ÿWPC² C… ö ”Зî ¡ ¬^À-M‹Þ#{Ýsél¯€ÒÙ¾JZùÖ™ïQÛ/ö‹ÏA‹ßÖ,8R¿ÍÇ"˜ÉXÉ,*þ¸ ¥5·¾zÝÃ!p2/¼âg0><¹ÕÄ-™¾h‹²_¡2Ò2ôE|¤–(B¦ë„´²³WŠðéÊéÕðm’3ÿú8cM˜ßÎ9÷ ¦û•ëÆ[;«Ú^1‡äž‹°²¯~ó.mxB¬Þ¡Ûì¶vúݹ7åz!Bòm‚ Öw¹4çƒúñÛƒ?]öõÙÃ2úZÃŒçÝÝ´1Á&6¦µ;S9_)É<‘¦mÉ¢›öo¿hZ'Wa@¨Ê^x?§¯)ù–§S¯–úcÆ&ÖãT«•ÌPKÀUÖÔ>O8Záèq¬xv–B€¢»–vÃ3 ùÊ7¸°ö¢”±=ñp,¾5¸,×19 ²•TP˜ÒÙîXñ³|ö‚ýTÆ#»æ²]]&¾ý&„ž¯˜{òƒ*>øBïóHÁ+æL £ð˜,šX‹_Þ;$?©f2õ1œXÌö–"¸EïJ¿¼ ÝæüªY<¾š¿³  )ú×HÆØÊÞ¡Ç:`t›ÌX¢Áµ+2¯Ñ•A¦Ÿv®*-bb %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ ÉÐ 0D™ ÆÝ Æ£ Æi Æ/#ÁõN¶²¸3jEŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸb§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 0믯¯¯ Bšš 0¤· D3[ D-Ž 0K»» ASÆY 0¤ 0Dà A«» u]-s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular¬|&-rtyBar(q¢3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ¿Ý ƒRí $ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€original€Order€and€the€subsequent€Final€Order€were€entered€by€Chancellor€G.€Richard€Johnson,€sittingÐ ° Ðby€Interchange.€€Plaintiffsðð€Rule€60.02€motion,€as€well€as€Bancoððs€motion€to€dismiss€and€the€Byrdsðð€motion€for€summaryÐ tÄ Ðjudgment,€were€decided€by€Judge€Jean€A.€Stanley.(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5˜HP LaserJet 4050ÈÈÈÈÈÈÈÈ0 ¨Ý ƒRí $ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€In€relevant€part,€Rule€12.02€provides€that€if,€ð ðon€a€motion€asserting€the€defense€numbered€(6)€to€dismiss€forÐ ° Ðfailure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted,€matters€outside€the€pleading€are€presented€to€and€not€excludedÐ tÄ Ðby€the€court,€the€motion€shall€be€treated€as€one€for€summary€judgment€and€disposed€of€as€provided€in€Rule€56,€and€allÐ 8ˆ Ðparties€shall€be€given€reasonable€opportunity€to€present€all€material€made€pertinent€to€such€a€motion€by€Rule€56.ððÐ üL ÐÌ€ )Ý ƒRí $ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€€On€September€16,€2002,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€denied€the€Rule€11€application€for€permission€toÐ ° Ðappeal€filed€by€Arfken€&€Associates,€P.A.€€òòóó - ù-(|G2í $¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ }»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô ò»»Ô d(|3ÿl$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ }»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3ÿl$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ }»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ }»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼ }»»»ÔÑ8€ZaXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îü }ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼ }»îîü #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓSubmitted€on€Briefs€September€18,€2002€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XZaX»¼ }ÔÌò òÔ#†¼ }»XXZa #ÔJAMES€EDWARDS,€òòet€al.óó€v.€Ð úJ ÐBANCO€LUMBER€COMPANY,€INC.€òòet€alóó.Ô‡XZaX»¼ }Ôó óÐ  ^ ÐÌÔ#†¼ }»XXZa¬#ÔÔ€XZaX»¼ }Ôà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Ô_ÔUnicoiÔ_Ô€CountyÐ  ^ Ðà@@øøìàNos.€5588€&€6191€€€€€€€Jean€A.€Stanley,€JudgeÐ ú J ÐÌFILED€OCTOBER€29,€2002Ð Ò"  Ðà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<½` AßÐ ¾  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2002„01038„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CVÐ ¹  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<` AßÐ ‘á  Ðó óÓ  ÓÌJames€and€Margaret€Edwards€(ð ðPlaintiffsðð)€sued€Banco€Lumber€Company€Inc.,€(ð ðBancoðð)€claimingÐ ŒÜ ÐBanco€had€trespassed€on€their€property€and€removed€timber.