ÿWPCu  yø®ÏJÂfÇ+"©m34VWÙÏïÓÝéÎÑ)­½º-{êr9‡bûÏ_=Tªr2Ȧ@¦Y3V¨MÜGmv9¸™/—híöÖªñïÍŸ¢á¨Ñ«%«öE P†ª…OtMâñoEŽ·ÙüŽLÙ47ÉÁÛ`]h…þ‘3;œÚ[N1¿HJt·=–øÙí ¶^šsüÏWrB¸l£%H£)àD<ЙûGC ÇÍ4½bçÕ±J3®×³¤ñøñOS!O±s|»÷¥ÑŽHH"/“¨¨ M¿TeþqДð¿I{ÊÖæF5¯/{_┑î’xÞ?æRm»µÛÔ6CªhÞ-ãWïHE»Eø%äá^gñs/—)„[-D–])# >UNI %— 0(w@Å4()0U:Y)“U:¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼ AQöÆG 0D 0DQ 0D• • D/Ù B B% D3B ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ 7 8 9 : ;£<=>Ó€JMn~<$3|xM Ý ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ XÍ7XXXÔÔ€ ’xX XÍ7ÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ XÍ7X ’xÔÐ  ÐÌò òDecember€21,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ô]–ôX XÍ7ÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular Ý ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ XÍ7XXXÔÔ€ ’xX XÍ7ÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ XÍ7X ’xÔÐ  ÐÌò òDecember€16,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ô]–ôX XÍ7ÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular !"#%Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'''÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd&&&&'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýñ>ñ›ñ>ñÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓ'°,X°À”X°œX'Óò òñJññ>ñßr€ (<,(j 8` `€€@Eȱ` ttx$°ð Õrßñ>ññJññMññJñßr€ (<,(j 8` `€€@Eȱ` ttx$°ð ÕrßñJññMññMññMññMññ>ñ›ñ>ññMññMññMññMñ›ñMññMññMññMñ›ñMññMñßt€ (>.*jxÔÍ` `€€@Eœ}` ttx$Ôµð œ tß›ñMñà@O O ìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE,€ˆÌà@kk%ìàAT€JACKSONó óˆÐ œì ÐÌà@. . ìà_______________________________________________________ˆÌÌà À à)Ìò òKIMBROUGH€L.€DUNLAP,€JR.ó ó,à À à)à  àHaywood€County€Chancery€CourtÐ 8 ˆ Ðà À à)à  àNo.€9593Ð ( x Ѐ€€€€Plaintiff/Appellee.à À à)Ð  d Ðà À à)ÌVS.à À à)à  àC.A.€No.€02A01„9712„CH„00320Ð ì <  Ðà À à)Ìò òPATRICIA€CARTER€DUNLAPó ó,à À à)Ð Ä  Ðà À à)Ì€€€€€Defendant/Appellant.à À à)Ð  ð  Ðà À à)Ì______________________________________________________________________________ÌÌFrom€the€Chancery€Court€of€Haywood€County€at€Brownsville.Ìò òHonorable€George€R.€Ellis,€Chancellor€ó óÐ <Œ ÐÌÌÌò òJoel€B.€McLemoreó ó,€Murfreesboro,€TennesseeÐ ì< ÐAttorney€for€Defendant/Appellant.ÌÌÌò òL.€L.€Harrell,€Jr.ó ó,€HARRELL€&€HARRELL,€Trenton,€TennesseeÐ  ð ÐAttorney€for€Plaintiff/Appellee.ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:ÌÌò òAFFIRMED€AS€MODIFIED€AND€REMANDEDó óÐ $h" ÐÌÌà À àò òFARMER,€J.ó óÐ Ü&,"% ÐÌò òHIGHERS,€J.ó ó:€(Concurs)Ð ´($' Ðò òLILLARD,€J.ó ó:€œ(Concurs)Ð ¤)ô$( ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ ,;|6; Ðñ6ññ8ññ7ñÓ3°,X°` À”X°,X°À”X3Óñ7ññ8ññ9ññ8ñÓ6°,X°` ¸ À”X°,X°À”X6Óñ8ññ9ññ:ññ9ñÓ6°,X°` ‚XÀ”X°,X°À”X6Óñ9ññ:ññ:ñÓ0°,X°` ˜X°,X°À”X0Óñ:ññ;ñÓ  Óñ;ññ<ñÓÓñ<ññ=ñà ` àDefendant€Patricia€Carter€Dunlap€appeals,€and€Plaintiff€KimbroughL.€Dunlap€crossÏappeals,€the€trial€courtððs€final€judgment€distributing€the€partiesðð€property€in€this€divorce€action.€€WeÏaffirm€the€trial€courtððs€judgment,€with€two€modifications.ÌÌÔ& X Ôà@bbìàò òòòI.€€Procedural€Historyóóó óˆÐ  ` ÐÌà ` àThe€partiesðð€twenty„nine„year€marriage€ended€on€May9,€1989,€when€the€trial€courtÏentered€a€final€divorce€decree€whichÔ'X ò Ô€incorporated€the€provisions€of€the€partiesðð€marital€dissolutionÏagreement(MDA).€€In€April€1990,€the€Defendant€filed€a€motion€to€alter,€amend,€or€set€aside€the€finalÏdivorce€decree.€€The€Defendantððs€motion€indicated€that€it€was€being€brought€pursuant€to€rule59€ofÏthe€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.