WPCE ! y\pb7Ʃ\,\DK,/ɱaPؿ QiHNf0i"eW6iET}SZdLߌ&q oW흏u4I;y FM!s4RUzէu|XKe*L[)+xp)x/n?۲ !)/ȑщP>~Jl'"Ob[[@.ϡ8Idޕ򔍪t֘(8'2g.<( 43>h/HkNosH廭jTu 0f*U.@  0 0  0oD@ o D+h A^ 4w@4DX Bg 0C%@ )) 0Uv* 0(* AM*@ @+oJ+0+@ .o.@ .. m.@ .o.@ X/ 0Nb/o/b=0@ E0oO0@ 0o0Es1 0~2o63@ 3o3Z4ni:@ <o<@ n=ox=@ >o>@ >o>o3?@ ?o?@ W@oa@@ @o@@ AoA@ Bo&B@ BoB@ JCoTC@ CoC@ xDoD\\ib01s01\clerk1nas,,,,0(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX($USUS.,< :Footnote TexXXX<:Footnote Ref8cc 6Block Text  , ,   5+ 4 <DL5      5+ 4 <DL!564Hyperlink    <\l:documentbodyC $VerdanaCXXXS \  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong <\l:informationa^^^C $VerdanaCXXXS \  `&Times New RomanS6 4Body Text  X    \  `&Times New Roman: 8Body Text 2        $Verdana <OL :Body Text I1   8.4 <DL!8   5+ 4 <DL!5<if :Body Text In  i  8.4 <DL!8   5+ 4 <DL!5 i :00 8Body Text 3  X        WPC i K513%)+-51d~ - WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -'dxd&Draw Object <<=8C HKKKK壖1 IN1B013C13|x d($      !USUS.,  _B.4 <DL!XBwXX        1  0  ݀AlegallypermittingnonconforminguseisprotectedunderT.C.A.137208,whichprovides:݌  ЌX@Xw  wXX@    8 E  (b)(1)Intheeventthatazoningchangeoccursinanylandareawheresuchlandarea ` wasnotpreviouslycoveredbyanyzoningrestrictionsofanygovernmentalagencyofthis $t stateoritspoliticalsubdivisions,orwheresuchlandiscoveredbyzoningrestrictionsofa 8 governmentalagencyofthisstateoritspoliticalsubdivisions,andsuchzoningrestrictions  differfromzoningrestrictionsimposedafterthezoningchange,thenanyindustrial, p  commercialorbusinessestablishmentinoperation,permittedtooperateunderzoning 4  regulationsorexceptionstheretopriortothezoningchangeshallbeallowedtocontinuein  H operationandbepermitted;provided,thatnochangeintheuseofthelandisundertakenby    suchindustryorbusiness.9݌  E E  ЌX@Xw  wXX@  `  8 E  (2)Whentheusepermittedtocontinuetoexpand,ortoberebuiltpursuanttoany 0  subsectionofthissectionisanoffpremisessign,suchuseshallnotprecludeanynewor D  additionalconforminguseorstructureonthepropertyonwhichthesignstructureislocated   oronanyadjacentpropertyunderthesameownership;provided,however,thatanysuchnew |  oradditionaluseorstructuredoesnotresultinanyviolationsoftheapplicablezoning @  restrictionsotherthanthosenonconformitiesassociatedwiththeoffpremisessignasallowed T  underthissubdivision(b)(2).`݌E E  ЌX@Xw  wXX@     8 E  (c)Industrial,commercialorotherbusinessestablishmentsinoperationand x permittedtooperateunderzoningregulationsorexceptionstheretoineffectimmediately < precedingachangeinzoningshallbeallowedtoexpandoperationsandconstructadditional P facilitieswhichinvolveanactualcontinuanceandexpansionoftheactivitiesoftheindustry  orbusinesswhichwerepermittedandbeingconductedpriortothechangeinzoning;  provided,thatthereisareasonableamountofspaceforsuchexpansionontheproperty L ownedbysuchindustryorbusinesssituatedwithintheareawhichisaffectedbythechangein ` zoning,soastoavoidnuisancestoadjoininglandowners.Nobuildingpermitorlike $ permissionforconstructionorlandscapingshallbedeniedtoanindustryorbusinessseeking  toexpandandcontinueactivitiesconductedbythatindustryorbusinesswhichwerepermitted \ priortothechangeinzoning;provided,thatthereisareasonableamountofspaceforsuch  p  expansiononthepropertyownedbysuchindustryorbusinesssituatedwithintheareawhich  isaffectedbythechangeinzoning,soastoavoidnuisancestheadjoininglandowners. # ݌tE E  ЌX@Xw  wXX@  ?  T.C.A.137208(b)and(c)(2004).  !USUS.,  _?+ 4 <DL!X?    whX  2  0  ݀Underthecommonlawwritofcertiorari:   , XB+ 4 <DLX!BThewritofcertiorarimaybegrantedwheneverauthorizedbylaw,andalsoincaseswhereaninferior 8 tribunal,board,orofficerexercisingjudicialfunctionshasexceededthejurisdictionconferred,oris L actingillegally,when,inthejudgmentofthecourt,thereisnootherplain,speedyoradequateremedy.  ww  , X  (  _T.C.A._278101(Supp.1997).#X@Xw#:  Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5(-2$ !USUS.,  ($"#$A<< c' WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -  COA P.J. W.S.HighersMcMullen BFIIndustT.C.A."nonconformitiesiestopLaffertyGovtFallin n]om]ereDicksonJennettePharroverbroadDyersburggrandfathered SCAKonisbergtimelineCoopertownnonuse Bhy S.W. Phy* WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -G U/ WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -2 (O$WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -- -5 WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -7 WPC i K513%)+-51d~ - ; 9($USUS.,    3    _wXXSincethatdate,theTennesseeCodehasbeenamendedtoincludea30monthdiscontinuationclause.  _T.C.A._Ԁ137208(g)(2004).(.(3($ !USUS.,      0  WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -< WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -  9($USUS.,    4    _wXX Agrandfatherclauseisdefinedas [a]statutoryorregulatoryclausethatexemptsaclassofpersonsor  transactionsbecauseofcircumstancesexistingbeforethenewruleorregulationtakeseffect. BlacksLaw t Dictionary 706(7thed.1999).Agoodexplanationofthereasonsforsucha grandfatherclauseisincludedinthis : Courtsopinionin Laffertyv.Winchester : P 8  Rarely,ifever,havelocalgovernmentsenactedzoningordinancesonacompletelycleanslate.  