€€Banco€filed€a€third„party€complaintÐ xÈ Ðagainst€Nathan€Byrd,€Betty€Byrd,€Fred€Byrd,€and€Barbara€Byrd€(the€ð ðÔ_ÔByrdsÔ_Ôðð)€for€indemnificationÐ d´ Ðrelying€on€a€Timber€Deed€and€Contract€between€Banco€and€the€Ô_ÔByrdsÔ_Ô.€€Plaintiffs€Ô_ÔnonsuitedÔ_Ô€theirÐ P  Ðaction€against€Banco€and€an€Order€was€entered€on€May€16,€2000,€dismissing€only€Plaintiffsðð€action.€Ð <Œ ÐApparently€realizing€this€was€not€a€final€order,€the€Trial€Court€entered€a€ð ðFinal€Orderðð€three€daysÐ (x Ðlater€which€disposed€of€not€only€Plaintiffsðð€claims€but€also€Bancoððs€third„party€complaint€against€theÐ d ÐÔ_ÔByrdsÔ_Ô.€€Plaintiffs€re„filed€their€lawsuit€against€Banco€one€year€and€two€days€after€the€first€order€wasÐ P Ðentered,€but€less€than€a€year€after€the€ð ðFinal€Orderðð€was€entered.€€Plaintiffs€also€sued€the€Ô_ÔByrdsÔ_Ô,€forÐ ì< Ðthe€first€time,€in€this€second€complaint.€€The€Trial€Court€held€the€entry€date€of€the€first€Order€shouldÐ Ø( Ðbe€used€when€determining€whether€the€second€complaint€had€been€re„filed€within€the€one„year€timeÐ Ä Ðperiod€under€the€ð ðSaving€Statute.ðð€€The€Trial€Court€dismissed€Plaintiffsðð€claims€against€Banco€andÐ ° Ðthe€Ô_ÔByrdsÔ_Ô€holding€the€statute€of€limitations€had€run.€€We€vacate€in€part€and€affirm€in€part.Ð œì ÐÌÌò òà@k k ìàTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€CircuitˆÐ `!°  Ðà@’ ’ ìàCourt€Vacated€in€Part€and€Affirmed€in€Part;€Case€Remanded.ˆÐ L"œ! ÐÌó óòòÌD.€Michael€Ô_ÔSwineyÔ_Ô,€J.,€óódelivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHouston€M.€Ô_ÔGoddardÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,óóÐ %` $ Ðand€òòHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.óó,€joined.Ð ü%L!% ÐÌJ.€Russell€Ô_ÔPryorÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔGreenevilleÔ_Ô,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellants€James€Edwards€and€Margaret€Edwards.Ð Ô'$#' ÐÌWilliam€B.€Lawson,€Erwin,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellee€Banco€Lumber€Company,€Inc.Ð ¬)ü$) ÐÌDouglas€K.€Ô_ÔShultsÔ_Ô,€Erwin,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellees€Nathan€Byrd,€Betty€Byrd,€Fred€Byrd,€andÐ „+Ô&+ ÐBarbara€Byrd.Ð  p,À',ýà ÐÔ_Ôà@66'ìàò òOPINIONˆÐ ° ÐÌà@ÛÛ%ìàòòBackgroundó óóóˆÐ ˆØ ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€facts€as€relevant€to€this€appeal€are€undisputed.€€On€June€25,€1996,€James€EdwardsÐ `° Ðfiled€suit€against€Banco.€€Mr.€Edwards€claimed€he€was€the€owner€of€a€certain€parcel€of€land€uponÐ L œ Ðwhich€Banco€trespassed,€cutting€a€road€through€Mr.€Edwardsðð€land€and€removing€timber.€€OnÐ 8 ˆ ÐDecember€16,€1996,€Banco€filed€an€answer€to€the€complaint€and€also€filed€a€third„party€complaintÐ $ t Ðagainst€the€Byrds.€€In€the€third„party€complaint,€Banco€alleged€it€had€entered€into€a€Timber€Deed€andÐ  ` ÐContract€with€the€Byrds€wherein€the€Byrds,€òòinter€aliaóó,€warranted€they€were€the€owners€of€the€landÐ ü L  Ðin€question.€€Banco€claimed€that€if€it€was€found€liable€to€Mr.€Edwards,€it€was€entitled€toÐ è 8  Ðindemnification€from€the€Byrds.€€Mr.€Edwards€then€amended€his€complaint€adding€MargaretÐ Ô$  ÐEdwards€as€a€plaintiff.€€The€complaint€was€never€amended€to€assert€a€claim€against€the€Byrds.Ð À  ÐÌà  àà ` àOn€May€15,€2000,€Plaintiffs€filed€a€motion€for€voluntary€nonsuit.