ÿWPCŽ/ ®£ïWdOÈ (Îê}yªï°1…î<âÈtÃäë$ŽeH §ÿ€_å+ÃajkH#Çt®t€ òÚ•8ܵ„”fèêqË‹gÄeýþwò8Ø$Â8:_ÿ}‹¢yºóqÀ«a²ÎÚƒïòb­—fCÉô¥€²é/½¶ŒÓ¯áξ¶Õ˜¶9¬sø?ã cÜhà>i ìü 45„i©ÝþÏ —6Š§ µ îÇ2-h¿Þð\û_2ªu÷¨µ·S hjåڌڿšÄúðƤŠg%>ÉÉŠ‰Á'7?¬Îký÷?ôï7‹Ð§È"jo8jˆ”’SþÅR/MÔJ9`ªe0’Œ°M–¿u¡%·ßñ›ÖÖAí àsÔØH Z…WþÈ—é3¢òÙýu§›ËL£󤹲I«ÍBì˜uÞ>Ÿ„á(Î' ±µò[H¹èS*X².EÛ2ž ½`<çþv¤ší´†”\ðÙõËxô…ÁÉÛ7‘8sJûŽdÎN†í:…¦[£M =ñD¤à£|Wüµbôˆ®8ܘÿ&†K±‹w ^ß“ÚH䲡‹È߀ž]ý%Q+Â"A÷æ»išá~dnGù½zæeíQÓ«b#Á\ % ^ # 0ˆ/ U%N· w 4 z Ò— i x mz 1‡‘ Æ ÆÞ Ƥ Æj 0c0N“ 1‡• 0DE`UNbH°øýèßúâÙæ»ê¡é‹–t!6 #B@$Z‚% 1uÜ) 72Q*Q*Q*Q*Q*Q*Q*Q*bƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ*ƒ* 0ë‹*‹*‹*‹* Bv+v+ 0¤“+ D37, D-j, 0K—,—, ASâ,Æ5- 0¤û- 0DŸ. A«ã.˜HP LaserJet 4 Plus,ð,,,,,ð0»o-s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularä]ö,bk1¤c¦ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ05hCEKQW]cioAutoList1I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à(EhCEKQW]cioAutoList2I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular >Ý ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔApparently,€Wife€chose€not€to€exercise€this€courtesy€on€appeal€as€she€asserts€that€the€trial€judgeððs€failure€toÐ ° Ðrecuse€herself,€or€in€the€alternative,€to€disqualify€Husbandððs€counsel€is€reversible€error.€€As€we€stated€above,€this€CourtÐ xÈ Ðfrowns€on€the€manipulation€of€the€impartiality€issue€to€gain€a€procedural€advantage€when€the€trial€result€was€unfavorableÐ @ Ðto€one€of€the€parties.€€ Ý ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWife€also€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€making€these€rulings.€€However,€the€issue,€as€presented,€is€whetherÐ ° Ðthe€trial€court€was€biased€against€Wife€and€whether€the€courtððs€decisions€created€the€appearance€of€impropriety.€€WifeððsÐ xÈ Ðattempts€to€persuade€us€that€the€decisions€were€erroneous€cannot€be€used€to€illustrate€the€impartiality€of€the€trial€court. óÝ ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔHusband€argues€that€the€parties€must€have€treated€the€home€as€a€ð ðfamily€homeðð€in€order€for€the€rebuttableÐ °  Ðpresumption€to€arise.€€We€disagree.€€The€case€law€is€unambiguous€ð!ð€if€separate€funds€are€used€to€purchase€propertyÐ ° Ðwhich€is€jointly€titled€in€the€coupleððs€names,€a€rebuttable€presumption€of€transmutation€exists. ÞÝ ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAs€we€stated€in€ò òòòSchoen€v.€J.C.€Bradford€&€Co.óóó ó,€642€S.W.2d€420,€427€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1982),€we€are€ð ðnotÐ ° Ðunder€a€duty€to€minutely€search€a€voluminous€record€to€verify€numerous€unsupported€allegations.ðð€€The€trial€recordÐ xÈ Ðconsisted€of€seventy„three€volumes€of€trial€transcript€and€185€exhibits.€€€€€ ÕÝ ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWife€contends€that€Husband€deposited€employment€earnings€into€the€account.€€Other€than€a€flow€chartÐ ° Ðintroduced€by€Wifeððs€expert,€nothing€in€the€record€supports€this€assertion.€€Further,€Wifeððs€expertððs€findings€and€analysisÐ xÈ Ðregarding€the€William€Blair€Account€fail€to€support€Wifeððs€claim.€€ ØÝ ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔHusband€earned€a€salary€for€assisting€his€mother€with€her€financial€affairs.€€(Exh.€17).€€ ÜÝ ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAside€from€citing€the€February€order,€Wifeððs€brief€provides€little€guidance€on€the€issue.€€ àÝ ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWife€insists€that€Husband€earned€$106,000€per€year.€€The€record€does€not€support€her€assertion.€€ ßÝ ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€trial€court€originally€set€the€child€support€award€and€determined€alimony€in€a€February€28,€2000€order.€Ð ° ÐThe€court€amended€this€order,€which€resulted€in€an€increase€in€Husbandððs€child€support€obligation.€€The€amended€orderÐ xÈ Ðalso€granted€Wife€alimony,€which€the€court€denied€in€the€February€order.€€Husband€argues€that€the€court€erred€inÐ @ Ðamending€its€earlier€order.€€We€disagree,€however,€because€the€February€order€was€not€a€final€judgment,€as€it€failed€toÐ X Ðgrant€the€parties€a€divorce.€€It€follows€that€the€court€could€properly€amend€the€order,€because€the€order€was€subject€toÐ Ð  Ðð ðrevision€at€any€time€before€entry€of€a€final€judgment€adjudicating€all€the€claims,€rights,€and€liabilities€of€the€parties.ðð€Ð ˜è ÐTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3(a).€€€€€€ ŒÝ ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔMs.€Turner€represented€Wife€throughout€the€divorce€proceedings.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔCaywoodÔ_Ô€also€represented€Wife€duringÐ ° Ða€portion€of€the€proceedings.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔCaywoodÔ_Ô,€however,€later€withdrew€as€counsel.€ ,Ý ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWife€states€that€the€trust€pays€the€mortgage,€property€taxes€ò òòòandóóó ó€home€ownerððs€insurance.€€This€assertion€isÐ ° Ðnot€supported€by€the€record.€€ 8Ý ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€earlier€portions€of€this€opinion,€we€have€addressed€Wifeððs€concerns€regarding€the€trial€courtððs€alleged€biasÐ ° Ðand€have€found€the€issue€to€be€without€merit.€€ PÝ ƒRyÊ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔHusband€argues€that€our€decision€in€ò òòòAvery€v.€Averyóóó ó,€No.€M2000„00889„COA„R3„CV,€2001€Tenn.€App.Ð ° ÐLEXIS€487,€at€*29,€n.12€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€July€11,€2001)€(òòò òno€perm.€app.€filedóóó ó),€precludes€us€from€examining€his€use€ofÐ xÈ Ðhis€separate€funds€in€our€analysis.€€There,€we€stated€that€ð ðit€would€be€bad€policy€for€a€court€to€hold€that€a€party€risks€allÐ @ Ðof€his€or€her€separate€property€by€spending€some€of€it€for€the€benefit€of€his€or€her€family.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€The€facts€in€that€caseÐ X Ðare€distinguishable€from€the€facts€in€the€present€case.€€In€òòò òAveryó óóó,€the€husband€did€not€deposit€marital€funds€with€hisÐ Ð  Ðseparate€funds.€€Here,€Husband€combined€the€two€classes€of€property,€and€his€use€of€the€separate€property€is€relevantÐ ˜è Ðto€determine€whether€he€kept€the€separate€property€segregated€in€order€to€retain€its€identity.€òòò òóóó ó3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)%i)- ù-(|G2yÊ$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€©Ü»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôÛ”ò»»Ô d(|3&$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€©Ü»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3&$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€©Ü»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€©Ü»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼©Ü»»»ÔÑ8€««XXdð»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îþ©ÜÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@õõ%ìàAT€JACKSONÔ#†¼©Ü»îîþ #ԈРÜ, ÐÓ  Ó€May€21,€2002€SessionÐ X ÐÔ‡X««X»¼©ÜÔÌò òÔ#†¼©Ü»XX««ð#ÔHUNTINGTON€Ô_ÔELDRIDGEÔ_Ô,€JR.òòóó€v.€DEBORAH€MARIE€WEST€Ô_ÔELDRIDGEÔ_ÔòòóóÔ‡X««X»¼©ÜÔó óÐ  ` ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Shelby€CountyÐ  h Ðà@@øøìàNo.€159705„3€Ô_ÔR.D.Ô_Ô€€€€€€Karen€R.€Williams,€JudgeÐ  X ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<×` AßÐ Ø(  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€W2000„00730„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€August€8,€Ô_Ô2002Ô_ÔÐ ×'  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<¶` AßÐ ·  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÔ‡X§5XXX««ÔÌHusband€filed€for€divorce€alleging€inappropriate€marital€conduct€and€irreconcilable€differences.€Ð ¢ò ÐWife€countersued€on€the€same€grounds.€€After€a€lengthy€trial,€the€court€awarded€Husband€theÐ ŽÞ Ðdivorce.€€Wife€appeals€several€aspects€of€the€courtððs€decision,€including€the€distribution€andÐ zÊ Ðclassification€of€the€partiesðð€property,€child€support,€and€alimony.€€Wife€also€contends€that€the€courtÐ f¶ Ðwas€biased€against€her€and€created€an€appearance€of€impropriety.€€Husband€also€raises€issues€onÐ R¢ Ðappeal.€€We€affirm€in€part,€reverse€in€part,€and€remand€the€case€for€further€proceedings.€€Ð >Ž Ðà@ìì*ìàò òó óÔ#†X««XXX§50#ÔÔ#†¼©Ü»XX««¹#ÔÔ‡X««X»¼©ÜÔˆÌÓ$Óò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Affirmed€in€part;Ð j ÐReversed€in€part;€and€Remandedó óÐ  Z ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼©Ü»àX««m#ÔÔ‡X««X.¼©ÜÔDavid€R.€Farmer,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòAlan€E.€Highers,€J.óó€andÐ ê: ÐòòFranklin€Ô_ÔMurchisonÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔSp.J.Ô_Ôóó,€joined.Ð Ú* ÐÌKay€Ô_ÔFareseÔ_Ô€Turner,€Melissa€C.€Berry,€and€Sam€B.€Blair,€Jr.,€Memphis,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,Ð º  ÐDeborah€Marie€West€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô.Ð ª ú ÐÌWanda€B.€Shea,€Lisa€E.€Ô_ÔCirceoÔ_Ô,€and€George€Lawrence€Rice,€III,€Memphis,€Tennessee,€for€theÐ Š"Ú! Ðappellee,€Huntington€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô,€Jr.Ð z#Ê" ÐÓF ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼©Ü»XX««u #ÔÔ‡X««X»¼©ÜÔÐ Z%ª $ ÐÌÔ#†¼©Ü»XX««˜ #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€X««X»¼©ÜÔÔ‡X§5XXX««Ôò òó óà  àHuntington€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô,€Jr.€(Husband)€and€Deborah€Marie€West€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô€(Wife)€were€marriedÐ :'Š"& Ðon€June€11,€1983.€€At€the€time€of€the€marriage,€Wife€owned€a€business€in€Chicago,€Illinois.€€HusbandÐ &(v#' Ðworked€for€Ducks€Unlimited€and€owned€a€substantial€amount€of€separate€assets.€€The€couple€had€twoÐ )b$( Ðminor€children€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.Ð þ)N%) ÐÌà  àIn€1993,€the€parties€moved€to€Memphis€in€conjunction€with€Husbandððs€employment.€€TheÐ Ö+&'+ Ðcoupleððs€marriage,€which€had€been€stormy€from€the€outset,€began€to€suffer€increasing€difficulties.€Ð Â,(, ÐHusband€and€Wife€separated,€and€thereafter,€Husband€filed€for€a€divorce.€€In€his€complaint,€HusbandÐ ®-þ(-ý Ðalleged€that€Wife€was€guilty€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct€and€alleged€that€irreconcilableÐ ° Ðdifferences€existed€between€the€parties.€€Wife€alleged€the€same€grounds€in€her€counter„complaint.€Ð œì ÐEach€party€sought€custody€of€the€minor€children.€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àThe€matter€came€to€trial€on€October€25,€1999€and€lasted€until€December€6,€1999.€€The€courtÐ `° Ðgranted€Husband€the€divorce€on€the€grounds€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€After€the€courtððsÐ L œ Ðruling,€the€parties€filed€several€post€trial€motions€contesting€various€aspects€of€the€courtððs€decision.€Ð 8 ˆ ÐThe€court€handed€down€its€final€post€trial€ruling€on€March€3,€2001.€€This€appeal€followed.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àWife€raises€several€issues€for€our€review.€€Within€many€of€these€issues,€Wife€lists€other€sub„Ð ü L  Ðissues.€€We€will€list€Wifeððs€central€issues€and€address€the€sub„issues€in€turn.€€These€issues,€as€statedÐ è 8  Ðby€Wife,€are€as€follows:€Ð Ô$  Ѐ¹Ó€ (Eh83%Óà8  àI.à0` Ð Ð àWhether€the€conduct€of€the€Trial€Court€demonstrated€by€the€evidentiary,Ð ¬ü  Ðprocedural€and€ethical€errors€constituted€bias€against€Wife€and€created€theÐ ˜è  Ðappearance€of€impropriety€that€tainted€the€Trial€Courtððs€rulings€on€each€issueÐ „Ô  Ðin€this€case€and€to€the€extent€to€require€reversal€and€reassignment€of€[the]Ð pÀ Ðcase€to€another€trial€court€in€[the]€event€of€remand€.