Propertyisusuallyalreadyinusewhenitisfirstzoned,andsoitisinevitablethatidealzoning N  theorywillclashwiththeexistinguseofparticularpiecesofproperty.Inordertoavoidthelegal  b problemsthatwouldattendalocalgovernmentseffortstoforceaprivatepropertyownerto  & discontinueanotherwisepermissibleuseofproperty,Tenn.CodeAnn.137208(b)(1999)    requireslocalgovernmentstopermitcertaintypesofpreexistingnonconformingusestocontinue ^   eveniftheyareinconsistentwiththezoningclassificationofthesurroundingproperty." r     Lafferty ,46S.W.3d752,758(Tenn.Ct.App.2000). d 9($USUS.,    5    _wXXItadoptsathirtymonthlimitoncessationofoperation,moregenerousthan_Coopertown_sordinance.  However,evenifthenewstatutorydiscontinuanceprovisionwereapplicable,whichitisnot,Customwouldnot t prevail._Coopertown_szoningordinancebecameeffectiveonJanuary30,1997,andCustomappliedforthesubject 8 permitonJuly23,2002.@ WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -B WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -D WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -F WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -I WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -K WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -M WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -O WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -Q WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -S WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -U WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -W WPC i K513%)+-51d~ -Y WPC i K513%)+-51d~ - !USUS.,  _ X@XXX UX X@38@XXdd8    @ INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE    @kk$ATNASHVILLE# X@X U\# [?X X@Ԉ &   ?+ 4 <DL!X?August5,2004Session L # X@X [?t# [?X X@ CUSTOMLANDDEVELOPMENT,INC.v.TOWNOFCOOPERTOWN J andCOOPERTOWNBOARDOFZONINGAPPEALS# X@X [?C#   ^  AnAppealfromtheChanceryCourtforRobertsonCounty  ^ No.17206RossH.Hicks,Judge  J -   wX X@ k[W$~ Kp@0 dd`  KE K K2 -  # X@X w# No.M200302107_COA_ԄR3CVFiledDecember22,_2004_   -   wX X@ k[W$~ Kp@0 dd`  KE K K2 -  # X@X w^#        f  Thisisazoningcase.Theappellantlandownerownsatractoflandthatitsoughttoresumeusing  asasanitarylandfill.Theappelleesarethenewlyincorporatedtowninwhichthelandfillislocated x andthetownszoningboard.In1996,thelandownerandthecountyinwhichthetownandlandfill d arelocatedresolvedadisputeinwhichthelandfillwasdeemedalegallypermittednonconforming P useunderthecountyzoningordinance.In2002,thelandownersoughtabuildingpermitfromthe < townplanningcommission.Thetownplanningcommissionrefusedtograntthepermituntilthe (x landownerobtainedadeterminationfromthetownzoningboardthatthelandfillwasalegally d permittednonconforminguseunderthetownsnewlyenactedzoningordinances.Thetownzoning P boarddeterminedthatthelandfillwasnotalegallypermittednonconforminguseunderthetown < zoningordinancesbecausethelandownerhaddiscontinueditsnonconforminguseofthelandfillfor ( longerthanoneyear.Consequently,nopermitwasissued.Thelandownerunsuccessfullyappealed  therulingtothetownzoningappealsboard.Thelandownerthenappealedthedecisionofthezoning  appealsboardtothetrialcourt.Thetrialcourtaffirmedtherulingofthezoningappealsboard.We  affirm,findingthattheuseofthepropertyasalandfillhadbeendiscontinuedformorethanoneyear  andthusthelandfilldidnotfallwithinthenonconforminguseexceptiontothetownszoning t  ordinance.f݌ `!  Ќ     Rule3Appeal;JudgmentoftheChanceryCourtisaffirmed  L"!   HollyM.Kirby,J.,deliveredtheopinionoftheCourt,inwhichW.FrankCrawford,P.J.,W.S. $$t# andAlanE.Highers,J.,joined. %` $  E.4 <DL!X!EJamesL.MurphyandAustinL.McMullen,Nashville,fortheappellantCustomLandDevelopment, &8"& Inc. '$#' GeorgeA.Dean,Nashville,forappelleesTownofCoopertownandCoopertownBoardofZoning )$) Appeals. *%*    p,', OPINION       Plaintiff/AppellantCustomLandDevelopment,Inc.( Custom)ownsatractoflandlocated  inRobertsonCountyknownastheHighlandsLandfill( Highlands).Customacquiredtheproperty t in1985andlaterleasedittoBrowningFerrisIndustries,Inc.( BFI)todevelopandoperatea ` landfill.BFIacceptedwasteatthelandfillonSeptember6,1988.Onthatsameday,Robertson L  Countyfiledsuittoenjointheoperation,claimingthatthelandfillviolatedtheRobertsonCounty 8  zoningordinances. $ t  l<`   Alegalbattlerelatingtovalidityofthecountyzoningordinanceensued,resultinginan  L  appealtothisCourt.Onappeal,thisCourtremandedCustomsclaimtotheRobertsonCounty  8  CircuitCourt. RobertsonCounty,Tennesseev.BrowningFerrisIndust.ofTennessee,Inc. ,799 $  S.W.2d662(Tenn.Ct.App.1990).Duringthistime,BFIterminatedtheHighlandslease.Custom   thenreacquiredtheapplicablepermitsandproceededwithdevelopmentofthepropertyasalandfill.   