€€This€motion€wasÐ ˜è  Ðgranted€by€the€Trial€Court€in€an€ð ðOrderðð€entered€on€May€16,€2000,€which€provides:Ð „Ô  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àPursuant€to€Plaintiffððs€Motion€to€take€a€voluntary€non„suit€à8@°` x` xàà8 @ àin€theÐ \¬ Ðaccordance€with€òòTennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,€41.01óó€in€theÐ H˜ Ðabove€matter,€Plaintiffððs€action€is€hereby€dismissed€without€prejudice.€Ð 4„ ÐThe€costs€of€this€matter€are€taxed€to€the€Plaintiff.Ð p` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àEnter€pursuant€to€òòRule€58.02.€€Tennessee€Rules€of€CivilÐ øH ÐProcedureòò.óóóóÐä4` x` x ÐÌThis€Order€was€signed€by€the€Trial€Court€and€all€attorneys€of€record.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àà ` àApparently€realizing€the€May€16€Order€was€not€a€final€order€because€it€did€not€disposeÐ ”ä Ðof€Bancoððs€third„party€complaint€against€the€Byrds,€the€Trial€Court€entered€another€order€on€May€19,Ð €Ð Ð2000€which€dismissed€the€entire€lawsuit.€€This€second€order€was€denominated€a€ð ðFinal€Orderðð€andÐ l¼ Ðstates€as€follows:Ð X ¨ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€plaintiffððs€Motion€for€a€voluntary€non„suit€in€this€causeÐ 0"€  Ðis€granted.€€This€cause€is€dismissed.€€Costs€are€taxed€to€plaintiff.Ð#l!` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ à*CLERK:€Enter€and€mail€a€copy€of€this€Order€toÐ ô$D # Ðcounsel/parties.Ðà%0!$` x` x ÐÌThe€ð ðFinal€Orderðð€was€signed€only€by€the€Trial€Court€and€does€not€contain€any€signatures€of€counsel.€Ð ¸'#& ÐThis€ð ðFinal€Orderðð€does€contain€a€certificate€of€service€by€the€circuit€court€clerk€certifying€that€thisÐ ¤(ô#' ÐOrder€was€served€by€mail€on€May€19,€2000,€upon€all€parties€or€their€attorneys€of€record€as€prescribedÐ )à$( Ðby€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àà ` àPlaintiffs,€represented€by€new€counsel,€re„filed€their€lawsuit€against€Banco€on€MayÐ ° Ð18,€2001,€asserting€essentially€the€same€cause€of€action.€€In€this€new€lawsuit,€Plaintiffs,€for€the€firstÐ œì Ðtime,€also€sued€the€Byrds.€€This€second€lawsuit€was€filed€one€year€and€two€days€after€entry€of€theÐ ˆØ ÐMay€16€Order€granting€Plaintiffsðð€motion€for€nonsuit,€but€less€than€one€year€from€the€date€the€MayÐ tÄ Ð19€ð ðFinal€Orderðð€was€entered.€€Ð `° ÐÌà  àà ` àBanco€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€claiming€the€statute€of€limitations€had€run€by€the€timeÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€second€lawsuit€was€filed€because€the€one„year€period€in€which€to€re„file€the€lawsuit€pursuant€toÐ $ t ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„1„105€had€expired.€€In€making€this€argument,€Banco€relied€on€the€entry€dateÐ  ` Ðof€the€first€Order€granting€Plaintiffs€a€nonsuit€as€the€effective€date€when€the€one„year€period€to€re„fileÐ ü L  Ðthe€lawsuit€began€to€run.€€The€Byrds€then€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€arguing€the€statuteÐ è 8  Ðof€limitations€had€run€on€Plaintiffsðð€claims€against€them€because€Plaintiffsðð€cause€of€action€accruedÐ Ô$  Ðon€or€before€August€of€1994,€and€these€Defendants€were€not€sued€by€Plaintiffs€until€May€18,€2001.€Ð À  ÐThe€Byrds€also€asserted€the€Saving€Statute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann€ðð€28„1„105,€was€not€applicable€to€anyÐ ¬ü  Ðclaims€brought€against€them€by€Plaintiffs€because€they€were€not€sued€by€Plaintiffs€in€the€originalÐ ˜è  Ðaction.