€.€.€.Ð\¬` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌÓ€ (5h88ÓØ! !ØÝ"‚3£"ÝÝ  Ýà8  àÝ‚3£üÝÔ25hÔÚ  ÚIIÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0` Ð Ð àÝ  ÝWhether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€the€division€of€marital€property€and€Ýƒ3£ü5ÝŒÐ4„` Ð ` Ð  ÐŒÝ  Ýà  àà ` àmarital€debt€.€.€.€.Ð  p ÐÌà8  àà0` Ð Ð àà  àIII.à ` àWhether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€the€calculation€and€award€of€child€support,Ð øH Ðboth€direct€and€indirect,€for€the€partiesðð€two€minor€children€.€.€.€.€Ðä4` Ð ` Ð  ÐØ! !ØÌà8  àIV.à0` Ð Ð àWhether€the€Trial€Court€failed€to€make€the€proper€award€of€alimony€andÐ ¼  Ðorder€Husband€to€secure€a€life€insurance€policy€to€guarantee€his€alimonyÐ ¨ø Ðobligation.Дä` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  àV.à0` Ð Ð àWhether€the€Trial€Court€failed€to€properly€weigh€each€partyððs€relative€faultÐ l¼ Ðin€the€breakup€of€the€marriage€and€erred€in€granting€the€divorce€to€HusbandÐ X ¨ Ðon€the€grounds€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct.ÐD!”` Ð ` Ð  Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àVI.à0` Ð Ð àWhether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€assessing€all€of€Wifeððs€attorney€fees€and€allÐ #l! Ðcourt€costs€in€the€case€against€Wife€when€Wife€stipulated€on€the€record€thatÐ $X" Ðboth€parties€were€entitled€to€a€divorce€on€grounds€but€Husband€refused€to€soÐ ô$D # Ðstipulate€and€proceeded€with€four€weeksðð€worth€of€cumulative€evidence€atÐ à%0!$ Ðtrial€on€Wifeððs€fault€calculated€for€Wifeððs€harassment,€embarrassment€andÐ Ì&"% Ðfinancial€ruin.и'#&` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  àVII.à0` Ð Ð àWhether€the€Trial€Court€erred€by€its€failure€to€rule€that€the€Order€of€Ô_ÔPendenteÔ_ÔÐ )à$( ÐLite€Support€should€have€remained€in€effect€until€[the]€entry€of€the€FinalÐ |*Ì%) ÐDecree€of€Divorce€on€June€26,€2000.€€€€Ðh+¸&*` Ð ` Ð  ЇÌà  àTo€the€extent€these€issues€involve€questions€of€fact,€our€review€of€the€trial€courtððs€ruling€isÐ œì Ðòòò òde€novoó óóó€with€a€presumption€of€correctness.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d);€ò òòòe.g.,€Ô_ÔBerryhillÔ_Ô€v.€Rhodesóóó ó,Ð ˆØ Ð21S.W.3d€188,€190€(Tenn.€2000).€€We€may€not€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€factual€findings€unless€theyÐ tÄ Ðare€contrary€to€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòò òId.€€ó óóóWith€respect€to€the€courtððs€legal€conclusions,Ð `° Ðour€review€is€ò òòòde€novoóóó ó€with€no€presumption€of€correctness.€€ò òòòBowden€v.€Wardóóó ó,€27€S.W.3d€913,€916Ð L œ Ð(Tenn.€2000).€€Further,€we€give€great€weight€to€the€factual€findings€of€the€trial€court€which€rest€onÐ 8 ˆ Ðdeterminations€of€witness€credibility.€€òòò òRandolph€v.€Randolphóóó ó,€937€S.W.2d€815,€819€(Tenn.€1996).€Ð $ t ÐAccordingly,€absent€clear€and€convincing€evidence€to€the€contrary,€we€will€not€re„evaluate€a€trialÐ  ` Ðjudgeððs€assessment€of€witness€credibility.€€ò òòòWells€v.€Tenn.€Bd.€of€Regentsóóó ó,€9€S.W.3d€779,€783€(Tenn.Ð ü L  Ð1999).€€€Ð è 8  ÐÌà@ÞÞìàò òòòThe€Conduct€of€the€Trial€Courtóóó óà@@ìì*ìàˆÐ À  ÐÌà  àIn€Wifeððs€first€issue,€she€contends€that€the€trial€court€was€biased€against€her€and€that€the€caseÐ ”ä  Ðshould€be€reversed€due€to€the€trial€courtððs€appearance€of€impropriety.€€Wife€supports€her€argumentÐ €Ð  Ðby€raising€numerous€sub„issues€regarding€various€events,€actions€and€decisions€that€took€place€duringÐ l¼ Ðthe€trial€of€this€matter.€€€Ð X¨ ÐÌà  àAt€the€outset,€we€restate€one€of€the€core€principles€of€our€jurisprudence:€€ð ðall€litigants€haveÐ 0€ Ða€right€to€have€their€cases€heard€by€fair€and€impartial€judges.ðð€€ò òòòÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôóóó ó,€986€S.W.2d€220,Ð l Ð228€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€A€trial€judge€must€not€only€be€impartial€in€fact,€but€must€also€beÐ X Ðperceived€to€be€impartial.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€€Accordingly,€even€if€a€trial€judge€believes€that€he€or€she€can€hear€aÐ ôD Ðcase€fairly€and€impartially,€the€judge€is€vested€with€the€responsibility€to€recuse€ð ðhimself€or€herselfÐ à0 Ðin€a€proceeding€in€which€the€judgeððs€impartiality€might€reasonably€be€questioned.ðð€€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.Ð Ì Ð10,€Canon€3(E)(1);€òòò òÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôó óóó,€986€S.W.2d€at€228.€€Ð ¸ ÐÌà  àInitially,€the€judge€has€the€duty€to€determine€whether€recusal€is€warranted€in€a€particular€case.€Ð à Ðòòò òÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôó óóó,€986€S.W.2d€at€228.€€These€decisions€are€discretionary,€unless€otherwise€mandated€by€theÐ |Ì ÐTennessee€Constitution€or€by€statute.€€òòò òId.€€òòóóSeeóóó ó€Tenn.€Const.€Art€6€ðð€11;€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€17„2„101Ð h¸ Ð(1994).€€A€judge€must€be€objective€when€making€his€or€her€determination.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôóóó ó,€986€S.W.2d€atÐ T ¤ Ð228.€€Thus,€when€parties€challenge€a€judgeððs€impartiality,€they€ð ðmust€come€forward€with€someÐ @! Ðevidence€that€would€prompt€a€reasonable,€disinterested€person€to€believe€that€the€judgeððs€impartialityÐ ,"|  Ðmight€reasonably€be€questioned.ðð€€ò òòòDavis€v.€Ô_ÔDepððtÔ_Ô€of€Employment€Sec.óóó ó,€23€S.W.3d€304,€313€(Tenn.Ð #h! ÐCt.€App.€1999).€Ð $T" ÐÌà  àThe€ð ðobjective€viewðð€of€a€judgeððs€conduct€is€characterized€by€two€important€limitations.€Ð Ü%,!$ Ðò òòòWilson€v.€Wilsonóóó ó,€987€S.W.2d€555,€562€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€In€order€to€disqualify€a€judge,€theÐ È&"% Ðbias€or€prejudice€must€come€from€an€extrajudicial€source€and€not€result€from€the€judgeððs€impressionsÐ ´'#& Ðduring€trial.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€If€this€were€not€the€case,€a€judge€who€makes€a€ruling€adverse€to€one€of€the€partiesÐ  (ð#' Ðwould€be€subject€to€charges€of€bias€and€prejudice.€€òòò òId.€€óóó óIndeed,€ð ðadverse€rulings€by€a€trial€court€areÐ Œ)Ü$( Ðnot€usually€sufficient€grounds€to€establish€bias.€€Rulings€of€a€trial€judge,€even€if€erroneous,€numerousÐ x*È%) Ðand€continuous,€do€not,€without€more,€justify€disqualification.ðð€€ò òòòAlley€v.€Stateóóó ó,€882€S.W.2d€810,€821„Ð d+´&* Ð22€(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€1994)€(citations€omitted);€òòò òBut€see€Ô_ÔHoalcraftÔ_Ô€v.€Smithsonóóó ó,€No.€M2000„01347„Ð ° ÐÔ_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R10„CV,€2001€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€489,€at€*50„54€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€July€10,€2001)€(òòò òno€perm.Ð œì Ðapp.€filedóóó ó)€(stating€that€the€cumulative€effect€of€the€trial€judgeððs€ð ðrepeated€misapplication€ofÐ ˆØ Ðfundamental,€rudimentary€legal€principles€in€ways€that€favored€Mr.€Smithson€substantively€andÐ tÄ Ðprocedurallyðð€prompts€an€objective€concern€regarding€the€judgeððs€impartiality).Ð `° ÐÌà  àThe€other€limitation€concerns€the€judgeððs€background€experience.€€ò òòòWilsonóóó ó,€987€S.W.2d€atÐ 8 ˆ Ð562.€€Disqualification€is€not€warranted€when€the€judgeððs€impersonal€prejudice€arises€from€the€judgeððsÐ $ t Ðbackground€experience.ò òòò€€Id.óóó ó€€Judges€will€generally€have€strong€feelings€about€certain€conduct€andÐ  ` Ðbehavior.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€ð ðWhen€the€judge€perceives€that€one€party€or€the€other€has€engaged€in€that€conduct,Ð ü L  Ðthe€party€should€not€be€surprised€that€he/she€has€incurred€the€judgeððs€wrath.ðð€€ò òòòId.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àóóó óParties€may€lose€the€right€to€challenge€a€judgeððs€impartiality€if€they€do€not€file€recusalÐ ¼  Ðmotions€soon€after€the€facts€forming€the€basis€of€the€motion€become€known.€€ò òòòId.€€óóó óThe€frequentlyÐ ¨ø  Ðcited€rule€that€ð ða€party€must€complain€and€seek€relief€immediately€after€the€occurrence€of€aÐ ”ä  Ðprejudicial€event€and€may€not€silently€preserve€the€event€as€an€ððace€in€the€holeðð€to€be€used€in€theÐ €Ð  Ðevent€of€an€adverse€decision,ðð€applies€in€cases€where€a€party€challenges€a€judgeððs€impartiality.€Ð l¼ Ðòòò òÔ_ÔGotwaldÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔGotwaldÔ_Ôó óóó,€768€S.W.2d€689,€694€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988);€òòò òsee€alsoó óóó€òòò òDavisó óóó,òòò òó óóó€23€S.W.3d€at€313;Ð X¨ Ðòòò òÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôó óóó,€986€S.W.2d€at€228.€€Accordingly,€the€failure€of€a€party€to€seek€the€recusal€of€a€judge€in€aÐ D” Ðtimely€manner€results€in€a€waiver€of€the€issue.€€òòò òDavisóóó ó,€23€S.W.3d€at€313.€Ð 0€ ÐÌà  àBefore€addressing€the€merits€of€Wifeððs€first€issue,€we€must€first€address€the€timeliness€ofÐ X ÐWifeððs€concerns€regarding€the€trial€judgeððs€alleged€bias€and€appearance€of€impropriety.€€Wife€failedÐ ôD Ðto€question€the€trial€judgeððs€impartiality€by€filing€a€motion€to€recuse€during€the€trial€of€this€matter.€Ð à0 ÐThe€first€time€Wife€raised€the€issue€is€in€this€appeal.€€After€reviewing€Wifeððs€various€allegations€inÐ Ì Ðsupport€of€her€issue,€it€is€clear€that€Wife€was€aware€of€the€events€that€she€alleges€took€place€at€trialÐ ¸ Ðbefore€she€filed€her€final€notice€of€appeal€on€March€7,€2001.€€This€compels€the€conclusion€that€WifeÐ ¤ô Ðð ðpurposely€decided€to€use€the€impartiality€issue€as€[her]€ððace„in„the„holeðð€in€the€event€that€[she]€lostÐ à Ðthe€[trial]€on€the€merits.ðð€€ò òòòDavisóóó ó,€23€S.W.3d€at€313.€€As€we€have€previously€stated,€ð ð[Ô_Ôc]ourtsÔ_Ô€frownÐ |Ì Ðupon€the€manipulation€of€the€impartiality€issue€to€gain€procedural€advantage€and€will€not€permitÐ h¸ Ðlitigants€to€refrain€from€asserting€known€grounds€for€disqualification€in€order€to€ððexperiment€withÐ T ¤ Ðthe€court€.€.€.€and€raise€the€objection€later€when€the€result€of€the€trial€is€unfavorable.ðððð€€òòò òÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôó óóó,€986Ð @! ÐS.W.2d€at€228€(citation€omitted).€€Therefore,€any€argument€concerning€the€trial€courtððs€alleged€biasÐ ,"|  Ðor€impropriety€in€this€case€is€waived€and€must€necessarily€be€viewed€with€skepticism.€€€€€€€€Ð #h! ÐÌà  àEven€though€Wifeððs€issue€regarding€the€alleged€bias€and€appearance€of€impropriety€of€theÐ ð$@ # Ðtrial€court€is€waived€as€untimely,€we€will€address€the€merits€of€Wifeððs€issue€in€order€to€foster€andÐ Ü%,!$ Ðpreserve€the€publicððs€confidence€in€judicial€neutrality.€€ò òòòSee€Davisóóó ó,€23€S.W.3d€at€313.€€Wife€attemptsÐ È&"% Ðto€illustrate,€through€several€allegations,€that€the€court€maintained€some€bias€against€her€and,€at€least,Ð ´'#& Ðcreated€an€appearance€of€impropriety€that€would€justify€the€disqualification€of€the€trial€judge.€€InÐ  (ð#' ÐWifeððs€first€allegation€regarding€the€bias€of€the€trial€court,€she€maintains€that€the€court€accepted€anÐ Œ)Ü$( Ðex€parte€communication€from€Husband€in€the€form€of€a€computer€disc€that€contained€a€proposedÐ x*È%) Ðfinal€decree,€Husbandððs€closing€argument,€and€other€matters€related€to€this€and€other€cases.€€WifeÐ d+´&* Ðstates€that€she€thought€that€Husbandððs€proposed€final€order€was€the€sole€item€on€the€disc€and€that€sheÐ ° Ðonly€learned€about€the€additional€items€after€the€trial€courtððs€final€order.€€Wife€contends€that€this€isÐ œì Ðð ðmaterial€to€the€consideration€of€bias€and€ððappearance€of€improprietyðð€standard.ðð€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àWife€did€not€argue€at€trial€that€this€constituted€an€appearance€of€impropriety€or€biased€theÐ `° Ðtrial€court.