Afterremandofthecase,RobertsonCountyandCustomenteredintoasettlementagreementthat   dissolvedtheinjunctionagainstHighlands.TheagreementstipulatedthattheHighlandslandfillwas   alegallypermittednonconforminguse     1     0  ݀ofthepropertyundertheRobertsonCountyzoning p ordinancesandthatthenonconformingusehadnotbeendiscontinuedthroughthedateoftheorder,  sincetheinjunctionhadpreventedtheoperationofthelandfill.Underthisexception,eventhough  thelandfilldidnotconformtotheCountyzoningordinances,Customwouldnonethelessbe  permittedbytheCountytooperatethelandfill.ThesettlementagreementbetweenCustomand t RobertsonCountywasapprovedbytheRobertsonCountyCircuitCourtonAugust22,1996.K.4 <DL!4X!K `   Afterdissolutionoftheinjunction,Customsoughtoutanewwastecollectioncompanyto 8  operatethelandfill.Thereweresubstantialobstacles.Duetothespecializednatureofthewaste $ t disposalindustry,clientswiththemeansandabilitytooperateaprofitablelandfillwerenotreadily  ` available.Inaddition,duringthelengthyperiodoftimeinwhichtheinjunctionhadbeeninforce,  L  environmentalguidelinesgoverninglandfillsbecamemorestringent.TheTennesseeDepartment  8  ofEnvironmentandConservationrequiredHighlandstocomplywiththenewguidelinesbefore $  resumingoperationofthelandfill.CompliancewiththesenewguidelinesrequiredCustomto   modifythedesignofthelandfillandaddimpermeablelinerstopreventadverseeffectsonthe   surroundingenvironment.     OnDecember1,1996,approximatelythreeandahalfmonthsafterdissolutionofthe p injunctionagainstHighlands,theownersofthepropertysurroundingthelandfillincorporatedthe \ Defendant/AppelleetownofCoopertown.TheHighlandspropertyislocatedwithintheboundaries H ofCoopertown.Shortlythereafter,Coopertownadoptedazoningordinancethatbecameeffective 4 onJanuary30,1997.  p   TheCoopertownzoningordinancerequiredHighlandstoobtainsiteapprovalforthe H modifieddesign.CoopertownauthorizedtheRobertsonCountyPlanningCommission( Planning 4 Commission)toperformasitereviewonitsbehalf.TheCountyPlanningCommissiongrantedsite   approvaltoHighlandsonSeptember4,1997.   Ѐ  Duringthistime,Customhadbeenlookingforaclienttooperatethelandfill.Inearly1998,  CustomenteredintoatentativeagreementwithRepublicIndustries,Inc.tooperatethelandfill.  FromMarchthroughMay1998,landfillrelatedconstructionbeganatHighlands.Itincludedan l accessroad,asiltationpond,andthefirstwastecell.InJune1998,however,RepublicIndustries, X  Inc.withdrewfromtheHighlandsproject.Customwasforcedtoresumethesearchforawaste D! servicescompanycapableofoperatingthelandfill. 0"    Finally,Customlocatedanothercompanytooperatethelandfill.OnAugust31,2001, $X" CustomenteredintoanagreementwithWasteIndustries,Inc.( WasteIndustries)tooperatethe $D # landfill.Inordertoutilizenewtechnologyandfurtherprotectthelocalenvironment,Waste %0!$  IndustriesaskedCustomtomakeadditionalmodificationstothesite.#X@XX X@=# X@XXX@ &"%   InMay2002,CoopertowncreatedtheCoopertownMunicipalPlanningCommission   ( CoopertownPlanningCommission).OnJuly23,2002,CustomsubmittedtotheCoopertown  PlanningCommissionasiteapprovalplanandarequestforabuildingpermittobuildatraileroffice  andscales.InitsmeetingheldonSeptember17,2002,theCoopertownPlanningCommission t decidedtopostponeitsreviewofCustomssiteplanuntilCustomreceivedafinalzoning ` determinationfromtheCoopertownBuildingCommissioner( BuildingCommissioner)onwhether L  HighlandswasalegallypermittednonconforminguseofthepropertyundertheCoopertownZoning 8  ordinance. $ t   AswiththeexceptiontotheCountyzoningordinance,the legallypermittednonconforming  L  usedeterminationwasanexceptiontotheCoopertownzoningordinances.OnSeptember23,2002,  8  theBuildingCommissionerdeterminedthatHighlandswasnotalegallypermittednonconforming $  useofthepropertybecauseCustomhaddiscontinuedoperationofthelandfillforoveroneyear.   Undersection6.021(I)oftheCoopertownZoningOrdinances,whenanonconforminguseofland   isdiscontinuedforaperiodofoneyear,thelegallypermittednonconforminguseisterminated.   Section6.021(I)oftheCoopertownZoningOrdinancereads:   8  I.Discontinuance\    8  Whenanonconforminguseoflandortheactiveoperationofsubstantiallyallthe H nonconformingusesinanybuildingorotherstructureortractoflandisdiscontinued 4 foraperiodonone(1)year,thenthelandorbuildingorotherstructureshall  p thereafterbeusedonlyforconforminguse.Intenttoresumeactiveoperationsshall  \ notaffecttheforegoingprovision.H    K.4 <DL!4X!K  K.4 <DL!4X!K  /  Thus,ifCustomsuseofthepropertydidnotmeettherequirementsforalegallypermitted   nonconforminguse,thismeantthatCustomcouldonlyusethepropertyforaconforminguse.Since   theCoopertownzoningordinancesdidnotpermitoperationofalandfillinthatlocation,Custom  wouldbeprecludedfromusingitspropertyforitsintendedpurposes,alandfill./0݌  Ќ  04X!4X!0    K.4 <DL!4X!K  S2  S22݌̌  04X!4X!0    K.4 <DL!4X!K  `3    CustomappealedthedecisionoftheBuildingCommissionertotheDefendant/Appellee l CoopertownBoardofZoningAppeals.TheCoopertownBoardofZoningAppealsaffirmedthe X  rulingoftheBuildingCommissionerandmadethefollowingfindings:`33݌ D! Ќ  04X!4X!0    K.4 <DL!4X!K  5  5&6݌̌  04X!4X!0  8  (i)whentheZoningOrdinancewasadoptedonJanuary30,1997,thePropertywas #l! zonedagriculturalandalandfillwasnotpermittedaseitherpermittedorconditional $X" use;(ii)althoughacourtorderenteredonAugust22,1996providedthatthelandfill $D # hadbeendeemedlegallynonconformingunderRobertsonCountyszoning %0!