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àà ` àPlaintiffs€responded€to€Bancoððs€motion€to€dismiss,€arguing€the€one„year€period€inÐ \¬ Ðwhich€to€re„file€their€lawsuit€did€not€begin€to€run€until€the€ð ðFinal€Orderðð€was€entered€on€May€19,Ð H˜ Ð2000,€and,€therefore,€the€second€lawsuit€against€Banco€was€filed€timely.€€Plaintiffs€filed,€in€the€firstÐ 4„ Ðaction,€a€Motion€for€Relief€from€and€to€Set€Aside€May€16,€2000,€Order€pursuant€to€Rule€60.02€ofÐ  p Ðthe€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€seeking€to€have€the€May€16€Order€set€aside€because€that€Order€was€ð ðsupercededÐ  \ Ðby€the€May€19,€2000,€Final€Order.ðð€€Plaintiffs€set€forth€various€reasons€why€they€were€entitled€toÐ øH Ðrelief€under€Rule€60.02,€including€their€claim€that€neither€they€nor€their€new€counsel€were€aware€ofÐ ä4 Ðthe€existence€of€the€first€Order.€€Plaintiffs€also€responded€to€the€Byrdsðð€motion€for€summaryÐ Ð  Ðjudgment,€again€arguing€the€second€action€was€filed€timely€because€it€was€re„filed€within€one€yearÐ ¼  Ðof€the€entry€of€the€Final€Order.€€Banco€filed€a€response€to€Plaintiffsðð€Rule€60.02€motion,€claimingÐ ¨ø Ðthe€Rule€60.02€motion€should€be€denied€because€it€was€not€filed€timely€and€because€it€failed€to€setÐ ”ä Ðforth€sufficient€grounds€for€relief.€€Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àà ` àIn€ruling€on€the€various€motions,€the€Trial€Court׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€denied€Plaintiffsðð€Rule€60.02Ð X ¨ Ðmotion,€concluding€the€motion€ð ðwas€not€brought€timely,€and€no€sufficient€grounds€for€relief€wereÐ D!” Ðpresented€to€the€Court€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€60.02."€€Relying€on€the€entryÐ 0"€  Ðdate€of€the€May€16€Order,€the€Trial€Court€granted€Bancoððs€motion€to€dismiss€after€concluding€theÐ #l! Ðstatute€of€limitations€had€run€since€the€second€lawsuit€had€not€been€filed€within€one€year€of€theÐ $X" Ðdismissal€of€the€first€lawsuit.€€The€Trial€Court€also€granted€the€Byrdsðð€motion€for€summary€judgmentÐ ô$D # Ðfor€two€reasons.€First,€the€statute€of€limitations€had€run€and€the€Saving€Statute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ à%0!$ Ðâ â28„1„105,€was€not€applicable€because€Plaintiffs€did€not€sue€the€Byrds€in€the€first€lawsuit.€€Second,Ð Ì&"% Ðeven€if€the€Saving€Statute€was€applicable,€the€second€lawsuit€was€not€filed€within€one€year€of€theÐ ° Ðdismissal€of€the€first€lawsuit.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àà ` àAlthough€not€exactly€stated€as€such,€Plaintiffs€appeal€the€Trial€Courtððs€denial€of€theirÐ tÄ ÐRule€60.02€motion€to€set€aside€the€May€16€Order,€as€well€as€the€Trial€Courtððs€granting€of€BancoððsÐ `° Ðmotion€to€dismiss€and€the€Byrdsðð€motion€for€summary€judgment€on€the€basis€that€the€statute€ofÐ L œ Ðlimitations€had€run.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà@))%ìàò òòòDiscussionó óóóˆÐ  ` ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€Trial€Court€granted€the€Byrdsðð€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€Since€mattersÐ è 8  Ðoutside€the€pleadings€were€considered€by€the€Trial€Court€when€it€granted€Bancoððs€motion€to€dismiss,Ð Ô$  Ðwe€will€treat€Bancoððs€motion€as€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€in€accordance€with€Rule€12.02.