€€As€grounds€for€setting€aside€the€final€decree,€theÏDefendantððs€motion€alleged€that€the€Plaintiff€had€induced€her€to€sign€the€MDA€through€fraud,€duress,Ïand€undue€influence.ÌÌà ` àThe€Plaintiff€responded€by€filing€a€motion€to€dismiss€in€which€he€contended€that€theÏDefendantððs€rule59€motion€was€untimely€in€that€it€was€not€filed€and€served€within€thirty€days€afterÏthe€final€divorce€decree€was€entered.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€T.R.C.P.€59.04.€€Instead€of€dismissing€the€DefendantððsÐ ("x  Ðmotion,€however,€the€trial€court€permitted€her€to€amend€her€motion€to€state€that€she€was€proceedingÏunder€rule60€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€instead€of€rule59.€€After€conducting€aÏhearing€on€the€merits,€the€trial€court€granted€in€part€and€denied€in€part€the€Defendantððs€motion.€€TheÏtrial€court€refused€to€set€aside€that€portion€of€the€final€decree€which€granted€a€divorce€to€the€Plaintiff,Ïand€the€court€affirmed€that€the€parties€effectively€were€divorced€as€of€May9,€1989.€€On€the€otherÏhand,€the€trial€court€partially€granted€the€Defendantððs€motion€by€setting€aside€the€MDA€which€wasÏincorporated€into€the€final€decree.€€The€trial€court€then€continued€the€proceedings€for€a€determinationÏof€the€equitable€division€of€the€partiesðð€property.€€The€Plaintiff€attempted€to€appeal€the€trial€courtððsÏorder€setting€aside€the€MDA,€but€this€court€denied€his€application€for€permission€to€appeal€in€MayÏ1992.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€T.R.A.P.9.Ð ˜4è/4 ÐÌà ` àThe€partiesðð€legal€maneuvers€consumed€the€next€two€years€of€this€litigation.€€AlthoughÏnot€pertinent€to€this€appeal,€the€various€motions€filed€by€the€parties€included€(1)the€DefendantððsÏmotion€to€enjoin€the€Plaintiff€from€disposing€of€the€partiesðð€jointly„owned€property,€(2)theÐ ø;H7< ÐDefendantððs€notice€that€she€was€taking€the€Plaintiffððs€deposition,€(3)the€Plaintiffððs€motionÏto€quash€the€notice,€(4)the€Defendantððs€motion€to€compel€and€for€sanctions€against€the€PlaintiffÏbased€upon€his€failure€to€produce€documents€requested€through€discovery,€(5)the€DefendantððsÏmotion€òòò òin€limineó óóó€seeking€to€limit€the€Plaintiffððs€testimony€and€evidence€to€ð ðhis€responses€toÐ 0 € Ðquestions€posed€in€the€depositions,ðð€(6)the€Defendantððs€motion€to€conduct€a€pretrial€conference€andÏto€set€definite€times€for€the€completion€of€discovery€and€for€a€trial,€(7)the€Defendantððs€motion€forÏthe€appointment€of€an€appraiser€to€estimate€the€value€of€the€Plaintiffððs€business,€the€DunlapÏInsurance€Agency,€(8)the€Plaintiffððs€motion€to€dissolve€the€restraining€order€which€had€been€issuedÏagainst€him,€and€(9)the€Defendantððs€second€motion€to€take€the€Plaintiffððs€deposition€and€request€forÏdocuments.€€ÌÌà ` àThe€trial€finally€took€place€on€April5,€1994.€€At€the€beginning€of€trial,€the€partiesÏstipulated€that€the€only€issue€before€the€court€was€the€division€of€the€property€which€the€parties€hadÏacquired€during€their€marriage.€€The€parties€indicated€that€the€disputed€real€property€included€theÏmarital€home,€a€commercial€building,€a€vacant€lot,€a€162„acre€farm,€an€additional€thirty„acre€tract,Ïa€five„acre€tract,€and€the€Dunlap€Insurance€Agency.€€The€parties€did€not€dispute€the€values€of€theseÏproperties€because€they€planned€to€have€an€appraiser€evaluate€the€properties.€€In€discussing€theÏevaluation€of€the€properties,€however,€the€Defendantððs€attorney€requested€ð ðthat€the€evaluations€beÏas€of€or€as€close€to€the€date€[of]€the€divorce€as€possible,ðð€May9,€1989.