$ regulationsandthattheusehadnotbeendiscontinuedbecauseoftheinjunction &"% issuedinthecase,thecourtdidnotrulethattheusewasinoperationatthetimeof '#& theorderoratthetimeoftheissuanceoftheinjunction;(iii)althoughtheowners (#' havesubmittedpermitapplicationsandreceivedsiteplanapproval,thelandfillhas )$( neverbeenoperationalsincetheadoptionoftheZoningOrdinance;(iv)eventhough |*%) someconstructionactivitieswereconductedeitherbeforeAprilof1998,oratthe h+&* latest,throughtheendofJune1998,thelandfillwasneverinoperationdespitethose  activities;(v)thoseconstructionactivitieswerenotsubstantialandthusinsufficient  tovestarighttocontinuetheuseofthePropertyasalandfill;(vi)thoseconstruction  activitiesendedinApril,1998oratthelatestinJuneof1998,andthusanyuse t establishedastheresultofthoseactivitieshasbeendiscontinuedforoveroneyear; ` (vii)theconstructionactivitieswerenotcompletedandthelandfillneveropened; L  (viii)noevidencewaspresentedthatwastematerialshaveeverbeendepositedatthe 8  site;(ix)noevidencewaspresentedthatanylandfillactivitiesasopposedto $ t constructionactivitieswereconductedontheProperty;(x)noevidencewas  ` presentedthatanylandfillactivitieswereconductedonthePropertysincethe  L  adoptionoftheZoningOrdinance;(xi)noevidencewaspresentedofanymeaningful  8  activitiesconductedonthePropertysince1998;(xii)whiletheownerhasmaintained $  thenecessarypermits,anylandfillusehasbeendiscontinuedforwelloveroneyear;   and(xiii)sincethelandfillusehasbeendiscontinuedforwelloveroneyear,Section   6.021(I)oftheZoningOrdinanceprohibitsthereestablishmentofthelandfilluse   ontheProperty.       K.4 <DL!4X!K H+ 4 <DL!4X!H  TheCoopertownBoardofZoningAppeals,then,concludedthatCustomsnumerousactivitiesin \ preparationtooperatethelandfilldidnotconstitutethe activeoperationofalandfillonthe H property,andthat activeoperationofthelandfillhadbeendiscontinuedforoverayear.Therefore, 4 underSection6.021(I)oftheCoopertownzoningordinances,Customwouldnotbepermittedto  p operatealandfillonitsproperty.CustomthenfiledaPetitionforWritofCertioraritotheRobertson  \ CountyChanceryCourt( ChanceryCourt)toappealthedecisionoftheBoardofZoningAppeals.      2     Dloc  ݀ H   TheChanceryCourtheldahearingonCustomspetition,basedontherecordofthe   CoopertownBoardofZoningappeals.Itadmittednoadditionalevidencebutheardargumentsof   counsel.OnJuly7,2003,afterconsideringtherecordandthepartiesarguments,theChancery  CourtissuedacompleteandcogentMemorandumOpinion.    AttheoutsetoftheMemorandumOpinion,theChanceryCourtoutlinedthepertinentfacts. l ItacknowledgedthenarrowscopeofitsreviewoftheBoardsdecision,limitedtoadetermination X  ofwhethertheBoardexceededitsjurisdictionoractedillegally,arbitrarilyorfraudulently.Itnoted D! thatitstaskwasnottosubstituteitsjudgmentforthatoftheBoard,butrathertoupholdtheBoards 0"  decisioniftherewasanyrationalbasisforit. #l! #X@XX X@h&#  Cognizantofthisstandardofreview,theChanceryCourtstatedthat centralissueinthiscase $D # isthedeterminationofwhetherornottheCoopertownBoardofZoningAppeals,actingonbehalf %0!$ oftheCityofCoopertown,exceededitsjurisdictionorhasactedillegally,arbitrarily,or  fraudulently.TheChanceryCourtlistedthreequestionsasdeterminativeoftheissue.The  questionswere:  8  1.WhatwastheeffectoftheAugust22,1996,RobertsonCountyCircuitCourt ` OrderofCompromiseandSettlement?L    8  2.IstheprovisionofCoopertownsZoningOrdinanceprovidingforlossofa 8  nonconforminguseifthatuseisdiscontinuedforaperiodofoneyearvalid?and8@0  $ t   8  3.Assumingvalidityoftheordinance,isCustomsperiodofnonuseinvoluntaryso  ` astoestopenforcementoftheordinanceagainstit? L      OntheissueoftheeffectoftheAugust1996settlementagreementbetweenCustomand $  RobertsonCounty,theChanceryCourtrejectedCoopertownsargumentthatitwasnotboundbythe   settlementagreement.TheChanceryCourtfoundthatCoopertownwasboundbythesettlement   agreement,andspecificallywasboundbythedeterminationintheagreementthatHighlandswasa   nonconforminguseunderTennesseeCodeAnnotated137208.     InitsMemorandumOpinion,theChanceryCourtstatedthatTennesseestatutesdonot \ specificallyauthorizeorprecludediscontinuationprovisionsinmunicipalzoningordinances.  