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀РÀ  ÐThe€standard€for€review€of€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€is€set€forth€in€òòStaples€v.€CBL€&Ð ¬ü  ÐAssociates,€Inc.óó,€15€S.W.3d€83€(Tenn.€2000):Ð ˜è  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€standards€governing€an€appellate€courtððs€review€of€aÐ pÀ Ðmotion€for€summary€judgment€are€well€settled.€€Since€our€inquiryÐ \¬ Ðinvolves€purely€a€question€of€law,€no€presumption€of€correctnessÐ H˜ Ðattaches€to€the€lower€courtððs€judgment,€and€our€task€is€confined€toÐ 4„ Ðreviewing€the€record€to€determine€whether€the€requirements€of€Tenn.Ð  p ÐR.€Civ.€P.€56€have€been€met.€€òòSee€Hunter€v.€Brownóó,€955€S.W.2d€49,Ð  \ Ð50„51€(Tenn.€1997);€òòCowden€v.€Sovran€Bank/Central€Southóó,€816Ð øH ÐS.W.2d€741,€744€(Tenn.€1991).€€Tennessee€Rule€of€Civil€ProcedureÐ ä4 Ð56.04€provides€that€summary€judgment€is€appropriate€where:€(1)€thereÐ Ð  Ðis€no€genuine€issue€with€regard€to€the€material€facts€relevant€to€theÐ ¼  Ðclaim€or€defense€contained€in€the€motion,€òòsee€Byrd€v.€Hallóó,€847Ð ¨ø ÐS.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993);€and€(2)€the€moving€party€is€entitledÐ ”ä Ðto€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law€on€the€undisputed€facts.€€òòSeeÐ €Ð ÐAnderson€v.€Standard€Register€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2d€555,€559€(Tenn.Ð l¼ Ð1993).€€The€moving€party€has€the€burden€of€proving€that€its€motionÐ X ¨ Ðsatisfies€these€requirements.€€òòSee€Downen€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.óó,€811Ð D!” ÐS.W.2d€523,€524€(Tenn.€1991).€€When€the€party€seeking€summaryÐ 0"€  Ðjudgment€makes€a€properly€supported€motion,€the€burden€shifts€to€theÐ #l! Ðnonmoving€party€to€set€forth€specific€facts€establishing€the€existenceÐ $X" Ðof€disputed,€material€facts€which€must€be€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact.€Ð ô$D # ÐòòSee€Byrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€215.Ðà%0!$` x` x Їà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àTo€properly€support€its€motion,€the€moving€party€must€eitherÐ ° Ðaffirmatively€negate€an€essential€element€of€the€non„moving€partyððsÐ œì Ðclaim€or€conclusively€establish€an€affirmative€defense.€€òòSee€McCarleyÐ ˆØ Ðv.€West€Quality€Food€Serv.óó,€960€S.W.2d€585,€588€(Tenn.€1998);Ð tÄ ÐòòRobinson€v.€Omeróó,€952€S.W.2d€423,€426€(Tenn.€1997).€€If€the€movingÐ `° Ðparty€fails€to€negate€a€claimed€basis€for€the€suit,€the€non„movingÐ L œ Ðpartyððs€burden€to€produce€evidence€establishing€the€existence€of€aÐ 8 ˆ Ðgenuine€issue€for€trial€is€not€triggered€and€the€motion€for€summaryÐ $ t Ðjudgment€must€fail.€€òòSee€McCarley€v.€West€Quality€Food€Serv.óó,€960Ð  ` ÐS.W.2d€at€588;€òòRobinson€v.€Omeróó,€952€S.W.2d€at€426.€€If€the€movingÐ ü L  Ðparty€successfully€negates€a€claimed€basis€for€the€action,€the€non„Ð è 8  Ðmoving€party€may€not€simply€rest€upon€the€pleadings,€but€must€offerÐ Ô$  Ðproof€to€establish€the€existence€of€the€essential€elements€of€the€claim.ÐÀ ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€standards€governing€the€assessment€of€evidence€in€theÐ ˜è  Ðsummary€judgment€context€are€also€well€established.€€Courts€mustÐ „Ô  Ðview€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€partyÐ pÀ Ðand€must€also€draw€all€reasonable€inferences€in€the€nonmovingÐ \¬ Ðpartyððs€favor.