).Ð `° ÐÌÓ  Óòòò òC.€Child€Supportó óóóÐ 8 ˆ ÐÓ$ÛÓÌà  àIn€its€final€order,€the€trial€court€established€the€child€support€obligations€of€the€parents€basedÐ  ` Ðupon€each€parentððs€tenure€as€the€primary€residential€parent€and€each€parentððs€income€using€the€ChildÐ ü L  ÐSupport€Guidelines.€€During€the€time€Ms.€Cummings€is€the€primary€residential€parent,€Mr.€CummingsÐ è 8  Ðis€to€pay€her€$1100€per€month.€€During€the€time€Mr.€Cummings€is€the€residential€parent,€Ms.Ð Ô$  ÐCummings€is€to€pay€him€$489€per€month.Ð À  ÐÌà  àBoth€parties€challenge€the€trial€courtððs€child€support€award,€essentially€asserting€that€theÐ ˜è  Ðamount€of€support€was€based€upon€an€incorrect€determination€of€the€income€of€each€parent.€€However,Ð „Ô  Ða€recent€decision€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court,€decided€after€the€entry€of€the€trial€courtððs€orderÐ pÀ Ðherein,€calls€the€award€into€question€on€other€grounds.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àIn€òòHopkinsóó,€2004€WL€2151200,€the€Court€determined€that,€even€where€residential€time€isÐ 4„ Ðdivided€equally€between€the€parents,€the€court€must€designate€one€of€the€parents€as€the€primaryÐ  p Ðresidential€parent.€ð ðTennesseeððs€statutes€require€both€a€residential€schedule,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ  \ Ð36„6„404(b)€(2001),€and€the€designation€of€a€primary€residential€parent,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„Ð øH Ð402(5).ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€*3.€€While€affirming€the€intermediate€appellate€courtððs€determination€that€the€parentsÐ ä4 Ðshould€equally€share€residential€time,€the€Court€vacated€the€lower€courtððs€award€of€child€supportÐ Ð  Ðbecause€the€court€had€failed€to€designate€a€primary€residential€parent,€and€the€eligibility€for€childÐ ¼  Ðsupport€is€based€on€such€a€designation.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àThe€Court€relied€on€its€previous€holding€in€òòGray€v.€Grayóó,€78€S.W.3d€881,€884€(Tenn.€2002)Ð €Ð Ðthat€child€support€cannot€be€awarded€to€the€parent€who€is€not€the€primary€residential€parent.€€The€courtÐ l¼ Ðalso€rejected€the€fatherððs€arguments€that€where€residential€placement€is€evenly€divided,€either€(1)€bothÐ X ¨ Ðparentsðð€incomes€should€be€considered,׃"×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€or€(2)€neither€parent€should€be€obligated€to€pay€support.Ð D!” Ðâ âÐ 0"€  Ðà  àIn€the€case€before€us,€the€trial€court€made€an€alternating€designation€of€each€parent€as€theÐ ° Ðâ âprimary€residential€parent€for€six€months€at€a€time.€€While€that€designation€accurately€reflected€theÐ œì Ðactual€situation€arising€from€the€courtððs€residential€schedule,€we€conclude€that€the€Supreme€CourtððsÐ ˆØ Ðholdings€and€analysis€in€òòGrayóó€and€òòHopkinsóó€preclude€the€designation€of€both€parents€as€the€primaryÐ tÄ Ðresidential€parent,€even€on€an€alternating€basis.€€As€the€Court€pointed€out,€the€designation€hasÐ `° Ðconsequences€with€regard€to€other€state€and€federal€statutes€that€require€designation€of€one€parent€asÐ L œ Ðthe€primary€custodian.€€òòHopkinsóó,€2004€WL€2151200,€at€*3€n.3;€òòsee€also€óóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„410.€Ð 8 ˆ ÐWe€think€the€Supreme€Court€has€interpreted€the€Child€Support€Guidelines€and€the€parenting€planÐ $ t Ðlegislation€as€requiring€the€designation€of€only€one€parent€as€the€primary€residential€parent€and€asÐ  ` Ðprohibiting€the€designation€of€both€parents€as€such.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àConsequently,€we€must€vacate€the€trial€courtððs€alternating€designation€of€both€parents€as€theÐ Ô$  Ðprimary€residential€parent€and€the€courtððs€award€of€child€support€based€on€that€rotating€status.׃ ×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€OnÐ À  Ðremand,€the€trial€court€should€designate€either€Ms.€Cummings€or€Mr.€Cummings€as€the€primaryÐ ¬ü  Ðresidential€parent€and€calculate€the€amount€of€support,€if€any,€due€to€the€primary€residential€parent.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àð ðPrimary€residential€parent€defined€as€ð ðthe€parent€with€whom€the€child€resides€more€than€fiftyÐ pÀ Ðpercent€(50%)€of€the€time.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„402(4).