8   3     P1,p  ݀The H ChanceryCourtnoted,however,thatsuchprovisionswererecognizedindictain Rivesv.Cityof 4 Clarksville ,618S.W.2d502(Tenn.Ct.App.1981),inwhichthisCourtstated:  p 8  Itshouldalsoberememberedthatretrospectivezoningisonlyoneofseveralpossible H methodsofattemptingtoeliminatenonconforminguses.Thereareothermethods 4 whichincludecondemnationthroughthepowerofeminentdomaininvokingthelaw   ofnuisance,forbiddingaresumptionofuseafteraspecifiedperiodofnonuse,and   prohibitingorlimitingextensionsorrepairstoproperty.    Rivesv.CityofClarksville ,618S.W.2dat510(emphasisadded).TheChanceryCourtinterpreted  thisdictaassuggestingthatadiscontinuationclausewasanappropriatemethodofcontrolling l nonconformingusesofland,andfoundfromthisthattheCoopertownBoardofZoningAppealshad X  arationalbasisforitsenforcementofthezoningordinance. D!   Finally,theChanceryCourtconsideredCustomsargumentthatanydiscontinuationofits #l! useofthepropertyasalandfillwasinvoluntary,stemmingfromtheoriginalinjunction,andthatthis $X" wouldestopCoopertownfromenforcingthediscontinuationordinance.ThePetitionforWritof $D # CertiorarichronicledCustomsnumerousactionsregardingdevelopmentofHighlands,suchasthe %0!$ searchfornewclients,actionstocomplywithnewenvironmentalregulations,andpreparationofthe &"% land.TheChanceryCourtconcluded,however,thatalthoughsomeconstructionactivitiestookplace '#& aslateas1998,HighlandshadneverbeenoperationalasalandfillsinceCoopertownadoptedthe (#' zoningordinance.CustompresentednoevidenceofanyactivitywhatsoeveronthesitefromJune )$( of1998throughAugust31,2001,thedateoftheagreementwithWasteIndustries.Itdidnotapply  forabuildingpermituntilJuly23,2002.TheChanceryCourtfoundthatthisperiodofinactivity  providedarationalbasisfor_Coopertown_sdecision.    Therefore,theChanceryCourtconcludedthatCustomfailedtobeartheburdenofproving ` thattheBoardofZoningAppealsexceededitsjurisdictionoractedillegally,arbitrarily,or L  fraudulently.Further,itfoundsubstantialandmaterialevidencetosupporttheBoardsdecision,and 8  affirmedtherefusaltoissueCustomabuildingpermit.Fromthisdecision,Customnowappeals. $ t   Onappeal,CustomarguesthattheChanceryCourterredinaffirmingtheBoardsdecision  L  becauseCoopertownhadnoauthoritytoactinamannerinconsistentwiththestandardfor  8  abandonmentofapropertyright.CustomarguesaswellthatCoopertowncannotbaseitsdecision $  onCustomsnonuseofthepropertyasalandfill,becauseanysuchnonusewasinvoluntary.Finally,   Custommaintainsthatithadavestedrighttodevelopthelandfill.     Thestandardofreviewgoverningthecommonlawwritofcertiorariiswellestablished.    Thecommonlawwritofcertiorariprovidestheproceduralvehicleforreviewingthedecisionsby p localzoningboards.Thiswritaffordsquitelimitedjudicialreview. Laffertyv.CityofWinchester , \ 46S.W.3d752,758!759(Tenn.Ct.App.2000)(citing 421Corp.v.MetropolitanGovtof H Nashville ,2000WL488137). Inrecognitionofthepolicythatfavorspermittingthecommunity 4 decisionmakersclosesttotheeventstomakethedecision,thecourtsrefrainfromsubstitutingtheir  p judgmentsforthebroaddiscretionarypowerofthelocalgovernmentbody. Id .at758.  \   ThisstandardofreviewreflectstheCourtsdeferencetothedecisionofthezoningboard. 4  Ifthereisarationalorjustifiablebasisfortheenactmentanditdoesnotviolateanystatestatuteor   positiveconstitutionalguaranty,thewisdomofthezoningregulationisamatterexclusivelyfor   legislativedetermination. Fallinv.KnoxCountyBoardofCommissioners ,656S.W.2d338,  342!343(Tenn.1983).Areviewingcourtmayoverturnthedecisionofanadministrativeagency  suchasazoningboardonlywhentheagencyhasactedunlawfully,arbitrarily,fraudulently,or  withoutmaterialevidence. Lafferty ,46S.W.3dat759.Theintrinsiccorrectnessofazoning l boardsdecisionisnotsubjecttoreviewunderthewritofcertiorari. Arnoldv.TennesseeBd.of X  Paroles ,956S.W.2d478,480(Tenn.1997).BoththeChanceryCourtandthisCourtareboundby D! thesamestandardofreview. SeeLafferty ,46S.W.3dat758759. 0"    Onappeal,CustomacknowledgesthattheGeneralAssemblyinT.C.A.137208granted $X" municipalitiesthepowertoregulatelandusewithintheirboundaries;however,itnotesthata $D # municipalitysexerciseofthisregulatorypowermustnotconflictwithstatelaw. 421Corp.v. %0!$ MetropolitanGovernmentofNashvilleandDavidsonCounty ,36S.W.3d469,476(Tenn.Ct.App. &"% 2000).CustomassertsthatanonconformingusesuchasHighlandsisallowedtocontinueoperations '#& under137208andthatthediscontinuationprovisionintheCoopertownzoningordinance (#' contravenesthisstatute.CustomalsoarguesthattheChanceryCourterredinrelyingondictain )$(  Rives asnotedaboveandignoredthedecisionofthisCourtin NationalAuto/TruckStops,Inc.v. |*%) WilliamsonCounty ,M200002456COAR3CV,2001Tenn.App.Lexis300at*3(Tenn.Ct.App.  Apr.30,2001).   iIn NationalAuto/TruckStops ,theplaintiffownedanauto/truckstopwithalargesign t outsidethatadvertisedthebusiness.Alateradoptedzoningordinancerenderedthesignslegally ` nonconforming. Id .at*2.Thezoningordinancealsoincludedanamortizationclausethatrequired L  theremovalofallnonconformingsignsbyaspecifieddate. Id .Theplaintiffdidnotremovethe 8  signsandlaterappliedforapermittoreplacetheexistingsignsbecausetheyhaddeteriorated.The $ t defendantcountydeniedthepermit,andthetruckstopfiledsuit. Id .Thetrialcourtupheldthe  ` countysrefusaltograntthepermit,holdingthatT.C.A.137208protectedbusinesses,notsigns.  