€€In€fact,€Wife€expressly€represented€to€the€trial€court€that€she€was€not€concerned€with€theÐ L œ Ðcourtððs€use€of€the€disc.€€The€record€reveals€the€following:Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà8  àòòWifeððs€Counselóó:€€.€.€.€In€fact,€there€were€more€things€on€[the€disc]€relative€to€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô,Ð  ` Ðand€that€the€point€to€what€weððre€saying.€€Ðü L Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àòòThe€Courtóó:€All€right.€€But€I€will€tell€you€on€the€record€I€didnððt€open€anything€on€thatÐ Ô$  Ðdisk€and€use€it€except€the€proposed€order.€€I€saw€that€there€were€other€files€on€it.€€IÐ À  Ðdidnððt€use€them€.€.€.€.€Ð¬ü Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àòòWifeððs€Counselóó:€Your€Honor,€I€want€to€„€„€there€may€be€a€Ô_ÔmisperceptionÔ_Ô.€€When€youÐ „Ô  Ðsay€that€you€didnððt€open€a€single€file€except€that€one,€thatððs€the€end€of€the€inquiry€asÐ pÀ Ðfar€as€this€side€of€the€counsel€table€is€concerned.€€I€donððt€know€how€else€to€say€it€anyÐ \¬ Ðbetter€than€that;€but€as€it€relates€to€you,€thatððs€the€end€of€it.ÐH˜Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àNow,€I€donððt€want€you€to€think€any€different€than€that,€because€you€saidÐ 4„ Ðsomething€about€an€inference€or€something€or€another.€€When€you€said€that,€thatððs€„Ð  p Є€you€opened€the€only€file,€thatððs€the€only€one€you€opened.€€Iððm€saying€that€for€Ms.Ð  \ ÐTurner,€Ms.€Berry,€and€myself€and€Iððm€sure€everybody€else.€€So€I€donððt€want€you€toÐ øH Ðthink€anything€other€than€that,€none€of€us€do;€and€please€understand€that,€becauseÐ ä4 Ðthatððs€important€to€all€of€us€here.ÐÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌÌà  àFrom€this€exchange,€it€is€evident€that€Wife€chose€not€to€raise€an€issue€with€the€trial€courtÐ ”ä Ðregarding€itððs€handling€of€the€disc.€€Further,€this€evidence€fails€to€prompt€a€reasonable€person€toÐ €Ð Ðquestion€the€impartiality€of€the€trial€court.€€The€courtððs€handling€of€the€disc€fails€to€warrant€theÐ l¼ Ðrecusal€of€the€trial€judge.€€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  à€Next,€Wife€contends€that€the€ð ðtrial€court€should€have€Ô_ÔrecusedÔ_Ô€itself€because€HusbandððsÐ 0"€  Ðcounsel€served€as€co„chairperson€of€her€re„election€campaign.ðð€€In€support€of€her€position,€Wife€citesÐ #l! Ðthe€case€of€òòò òCollier€v.€Griffithó óóó,€No.€01„A„01„9109„CV„00339,€1992€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€245€(Tenn.Ð $X" ÐCt.€App.€March€11,€1992)€(òòò òno€perm.€app.€filedó óóó).€€In€that€case,€we€stated€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÐ ô$D # Ðfailing€to€recuse€itself€because€ð ðopposing€counsel€was€serving€as€the€finance€chairman€of€the€trialÐ à%0!$ Ðjudgeððs€re„election€campaign€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€*19.€€We€did€not,€however,€hold€that€recusal€in€suchÐ Ì&"% Ðinstances€was€mandatory.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€*17„18.€€We€held€that€the€circumstances€in€that€case€were€ð ðsufficientÐ ¸'#& Ðto€cause€a€reasonable€person€to€harbor€doubts€about€the€trial€judgeððs€impartiality.€€Thus€the€trialÐ ¤(ô#' Ðjudge€should€have€Ô_ÔrecusedÔ_Ô€himself€from€the€case€òòò òwhen€Mr.€Collier€requested€that€he€do€so.ððó óóó€€òòò òId.ó óóóÐ )à$( Ðat€*19€(emphasis€added).€€Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àInitially,€we€are€compelled€to€point€out€that€Wife€failed€to€bring€this€matter€before€the€trialÐ ° Ðcourt.€€Wife€maintains€that€she€served€a€Motion€to€Disqualify€Larry€Rice€as€Counsel€upon€HusbandððsÐ œì Ðcounsel€and€the€trial€court,€where€she€cited€the€appearance€of€impropriety€standard€of€Canon€2€of€theÐ ˆØ ÐCode€of€Judicial€Conduct.€€Wife€candidly€admits€that€she€ð ðdid€not€file€her€Motion€to€DisqualifyÐ tÄ ÐLarry€Rice€as€Counsel€out€of€professional€courtesy€for€counsel€and€Judge€Williams.ðð׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Therefore,Ð `° Ðthe€only€item€in€the€record€concerning€this€issue€is€Husbandððs€ð ðResponse€to€Motion€to€DisqualifyÐ L œ ÐLarry€Rice€as€Counsel€for€Plaintiff.ðð€€Husbandððs€motion€provides€the€following:Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà8  àPlaintiff€admits€that€attorney€Larry€Rice€served€as€co„chairperson€for€the€re„electionÐ  ` Ðcampaign€of€Karen€Williams.€€However,€Plaintiff€alleges€that€Mr.€Rice€and€Mr.Ð ü L  ÐÔ_ÔCaywoodÔ_Ô€organized€the€raising€of€funds€to€retire€post€election€debt€of€Judge€WilliamsÐ è 8  Ðfrom€her€previous€campaign.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔCaywoodÔ_Ô€similarly€served€on€the€campaign€re„Ð Ô$  Ðelection€committee,€comprised€of€twelve€other€people,€for€Judge€Williams,€beforeÐ À  Ðwhom€this€matter€is€pending.€€€€Ð¬ü Ð Ð  ÐÌAttached€to€the€motion€was€the€affidavit€of€James€Bingham.€€In€the€sworn€affidavit,€Mr.€BinghamÐ „Ô  Ðstates€that€ð ðMr.€Rice€served€as€campaign€co„chair€for€Karen€R.€Williams,€Circuit€Judge.€€Mr.Ð pÀ ÐÔ_ÔCaywoodÔ_Ô€and€Ms.€Turner€also€assisted€Judge€Williams€in€her€re„election€campaign.ððÔ_Ô׃!°×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô_Ô€€Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àBecause€the€trial€courtððs€decision€in€hearing€the€case€is€discretionary,€we€must€presume€thatÐ 4„ Ðthe€decision€is€correct.€€òòò òÔ_ÔOverstreetÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔShoneyÔ_Ôððs€Inc.ó óóó,€4€S.W.3d€694,€709€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).Ð  p ÐDespite€the€fact€that€Wife€failed€to€file€a€motion€to€recuse€the€trial€judge€because€of€the€judgeððsÐ  \ Ðrelationship€with€Husbandððs€counsel,€we€find€no€error€with€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€hear€this€case.€Ð øH ÐWe€find€it€particularly€insightful€that€counsel€for€both€parties€served€in€the€trial€judgeððs€campaign.€Ð ä4 ÐWith€that€in€mind,€we€cannot€say€that€Husbandððs€counselððs€efforts€in€the€trial€judgeððs€campaignÐ Ð  Ðwould€prompt€a€reasonable€person€to€question€the€trial€judgeððs€impartiality.€€€Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àNext,€Wife€asserts€that€the€trial€court€conducted€ex€parte€communications€with€HusbandððsÐ ”ä Ðcounsel.€€In€support€of€her€claim,€Wife€relies€on€the€following€exchange:Ð €Ð ÐÌà8  àThe€Court:€€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô€versus€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô,€159705.€€I€donððt€have€any€of€your€pleadings.€Ð X ¨ ÐThey€canððt€be€found€because€your€case€is€on€appeal.€€I€donððt€have€any€jurisdiction.ÐD!”Ð Ð  Ðà8  à.€.€.€.Ð0"€ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àMr.€Blair:€.€.€.€Iððm€going€to€raise€an€issue€that€Iððm€very€uncomfortable€with,€but€I€needÐ $X" Ðto€raise€it.€€This€case€is€brand€new€to€me,€and€Iððm€representing€the€defendant€in€thisÐ ô$D # Ðcase€and€trying€to€get€this€case€prepared€for€the€appeal€and€have€that€appeal€proceed.€Ð ° ÐThis€case€has€been€a€very€difficult€case€for€the€parties€and€the€Court€and€the€lawyers.€Ð œì ÐThere€have€been€a€lot€of€accusations,€there€have€been€a€lot€of€problems,€and€Iððm€just€„Ð ˆØ Є€Iððm€just€„€„€a€new€player,€but€Iððm€very€concerned.ÐtÄÐ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` àThere€has€been€no€response€to€our€motion€filed,€and€I€walk€into€court€todayÐ `° Ðand€I€hear€Mr.€Rice€talking€with€your€clerk€and€heððs€suggesting€to€the€clerk€that€theÐ L œ Ðmotion€shouldnððt€be€heard€because€there€is€no€jurisdiction€because€the€case€is€onÐ 8 ˆ Ðappeal.€€Your€Honor€comes€on€the€bench€and€says€exactly€that,€and€that€„€„€Ð$ tÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àThe€Court:€(Interposing.)€€Do€you€think€that€I€donððt€have€an€independent€view€of€thisÐ ü L  Ðcase?Ðè 8 Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àMr.€Blair:€Your€Honor,€Iððm€very€uncomfortable€with€this.€€I€wanted€to€express€myÐ À  Ðthoughts,€Your€Honor.Ьü Ð Ð  Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àThe€Court:€That€has€been€a€problem€throughout€this€case.€€I€have€never€seen€suchÐ „Ô  Ðdistrust€between€a€group€of€lawyers.€€Youððre€looking€at€things€under€the€bed€thatÐ pÀ Ðarenððt€there.Ð\¬Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àMr.€Blair:€I€understand€that,€and€I€wanted€the€Court€to€know€that€I€saw€whatÐ 4„ Ðoccurred.€€Iððm€sure€the€Court€can€assure€us€that€it€didnððt€occur.Ð pÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àThe€Court:€I€can€assure€you€that€I€had€the€thought€in€my€mind€last€night€when€I€readÐ øH Ðthis€docket€for€today€and€said€why€is€this€case€on€my€list€when€itððs€on€appeal?Ðä4Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àMr.€Blair:€I€just€needed€to€raise€that.м Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àThe€Court:€Would€you€like€to€move€on€to€a€new€issue?€€Are€you€satisfied€with€that?ДäÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àMr.€Blair:€Your€Honor,€I€had€to€raise€it.€€I€told€you€I€was€uncomfortable.€€You€madeÐ l¼ Ðthe€statement€„€„ÐX ¨Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àThe€Court:€(Interposing.)€€Letððs€go€on.€Ð0"€ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àMr.€Blair:€All€right.€€Lets€go€on€.€.€.€.€€€Ð$X"Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àWife€contends€that€the€trial€courtððs€decision€regarding€jurisdiction€was€influenced€by€ex€parteÐ à%0!$ Ðcommunications€between€the€courtððs€clerk€and€Husbandððs€attorney.€€Wife€maintains€that€such€aÐ Ì&"% Ðconclusion€is€reasonable€in€light€of€the€above€exchange.€€We€disagree.€€€In€light€of€the€trial€judgeððsÐ ¸'#& Ðexplanation€and€lack€of€any€other€evidence€in€the€record€to€suggest€to€the€contrary,€a€reasonableÐ ¤(ô#' Ðperson€would€not€be€prompted€to€question€the€trial€courtððs€impartiality€based€on€Wifeððs€assertions.€Ð )à$( ÐWifeððs€inferences€are€tenuous€at€best;€we€find€this€allegation€without€merit.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àNext,€Wife€contends€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôt]heÔ_Ô€Trial€Court€followed€case€law€cited€by€Husbandððs€counselÐ ° Ðthat€was€not€applicable€to€the€facts€of€this€case,€and€the€Ô_Ôholding[sÔ_Ô]€of€which€were€misrepresented€toÐ œì Ðthe€Court€and€contrary€to€Husbandððs€position.ðð€€There€is€simply€no€evidence€of€this€in€the€record.€Ð ˆØ ÐAt€trial,€Husbandððs€counsel€stated€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôt]heÔ_Ô€Western€Section€Court€of€Appeals€as€recently€as€1999Ð tÄ Ðin€Ô_ÔBradfieldÔ_Ô€versus€City€of€Memphis€said€that€ultimately€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€declined€toÐ `° Ðadopt€a€rule€that€would€allow€a€case€to€be€pending€in€more€than€one€court€at€a€time.ðð€€Wife€relies€onÐ L œ Ðthis€statement€as€evidence€of€her€assertions€regarding€Husbandððs€counselððs€misrepresentations.€€TheÐ 8 ˆ ÐÔ_ÔBradfieldÔ_Ô€case€cited€by€Husband€states€exactly€as€Husband€represented€to€the€court.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔBradfieldÔ_Ô€v.Ð $ t ÐCity€of€Memphisó óóó,€No.€02A01„9808„CV„00220,€Tenn.€Ct.€App.€LEXIS€580,€at€*10€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð  ` ÐAug.€24,€1999)€(òòò òno€perm.€app.€filedóóó ó).€€This€issue€is€without€merit.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àNext,€Wife€alleges€that€the€trial€court€accepted€documents€under€seal€from€Husbandððs€counselÐ Ô$  Ðwithout€disclosing€the€documents€to€Wife.