€€In€an€arrangement€where€each€parentÐ \¬ Ðhas€an€exactly€equal€amount€of€residential€placement€time,€neither€parent€actually€meets€thisÐ H˜ Ðdefinition.׃%×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€However,€even€though€there€may€be€no€primary€residential€parent€in€fact,€the€law€requiresÐ 4„ Ðthe€designation€of€one€parent€as€the€primary€residential€parent,€regardless€of€the€statutory€definition.Ð  p ÐÌà  àThe€Supreme€Court€did€not€provide€guidance€in€òòHopkinsóó€on€the€factors€to€be€considered€inÐ øH Ðdesignating€one€parent€as€the€primary€residential€parent€where€neither€parent€has€residential€custodyÐ ä4 Ðof€the€child€more€than€50%€of€the€time.€€By€the€time€a€trial€court€has€reached€the€conclusion€thatÐ Ð  Ðequally€shared€residential€time€is€in€the€childððs€best€interests,€it€will€have€already€considered€all€the€Ð ¼  Ðstatutory€criteria€relevant€to€primary€residential€custody,€such€as€continuity,€parent„child€attachment,€Ð ¨ø Ðability€and€willingness€to€provide€for€the€childððs€needs,€etc.€€After€considering€those€factors,€the€courtÐ ”ä Ðwill€have€concluded€that€the€parents€should€share€residential€time€equally,òò€i.e.óó,€that€neither€parentÐ €Ð Ðshould€have€residential€placement€for€more€than€50%€of€the€time.€Consequently,€when€the€court€mustÐ l¼ Ðby€law€designate€a€primary€residential€parent€after€having€determined€that€neither€parent€should,€inÐ X ¨ Ðfact,€be€the€primary€residential€parent,€the€statutory€factors€have€little€relevance.€€Otherwise,€we€wouldÐ D!” Ðbe€requiring€the€court€to€re„evaluate€the€same€factors.Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àHowever,€the€designation€of€primary€residential€parent€has€a€practical€and€immediate€effect€ofÐ $X" Ðthe€childððs€right€to€support€and,€therefore,€on€the€childððs€best€interests.€€Therefore,€when€designatingÐ ô$D # Ða€primary€residential€parent€in€a€situation€where€all€the€other€relevant€factors€lead€to€equally€sharedÐ à%0!$ Ðresidential€time,€we€think€the€trial€court€should€consider€the€fact€that€only€the€primary€residential€parentÐ Ì&"% Ðis€entitled€to€receive€support.€€ð ðChild€support€payments€are€for€the€benefit€of€the€child,€and€both€parentsÐ ° Ðhave€a€duty€to€support€their€minor€children.ðð€€òòHopkinsóó,€2004€WL€2151200,€at€*2,€citingòò€Gallaher€v.Ð œì ÐGallaheróó,€104€S.W.3d€455,€461€(Tenn.€2003).€€One€of€the€major€goals€of€the€Child€Support€GuidelinesÐ ˆØ Ðis:Ð tÄ ÐÌà8  àTo€ensure€that€when€parents€live€separately,€the€economic€impact€on€the€child(ren)€isÐ L œ Ðminimized€and€to€the€extent€that€either€parent€enjoys€a€higher€standard€of€living,€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðchild(ren)€share(s)€in€that€higher€standard.Ð$ tf!f! ÐÌTenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.€1240„2„4„.02€(2)(e).Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àConsequently,€when€one€parentððs€income€is€greater€than€the€otherððs,€the€child€should€not€beÐ Ô$  Ðdisadvantaged€by€a€determination€that€deprives€the€child€of€€support€that€would€help€him€or€her€shareÐ À  Ðin€that€parentððs€economic€advantage.€€All€other€factors€being€equal,€we€think€this€considerationÐ ¬ü  Ðmilitates€in€favor€of€designating€the€parent€with€lower€income,€when€the€difference€is€enough€to€affectÐ ˜è  Ðthe€childððs€standard€of€living,€as€the€primary€residential€parent€when€residential€time€is€shared€equally.€Ð „Ô  ÐOf€course,€the€other€parentððs€support€obligation€may€be€reduced€because€of€the€greater€than€standardÐ pÀ Ðtime€he€or€she€has€residential€custody€of€the€child,€and€the€courts€should€make€a€case„by„caseÐ \¬ Ðdetermination€of€the€amount€of€support€due.€€òòHopkinsóó,€2004€WL€2151200,€at€*3;€òòGrayóó,€78€S.W.3d€atÐ H˜ Ð884;€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.€1240„2„4„.04(2)(b).Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àBecause€it€is€important€that€the€child€herein€not€be€deprived€of€the€benefit€of€support€duringÐ  \ Ðthe€time€it€may€take€for€a€new€parenting€plan€to€the€developed,€approved,€or€ordered,€and€based€uponÐ øH Ðthe€trial€courtððs€rulings€on€child€support,€during€the€interim€until€a€new€plan€is€in€effect€Ms.€CummingsÐ ä4 Ðshall€be€designated€as€the€primary€residential€parent.€€Based€upon€the€trial€courtððs€calculations€of€Mr.