€€The€Defendantððs€attorneyÏasked€the€trial€court€to€exclude€ð ðany€testimony€past€that€date€as€to€devaluation€or€expenditures.ðð€€ÌÌà ` àThe€trial€court€did€not€issue€its€ruling€immediately€after€the€trial.€€In€August€1994,€perÏthe€partiesðð€agreement,€the€trial€court€appointed€an€appraiser€to€determine€the€values€of€the€propertiesÏin€controversy.€€Sometime€during€the€fall€of€1994,€the€Defendant€retained€a€different€attorney€toÏrepresent€her€in€these€proceedings.€€The€Defendantððs€new€attorney€filed€a€motion€for€ð ðinterim€reliefððÏrequesting,€ò òòòinter€aliaóó,€ó óa€one„time€payment€for€the€rental€value€of€the€marital€home€since€the€divorce.€Ð p5À04 ÐIn€January€1995,€the€Defendant€also€filed€a€motion€requesting€the€trial€court€to€order€that€the€maritalÏhome€be€sold€and€that€the€net€proceeds€be€divided€equally€between€the€parties.€€ÌÐ ;`6: Ðà ` àThe€trial€court€did€not€enter€its€judgment€dividing€the€partiesðð€property€until€1997.€ÏThe€intervening€two€years€of€this€litigation€were€filled€with€various€filings€by€the€parties,€some€atÏthe€direction€of€the€trial€court,€in€which€the€parties€outlined€their€respective€positions€as€to€theÏdivision€of€the€partiesðð€property,€submitted€proposed€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law,€andÏcompiled€lists€of€the€assets€to€be€divided€by€the€court.€€In€January€1997,€the€trial€court€entered€anÏorder€in€which€it€classified€the€partiesðð€various€properties€as€either€marital€or€separate€property.€€AsÏpertinent€to€this€appeal,€the€trial€court€found€the€following€properties€to€be€marital€property€subjectÏto€division:€€the€marital€home;€the€commercial€building€on€14th€Avenue€in€Humboldt;€and€forty„nineÏpercent(49%)€of€the€Dunlap€Insurance€Agency.€€Additionally,€the€trial€court€found€the€followingÏproperties€to€be€the€Plaintiffððs€separate€property:€€the€Plaintiffððs€interests€in€the€162„acre€farm€andÏthe€thirty„acre€tract,€both€of€which€he€owned€jointly€with€his€brother.€€On€February3,€1997,€theÏPlaintiff€filed€a€motion€asking€the€trial€court€to€reconsider€its€order€or,€in€the€alternative,€to€grant€himÏa€new€trial.ÌÌà ` àIn€March€1997,€almost€eight€years€after€the€parties€were€divorced€and€two€monthsÏafter€the€trial€court€entered€its€order€classifying€the€partiesðð€property,€the€Defendant€filed€a€motionÏasking€the€Chancellor€hearing€the€case€to€recuse€himself€from€further€participation€in€theseÏproceedings.€€As€grounds€for€recusal,€the€Defendantððs€motion€averred€that€the€Defendant€and€herÏcounsel€had€filed€complaints€with€the€Court€of€the€Judiciary€ð ðconcerning€the€pace€of€this€caseðð€and,Ïthus,€that€the€Chancellor€now€was€a€party€opponent€to€the€Defendant€and€her€counsel€ð ðin€the€relatedÏmatter.ððÌÌà ` àOn€April10,€1997,€the€trial€court€entered€an€order€which€distributed€the€partiesððÏproperty€in€accordance€with€the€courtððs€previous€classifications€of€the€various€properties€as€eitherÏmarital€or€separate.€€On€May1,€1997,€the€trial€court€entered€an€order€denying€the€Defendantððs€MarchÏ1997€motion€to€recuse.€€The€trial€court€also€entered€an€order€disposing€of€the€Defendantððs€JanuaryÏ1995€motion€for€the€sale€of€the€marital€home.€€The€trial€courtððs€order€ruled€thatÌÌÓÓà8 ` àthe€parties€had€heretofore€agreed€that€the€valuation€of€the€propertyÏwould€be€as€of€the€date€of€the€divorce€and€that€either€party€mayÏpurchase€same€from€the€other€party€based€upon€said€valuation€less€theÏamount€of€the€indebtedness€owing€at€the€time€of€the€divorce€if€thisÐ