€€Wife€further€alleges€that€the€trial€court€denied€the€receiptÐ À  Ðof€the€documents.€€Wife€contends€this€conduct€is€evidence€of€the€trial€courtððs€bias€against€her€andÐ ¬ü  Ðcreates€the€appearance€of€impropriety.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àTo€support€her€contention,€Wife€states€that€she€discovered€a€folder€containing€trustÐ pÀ Ðdocuments€within€a€box€consisting€of€the€trial€record.€€Wife€states€that€the€trial€judge€preventedÐ \¬ Ðdiscovery€of€these€particular€trust€documents€and€appointed€Joe€Duncan,€an€attorney,€to€review€theÐ H˜ Ðdocuments€in€order€to€report€their€contents€to€the€court.€€The€trial€judge€indicated€at€trial€that€sheÐ 4„ Ðð ðnever€saw€Barbara€B.€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔTTEEUAÔ_Ô€two,€slash,€ten,€slash,€ninety„six€trust.ðð€€Wife€contendsÐ  p Ðthat€this€was€the€very€trust€contained€in€the€folder.€€Wife€also€alleges€that€Husbandððs€attorneyððsÐ  \ Ðattorney€admitted€to€sending€documents€under€seal€to€the€trial€judge€that€were€not€in€the€record.€€Ð øH ÐÌà  àWife€failed€to€cite€to,€nor€can€we€locate,€any€evidence€in€the€record€to€support€WifeððsÐ Ð  Ðallegations.€€Again,€Wife€ð ðmust€come€forward€with€some€evidence€that€would€prompt€a€reasonable,Ð ¼  Ðdisinterested€person€to€believe€that€the€judgeððs€impartiality€might€reasonably€be€questioned.ðð€€ò òòòDavis,Ð ¨ø Ðóóó ó23€S.W.3d€at€313.€€We€have€found€no€such€evidence,€and€Wife€did€not€seek€to€develop€evidence€toÐ ”ä Ðsupport€her€claim.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€This€issue€is€without€merit.Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àWife€also€complains€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôt]heÔ_Ô€[Ô_Ôc]ourtÔ_Ôððs€failure€to€properly€maintain€the€trial€record€andÐ X ¨ Ðrefusal€to€release€the€complete€trial€record€to€the€Shelby€County€Circuit€Court€Clerkððs€office€forÐ D!” Ðpreparation€for€appeal€also€illustrates€the€judgeððs€misconduct€in€this€matter.ðð€€Again,€Wife€cites€noÐ 0"€  Ðevidence,€nor€can€we€find€any,€that€would€support€her€claims.€€This€was€a€lengthy€trial€with€aÐ #l! Ðsubstantial€record.€€Even€if€evidence€did€exist€to€support€Wifeððs€contention€that€the€ð ð[Ô_Ôc]ourtÔ_Ô€kept€theÐ $X" Ðrecord€in€utter€disarray,ðð€it€would€not€prompt€a€reasonable€person€to€question€the€judgeððsÐ ô$D # Ðimpartiality.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.€€€€€€€Ð à%0!$ Ðâ âÐ Ì&"% Ðà  àFinally,€Wife€alleges€that€the€trial€courtððs€bias€is€evidenced€by€certain€procedural€andÐ ° Ðâ âevidentiary€errors€made€by€the€court.€€Wife€contends€that€the€following€actions€by€the€trial€court€Ð œì Ðconstituted€bias€and€created€the€appearance€of€impropriety.€€According€to€her€brief,€Wife€states€theseÐ ˆØ Ðactions€as€follows:€Ð tÄ ÐÌà8  à(1)€€The€Trial€Court€limited€Wifeððs€requests€for€discovery€relative€to€a€$2.3€millionÐ L œ Ðtransfer€from€the€Barbara€B.€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô€2/10/96€Trust€when€Husband€not€only€has€aÐ 8 ˆ Ðbeneficial€present€Ô_ÔpossessoryÔ_Ô€interest€in€the€trust€but€also€is€a€beneficiary€and€trusteeÐ $ t Ðof€the€trust.€€Ð `Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(2)€The€Trial€Court€entered€three€Final€Decrees€of€Divorce€in€this€cause€andÐ è 8  Ðsubsequently€orally€modified€them.ÐÔ$ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(3)€The€Trial€Court€adopted€opposing€counselððs€proposed€ruling€and€made€it€CourtððsÐ ¬ü  ÐFebruary€order,€despite€the€fact€that€this€ruling€did€not€conform€to€proof€at€trial.Иè Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(4)€The€Trial€Court€failed€to€recognize€the€conflict€in€permitting€Joe€Duncan€to€serveÐ pÀ Ðas€Guardian€Ad€Litem,€while€drafting€Husbandððs€will€and€later€serving€as€SpecialÐ \¬ ÐMaster€to€review€trust€documents€in€camera.ÐH˜Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àAs€we€stated€earlier,€adverse€rulings€by€a€trial€judge€against€one€of€the€parties,€even€ifÐ  p Ðerroneous,€are€not€grounds€for€the€disqualification€of€the€trial€judge.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€fact€that€Wife€may€beÐ  \ Ðdissatisfied€with€some€of€the€judgeððs€decisions€is€not€enough€to€illustrate€bias.€€Wife€must€show€thatÐ øH Ðthe€decisions€were€motivated€by€bias€that€stemmed€from€an€extrajudicial€source;€the€decisions€by€theÐ ä4 Ðtrial€court€in€this€case€cannot€stand€alone€as€evidence€that€would€lead€a€reasonable€person€toÐ Ð  Ðconclude€that€the€court€was€impartial.€€€€€€Ð ¼  ÐÌà@ìàòòò òDistribution€of€Propertyó óóóˆÐ ”ä Ðà  àÌà  àWife€raises€several€points€of€error€regarding€the€trial€courtððs€classification€and€distributionÐ h¸ Ðof€the€partiesðð€property.€€Trial€courts€are€vested€with€a€great€deal€of€discretion€when€classifying€andÐ T ¤ Ðdividing€the€marital€estate,€and€their€decisions€are€entitled€to€great€weight€on€appeal.€€ò òòòGoodman€v.Ð @! ÐGoodmanóóó ó,€8€S.W.3d€289,€298€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€€Accordingly,€unless€the€courtððs€decision€isÐ ,"|  Ðcontrary€to€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€or€is€based€on€an€error€of€law,€we€will€not€interfereÐ #h! Ðwith€the€decision€on€appeal.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€Ð $T" ÐÌà  àBefore€we€address€Wifeððs€concerns€regarding€the€courtððs€classification€of€the€partiesððÐ Ü%,!$ Ðproperty,€it€is€helpful€to€review€some€well„established€principles€of€our€divorce€jurisprudence.€€InÐ È&"% Ðan€action€for€divorce,€Tennessee,€as€a€ð ðdual€propertyðð€state,€draws€a€distinction€between€separate€andÐ ´'#& Ðmarital€property.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôóóó ó,€769€S.W.2d€849,€856€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€Because€theÐ ° ÐTennessee€statutes€only€allow€for€the€division€of€marital€property€upon€the€dissolution€of€a€marriage,Ð œì Ðit€is€of€primary€importance€for€the€trial€court€to€classify€property€as€separate€or€marital.€€Tenn.€CodeÐ ˆØ ÐAnn.€ðð€36„4„121(a)(2001);€ò òòòBrock€v.€Brockóóó ó,€941€S.W.2d€896,€900€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€Therefore,Ð tÄ Ðbecause€separate€property€is€not€subject€to€division€in€an€action€for€divorce,€the€trial€court€mustÐ `° Ðinitially€determine€the€nature€of€the€partiesðð€property.€€òòò òÔ_ÔWattersÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔWattersÔ_Ôó óóó,€959€S.W.2d€585,€588Ð L œ Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997);€ò òòòBrockóóó ó,€941€S.W.2d€at€900.€€€€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àThe€General€Assembly€defines€ð ðseparate€propertyðð€as:Ð  ` ÐÌà8  àà ` à(A)€All€real€and€personal€property€owned€by€a€spouse€before€marriage;Ðè 8 Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(B)€Property€acquired€in€exchange€for€property€acquired€before€the€marriage;€ÐÔ$ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(C)€Income€from€and€appreciation€of€property€owned€by€a€spouse€beforeÐ À  Ðmarriage€except€when€characterized€as€marital€property€under€subdivision€(b)(1);Ьü Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(D)€Property€acquired€by€a€spouse€at€any€time€by€gift,€bequest,€devise€orÐ ˜è  Ðdescent;Ð„Ô Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(E)€Pain€and€suffering€awards,€victim€of€crime€compensation€awards,€futureÐ pÀ Ðmedical€expenses,€and€future€lost€wages;€andÐ\¬Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(F)€Property€acquired€by€a€spouse€after€an€order€of€legal€separation€where€theÐ H˜ Ðcourt€has€made€a€final€disposition€of€property.€€Ð4„Ð Ð  Ѐ€Ð  p ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(2)€(2001).€€Further,€the€Tennessee€legislature€provides€the€followingÐ  \ Ðdefinitions€for€ð ðmarital€propertyðð€in€a€divorce€action:Ð øH ÐÌà8  àà ` à(1)(A)€ð ðMarital€Propertyðð€means€all€real€and€personal€property,€both€tangibleÐ Ð  Ðand€intangible,€acquired€by€either€or€both€spouses€during€the€course€of€the€marriageÐ ¼  Ðup€to€the€date€of€the€final€divorce€hearing€and€owned€by€either€or€both€spouses€as€ofÐ ¨ø Ðthe€date€of€filing€a€complaint€for€divorce.€.€.€.ДäÐ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(B)€ð ðMarital€Propertyðð€includes€income€from,€and€any€increase€in€valueÐ €Ð Ðduring€the€marriage€of,€property€determined€to€be€separate€property€in€accordanceÐ l¼ Ðwith€subdivision€(b)(2)€if€each€party€substantially€contributed€to€its€preservation€andÐ X ¨ Ðappreciation,€and€the€value€of€vested€and€Ô_ÔunvestedÔ_Ô€pension,€vested€and€Ô_ÔunvestedÔ_ÔÐ D!” Ðstock€option€rights,€retirement€or€other€fringe€benefit€rights€relating€to€employmentÐ 0"€  Ðthat€accrued€during€the€period€of€the€marriage.Ð#l!Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(C)€ð ðMarital€Propertyðð€includes€recovery€in€personal€injury,€workersððÐ $X" Ðcompensation,€social€security€disability€actions,€and€other€similar€actions€for€theÐ ô$D # Ðfollowing:€wages€lost€during€the€marriage,€reimbursement€for€medical€bills€incurredÐ à%0!$ Ðand€paid€with€marital€property,€and€property€damage€to€marital€property.ÐÌ&"%Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b)€(2001).€€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àThis€Court€has€recognized€instances€where€separate€property€can€become€part€of€the€maritalÐ ° Ðâ âestate€due€to€the€partiesðð€treatment€of€the€separate€property.€€The€doctrines€of€transmutation€andÐ œì Ðcommingling€provide€an€avenue€where€separate€property€can€become€marital€property.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔHoferÔ_Ô€v.Ð ˆØ ÐÔ_ÔHoferÔ_Ôóóó ó,€No.€02A01„9510„CH„00210,€1997€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€74€at€*8„9€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Feb.€3,Ð tÄ Ð1997)òòò òó óóó€(òòò òno€perm.€app.€filedóóó ó)€(citing€òòò òPope€v.€Popeó óóó,€No.€88„58„II,€1988€WL€74615,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð `° ÐApp.€1988));€òòò òÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôó óóó,€769€S.W.2d€at€858.€€This€Court€has€previously€defined€transmutation€asÐ L œ Ðfollows:Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà8  à[Transmutation]€occurs€when€separate€property€is€treated€in€such€a€way€as€to€giveÐ  ` Ðevidence€of€an€intention€that€it€become€marital€property.€€One€method€of€causingÐ ü L  Ðtransmutation€is€to€purchase€property€with€separate€funds€but€to€take€title€in€jointÐ è 8  Ðtenancy.€€This€may€also€be€done€by€placing€separate€property€in€the€names€of€bothÐ Ô$  Ðspouses.€€The€rationale€underlying€both€these€doctrines€is€that€dealing€with€propertyÐ À  Ðin€these€ways€creates€a€rebuttable€presumption€of€a€gift€to€the€marital€estate.€€ThisÐ ¬ü  Ðpresumption€is€based€also€upon€the€provision€in€many€marital€property€statutes€thatÐ ˜è  Ðproperty€acquired€during€the€marriage€is€presumed€marital.€€The€presumption€can€beÐ „Ô  Ðrebutted€by€evidence€of€circumstances€or€communications€clearly€indicating€an€intentÐ pÀ Ðthat€the€property€remain€separate.Ð\¬Ð Ð  Ðòòò òÌÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôó óóó,€769€S.W.2d€at€858€(quoting€2€H.€Clark,€ò òòòThe€Law€of€Domestic€Relations€in€the€UnitedÐ 0€ ÐStatesóóó ó€ðð€16.2€at€185€(1987)).€€The€related€doctrine€of€commingling€concerns€instances€where€separateÐ l Ðproperty€becomes€marital€property€when€the€separate€property€is€inextricably€mingled€with€maritalÐ X Ðproperty€or€the€other€spouseððs€separate€property.