Ð Ð  ÐCummingsðð€support€obligation€under€the€Guidelines,€and€deviating€downward€from€that€amount€dueÐ ¼  Ðto€the€extended€time€Grey€will€be€in€Mr.€Cummingsðð€physical€custody,€Mr.€Cummings€shall€pay€to€Ms.Ð ¨ø ÐCummings€child€support€in€the€amount€of€$500€per€month€until€a€new€parenting€plan€setting€supportÐ ”ä Ðis€entered.Ð €Ð ÐÌà@°°"7àò òIV.€€òòThe€Injunctionóóó óˆÐ X ¨ ÐÌà  àThe€trial€courtððs€final€order€includes€an€injunction€to€prevent€Ms.€Cummings€from€residingÐ 0"€  Ðoutside€Williamson€County€ð ðabsent€the€express€consent€of€Plaintiff€[Mr.€Cummings]€or€the€Court.ðð׃×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р#l! ÐWe€can€find€no€basis€in€law€for€the€trial€courtððs€injunction€preventing€an€adult€citizen€from€livingÐ $X" Ðwhere€she€may€choose.Ð ô$D # ÐÌà  àTo€the€extent€the€court€based€the€injunction€on€some€concern€about€the€mother€relocating€withÐ Ì&"% Ðthe€child,€that€situation€is€governed€by€statute.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„6„108.€€òòSee€Caudill€v.€Foley,óóÐ ¸'#& Ð21€S.W.3d€203,€206€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000);€òòHelton€v.€Heltonóó,€No.€M2002„02792„COA„R3„CV,€2004Ð ¤(ô#' ÐWL€63478€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€January€13,€2004)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed).€The€statuteÐ )à$( Ðis€not€designed€to€give€the€courts€the€authority€to€dictate€where€divorced€parents€must€live,€but€onlyÐ ° Ðto€protect€the€visitation€rights€of€non„custodial€parents€in€situations€where€the€custodial€parent€wishesÐ œì Ðto€relocate€to€another€state€or€more€than€100€miles€from€the€residence€of€the€non„custodial€parent.€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àThere€is€no€proposed€relocation€in€the€case€before€us€and€no€notice€that€would€trigger€theÐ `° Ðcourtððs€involvement€in€that€decision.€€Even€in€those€situations€involving€a€proposed€relocation€toÐ L œ Ðanother€state,€the€statute€does€not€bar€relocation,€but€merely€sets€out€a€procedure€that€the€custodialÐ 8 ˆ Ðparent€must€follow€in€order€to€obtain€the€courtððs€permission€to€move€with€the€child.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àWe€accordingly€vacate€the€injunction€because€it€is€beyond€the€courtððs€authority.Ð ü L  ÐÌà@´´"7àò òV.€€òòProperty€Issuesóóó óˆÐ Ô$  ÐÌà  àMs.€Cummings€challenges€the€trial€courtððs€distribution€of€the€partiesðð€property€on€two€grounds.€Ð ¬ü  ÐFirst,€she€argues€that€the€court€awarded€property€that€was€her€separate€property€to€Mr.€Cummings.€Ð ˜è  ÐSecond,€she€argues€that€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€marital€property€was€inequitable€and€that€theÐ „Ô  Ðallocation€of€marital€debt€was€inequitable.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àMs.€Cummings€is€correct,€of€course,€in€asserting€that€separate€property€is€not€subject€to€divisionÐ H˜ Ðor€distribution.€€òòóóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(a)(1);€òòBrock€v.€Brockóó,€941€S.W.2d€896,€900€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð 4„ ÐApp.€1996);€òòCutsinger€v.€Cutsingeróó,€917€S.W.2d€238,€241€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€The€general€rulesÐ  p Ðfor€determining€whether€property€is€separate€or€marital€are€found€in€statute.€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€36„4„Ð  \ Ð121(b)(1)€&€„121(b)(2).€Property€owned€by€a€party€before€marriage€is€generally€classified€as€separateÐ øH Ðproperty€and€remains€with€the€original€owner.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b).€€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àOn€appeal,€Ms.€Cummings€asserts€that€the€proof€showed€that€prior€to€the€marriage€she€ownedÐ ¼  Ðhousehold€furnishings,€while€Mr.€Cummings€owned€none.׃-×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€She€particularly€disputes€the€award€to€Mr.Ð ¨ø ÐCummings€of€half€the€dishes,€silverware€and€cookware.€€On€appeal,€Mr.€Cummings€does€not€disputeÐ ”ä Ðthe€ownership€of€these€items€and€volunteered€to€return€the€dishes,€silverware,€and€cookware€that€Ms.Ð €Ð ÐCummings€owned€prior€to€the€marriage.€€We€agree€that€they€should€be€restored€to€her.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àIn€addition,€Ms.€Cummings€asserts€the€she€owned€pieces€of€baby€furniture€that€are€familyÐ D!” Ðheirlooms€and€that€the€parties€were€using€for€Grey.