ÿWPC`' G# òUNý %K 0 GQw@˜4Øìn­û¨ 0ä° 0D” 0@Ø D/bGUNO B 0Jº AQ ÆU 0D B_ 0D| 0TÀ 0^ n­r D3 R 0hZ 0r 0|4 0†° 06 1uÆ 0d; ŸU>¥B)ãDC  AMOU*œûÆßÁj W Éa_*†‰v~ vÓ!˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ßÕ$¡¡Ô€XÖEXXXÔ ÈÉDÊËDÌÍDÎÏÐÓ€Úê‚_#xtttttt3|xÜ«<þ6X9`("Courier NewTTXXxþ6X@ÉDQX@(”(2Xå$¤¤Ý ƒßÕ!ÝÔ€XÆXXXÔÝ  ÝÒ€°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€XÆXXXÆÔà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó()Ã$òòÚ  Ú3Ú  Úóó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò'÷ÿ dxd- ù-6Times New Roman RegularüÿP Pd2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô!"$Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý d($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô«<þ6X9`("Courier NewTTXXxþ6X@ÉDQX@####'ÿÿdxd26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô%'+,-./ ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓH< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d::::7Border 1dd!;Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial ñÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€9ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€=ÔÔ€=ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€=XÔÌÌAugust€24,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó ÕÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€9XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝJane€Roe€is€a€fifty„seven€year€old€citizen€and€resident€of€Tennessee€who€surrenderedÏher€child€for€adoption€in€1956€at€the€age€of€seventeen.€Promise€Doe€is€birth€parent€of€anÏadopted€child€whom€she€surrendered€in€1990€when€Promise€Doe€was€a€teenager.€€€Ì `Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€9XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝPlaintiffs€Kimberly€C.€and€Russ.€C.€are€husband€and€wife€adoptive€parents€of€twoÏchildren,€whom€they€adopted€in€the€State€of€Tennessee.€Ì MÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€9XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝSmall€World€Ministries,€Inc.€is€a€non„profit€ministry€licensed€by€the€State€ofÏTennessee€as€a€child„placing€agency.€€Ì ¿Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€9XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAmici€Curiae€filed€a€"notice€of€legislative€changes€to€Tennessee's€Adoption€Law"Ïreferring€the€court€to€changes€occurring€after€the€case€at€bar€was€heard€in€oral€argument.€ÏThese€amendments€have€been€duly€considered€by€this€court.€Ì UÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€9XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€note€that€the€fact€that€the€General€Assembly€can€change€the€law€does€notÏundermine€the€legitimacy€of€a€person's€reliance€on€official€promises€of€confidentiality€or€theÏcreation€or€existence€of€a€vested€right€deserving€of€constitutional€protection.€€In€fact,€sinceÏlegislation€is€generally€presumed€to€be€prospective,€òòsee€Woods€v.€TRW,€Inc.,óó€557€S.W.2dÏ274,€276€(Tenn.€1977);€òòHenderson€v.€Lutcheóó,€938€S.W.2d€428,€430€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996),Ïpersons€could€reasonably€conclude€that€subsequent€legislative€changes€would€have€onlyÏprospective€effect.€€That€is€exactly€what€Tennessee€Constitution€article€I,€ðð€20€is€all€about.Ì |Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€9ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€9XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€analyzing€the€issue€of€retrospective€legislating,€the€lower€court€adopted€the€three„prong€approach€found€in€ò òòòFicarra€v.€Department€of€Regulatory€Agenciesó óóó,€849€P.2dÏ6,€15€(Colo.1993):Ìà8 à[I]n€determining€whether€a€retroactive€statute€impairs€or€destroys€vested€rightsÏthe€most€important€inquiries€are€(1)€whether€the€public€interest€is€advanced€orÏretarded,€(2)€whether€the€retroactive€provision€gives€effect€to€or€defeats€theÏbonafide€intentions€or€òòreasonable€expectationsóó€of€effected€persons,€and€(3)Ïwhether€the€statute€surprises€persons€who€have€long€relied€on€a€contrary€stateÏof€the€law.Ìò òòòSee€Doe€v.€Sundquistó óóó,€1997€WL€354786,€at€*9.€€Though€we€do€not€adopt€the€ColoradoÏstandard€as€our€own,€we€note€that€numbers€two€and€three€embrace€the€same€concern€as€ourÏòòreasonableóó€expectations€inquiry.€€Where€we€disagree€is€with€the€lower€court's€conclusion€thatÏthere€was€no€such€expectation.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€9ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓ` °‡XøÈ“XÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€9¼Ô›œÞ ÞÌPROMISE›€DOE,€JANE€ROE,à à€à à)ÌKIMBERLY€C.€and€RUSS€C.,€andà à)ÌSMALL€WORLD€MINISTRIES,à à)ÌINC.,à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌÓ#` Ü‚Xøôx‘X#Óà àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà à)à à01„A„01„9705„CV„00209Ìv.à àà à)Ìà àà à)à àDavidson€CircuitÌDONALD€SUNDQUIST,à à)à àNo.€97C„941ÌGovernor€of€the€State€of€Tennessee,à à)ÌÙ€!ÙœßR€<>;A1-j|Ðü<` ç `€€@ÿRß›in€his€official€capacity,€andà à)ÌGEORGE€HATTAWAY,€in€hisà à)Ìofficial€capacity€as€the€à à)ÌCommissioner€of€the€Department€ofà à)ÌChildren's€Services€for€the€à à)ÌState€of€Tennessee,à à)Ìà àà à)Ìà àœDefendants/Appellees.›à à)Ìà àà à)ÌÌÌÓ  ÓCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌÌAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€WALTER€C.€KURTZ,€JUDGE€ÌÓ ` Ü‚XœÈ“X ÓÌÓ  ÓÌÌÔ€9XÔLARRY€L.€CRAINÌKEVIN€H.€THERIOTÌ101€Westpark€Drive,€Suite€250ÌBrentwood,€Tennessee€€37027Ìà àATTORNEYS€FOR€PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTSÌÌÌJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌÌDIANNE€STAMEY€DYCUSÌ425€Fifth€Avenue€NorthÌ2nd€Floor,€Cordell€Hull€BuildingÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37243„0499Ìà àATTORNEYS€FOR€DEFENDANTS/APPELLEESÌÌÌÓ  ÓÔ€9¼ÔREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÓ  ÓWALTER€W.€BUSSART,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÑ7€ ~XXdðXXdì7ÑÑ€ÑÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòÔ€9°ÔOPINIONóóÌÓ  ÓÓ€ÓÔ€9¼Ôà àOn€July€1,€1996,€a€new€adoption€law€became€effective€in€Tennessee.€ÏThe€issue€before€this€court€today€is€whether€this€Act,€specifically€theÏprovisions€which€relate€to€the€release€of€identifying€information€to€adoptedÏchildren€over€the€age€of€twenty„one€years€concerning€their€surrenderingÏbirth€parents,€can€stand€under€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€The€law€operatesÏprospectively€as€well€as€retro„spectively€by€releasing€information€thought€toÏbe€qualifiedly€confidential€pursuant€to€the€law€in€existence€from€1951€toÏ1996.€€The€plaintiffs€are€birth€parents€who€have€surrendered€children€underÏthis€former€Tennessee€statutory€scheme,× ƒ? ××  ×€adoptive€parents€who€have€adoptedÏchildren€under€the€prior€law,× ƒ@ ××  ×€and€a€non„profit€organization€licensed€byÏTennessee€as€a€child„placing€agency× ƒA ××  ×€which€has€facilitated€adoptions€underÏthe€prior€law.€€These€Plaintiffs€contend€that€the€Act's€retrospective€effect€ofÍdisclosing€confidential€information€so€as€to€impair€prior€vested€rights€is€aÏclear€violation€of€Article€I,€ðð€20€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€In€addition,ÏPlaintiffs€claim€that€the€Act€results€in€the€deprivation€of€the€privacy€rightsÏand€interests€of€Plaintiffs€as€guaranteed€by€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€ÌÌà àThis€case€has€somewhat€of€a€lengthy€procedural€history.€€PlaintiffsÏfirst€filed€their€action€in€federal€court,€primarily€basing€their€claim€on€theÏfederal€constitutional€right€to€privacy;€they€were€unsuccessful€there.€€òòò òDoe€v.ÏSundquistó óóó,€943€F.€Supp.€886€(M.D.Tenn.€1996),€òòò òaff'dó óóó,€106€F.3d€703€(6thÏCir.€1997).€€Soon€thereafter,€Plaintiffs€filed€a€complaint€in€the€Circuit€CourtÏof€Davidson€County€seeking€injunctive€relief€against€the€enforcement€ofÏcertain€provisions€of€this€law,€specifically€Section€36„1„127(c)€of€theÏTennessee€Code.€€Contemporaneously,€Plaintiffs€filed€a€motion€for€aÏtemporary€restraining€order€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rule€of€Civil€ProcedureÏ65.03€which€the€trial€court€granted.€€Plaintiffs€then€filed€a€motion€forÏtemporary€injunction€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rule€of€Civil€Procedure€65.04Ïwhich€the€trial€court€denied€on€May€2,€1997.€€Subsequently,€this€courtÏgranted€Plaintiffs'€Rule€10€application€for€extraordinary€appeal€as€well€as€itsÏmotion€for€a€stay€of€enforcement€of€the€law€pending€the€appeal.€€In€a€JuneÏ12,€1997€order,€this€court€reserved€ruling€on€the€Rule€10€appeal€"pendingÏdisposition€by€the€[t]rial€[c]ourt€of€the€remaining€issues€in€the€case."€€€ÏHowever,€on€July€12,€1997,€the€trial€court€summarily€granted€Defendants'Ï"motion€to€dismiss"€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rule€of€Civil€Procedure€12.02(6).€ÏIn€the€appeal€before€us€today,€Plaintiffs€challenge€the€lower€court's€grantingÏof€Defendants'€12.02(6)€motion€to€dismiss€as€well€as€the€May€2,€1997€denialÏof€the€Motion€for€Temporary€Injunction.ÌÌà à€Our€review€is€governed€by€the€procedural€posture€of€this€case€whichÏis€the€appeal€of€the€trial€court's€grant€of€a€Rule€12.02(6)€motion€to€dismissÏfor€failure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted€„„€a€motionÏwhich€tests€the€legal€sufficiency€of€the€complaint€and€not€the€strength€of€aÏplaintiff's€proof.€€òòò òRiggs€v.€Bursonó óóó,€941€S.W.2d€44,€47€(Tenn.€1997).€€AÏRule€12.02(6)€motion€is€therefore€determined€by€an€examination€of€theÏcomplaint€alone.€òòò ò€Cook€v.€Spinnaker's€of€Rivergate,€Inc.ó óóó,€878€S.W.2dÏ934,€938€(Tenn.€1994)€(citing€òòò òWolcotts€Fin.€Serv.,€Inc.€v.ÏMcReynoldsó óóó,€807€S.W.2d€708,€710€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990)).€€Regarding€theÏ12.02(6)€motion,€our€supreme€court€has€stated€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àSuch€a€motion€admits€the€truth€of€all€relevant€and€materialÏaverments€contained€in€the€complaint,€but€asserts€that€such€factsÏdo€not€constitute€a€cause€of€action.€€In€considering€a€motion€toÏdismiss,€courts€should€construe€the€complaint€liberally€in€favorÏof€the€plaintiff,€taking€all€allegations€of€fact€as€true,€and€denyÏthe€motion€unless€it€appears€that€the€plaintiff€can€prove€no€set€ofÏfacts€in€support€of€her€claim€that€would€entitle€her€to€relief.€€ÌÌÓ€Óòòò òStein€v.€Davidson€Hotel€Co.ó óóó,€945€S.W.2d€714,€716€(Tenn.€1997)€(citingÏòòò òCookó óóó,€878€S.W.2d€at€938).€€Once€a€trial€court's€grant€of€a€12.02(6)€motionÏhas€been€appealed,€the€appellate€court€is€required€to€"take€all€allegations€ofÏfact€in€the€plaintiff's€complaint€as€true,€and€review€the€lower€courts'€legalÏconclusions€de€novo€with€no€presumption€of€correctness."€€òòò òSteinó óóó,€945ÏS.W.2d€at€716€(citing€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d)€and€òòò òOwens€v.€TruckstopsÏof€Am.ó óóó,€915€S.W.2d€420,€424€(Tenn.1996)).ÌÌà àAs€stated,€Plaintiffs€initially€sought€relief€in€federal€court€where€theyÏwere€unsuccessful.€€While€the€federal€appellate€court's€opinion€did€notÏaddress€the€state€issues€which€have€been€raised€in€state€court,€the€SixthÏCircuit€Court's€opinion,€along€with€that€of€the€federal€district€court€and€theÍstate€circuit€court,€outline€the€law€of€adoption,€both€past€and€present,€asÏfollows:€€ÌÓÓà8 à€€€€€Under€[section€36„1„127(c)(1)Ô€9XÔ€Ô€9¼Ôof€the€new€adoption€law]€thatÏwas€to€go€into€effect€July€1,€1996,€ÌÓ ` Ü‚X˜ È“X Óà8 àà8 à(A)€All€adoption€records€...€shall€be€made€available€toÏthe€following€eligible€persons:€€(I)€An€adopted€personÏ...€who€is€twenty„one€(21)€years€of€age€or€older€...;€Ï(ii)€The€legal€representative€of€[such]€a€person€...€(B)ÏInformation€...€shall€be€released€...€only€to€the€parents,Ïsiblings,€lineal€descendants,€or€lineal€ancestors,€of€theÏadopted€person€...,€and€only€with€the€express€writtenÏconsent€[of]€the€adopted€person....€òòò ò€Ìà8 àId.€ó óóóðð€36„1„127(c)(1).€€The€new€law€also€provides€for€a€"contactÏveto,"€under€which€a€parent,€sibling,€spouse,€lineal€ancestor,€orÏlineal€descendant€of€an€adopted€person€may€register€to€preventÏcontact€by€the€adopted€person.€€òòò òId.€ó óóóðð€36„1„128.€€The€contactÏveto€can€prohibit€the€adopted€person€from€contacting€anyÏspouse,€sibling,€lineal€descendant,€or€lineal€ancestor€of€theÏperson€registering€the€veto.€€òòò òId.€ó óóóðð€36„1„130(a)(6)(A)(I).€€AÏviolator€of€the€contact€veto€provision€is€subject€to€civil€andÏcriminal€liability.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóðð€36„1„132.€€Before€disclosure€of€theÏidentity€of€an€adopted€person's€relatives€is€made,€the€state€"shallÏconduct€a€diligent€search"€for€the€relatives€to€give€them€a€chanceÏto€register€for€the€veto.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€ðð€36„1„131.€€In€any€event,€theÏrelatives€of€an€adopted€person€can€veto€only€contact,€notÏdisclosure€of€their€identities.ÌÌÓ€Óòòò òDoe€v.€Sundquistó óóó,€106€F.3d€at€704.œ× ƒB ××  ×›€€With€greater€elaboration€on€the€pre„1996€adoption€law,€the€federal€district€court€summarized€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àIn€1949,€the€Tennessee€General€Assembly€amended€the€state'sÏadoption€statutes€and€sealed€records€of€the€adopted€child's€"realÏname,"€any€information€obtained€by€the€Tennessee€DepartmentÏof€Public€Welfare€in€its€investigation€of€the€adoption€petition,Ïand€any€reports€filed€by€the€Department€with€the€court.€€1949ÏTenn.€Pub.€Acts,€Chap.€127€ðððð€3,€5,€and€6.€€However,€the€lawÍalso€stated€that€"upon€petition€by€an€adopted€person€who€is€overÏtwenty€one.€.€.,"€a€judge€could€require€the€department€to€deliverÏ"the€secret€records€relating€to€said€adopted€persons"€and€theÏjudge€would€open€and€inspect€the€record€and€release€the€adoptedÏperson€any€contents€as€he€"in€his€sound€discretion"€deemed€to€beÏin€the€best€interest€of€the€adopted€person€and€to€the€State€ofÏTennessee.€€òòò òId.€ó óóóðð€8.€€In€1951,€the€statue€was€again€amended,€andÏthe€legislature€placed€all€adoption€records€under€seal€and€forcedÏadoptees€seeking€information€to€file€a€court€order.€€1951€Tenn.ÏPub.€Acts,€Chap.€202€ðð€24.€€Disclosure€was€predicated€upon€aÏcourt€finding€that€it€would€be€in€the€best€interest€of€the€adopteeÏor€the€public€to€have€the€information€released.€€òòò òId.€€ó óóóat€ðð€26.ÌÌÓ€Óòòò òDoe€v.€Sundquistó óóó,€943€F.€Supp.€at€889.€€€In€the€opinion€below€which€is€onÏappeal€today,€the€circuit€court€described€the€changes€made€in€the€law€betweenÏ1951€and€the€present:ÌÓÓà8 àIn€1982,€the€legislature€amended€the€law€and€provided€that€uponÏwritten€request€by€an€adopted€person€over€the€age€of€eighteenÏ(18)€years€of€age€or€an€adoptive€parent€with€a€child€under€theÏage€of€eighteen€(18)€years€of€age,€the€Department€of€HumanÏServices€(DHS)€shall€provide€all€non„identifying€informationÏabout€the€adopted€person€and€the€adopted€person's€biologicalÏfamily€contained€in€the€sealed€adoption€records.€€T.C.A.€ððÏ36„1„140€(1982)€(repealed€1995€and€transferred€to€T.C.A.€ððÏ36„1„133€in€1995).€€The€amendment€also€provided€that€DHSÏmay€release€only€the€following€information:€€the€date,€time,Ïheight,€and€weight€of€the€adopted€person€at€birth;€€the€age€of€theÏadopted€person's€biological€parents€at€birth;€€the€nationality,Ïethnic€background,€race,€and€religious€preference€of€theÏbiological€parents;€€the€educational€level€of€the€biologicalÏparents;€€a€general€physical€description€of€the€biological€parents;€Ïany€non„identifying€information€concerning€other€children€ofÏthe€biological€parents€at€the€time€of€the€adopted€person's€birth;€Ïand€any€available€health€history€of€the€biological€parents€and€anyÏother€biological€relatives.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€The€amendment€provided€thatÏthe€release€of€information€did€not€authorize€or€require€theÏrelease€of€information€that€would€lead€to€the€discovery€of€theÏidentity€or€whereabouts€of€the€biological€parents.€€òòò òId.ó óóóÌà8 àà àIn€1985€the€legislature€again€provided€for€furtherÍdisclosure€of€information€in€adoption€records€if€DHS€obtainedÏconsent€from€the€biological€parents.€€1985€Tennessee€PublicÏActs,€Chapter€285;€€€T.C.A.€ðð€36„1„141.Ìà8 àà àSince€1985€the€legislature€has€twice€more€amended€theÏstatute.€€T.C.A.€ðð€36„1„141€(1989).€€The€law€provided€that€uponÏwritten€request€of€an€adopted€person€over€the€age€of€twenty„oneÏ(21),€DHS€shall€search€sealed€adoption€records€in€its€possessionÏfor€information€concerning€the€location€of€the€adopted€person'sÏbiological€parent(s).€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€If€DHS€located€the€biologicalÏparent(s),€DNS€was€to€notify€the€parent(s)€of€the€adoptedÏperson's€request;€€and,€if€the€parent(s)€objected,€then€noÏinformation€in€the€adoption€record€was€to€be€disclosed.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€IfÏthe€biological€parent(s),€or€either€of€them,€consented,€theÏdepartment€of€human€services€was€to€provide€the€adopted€personÏwith€the€name,€address,€and€identifying€information€of€theÏbiological€parent(s).€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€If€the€biological€parent(s)€could€not€beÏlocated,€the€adopted€person€was€to€provide€the€office€of€vitalÏrecords€with€the€correspondence€from€the€DHS€and€obtain€aÏcopy€of€their€birth€certificate.€€òòò òId.Ìó óóóÌÓ€Óòòò òDoe€v.€Sundquistó óóó,€1997€WL€354786,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Cir.€Ct.€1997).€€WithÏthe€history€of€the€statutory€law€as€well€as€of€this€case€delineated€above,€weÏturn€to€a€discussion€of€the€issues€on€appeal.€€ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓI.€TENNESSEE€CONSTITUTIONALÌ€PROTECTION€AGAINST€RETROSPECTIVE€LAWSÌÓ  ÓÓ€ÓÌà àPlaintiff's€contend€that€the€retroactive€provisions€of€the€Act€depriveÏthem€of€their€rights€as€guaranteed€by€the€Tennessee€Constitution,€specificallyÏArticle€I,€ðð€20€which€provides€"[t]hat€no€retrospective€law,€or€law€impairingÏthe€obligations€of€contracts,€shall€be€made."€€For€purposes€of€thisÏconstitutional€provision,€the€term€"retrospective€laws"€has€been€defined€byÏthe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€as€those€laws€"which€take€away€or€impairÏvested€rights€acquired€under€existing€laws€or€create€a€new€obligation,€imposeÏa€new€duty,€or€attach€a€new€disability€in€respect€of€transactions€orÍconsiderations€already€passed."€€òòò òMorris€v.€Grossó óóó,€572€S.W.2d€902,€907Ï(Tenn.€1978);€òòò òsee€also€Owens€v.€Truckstops€of€Am.ó óóó,€915€S.W.2d€420,Ï427€(Tenn.€1996).€€Plaintiffs€argue€that€the€Act€takes€away€or€impairs€aÏvested€right€in€"the€confidentiality€of€the€identifying€information€in€adoptionÏfiles"€acquired€under€existing€laws.€€We€agree.ÌÌÓ  ÓA.ÌTENNESSEE€LAW€RELATING€TO€ARTICLE€1,€ðð€20ÌÓ  ÓÌ€à àDespite€the€fact€that€Tennessee€courts,€through€the€years,€have€oftenÏaddressed€issues€of€retrospective€laws€and€vested€rights,€no€case€hasÏarticulated€a€clear€test€for€discerning€when€a€retrospective€law€impairs€aÏvested€right€or€for€that€matter€when€a€right€is€vested.€€An€evaluation€of€theÏcase€law€reveals€that,€in€discussing€this€issue,€many€courts€have€distinguishedÏbetween€the€procedural€or€remedial€and€the€substantive€nature€of€the€law.€ÏOne€supreme€court€case€clarified€how€this€determination€relates€to€theÏultimate€issue€of€a€retroactive€law's€unconstitutionality€as€follows:ÌÓÓ€€à8 àremedial€statutes,€or€statutes€relating€to€remedies€or€modes€ofÏprocedure,€which€do€not€create€new€or€take€away€vested€rights,Ïbut€only€operate€in€furtherance€of€the€remedy€or€confirmationÏof€rights€already€existing,€do€not€come€within€the€legalÏconception€of€a€retrospective€law,€or€the€general€rule€against€theÏretrospective€operation€of€statutes.ÌÌÓ€Óòòò òDowlen€v.€Fitchó óóó,€264€S.W.2d€824,€826€(Tenn.€1954)€(citing€AmericanÏJurisprudence€at€Section€482).€€Thus€òòò òDowlenó óóó€takes€the€position€thatÏremedial€laws€are€not,€legally€speaking,€"retrospective"€laws€and,€therefore,Ïthe€constitutional€prohibition€does€not€apply.€€Other€cases€have€taken€thisÏprinciple€one€step€further€suggesting€that€when€applied€retroactively,€aÏsubstantive€statute€by€its€very€nature€will€€impair€vested€rights:€€"If€[a€statute]Íis€'substantive,'€it€is€not€applied€retro„actively€because€to€do€so€wouldÏ'disturb€a€vested€right€or€contractual€obligation.'"€€òòò òKuykendall€v.ÏWheeleró óóó,€890€S.W.2d€785,€787€(Tenn.€1994)€(quoting€òòò òSaylors€v.ÏRiggsbeeó óóó,€544€S.W.2d€609,€610€(Tenn.€1976)€("The€usual€test€of€theÏ'substantive'€or€'procedural'€character€of€a€statute€for€this€purpose€is€toÏdetermine€whether€or€not€application€of€the€new€or€amended€law€wouldÏdisturb€a€vested€right€or€contractual€obligation.")).€€€ÌÌà àUnder€the€rationale€of€the€preceding€cases,€the€only€question€that€aÏcourt€need€ask€is€whether€the€statute€is€substantive€or€procedural.€€We€areÏpersuaded€that€such€an€inquiry€begs€the€ultimate€question€of€whether€theÏretroactive€application€of€a€law€will€"take€away€or€impair€vested€rightsÏacquired€under€existing€laws€or€create€a€new€obligation,€impose€a€new€duty,Ïor€attach€a€new€disability€in€respect€of€transactions€or€considerations€alreadyÏpassed."€€òòò òMorrisó óóó,€572€S.W.2d€at€907;€òòò òOwensó óóó,€915€S.W.2d€at€427.€€OurÏposition€finds€support€in€certain€Tennessee€cases€which€have€acknowledgedÏthat€the€substantive/procedural€distinction€is€not€the€definitive€factor.€€InÏòòò òHenderson€v.€Fordó óóó,€the€supreme€court€referred€to€an€earlier€case€whereÏ"the€Court€was€careful€to€point€out€that€even€a€statute€whose€primaryÏpurpose€was€procedural€could€not€be€applied€so€as€to€impair€a€contractualÏobligation€or€disturb€a€vested€right."€€òòò òHenderson€v.€Fordó óóó,€488€S.W.2dÏ720,€721€(Tenn.€1972)€(citing€òòò òNational€Life€&€Accident€Ins.€Co.€v.ÏAtwoodó óóó,€29€Tenn.€App.€141,€194€S.W.2d€350,€(1946));€òòò òsee€alsoó óóó€òòò òKee€v.ÏShelter€Ins.ó óóó,€852€S.W.2d€226,€228€(Tenn.€1993)€(affirming€"the€principleÏthat€retrospective€application€of€a€remedial€or€procedural€statute€isÏconstitutionally€forbidden€if€it€takes€away€a€vested€right€or€impairsÏcontractual€obligations"€and€finding€that€the€retrospective€application€of€theÍlaw€at€issue,€a€remedial€law,€would€impair€accrued€contract€rights).€€InÏòòò òHendersonó óóó,€the€court€resolved€the€ultimate€issue€to€be€"in€essence,€whetherÏthe€application€of€the€.€.€.€amendment€[at€issue€there]€to€theÏdefendant„in„error€would€impair€any€such€right€vested€in€him€at€the€time€ofÏthe€enactment€of€the€amendment."€€òòò òHendersonó óóó,€488€S.W.2d€at€722.€€ÌÌà àAccordingly,€we€find€that€the€ultimate€issue€in€the€case€at€bar€isÏwhether€or€not€this€new€law,€when€applied€retroactively,€impairs€vestedÏrights.€€We€receive€guidance€from€other€Tennessee€cases€which€haveÏapproached€the€Article€1,€ðð€20€issue€by€asking€this€question.€€In€òòò òMiller€v.ÏSohnsó óóó,€464€S.W.2d€824,€825€(Tenn.€1971),€the€court€addressed€the€issue€ofÏwhether€the€Uniform€Contribution€Among€Tort€Feasors€Act€could€be€appliedÏretroactively.€€There,€the€plaintiff€filed€a€suit€against€three€defendantsÏfollowing€an€automobile€accident.€€He€subsequently€entered€into€a€covenantÏnot€to€sue€with€two€of€these€defendants€in€exchange€for€their€payment€to€himÏof€$5000.€€The€remaining€defendant€sought€to€reduce€the€judgment€againstÏhim€by€$5000€pursuant€to€the€Uniform€Act€which€was€enacted€after€theÏaccident.€€The€court€found€that,€at€the€time€of€the€occurrence€of€the€accident,Ïwhen€the€substantive€rights€of€the€plaintiff€accrued€€"one€of€these€rights€wasÏfor€a€consideration,€to€make€a€covenant€not€to€sue,€without€the€amount€paidÏby€the€alleged€joint€tort„feasor€reducing€the€amount€he€might€recover€in€aÏsubsequent€suit."