L   Id .at*1.Thetruckstopappealed.ThisCourtreversed,findingthatthesignswerenecessarytothe  8  continuedconductofthetruckstopsbusiness,termingitan accessoryuseofthebusiness $  establishment.Itfoundthatthis accessoryusewasalsosubjecttotheprotectionsofsection137   208,includingthelanguageofsection137208(d),whichprovidesthat [n]obuildingpermit...   shallbedeniedtoanindustryorbusinessseekingtodestroyandreconstructfacilitiesnecessaryto   thecontinuedconductoftheactivitiesofthatindustryorbusiness. Id .at*4.Justastheprincipal   businessfacilitiescouldbedestroyedandreconstructed,theappellatecourtheldthatthe facilities p forthe accessoryuse,i.e.thesign,couldbedestroyedandreconstructedaswell. Id.  \  H  i E.4 <DL!X!E  Customsargument,however,missesthepoint.ItisundisputedthatSection137208, 4 essentiallya grandfatherclause,=   4      ׀envisionsthatanonconformingbusinessmayneedtodiscontinue  p operationsforaperiodoftime,specificallyauthorizingsuchnonconformingbusinessto destroy  \ [its]presentfacilitiesandreconstructnewfacilities....T.C.A.137208(d).Oncethe H nonconformingusehasbeendiscontinued,however,theissuebecomes,howlongthepropertyowner 4 hastoresumethenonconforminguseinordertoretainitsprotectedstatusunderSection137208.   AtthetimeCustomrequestedthesubjectpermit,therewasnodiscontinuanceprovisioninthe   statute.Inlightofthis,Customsposition,apparently,isthattheperiodofdiscontinuancecanlast  indefinitely,solongasthepropertyowneristryingreallyhardtoresumeoperation.Thisisclearly  untenable.    l   Here,Coopertownenacteditsowndiscontinuanceordinance,statingthatanonconforming   usethatisdiscontinuedforlongerthanoneyearwillnotbeprotectedbythe grandfatherclause.  CoopertownZoningOrdinanceSection6.021(I). CustomarguedtotheChanceryCourtthat  CoopertownsdiscontinuanceordinancedirectlyconflictedwithT.C.A.137208andwastherefore t unauthorized.TheChanceryCourtrejectedthisargument,findingthat, theplacingofanobjective ` timelimitonnonconforminguseswhicharenotoperationalisimminentlyreasonableanddoesnot L  conflictwiththestatestatutoryscheme.Weagree.AsnotedbytheChanceryCourt,sucha 8  discontinuanceordinancewasspecificallymentionedbythisCourtin Rivesv.CityofClarksville , $ t 618S.W.2d502,510(Tenn.Ct.App.1981).Moreover,theChanceryCourtsholdingisconfirmed  ` bytheLegislatureslateramendmentofSection137208toincludeastatewidediscontinuance  L  provision. See T.C.A.137208(g)(2004).>   5        8    Customfurtherassertsthatthediscontinuationordinanceshouldnotbeapplicablebecause   itsdiscontinuationofthepropertysuseasalandfillwas involuntary.Itmaintainsthatthephrase    inoperationinSection137208shouldbeconstruedtoincludeanonconformingbusinessthatis   notinoperationonthedateofthezoningchange,ifthelackofactiveoperationisinvoluntary.   Customadvocatesastandardunderwhichtheownerofanonconformingbusinesscannotbe p deprivedofhisrighttoengageinthenonconforminguseofhispropertyunlesshedemonstratesan \ intenttoabandonthenonconforminguse,citingthecommonlawprinciplethataninterestin H propertyisnotconsideredabandonedunlessthereisproofofintenttoabandonandanovertact 4 evidencingtheintenttoabandon. Stateexrel.Phillipsv.Smith ,241S.W.2d844(Tenn.Ct.App.  p 1950); Phyv.Hatfield ,126S.W.105(Tenn.1909); Boydv.Hunt ,52S.W.131(Tenn.1899).  \   Insupportofitsargument,Customcites Bolesv.CityofChattanooga ,892S.W.2d416 4 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994),involvingaCityofChattanoogadiscontinuanceordinancewithatimelimit   of100days.In Boles ,theplaintiffoperatedanadultbookstoreforseveralyearsbeforealocal   zoningordinancerenderedtheusenonconforming. Id .at418.Thebookstorecontinuedtooperate,  however,asapreexistingnonconforminguseunderthe grandfatherprovisionoftheordinance.   Id .Tenyearsafterthezoningordinancebecameeffective,thelocalattorneygeneralfiledcriminal  chargesagainstthebookstore,claimingthatthebookstorewasapublicnuisance. Id .Thecriminal l courtissuedatemporaryinjunctionagainstthebookstore,requiringtheimmediateclosureofthe X  business. Id .Theinjunctionwaslatermadepermanent. Id .at418419.Theownersofthe D! bookstorethenappealedthepermanentinjunctiononconstitutionalgrounds,assertingthatitwas 0"  overbroad. Id .at419. #l!   Whiletheappealwaspending,theownerofthebookstoreleasedthepremisestoatenantfor $D # theoperationofanadultbookstore. Id .at420.Thenewbookstorewasrefusedapermitonthe %0!$  groundsthatthenonconformingusewasnolongerprotectedbecausethepropertyownershad &"% discontinuedthatuseformorethan100consecutivedays,therebyinvokingthediscontinuation  clauseofthezoningordinance. Id.      