€€òòò òÔ_ÔHoferÔ_Ô,€óóó ó1997€Tenn.€App.€Lexis€74,€at€*8.ò òòò€Ð ôD Ðóóó óCommingling€does€not€occur€if€the€separate€property€can€be€traced€into€its€product€or€if€the€separateÐ à0 Ðproperty€continues€to€be€segregated.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€€€€€Ð Ì ÐÌà  àFirst,€Wife€contends€that€the€court€erred€in€classifying€certain€real€property€as€a€combinationÐ ¤ô Ðof€marital€and€separate€property.€€At€issue€is€property€located€at€404€North€Ô_ÔGreenbayÔ_Ô,€Lake€Forest,Ð à ÐIllinois.€€With€the€intent€of€moving€from€Memphis€and€back€to€Lake€Forest,€Illinois,€the€coupleÐ |Ì Ðacquired€this€property€in€1997€for€1.675€million€dollars.€€Husband€paid€over€1.2€million€dollars€ofÐ h¸ Ðthis€purchase€price€up€front€and€took€out€a€mortgage€on€the€remainder.€€The€1.2€million€dollar€downÐ T ¤ Ðpayment€represented€a€portion€of€a€2€million€dollar€gift€from€Husbandððs€mother€to€Husband.€€TheÐ @! Ðmortgage€document€shows,€and€the€parties€agree,€that€the€house€was€jointly€titled€in€the€names€ofÐ ,"|  Ðeach€spouse.€€Ð #h! ÐÌà  àThe€parties€never€moved€into€the€Ô_ÔGreenbayÔ_Ô€residence€nor€did€they€spend€a€great€deal€of€timeÐ ð$@ # Ðthere.€€Despite€the€coupleððs€planned€additions€to€the€house,€it€was€largely€left€unimproved.€€A€trust,Ð Ü%,!$ Ðreferred€to€as€the€Huntington€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô,€Jr.€Trust€by€the€parties,€paid€for€the€remaining€mortgage€onÐ È&"% Ðthe€home.€€Ð ´'#& ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€found€that€the€fair€market€value€of€the€home€was€1.9€million€dollars.€€AfterÐ Œ)Ü$( Ðâ âdetermining€that€the€house€contained€1.674€million€dollars€in€equity,€the€court€awarded€1.2€millionÐ x*È%) Ðdollars€to€Husband€as€his€separate€property.€€The€court€ruled€that€the€remaining€$474,000€was€maritalÐ ° Ðproperty€and€awarded€it€to€Husband€as€part€of€his€share€of€the€coupleððs€marital€estate.€€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àWife€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€classifying€1.2€million€dollars€of€the€houseððs€equityÐ tÄ Ðas€Husbandððs€separate€property.€€Wife€states€that€there€is€a€rebuttable€presumption€that€HusbandÐ `° Ðmade€a€gift€to€the€marital€estate€when€the€couple€assumed€joint€title€to€the€property.€€BecauseÐ L œ ÐHusband€failed€to€rebut€this€presumption,€Wife€states€that€the€trial€court€should€not€have€classifiedÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€1.2€million€dollars€at€issue€as€Husbandððs€separate€property.€€We€agree€with€Wife.€€Ð $ t Ðò òÌà  àó óWe€have€examined€this€issue€in€several€cases.€€In€ò òòòÔ_ÔBarnhillÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBarnhillÔ_Ôóóó ó,€826€S.W.2d€443Ð ü L  Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991),€Husband€acquired€$60,000€from€his€father€which€the€trial€court€properlyÐ è 8  Ðrecognized€was€separate€property.€€Husband€used€the€$60,000€to€purchase€a€tract€of€land,€andÐ Ô$  ÐHusband€titled€the€land€in€both€his€and€Wifeððs€names.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€452.€€Wife€argued€that€the€doctrine€ofÐ À  Ðtransmutation€applied,€and€we€agreed.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€We€stated€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôb]yÔ_Ô€assuming€title€in€joint€tenancy,€thereÐ ¬ü  Ðexists€a€rebuttable€presumption€the€Husband€made€a€gift€to€the€marital€estate.€€There€was€no€intentÐ ˜è  Ðevident€in€the€record€that€Husband€intended€that€this€property€remain€separate.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€(citationÐ „Ô  Ðomitted).€€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àIn€òòò òFeather€v.€Featheró óóó,€No.€01A01„9704„CH„00183,€1998€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€233€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð H˜ ÐApp.€Apr.€3,€1998)€(òòò òno€perm.€app.€filedóóó ó),€we€held€that€the€wife€in€that€case€successfully€rebutted€theÐ 4„ Ðpresumption€of€a€gift€to€the€marital€estate€when€the€marital€home€was€jointly€titled€in€the€coupleððsÐ  p Ðnames€and€partly€paid€for€with€the€wifeððs€separate€funds.€ò òòòóóó ó€€We€ruled€that€communications€betweenÐ  \ Ðthe€husband€and€wife€clearly€indicated€an€intent€that€the€wifeððs€property€remain€separate.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€at€*27.€Ð øH ÐThe€husband€testified€as€follows:Ð ä4 ÐÌà8  àA.€€She€had€the€intent€she€stated€of€keeping€that€property€separate€from€me.м Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àQ.€€All€right.€€Because€it€has€relevance€under€the€rules€weððve€talked€about,€Iððll€justÐ ”ä Ðask€you€specifically,€did€you€agree€with€your€wife€that€Ô_ÔthatÔ_Ô€$24,000€from€herÐ €Ð Ðinheritance€would€be€considered€a€part€of€her€separate€property?Ðl¼Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àA.€€Yes,€I€agreed€to€that.ÐD!”Ð Ð  ÐÌò òòòId.óóó ó€€We€concluded€that€the€record€supported€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€the€$24,000€remained€theÐ #l! Ðwifeððs€separate€property.€€ò òòòId.óóó óÐ $X" ÐÌà  àWhen€Husbandððs€mother€gave€him€a€gift€of€2€million€dollars,€the€gift€was€Husbandððs€separateÐ à%0!$ Ðproperty.€€When€Husband€applied€1.2€million€dollars€of€this€gift€toward€the€purchase€of€the€Ô_ÔGreenbayÔ_ÔÐ Ì&"% Ðhouse€and€titled€it€in€the€names€of€both€spouses,€however,€Husband€created€a€rebuttable€presumptionÐ ¸'#& Ðof€a€gift€to€the€marital€estate.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€From€our€review€of€the€record,€Husband€failed€to€rebut€thisÐ ¤(ô#' Ðpresumption.€€We€can€find€no€evidence€in€the€record€that€clearly€indicates€Husbandððs€intent€to€keepÐ ° Ðthe€1.2€million€dollars€as€separate€property.€€Husband€did€not€state€that€he€intended€to€keep€theÐ œì Ðproperty€separate€in€his€testimony.€€Instead,€Husband€stated€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôw]eÔ_Ô€purchased€[the€house]€inÐ ˆØ ÐFebruary,€1997.ðð€€This€statement€indicates€that€Husband€considered€both€himself€and€Wife€as€co„Ð tÄ Ðpurchasers€of€the€home.€€Husband€relies€heavily€on€circumstances€to€defeat€the€presumptionÐ `° Ðincluding€the€fact€that€the€parties€did€not€move€to€the€residence,€that€they€did€not€spend€much€timeÐ L œ Ðat€the€residence,€and€that€they€did€not€improve€the€residence.€€Husband€further€notes€that€WifeððsÐ 8 ˆ Ðmarital€misconduct€caused€the€parties€to€terminate€their€move.€€These€circumstances€do€not€illustrateÐ $ t Ðthat€Husband€intended€to€keep€the€1.2€million€dollars€as€his€separate€property€and€will€not€defeat€theÐ  ` Ðpresumption€in€this€case.€€Husbandððs€intent€was€to€use€the€home€as€the€coupleððs€residence€when€heÐ ü L  Ðmade€the€down€payment.€€Husbandððs€testimony€establishes€that€the€parties€intended€to€move€backÐ è 8  Ðto€Lake€Forest€and€use€the€Ô_ÔGreenbayÔ_Ô€residence€as€their€home.€€The€fact€that€the€couple€never€usedÐ Ô$  Ðthe€house€as€intended€is€of€no€effect,€because€this€does€not€clearly€indicate€Husbandððs€intent€to€keepÐ À  Ðthe€property€separate.€€Additionally,€Husband€was€aware€that€he€and€Wife€were€having€maritalÐ ¬ü  Ðdifficulties€when€he€purchased€the€home.€€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àWe€hold€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€classifying€a€portion€of€the€equity€in€the€home€asÐ pÀ ÐHusbandððs€separate€property.€€The€trial€court€should€have€classified€all€of€the€equity€in€the€house,Ð \¬ Ð1.674€million€dollars,€as€marital€property.€€Accordingly,€the€1.2€million€dollars€the€court€awardedÐ H˜ Ðto€Husband€is€part€of€the€marital€estate,€not€Husbandððs€separate€property€as€found€by€the€trial€court.€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àNext,€Wife€states€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôt]heÔ_Ô€[Ô_Ôc]ourtÔ_Ô€classified€portions€of€Husbandððs€pre„marital€investmentÐ  \ Ðaccounts€as€separate€property€when€proof€at€trial€showed€that€Husband€had€inextricably€commingledÐ øH Ðseparate€and€marital€monies€in€these€accounts,€which€included€stocks€and€bonds,€transmuting€theirÐ ä4 Ðnature€from€separate€to€marital€property.ðð€€Wife€maintains€that€the€court€erred€in€classifying€theÐ Ð  Ðaccounts€as€ð ðmixed€assets.ðð€€Wife€contends€that€the€court€should€have€concluded€that€the€accountsÐ ¼  Ðwere€marital€property€subject€to€equitable€division.€Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àAt€the€time€of€the€divorce,€Husband€maintained€two€large€investment€accounts.€€These€wereÐ €Ð Ðthe€William€Blair€Account€and€the€Smith€Barney€Account.€€Husband€kept€these€accounts€in€his€nameÐ l¼ Ðthroughout€the€marriage.€€Wife€was€not€listed€as€a€joint€owner€on€the€accounts,€did€not€have€accessÐ X ¨ Ðto€the€accounts,€and€did€not€write€checks€on€the€accounts.€€Ð D!” ÐÌà  àHusband€opened€the€William€Blair€Account€in€1984.€€At€the€time€of€trial,€the€account€hadÐ #l! Ða€balance€of€over€1.5€million€dollars.€€The€account€contained€a€large€portion€of€separate€funds,Ð $X" Ðincluding€funds€Husband€acquired€via€various€gifts€and€inheritances.€€During€the€latter€years€of€theÐ ô$D # Ðâ âmarriage,€Husband€deposited€marital€funds€into€the€account.€€These€deposits€were€$500,000€inÐ à%0!$ Ðproceeds€from€the€sale€of€the€partiesðð€jointly€owned€residence,€the€repayment€of€a€$25,000€loan,€andÐ ° Ðan€additional€deposit€of€$6,500.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àHusbandððs€Smith€Barney€Account€also€had€a€value€of€approximately€1.5€million€dollars€atÐ tÄ Ðthe€time€of€the€divorce€proceedings.€€This€account€contained€funds€that€Husband€acquired€prior€toÐ `° Ðhis€marriage,€funds€that€Husband€received€as€gifts,€and€funds€that€Husband€inherited.€€Additionally,Ð L œ Ðthis€account€contained€deposits€as€a€result€of€Husbandððs€work€for€his€mother.׃è×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€deposits€fromÐ 8 ˆ ÐHusbandððs€employment€were€from€1996€to€1998€and€totaled€$234,000.€€Ð $ t ÐÌà  àTo€complicate€matters,€Husband€used€a€marital€account,€the€Northern€Trust€Account,€as€aÐ ü L  Ðð ðconduit€account.ðð€€Husband€would€deposit€both€marital€funds€and€separate€funds€into€this€account.€Ð è 8  ÐHusband€would€transfer€money€between€the€William€Blair€and€Smith€Barney€Accounts€and€theÐ Ô$  ÐNorthern€Trust€Account.€€Husband€would€also€write€checks€and€transfer€money€to€its€ultimateÐ À  Ðdestination€from€this€marital€account.€€Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àBoth€parties€provided€experts€who€testified€regarding€the€above€accounts.€€Husbandððs€expertÐ „Ô  Ðtestified€that€he€was€able€to€determine€the€source€of€each€deposit€in€the€investment€accounts€at€issue.€Ð pÀ ÐHusbandððs€expert€further€testified€regarding€the€withdrawals€from€the€investment€accounts.€€TheÐ \¬ Ðexpert€testified€that€he€was€able€to€trace€the€withdrawals€from€the€investment€accounts€to€theirÐ H˜ Ðultimate€destination.€€Finally,€Husbandððs€expert€testified€that€he€was€able€to€match€each€deposit€withÐ 4„ Ðits€corresponding€withdrawal.€€Ð  p ÐÌà  àWifeððs€expert€provided€testimony€that€conflicted€with€Husbandððs€expertððs€conclusions.€Ð øH ÐWifeððs€expert€testified€that€he€failed€to€find€any€facts€which€would€lead€him€to€conclude€thatÐ ä4 ÐHusband€tried€to€keep€marital€funds€isolated€from€Husbandððs€separate€funds.€€The€expert€emphasizedÐ Ð  Ðthe€interaction€between€the€marital€account,€Northern€Trust,€and€the€William€Blair€and€Smith€BarneyÐ ¼  Ðaccounts.