€€òòSee€Robinson€v.€Omeróó,€952€S.W.2d€at€426;€òòByrd€v.Ð H˜ ÐHallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210„11.€€Courts€should€grant€a€summaryÐ 4„ Ðjudgment€only€when€both€the€facts€and€the€inferences€to€be€drawnÐ  p Ðfrom€the€facts€permit€a€reasonable€person€to€reach€only€oneÐ  \ Ðconclusion.€€òòSee€McCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€150,€153€(Tenn.Ð øH Ð1995);€òòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).Ðä4` x` x ÐÌòòStaplesóó,€15€S.W.3d€at€88„89.€A€fact€is€ð ðmaterialðð€for€summary€judgment€purposes,€if€it€ð ðmust€beÐ ¼  Ðdecided€in€order€to€resolve€the€substantive€claim€or€defense€at€which€the€motion€is€directed.ðð€€òòLutherÐ ¨ø Ðv.€Comptonóó,€5€S.W.3d€635,€639€(Tenn.€1999)(quoting€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€211).Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€primary€issue€in€this€appeal€centers€around€whether€the€initial€May€16€Order€orÐ l¼ Ðthe€May€19€Final€Order€is€the€one€to€be€used€for€purposes€of€calculating€the€one„year€period€in€whichÐ X ¨ ÐPlaintiffs€had€to€re„file€their€lawsuit.€€This€Court€was€recently€confronted€with€a€similar€issue€inÐ D!” ÐòòArfken€&€Associates,€P.A.€v.€Simpson€Bridge€Company,€Inc.óó,€No.€E2000„02780„COA„R3„CV,€2002Ð 0"€  ÐTenn.€App.€LEXIS€218€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Mar.€26,€2002).׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€òòArfkenóó,€two€Final€Orders€were€enteredÐ #l! Ðby€the€trial€court€and€the€issue€to€be€decided€on€appeal€was€which€one€of€those€two€orders€controlledÐ $X" Ðfor€purposes€of€determining€whether€the€notice€of€appeal€was€filed€timely.€€The€first€ð ðFinal€OrderððÐ ô$D # Ðwas€entered€by€the€trial€court€on€September€28,€2000.€€The€next€document€in€the€record€was€oneÐ à%0!$ Ðtitled€ð ðFinal€Orderðð€entered€on€October€11,€2000.€€òòArfkenóó,€2002€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€218€at€*€3.€€InÐ Ì&"% Ðdiscussing€the€similarities€between€the€two€Final€Orders,€the€majority€opinion€observed€as€follows:Ð ¸'#& ÐÐ ¤(ô#' Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àCuriously,€the€subsequent€Final€Order€is€an€exact€copy,€òòi.e.óó,€the€exactÐ ° Ðwording,€spacing,€paragraphing,€indenting,€punctuation,€etc.,€of€theÐ œì Ðfirst€Final€Order.€€A€side„by„side€comparison€of€these€two€documentsÐ ˆØ Ðleads€to€the€inescapable€conclusions€that€one€is€a€photostatic€copy€ofÐ tÄ Ðthe€other.€€It€is€clear€to€the€naked€eye€that€the€attorneysðð€signatures€onÐ `° Ðthe€documents€ð!ð€and€both€documents€contain€the€signatures€ofÐ L œ Ðcounsel€for€each€of€the€parties€ð!ð€are€precisely€identical.€€It€is€apparentÐ 8 ˆ Ðthat€one€of€the€documents€was€signed€by€counsel€and€that€the€signedÐ $ t Ðcopy€was€then€photocopied€resulting€in€the€two€documents€underÐ  ` Ðdiscussion.€€It€is€likewise€clear€that€the€trial€judge€signed€whicheverÐ ü L  Ðof€the€documents€is€a€copy€òòandóó€that€she€also€signed,€apparently€at€aÐ è 8  Ðdifferent€time,€whichever€is€the€original€document.€€In€other€words,Ð Ô$  Ðit€is€clear€that,€unlike€the€attorneys,€her€signature€was€òònotóó€affixed€toÐ À  Ðthe€original€before€it€was€copied.Ьü ` x` x ÐÌòòArfkenóó,€2002€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€218€at€*€3,€*4.€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€majority€in€òòArfkenóó€concluded€the€first€Final€Order€controlled€because€the€secondÐ \¬ ÐFinal€Order€did€nothing€whatsoever€to€change€the€first€order.