€€Consequently,€she€objects€to€the€trial€courtððs€orderÐ 0"€  Ðthat:Ð #l! ÐÌÒ°ÒÒÒAll€of€the€minor€childððs€furnishings,€toys€and€clothing€currently€at€the€maritalÐ ô$D # Ðresidence€shall€remain€there€as€the€property€of€the€child.€€Only€that€which€PlaintiffÐ à%0!$ Ðagrees€may€go€with€Defendant€shall€go€with€Defendant.Ð Ì&"% ÐÐ ¸'#& ÐÒ°ÒÒ°Òà  àThe€proof€shows€that€furnishings€used€for€Grey€include€an€antique€crib€and€changing€tableÐ ° Ðthat€belonged€to€Ms.€Cummingsðð€family€before€the€marriage.€€Mr.€Cummings€stipulated€on€appealÐ œì Ðthat€he€had€no€objection€to€the€mother€regaining€possession€of€above€items€after€Grey€no€longer€hadÐ ˆØ Ðneed€of€them.€€However,€since€these€are€the€wifeððs€separate€property,€not€the€childððs,€they€shouldÐ tÄ Ðhave€been€awarded€to€her€as€her€separate€property,€and€she€is€entitled€to€regain€possession€of€theseÐ `° Ðitems€immediately€if€she€wishes.Ð L œ ÐÌà  àMs.€Cummingsðð€second€argument€regarding€property€is€that€the€division€of€marital€propertyÐ $ t Ðwas€inequitable.€€She€has€provided€a€table€reflecting€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€various€pieces€ofÐ  ` Ðproperty€and€the€valuation€given€those€pieces€by€the€parties.€€She€first€argues€that€the€apparentÐ ü L  Ðdivision€is€misleading€because€the€court€included€two€pieces€of€property€that€neither€party€owned.€Ð è 8  ÐThe€first€is€a€1967€Camaro€which€Ms.€Cummings€testified,€without€contradiction,€belonged€to€herÐ Ô$  Ðparents.€The€second€is€an€investment€account€that€she€stated€was€not€hers€but€was€an€asset€of€herÐ À  Ðdeceased€fatherððs€estate.€€When€the€total€value€assigned€to€those€two€items€by€Ms.€Cummings€isÐ ¬ü  Ðdeducted,€Ms.€Cummings€values€the€property€awarded€to€her€at€$19,250€and€that€awarded€to€Mr.Ð ˜è  ÐCummings€at€$17,350.€€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€is€charged€with€equitably€dividing,€distributing,€or€assigning€the€maritalÐ \¬ Ðproperty€in€ð ðproportions€as€the€court€deems€just.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(a)(1);€òòJolly€v.€Jollyóó,Ð H˜ Ð130€S.W.3d€783,€785€(Tenn.€2004).€€The€court€is€to€consider€all€relevant€factors€in€its€distribution.€Ð 4„ ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(c)€(listing€the€factors€to€be€considered).€€The€court€may€consider€anyÐ  p Ðother€factors€necessary€in€determining€the€equities€between€the€parties,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„Ð  \ Ð121(c)(11),€except€that€division€of€marital€property€is€to€be€made€without€regard€to€marital€fault.€Ð øH ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(a)(1).Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àThe€courtððs€distribution€of€property€ð ðis€not€achieved€by€a€mechanical€application€of€theÐ ¼  Ðstatutory€factors,€but€rather€by€considering€and€weighing€the€most€relevant€factors€in€light€of€theÐ ¨ø Ðunique€facts€of€the€case.ðð€€òòBatson€v.€Batsonóó,€769€S.W.2d€849,€859€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€AnÐ ”ä Ðequitable€distribution€is€not€necessarily€an€equal€one,€and€a€division€is€not€rendered€inequitableÐ €Ð Ðsimply€because€it€is€not€precisely€equal.€€€òòCohen€v.€Cohenóó,€937€S.W.2d€823,€832€(Tenn.€1996);Ð l¼ ÐòòKinard€v.€Kinardóó,€986€S.W.2d€220,€230€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998);€òòWord€v.€Wordóó,€937€S.W.2d€931,€933Ð X ¨ Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).Ð D!” ÐÌà  àBecause€dividing€a€marital€estate€is€a€process€guided€by€considering€all€relevant€factors,€inÐ #l! Ðlight€of€the€facts€of€a€particular€case,€a€trial€court€has€a€great€deal€of€discretion€concerning€the€mannerÐ $X" Ðin€which€it€divides€marital€property.€€òòJollyóó,€130€S.W.3d€at€785;€òòFlannery€v.€Flanneryóó,€121€S.W.3dÐ ô$D # Ð647,€650€(Tenn.€2003);€òòSmith€v.€Smithóó,€984€S.W.2d€606,€609€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€AppellateÐ à%0!$ Ðcourts€ordinarily€defer€to€the€trial€courtððs€decision€unless€it€is€inconsistent€with€the€factors€in€Tenn.Ð Ì&"% ÐCode€Ann.€ðð36„4„121(c)€or€is€not€supported€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€òòJollyóó,€130€S.W.3dÐ ¸'#& Ðat€785„86.