ÿWPC3 mà>´ ΰ¼3™±ä½;_("YSÖhæ ×Ód—il8æ™Û륧"…ñÙ1à[þf "="iÓÕZã {à¡îA| Yo27ÇLî8øí •Ä'£=ié Þ¼ÛZ¼“„ƒlí\)†é°F Xøç·"@‰n…FòÂ0,qï)ÜLÍ•ÅuŠ=½îÝRTÞ~¼æ³ío§b aáÞ! íæ€á—æñ”QºÈW¦à/’Ÿ~ìH»¯@îŧCþÁ†ÕÎ-Ñ êrNzwû×y”?³Ö4?I®1ï¡ÅÀ¶»,Aú¶XFe\4EàóûÂ.’PZY¥É^YjÑRxcøT£ÈŠJ®@š óFs£U3$¬BCÿI˜Eþˆ)¿˜­há€òªU¿m?—x&žÁ­Òh«òèA J#\ÐÏ¢Rqw±ÞÃ4jCoúW5*9½þ§jáΰOʳu{µëÄÙ.t캈VU‘…™8…@‰sNåv§§Jê+ÃÜÝÁA¿^ÊÁ-/T^H,žnXù€Q6‰´Ö¹Û§C€éNn0›®³|ìÐy4Ø]úF*«ÆsìåÙ°yÍa'åüJ«œ[Ìb %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÁÐ ‘ Æ™ Æ_ Æ% Æë 0D±Nõe÷\Ey­{K(Èsá; b(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( 0ë0000 B 0¤8 D3Ü D- 0K<< AS‡ÆÚ 0¤  0DD A«ˆ»“ +â (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularÑuV)lw¤3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4050 SeriÈÈÈÈÈÈÈÈ0 Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó [Ý ƒR6Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¡eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€marital€assets€include€the€increase€in€value€of€UBF€which€can€be€calculated€as€follows:€€€$517,705.00€(Mr.Ð ° ÐDavisððs€share€in€UBF)€„€$11,000.00(one€half€of€the€value€of€UBF€in€1981)€=€$506,705.00. Ý ƒR6Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¡eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€See€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó,€an€unreported€opinion€of€this€Court,€filed€in€Knoxville€on€October€4,€1999.€€No.€03A01„Ð ° Ð9901„CV„00016. £Ý ƒR6Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¡eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Mr.€Davis€owns€2550€shares€of€stock. AÝ ƒR6Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¡eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Our€use€of€the€first€name€of€Horace€Davis€should€not€be€construed€as€disrespectful,€but€is€to€avoid€confusionÐ ° Ðin€referring€to€two€Mr.€Ô_ÔDavisesÔ_Ô. ¾Ý ƒR6Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¡eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Mr.€Davis€testified€that€the€value€of€the€marital€home€was€$115,000.00€while€Ms.€Davis€testified€that€the€valueÐ ° Ðof€the€marital€home€was€$100,000.00.€€The€Trial€Court€failed€to€place€a€value€on€the€home.€€Here€it€makes€no€differenceÐ tÄ Ðin€our€evaluation€of€the€appropriateness€of€the€Trial€Courtððs€division€whether€we€use€the€higher€or€lower€of€these€valuesÐ 8ˆ Ðas€our€conclusion€is€the€same€regardless€of€which€values€are€used.€€To€simplify€the€calculation,€we€use€only€one€of€theÐ üL Ðvalues,€the€lower. ×Ý ƒR6Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¡eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Mr.€Davis€appealed€the€judgment€of€the€Cocke€County€Circuit€Court€following€the€trial€on€July€21,€1998.€€ThisÐ ° ÐCourt€remanded€the€cause€to€the€Trial€Court€for€a€final€judgment.€€See€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó,€an€unreported€opinion€of€thisÐ tÄ ÐCourt,€filed€in€Knoxville€on€October€4,€1999,€No.€03A01„9901„CV„00016.€ Ý ƒR6Ó$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¡eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Mr.€Davis€estimated€€that€the€household€furnishings€were€worth€$9,000.00€and€Ms.€Davis€estimated€their€valueÐ ° Ðat€$3,000.00.€€Again,€it€makes€no€difference€in€our€evaluation€of€the€appropriateness€of€the€Trial€Courtððs€division€whetherÐ tÄ Ðwe€use€the€higher€or€lower€of€these€values.€€However,€in€order€to€remain€consistent,€we€choose€the€lower€value.- ù-(|G26Ó$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ »»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¡eò»»Ô d(|3`$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ »»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3`$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ »»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ »»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼ »»»ÔÑ8€VAXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡î ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼ »îî #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓMarch€26,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XVAX»¼ ÔÌò òÔ#†¼ »XXVAó#ÔWILLIAM€H.€DAVISòòóó€v.€DAIRA€F.€DAVISòòóóÔ‡XVAX»¼ Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Cocke€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€23,867„I€€Ben€W.€Hooper,€II,€Judge€Ð æ 6 ÐÌFILED€AUGUST€13,€Ô_Ô2001Ô_ÔÐ ¾   Ðà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2000„02678„COA„R3„CVÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€appeal€from€the€Cocke€County€Circuit€Court€questions€whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€inò ò€ó ódividingÐ xÈ  Ðthe€marital€estate.€€Mr.€Davis€appeals€the€Trial€Courtððs€valuation€of€his€closely€held€corporation,€theÐ h¸ Ðpayment€of€some€debt€by€Mr.€Davis,€and€the€award€of€permanent€periodic€alimony€to€Ms.€Davis.ò ò€Ð T¤ Ðó óWe€affirm€the€decision€of€the€Trial€Court€as€modified€and€remand€for€such€further€proceedings,€ifÐ D” Ðany,€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€We€adjudge€costs€of€the€appeal€against€the€Appellant,€William€H.Ð 0€ ÐDavis€and€his€surety.Ð l ÐÓ•ÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Affirmed€AsÐ ôD ÐModified;€Cause€Remandedó óÐ à0 ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼ »àXVAg#ÔÔ‡XVAX.¼ ÔHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€whichòòóó€òòCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,óóÐ ¸ Ðand€òòD.€Michael€Swiney,€JJ.óó,€joined.Ð ¤ô ÐÌJerry€W.€Laughlin,€Greeneville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellant,€William€H.€Ô#†¼ »XXVA #ÔÔ‡XVAX»¼ ÔDavis.Ð |Ì ÐÌK.€Karl€Spalvins,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellee,€Daira€F.€Davis.Ð T ¤ ÐÓÜÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼ »XXVAW #ÔÔ‡XVAX»¼ ÔÐ ,"|! ÐòòóóÔ#†¼ »XXVA1 #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€XVAX»¼ ÔÌà  àThis€appeal€arises€from€a€divorce€between€William€H.€Davis,€the€Appellant,€and€Daira€F.Ð $T# ÐDavis,€the€Appellee.€€Mr.€Davis€appeals€the€judgment€of€the€Cocke€County€Circuit€Court׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€andÐ ð$@ $ Ðpresents€for€our€review€four€issues€which€we€restate:€€Ð Ü%,!% ÐÌà8  àI.€€Whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€when€it€ruled,€on€remand,€that€the€$17,767.98Ð ´'#' Ðâ âpayment€€Mr.€Davis€made€to€satisfy€credit€card€obligations€would€not€be€creditedÐ  (ð#(ý Ðagainst€the€$208,386.00€judgment€Ms.€Davis€received€as€her€share€of€Mr.€DavisððsÐ ° Ðcorporation,€but€was€a€separate€responsibility€for€Mr.€Davis.МìÐ Ð  Ðâ âÌà8  àII.€€Whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€determining€the€value€of€Mr.€Davisððs€share€ofÐ tÄ Ðhis€closely€held€corporation.Ð`°Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àIII.€€Whether€the€Trial€Court€failed€to€equitably€divide€the€marital€assets,€awardingÐ 8 ˆ ÐMs.€Davis€a€substantially€disproportionate€share.Ð$ tÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àIV.