€€The€dissent€in€òòArfkenóó€believed€theÐ H˜ Ðsecond€Final€Order€was€the€effective€order€because€it€was€filed€within€30€days€of€the€first€order,€andÐ 4„ Ðpursuant€to€Rule€59.05,€a€trial€court€retains€jurisdiction€to€alter€or€amend€its€judgment€on€its€ownÐ  p Ðinitiative€within€30€days€of€entry.€€The€majority€addressed€the€rationale€of€the€dissent,€stating:Ð  \ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€dissent€believes€that€the€notice€of€appeal€was€timely€filedÐ ä4 Ðbecause€it€was€filed€within€thirty€days€of€the€entry€of€the€subsequentÐ Ð  ÐFinal€Order.€€The€dissent€correctly€points€out€that€when€theÐ ¼  Ðsubsequent€Final€Order€was€marked€filed€by€the€trial€court€clerk€ð!ð€onÐ ¨ø ÐOctober€11,€2000€ð!ð€the€trial€court€still€had€jurisdiction€of€this€case.€Ð ”ä ÐThus,€the€dissent€reasons,€the€trial€court€had€the€authority€to€enter€theÐ €Ð Ðsubsequent€Final€Order€and€we€should€calculate€the€time€for€filing€theÐ l¼ Ðnotice€of€appeal€from€that€date.ÐX ¨` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àòòWe€would€agree€with€the€dissent€if€the€subsequent€Final€OrderÐ 0"€  Ðhad€changed€the€first€Final€Orderóó;€but€it€did€not.€€As€we€have€pointedÐ #l! Ðout,€these€two€documents€are€identical.€€The€subsequent€Final€OrderÐ $X" Ðchanges€nothing;€it€does€not€even€ð ðtweakðð€the€first€Final€Order.€€InÐ ô$D # Ðour€judgment,€the€subsequent€Final€Order€ð!ð€since€it€accomplishedÐ à%0!$ Ðabsolutely€nothing€that€was€not€already€effective€by€virtue€of€òòóóthe€firstÐ Ì&"% ÐFinal€Order€ð!ð€is€a€nullity.€€The€plaintiff€is€appealing€from€the€firstÐ ¸'#& ÐFinal€Order€regardless€of€what€the€notice€of€appeal€says.Ф(ô#'` x` x ÐÌòòArfkenóó,€2002€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€218€at€*6,€*7€(emphasis€added).Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àà ` àThe€majority€in€òòArfkenóó€indicated€it€would€have€agreed€with€the€dissent€that€the€entryÐ ° Ðdate€of€the€second€Final€Order€was€applicable€òòifóó€the€second€Final€Order€had€changed€the€first€FinalÐ œì ÐOrder.€€In€other€words,€had€there€been€a€change,€the€second€Final€Order€would€have€been€anÐ ˆØ Ðalteration€or€amendment€of€the€first€Final€Order€pursuant€to€Rule€59.05.€€In€the€present€case,€the€MayÐ tÄ Ð19€Final€Order€did€just€that.€€Unlike€the€two€orders€at€issue€in€òòArfkenóó,€the€two€orders€in€the€presentÐ `° Ðcase€are€far€from€mirror€images€of€each€other.€€Equally€as€important€is€the€fact€the€first€order€was€notÐ L œ Ða€final€order€because€it€did€not€dispose€of€all€pending€claims.€€The€second€order€was€properly€titledÐ 8 ˆ Ða€ð ðFinal€Orderðð€because€it€did€dispose€of€all€pending€claims.€€We€conclude€the€Final€Order€enteredÐ $ t Ðon€May€19€changed€the€May€16€order€sufficiently€to€be€considered€an€alteration€or€amendmentÐ  ` Ðpursuant€to€Rule€59.05.€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€the€May€19€Final€Order€supercedes€the€May€16Ð ü L  Ðorder.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àà ` àHaving€concluded€the€May€19€Final€Order€controls,€we€now€turn€to€whether€PlaintiffsÐ À  Ðare€entitled€to€any€relief€on€appeal.€€We€will€discuss€the€claims€against€Banco€separately€from€theÐ ¬ü  Ðclaims€against€the€Byrds.