Ð ¤(ô#' Ðâ âÐ )à$( ÐÑ#ïOÑâ #âÑe°Ñâ #âÑ  Ñà  àBased€on€our€review€of€the€record,€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€evidence€preponderatesÐ e Ðagainst€the€trial€courtððs€division€or€that€the€division€is€inconsistent€with€the€relevant€factors.€€WeÐ Qì Ðaffirm€the€courtððs€division€of€marital€property€as€equitable.Ð =Ø Ðâ âÌà  àMs.€Cummings€also€challenges€the€trial€courtððs€allocation€of€marital€debt€as€inequitable€inÐ ° Ðlight€of€the€relevant€factors:€(1)€which€party€incurred€the€debt,€(2)€the€purpose€of€the€debt,€(3)€whichÐ  œ Ðparty€benefitted€from€incurring€the€debt,€and€(4)€which€party€is€better€able€to€repay€the€debt.€€òòAlfordÐ í ˆ Ðv.€Alfordóó,€120€S.W.3d€810,€814€(Tenn.€2003);€òòKing€v.€Kingóó,€986€S.W.2d€216,€218€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð Ù t Ð1998);€òòMondelli€v.€Howardóó,€780€S.W.2d€769,€773€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€€She€argues€that€most€ofÐ Å ` Ðthe€debt€incurred€during€the€marriage€was€for€the€benefit€of€the€family,€that€both€parties€thereforeÐ ± L  Ðbenefitted€from€it,€and€that€Mr.€Cummings€is€better€able€to€pay€the€debts.Ð  8  ÐÌà  àAll€debts€incurred€by€either€or€both€spouses€during€the€course€of€the€marriage€up€to€the€dateÐ u  Ðof€the€final€divorce€hearing€are€marital€debts.€€òòAlfordóó,€120€S.W.3d€at€813.€€Like€marital€property,Ð aü  Ðmarital€debt€is€subject€to€equitable€distribution.€€òòIdóó.€€Application€of€the€four€factors€listed€aboveÐ Mè  Ðinsures€a€fair€allocation€and€protection€of€one€spouse€from€the€personal€excesses€of€the€other.€€òòIdóó.€atÐ 9Ô  Ð814.Ð %À ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€ordered€Mr.€Cummings€to€pay€the€Sears€debt€and€one„half€the€Bank€ofÐ ý˜ ÐAmerica€debt,€for€a€total€of€$6,054.€€It€ordered€Ms.€Cummings€to€pay€four€credit€card€debts€and€theÐ é„ Ðother€half€of€the€Bank€of€America€debt,€for€a€total€of€$15,343.€€Ms.€Cummings€had€the€credit€cardsÐ Õp Ðbefore€the€marriage€and€owed€balances€on€them€at€that€time€of€approximately€$4,563.׃(×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€SubtractingÐ Á\ Ðthose€balances,€Ms.€Cummings€was€ordered€to€pay€$10,780€of€the€debt€incurred€during€the€marriage.€Ð ­H ÐThus,€out€of€the€total€debt€incurred€during€the€marriage,€$16,834,€the€husband€was€ordered€to€payÐ ™4 Ð36%€and€the€wife€was€assigned€64%.Ð …  ÐÌà  àMs.€Cummings€does€not€object€to€being€assigned€the€debt€she€had€accumulated€before€theÐ ]ø Ðmarriage.€€Instead,€she€argues€that€although€the€credit€cards€were€in€her€name,€the€charges€madeÐ Iä Ðduring€the€marriage€were€for€the€family.€€The€evidence€supports€that€argument.€€She€also€argues€thatÐ 5Ð Ðher€income€is€much€smaller€than€her€former€husbandððs,€and€the€evidence€also€supports€that€position.€Ð !¼ ÐAt€the€time€of€the€parties€met,€Ms.€Cummings€was€working€and€Mr.€Cummings€was€not.€€At€herÐ  ¨ Ðhusbandððs€request,€Ms.€Cummings€gave€up€her€employment€after€the€birth€of€their€child.€€When€theÐ ù ” Ðmarriage€began€deteriorating,€she€began€working€part€time.€€Meanwhile,€Mr.€Cummings€had€startedÐ å!€  Ða€business€and€worked€industriously€to€make€it€successful.Ð Ñ"l! ÐÌà  àWe€agree€that€the€debt€incurred€during€the€marriage€should€be€more€equitably€divided.€Ð ©$D # ÐHowever,€we€do€not€agree€that€Mr.€Cummings€should€be€assigned€all€but€one€account,€as€suggestedÐ •%0!$ Ðby€Ms.€Cummings.€€We€think€an€equal€division€would€be€equitable€under€the€facts€of€this€case.€Ð &"% ÐTherefore,€we€modify€the€trial€courtððs€allocation€of€marital€debt.€€Mr.€Cummings€shall€be€responsibleÐ m'#& Ðfor€the€$4,754€debt€to€Sears€and€$1,300€of€the€Bank€of€America€debt,€as€ordered€by€the€trial€court.€Ð Y(ô#' ÐIn€addition,€he€shall€pay€to€Ms.€Cummings€$2,062€to€equalize€the€debt€incurred€during€theÐ e Ðmarriage.׃'×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð Qì ÐÌà@88 ìàò òVI.€€òòAttorneyððs€feesóóó óˆÐ )Ä ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€ordered€Ms.€Cummings€to€pay€her€former€husband€$11,000€for€attorneyððs€fees,Ð  œ Ðexpenses,€and€costs€as€a€sanction€for€her€perjury€in€the€first€hearing.€€Ð í ˆ ÐÌÔ‡*XEXXXEÔà  àGenerally,€an€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€in€divorce€cases€is€considered€alimony€or€spousalÐ Å ` Ðsupport,€generally€characterized€as€alimony€òòin€solidoóó.€€òòYount€v.€Yountóó,€91€S.W.3d€777,€783€(Tenn.Ð ± L  ÐCt.€App.