€€Wifeððs€expert€focused€on€the€significant€activity€within€the€different€accounts€andÐ ¨ø Ðdetermined€that€the€accounts€had€been€inextricably€commingled.€€Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àThe€court€ruled€that€the€William€Blair€Account€had€a€value€of€$1,526,874.€€The€courtÐ l¼ Ðclassified€this€as€a€mixed€asset,€and€awarded€$235,000€to€Husband€as€separate€property.€€The€courtÐ X ¨ Ðdivided€the€remainder€equally€between€the€parties.€€Regarding€the€Smith€Barney€Account,€the€courtÐ D!” Ðruled€that€it€had€a€value€of€$1,488,494.€€The€court€also€classified€this€account€as€a€mixed€asset€andÐ 0"€  Ðawarded€$525,000€to€Husband€as€separate€property.€€The€court€divided€the€remainder€equallyÐ #l! Ðbetween€Husband€and€Wife.Ð $X" Ðâ âÐ ô$D # Ðà  àThe€trial€court€made€no€factual€findings€to€support€its€rulings€regarding€the€accounts.€€AfterÐ ° Ðâ âa€thorough€review€of€the€record,€we€can€find€no€evidence€to€support€the€trial€courtððs€findings.€Ð œì ÐAccordingly,€we€must€determine€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€from€the€record€without€aÐ ˆØ Ðpresumption€of€correctness€afforded€to€the€trial€courtððs€ruling.€€òòò òÔ_ÔGanzevoortÔ_Ô€v.€Russelló óóó,€949€S.W.2dÐ tÄ Ð293,€296€(Tenn.€1997);€òòò òRealty€Shop,€Inc.€v.€RR€Westminster€Holding,€Incó óóó,€7€S.W.3d€581,€596Ð `° Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€Wife€insists€that€each€account€is€marital€property,€while€Husband€contendsÐ L œ Ðthat€the€accounts€are€each€his€separate€property.€€We€have€determined€that€each€account€is€maritalÐ 8 ˆ Ðproperty,€as€the€separate€funds€have€been€inextricably€commingled€with€marital€property.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àWhen€Husband€combined€his€separate€funds€with€the€coupleððs€marital€funds,€he€jeopardizedÐ ü L  Ðthe€identity€of€his€separate€funds.€€In€order€for€Husband€to€prevent€his€separate€funds€from€becomingÐ è 8  Ðmarital€property,€Husband€had€to€illustrate€that€the€separate€property€was€not€òòò òinextricablyó óóó€mingledÐ Ô$  Ðwith€the€coupleððs€marital€property.€€Husband€could€accomplish€this€by€demonstrating€that€theÐ À  Ðproperty€continued€to€be€segregated€or€by€demonstrating€that€the€separate€funds€could€be€traced€intoÐ ¬ü  Ðtheir€product.€€From€our€review€of€the€record,€Husband€failed€to€accomplish€this€task.€€€€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àFirst,€Husband€admits€that€he€did€not€keep€the€separate€funds€in€the€two€accounts€segregated.€Ð pÀ ÐThe€separate€funds€were€often€used€to€pay€expenses€and€purchase€marital€property.׃$×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð \¬ ÐHusband€used€separate€funds€for€these€purposes€while€marital€funds€were€in€the€account.€Ð H˜ ÐAdditionally,€Husband€claimed€to€use€separate€funds€in€conjunction€with€marital€funds€€when€payingÐ 4„ Ðexpenses€and€purchasing€marital€property.€€However,€from€our€review€of€the€record,€we€cannot€sayÐ  p Ðwith€any€certainty€that€the€marital€funds€left€the€account€with€the€separate€property.€€The€maritalÐ  \ Ðfunds€may€very€well€have€remained€in€the€accounts.€€This€is€due€to€the€fact€that€Husband€could€notÐ øH Ðclearly€match€the€marital€deposits€with€their€ultimate€destination.€€If€the€marital€deposits€could€notÐ ä4 Ðbe€matched€to€their€destination,€we€must€conclude€that€the€accounts€were€inextricably€commingled.€Ð Ð  Ѐ€Ìà  àSecond,€Husbandððs€expert€testified€that€he€failed€to€account€for€the€investment€activity€withinÐ ¨ø Ðthe€account.€€When€marital€property€within€the€account€earned€money,€the€earnings€were€not€treatedÐ ”ä Ðas€distinct€from€the€earnings€from€the€separate€property.€€Although€the€expert€testified€that€theÐ €Ð Ðmarital€investment€earnings€were€relatively€small€compared€to€the€separate€property€investmentÐ l¼ Ðearnings,€we€cannot€discount€the€fact€that€marital€property€contributed€to€the€growth€of€this€account.€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àHusband€argues€that€the€outflow€of€money€toward€marital€expenses€outweighed€any€depositsÐ 0"€  Ðor€earnings€that€could€be€classified€as€marital€property,€so€the€remaining€funds€must€be€his€separateÐ #l! Ðproperty.€€€This€argument€fails€to€demonstrate€that€the€funds€were€not€commingled.€€Any€argumentÐ $X" Ðbased€on€tracing€must€be€more€certain.€€After€Husband€combined€the€marital€and€separate€property,Ð ô$D # Ðhe€had€the€obligation€to€establish€that€the€two€sources€of€funds€were€not€inextricably€commingled.€Ð ° ÐHusband€cannot€accomplish€this€task€by€merely€relying€on€the€fact€that€the€marital€withdrawalsÐ œì Ðoutweighed€the€marital€deposits.€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àHusband€contends€that€we€must€examine€his€intent.€€Husband€argues€that€the€comminglingÐ `° Ðof€the€funds€did€not€result€in€the€transmutation€of€his€separate€property€to€marital€property€becauseÐ L œ Ðhe€has€rebutted€the€presumption€of€commingling€by€evidence€establishing€that€the€accounts€were€inÐ 8 ˆ Ðhis€name€only€and€that€Wife€had€no€access€to€the€accounts.€€Husbandððs€intent€is€irrelevant€at€thisÐ $ t Ðpoint.€€Once€marital€funds€were€ò òòòinextricablyóóó ó€commingled€with€separate€funds,€we€can€no€longer€lookÐ  ` Ðto€Husbandððs€intent€regarding€those€separate€funds.€€At€this€point,€it€is€impossible€to€determine€whatÐ ü L  Ðportion€of€Husbandððs€funds€remained€separate,€even€if€he€had€the€intent€to€keep€the€funds€separate.€Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àWe€hold€that€the€William€Blair€and€Smith€Barney€investment€accounts€were€inextricablyÐ À  Ðcommingled.€€Accordingly,€the€entire€balance€of€these€accounts€is€properly€classified€as€maritalÐ ¬ü  Ðproperty.€€As€these€accounts€are€investment€accounts,€we€remand€this€issue€to€the€trial€court€toÐ ˜è  Ðdetermine€their€respective€values.€€€€€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àWife€next€argues€that€the€court€erred€in€its€treatment€of€the€Huntington€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô,€Jr.€2/1/97Ð \¬ ÐTrust.€€Wife€contends€that€any€increase€in€the€value€of€the€trust€is€marital€property.€€Additionally,Ð H˜ ÐWife€contends€that€Husband€converted€the€trust€into€a€marital€asset€by€withdrawing€from€the€trustÐ 4„ Ðto€pay€marital€expenses.€€Regarding€the€trust,€the€court€determined€that€ð ðHusband€has€no€presentÐ  p ÐÔ_ÔpossessoryÔ_Ô€interest€in€the€.€.€.€Huntington€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô,€Jr.€Trust€and€therefore,€declines€to€classify€orÐ  \ Ðdivide€[it].ðð€€Ð øH ÐÌà  àThe€trust€was€established€by€a€2€million€dollar€contribution€from€Husbandððs€mother.€€KentÐ Ð  ÐChandler,€Jr.€and€Jerry€Jones€are€the€independent€trustees€of€this€trust.€€Only€the€independent€trusteesÐ ¼  Ðmay,€in€their€discretion,€distribute€the€income€and€principal€from€the€trust.€€The€independent€trusteesÐ ¨ø Ðhave€the€obligation€to€preserve€the€trustððs€assets€for€all€of€the€members€of€the€class€of€beneficiaries.€Ð ”ä ÐThe€beneficiaries€of€this€trust€are€Husband€and€his€descendants.€€At€the€time€of€the€trial,€the€trust€wasÐ €Ð Ðvalued€at€3.3€million€dollars.€€Since€the€inception€of€the€trust,€the€independent€trustees€have€paid€theÐ l¼ Ðmortgage€payments€and€the€property€taxes€on€the€Ô_ÔGreenbayÔ_Ô€residence€owned€by€Husband.€€HusbandÐ X ¨ Ðlisted€these€distributions€on€his€affidavit€of€income€and€expenses.€€Mr.€Jones€testified€that€HusbandÐ D!” Ðwas€without€any€present€Ô_ÔpossessoryÔ_Ô€interest€in€the€trust.€€Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àWe€examined€a€similar€situation€in€òòò òTower€v.€Toweró óóó,€02A01„9407„CV„00170,1995€Tenn.Ð $X" ÐApp.€LEXIS€720,€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Nov.€3,€1995)€(òòò òno€perm.€app.€filedóóó ó).€€There,€the€wife€receivedÐ ô$D # Ðmonthly€income€from€a€trust.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€*7.€€The€trial€court€classified€a€portion€of€the€trust€as€the€wifeððsÐ à%0!$ Ðseparate€property,€despite€the€uncontradicted€testimony€that€established€that€the€wife€had€no€presentÐ Ì&"% ÐÔ_ÔpossessoryÔ_Ô€interest€in€the€trust.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€We€reversed€the€trial€court,€holding€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÐ ¸'#& Ðclassifying€a€portion€of€the€trust€as€the€wifeððs€separate€property€because€there€was€no€evidence€thatÐ ¤(ô#' Ðthe€wife€had€a€present€Ô_ÔpossessoryÔ_Ô€interest€in€the€trust.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€at€*14.€€Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àThe€present€case€is€analogous€to€ò òòòToweróóó ó.€€Testimony€established€that€Husband€was€withoutÐ ° Ðâ âany€present€Ô_ÔpossessoryÔ_Ô€interest€in€the€Huntington€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô,€Jr.€2/1/97€Trust.€€Further,€our€review€ofÐ œì Ðthe€trust€document€leads€us€to€the€same€conclusion.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court€was€correct€inÐ ˆØ Ðrefusing€to€classify€the€trust€as€Husbandððs€separate€property.€€€€€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àIn€her€next€sub„issue,€Wife€states€that€the€court€erred€in€finding€that€the€partiesðð€clubÐ L œ Ðmemberships€have€no€value.€€Wifeððs€entire€argument€in€support€of€this€contention€is€as€follows:€ð ð[Ô_Ôi]tÔ_ÔÐ 8 ˆ Ðis€ludicrous€to€consider€the€Courtððs€division€of€these€clubs€(7€to€Husband€and€1€to€Wife)€is€equitable.€Ð $ t ÐIt€is€also€ludicrous€that€the€Court€found€that€the€club€memberships€have€no€value.ðð€€Wife€fails€to€citeÐ  ` Ðany€evidence€in€the€record€that€would€justify€her€conclusions.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àNext,€Wife€argues€that€the€court€erred€in€ruling€that€Wife€dissipated€a€portion€of€her€WilliamÐ Ô$  ÐBlair€investment€account.€€In€support€of€Wifeððs€assertion,€she€cites€to€the€courtððs€February€28,€2000Ð À  Ðorder.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€This€was€not€the€courtððs€final€order.€€In€its€final€order,€the€court€ruled€that€the€account€wasÐ ¬ü  Ða€marital€asset€and€valued€the€account€at€$350,574.€€This€valuation€is€supported€by€Wifeððs€OctoberÐ ˜è  Ð1999€William€Blair€statement.€€The€court€awarded€the€entire€amount€of€the€account€to€Wife€and€didÐ „Ô  Ðnot€state€that€Wife€dissipated€funds€from€the€account.€€Accordingly,€this€issue€is€without€merit.€€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àWife€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€assigning€the€ð ðmajority€of€the€marital€debt€toÐ H˜ ÐWife.ðð€€When€addressing€the€partiesðð€marital€debts,€the€court€awarded€the€debt€associated€with€theÐ 4„ Ðpartiesðð€two€residences€to€the€person€who€received€the€residence.€€The€remainder€of€the€debt€wasÐ  p Ðassociated€with€Wifeððs€credit€cards.€€The€record€establishes€that€Wife€charged€a€great€deal€of€moneyÐ  \ Ðto€these€cards€from€January€1998€to€September€1999.€€The€court€found€that€Wife€spent€large€sumsÐ øH Ðof€money€on€frequent€trips€and€extravagances€during€the€marriage€and€during€the€period€ofÐ ä4 Ðseparation.€€After€a€review€of€the€record,€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderateÐ Ð  Ðagainst€the€trial€courtððs€assignment€of€the€coupleððs€marital€debt.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.€€€Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àFinally,€Wife€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€its€equitable€distribution€of€maritalÐ ”ä Ðproperty.€€Husband€also€argues€that€the€court€erred€in€its€distribution.