Thebookstoreownerassertedthatthediscontinuationclauseintheordinancewasnot t applicablebecausethediscontinuationofthebookstorewasinvoluntary. Id .Indiscussingtheintent ` aspectofdiscontinuednonconforminguse,the Boles courtstated: L  8  Webelievethattheterm discontinuedorwordsofsimilarimport,asutilizedin $ t zoningordinanceswithspecifictimelimitations,shouldbeconstruedtoincludean  ` elementofintent,combinedwithsomeact!orfailuretoact!indicativeof  L  abandonment....Toholdthatanonconformingusecanbecutoffautomatically  8  bytimelimitsondiscontinuance,regardlessofthereasonforthatdiscontinuance, $  strikesusasintrinsicallyunfair....Accordingly,weholdthattheterm    discontinuedasfoundin[Chattanoogasdiscontinuanceordinance]doesnotapply   ifthediscontinuanceofthenonconforminguseispurelyinvoluntaryinnature.     Ѐ Id. at422.Thus,thecourtin Boles heldthatthecessationofoperationoftheadultbookstorecould p notbeconsidereda discontinuanceofthenonconformingusebecauseitwas purelyinvoluntary \ innature,thatis,thepropertyownerwaslegallypreventedfromusingthepropertyforthatpurpose H bytheinjunction.Within100daysaftertheinjunctionwaslifted,thenonconforminguseresumed 4  Id. at420.The Boles opinionincludedlanguagesuggestingthattheword discontinuedshouldbe  p readtorequireanintentandanact(orfailuretoact)indicatingabandonment. Id. at422.  \   Custom,ofcourse,emphasizesthedictain Boles opiningthatintenttoabandonshouldbe 4 readintotheterm discontinued.Theholding,however,wassimplythatadiscontinuancethatis    purelyinvoluntaryinnature,aswherethenonconforminguseisprohibitedbyaninjunctionduring   thespecifiedtimeperiod,cannotbeconsidereda discontinuanceundertheordinance.Thisis  clearlydistinguishablefromtheinstantcase,inwhichtheinjunctionwasliftedinAugust1996,the  ordinancebecameeffectiveinJanuary1997,andCustomdidnotapplyforthesubjectpermituntil  July2002. l    Thefactsintheinstantcasearemorecomparableto Tolesv.CityofDyersburg ,39S.W.3d D! 138(Tenn.Ct.App.2000)(perm.toapp.),relieduponbytheChanceryCourtbelow.In Toles ,the 0"  plaintiff( Toles)ownedatavernlocatedinthecityofDyersburg. Id. at139.Thetavernhadbeen #l! operatedbyatenantwhoallowedthebusinesslicenseandliquorlicensetoexpire. Id. Afterthis $X" tenantleft,Tolesbeganmakingimprovementstothepropertyandsoughtoutanewtenanttooperate $D # thetavern.Repairswererequiredbythecityfiredepartmentbeforethepermitcouldbeissued,and %0!$ numerousreinspectionswereconductedbeforethepropertywasdeemedincompliancewith &"% applicablecodes. Id .DuringthefivemonthperiodinwhichTolesrepairedthepropertyandsought '#& outanewtenant,thepropertywasrezonedasresidential,causingthetaverntobecomea (#' nonconforminguse. Id .at139140.Tolesfinallyfoundanewtenantandappliedforabeerpermit.  )$(  Id. ThecityzoningcommissiondeniedTolesthepermit,determiningthatthepropertycouldnot |*%) be grandfatheredasanonconformingpriorusebecausethebusinesswasnotinoperationwhenthe  propertywasrezoned. Id. at140.Thepropertyownerappealed.   ̀  Onappeal,thepropertyownercited Boles ,arguingthathisrepairworkandapplicationfor t permitsshowedsufficientintenttocontinueoperationofthetaverntoallowthepropertytobe `  grandfatheredunderthenewzoningordinance. Id. Theappellatecourtdistinguished Boles , L  notingthatthenonconformingusewasnotpreventedbyaninjunction.Rather,itfound,therewas 8   noextrinsicforcewhichpreventedtheclubfromcontinuingitsoperations. Id .at141  .Itnoted $ t thatfindingsomeonetooperatethetavern apparentlytooktime,andthefactthatnumerousrepairs  ` wererequiredtoconformtoapplicablecodeswasnotthefaultofthecity. Id. Itfoundbothdelays  L  tobewithinthecontrolofthepropertyowner. Id.   8    The Toles courtread Boles asindicatingthat intentisonlyrelevant wheresomeforce   outsidethecontrolofthepropertyownerpreventsthecontinueduseofthelandinaparticular   manner. Id. Sincenoforceoutsidethecontrolofthepropertyownerpreventedhimfromoperating   thetavern,theintentofthepropertyownerwas notimportant. Id. Therefore,the Toles Court   foundthatsincenobusinessexistedatthetimeofthezoningchange,therewasnobusinessto p  grandfatherinunderthenewzoningordinance. Id. Asaresult,theCourtupheldthedenialofthe \ beerpermit. Id.  H   Customlikensitssituationto Boles ,arguingthatitslengthyperiodofnonusestemmedfrom  p theoriginalinjunction;itcausedCustomtoloseitsoriginaloperatorofthelandfillandcaused  \ Customtohavetocomplywithmorestringentenvironmentalregulations.Wemustconclude, H though,thatthefactsinthiscasearemorelike Toles than Boles .Indeed,Customsactionscanfairly 4 becharacterizedas preparationforuseoftheproperty,whichhasbeenfoundnottoconstitutea   preexistingnonconforminguse. SeeDicksonCountyv.Jennette ,2000WL1121550at*7(Tenn.   Ct.App.Aug.9,2000)( [m]erepreparationforuseofproperty...isnotenoughtoshowa  devotionofthepropertytothatuseinordertoshowapreexistingnonconforminguse.)(quoting   CityofPharrv.Pena ,853S.W.2d56,64(Tex.App.1993)).   iTheevidenceintherecordshowsclearlythatdevelopmentofalandfillisacomplexand X  timeconsumingundertaking.Evenso,the grandfatherprovisionofT.C.A.137208was D! designedtoprotectongoingbusinessoperations,nottoextendthetimeallowedtodevelopa 0"  nonconformingbusiness.Thestatutecontainsnoexceptionforacomplexbusinesssuchasalandfill. #l! Consequently,wemustconcludethattheChanceryCourtdidnoterrinholdingthatthe $X"  grandfatherprovisionofT.C.A.137208doesnotprotecttheuseoftheHighlandspropertyas $D # alandfill. %0!$  &"%  i  Finally,CustomassertsthatitobtainedavestedrighttodevelopHighlandsbasedonthe '#& $400,000spentonconstructionofHighlandsin1998.Customcites Stateexrel.SCAChemical (#' WasteServices , Inc,v.Konigsberg ,636S.W.2d430(Tenn.1982),and HoweRealtyCo.v.Cityof )$( Nashville ,141S.W.2d904(Tenn.1940),insupportofitsargumentthatrightsunderanexisting |*%) ordinancemayvestifsubstantialconstructionorsubstantialliabilitiesareincurredrelatedtothe h+&* construction.Inboth Konisberg and Howe ,however,theplaintiffsestoppelargumentwasrejected  becausenoconstructionhadbegunundertheexistingordinance.   iThemorerecentcaseof Rutherfordv.Murray ,2004WL1870066(Tenn.Ct.App.Aug.20, t 2004)providesmoreguidanceonthisissue.In Rutherford ,theplaintiffzoningboardsuedthe ` defendant( Murray)foroperatinganautorepairshopinviolationofthezoningordinance. Id. at L  *1.Thetrialcourtdeterminedthattheautorepairshopwasavalidnonconformingusebecause 8  Murrayhadcompletedasubstantialportionoftheconstructionoftheshopbeforethenewzoning $ t ordinancetookeffect,andwasthereforeprotectedunderthe grandfatherclauseofT.C.A.137  ` 208. Id. at*6,*8.Substantialconstruction,then,resultedinavestedrightwhentheconstruction  L  occurredimmediatelypriortothezoningchange.  8   $  Inthiscase,however,the$400,000inconstructioncostswereincurredbyCustomlongafter   theCoopertownordinancebecameeffectiveandsomemonthsaftertheoneyeardiscontinuation   clausedisallowedthenonconforminguse.Atimelineofundisputedfactsishelpfultothisanalysis:       i8  August22,1996 !OrderofCompromiseandSettlemententeredbetweenthe p RobertsonCountyCommissionandCustomdesignatedHighlandsasalegally ` permittednonconforminguse.L      K.4 <DL!4X!K  g  8  December1,1996 !LocalpropertyownersincorporatethetownofCoopertown, $t whichincludestheHighlandsproperty.g݌d    Ќ  04X!4X!0  K.4 <DL!4X!K 8  January30,1997 !Coopertownzoningordinancebecomeseffective.The < CoopertownordinanceprovidedthattheRobertsonCountyPlanningCommission , wouldperformsiteplanapprovalonbehalfofCoopertown.(CoopertownZoning  ordinancep.122)     8  August21,1997 !CustomobtainedbusinesslicenseforHighlandsfromRobertson  County.|    8  September4,1997 !RobertsonCountyPlanningCommissionapprovedCustoms T! siteplan.D"      8  March!June,1998 !Approximately$400,000spentonconstructionofHighlands.$l"     8  August31,2001 !CustomsignsagreementwithWasteIndustriestooperatethe %H!$ landfill.WasteIndustriesrequestedmodificationstothelandfill.&8"%     8  March5,2002 !TennesseeDepartmentofEcologyandConservationapproved ($' modificationsrequestedbyWasteIndustries.)%(      *%)  8  July23,2002 !Customsubmittedbuildingpermitfortrailerofficeandscalesto   CoopertownPlanningCommission.     8  September17,2002 !CoopertownPlanningCommissiondeterminedthatitwould x notreviewthemodifiedsiteplanuntilCustomobtainedafinalzoningdetermination.h     8  September23,2002 !CoopertownBuildingCommissionerdeterminedthatthe @  landfillwasnotalegallypermittednonconforminguseonthegroundsthatthe 0  propertyhadnotbeenusedasalandfillforoveroneyear. l     8  October8,2002 !CoopertownBoardofZoningAppealsconductedapublichearing  D  ontheissueandupheldthedecisionoftheCoopertownBuildingCommissioner4       Thefactsshownaboveareundisputedbytheparties.TheCoopertownzoningordinanceand   thediscontinuationprovisionwentintoeffectonJanuary30,1997.Customwasawarethattherehad   beennoactualoperationofthelandfillsince1997.Despitethis,Customchosetobeginconstruction   sometimeinMayof1998.Unlike Rutherford ,theCoopertownzoningordinancesremainedthe  samebothbeforeandafterCustomincurredtheconstructioncosts.Assuch,wemustconcludethat l  Rutherford isnotapplicable. X   Customarguesthatitincurredtheconstructioncostsbasedontherepresentationsofthe 0 RobertsonCountyPlanningCommission,actingasagentsforCoopertown.However,thebusiness l licensewasgrantedbyRobertsonCountyinAugust1997andthesiteplanwasapprovedbythe X planningcommissioninSeptember1997,bothpriortotheeffectivedateoftheoneyear D discontinuationordinance.Wemustconcludethatthemeregrantingofsiteplanapprovaland 0 issuanceofabusinesslicensebytheCountydoesnotgrantavestedpropertyrighttoHighlands.For  allofthesereasons,wefindthattheChanceryCourtdidnoterrinaffirmingtherulingofthe  CoopertownBoardofZoningAppeals.    Therefore,thedecisionofthetrialcourtisaffirmed.Costsofthisappealareassessedagainst | AppellantCustomLandDevelopment,Inc.,forwhichexecutionmayissue,ifnecessary. h     a     i   _________________________________________ %T #    a     i   HOLLYM.KIRBY,JUDGE %@!$