€2002);òò€Miller€v.€Milleróó,€81€S.W.3d€771,€775€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001);€òòWilder€v.€Wilderóó,€66Ð  8  ÐS.W.3d€892,€894€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001).òò€€óóCourts€are€authorized€to€award€ð ðsuitable€support€andÐ ‰$  Ðmaintenance€of€either€spouse€by€the€other€spouse€.€.€.€according€to€the€nature€of€the€case€and€theÐ u  Ðcircumstances€of€the€parties.€.€.€.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€AnnÔ#†XEXX*XEô4#ÔÔ‡*XEXXXEÔ€ðð€36„5„101(a)(1).Ð aü  ÐÔ#†XEXX*XEÝ7#ÔÔ‡*XEXXXEÔòòÌóóà  àBecause€attorneyððs€fees€are€considered€alimony€or€spousal€support,€an€award€of€such€fees€isÐ 9Ô  Ðsubject€to€the€same€factors€that€must€be€considered€in€the€award€of€any€other€type€of€alimony.€€òòYountóó,Ð %À Ð91€S.W.3d€at€783;€òòLindsey€v.€Lindseyóó,€976€S.W.2d€175,€181€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€Therefore,€allÐ ¬ Ðrelevant€factors,€including€those€listed€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1),€are€to€be€consideredÐ ý˜ Ðand€balanced€in€a€determination€of€whether€to€award€attorneyððs€fees.€€òòLangschmidt€v.€Langschmidtóó,Ð é„ Ð81€S.W.3d€741,€751€(Tenn.€2000);òò€Kincaid€v.€Kincaidóó,€912€S.W.2d€140,€144€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).Ð Õp ÐòòSee€also€Ô#†XEXX*XEI8#ÔRobertson€v.€Robertsonóó,€76€S.W.3d€337,€338€(Tenn.€2002);€òòAnderton€v.€Andertonóó,€988Ð Á\ ÐS.W.2d€675,€682„83€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€Ô‡*XEXXXEÔÐ ­H ÐÌÔ#†XEXX*XE'<#Ôà  àAmong€the€factors€relevant€to€an€award€of€alimony,€the€two€considered€to€be€the€mostÐ …  Ðimportant€are€the€disadvantaged€spouseððs€need€and€the€obligor€spouseððs€ability€to€pay.€€òòRobertsonóó,Ð q  Ð76€S.W.3d€at€342;€òòBogan€v.€Boganóó,€60€S.W.3d€721,€730€(Tenn.€2001);òò€Ô‡*XEXXXEÔAaron€v.€Aaronóó,€909€S.W.2dÐ ]ø Ð408,€410€(Tenn.€1995).€€As€with€other€forms€of€spousal€support,€the€need€of€the€spouse€requestingÐ Iä Ðthe€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€is€the€single€most€important€factor;€the€most€important€factors€are€theÐ 5Ð Ðreal€need€of€the€disadvantaged€spouse,€a€demonstrated€financial€inability€to€obtain€counsel,€and€theÐ !¼ Ðability€of€the€obligor€spouse€to€pay.€€€€òòMilleróó,€81€S.W.3d€at€775;€òòóó€òòWilderóó,€66€S.W.3d€at€895;€òòWattersóó,Ð  ¨ Ð22€S.W.3d€at€821;€òòCranfordóó,€772€S.W.2d€at€50.Ô#†XEXX*XEÃ=#Ô€€Consequently,€a€spouse€with€adequate€property€andÐ ù ” Ðincome€is€generally€not€entitled€to€an€award€of€additional€alimony€to€compensate€for€attorneyððs€feesÐ å!€  Ðand€expenses,€depending€on€all€relevant€factors.€€òòWilderóó,€66€S.W.3d€at€895Ô‡*XEXXXEÔ;òò€Koja€v.€Kojaóó,€42€S.W.3dÐ Ñ"l! Ð94,€98€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000);€òòUmstot€v.€Umstotóó,€968€S.W.2d€819,€824€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997);€Ð ½#X" ÐòòHoughland€v.€Houghlandóó,€844€S.W.2d€619,€623„24€€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);€Ô#†XEXX*XE|A#ÔòòLindseyóó,€976€S.W.2dÐ ©$D # Ðat€181Ô‡*XEXXXEÔ.òòóó€€The€primary€focus€is€on€whether€the€requesting€spouse€has€the€ability€to€pay€his€or€her€ownÐ •%0!$ Ðfees;€and,€if€not,€whether€the€other€spouse€has€the€resources€to€do€so.€òòÐ &"% ÐóóÐ m'#& ÐÔ#†XEXX*XEéB#Ôà  àTrial€courts€have€broad€discretion€to€determine€whether€spousal€support€is€needed€and,€if€so,Ð e Ðits€nature,€amount€and€duration.€€òòBurlew€v.€Burlewóó,€40€S.W.3d€465,€470€(Tenn.€2001).€€Ô‡*XEXXXEÔAn€awardÐ Qì Ðof€attorneyððs€fees€as€alimony,€like€an€award€of€other€support,€is€considered€to€be€within€the€soundÐ =Ø Ðdiscretion€of€the€trial€court.€òò€Loyd€v.€Loydóó,€860€S.W.2d€409,€413€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993);€òòWallace€v.Ð )Ä ÐWallaceóó,€733€S.W.2d€102,€110„11€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987).€€Consequently,€such€an€award€will€not€beÐ ° Ðreversed€on€appeal€if€that€discretion€is€not€abused.€€òòAaronóó,€909€S.W.2d€at€411€(citing€Sòòtoreyóó,€835Ð  œ ÐS.W.2d€at€597);€Ô#†XEXX*XEöD#ÔÔ‡*XEXXXEÔòòYountóó,€91€S.W.3d€at€783;Ô#†XEXX*XE[G#Ô€òòElliot€v.€Elliot,óó€825€S.W.2d€87,€92€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).Ô‡*XEXXXEÔ€Ð í ˆ ÐÔ#†XEXX*XEüG#ÔA€trial€court€abuses€its€discretion€only€when€it€applies€an€incorrect€legal€standard,€or€reaches€aÐ Ù t Ðdecision€which€is€against€logic€or€reasoning€or€that€causes€an€injustice€to€the€party€complaining.