€€Whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€awarding€Ms.€Davis€permanent€periodicÐ ü L  Ðalimony.Ðè 8 Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àWe€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€as€modified€and€remand€for€further€proceedings,Ð À  Ðif€any,€consistent€with€this€opinion.Ð ¬ü  ÐÒe°ÒÒ°eÒÌà  àThe€parties€were€married€in€Cocke€County€on€April€23,€1981.€€There€was€one€child€born€ofÐ „Ô  Ðthis€marriage,€Diana€Nicole€Davis.€€The€parties€separated€on€November€24,€1994€and€Mr.€Davis€filedÐ pÀ Ða€complaint€for€divorce€on€July€2,€1996.€€Following€a€trial€on€July€21,€1998,€the€Trial€Court€grantedÐ \¬ ÐMr.€and€Ms.€Davis€a€divorce.€€Ms.€Davis€received€custody€of€Diana€Nicole€Davis€and€Mr.€DavisÐ H˜ Ðreceived€reasonable€and€liberal€visitation.€€Child€support€was€also€set€in€accordance€with€the€childÐ 4„ Ðsupport€guidelines.€€Mr.€Davis€was€to€provide€health€insurance€for€Ms.€Davis€for€18€monthsÐ  p Ðfollowing€the€divorce.€€Additionally,€he€was€to€provide€health€insurance€for€the€minor€child€and€wasÐ  \ Ðresponsible€for€any€uncovered€medical€expenses.€€Ð øH ÐÒe°ÃÒÒ°eÒÌà  àAs€for€the€division€of€the€marital€estate,€the€Trial€Court€awarded€Ms.€Davis€a€1990€Lincoln,Ð Ð  Ðand€Mr.€Davis€a€1977€Jeep.€€There€was€a€1998€Jeep€leased€to€United€Business€Forms,€Inc.,€Mr.Ð ¼  ÐDavisððs€corporation,€which€was€also€awarded€to€him.€€No€value€was€given€to€any€of€the€automobilesÐ ¨ø Ðby€the€Trial€Court.€€The€marital€home€was€valued€at€$100,000.00€by€Ms.€Davis€and€$115,000.00Ð ”ä Ðdollars€by€Mr.€Davis.€€The€contents€of€the€marital€home€were€valued€by€Ms.€Davis€at€$3,000.00€andÐ €Ð ÐMr.€Davis€at€$9,000.00.€€The€Court€awarded€the€marital€home€and€its€contents€to€Ms.€Davis€withoutÐ l¼ Ðassigning€a€value€to€either€the€marital€home€or€the€contents€and€ordered€Mr.€Davis€to€pay€theÐ X ¨ Ðremaining€mortgage€on€the€home€which€was€approximately€$6,400.00€dollars.€€Ð D!” ÐÌà  àThe€Ô_ÔDavisesÔ_Ô€had€a€401K€with€a€value€of€$29,468.69€which€was€awarded€to€Mr.€Davis€alongÐ #l! Ðwith€two€IRA€accounts;€one€with€a€value€of€approximately€$12,000.00€and€the€other€with€a€value€ofÐ $X" Ðapproximately€$4,000.00.€€An€account€with€$6,200.00€held€by€Mr.€Davis€for€the€purpose€ofÐ ô$D # Ðpurchasing€a€car€for€the€minor€child€was€awarded€to€Mr.€Davis,€and€the€Court€ordered€him€to€proceedÐ à%0!$ Ðwith€the€purchase€of€an€automobile€for€the€minor€child.€€Mr.€Davis€was€ordered€to€provide€insuranceÐ Ì&"% Ðcoverage€for€the€automobile.€€Finally,€there€was€a€substantial€amount€of€credit€card€debt€at€issueÐ ¸'#& Ðduring€the€trial.€€The€Trial€Court€ordered€Mr.€Davis€to€pay€ð ða€lump€sum€sufficient€to€pay€off€all€ofÐ ¤(ô#' Ðthose€credit€card€obligations.ðð€Ms.€Davis€was€awarded€permanent€periodic€alimony€in€the€amountÐ )à$( Ðof€$1,650.00€per€month.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àThe€only€other€property€at€issue€is€Mr.€Davisððs€business.€€When€the€parties€married,€Mr.Ð ° ÐDavis€and€his€brother,€Horace€DavisÔ_Ô׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€were€the€principal€shareholders€of€a€closely€help€corporation,Ð œì ÐUnited€Business€Forms,€Inc.€€According€to€the€record,€United€Business€Forms,€Ô_ÔInc.Ô_Ô€is€a€printingÐ ˆØ Ðbusiness€begun€by€Mr.€Davis€and€Horace€Davis€in€1971.€€United€Business€Forms,€Inc.,€(hereinafterÐ tÄ Ðreferred€to€as€UBF)€manufactures€snap„out€business€forms,€and€employs€approximately€65€people.€Ð `° ÐAt€the€time€of€trial€Mr.€Davis€and€Horace€Davis€each€owned€2550€shares€of€stock€in€UBF€and€eachÐ L œ Ðheld€slightly€less€than€fifty€percent€of€the€corporate€stock.€€A€third€shareholder,€Mr.€Ray€Adams,Ð 8 ˆ Ðowns€the€remaining€three€shares.€€In€1985€Mr.€Davis€and€Horace€Davis€were€the€sole€shareholdersÐ $ t Ðof€UBF.€€At€that€time€they€entered€into€a€Stock€Redemption€Agreement€which€is€at€issue€on€thisÐ  ` Ðappeal.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àFollowing€the€trial,€Mr.€Davis€filed€a€Notice€of€Appeal.€This€Court€remanded€the€cause€toÐ Ô$  Ðthe€Trial€Court€for€a€final€judgment.€See€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó,€an€unreported€opinion€of€this€Court,€filedÐ À  Ðin€Knoxville€on€October€4,€1999.€€According€to€the€Order€of€the€Court€of€Appeals,€the€Trial€CourtÐ ¬ü  Ðhad€reserved€a€question€of€the€method€of€payment€as€to€a€lump€sum€judgment€Ms.€Davis€was€toÐ ˜è  Ðreceive€from€Mr.€Davis.€€If€the€parties€could€not€agree€on€a€method€of€payment,€the€Trial€CourtÐ „Ô  Ðwould€render€a€decision.€€At€the€time€of€oral€argument€on€appeal,€the€parties€had€not€agreed€as€to€aÐ pÀ Ðmethod€of€payment.€€Therefore,€this€Court€concluded€the€order€was€not€a€final€one€subject€to€anÐ \¬ Ðappeal€as€of€right.€€The€case€was€remanded€to€the€Trial€Court€for€a€final€judgment.€€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àFollowing€remand,€Mr.€Davis€filed€a€Motion€to€Specify€Terms€of€Judgment.€€On€March€16,Ð  p Ð2000,€a€€hearing€on€that€motion€took€place.€€The€Trial€Court€held€that€beginning€June,€2000,€Mr.Ð  \ ÐDavis€would€be€obligated€to€pay€$1500.00€per€month€toward€the€$208,386.00€judgment.€Ð øH ÐAdditionally,€the€Trial€Court€also€determined€that€the€$17,767.98€paid€by€Mr.€Davis€to€satisfy€Ms.Ð ä4 ÐDavisððs€credit€card€debt€was€not€to€be€credited€toward€the€$208,386.00€judgment,€but€that€the€twoÐ Ð  Ðwere€separate€liabilities.€€Mr.€Davis€also€appeals€this€decision€by€the€Trial€Court.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àWe€review€the€Trial€Courtððs€findings€of€fact€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€of€the€proceedingsÐ ”ä Ðbelow,€€with€a€presumption€of€correctness€€ð ðunless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.ððÐ €Ð ÐTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d);€òòsee€also€Hass€v.€Knightonóó,€676€S.W.2d€554€(Tenn.€1984).€€There€is€noÐ l¼ Ðpresumption€of€correctness€with€regard€to€the€trial€courtððs€conclusion€of€law,€and€those€conclusionsÐ X ¨ Ðare€reviewed€òòde€novoóó.€€òòJahn€v.€Jahnóó,€932€S.W.2d€939€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).Ð D!” ÐÌÓ  Óà @ àà @` àI.Ð #l! ÐÓ  Óà  àMr.€Davisððs€first€issue€on€appeal€is€that€the€Trial€Court€erred€when€it€ruled€the€$17,767.98Ð $X" Ðpayment€Mr.€Davis€made€to€satisfy€the€credit€card€obligation€would€not€be€credited€against€theÐ ô$D # Ð$208,386.00€judgment€Ms.€Davis€received.€€Mr.€Davis€argues€that€during€the€March€16,€2000,Ð à%0!$ Ðhearing€on€the€Motion€to€Specify€Terms€of€Judgment€the€Trial€Court€declared€òòsua€sponteóó€that€Mr.Ð Ì&"% ÐDavis€was€not€entitled€to€a€credit€against€the€lump€sum€judgment.€€He€asserts€that€Ms.€Davis€testifiedÐ ¸'#& Ðthat€these€were€her€individual€debts€and€that€she€was€willing€to€pay€these€debts.€€He€further€arguesÐ ¤(ô#' Ðthat€both€parties€acknowledged€that€the€$17,767.98€payment€would€be€credited€toward€the€lump€sumÐ ° Ðpayment€and€that€the€brief€submitted€by€Ms.