€€With€regard€to€Banco,€Plaintiffs€argue€the€second€complaint€was€timelyÐ ˜è  Ðfiled€and€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€not€granting€their€Rule€60.02€motion€to€set€aside€the€May€16€OrderÐ „Ô  Ðand€in€dismissing€these€claims.€€Because€the€May€16€Order€was€superceded€by€the€May€19€FinalÐ pÀ ÐOrder,€the€May€16€Order€has€no€continuing€legal€effect€and€there€is€nothing€to€ð ðset€asideðð.€€We,Ð \¬ Ðtherefore,€affirm€the€Trial€Courtððs€denial€of€Plaintiffsðð€Rule€60.02€motion€seeking€to€have€the€MayÐ H˜ Ð16€Order€set€aside,€and€we€need€not€discuss€whether€or€not€Plaintiffs€adequately€set€forth€groundsÐ 4„ Ðfor€relief€under€Rule€60.02.€€Unfortunately€for€Banco,€this€same€reasoning€means€that€Plaintiffs€areÐ  p Ðcorrect€that€the€second€complaint€was€filed€within€one€year€of€the€dismissal€of€the€first€complaint.€Ð  \ ÐAccordingly,€we€vacate€the€Trial€Courtððs€Order€granting€Bancoððs€motion€to€dismiss€based€on€theÐ øH Ðrunning€of€the€statute€of€limitations.Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€Byrds€correctly€point€out€they€never€were€sued€by€Plaintiffs€in€the€originalÐ ¼  Ðcomplaint.€€Because€they€were€not€sued€by€Plaintiffs€in€the€original€action,€the€Saving€Statute,€Tenn.Ð ¨ø ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€28„1„105,€simply€is€not€applicable€as€there€was€nothing€to€be€saved.€€The€Byrds€assertÐ ”ä ÐPlaintiffsðð€cause€of€action€accrued€on€or€before€August€of€1994,€seven€years€and€nine€months€beforeÐ €Ð Ðthey€were€first€sued€by€Plaintiffs€on€May€18,€2001.€€The€Trial€Court€concluded€Plaintiffsðð€claimsÐ l¼ Ðagainst€the€Byrds€were€not€timely€and€the€Saving€Statute€had€no€application.€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àà ` àOn€appeal,€Plaintiffs€only€argument€as€it€relates€to€their€claims€against€the€Byrds€isÐ 0"€  Ðthat€the€Saving€Statute€applies€to€save€these€claims,€an€argument€we€have€rejected€because€PlaintiffsÐ #l! Ðnever€sued€the€Byrds€in€the€first€lawsuit.€€Plaintiffs€do€not€argue€on€appeal€that€even€if€the€SavingÐ $X" ÐStatute€is€not€applicable,€their€claims€against€the€Byrds€were€timely€nevertheless.€€Likewise,Ð ô$D # ÐPlaintiffs€do€not€point€us€to€anything€in€the€record€which€would€lead€us€to€conclude€the€Trial€CourtÐ à%0!$ Ðcommitted€reversible€error€when€it€determined€the€statute€of€limitations€on€the€claims€against€theÐ Ì&"% ÐByrds€had€run.€€The€Trial€Courtððs€judgment€granting€the€Byrdsðð€motion€for€summary€judgmentÐ ¸'#& Ðbecause€the€statute€of€limitations€had€run€is,€therefore,€affirmed.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌÌÐ h+¸&* Ðà@  %ìàò òòòConclusionóóó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àà ` àWe€vacate€the€Trial€Courtððs€Order€granting€Bancoððs€motion€to€dismiss.€€We€affirmÐ ˆØ Ðthe€Trial€Courtððs€denial€of€Plaintiffsðð€Motion€for€Rule€60.02€relief.€€The€Trial€Courtððs€judgmentÐ tÄ Ðgranting€summary€judgment€to€the€Byrds€is€affirmed.€€This€case€is€remanded€to€the€Trial€Court€forÐ `° Ðfurther€proceedings€as€necessary€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€Costs€of€appeal€are€taxed€one„half€toÐ L œ Ðthe€Appellants,€James€and€Margaret€Edwards,€and€their€surety,€and€one„half€to€the€Appellee,€BancoÐ 8 ˆ ÐLumber€Company,€Inc.Ð $ t ÐÌÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à_____________________________________Ð ¬ü  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àD.€MICHAEL€SWINEY,€JUDGE