€€In€light€of€our€decisionÐ €Ð Ðregarding€the€classification€of€the€partiesðð€property,€we€must€remand€the€case€for€another€equitableÐ l¼ Ðdistribution€in€accordance€with€section€36„4„121€of€the€Tennessee€Code.€€€€€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà@¥¥$ìàòòò òChild€Supportóóó óˆÐ 0"€  ÐÓ °X°œXÓÌà  àWifeððs€next€issue€concerns€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€child€support.€€The€parties€entered€intoÐ $T" Ðâ âa€permanent€custodial€plan€that€declared€Wife€to€be€the€two€minor€childrenððs€custodial€parent.€€TheÐ ð$@ # Ðcourt€then€determined€Husbandððs€child€support€obligations.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€awarding€Wife€child€support,€theÐ ° Ðcourt€stated€as€follows:Ð œì Ðâ âÌà8  àThe€Court€finds€that€Husband€has€shown€that€an€amount€greater€than€thirty„twoÐ tÄ Ðpercent€(32%)€of€his€net€income€in€excess€of€$18,000€per€month€exceeds€a€reasonableÐ `° Ðamount€of€child€support€based€upon€the€best€interest€of€the€children€and€theÐ L œ Ðcircumstances€of€the€parties.€€The€children€have€large€trusts€[sic]€accounts€that€canÐ 8 ˆ Ðbe€called€upon€to€meet€their€educational€and€other€needs.€€Therefore,€Husband€shallÐ $ t Ðpay€child€support€to€Wife€in€the€amount€of€$5,760€per€month€.€.€.€.€€Ð `Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àWife€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€its€calculation€of€Husbandððs€monthly€income.€Ð è 8  ÐFurther,€Wife€contends€that€the€court€erred€by€placing€a€ð ðcash€cap€on€child€support.ðð€€Finally,€WifeÐ Ô$  Ðargues€that€the€court€should€have€deviated€upward€from€the€guideline€amount€of€child€support.€€InÐ À  Ðresponse,€Husband€maintains€that€the€court€not€only€was€correct€in€placing€a€cash€cap€on€childÐ ¬ü  Ðsupport,€but€that€the€trial€court€should€have€limited€the€amount€of€child€support€to€$3200€per€month.€Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àGenerally,€the€most€important€finding€in€a€child€support€proceeding€is€the€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ôððs€income.€Ð pÀ Ðò òòòÔ_ÔAndertonÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔAndertonÔ_Ôóóó ó,€988€S.W.2d€675,€680€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€After€the€court€determines€theÐ \¬ ÐÔ_ÔobligorÔ_Ôððs€income,€the€guidelines€require€the€court€to€calculate€the€amount€of€child€support€using€theÐ H˜ Ðpercentages€contained€in€the€guidelines.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó;€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Ô_ÔRegsÔ_Ô.€r.€1240„2„4„.01(2)€&€(3),€„Ð 4„ Ð.02(7),€„.03(5).€€The€amount€of€child€support€provided€by€this€calculation€is€presumptively€correct.€Ð  p Ðòòò òÔ_ÔAndertonÔ_Ôó óóó,€988€S.W.2d€at€681.€€Courts€may€deviate€from€the€guideline€amount€in€certain€situations.€Ð  \ ÐTenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Ô_ÔRegsÔ_Ô.€r.€1240„2„4„.04.€€If€the€court€does€not€award€the€guideline€amount,€the€courtÐ øH Ðmust€Ð ä4 ÐÌà8  àmake€a€written€or€specific€finding€that€the€application€of€the€child€support€guidelinesÐ ¼  Ðwould€be€unjust€or€inappropriate€in€that€particular€case.€€Findings€that€rebut€theseÐ ¨ø Ðguidelines€must€state€the€amount€that€would€have€been€required€under€the€guidelinesÐ ”ä Ðand€include€a€justification€for€deviation€from€the€guidelines€which€takes€intoÐ €Ð Ðconsideration€the€best€interest€of€the€child.€€€€€€€Ðl¼Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Ô_ÔRegsÔ_Ô.€r.€1240„2„4„.02(7).€€Of€particular€importance€to€this€case,€the€court€Ð D!” ÐÌà8  àmay€consider€a€downward€deviation€from€the€guidelines€if€the€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ô€demonstratesÐ #l! Ðthat€the€percentage€applied€to€the€excess€of€the€net€income€above€$10,000€a€monthÐ $X" Ðexceeds€a€reasonable€amount€of€child€support€based€upon€the€best€interest€of€the€childÐ ô$D # Ðand€the€circumstances€of€the€parties.€€The€court€may€require€that€sums€paid€above€theÐ ° Ðpercentage€applied€to€the€net€income€above€$10,000€be€placed€in€an€educational€orÐ œì Ðother€trust€fund€for€the€benefit€of€the€child.€€€ÐˆØÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Ô_ÔRegsÔ_Ô.€r.€1240„2„4„.04(3).Ð `° ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€failed€to€calculate€Husbandððs€income.€€Further,€the€court€deviatedÐ 8 ˆ Ðdownward€from€the€presumptive€amount€provided€by€the€guidelines€and€did€not€state€the€amount€thatÐ $ t Ðthe€guidelines€would€have€required.€€This€is€in€contravention€of€the€child€support€guidelines.€Ð  ` ÐAdditionally,€the€court€did€not€provide€an€adequate€justification€for€the€downward€deviation€of€theÐ ü L  Ðchild€support€award.€€The€fact€that€the€children€have€large€trust€accounts,€which€were€in€existenceÐ è 8  Ðwhile€the€parties€were€married,€is€not€a€specific€finding€to€support€the€conclusion€that€HusbandÐ Ô$  Ðdemonstrated€that€the€presumptive€amount€exceeded€a€ð ðreasonable€amount€of€child€support€basedÐ À  Ðupon€the€best€interest€of€the€child€and€the€circumstances€of€the€parties.ðð€€Accordingly,€we€remandÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€case€in€order€for€the€trial€court€to€determine€Husbandððs€income€and€to€make€a€written€findingÐ ˜è  Ðsupporting€any€deviation€from€the€amount€of€child€support€as€calculated€by€the€guidelines.€€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àWe€can€address€some€of€the€partiesðð€concerns€regarding€the€calculation€of€child€support.€Ð \¬ ÐFirst,€Wife€contends€that€Husband€is€voluntarily€underemployed.€€Prior€to€the€divorce,€HusbandÐ H˜ Ðworked€at€Ducks€Unlimited€where€he€earned€approximately€$86,000€per€year.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Husband€voluntarilyÐ 4„ Ðresigned€from€Ducks€Unlimited€on€June€30,€1998.€€During€the€same€time€that€Husband€worked€forÐ  p ÐDucks€Unlimited,€Husband€worked€for€his€mother.€€While€Husband€was€with€Ducks€Unlimited,€heÐ  \ Ðearned€$7,000€per€month€for€the€management€of€his€motherððs€financial€affairs.€€Beginning€on€JuneÐ øH Ð1,€1998,€Husband€earned€$9,000€per€month€from€his€mother.€€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àWhether€an€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ô€is€willfully€and€voluntarily€underemployed€is€a€question€of€fact,€and€theÐ ¼  Ðtrial€court€has€considerable€discretion€in€its€determination.€€òòò òWillis€v.€Willisó óóó,€62€S.W.3d€735,€738Ð ¨ø Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001)€(citing€ò òòòBrooks€v.€Brooksóóó ó,€992€S.W.2d€403,€409€(Tenn.€1999)€(Birch,€J.Ð ”ä Ðdissenting)).€€When€a€trial€court€must€determine€whether€a€parent€is€willfully€and€voluntarilyÐ €Ð Ðunderemployed,€the€reasons€for€an€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ô€parentððs€decision€to€accept€lower€paying€employment€areÐ l¼ Ðrelevant.€€ò òòòRalston€v.€Ralstonóóó ó,€No.€01A01„9804„CV„00222,€1999€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€529,€at€*€8Ð X ¨ Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Aug.€3,€1999)€(òòò òno€perm.€app.€filedóóó ó).€€In€making€its€determination,€the€trial€courtÐ D!” Ðmust€consider€the€partyððs€past€and€present€employment€and€whether€the€partyððs€choice€to€accept€aÐ 0"€  Ðlower€paying€job€was€reasonable€and€made€in€good€faith.€€ò òòòWillisóóó ó,€62€S.W.3d€at€738€(citingò òòò€Ralstonóóó ó,Ð #l! Ð1999€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€529,€at€*7).€€€€Ð $X" ÐÌà  àIn€making€any€determination€of€willful€and€voluntary€underemployment,€it€is€important€toÐ à%0!$ Ðdetermine€whether€the€leaving€of€previous€employment€was€voluntary€or€involuntary.€€ò òòòRalstonóóó ó,€1999Ð Ì&"% ÐTenn.€App.€LEXIS€529,€at€*€10„11.€€When€a€party€with€child€support€obligations€voluntarily€leavesÐ ¸'#& Ðtheir€employment€and€chooses€to€accept€a€job€which€provides€significantly€less€income,€courts€areÐ ¤(ô#' Ðmore€inclined€to€find€willful€and€voluntary€underemployment.€€ò òòòWillisóóó ó,€62€S.W.3d€at€738€(citingÐ )à$( Ðò òòòBrooksóóó ó,€992€S.W.2d€at€407).€€In€addition,€courts€may€consider€a€partyððs€course€of€action€andÐ ° Ðdecision„making€after€leaving€their€previous€employment.€€ò òòòRalstonóóó ó,€1999€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS,€at€*11„Ð œì Ð16.€€Accordingly,€it€is€important€for€courts€to€examine€a€partyððs€efforts€to€replace€lost€income€afterÐ ˆØ Ðthe€termination€of€their€previous€employment.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€*15.€€€€€€€€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€concluded€that€after€Husband€left€Ducks€Unlimited,€he€receivedÐ L œ Ða€€ð ðsubstantial€increase€in€the€salary€he€receives€from€his€mother€[and]€.€.€.€also€added€the€duties€ofÐ 8 ˆ Ðhelping€to€manage€his€brotherððs€financial€affairs€as€well€as€the€family€trusts.ðð€€Our€review€of€theÐ $ t Ðrecord€substantiates€this€finding.€€At€trial,€Wife€acknowledged€that€the€couple€had€to€move€toÐ  ` ÐMemphis€in€order€for€Husband€to€remain€employed€with€Ducks€Unlimited.€€Wife€stated€that€theÐ ü L  Ðcouple€always€knew€that€they€would€move€back€to€Lake€Forest,€Illinois.€€Husband€stated€that€heÐ è 8  Ðplanned€to€move€back€to€Illinois€in€order€to€manage€his€motherððs€affairs,€take€care€of€his€brotherððsÐ Ô$  Ðneeds,€and€to€become€more€involved€with€ð ðthe€[Buchanan]€Foundation€through€the€family€office€inÐ À  ÐIllinois.ðð€€Further,€Husband€stated€that€his€employment€in€Illinois€would€be€full€time.€€Accordingly,Ð ¬ü  Ðthe€court€examined€Husbandððs€reasons€for€terminating€his€employment€with€Ducks€Unlimited€andÐ ˜è  Ðdetermined€that€it€was€a€reasonable€decision.€€The€court€also€considered€Husbandððs€efforts€to€makeÐ „Ô  Ðup€for€any€lost€income.€€In€light€of€the€trial€courtððs€discretion€in€this€question€of€fact,€we€cannot€sayÐ pÀ Ðthat€the€evidence€preponderates€in€favor€of€finding€that€Husband€is€voluntarily€underemployed.€Ð \¬ ÐAccordingly,€we€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€finding€on€this€issue.€€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àBoth€parties€raise€issues€regarding€the€calculation€of€Husbandððs€income.€€Wife€contends€thatÐ  p Ðcapital€gains€associated€with€the€sale€of€the€partiesðð€Ô_ÔDeerpathÔ_Ô€residence€should€be€included€when€theÐ  \ Ðcourt€determines€Husbandððs€income€for€child€support€purposes.€€On€his€1997€tax€return,€HusbandÐ øH Ðreported€a€capital€gain€of€$340,000€which€represented€the€sale€of€the€Ô_ÔDeerpathÔ_Ô€residence.€€ThisÐ ä4 Ðcapital€gain€should€be€included€when€the€trial€court€calculates€Husbandððs€income€for€child€supportÐ Ð  Ðpurposes.€€Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àð ðGenerally,€capital€gains€are€included€in€the€definition€of€gross€income.ðð€€ò òòòBrooks€v.€Brooksóóó ó,Ð ”ä Ð992€S.W.2d€403,€407€(Tenn.€1999)€(citing€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Reg.€ch.€1240„2„4„.03(3)(a)).€€In€òòò òSmithÐ €Ð Ðv.€Smith,ó óóó€No.€01„A„01„9705„CH„00216,€1997€Tenn.€Ct.€LEXIS€733,€at€*6„8€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Oct.Ð l¼ Ð29,€1997)€(òòò òno€perm.€app.€filedóóó ó),€we€held€that€the€trial€court€should€have€considered€a€one€time€capitalÐ X ¨ Ðgain€when€determining€the€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ôððs€income.€€In€our€decision,€we€distinguished€òòò òHall€v.€Halló óóó,€No.Ð D!” Ð03A01„9701„GS„00030,€1997€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€501€(Tenn€Ct.€App.€July€21,€1997)€(òòò òno€perm.€app.Ð 0"€  Ðfiledóóó ó).€€In€òòò òHalló óóó,€we€did€not€include€an€isolated€capital€gain€when€calculating€Husbandððs€gross€income.€Ð #l! Ðòòò òId.ó óóó€at€*7.€€However,€this€was€due€to€the€fact€that€the€capital€gain€was€included€in€the€marital€estate.€Ð $X" Ðòòò òId.ó óóó;€òòò òsee€also€Smithó óóó,€1997€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€733,€at€*8.€€In€this€case,€the€evidence€fails€to€establishÐ ô$D # Ðthat€the€$340,000€capital€gain€was€included€in€the€marital€estate.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court€shallÐ à%0!$ Ðconsider€the€$340,000€capital€gain€when€determining€Husbandððs€income€for€child€support€purposes.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àWife€also€contends€that€the€court€should€consider€income€from€Husbandððs€trusts€whenÐ ¤(ô#' Ðâ âdetermining€his€income.€€As€stated€earlier,€the€Huntington€Ô_ÔEldridgeÔ_Ô,€Jr.€Trust€pays€the€property€taxesÐ )à$( Ðand€mortgage€on€the€Ô_ÔGreenbayÔ_Ô€property.׃"×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Husband€included€this€as€income€on€his€Rule€14€affidavitÐ ° Ðâ âof€monthly€income.€€It€follows€that€the€court€did€consider€this€as€income€and€will€consider€it€asÐ œì Ðincome€on€remand.€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àHusband€states€that€the€income€provided€on€his€Rule€14€affidavit€includes€income€from€hisÐ `° ÐWilliam€Blair€and€Smith€Barney€Accounts.€€Husband€contends€that€if€we€determine€that€theseÐ L œ Ðaccounts€are€marital€assets,€then€his€income€and€corresponding€child€support€obligations€should€beÐ 8 ˆ Ðreduced€accordingly.€€We€agree€with€Husband.€€Section€36„4„121(b)(1)(E)€of€the€Tennessee€CodeÐ $ t Ðstates€as€follows:Ð  ` ÐÌà8  àProperty€shall€be€considered€marital€property€as€defined€by€this€subsection€for€theÐ è 8  Ðsole€purpose€of€dividing€assets€upon€divorce€or€legal€separation€and€for€no€otherÐ Ô$  Ðpurpose;€and€assets€distributed€as€marital€property€will€not€be€considered€as€incomeÐ À  Ðfor€child€support€or€alimony€purposes,€except€to€the€extent€the€asset€will€createÐ ¬ü  Ðadditional€income€after€the€division.Иè Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(E)(2001).€€Accordingly,€if€the€trial€court€awards€a€portion€of€theÐ pÀ Ðaccounts€to€Wife,€the€court€cannot€include€income€from€Wifeððs€portion€of€the€accounts€whenÐ \¬ Ðcalculating€Husbandððs€income€for€child€support€purposes.€€€€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àFinally,€Wife€contends€that€the€court€erred€by€appointing€Husband€the€trustee€of€theÐ  p Ðchildrenððs€accounts.€€The€court€found€that€Wife€had€questionable€spending€habits€that€could€lead€toÐ  \ Ðbankruptcy.€€Additionally,€Wife€testified€that€she€did€not€know€much€about€managing€money.€€OurÐ øH Ðreview€of€the€record€supports€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€appoint€Husband€the€trustee€of€theÐ ä4 Ðchildrenððs€accounts.€€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àWe€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€to€determine€Husbandððs€income€pursuant€to€thisÐ ¨ø Ðopinion.€€The€court€shall€then€determine€the€amount€of€child€support€due€under€the€guidelines.€€If€theÐ ”ä Ðcourt€finds€that€the€guideline€amount€is€unjust€or€inappropriate,€the€court€must€make€a€writtenÐ €Ð Ðfinding€to€that€extent€which€includes€a€justification€for€any€deviation€taking€into€consideration€theÐ l¼ Ðchildrenððs€best€interests.€€€€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà@ŒŒ'ìàò òòòAlimonyˆÐ 0"€  Ðó óóóÌà0  àThe€court€awarded€rehabilitative€alimony€to€Wife.€€In€its€award,€the€court€ordered€that€Ð$T"(#(# ÐHusband€pay€Wife€$5,000€per€month€for€five€years,€$3,000€per€month€for€three€years,€and€$1,500Ð ð$@ # Ðper€month€for€two€years.€€Wife€contends€that€the€court€erred€in€its€award€and€should€have€orderedÐ Ü%,!$ Ðalimony€ò òòòin€futuroóóó ó.€€Based€on€our€review€of€the€record,€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€alimony€is€notÐ È&"% Ðcontrary€to€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€However,€in€light€of€our€remand€to€the€trial€court€toÐ ´'#& Ðreconsider€its€distribution€of€the€partiesðð€marital€property€in€accordance€with€this€opinion,€the€courtÐ  (ð#' Ðmust€reconsider€its€award€of€rehabilitative€alimony€as€well.€€Section€36„5„101(d)(1)(G)€&€(H)€of€theÐ ° ÐTennessee€Code€states€that€the€trial€court€must€consider€the€separate€assets€of€each€party€in€additionÐ œì Ðto€the€distribution€of€the€partiesðð€marital€property€when€awarding€alimony.€€Accordingly,€we€remandÐ ˆØ Ðthis€case€to€the€trial€court€for€the€reconsideration€of€alimony.Ð tÄ ÐÌà@••!ìàòòò òGrounds€for€Divorceó óóóˆÐ L œ ÐÌà  àWifeððs€next€issue€concerns€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€grant€the€divorce€to€Husband€on€theÐ  p Ðgrounds€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€Wife€maintains€that€the€courtððs€decision€was€motivatedÐ  \ Ðby€its€bias€toward€Husband€and€was€not€based€upon€an€objective€review€of€the€record.׃#×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€WifeÐ ø H  Ðcontends€that€the€court€should€have€awarded€her€the€divorce€as€she€was€the€party€less€at€fault.€€Ð ä 4  ÐÌà  àGrounds€for€divorce€are€governed€by€statute€in€Tennessee.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔChastainÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔChastainÔ_Ôóóó ó,€559Ð ¼  ÐS.W.2d€933,€934€(Tenn.€1977).€€One€cause€of€divorce€of€importance€to€this€case€is€when€ð ð[Ô_Ôt]heÔ_ÔÐ ¨ø  Ðhusband€or€wife€is€guilty€of€such€cruel€and€inhuman€treatment€or€conduct€towards€the€spouse€asÐ ”ä  Ðrenders€cohabitation€unsafe€and€improper€which€may€also€be€referred€to€in€[the]€pleadings€asÐ €Ð  Ðinappropriate€marital€conduct€.€.€.€.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„101(11)€(2001).€€Essentially,Ð l¼ Ðinappropriate€marital€conduct€is€when€ð ðeither€or€both€of€the€parties€[have]€engaged€in€a€course€ofÐ X¨ Ðconduct€which€(1)€caused€pain,€anguish€or€distress€to€the€other€party€and€(2)€rendered€continuedÐ D” Ðcohabitation€ððimproper,ðð€ððunendurable,ðð€ððintolerable,ðð€or€ððunacceptable.ðððð€€òòò òEarls€v.€Earlsó óóó,€42€S.W.3dÐ 0€ Ð877,€892€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000)€(Cottrell,€J.,€concurring)€(citations€omitted).€€€òòò òÐ l ÐÌà  àó óóóThe€trial€courtððs€assessment€of€witness€credibility€is€important€when€deciding€whether€a€partyÐ ð@ Ðshould€be€awarded€a€divorce€on€the€grounds€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€òòò òÔ_ÔNewberryÔ_Ô€v.Ð Ü, ÐÔ_ÔNewberryÔ_Ôó óóó,€493€S.W.2d€99,€101€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1973).€€In€ò òòòÔ_ÔNewberryÔ_Ôóóó ó,€we€stated€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôt]heÔ_Ô€existenceÐ È Ðof€such€continuous€refined€cruelty€can€best€be€determined€by€the€trier€of€facts€who€has€seen€theÐ ´ Ðparties€face€to€face€and€who€has€observed€their€manner€and€demeanor€as€well€as€that€of€theirÐ  ð Ðrespective€witnesses.ððò òòò€€Id.€€Ð ŒÜ ÐÌà  àóóó óIn€this€case,€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€awardÐ `° ÐHusband€the€divorce€on€the€grounds€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€The€record€contains€proof€thatÐ L œ Ðboth€parties€contributed€to€the€downfall€of€this€marriage.€€The€court€found€that€Wifeððs€conductÐ 8!ˆ Ðconstituted€a€higher€degree€of€fault€than€Husbandððs,€however,€citing€Wifeððs€abuse€of€alcohol,€her€useÐ $"t  Ðof€illegal€drugs,€her€conduct€that€was€intentionally€designed€to€hurt€Husband,€her€conduct€that€wasÐ #`! Ðinappropriate€in€public,€and€her€affair.€€Additionally,€in€the€months€preceding€Husbandððs€action€forÐ ü#L" Ðdivorce,€the€record€also€establishes€that€Wife€began€to€stay€out€late€at€night€and€refused€to€tellÐ è$8 # ÐHusband€her€location.€€Much€of€this€proof€was€corroborated€by€other€witnesses€at€trial,€includingÐ Ô%$!$ ÐWife.€€Accordingly,€the€record€demonstrates€that€Wifeððs€conduct€caused€pain,€anguish€and€distressÐ À&"% Ðto€Husband€that€rendered€cohabitation€unacceptable€and€unendurable.€€Further,€the€court€specificallyÐ ¬'ü"& Ðfound€that€ð ðmuch€of€the€testimony€of€Wife€was€not€credible,€particularly€as€it€relates€to€finances€orÐ ˜(è#' Ðthe€conduct€of€Husband.ðð€€In€light€of€our€review€of€the€record€and€the€trial€courtððs€finding€regardingÐ ° ÐWifeððs€credibility,€the€trial€court€did€not€err€in€granting€the€divorce€to€Husband€on€the€grounds€ofÐ œì Ðinappropriate€marital€conduct.€€€€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà@‡‡#ìàòòò òAttorneyððs€feesˆÐ `° ÐÌà  àó óóóIn€Wifeððs€next€issue,€she€contends€that€the€court€erred€in€assessing€Wife€her€attorneyððs€feesÐ 0 € Ðand€court€costs.€€Wife€relies€in€part€on€Rule€403€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence.€€Pursuant€toÐ  l Ðthis€rule,€relevant€evidence€may€be€excluded€if€its€probative€value€is€substantially€outweighed€byÐ  X Ðð ðconsiderations€of€undue€delay,€waste€of€time,€or€needless€presentation€of€cumulative€evidence.ðð€Ð ô D  ÐTenn.€R.€Ô_ÔEvidÔ_Ô.€403.€€Wife€argues€that€the€trial€court€caused€her€to€incur€substantial€attorneyððs€feesÐ à 0  Ðand€expenses€by€permitting€Husband€to€ð ðput€on€four€weeks€of€cumulative€evidence€relating€to€WifeððsÐ Ì  Ðfault.ðð€€Ð ¸  ÐÌà  àIn€a€divorce€case,€an€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€is€treated€as€an€award€of€alimony€ò òòòin€solidoóóó ó.€Ð à  Ðòòò òÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôó óóó,€986€S.W.2d€220,€235€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998);€òòò òÔ_ÔHerreraÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔHerreraÔ_Ôóóó ó,€944€S.W.2dÐ |Ì  Ð379,€390€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€Thus,€when€determining€whether€to€award€attorneyððs€fees,€the€trialÐ h¸ Ðcourt€is€required€to€consider€the€same€factors€used€when€considering€a€request€for€alimony.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔKincaidÔ_ÔÐ T¤ Ðv.€Ô_ÔKincaidÔ_Ôóóó ó,€912€S.W.2d€140,€144€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€As€with€alimony,€need€is€the€critical€factorÐ @ Ðto€be€considered€by€the€court€when€deciding€whether€to€award€attorneyððs€fees.€ò òòòóóó ó€ò òòòÔ_ÔHerreraÔ_Ôó óóó,€944€S.W.2dÐ ,| Ðat€390.€€An€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€is€proper€when€one€spouse€is€disadvantaged€and€does€not€haveÐ h Ðsufficient€resources€with€which€to€pay€attorneyððs€fees.ò òòò€€Id.óóó ó€€The€question€of€whether€to€awardÐ T Ðattorneyððs€fees,€and€the€amount€thereof,€are€largely€left€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€courtò òòò€óóó óand€willÐ ð@ Ðnot€be€disturbed€on€appeal€unless€the€trial€court€clearly€abused€that€discretion.€€òòò òAaron€v.€Aaron,ó óóó€909Ð Ü, ÐS.W.2d€408,€411€(Tenn.€1995).Ð È ÐÌà  àIn€its€decision,€the€trial€court€determined€that€ð ðwhile€the€fault€of€the€breakup€of€the€marriageÐ  ð Ðfalls€more€heavily€on€Wife,€each€party€contributed€to€the€protracted€nature€of€this€litigation€and€bothÐ ŒÜ Ðparties€have€sufficient€liquid€assets€to€pay€their€[own]€attorney€fees.ðð€€Thereafter,€the€court€refusedÐ xÈ Ðto€award€attorneyððs€fees€to€either€party.€€From€our€review€of€the€record,€the€trial€court€did€not€abuseÐ d´ Ðits€discretion€by€refusing€to€award€Wife€her€attorneyððs€fees.€€When€Husband€filed€for€the€divorce,Ð P   ÐWifeððs€William€Blair€Account€had€a€balance€of€over€$700,000.€€Wife€paid€her€attorneyððs€fees€fromÐ