€Davis€during€the€first€appeal€to€this€Court€reflects€thatÐ œì Ðacknowledgment.€€Therefore,€it€is€Mr.€Davisððs€argument€that€the€Trial€Court,€upon€remand,€modifiedÐ ˆØ Ðits€original€order,€òòsua€sponteóó,€at€the€motion€hearing€on€March€16,€2000.ò òó óÐ tÄ ÐÌà  àMs.€Davis€argues€that€the€original€judgment€required€Mr.€Davis€to€pay€to€her€the€amount€of€Ð L œ Ð$208,386.00€for€her€interest€in€UBF.€€She€further€asserts€that€Mr.€Davis€was€also€required€to€pay€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðcredit€card€debt,€which€was€to€be€paid€in€a€lump€sum.€€Ms.€Davis€argues€that€Mr.€Davis€was€the€partyÐ $ t Ðwho€filed€the€Motion€to€Specify€Terms€of€Judgment€and€that€the€Trial€Court€was€ordered€to€resolveÐ  ` Ðthe€issue€as€to€the€terms€of€payment€of€the€$208,386.00€judgment,€and€at€the€time€of€the€hearing€onÐ ü L  ÐMarch€16,€2000,€Mr.€Davis€had€not€paid€any€amount€toward€that€judgment,€but€had€paid€$17,767.98Ð è 8  Ðtoward€the€satisfaction€of€the€credit€card€debt.€€Ms.€Davis€argues€that€Mr.€Davis€initiated€theÐ Ô$  Ðdiscussion€at€the€motion€hearing€concerning€the€credit€toward€the€$208,386.00€judgment,€and€thatÐ À  Ðnow€he€is€trying€to€argue€on€appeal€that€the€Trial€Courtððs€ruling€on€that€matter€was€òòsua€sponteóó.Ð ¬ü  ÐFinally,€Ms.€Davis€argues€that€the€Trial€Court€was€merely€clarifying€for€Mr.€Davis,€upon€his€request,Ð ˜è  Ðits€order€from€the€July€21,€1998,€hearing.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àUpon€review€of€the€transcript€of€the€hearing€on€July€21,€1998,€and€the€transcript€of€theÐ \¬ Ðhearing€March€16,€2000,€we€agree€with€Ms.€Davis.€€At€the€July€21,€1998,€hearing,€the€Trial€CourtÐ H˜ Ðstated€the€following:Ð 4„ Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àIn€order€to€make€the€other€awards€and€figures€that€Iððve€used€in€thisÐ  \ Ðdecision€to€equal€out,€it€means€that€Mr.€Davis€would€be€obligated€toÐ øH Ðpay€Ms.€Davis€for€her€interest€in€the€business€the€sum€of€$208,000€.Ð ä4 Ð.€.€$208,386.ÐÐ ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€Court€is€going€to€also€require€that€an€amount€sufficient€to€pay€allÐ ¨ø Ðof€her€credit€card€obligations,€including€one„half€of€those€which€IððmÐ ”ä Ðgoing€to€order€them€to€pay€equally,€and€that€being€Proffittððs€andÐ €Ð ÐLoweððs,€heððll€have€to€pay€a€lump€sum€sufficient€to€pay€off€all€of€thoseÐ l¼ Ðcredit€card€obligations.ÐX ¨` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àNow,€the€Court€is€not€going€to€make€a€ruling€at€this€time€on€how€theÐ 0"€  Ðbalance€of€that€will€be€paid,€so€that€you€all€will€be€given€anÐ #l! Ðopportunity€to€see€if€you€can€agree€upon€some€manner€or€method€ofÐ $X" Ðpayment,€however€you€wish€to€do€it.€€Now,€if€you€canððt€do€it,€thenÐ ô$D # Ðweððll€have€to€have€a€further€hearing€on€it.€Ðà%0!$` x` x Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àÌThe€Order€from€this€hearing€filed€on€December€14,€1998,€Ô_ÔnuncÔ_Ô€pro€tunc€July€21,€1998,€states€theÐ ¸'#& Ðfollowing€with€respect€to€this€matter:Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à11.€€Mr.€Davis€shall€be€obligated€to€pay€to€Mrs.€Davis€the€sum€of€TwoÐ |*Ì%) ÐHundred€Eight€Thousand€Three€Hundred€Eighty€Six€DollarsÐ h+¸&* Ð($208,386.00)€for€her€interest€in€the€business.€€Mr.€Davis€shall€pay€inÐ ° Ða€lump€sum€an€amount€sufficient€to€satisfy€all€of€Mrs.€Davisððs€creditÐ œì Ðcard€obligations€and€one„half€of€the€credit€card€obligations€to€ProffittsÐ ˆØ Ðand€Lowes.€€The€parties€are€hereby€granted€an€opportunity€to€reach€anÐ tÄ Ðagreement€upon€some€manner€or€method€for€the€payment€of€theÐ `° Ðbalance.€€Absent€such€an€agreement,€upon€proper€motion€the€CourtÐ L œ Ðwill€make€a€ruling€on€the€manner€and€method€for€the€payment€of€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðbalance.Ð$ t` x` x ÐÌAccording€to€the€transcript€of€the€motion€hearing€on€March€16,€2000,€this€issue€was€addressed.€€TheÐ ü L  Ðlawyers€for€the€parties€were€discussing€how€the€lump€sum€payment€of€$208,386.00€would€be€paidÐ è 8  Ðto€Ms.€Davis€and€the€following€discussion€took€place:Ð Ô$  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àThe€Court:€€The€credit€card€billing.€€Let€me€see€here€a€minute.€€WeððreÐ ¬ü  Ðdown€to€what,€$190,618.02?Ð˜è ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àMr.€Spalvins€[attorney€for€Ms.€Davis]:€€No,€Your€Honor.€€I€donððtÐ pÀ Ðthink€thatððs€the€way€that€is€calculated.€€I€think€her€interest€inÐ \¬ Ðthe€business€was€separate€and€additional€and€I€think€theÐ H˜ Ðinterest€in€the€business€of€$208,000„some€dollars€is€still€solid.Ð4„¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àMr.€Laughlin€[attorney€for€Mr.€Davis]:€€No,€Your€Honor.€€I€think€itððsÐ  \ Ðquite€clear€that€thatððs€to€be€a€credit€against€the€amount€forÐ øH Ðwhich€he€was€obligated€to€pay€her€for€her€interest,€what€theÐ ä4 ÐCourt€determined€to€be€her€interest€in€the€stock.ÐÐ ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àThe€Court:€€Okay.€€Let€me,€where€is€.€.€.€well,€Iððm€not€going€to€askÐ ¨ø Ðyou€where€it€is,€let€me€find€the€Order.€€Letððs€take€thisÐ ”ä Ðeducation€business€first.€€Has€she€enrolled€in€school€orÐ €Ð Ðanything?Ðl¼¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à[the€Court€moves€on€to€another€matter€briefly]ÐD!”` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àThe€Court:€€In€reading€my€opinion€which€is€very€short,€I€do€not€findÐ #l! Ðthat€there€is€a€credit€against€the€sum€of€$208,386.00.€€Ð$X"¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àMr.€Laughlin:€€Can€I€mention€to€the€Court€the€language€on€Page€5?Ðà%0!$` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€Court:€€Yeah,€I€just€got€through€reading€that.и'#&` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àMr.€Laughlin:€€Iððm€sorry,€Your€Honor.€€On€Page€4€it€talks€aboutÐ )à$( Ð$208,000.00,€Iððm€sorry.Ð|*Ì%)¸ x¸ x ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€Court:€€Okay.а` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àMr.€Laughlin:€€And€then€it€talks€in€terms€in€the€very€last€paragraphÐ ˆØ Ðabout€the€payment€of€the€credit€card€obligations€and€thenÐ tÄ Ðcontinuing€onto€the€next€page,€it€talks€about€the€payment€ofÐ `° Ðthe€balance€of€that,€payment€of€the€balance€of€the€$208€.€.€.ÐL œ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àMr.€Spalvins:€€Where€are€you€reading€from?€€Iððve€got€the€judgmentÐ $ t Ðbefore€me?Ð `¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àMr.€Laughlin:€€Iððm€sorry.€€Weððre€reading€from€the€MemorandumÐ è 8  ÐOpinion,€Page€5.ÐÔ$ ¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àMr.€Spalvins:€€Oh,€okay.€€All€right.Ьü ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àMr.€Laughlin:€€And€it€says,€give€the€opportunity€it€talks€in€terms€ofÐ „Ô  Ðthe€balance€of€this€amount,€and€thatððs€why€we€believe€that€theÐ pÀ ÐCourt€intended€to€take€the€credit€card€obligations,€her€creditÐ \¬ Ðcard€obligations€a€credit,€if€you€will,€against€the€$208,Ð H˜ Ðbecause€.€.€.Ð4„¸ x¸ x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà0¸ ` x` xàà ` àThe€Court:€€I€see€and€understand€why€youððre€saying€that.€€But€whenÐ  \ ÐI€have€said€that€the€Court€is€going€to€also€require€that€anÐ øH Ðamount€sufficient€to€pay€all€of€her€credit€card€obligations€andÐ ä4 Ðhaving€just€stated€that€he€owed€her€$208,386.00,€and€then€IÐ Ð  Ðsay€is€also€going€to€require.€€That€language€is,€I€can€prettyÐ ¼  Ðwell€tell€what€I€meant€by€reading€what€I€said,€so€there€will€notÐ ¨ø Ðbe€a€credit€there.€Ð”ä¸ x¸ x ÐÌIt€appears€from€this€discussion€that€the€Trial€Court€was€merely€clarifying€an€earlier€point€addressedÐ l¼ Ðby€the€attorney€at€the€motion€hearing.€€The€Trial€Court€reviewed€the€Memorandum€Opinion€andÐ X ¨ Ðpointed€out€that€the€language,€ð ðthe€Court€is€going€to€also€require€that€an€amount€sufficient€to€pay€allÐ D!” Ðof€her€credit€card€obligations€.€.€.ðð€is€the€language€suggesting€that€no€credit€was€intended.€Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àMr.€Davis€argued€that€the€Trial€Court€changed€its€previous€ruling€òòsua€sponteóó€at€the€motionÐ $X" Ðhearing.€€The€term€òòsua€sponteóó€is€defined€as,€ð ðof€his€or€its€own€will€or€motion;€voluntarily;€withoutÐ ô$D # Ðprompting€or€suggestion.ðð€òòBlackððs€Law€Dictionaryóó€1424€(6th€ed.€1990).€We€do€not€find€that€the€TrialÐ à%0!$ ÐCourt€addressed€this€issue€òòsua€sponteóó.€€The€aforementioned€discussion€clearly€shows€that€theÐ Ì&"% Ðattorneys€had€different€opinions€as€to€what€the€Trial€Court€ordered€at€the€July€21,€1998,€hearing€andÐ ¸'#& Ðtherefore€turned€to€the€Trial€Court€for€clarification.€€The€Trial€Court€reviewed€the€MemorandumÐ ¤(ô#' ÐOpinion,€pointed€out€specific€language€and€reiterated€his€decision€from€the€prior€hearing.€€NoÐ )à$( Ðâ âchanges€were€made€to€the€prior€order,€only€clarification.€€The€Trial€Court€is€in€the€best€position€toÐ |*Ì%) Ðclarify€an€order€set€forth€by€said€Trial€Court.€€We€therefore€find€that€the€trial€Court€did€not€err€inÐ ° Ðclarifying€the€previous€court€order.Ð œì Ðâ âÌÓ  ÓII.à @ àà @` àà @¸ àà @ àà @h àà @À àà @ àÐ tÄ ÐÓ  Óà  àThe€second€issue€this€Court€will€address€is€the€Trial€Courtððs€valuation€of€Mr.€DavisððsÐ `° ÐCorporation.€€The€Trial€Court€determined€that€on€January€1,€1981,€UBF€had€a€value€of€$22,000.00Ð L œ Ðand€at€the€ð ðtime€material€to€this€litigationðð€UBF€had€a€value€of€$517,705.00€dollars.€€Ms.€Davis€wasÐ 8 ˆ Ðawarded€$208,386.00€as€her€interest€in€UBF.€€Dividing€a€marital€estate€begins€with€classifying€theÐ $ t Ðproperty€as€either€€separate€or€marital€property.€€òòMcClellan€v.€McClellanóó,€873€S.W.2d€350€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð  ` ÐApp.€1993).€€The€Trial€Court€did€not€make€a€determination€as€to€whether€UBF€was€Mr.€DavisððsÐ ü L  Ðseparate€property€or€marital€property,€therefore€it€is€incumbent€upon€this€Court€to€make€thatÐ è 8  Ðdetermination€before€evaluating€whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€its€value€determination€and€inÐ Ô$  Ðdividing€the€marital€assets.ò òó óÐ À  ÐÌà  àMarital€property€is€defined€at€T.C.A.€36„4„121(b)(1)(B)€as€follows:Ð ˜è  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àð ðMarital€Propertyðð€includes€income€from,€and€any€increase€in€valueÐ pÀ Ðduring€the€marriage€of,€property€determined€to€be€separate€propertyÐ \¬ Ðin€accordance€with€subdivision€(b)(2)€if€each€party€substantiallyÐ H˜ Ðcontributed€to€its€preservation€and€appreciation,€and€the€value€ofÐ 4„ Ðvested€and€unvested€pension,€vested€and€unvested€stock€option€rights,Ð  p Ðretirement€or€other€fringe€benefit€rights€relating€to€employment€thatÐ  \ Ðaccrued€during€the€period€of€the€marriage.ÐøH` x` x ÐÌSeparate€property€is€defined€at€T.C.A.€36„4„121(b)(2)(A)€as€ð ðAll€real€and€personal€property€ownedÐ Ð  Ðby€a€spouse€before€marriage.ððÐ ¼  ÐÌà  àBecause€Mr.€Davis€owned€stock€in€UBF€prior€to€his€marriage€to€Ms.€Davis,€we€find€that€UBFÐ ”ä Ðis€Mr.€Davisððs€separate€property.€€However,€UBFððs€increase€in€value€during€the€marriage€is€maritalÐ €Ð Ðproperty€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€36„4„121(b)(1)(B),€ð ðany€increase€in€value€during€the€marriage€of,Ð l¼ Ðproperty€determined€to€be€separate€property€in€accordance€with€subdivision€(b)(2)€if€each€partyÐ X ¨ Ðsubstantially€contributed€to€its€preservation€and€appreciationðð.€€ð ðSubstantial€contributionðð€includesÐ D!” Ðbut€is€not€limited€to€the€ð ðdirect€or€indirect€contribution€of€a€spouse€as€homemaker,€wage€earner,Ð 0"€  Ðparent€or€family€financial€manager.ðð€T.C.A.€36„4„121(b)(1)(D).€€A€spouseððs€ð ðindirect€contributionsÐ #l! Ðas€homemaker€constitute€contributions€to€the€appreciation€or€preservation€of€the€other€spouseððsÐ $X" Ðseparate€property.ðð€òòCohen€v.€Cohenóó,€937€S.W.2d€823€(Tenn.€1996).Ð ô$D # ÐÌà  àUpon€review€of€the€testimony€of€Ms.€Davis,€we€find€that€she€did€ð ðsubstantially€contributeððÐ Ì&"% Ðto€the€appreciation€of€UBF.€€Ms.€Davis€testified€that€when€she€married€Mr.€Davis€she€had€two€yearsÐ ¸'#& Ðof€college€education.€€Upon€her€marriage€to€Mr.€Davis€she€dropped€out€of€school€and€became€aÐ ¤(ô#' Ðhomemaker.€€Shortly€thereafter€Mr.€and€Ms.€Davis€had€a€daughter.€€There€is€no€dispute€as€to€Ms.Ð )à$( ÐDavisððs€role€as€homemaker€and€parent.€€In€addition€to€Ms.€Davisððs€aforementioned€indirectÐ |*Ì%) Ðcontributions€to€UBF,€she€also€contributed€directly€to€UBF.€€Ms.€Davis€testified€that€twice€she€hadÐ h+¸&* Ðbeen€employed€at€UBF.€€The€first€time€she€began€working€there€was€shortly€after€the€birth€of€theirÐ ° Ðdaughter.€€Ms.€Davis€testified€that€she€went€to€work€at€the€request€of€Mr.€Davis€because€UBF€wasÐ œì Ðshort„handed.€€Ms.€Davis€further€testified€she€worked€two€to€three€years€for€UBF€during€another€timeÐ ˆØ Ðperiod.€€Ms.€Davis€testified€that€she€went€to€Salt€Lake€City€with€Mr.€Davis€on€a€business€trip€toÐ tÄ Ðpurchase€equipment€for€UBF€and€she€attended€a€convention€in€Charlotte,€North€Carolina€with€Mr.Ð `° ÐDavis.€€Additionally,€she€accompanied€Mr.€Davis€on€a€business€trip€to€Atlanta,€Georgia€to€a€paperÐ L œ Ðcompany.€€Therefore,€while€UBF€is€considered€the€separate€property€of€Mr.€Davis,€the€increase€inÐ 8 ˆ Ðvalue€of€UBF€is€considered€a€marital€asset.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àAs€for€the€valuation€of€Mr.€Davisððs€share€of€UBF,€Mr.€Davis€argues€that€the€Trial€Court€erredÐ ü L  Ðin€assessing€his€value€in€UBF€at€$517,705.00.€€Mr.€Davis€asserts€that€UBF€is€subject€to€a€StockÐ è 8  ÐRedemption€Agreement€and€that€this€agreement€provides€that€if€Mr.€Davis€attempts€to€sell€orÐ Ô$  Ðencumber€his€stock€in€UBF,€UBF€has€the€right€to€redeem€the€stock€for€$175,000.00€dollars,€and€ifÐ À  Ðit€fails€to€do€so€the€other€stockholders€have€the€right€to€purchase€Mr.€Davisððs€stock€for€the€sameÐ ¬ü  Ðprice.€€Therefore,€Mr.€Davis€argues€that€there€is€no€way€the€value€of€his€shares€of€UBF€can€exceedÐ ˜è  Ð$175,000.00.€€Mr.€Davis€further€argues€that€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€adopting€the€opinion€of€LeRoyÐ „Ô  ÐBible,€a€certified€public€accountant,€who€testified€on€behalf€of€Ms.€Davis€as€to€the€value€of€Mr.Ð pÀ ÐDavisððs€share€of€UBF.€€Mr.€Davis€asserts€that€it€is€evident€Mr.€Bible€did€not€consider€the€effect€ofÐ \¬ Ðthe€Stock€Redemption€Agreement€in€arriving€at€his€opinion€that€Mr.€Davisððs€share€of€UBF€wasÐ H˜ Ðbetween€$518,503.00€and€$517,705.00.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àMr.€Davis€relies€on€the€case€of€òòErwin€v.€Erwinóó,€an€unreported€opinion€of€this€Court,€filed€inÐ  \ ÐNashville€on€March€25,€1988,€arguing€that€a€Trial€Court€must€take€into€consideration€the€effect€anyÐ øH Ðstock€redemption€agreements€might€have€on€a€corporation€when€placing€a€value€on€that€asset.€€WeÐ ä4 Ðagree€with€Mr.€Davisððs€argument€as€to€what€òòErwin€v.€Erwinóó€holds€with€respect€to€valuing€an€assetÐ Ð  Ðwhen€a€stock€redemption€agreement€is€in€place.€€The€Court€states€that€ð ðif€the€true€value€of€the€stockÐ ¼  Ðis€greater€than€its€agreed€value,€then€its€value€for€purposes€of€this€suit€would€be€somewhat€greaterÐ ¨ø Ðthan€its€agreed€value€and€somewhat€less€than€its€true€value.ðð€€It€also€sets€forth€the€premise€that€if€theÐ ”ä Ðstockholder€chooses€to€sell€his€share€of€the€corporation,€then€the€stock€redemption€agreement€forcesÐ €Ð Ðthe€value€of€those€shares€of€stock€to€be€sold€at€a€set€price.€€However,€the€Court€further€notes€that€ifÐ l¼ Ðthe€stockholder€continues€to€hold€onto€the€shares€of€stock€he€is€free€to€continue€to€ð ðreap€all€theÐ X ¨ Ðbenefits€of€ownership€without€offering€it€for€sale.ðð€€Ð D!” ÐÌà  àMs.€Davis€argues€that€each€party€presented€expert€testimony€and€the€Trial€Court€had€a€wideÐ #l! Ðrange€of€values€for€Mr.€Davisððs€share€of€UBF€from€which€the€Trial€Court€chose€$517,705.00.€€Ms.Ð $X" ÐDavis€further€argues€that€the€methods€used€by€both€experts€are€valid€means€of€placing€a€value€on€aÐ ô$D # Ðcorporation€and€that€there€is€no€requirement€that€Trial€Courts€rely€on€stock€redemption€agreementsÐ à%0!$ Ðwhen€assessing€the€value€of€a€corporation€for€the€purpose€of€dividing€assets€in€a€divorce.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àThe€valuation€of€a€marital€asset€is€a€question€of€fact€to€be€determined€by€considering€allÐ ¤(ô#' Ðrelevant€evidence.€òòKinard€v.€Kinardóó,€986€S.W.2d€220€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€€1998).€€Each€party€bearsò ò€ó ótheÐ )à$( Ðburden€of€bringing€forth€competent€evidence.€òòWallace€v.€Wallaceóó,€733€S.W.2d€102€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð €*Ð%) Ð1987).€€If€the€evidence€the€parties€set€forth€as€to€value€is€conflicting,€the€trial€judge€may€assign€aÐ l+¼&* Ðvalue€thatò ò€ó óis€within€the€range€of€values€supported€by€the€evidence.€€òòRay€v.€Rayóó,€916€S.W.2d€469Ð ° Ð(Tenn.Ct.€App.€1995).òòóó€€On€appeal,€we€presume€the€trial€judgeððs€factual€determinations€are€correctÐ  ð Ðunlessò ò€ó óthe€evidence€preponderates€against€them.ò ò€€ó óòòJahn€v.€Jahnóóò ò,€ó ó932€S.W.2d€939ò ò€ó ó(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ŒÜ Ð1996).Ð |Ì ÐÌà  àMr.€and€Ms.€Davis€both€presented€expert€testimony€at€the€trial€as€to€the€value€of€UBF.€€Mr.Ð T ¤ ÐRay€Adams,€CPA,€testified€on€behalf€of€Mr.€Davis,€and€Mr.€LeRoy€Bible,€CPA,€€testified€on€behalfÐ @  Ðof€Ms.€Davis.€€According€to€the€record,€Mr.€Adams€used€a€ð ðcapitalization€of€incomeðð€method€andÐ , | Ða€ð ðweighted€averageðð€method€to€determine€the€value€of€UBF.€€Under€the€ð ðnormal€averageðð€Mr.Ð  h ÐAdams€arrived€at€a€value€of€$126,900.00€and€the€weighted€average€he€arrived€at€$142,200.00.€€AÐ  T  Ðdiscount€was€applied€by€Mr.€Adams€in€arriving€at€the€aforementioned€values€for€ð ðlack€of€controlððÐ ð @  Ðand€ð ðlack€of€marketability.ðð€€Mr.€Adams€further€testified€that€he€did€not€take€into€consideration€aÐ Ü,  Ðmethod€of€valuation€based€on€comparable€sales€of€similarly€situated€businesses€as€he€was€unable€toÐ È  Ðfind€such€comparable€businesses.€€Mr.€Adams€also€testified€as€to€the€value€of€UBF€based€on€usingÐ ´  Ða€ð ðcost€method.ðð€€Using€this€method€Mr.€Adams€testified€that€the€value€of€Mr.€Davisððs€interest€inÐ  ð  ÐUBF€was€$270,800.00.€€Finally,€averaging€the€results€under€each€method€used€Mr.€Adams€testifiedÐ ŒÜ  Ðthat€he€arrived€at€the€figure€$180,000.00.€€Finally,€Mr.€Adams€testified€that€the€book€value€for€UBFÐ xÈ Ðwas€1,095,000.00.€€From€this€figure€tax€liability€was€subtracted,€a€discount€was€taken€for€a€minorityÐ d´ Ðshare€and€a€discount€was€taken€for€lack€of€marketability€arriving€at€the€figure€$278,831.00€which€heÐ P  Ðrounded€to€$270,800.00.Ð <Œ ÐÌà  àMr.€Bible,€testifying€on€behalf€of€Ms.€Davis,€stated€that€he€valued€the€business€in€DecemberÐ d Ð1980,€a€few€months€prior€to€the€marriage€of€Mr.€and€Ms.€Davis.€€Mr.€Bible€stated€that€Mr.€DavisððsÐ P Ðshare€of€UBF€based€on€that€valuation€was€$20,000.00€to€$22,000.00.€€Mr.€Bible€also€valued€UBFÐ ì< Ðin€December,€1996.€€Mr.€Bible€testified€that€he€used€a€ð ðweighted€average.ðð€€He€also€testified€that€theÐ Ø( Ðpreferred€method€of€placing€a€value€on€this€corporation€was€to€find€a€comparable€sale,€but€he,€likeÐ Ä ÐMr.€Adams,€was€unable€to€find€one.€According€to€Mr.€Bible,€the€method€he€used€is€referred€to€by€theÐ ° ÐInternal€Revenue€Service€as€the€ð ðindustry€standard.ðð€€Additionally,€discounts€were€taken€for€lack€ofÐ œì Ðcontrol€and€marketability.€€Mr.€Bible€arrived€at€$203.00€€per€share€multiplied€by€the€number€ofÐ ˆØ Ðshares€Mr.€Davis€owns׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€for€a€total€of€$518,000.00.€€Mr.€Bible€testified€that€a€value€of€$517,705.00€Ð tÄ Ðwhich€he€arrived€at€using€numbers€that€Mr.€Adams€had€provided€was€also€a€fair€representation€ofÐ ` ° Ðthe€value€of€Mr.€Davisððs€interest€in€UBF.€Ð L!œ ÐÌà  àWhile€we€agree€that€the€stock€redemption€agreement€should€be€considered€in€placing€a€valueÐ $#t! Ðon€Mr.€Davisððs€share€of€UBF,€there€is€absolutely€no€evidence€that€Mr.€Bible€did€not€consider€theÐ $`" Ðagreement€in€arriving€at€his€figures.€€At€no€point€was€Mr.€Bible€asked€on€direct€examination€or€cross„Ð ü$L # Ðexamination€whether€he€considered€the€stock€redemption€agreement€when€valuing€Mr.€Davisððs€shareÐ è%8!$ Ðof€the€corporation.€€It€was€the€responsibility€of€Mr.€Davis€to€insure€that€Mr.€Bible€had€the€appropriateÐ Ô&$"% Ðdocumentation€in€order€for€him€to€do€a€competent€valuation€of€his€corporation.€€This€Court€cannotÐ À'#& Ðautomatically€assume€simply€because€Mr.€Davis€argues€that€Mr.€Bible€did€not€consider€the€stockÐ ¬(ü#' Ðredemption€agreement€that€that€was€the€case,€nor€can€this€Court€assume€that€the€value€of€Mr.€DavisððsÐ ˜)è$( Ðstock€is€$175,000.00€because€the€stock€redemption€agreement€may€prevent€its€sale€at€a€higher€price.€Ð ° ÐTherefore,€we€find€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€Trial€Courtððs€valuation€of€Mr.Ð œì ÐDavisððs€share€in€UBF€of€$517,705.00.Ð ˆØ ÐÌÓ  ÓIII.Ð `° ÐÓ  Óà  àMr.€Davisððs€third€issue€on€appeal€questions€whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€dividing€theÐ L œ Ðmarital€assets€and€liabilities;€thereby€granting€Ms.€Davis€a€disproportionate€share€of€the€assets.€€HeÐ 8 ˆ Ðfurther€contends€that€the€Trial€Court€did€so€without€consideration€of€the€statutory€criteria€upon€which€Ð $ t Ðsuch€divisions€should€be€based.€€More€specifically€he€argues€that€the€Trial€Court€ignored€the€factorsÐ  ` Ðset€forth€in€T.C.A.€36„4„121(c).€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àð ðTrial€Courts€have€wide€latitude€in€fashioning€an€equitable€division€of€marital€property.ððÐ Ô$  ÐòòBrown€v.€Brownóó,€913€S.W.2d€163€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994).€€The€standard€factors€set€forth€in€T.C.A.Ð À  Ð36„4„121(c)€must€be€considered.€€This€Court€has€further€stated€in€òòBatson€v.€Batsonóó,€769€S.W.2d€849Ð ¬ü  Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988)€the€following:Ð ˜è  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àan€equitable€property€division€is€not€necessarily€an€equal€one.€€It€isÐ pÀ Ðnot€achieved€by€a€mechanical€application€of€the€statutory€factors,€butÐ \¬ Ðrather€by€considering€and€weighing€the€most€relevant€factors€in€lightÐ H˜ Ðof€the€unique€facts€of€the€case.€Ð4„` x` x ÐÌAppellate€Courts€are€to€defer€to€a€Trial€Courtððs€division€of€marital€property€unless€that€division€isÐ  \ Ðunsupported€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€or€inconsistent€with€the€statutory€factors.€€òòBrownÐ øH Ðv.€Brownóó,€913€S.W.2d€163€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994).Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àThe€Trial€Courtððs€division€of€the€marital€assets€and€liabilities€as€modified€by€this€opinion€isÐ ¼  Ðas€follows:Ð ¨ø ÐÌòòAssetóóà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àòòValueóóà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#à€€òòMr.€Davisóóà0È(#(#àà0 È(#È(#àòòMs.€DavisóóЀР(# (# ÐÌ1990€Lincolnà0 ` àà0¸ ` (#` (#à€€€€€€€(no€value€stated)à0À¸ (#¸ (#àà0À(#À(#àà0p(#(#àà0Èp(#p(#à€€€€€€€€(no€value€stated)ÐX ¨È(#È(# Ð1977€Jeepà0 ` àà0¸ ` (#` (#à€€€€€€€(no€value€stated)à0À¸ (#¸ (#à€€€€€€€€€(no€value€stated)ÐD!”À(#À(# Ð1998€Jeepà0 ` àà0¸ ` (#` (#à€€€€€€€€(leased€to€UBF)à0À¸ (#¸ (#à€€€€€€€€€€(leased€to€UBF)Ð0"€ À(#À(# ÐIRA€#1à0 ` àà0¸ ` (#` (#à€€€€€€€€€€€€$€€12,000.00à0À¸ (#¸ (#àà0À(#À(#à€€€$€€12,000.00Ð#l!(#(# ÐIRA€#2à0 ` àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#à€€€€€€4,000.00à0À(#(#àà0À(#À(#à€€€€€€€€€4,000.00Ð$X"(#(# Ð401Kà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#à€€€€29,468.69à0À(#(#àà0À(#À(#à€€€€€€€29,468.69Ðô$D #(#(# ÐMarital€home׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×à0 ` àà0¸ ` (#` (#à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€100,000.00à0À¸ (#¸ (#àà0À(#À(#àà0p(#(#àà0Èp(#p(#àà0 È(#È(#à€€$100,000.00Ðà%0!$ (# (# ÐMortgage€on€homeà0 ¸ àà0¸ (#¸ (#à€€€€€(6,400.00)à0À(#(#àà0À(#À(#à€€€€€€€€(6,400.00)ÐÌ&"%(#(# ÐHousehold€furnishings׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×à0  à€€€€€€3,000.00à0À(#(#àà0À(#À(#àà0p(#(#àà0Èp(#p(#àà0 È(#È(#à€€€€€€€€3,000.00а (# (# ÐCredit€card€debtà ¸ àà0  à€€€(17,767.98)à0À(#(#àà0À(#À(#à€€€€€€(17,767.98)Мì(#(# ÐÔ_ÔUBFÔ_Ô׃Ü×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×à0  àà0` (#(#à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€òò506,705.00óóà0À` (#` (#àà0À(#À(#à€€€€€òò298,319.00óóà0È(#(#àòòà  àóó€€€€òò208,386.00óóЈØÈ(#È(# ÐÌTotalà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àò ò$631,005.71ó óà0À(#(#àà0À(#À(#à€€€ò ò$319,619.71ó óà0È(#(#àà0 È(#È(#à€€ò ò$311,386.00ó óÐ`° (# (# Ðà@ìì*ìàˆÌPercentage€of€assetsà0 ¸ àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#à€€€€€€€€€€€€€50.7%à0 (#(#à€€€€€€€€€€€€49.3%Ð8 ˆ (# (# ÐÌWe€find€that€the€division€of€the€marital€assets€in€this€case€is€equitable.€€A€division€of€marital€assetsÐ  ` Ðis€not€inequitable€simply€because€it€is€not€precisely€equal.€€òòKinard€v.€Kinardóó,€986€S.W.2d€220€(Tenn.Ð ü L  ÐCt.€App.€1998).Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àThe€statutory€factors€that€are€most€determinative€on€this€issue€are€the€following:€€(1)€theÐ À  Ðduration€of€this€marriage;€(2)€Mr.€Davis€is€part€owner€in€a€successful€business€that€continues€toÐ ¬ü  Ðgenerate€a€stable€income€for€him€while€Ms.€Davis€lacks€the€earning€capacity€and€employability€toÐ ˜è  Ðmatch€that€of€Mr.€Davis;€(3)€Ms.€Davis€did€contribute€both€directly€and€indirectly€as€employee,Ð „Ô  Ðspouse,€mother,€and€homemaker€to€Mr.€Davisððs€successful€business;€(4)€Ms.€Davis€is€currentlyÐ pÀ Ðemployed€at€a€hospital€emergency€room€making€approximately€$215.00€a€week€while€Mr.€DavisÐ \¬ Ðretains€UBF€as€his€separate€property€and€will€continue€to€reap€the€benefits€of€his€ownership€sharesÐ H˜ Ðin€the€corporation.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àUpon€review€of€the€statutory€factors€set€forth€in€T.C.A.€36„4„121(c),€we€do€not€find€that€theÐ  \ Ðevidence€preponderates€against€the€Trial€Courtððs€division€of€the€marital€assets€and€therefore€affirmÐ øH Ðthe€Trial€Courtððs€division€of€the€marital€assets.à  àÐ ä4 ÐÐ  Ð  Ðà0  àà0` (#(#àÐ ` (#` (# ÐÌÓ  Ó€IV.Ð ˆØ ÐÓ  Óà  àMr.€Davisððs€fourth€issue€on€appeal€is€whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€awarding€Ms.€DavisÐ tÄ Ðpermanent€periodic€alimony.€€During€the€hearing€on€July€21,€1998,€the€Trial€Court,€in€itsÐ `° ÐMemorandum€Opinion€stated€the€following€with€respect€to€rehabilitative€alimony:Ð L œ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àNow,€with€respect€to€what€we€just€generally€call€rehabilitationÐ $ t Ðalimony,€Iððm€going€to€provide€that€there€will€be€an€amount€paid€overÐ  ` Ðthe€next€five€years,€if€the€wife€does,€in€fact,€enroll€in€school€to€furtherÐ ü L  Ðher€education€and€the€amount€to€be€paid€will€be€the€actual€cost€of€theÐ è 8  Ðtuition€and€books,€which€means€if€she€does€not€enroll€then€there€willÐ Ô$  Ðbe€nothing€to€be€paid.ÐÀ ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àAlimony€in€the€amount€of€$1,650€per€month€will€be€paid.€€Of€course,Ð ˜è  Ðwe€know€that€by€statute€that€is€paid€for€as€long€as€she€lives€or,€I€guess,Ð „Ô  Ðit€could€even€go€against€his€estate€if€he€were€to€predecease€her,€butÐ pÀ Ðupon€your€remarriage€or€cohabitation€with€a€third€party,€then€thatÐ \¬ Ðwould€be€terminated.ÐH˜` x` x ÐÌFollowing€this€Courtððs€remand€of€the€first€appeal€to€the€Trial€Court׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€the€subsequent€hearing€onÐ  p ÐMarch€16,€2000,€the€Trial€Court,€upon€the€request€of€this€Court,€attempted€to€set€parameters€as€toÐ  \ Ðwhere€Ms.€Davis€could€attend€school€and€still€expect€Mr.€Davis€to€pay€for€tuition.€€The€Trial€CourtÐ øH Ðdetermined€the€following€in€pertinent€part:Ð ä4 ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€Court:à0` x` xàLetððs€take€this€education€business€first.€€Has€sheÐ ¼  Ðenrolled€in€school€or€anything?Шøxx ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àMr.€Spalvins:à0` x` xàNo,€Your€Honor,€she€has€not.ЀÐxx ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€Court:€€à0` x` xàSo€that€doesnððt€even.€.€.€Well,€is€she€going€to?ÐX ¨xx ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àMr.€Spalvins:à0` x` xàShe€says€ð ðnoðð,€Your€Honor.Ð0"€ xx ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€Court:à0` x` xàIf€that€be€the€case€then€at€least€Iððm€going€to€removeÐ $X" Ðfrom€the€Appellate€Courtððs€consideration€anythingÐ ô$D # Ðconcerning€that€particular€matter;€that€it€is€now€noÐ à%0!$ Ðlonger€a€part€of€this€litigation€in€any€respect,€itððsÐ Ì&"% Ðresolved€by€her€announcement€of€not€going€to€€school,Ð ¸'#& Ðbecause€they€had€mentioned€that€as€being€a€loose€end.€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐNow,€heððs€paying€$1650.00€alimony,€having€noÐ ° Ðproblem€with€that.Мìxx ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àMr.€Spalvins:à0` x` xàInitially€there€were€some€problems€but€I€think€thatððsÐ tÄ Ðkind€of€been€smoothed€out,€Your€Honor.€Ð`°xx ÐÌFollowing€the€hearing€on€March€16,€2000,€the€Trial€Court€amended€its€original€order€and€determinedÐ 8 ˆ Ðthat€Ms.€Davis€no€longer€needed€rehabilitative€alimony€as€she€was€no€longer€interested€in€returningÐ $ t Ðto€college.€€Ð  ` ÐÌà  àMr.€Davis€makes€several€arguments€concerning€the€alimony€award.€€First,€he€argues€that€theÐ è 8  ÐTrial€Court€made€no€finding€that€Ms.€Davis€was€economically€disadvantaged€relative€to€Mr.€Davis,Ð Ô$  Ðand€that€no€such€status€exists€due€to€the€division€of€the€marital€assets€at€trial.€€Additionally,€Mr.Ð À  ÐDavis€argues€that€because€the€Trial€Court€initially€awarded€Ms.€Davis€rehabilitative€alimony€she€isÐ ¬ü  Ðobviously€capable€of€rehabilitation€and€therefore€rehabilitative€alimony€should€be€awarded€ratherÐ ˜è  Ðthan€permanent€periodic€alimony.€€Finally,€Mr.€Davis€argues€that€Ms.€Davis€is€able€to€work€and€thatÐ „Ô  Ðshe€only€expected€to€receive€rehabilitative€alimony€pending€the€completion€of€her€college€education,Ð pÀ Ðand€therefore,€rehabilitative€alimony€is€the€only€form€of€alimony€appropriate.€€Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àMs.€Davis€argues€that€the€Trial€Court€did€find€that€she€was€economically€disadvantaged€asÐ 4„ Ðcompared€to€Mr.€Davis.€€Additionally,€she€argues€that€since€the€parties€separation€she€has€beenÐ  p Ðunable€to€maintain€the€standard€of€living€to€which€she€was€accustomed€during€her€marriage.€€Ð  \ ÐÌà  àThe€Trial€Court€has€broad€discretion€in€determining€an€award€of€alimony.€€òòLoyd€v.€Loydóó,€860Ð ä4 ÐS.W.2d€409€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€The€decision€is€factually€driven€and€requires€a€balancing€of€theÐ Ð  Ðfactors€listed€in€T.C.A.€36„5„101(d);€€òòLoyd€v.€Loydóó,€860€S.W.2d€409€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€Of€theseÐ ¼  Ðfactors,€need€and€the€ability€to€pay€are€the€most€critical.€€òòLancaster€v.€Lancasteróó,€671€S.W.2d€501€Ð ¨ø ÐAccordingly,€this€Court€is€not€inclined€to€alter€a€trial€court's€award€of€alimony€unless€it€isÐ ”ä Ðunsupported€by€the€evidence€or€is€contrary€to€the€public€policy€embodied€in€the€applicable€statutes.€Ð €Ð ÐòòBrown€v.€Brownóó,€913€S.W.2d€163€(Tenn.Ct.App.1994).Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThe€following€factors,€codified€at€€T.C.A.€36„5„101(d)(1)€are€to€be€considered€in€determiningÐ D!” Ðan€award€of€alimony:Ð 0"€  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(d)(1)€It€is€the€intent€of€the€general€assembly€that€a€spouse€who€isÐ $X" Ðeconomically€disadvantaged,€relative€to€the€other€spouse,€beÐ ô$D # Ðrehabilitated€whenever€possible€by€the€granting€of€an€order€forÐ à%0!$ Ðpayment€of€rehabilitative,€temporary€support€and€maintenance.€Ð Ì&"% ÐWhere€there€is€such€relative€economic€disadvantage€and€rehabilitationÐ ¸'#& Ðis€not€feasible€in€consideration€of€all€relevant€factors,€including€thoseÐ ¤(ô#' Ðset€out€in€this€subsection,€then€the€court€may€grant€an€order€forÐ )à$( Ðpayment€of€support€and€maintenance€on€a€long„term€basis€or€until€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðdeath€or€remarriage€of€the€recipient€except€as€otherwise€provided€inÐ h+¸&* Ðsubdivision€(a)(3).€€Rehabilitative€support€and€maintenance€is€aÐ ° Ðseparate€class€of€spousal€support€as€distinguished€from€alimony€inÐ œì Ðsolido€and€periodic€alimony.€€In€determining€whether€the€granting€ofÐ ˆØ Ðan€order€for€payment€of€support€and€maintenance€to€a€party€isÐ tÄ Ðappropriate,€and€in€determining€the€nature,€amount,€length€of€term,Ð `° Ðand€manner€of€payment,€the€court€shall€consider€all€relevant€factors,Ð L œ Ðincluding:Ð8 ˆ` x` x ÐÓ  ÓÓ  Óà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(A)€The€relative€earning€capacity,€obligations,€needs,€and€financialÐ $ t Ðresources€of€each€party,€including€income€from€pension,€profitÐ  ` Ðsharing€or€retirement€plans€and€all€other€sources;€Ðü L ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(B)€The€relative€education€and€training€of€each€party,€the€ability€andÐ è 8  Ðopportunity€of€each€party€to€secure€such€education€and€training,€andÐ Ô$  Ðthe€necessity€of€a€party€to€secure€further€education€and€training€toÐ À  Ðimprove€such€party's€earning€capacity€to€a€reasonable€level;€Ð¬ü ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(C)€The€duration€of€the€marriage;€Ð˜è ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(D)€The€age€and€mental€condition€of€each€party;€Ð„Ô ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(E)€The€physical€condition€of€each€party,€including,€but€not€limited€to,Ð pÀ Ðphysical€disability€or€incapacity€due€to€a€chronic€debilitating€disease;€Ð\¬` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(F)€The€extent€to€which€it€would€be€undesirable€for€a€party€to€seekÐ H˜ Ðemployment€outside€the€home€because€such€party€will€be€custodianÐ 4„ Ðof€a€minor€child€of€the€marriage;€Ð p` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(G)€The€separate€assets€of€each€party,€both€real€and€personal,€tangibleÐ  \ Ðand€intangible;€ÐøH` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(H)€The€provisions€made€with€regard€to€the€marital€property€asÐ ä4 Ðdefined€in€ðð€36-4-121;€ÐÐ ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(I)€The€standard€of€living€of€the€parties€established€during€theÐ ¼  Ðmarriage;€Ð¨ø` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(J)€The€extent€to€which€each€party€has€made€such€tangible€andÐ ”ä Ðintangible€contributions€to€the€marriage€as€monetary€and€homemakerÐ €Ð Ðcontributions,€and€tangible€and€intangible€contributions€by€a€party€toÐ l¼ Ðthe€education,€training€or€increased€earning€power€of€the€other€party;€ÐX ¨` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(K)€The€relative€fault€of€the€parties€in€cases€where€the€court,€in€itsÐ D!” Ðdiscretion,€deems€it€appropriate€to€do€so;€and€Ð0"€ ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(L)€Such€other€factors,€including€the€tax€consequences€to€each€party,Ð #l! Ðas€are€necessary€to€consider€the€equities€between€the€parties.€Ð$X"` x` x ÐÓG¿ÓÌÌÓ  Óà  àWe€find€that€Ms.€Davis€is€economically€disadvantaged€as€compared€to€Mr.€Davis.€€Ms.€DavisÐ Ì&"% Ðis€currently€making€less€than€$1,000.00€a€month€while€Mr.€Davis€maintains€his€closely€heldÐ ¸'#& Ðcorporation€which€generates€an€income€of€at€least€$1,000.00€per€week.€€Additionally,€Ms.€Davis€hasÐ ¤(ô#' Ða€very€limited€work€history€and€lacks€a€post„secondary€degree€or€any€technical€training€for€aÐ )à$( Ðspecified€area€of€vocation.€€Even€with€the€income€Ms.€Davis€is€currently€receiving€from€herÐ |*Ì%) Ðemployment,€it€is€evident€that€she€cannot€match€the€earning€capacity€of€Mr.€Davis.€€The€purpose€ofÐ h+¸&* Ðspousal€support€is€to€assist€the€disadvantaged€spouse€in€becoming€self„sufficient€and€when€economicÐ ° Ðrehabilitation€is€not€feasible,€to€mitigate€the€harsh€economic€reality€of€divorce.€òòAnderton€v.€Andertonóó,Ð œì Ð988€S.W.2d€675€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€Divorced€couples€often€lack€sufficient€income€or€assets€toÐ ˆØ Ðenable€both€parties€to€maintain€their€pre-divorce€standard€of€living,€however,€the€obligor€spouse€mayÐ tÄ Ðbe€able€to€provide€some€financial€assistance€to€enable€the€disadvantaged€spouse€to€approach€his€orÐ `° Ðher€former€financial€condition.€òòAnderton€v.€Andertonóó,€988€S.W.2d€675€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€Ð L œ ÐÓïÉÓÌÓ  Óà  àIn€Tennessee€there€is€a€preference€for€rehabilitative€alimony.€However,€where€rehabilitationÐ $ t Ðis€not€feasible,€a€court€may€grant€alimony€òòin€futuroóó.€T.C.A.€36-5-101(d)(1).€€The€Trial€Court€didÐ  ` Ðoriginally€determine€based€upon€testimony€by€Ms.€Davis€that€rehabilitative€alimony€was€appropriateÐ ü L  Ðas€it€was€Ms.€Davisððs€desire€to€return€to€college€and€complete€her€degree.€€However,€in€addition€toÐ è 8  Ðthe€original€award€of€rehabilitative€alimony€the€Trial€Court€also€awarded€Ms.€Davis€alimony€òòinÐ Ô$  Ðfuturoóó€in€the€amount€of€$1650.00€per€month.€€The€Trial€Court€later€determined€that€because€Ms.Ð À  ÐDavis€had€obtained€a€job€and€no€longer€desired€to€attend€college,€the€Trial€Court€deleted€Mr.€DavisððsÐ ¬ü  Ðrehabilitative€alimony€responsibility.€€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àThis€Court€does€not€find€that€rehabilitation€of€Ms.€Davis€is€feasible.€€While€we€are€notÐ pÀ Ðdiscouraging€her€from€returning€to€college€some€day,€we€find€that€rehabilitation€would€be€difficultÐ \¬ Ðfor€Ms.€Davis€as€it€pertains€to€this€proceeding.€€Even€if€Ms.€Davis€were€to€return€to€college€andÐ H˜ Ðobtain€a€degree,€it€would€be€difficult€for€her€to€ever€achieve€a€level€of€financial€security€equal€to€thatÐ 4„ Ðof€Mr.€Davis€or€for€her€to€obtain€a€reasonable€standard€of€living€when€viewed€in€the€context€of€herÐ  p Ðpre„divorce€economic€condition.€€Ms.€Davis€testified€to€a€very€limited€work€history,€most€of€whichÐ  \ Ðshe€obtained€working€in€Mr.€Davisððs€corporation.€€She€lacks€a€post„secondary€degree€or€vocationalÐ øH Ðskills.€€Ms.€Davisððs€age€(47€years€old)€is€also€a€factor€in€determining€that€rehabilitation€is€notÐ ä4 Ðfeasible.€€She€testified€that€she€has€generated€some€income€hanging€wallpaper,€but€that€that€was€onlyÐ Ð  Ðpart„time.€€Additionally,€Ms.€Davis€testified€very€generally€to€several€health€problems€including€aÐ ¼  Ðhearing€problem,€high€blood€pressure€and€a€heart€condition.€€It€is€evident€from€the€record,€however,Ð ¨ø Ðthat€these€ailments€are€not€currently€preventing€her€from€working€as€she€has€obtained€employmentÐ ”ä Ðin€a€hospital€emergency€room.€€We€find€that€the€rehabilitation€of€Ms.€Davis€is€not€feasible.Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àAs€for€alimony€òòin€futuroóó,€the€Trial€Court€granted€Ms.€Davis€$1650.00€per€month€for€theÐ X ¨ Ðremainder€of€her€life€or€until€she€remarries€or€co„habits€with€another€person.€€Ms.€Davis€signed€anÐ D!” Ðaffidavit€of€income€and€expenses€on€July€20,€1998,€whereby€she€documented€that€her€needsÐ 0"€  Ðamounted€to€$5,035.16€per€month.€€We€find€this€to€be€excessive.€€In€her€affidavit,€Ms.€DavisÐ #l! Ðincluded€$300.00€€per€month€for€her€mortgage€payment.€€However,€Mr.€Davis€has€paid€the€mortgageÐ $X" Ðin€its€entirety€and€Ms.€Davis€was€awarded€the€marital€home€free€and€clear€of€any€outstandingÐ ô$D # Ðmortgage.€€Also,€Ms.€Davis€documented€that€she€needed€$200.00€per€month€for€school€expenses€butÐ à%0!$ ÐMs.€Davis€has€stated€she€is€no€longer€interested€in€attending€school€and€their€daughter€has€nowÐ Ì&"% Ðgraduated€from€high€school.€€Ms.€Davis€also€stated€that€she€needs€$1,800.00€per€month€forÐ ¸'#& Ðinstallment€payments€on€her€credit€card€bills,€but€Mr.€Davis€paid€the€balance€on€her€outstandingÐ ¤(ô#' Ðcredit€card€bills€in€the€amount€of€$17,767.98.€€Ms.€Davis€also€listed€automobile€insurance€for€fourÐ )à$( Ðpeople€and€four€automobiles€in€the€amount€of€$200.00€per€month.€€At€trial€she€was€awarded€oneÐ |*Ì%) Ðautomobile,€and€Mr.€Davis€was€required€to€purchase€an€automobile€for€their€daughter€and€maintainÐ h+¸&* Ðthe€automobile€insurance.€€Therefore,€we€will€reduce€her€need€for€automobile€insurance€to€$100.00Ð ° Ðper€month.€€Ms.€Davis€listed€recreation€and€entertainment€as€$200.00€per€month€and€miscellaneousÐ œì Ðwas€listed€twice€at€$200.00€per€listing€for€a€total€monthly€expense€of€$400.00.€€Finally,€Ms.€DavisÐ ˆØ Ðlisted€$125.00€per€month€for€vacations,€$150.00€per€month€for€a€weight€loss€program€and€$66.00€perÐ tÄ Ðmonth€for€gifts.€€This€equals€$3,341.00€in€excessive€expenses.€€That€brings€her€need€from€$5,035.16Ð `° Ðto€$1,694.16€which€is€at€least€a€more€reasonable€figure€than€the€one€presented€by€Ms.€Davis.€€Ð L œ ÐÌà  àMs.€Davis€testified€that€she€currently€makes€approximately€$215.00€dollars€per€week.€€ThatÐ $ t Ðis€approximately€$900.00€€per€month€income.€€In€addition,€she€received€one€half€of€the€marital€estateÐ  ` Ðincluding€a€lump€sum€award€of€$208,386.00€to€be€paid€at€$1,500.00€per€month€plus€interest.€€WeÐ ü L  Ðbelieve€the€award€of€$1650.00€per€month€alimony€òòin€futuro€óówas€excessive€considering€the€divisionÐ è 8  Ðof€marital€assets€and€the€need€demonstrated€by€Ms.€Davis.€€We€therefore€reduce€her€alimony€òòinÐ Ô$  Ðfuturoóó€from€$1650.00€per€month€to€$1,000.00€per€month€effective€on€the€date€this€decision€becomesÐ À  Ðfinal.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àFor€the€foregoing€reasons€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€affirmed€as€modified.€€€ThisÐ „Ô  Ðcause€is€remanded€for€proceedings€not€inconsistent€with€this€opinion.€€Costs€of€appeal€are€adjudgedÐ pÀ Ðagainst€Appellant,€William€H.€Davis€and€his€surety.Ð \¬ ÐÌÌà  àÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________Ð  \ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àHOUSTON€M.€GODDARD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÐ øH ÐÌ