€Ð Å ` ÐòòEldridgeóó,€42€S.W.3d€at€85.Ô‡*XEXXXEÔòòÐ ± L  ÐóóÔ#†XEXX*XEcI#ÔÌà  àWhile€fault€is€one€of€many€factors€that€may€be€considered€in€setting€spousal€support,€Ô‡*XEXXXEÔTenn.Ð ‰$  ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)(k)Ô#†XEXX*XE#J#Ô,€our€courts€have€generally€disapproved€of€the€use€of€alimony€as€aÐ u  Ðweapon€to€punish€a€guilty€spouse.€€òòAndertonóó,€988€S.W.2d€at€682;€òòDuncan€v.€Duncan,óó€686€S.W.2dÐ aü  Ð568€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€€1984).€€ð ðIt€is€well€settled€that€while€fault€is€a€factor€to€be€considered,€it€mustÐ Mè  Ðnot€be€applied€in€a€punitive€manner€against€a€guilty€party€in€determining€the€award€of€alimony.ððÐ 9Ô  ÐòòWilderóó,€66€S.W.3d€at€895.€€Ô‡*XEXXXEÔSince€marital€fault€may€be€considered€in€an€award€of€alimony,€it€may€alsoÐ %À Ðbe€considered€in€an€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€as€alimony.€òòInman€v.€Inmanóó,€811€S.W.2d€870,€874Ð ¬ Ð(Tenn.€1991)òòóó;€òòYountóó,€91€S.W.3d€at€783.€€òòóóÔ#†XEXX*XE‹L#ÔÔ‡+XEXXXEÔHowever,€marital€fault€alone€is€not€sufficient€to€justify€anÐ ý˜ Ðaward€of€attorneyððs€fees€in€the€absence€of€a€demonstrated€need€for€the€alimony.€€òòWilderóó,€66€S.W.3dÐ é„ Ðat€895,€citing€òòFisher€v.€Fisheróó,€648€S.W.2d€244,€247€(Tenn.€1983)Ô#†XEXX+XEßM#ÔÔ‡+XEXXXEÔ€(ð ðwhile€fault€is€a€factor€to€beÐ Õp Ðconsidered,€it€must€not€be€applied€in€a€punitive€manner€against€a€guilty€party€in€determining€theÐ Á\ Ðaward€of€alimonyðð).Ô#†XEXX+XE9O#Ô€€While€a€trial€court€could€properly€consider€the€relative€fault€of€the€parties€forÐ ­H Ðthe€breakup€of€the€marriage€in€awarding€fees,€€ð ða€spouse€with€adequate€property€and€income€is€notÐ ™4 Ðentitled€to€an€award€of€additional€alimony€to€compensate€for€attorneyððs€fees€and€expenses.ðð€€òòLindseyóó,Ð …  Ð976€S.W.2d€at€181.€€Attorneyððs€fees€in€a€divorce€case€are€not€awarded€on€a€ð ðprevailing€partyðð€theory.Ð q  ÐThe€marital€fault€of€a€party€alone,€without€consideration€of€the€financial€need€and€ability€to€pay€ofÐ ]ø Ðthe€parties,€is€not€a€sufficient€basis€for€the€award€of€attorneyððs€fees.€€Ô‡*XEXXXEÔÐ Iä ÐÔ#†XEXX*XEðR#ÔÌà  àIn€the€case€before€us,€Mr.€Cummings€did€not€demonstrate€a€financial€need€for€the€award€ofÐ !¼ Ðspousal€support€or€attorneyððs€fees.€€The€financial€situations€of€the€parties€at€the€end€of€the€marriageÐ  ¨ Ðmade€Ms.€Cummings€the€economically€disadvantaged€spouse.€€The€trial€court€herein€did€not€baseÐ ù ” Ðits€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€on€the€factors€of€need€or€ability€to€pay;€nor€did€it€award€fees€to€Mr.Ð å!€  ÐCummings€on€the€basis€of€any€finding€of€marital€fault€on€the€part€of€Ms.€Cummings.€€Instead,€theÐ Ñ"l! Ðcourt€ordered€Ms.€Cummings€to€pay€her€former€husbandððs€legal€fees€as€a€sanction€for€her€conductÐ ½#X" Ðin€this€litigation.Ð ©$D # ÐÌà  àPerjury€is€an€offense€against€the€courts€that€should€be€neither€condoned€nor€taken€lightly.€Ð &"% ÐIt€ð ðoffends€the€basic€principles€underlying€our€judicial€system.ðð€€òòWilder€v.€Wilderóó,€863€S.W.2d€707,Ð m'#& Ð713€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€Perjury€is€the€type€of€conduct€that€may€justify€a€denial€of€relief€in€aÐ Y(ô#' Ðdivorce€case€under€the€doctrine€of€unclean€hands.€€òòChastain€v.€Chastainóó,€559€S.W.2d€933,€935Ð E)à$( Ð(Tenn.€1977).€€It€does€not,€however,€require€such€denial,€and€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€eachÐ 1*Ì%) Ðsituation€must€be€examined.€€òòWilderóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€713.€€The€trial€courtððs€award€of€the€husbandððsÐ +¸&* Ðattorneyððs€fees€herein€is€not€a€denial€of€relief€to€the€wife.€€Rather,€as€the€court€stated,€it€is€punishmentÐ  ,¤'+ Ðfor€her€false€testimony.€€An€award€of€fees€against€a€party€who€has€committed€perjury€during€theÐ e Ðlitigation€is€an€allowable€punishment.€€òòWilson€v.€Wilsonóó,€58€S.W.3d€718,€729€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001).€Ð Qì ÐIn€addition,€courts€also€retain€authority€to€punish€or€sanction€perjury€by€other€means€and€remedies.׃,×Ý ƒN#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð =Ø ÐÌà  àWhere€the€sanction€imposed€inures€to€the€financial€benefit€of€the€other€party,€we€believe€allÐ ° Ðthe€circumstances€must€be€considered€and€the€sanction€should€have€some€relation€to€the€harm€causedÐ  œ Ðthe€other€party€by€the€perjury.€€In€the€case€before€us,€it€was€Ms.€Cummingsðð€sworn€denials€of€adulteryÐ í ˆ Ðthat€constituted€her€false€testimony.€€Only€after€her€partner€in€that€adultery€testified€in€contradictionÐ Ù t Ðto€those€denials€did€she€admit€the€true€facts€and€agree€to€stipulate€to€Mr.€Cummings€being€awardedÐ Å ` Ðthe€divorce€on€the€ground€of€adultery.€€Mr.€Cummings€was€forced€to€incur€costs€and€expenses€inÐ ± L  Ðefforts€to€disprove€his€wifeððs€false€denials€that€he€would€not€have€incurred€if€she€had€been€truthfulÐ  8  Ðin€this€litigation€from€the€outset.€€Some€of€those€costs€relate€to€the€retention€of€a€private€investigatorÐ ‰$  Ðand€the€preparation€of€a€laboratory€report,€obtaining€telephone€records,€and€taking€the€deposition€of€Ð u  ÐMr.€Thompson,€including€attorney€time,€reporter€fees€and€transcription€costs.€€Requiring€Ms.Ð aü  ÐCummings€to€pay€these€additional€costs€caused€by€her€false€testimony€is€reasonable,€related€to€curingÐ Mè  Ðthe€harm€caused€the€other€party,€and€well€within€the€courtððs€discretion.Ð 9Ô  ÐÌà  àHowever,€these€expenses€do€not€constitute€all€the€attorneyððs€fees€incurred€by€Mr.€CummingsÐ ¬ Ðin€this€litigation.€€As€this€opinion€demonstrates,€the€parties€litigated€a€number€of€issues€related€to€theÐ ý˜ Ðdissolution€of€their€marriage.€€These€issue€would€have€required€attorney€time€in€preparation€and€trialÐ é„ Ðregardless€of€Ms.€Cummingsðð€initial€denials,€just€as€they€did€after€her€stipulation,€acknowledgementÐ Õp Ðof€wrongdoing,€and€apology€to€the€court.€€As€to€those€fees,€the€general€principles€applicable€toÐ Á\ Ðattorneyððs€fee€awards€in€divorce€cases€should€be€the€factors€guiding€the€decision.€€As€stated€earlier,Ð ­H ÐMr.€Cummings€has€not€demonstrated€his€inability€to€pay€his€own€attorneyððs€fees€and€his€need€to€haveÐ ™4 Ðthose€fees€paid€by€his€former€wife.€€Similarly,€the€wifeððs€ability€to€pay€them,€as€well€as€her€own€fees,Ð …  Ðis€less€than€the€husbandððs.€€Ð q  ÐÌà  àAccordingly,€we€affirm€that€portion€of€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€to€Mr.Ð Iä ÐCummings€for€those€fees€and€expenses€related€to€or€caused€by€Ms.€Cummingsðð€denial,€in€thisÐ 5Ð Ðlitigation,€of€adultery.€€This€court€is€unable€to€accurately€identify€those€charges€and€expenses€fromÐ !¼ Ðthe€records€submitted€to€the€trial€court.€€Consequently,€we€must€remand€for€calculation€of€theÐ  ¨ Ðappropriate€amount.€€Except€for€those€fees€in€the€amount€determined,€each€party€shall€be€requiredÐ ù ” Ðto€pay€his€or€her€own€attorneyððs€fees.Ð å!€  ÐÌà@ßß"ìàò òVII.€€òòConclusionóóˆÐ ½#X" Ðó óÌà  àWe€vacate€the€permanent€parenting€plan€ordered€by€the€trial€court€and€remand€for€adoptionÐ •%0!$ Ðof€a€new€permanent€parenting€plan€addressing€the€residential€schedule,€designation€of€primaryÐ &"% Ðresidential€parent,€establishment€of€child€support,€and€allocation€of€decision„making€authority.€Ð m'#& ÐPending€approval€or€order€of€a€new€plan:€(1)€the€parties€shall€each€have€primary€residential€custodyÐ Y(ô#' Ðof€their€child€on€a€weekly€basis€with€midweek€overnight€visitation€for€the€nonresidential€parent;€(2)Ð e Ðthe€father€shall€pay€child€support€of€$500€per€month;€(3)€the€parties€shall€have€joint€decision„makingÐ Qì Ðauthority€regarding€education,€healthcare,€activities,€and€religious€upbringing.€€The€injunction€againstÐ =Ø Ðthe€mother€leaving€the€county€is€vacated.€€The€distribution€of€marital€property€is€affirmed,€and€theÐ )Ä Ðallocation€of€marital€debt€is€modified€as€specified.€€The€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€is€modified€to€onlyÐ ° Ðthat€amount€related€to€disproving€the€wifeððs€false€testimony,€which€amount€should€be€calculated€byÐ  œ Ðthe€trial€court€on€remand.€€We€remand€this€case€to€the€Chancery€Court€of€Williamson€County€forÐ í ˆ Ðfurther€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€The€costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€equally€to€theÐ Ù t ÐAppellant,€Pepper€Cummings,€and€the€Appellee,€Christopher€Cummings.Ð Å ` ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à____________________________________Ð u  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGE