ÿWPCé 7# UN %k 0GqU:¸w@ò42FU 0‹] 0DèL,xU:€ 0Jº 0T 0^X 0h¶ 0r 0| 0† 0’ 1u" 0d— 0@û D3; Bn U>‹ AQÉ Æ 0Dà 0D$ D/h B— U*´ B)Þ DC AMJ—ûv~˜vÓ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLLÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX('\$¡¡Ô€XåÙXXMXÔ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ãPäPæPçPèPéPêPëÓ€÷úB\J#3|xú(;(3®I$¤¤Ý ƒ'\!ÝÔ€XÅXXXÔÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóC:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPTÇ"Arial Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò'''''ÿÿdxd d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d00007Border 1dd* 1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ üÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€/XÔÌÌò òDecember€2,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€/ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ñÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€/ôÔWe€note€that€our€supreme€court€has€granted€permission€to€appeal€concerning€the€issue€of€the€Ïinterpretation€of€the€open€and€obvious€rule€in€Tennessee€in€òòColn€v.€City€of€Savannahóó,€No.€02A01„9507„CV„00152,€1996€WL€544652€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Sept.€25,€1996)€òòperm.óó€òòapp.óó€òògrantedóó€(Feb.€3,€1997).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€(ÔÔ€/ÔÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€ ÉXXdðXXdð7Ñ›Þ ÞÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌÌÌANNETTE€DUBOSE,à àà àà à)€€ÌÙ€*ÙœßR€231A1-j|íA` Å `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àò ò)€€Madison€Circuit€No.€C„94„321Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€Appeal€No.€02A01„9705„CV„00096Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌDEBBIE€RAMEY,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óDefendant/Appellee.à àò ò)ó óÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€MADISON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€JACKSON,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€FRANKLIN€MURCHISON,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òTHOMAS€K.€McALEXANDERó óÌò òHILL€BOREN,€P.C.Ìó óJackson,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppellantÌÌÌÌò òJONATHAN€O.€STEENó óÌò òSPRAGINS,€BARNETT,€COBB€&€BUTLERÌó óJackson,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌÌÌÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ó óà àœÌÓÓà àPlaintiff/Appellant,›€Annette€Dubose€(ð ðDuboseðð),€appeals€the€judgment€of€the€trialÏÑ7€:XXdðXXdð7Ñcourt€denying€her€motion€for€a€new€trial€and€specifically€finding€that€the€jury€verdict€andÏthe€judgment€previously€entered€in€this€case€were€proper€and€correct.€€For€reasonsÏhereinafter€stated,€€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌÓ  Óòòò òProcedural€HistoryÌÓ  Óó óóóà àDubose€filed€this€lawsuit€in€the€Madison€County€Circuit€Court€alleging€thatÏœDebbie€Ramey€(ð ðRameyðð)›€was€negligent€(1)€in€keeping€and€maintaining€a€mix€breedÏChow€which€she€knew€or€had€reason€to€know€had€a€propensity€for€biting€and€(2)€inÏkeeping€an€animal€in€an€area€where€persons€lawfully€upon€Rameyððs€property€wouldÏcome€into€contact€with€the€dog.€€œDubose€further€alleged€that€Ramey€was€negligent€inÏmaintaining€her€garage€in€such€a€manner€as€to€present€a€hazard€to€persons€lawfullyÏupon€her€property.€€Ramey€filed€an€answer€denying€liability€or€negligence€in€any€wayÏand€claiming€that€Dubose€was€barred€from€recovery€under€the€legal€doctrines€ofÏcomparative€fault,€assumption€of€the€risk,€sudden€emergency,€and€unavoidableÍaccident.€€€This€case€came€to€trial€by€jury€on€November€18,€1996,€with€the€HonorableÏFranklin€Murchison€presiding.ÌÌà àAt€the€conclusion€of€the€trial,€the€jury€announced€a€verdict€finding€Dubose€100%Ïat€fault.€€The€trial€court€approved€the€verdict€and€entered€a€judgment€accordingly.€ÌÌà àThereafter,€Dubose€filed€a€motion€for€a€new€trial€on€the€grounds€that€there€wasÏno€legal€or€material€evidence€to€support€the€juryððs€verdict,€and€that€the€juryððs€verdict€inÏthe€matter€was€contrary€to€the€weight€of€the€evidence€presented€at€trial.€€€Following›€aÏhearing€on€the€motion€for€a€new€trial,€the€trial€court€denied€Duboseððs€motion,€findingÏthat€the€jury€verdict€and€the€judgment€previously€entered€in€this€case€were€proper€andÏcorrect.€œ€This›€appeal€œensued.Ì›Ìà àThe€œissues›€on€appeal€are€as€follows:€(1)€Whether€the€trial€court€abused€itsÏdiscretion€in€overruling€Duboseððs€motion€for€a€new€trial€which€requested€relief€on€theÏbasis€that€the€juryððs€verdict€was€contrary€to€the€weight€of€the€evidence;€and€(2)€whetherÏthere€is€material€evidence€to€support€the€juryððs€verdict.Ìà àÌÓ  Óòòò òFactsó óóóÌÓ  Óà àOn€November€29,€1993,€Dubose,€along€with€her€sister„in„law,€Mrs.€DorothyÏJohnson€(ð ðJohnsonðð),€came€to€the€home€of€Ramey€in€order€to€present€a€ChristmasÏAround€the€World€party.€€œThis€was€a€sales€presentation€whereby€Dubose€and€JohnsonÏdisplayed€Christmas€decorations€and€other€merchandise€to€Ramey€and€her€guests.€€ÌÌà àDubose€and€Johnson€rode€together€and€arrived€at€Rameyððs€home€between€6:15Ïand€6:30€p.m.€on€this€day.€€Johnson€pulled€the€car€into›€Rameyððs€driveway€withoutÏentering€her€garage.€€œWhen›€Dubose€arrived,€Rameyððs€dog,€Bo„Bo,€€began€barking,€andÏRamey€came€out€of€her€home€into€the€garage.€€œAfter›€quieting€Bo„Bo,€Ramey€came€toÏthe€car€where€Dubose€and€Johnson€were€unloading€their€merchandise€for€the€party.€ÏShe€helped€them€carry€the€merchandise€into€the€house.€€œBo„Bo›€was€tied€to€the€garageÏwall€to€prevent€him€from€escaping€outside€into€the€weather,€which€was€rainy€and€cold.€ÏœBo„Bo›€was€wearing€a€cast€on€his€leg€from€the€shoulder€down€because€he€had€beenÏœshot.Ì›€Ìà àRamey€led€Dubose€and€Johnson€through€the€garage€past€Bo„Bo€and€throughÏthe€door€that€led€into€Rameyððs€home.€€œRamey›€stopped€and€held€Bo„Bo€as€Dubose€andÏJohnson€entered€the€house.€œÌ›Ìà àApproximately€five€guests€attended€the€party,€excluding€Dubose€and€Johnson.€€ÏEach€of€the€guests€was€advised€to€use€the€front€door€because€of€Bo„Boððs€illÏtemperament.€€œThat›€night,€the€guests€at€the€party€had€numerous€conversations€aboutÏBo„Bo.€€These€conversations€centered€around€the€fact€that€Bo„Bo€had€been€shot€andÏthat€the€guests€needed€to€use€caution€around€Bo„Bo.€€œHowever,›€Dubose€and€JohnsonÏcontend€that€they€heard€no€such€conversations€concerning€the€dog€or€his€tendenciesÏto€be€temperamental.€€Ìà àAfter€the€presentation€was€completed,€Ramey€helped€Dubose€and€JohnsonÍcarry€the€merchandise€to€their€car.€€œAfter›€loading€the€car,€Dubose€realized€that€she€hadÏleft€her€sweater€in€Rameyððs€home.€€œRamey›€contends€that€she€told€Dubose€to€stay€in€theÏcar€while€she€went€to€retrieve€the€sweater.€€œDubose,›€however,€insists€that€she€heard€noÏsuch€utterance€from€Ramey.€€œThe›€testimony€of€Mrs.€Betty€Jones€indicated€that€RameyÏwas,€indeed,€coming€in€from€the€garage€to€retrieve€Duboseððs€sweater€when€theÏœincident›€occurred.€œÌ›€€Ìà àDubose€œentered›€the€garage€and€stepped€over€œRameyððs›€weed€eater€that€wasÏlying€on€the€garage€floor.€€€As€Dubose€stepped€over€the€weed€eater,€Bo„Bo€growledÏand€lunged€at€her.€€œDubose›€proceeded€to€back€away€from€Bo„Bo,€whereupon€she€fellÏover€the€weed€eater€and€broke€her€wrist.€€œAs›€her€left€leg€swung€œinto›€the€air,€Bo„Bo€bitÏDubose€on€the€leg.€€Ìà àDubose€was€taken€to€the€emergency€room€where€the€injury€to€her€wrist€wasÏtemporarily€treated€by€Dr.€Kelly€Ballard.€€œThereafter,›€Dubose€sought€the€advice€andÏtreatment€of€Dr.€James€Craig€at€The€Jackson€Clinic.€ÌÌÓ  Óò òòòDiscussionÌÓ  Óó óóóà àIn€reviewing€a€judgment€based€upon€a€jury€verdict,€this€Court€is€not€authorizedÏto€re„examine€the€weight€of€the€evidence,€but€may€set€aside€a€jury€verdict€only€if€thereÏis€no€material€evidence€to€support€the€verdict.€€T.R.A.P.€13(d);€òòBynum€v.€Hollowellóó,€656ÏS.W.2d€400,€402€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983);€òòCohen€v.€Cookóó,€462€S.W.2d€502€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1969).€In€determining€whether€there€is€material€evidence€to€support€the€verdict,Ïwe€are€required€to€take€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€all€the€evidence€in€favor€of€theÍverdict,€to€assume€the€truth€of€all€that€tends€to€support€it,€to€disregard€all€to€the€contrary,Ïand€to€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€to€sustain€the€verdict.€€òòBynum€v.€Hollowellóó,€656ÏS.W.2d€at€402;€òòBudiselich€v.€Rigsbyóó,€639€S.W.2d€663€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1982).€€If€there€isÏany€material€evidence€to€support€the€verdict,€it€must€be€affirmed.€€òòCity€of€ChattanoogaÏv.€Ballewóó,€354€S.W.2d€806,€809€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1961);€òòBynum€v.€Hollowellóó,€656ÏS.W.2d€at€402.Ìà àWe€will€first€address€Duboseððs€contention€regarding€the€apportionment€of€faultÏconcerning€her€claims€of€negligence€against€Ramey€as€we€find€such€issue€to€beÏdispositive€of€this€appeal.€€In€order€to€affirm€the€juryððs€verdict€in€favor€of€Ramey,€theÏquestion€that€we€must€resolve€is€whether€there€is€material€evidence€to€support€theÏjuryððs€verdict€that€the€fault€attributable€to€Dubose€was€equal€to€or€greater€than€the€faultÏattributable€to€Ramey.€€òòEaton€v.€McClainóó,€891€S.W.2d€587€(Tenn.€1994).€€If€so,€œDubose›Ïis€precluded€from€recovery.€€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó,€833€S.W.2d€52€(1992).€€In€òòEatonóó,Ïour€Supreme€Court€set€forth€the€following€nonexhaustive€list€of€pertinent€factors€toÏevaluate€in€assigning€percentages€of€fault€to€each€party:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(1)€The€relative€closeness€of€the€causal€relationshipÏbetween€the€conduct€of€the€defendant€and€the€injury€to€theÏplaintiff;€(2)€the€reasonableness€of€the€partyððs€conduct€inÏconfronting€a€risk,€such€as€whether€the€party€knew€of€theÏrisk,€or€should€have€known€of€it;€(3)€the€extent€to€which€theÏdefendant€failed€to€reasonably€utilize€an€existingÏopportunity€to€avoid€the€injury€to€the€plaintiff;€(4)€theÏexistence€of€a€sudden€emergency€requiring€a€hastyÏdecision;€(5)€the€significance€of€what€the€party€wasÏattempting€to€accomplish€by€the€conduct,€such€as€anÏattempt€to€save€anotherððs€life;€and€(6)€the€partyððs€particularÏcapacities,€such€as€age,€maturity,€training,€education,€andÏso€forth.ÌÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€œ592.ÌÌ›à àBased€on€the€evidence€presented,€we€conclude€that€the€most€important€factor€toÏconsider€is€number€two„„whether€Dubose€was€or€should€have€been€aware€of€the€riskÏinvolved€in€entering€the€garage€without€the€accompaniment€of€Ramey€and€whetherÏsuch€a€risk€was€reasonable.€œÌ›Ìà àAs€mentioned€above,€Dubose€claims€that€Ramey€was€negligent€(1)€in€keepingÏand€maintaining€Bo„Bo,€which€she€knew€or€had€reason€to€know€had€a€propensity€forÏbiting,€and€(2)€in€keeping€Bo„Bo€in€an€area€where€persons€lawfully€upon€her€propertyÏwould€come€into€contact€with€him.€€œRamey›€asserts€comparative€fault€and€assumption€ofÏthe€risk€€as€defenses€to€these€œclaims.›€€œÌ›Ìà àThe€doctrine€of€assumption€of€the€risk,€also€known€as€òòvolenti€non€fit€injuriaóó,€isÏone€in€which€a€plaintiff€may€not€recover€for€an€injury€to€which€he€or€she€assents,€òòi.e.óó,Ïthat€a€person€may€not€recover€from€an€injury€received€when€he€or€she€voluntarilyÏexposes€himself€œor€herself€to›€a€known€and€appreciated€danger.€€œòòSeeóó›€òòPerez€v.ÏMcConkeyóó,€872€S.W.2d€897€(Tenn.€1994).€€Historically,€the€requirements€for€theÏdefense€of€òòvolenti€non€fit€injuriaóó€have€been€that:€(1)€the€plaintiff€has€knowledge€of€theÏfacts€constituting€a€dangerous€condition;€(2)€he€œor€she€knows›€the€condition€isÏdangerous;€(3)€he€œor€she€appreciates›€the€nature€or€extent€of€the€danger;€and€(4)€he€œorÏshe€voluntarily›€exposes€himself€œor€herself€to›€the€danger.€€òòId.óó€€With€the€onset€of€ourÏsupreme€courtððs€decision€in€œòòPerezóó,›€the€doctrine€of€implied€assumption€of€the€risk€hasÏbeen€abrogated€and€maintains€no€independent€existence.€€However,€œunder€theÍscheme€of€comparative€fault€adopted€in€òòMcIntyreóó,€the›€principles€œcontained›€œwithinÏassumption€of€the€risk€survive€as›€factors€to€be€considered€by€the€jury€in€apportioningÏdegrees€of€fault€between€the€œparties.›€€òòEaton€v.€McClainóó,€891€S.W.2d€587,€592€(Tenn.Ï1994).€€œÌ›Ìà àAfter€having€stepped€over€the€weed€eater,€having€had€Bo„Bo€bark€at€JohnsonÏand€her€when€they€drove€up€to€Rameyððs€œhouse,›€having€observed€Bo„Boððs€size€and€theÏfact€that€he€was€placed€on€a€cable€in€the€œgarage,›€having€seen€the€cast€on€Bo„Boððs€legÏand€being€told€that€œhe›€had€been€œshot,›€having€watched€as€Ramey€quieted€and€held€Bo„Bo€by€his€collar€while€Dubose€and€Johnson€passed€through€the€œgarage,›€and€havingÏbeen€present€when€Bo„Boððs€ill€temperament€was€the€topic€of€œa€variety›€of€conversationsÏat€the€œparty,›€Dubose€proceeded€into€the€garage€unattended€by€Ramey.€€Under€theÏcircumstances,€we€conclude€that€there€was€material€evidence€to€support€the€juryððsÏverdict€that€Dubose€was€equal€to€or€greater€than€50%€at€fault€by€confronting€the€risk€ofÏentering€the€garage€unattended€by€Ramey.€€In€view€of€the€fact€that€Tennessee€hasÏadopted€the€doctrine€of€comparative€fault,€whether€the€jury€found€Dubose€to€be€100%Ïor€50%€at€fault€is€inconsequential.€€There€was€material€evidence€to€support€the€findingÏthat€Dubose,€by€assuming€a€known€risk,€was€equal€to€or€greater€than€50%€at€fault€and,Ïthereby,€to€bar€her€claim€for€œrelief.Ì›Ìà àDubose€also€claims€that€Ramey€was€negligent€in€maintaining€her€garage€inÏsuch€a€manner€as€to€present€a€hazard€to€persons€lawfully€upon€the€DefendantððsÏproperty€by€leaving€her€weed€eater€on€the€garage€floor.€€œThis›€is€a€claim€based€onÍpremises€œliability.Ì›Ìà à€Under€premises€liability,€a€premises€owner€has€a€duty€to€maintain€his€or€herÏpremises€in€a€reasonably€safe€and€suitable€condition;€this€general€duty€includes€theÏresponsibility€of€either€removing€or€warning€against€any€latent€dangerous€conditionsÏon€the€premises€of€which€the€owner€is€aware€or€should€have€been€aware€through€theÏexercise€of€reasonable€care.€€òòEaton€v.€McClainóó,€891€S.W.2d€587,€593„94€(Tenn.€1994);ÏòòChambliss€v.€Shoneyððs€Inc.óó,€742€S.W.2d€271€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987);€òòTeal€v.€E.I.€DuPontÏde€Nemours€and€Co.óó,€728€F.2d€799€(6th€Cir.€1984).€€The€open€and€obvious€rule€is€oneÏthat€has€been€utilized€in€cases€dealing€primarily€with€premises€liability.€€Historically,Ïthe€open€and€obvious€rule€is€one€whereby€an€invitee€can€be€barred€from€recovery€forÏinjuries€resulting€from€a€danger€as€readily€apparent€to€the€invitee€as€to€the€owner€of€theÏpremises.€€With€the€adoption€of€comparative€fault€principles,€the€law€concerning€theÏeffects€of€the€open€and€obvious€rule€on€a€plaintiffððs€claim€for€recovery€is€somewhatÏunsettled€in€Tennessee.€€One€line€of€cases€deals€with€the€open€and€obvious€rule€as€aÏfactor€to€be€considered€within€the€scheme€of€comparative€fault.€€œòòSeeóó›€òòCooperwood€v.ÏKroger€Food€Stores,€Inc.óó,€No.€02A01„9308„CV„00182,€1994€WL€725217,€at€*2„3€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€Dec.€30,€1994);€òòBroyles€v.€City€of€Knoxvilleóó,€No.€03A01„9505„CV„00166,€1995ÏWL€511904,€at€*3„4€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Aug.€30,€1995);€òòShope€v.€Radio€Shackóó,€No.€Ï03A01„9508„CV„00288,€1995€WL€733885,€at€*2„3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Dec.€7,€1995).€€AÏseparate€line€of€cases€adheres€to€the€principle€that€the€open€and€obvious€rule€is€aÏcomplete€bar€to€a€plaintiffððs€claim€for€relief.€€œòòSeeóó€òòJones›€v.€Exxon€Corp.óó,€940€S.W.2d€69,Ï71„72€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996);€òòValentine€v.€Weatherfordóó,€No.€02A01„9511„CV„00264,Í1996€WL€741878,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€€Dec.€31,€1996);€òòTracy€v.€Exxon€Corp.óó,€No.Ï02A01„9512„CV„00277,€1996€WL€741876,€at€2€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Dec.€31.€1996);ÏòòSuddath€v.€Parksóó,€914€S.W.2d€910,€914€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).× ƒ4 ××  ×€€œÌ›Ìà àœIn€this€case,€it€is€undisputed€that€Dubose€saw€the€weed€eater€when€she€enteredÏthe€garage,€and€therefore,€encountered€an€open€and€obvious€danger.€€ÓÓà àÌà àÌà8 àQuestion:€à àAfter€you€got€your€sister„in„lawððs€car€loaded,€whatÏhappened€à àà àà àà àà àà àafter€that?ÌÌà8 àAnswer:à à[I]€realized€then€that€I€did€not€have€my€sweater.€€And€I€said,Ïð ðIððm€à àà àgoing€back€and€get€my€sweater.ðð€€And€I€stepped€across€theÏà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àweedÏeater.€€And€as€I€stepped€across,€I€looked€up,€the€dogÏà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àgrowled,€and€this„„and€I€stopped.€.€.€ÌÌà8 àQuestion:à àNow,€when€you€went€back€in€(to€the€garage),€you€steppedÏover€à àà àthe€weed€eater;€is€that€right?€Ìà àÌà8 àAnswer:à àYes,€sir.€ÌÌÓÓWhich›€line€of€cases€we€follow€concerning€the€interpretation€of€the€open€and€obviousÏrule€is€œof€no€consequence.›€€The€end€result€is€the€same.€€Regardless€of€whether€theÏopen€and€obvious€rule€is€a€factor€œto€be€considered€under›€comparative€fault€or€aÏcomplete€bar€to€plaintiffððs€recovery,€Dubose€is€barred€from€recovery€because€there€wasÏmaterial€evidence€from€which€the€jury€could€reasonably€find€Dubose€equal€to€orÏgreater€than€50%€at€fault€in€this€matter.€€€œÌ›Ìà àThe€trial€court€entered€a€judgment€in€favor€of€Ramey€because€the€jury€foundÏDubose€to€be€equal€to€or€greater€than€50%€at€fault€in€this€incident.€€œIn›€fact,€the€juryÏfound€Dubose€to€be€100%€at€fault.€€œWe›€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€denyingÏDuboseððs€motion€for€a€new€trial€and€affirming€the€jury€verdict€because€the€recordÏcontains€material€evidence€to€support€a€verdict€of€equal€to€or€greater€than€50%€fault€onÏthe€part€of€Dubose.€€As€mentioned€above,€in€view€of€the€fact€that€Tennessee€hasÏadopted€the€doctrine€of€modified€comparative€fault,€it€is€of€no€consequence€whetherÏthe€jury€found€Dubose€to€be€100%€at€fault€or€50%€at€fault.€€In€any€event,€there€wasÏmaterial€evidence€to€support€the€juryððs€verdict€that€Dubose€was€50%€at€fault€or€greaterÏand,€thereby,€to€bar€her€claim€for€relief.€ÌÌÓ  Óòòœà àò òDenial›€of€Motion€for€a€New€Trialó óÌÓ  Óà àóóTrial€courts€are€afforded€œbroad›€discretion€in€procedural€matters€in€order€toÏexpedite€litigation€and€to€preserve€fundamental€rights€of€the€parties.€€This€Court€will€notÏreverse€a€discretionary€judgment€of€the€trial€court€unless€œit›€affirmatively€appears€thatÏsuch€discretion€has€been€explicitly€abused€to€great€injustice€and€injury€of€the€partyÏcomplaining.€€œòòSeeóó›€T.R.A.P.€36(b);€òòDouglas€v.€Estate€of€Robertsonóó,€876€S.W.2d€95,€97Ï(Tenn.€1994);€òòBruce€v.€Bruceóó,€801€S.W.2d€102,€107€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990);€òòEsstman€v.ÏBoydóó,€605€S.W.2d€237,€240„41€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€œ1980).Ì›Ìà àAfter€an€examination€of€the€record,€we€find€no€abuse€of€discretion€by€the€trialÏcourt€in€denying€Duboseððs€motion€for€a€new€trial.€€Dubose€has€made€no€showing€thatÏthe€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€denying€her€motion€for€a€new€trial,€much€less€anÍabuse€that€rises€to€the€level€of€a€great€injustice€or€injury€to€her.€€The€record€evincesÏsufficient€evidence€for€the€trial€judge€to€deny€the€motion€for€a€new€trial.€€We€affirm€theÏaction€of€the€trial€court€in€overruling€Duboseððs€motion€for€a€new€trial.òòÌœà àÌÓ  Óà àò òFrivolous›€Appealó óóóÌÓ  Óà àRamey€œasserts›€that€Duboseððs€appeal€is€frivolous€and€that€she€should€beÏawarded€damages€in€accordance€with€T.C.A.€ðð€27„1„122€(1980).€€We€are€notÏœpersuaded›€and€do€not€find€this€appeal€to€be€wholly€insubstantial€or€brought€solely€forÏthe€purpose€of€delay.€€Accordingly,€we€decline€to€award€Ramey€damages€for€frivolousÏappeal.€€€Ìòòò òÌÓ  Óœà àConclusion›ÌÓ  Óà àó óóóThe€trial€courtððs€œjudgment›€affirming€the€verdict€of€the€jury€and€denying€DuboseððsÏmotion€for€a€new€trial€is€affirmed.€€œCosts›€œare›€taxed€to€the€Appellant,€for€which€executionÏmay€issue€if€œnecessary.ÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌFARMER,€J.€ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌLILLARD,€J.›