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€826.€€In€so€holding€the€court€stated€that€"the€test€ofÏimpairment€is€whether€the€right€in€full€existing€at€the€time€of€its€accrualÏwould€be€diminished€by€application€of€the€statute."€€òòò òId.€€ó óóóÌÌà àAnother€"test€of€the€impairment"€employed€by€our€supreme€court€wasÏto€ask€whether€the€retroactive€legislation€"deprives€a€person€of€his€reasonableÍexpectations€under€prior€law."€€òòò òFord€Motor€Co.€v.€Moultonó óóó,€511€S.W.2dÏ690,€696€(Tenn.€1974).€€In€òòò òMoultonó óóó,€the€issue€was€whether€it€wasÏconstitutionally€permissible€to€apply€an€amended€statute€of€limitations€whichÏhad€the€effect€of€reviving€an€otherwise€barred€cause€of€action.€€Adopting€theÏcourt€of€appeals'€analysis€but€not€its€conclusion,€the€supreme€court€held€thatÏ"[t]he€statute€had€run€under€the€prior€law€prior€to€the€amendment;€and,Ïtherefore,€petitioners€had€a€right€to€'expect'€under€the€prior€law€they€wouldÏnot€be€sued;€but,€if€sued,€they€were€assured€of€a€perfect€defense."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€697;€Ïòòò òsee€also€Buckner€v.€GAF€Corp.ó óóó,€495€F.€Supp.€351,€356€(E.D.€Tenn.Ï1979)€(in€holding€that€the€defendants€obtained€a€vested€right€in€their€statuteÏof€limitations€defense€and€thus€that€the€asbestos€exception€to€the€statute€couldÏnot€revive€plaintiff's€claim,€the€court€stated€that€the€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€"has€not€retreated€from€its€holding€that:€'€.€.€.€retroactive€legislation€isÏunconstitutional€'only€when€it€deprives€a€person€of€his€reasonableÏexpectations€under€the€prior€law.'€'€").€€Yet€another€case€sheds€some€light€onÏthe€determination€by€defining€"vested€rights"€as€follows:€€"The€words€(vestedÏrights)€are€used€as€implying€interests€which€it€is€proper€for€the€state€toÏrecognize€and€protect€and€of€which€the€individual€could€not€be€deprivedÏarbitrarily€without€injustice."€€ò òòòMorris€v.€Grossó óóó,€572€S.W.2d€902,€905Ï(Tenn.1978)(quoting€16€Am.Jur.2d€Constitutional€Law€ðð€421€(1964)).ÌÌà àIn€presenting€the€cases€as€we€have,€we€do€not€intend€to€indicate€thatÏthere€is€no€relationship€between€the€substantive/procedural€question€and€theÏvested€right€question.€€Quite€the€contrary,€whether€a€statute€is€substantive€orÏprocedural€can€depend€upon€whether€or€not€its€retroactive€applicationÏimpairs€a€vested€right.€€The€case€of€€ò òòòBrewer€v.€Aetna€Life€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€490ÏS.W.2d€506,€510€(Tenn.1973),€is€illustrative€of€the€interplay€between€theseÍtwo€issues.€€There,€the€court€considered€the€retroactive€application€of€aÏstatute€which€"create[d]"€a€rebuttable€presumption€that€a€fireman€who€dies€ofÏa€disease€of€the€lungs,€hypertension€or€heart€disease,€did€so€in€the€line€ofÏduty,€and€in€the€course€and€scope€of€his€employment."€€In€concluding€that€theÏstatute€did€not€impair€a€vested€right,€the€court€noted€the€remedial€nature€ofÏthe€law€and€quoted€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€as€follows:€€"It€must€beÏevident€that€the€right€to€have€one's€controversies€determined€by€existingÏrules€of€evidence€is€not€a€vested€right.€€These€rules€pertain€to€the€remediesÏwhich€the€state€provides€for€its€citizens€.€.€.€"€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€511€(quoting€ò òòòMarx€v.ÏHanthornó óóó,€148€U.S.€172€(1893)).ÌÌà àÓ  ÓB.Ì€RETROACTIVE€APPLICATION€ÌOF€TENNESSEE€CODE€ANNOTATED€SECTION€36„1„127(c)ÌÓ  ÓÌà àFirst€of€all,€we€reiterate€that€this€case€is€before€the€court€of€appeals€onÏa€Rule€12.02(6)€dismissal€which€restricts€our€review€to€the€sufficiency€of€theÏcomplaint€alone€and€which€mandates€that€we€construe€said€complaintÏliberally€taking€all€allegations€of€fact€as€true.€€Regarding€the€plaintiffs€in€thisÏaction,€the€complaint€alleges€that€the€plaintiff€Promise€Doe€is€a€birth€parentÏwho€surrendered€her€child€for€adoption€in€Tennessee€in€1990€at€which€timeÏshe€was€assured€that€the€information€would€remain€confidential€and€sealed.€€ÏThe€complaint€alleges€that€"the€emotional€trauma€and€personal€sacrifice"€ofÏPromise€Doe€"was€attenuated€in€part€only€by€the€promise€as€set€forth€in€theÏthen€existing€adoption€law€that€the€details€surrounding€her€decision€wouldÏremain€confidential€for€the€rest€of€her€life."€€Plaintiff€Jane€Roe€is€also€a€birthÏmother€who€surrendered€her€child€for€adoption€at€the€age€of€seventeen€inÍ1956„„she€alleges€that€it€is€essential€that€her€identity€and€her€personalÏcircumstances€at€the€time€of€the€birth€of€her€first€child€remain€confidential.€ÏPlaintiffs€Kimberly€C.€and€Russ€C.€are€adoptive€parents€of€two€childrenÏwhom€they€adopted€under€the€prior€law.€€They€claim€that€they€were€requiredÏto€divulge€detailed€information€of€a€private€natuÔ% €2 Ôre€to€the€adoption€agencyÏwhich€is€now€a€part€of€the€adoption€records.€€Thus,€from€the€complaint,€it€isÏclear€that€the€information€at€issue€in€this€case€concerns€some€of€the€mostÏprivate€and€intimate€details€of€a€person's€life.€€It€is€not€the€sort€ofÏinformation€that€people€casually€make€public,€and,€in€fact,€it€involves€mattersÏthat€persons€have€historically€gone€to€great€lengths€to€keep€private.ÌÌà àThe€final€plaintiff,€Small€World€Ministries,€Inc.,€is€a€non„profitÏministry€licensed€by€the€State€of€Tennessee€as€a€child„placing€agency.€€InÏorder€to€maintain€its€licence,€Small€World€€has€to€abide€by€certain€standardsÏpromulgated€by€the€State€Department€of€Human€Services.€€One€suchÏregulation,€Chapter€1240„4„9.05,€Standards€for€Child„Placing€Agencies,Ïmandates€that€Small€World€provide€birth€parents€with:ÌÓÓà8 àA€clear€definition€of€the€confidential€aspects€of€the€servicesÏprovided€for€them€and€their€child€and€of€the€opportunityÏavailable€to€them€at€any€time€to€waive€their€right€of€privacy€ifÏtheir€child,€upon€reaching€the€age€of€maturity,€wishes€to€knowÏmore€about€them€or€to€see€them.ÌÌÓ€ÓThis€regulation€was€adopted€November€3,€1988€and€since€that€time,€SmallÏWorld€has€routinely€advised€birth€parents€of€their€state„recognized€right€toÏconfidentiality.ÌÌà àInitially,€we€reject€the€following€assertion€made€by€Defendants:€€"TheÏnew€legislation€has€not€changed€any€right€of€the€plaintiffs€or€abolished€anyÍremedy€available€to€them.€€Rather,€the€new€statute€has€simply€changed€theÏmethod€for€obtaining€such€information€to€be€easier€and€less€costly€forÏadoptees."€€For€over€forty€years,€the€identity€of€an€adoptee's€birth€parentsÏhas€been€available€to€that€adoptee€in€only€two€circumstances:€€first,€after€aÏcourt's€determination€that€it€was€in€the€best€interest€of€the€adopted€person€orÏthe€public€and,€more€recently,€with€consent€of€the€birth€parent(s).€€WhileÏnon„identifying€information€has€been€more€readily€available€in€recent€years,Ïthe€law€has€protected€the€identity€of€the€parents€except€in€these€"best€interest"Ïor€"consent"€circumstances.€€Under€the€new€law,€all€of€the€adoption€recordÏincluding€the€birth€parents'€identity€is€available€to€the€adoptee€regardless€of€aÏbest€interest€determination€and€regardless€of€the€birth€parents'€consent.€€ThisÏis€a€material€change.œ× ƒC ××  ×›ÌÌà àIn€ò òòòSpencer€Kellogg€&€Sons,€Inc.€v.€Lobbanó óóó,€315€S.W.2d€514Ï(Tenn.€1958),€our€supreme€court€defined€"substantive€law"€as€"that€part€ofÏthe€law€which€creates,€defines,€and€regulates€rights;€that€which€creates€duties,Ïrights€and€obligations;€the€law€which€relates€to€rights€and€duties€which€giveÏrise€to€a€cause€of€action.€€"Procedure,"€on€the€other€hand,€has€been€describedÏby€the€court€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 à'[T]he€mode€or€proceeding€by€which€a€legal€right€is€enforced,€asÏdistinguished€from€the€law€which€gives€or€defines€the€right,€andÏwhich€by€means€of€the€proceeding,€the€court€is€to€administer„„the€machinery,€as€distinguished€from€its€product;€.€.€.€includingÏpleading,€Process,€evidence,€and€practice€.€.€..€€Practice€[is]€theÍform€.€.€.€for€the€enforcement€of€rights€or€the€redress€ofÏwrongs,€as€distinguished€from€the€substantive€law€which€givesÏthe€right€or€denounces€the€wrong.€.€.€.'ÌÌÓ€Óò òòòSaylors€v.€Riggsbeeó óóó,€544€S.W.2d€609,€610€(Tenn.1976)(quoting€ò òòòJones€v.ÏGarrettó óóó,€386€P.2d€194,€198„99€(Kan.1963)).€€The€provision€of€the€newÏadoption€law€at€issue€creates€and€defines€a€right€of€adopted€persons€which€hasÏnot€previously€existed„„that€is€a€right€to€unqualified€access€to€the€identity€ofÏtheir€birth€parents.€€As€such,€Section€36„1„127(c)€of€the€Tennessee€Code€is€aÏsubstantive€change€in€the€law€and€not€merely€a€procedural€or€remedial€one.€ÌÌà àThe€case€of€òòò òAnderson€v.€Memphis€œHousing›€œAuthorityó óóó,›€534ÏS.W.2d€125€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1975),€is€analogous.€€That€case€involved€anÏinverse€condemnation€law€which,€in€pre„amendment€form,€entitled€landÏowners€"to€recover€in€damages€the€value€of€the€land€or€right€taken,€no€moreÏand€no€less."€€òòò òId.€ó óóóat€128.€€As€amended,€the€law€provided€that€the€ownerÏrecover€"for€greater€and€a€new€and€different€measure€of€damages€than€wasÏpreviously€allowed,€viz.,€attorney€fees€etc."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€The€court€held€that€theÏAmendment€"is€one€that€does€not€merely€enlarge€or€affect€a€procedure€forÏthe€enforcement€of€an€existing€right,€but€on€the€contrary,€creates€a€new€rightÏof€recovery€theretofore€nonexistent."€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€In€the€same€manner,€we€find€thatÏSection€36„1„127(c)€does€not€merely€enlarge€or€affect€a€procedure€for€anÏadoptee's€procurement€of€his€or€her€birth€parents'€identity.€€Rather,€this€lawÏcreates€a€new€right€to€this€information€which€has€heretofore€beenÏnonexistent.ÌÌà àThough,€under€certain€Tennessee€cases,€the€substantive€nature€of€theÏlaw€would€suffice€to€support€a€conclusion€that€the€law's€retrospectiveÏapplication€violates€Article€1,€ðð€20,€we€hold€that€the€ultimate€issue€is€whetherÍthe€retroactive€application€of€this€law€will€impair€the€rights€vested€inÏPlaintiffs.€€To€reiterate,€vested€rights€have€been€defined€as€those€"interestsÏwhich€it€is€proper€for€the€state€to€recognize€and€protect€and€of€which€theÏindividual€could€not€be€deprived€arbitrarily€without€injustice."€€ò òòòSee€MorrisÏv.€Grossó óóó,€572€S.W.2d€902,€905€(Tenn.1978).€€Additionally,€our€supremeÏcourt€has€focussed€on€whether€the€retroactive€legislation€deprived€a€personÏof€his€reasonable€expectations€under€the€prior€law.€€ò òòòFord€Motor€Co.€v.ÏMoultonó óóó,€511€S.W.2d€690,€696€(Tenn.1974).ÌÌà àApplying€these€standards€to€the€case€at€bar,€we€find€that€theÏretrospective€application€of€Section€36„1„127(c)€does€impair€the€vested€rightsÏof€birth€parents€who€surrendered€their€children€for€adoption€under€formerÏlaw.€€Under€the€prior€law,€these€birth€parents€had€a€reasonable€expectationÏthat€any€identifying€information€would€remain€confidential€if€they€soÏdesired.× ƒD ××  ×€€While€the€DHS€regulation€mandating€that€birth€parents€be€assuredÏof€the€confidential€aspects€of€the€adoption„related€services€was€merely€a€stateÏregulation€and€only€adopted€in€1988,€it€is€indicative€of€the€expectation€ofÏconfidentiality€prevalent€under€the€prior€law.€€The€birth€mother€plaintiffs€allÏproclaim€that€they€were€assured€confidentiality€and€expected€the€same€underÍthat€law.€€We€find€that€this€interest€in€the€confidentiality€of€identifyingÏinformation€is€a€proper€interest€for€the€state€to€recognize€and€protect.€€Life„changing€decisions€were€made€based€upon€this€expectation€and€to€nowÏdeprive€those€who€relied€upon€their€legitimate€expectation€under€the€lawÏwould€be€to€deprive€them€of€a€vested€right.ÌÌà àIt€is€significant,€as€the€complaint€alleges,€that€œPlaintiffs›€did€notÏvoluntarily€release€this€information€to€the€government€but€rather€wereÏrequired€to€do€so€as€a€condition€to€being€able€to€use€the€adoption€machineryÏexclusively€available€from€the€state.€€In€return€for€providing€thisÏinformation,€these€persons€were€assured€that€their€privacy€would€beÏprotected€by€keeping€their€information€confidential€except€in€the€narrow,Ïstatutorily€defined€circumstances.€€The€effect€of€the€challenged€statutes€is,€forÏall€practical€purposes,€to€remove€any€restriction€on€access€to€the€heretoforeÏconfidential€information.ÌÌà àWe€find€that€the€parties€challenging€the€statutes€have€presentedÏcompelling€evidence€depicting€their€reliance€on€the€statute's€confidentialityÏprovisions€and€the€significant€effects€that€retroactively€changing€the€rulesÏwould€bring€about.€€Constitutional€analysis€frequently€requires€courts€toÏweigh€competing€rights€and€interests,€but€in€the€context€of€œTenn›œessee›ÏœConst›œitution›€œart›œicle›€I,€ðð€20,€the€balance€is€always€struck€in€favor€of€vestedÏrights.ÌÌà àWe€note€that€our€ruling€does€not€extend€to€all€information€contained€inÏadoption€records€as€only€the€identifying€information€of€birth€parents€hasÏbeen€consistently€protected€throughout€the€years.€€Therefore,€our€holdingÍwith€regard€to€Article€1,€ðð€20€does€not€encompass€the€adoptive€parentÏplaintiffs.€€Their€redress€is€through€the€legislative€process.ÌÌà àPlaintiffs€present€and€the€court€below€addresses€issues€of€Right€ofÏPrivacy,€Equal€Protection€and€Freedom€of€Conscience.€€Since€the€foregoingÏissue€of€Retrospective€Legislation€is€determinative€we€do€not€address€thoseÏissues€here.ÌÌà àIt€should€be€noted€that€the€trial€court's€memorandum€opinion€citedÏcertain€affidavits€as€a€basis€for€its€disposition€of€the€case.€€This€wouldÏindicate€that€the€dismissal€below€was€summary€judgment,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.Ï56,€instead€of€Rule€12.02(6)€grounds.€€Nevertheless,€our€result€would€be€theÏsame€under€either€review.ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€therefore€reversed,€and€the€cause€isÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings.ÌÌÌÓ#` Ü‚X˜ $ ’X#ÓÓÓà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àÔ€9XÔWALTER€W.€BUSSART,à àSPECIAL€œÏJUDGE›ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ______________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌÌ______________________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE