ÿWPC> 0# °UN» %  0(b 7U:Cw@}4½Ñà 0Jè 0T2 0^† 0hä 0rL 0|¾ 0†: 0À 1uP 0dÅU>) AQg Ƹ 0D~ 0@ 0D U*F D/p BŸ B¼ D3Ù B) DC5 AMx (Å v~í vÓk˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù -,ó‚ AZ"Arial Regular PQDRUSTUDVDWXÓ€bê‚_#3|xb2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó< Œ 9p`(Arial(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxd% Line 7 d****7Border 1dd!#+Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€%ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€%XÔÌÌApril€15,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿáùEG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÑ Ü ÑÑ X ÑÑ\R AØ'\Ñò òÔ€¼ÔÔ€%ÔÑ€ÑÑ7€3hXXdðdÈ7Ñ›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÙ€!ÙœßR€,-+A1-j|¬E` ç `€€@ÿRß›à@ àAT€NASHVILLEó óÔ€%XÔÌÌÌÌÌJOE€ERWIN€and€SUSAN€ERWIN,à à)Ìas€surviving€parents€and€next€of€kinà à)Ìof€BETHANY€SUZANNE€ERWIN,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9706„CV„00248ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àMaury€CircuitÌJAMES€M.€ROSE,€WADE€MATHENY,€à à)à àNo.€5932à àà àà àà àÌin€his€capacity€as€Sheriff€of€Mauryà à)ÌCounty,€Tennessee,€MAURY€COUNTYà à)ÌSHERIFFððS€DEPARTMENT,€MAURYà à)ÌCOUNTY,€TENNESSEE,€andà àà à)ÌTRACY€JOE€LOVELL,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€MAURY€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€COLUMBIA,€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€WILLIAM€œB.›€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌPAUL€A.€BATESÌCHRISTOPHER€V.€SOCKWELLÌP.€O.€Box€357ÌLawrenceburg,€Tennessee€38464Ìà àAttorneys€for€Plaintiffs/AppellantsÌÌALAN€M.€SOWELLÌ150€Second€Avenue€North,€Suite€201ÌNashville,€Tennessee€37201„1931Ìà àAttorney€for€Defendants/Appellees€James€M.€Rose€Ìà àand€Maury€County,€TennesseeÌÌT.€EDWARD€LAWWELLÌ610€North€Garden€StreetÌP.€O.€Box€1017ÌColumbia,€Tennessee€38402Ìà àAttorney€for€œAppellee€Tennessee›€Farmers€Mutual€Insurance€CompanyÌÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED€IN€PART;€REVERSED€IN€PART;Ìà@ àAND€REMANDEDÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌCONCUR:ÌTODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌKOCH,€J.ÌÇÑ ° ÑÓÓò òÔ€%„Ôòòà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÔ€%XÔÌÌà àà àThis€case€involves€questions€of€the€liability€of€a€municipality€and€itsÏagents€under€the€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act.€€It€also€involves€a€question€ofÏthe€liability€of€a€plaintiffððs€underinsured€motorist€carrier€when€the€plaintiff€hasÏrecovered€from€the€tort„feasor€more€than€the€policy€limits.€€We€affirm€the€lowerÏcourtððs€order€on€the€liability€of€the€municipality€and€its€agents€and€œthe›€orderÏdismissing€the€claim€against€the€underinsured€motorist€œcarrier.€€We€reverse€theÏorder€awarding€prejudgment€interest€because€it€raises€the€recovery€from€theÏmunicipality€over€the€allowable€limit.›ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àà àOn€February€12,€1993,€œMaury›€County€Deputy€œSheriff€Mike€Rose›Ïœobserved€a€white€Mustang€pass€another€car€in€a€no„passing€zone€onÏCampbellsville€Pike.€€Deputy€Rose€pursued€the€Mustang€in€a€southerly€directionÏon€the€narrow,€crooked,€two„lane€road.€€The€driver,€later€identified€as€Tracy€JoeÏLovell,€did€not€heed€Deputy›€Roseððs€blue€lights€and€siren,€œbut€sped›€œaway.€€DeputyÏRose€followed€in€hot€pursuit.›ÌÌà àà àDeputy€Rose€was€driving€a€1987€Dodge€with€more€than€100,000Ïmiles€on€it.€€The€car€frame€had€been€welded€together€by€a€jail€trustee€and€theÍcarððs€shocks€and€brakes€were€not€in€good€condition.€€About€three€miles€fromÏwhere€the€chase€began€Deputy€Rose€lost€control€of€the€car€coming€out€of€a€curveÏand€crashed€head„on€into€a€car€being€driven€by€Bethany€Suzanne€Erwin,€aÏstudent€at€Middle€Tennessee€State€University.€€Ms.€Erwin€was€pronounced€deadÏshortly€thereafter.ÌÌœà àà àMs.€Erwinððs€parents€filed€a€wrongful€death€action€against€Mr.€Lovell,ÏDeputy€Rose,€the€Maury€County€Sheriff,€and€Maury€County.€€The€plaintiffs€alsoÏserved€a€copy€of€the€complaint€on€their€underinsured€motorist€carrier€which€hadÏissued€to€them€a€policy€with€$100,000€in€coverage€for€harm€caused€by€anÏunderinsured€motorist.€€In€an€amended€complaint,€the€plaintiffs€added€a€claimÏagainst€Mr.€Rose,€the€sheriff,€and€Maury€County€for€violating€the€decedentððs€civilÏrights€under€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983.ÌÌà àà àPrior€to€trial,€the€lower€court€granted€summary€judgment€to€the€sheriffÏand€partial€summary€judgment€to€the€county,€limiting€the€countyððs€liability€toÏ$130,000€or€the€amount€of€the€sheriffððs€bond.€€The€courtððs€action€in€dismissing€theÏsheriff€is€not€challenged€on€appeal.ÌÌà àà àThe€lower€court€bifurcated€the€trial,€trying€the€case€against€DeputyÏRose€and€the€county€first.€€The€court€apportioned€fifty€percent€of€the€fault€to€DeputyÏRose€and€fifty€percent€to€Tracy€Joe€Lovell.€€The€court€found€the€damages€to€be€inÍexcess€of€$1,000,000€but€limited€the€countyððs€liability€to€$130,000€under€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€29„20„403(2)(A).€€Pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„310,€theÏcourt€dismissed€the€claim€against€Deputy€Rose€altogether.ÌÌà àà àThe€court€then€tried€the€case€against€Mr.€Lovell€to€a€jury.€€The€juryÏreturned€a€verdict€for€$1,000,000,€finding€Mr.€Lovell€eighty„four€percent€at€faultÏand€Deputy€Rose€sixteen€percent€at€fault.ÌÌà àà àThe€underinsured€motorist€carrier€moved€for€summary€judgment€onÏthe€Erwins›ðð€claim€under€the€policy.€€œFinding›€that€Mr.€Lovell€had€a€$25,000€liabilityÏpolicy€and€that€the€county€had€paid€the€$130,000€judgment€against€it,€the€trialÏjudge€dismissed€the€claim€against€the€underinsured€carrier.ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌÌà àà àThe€appellants€argue€that€the€acts€of€Deputy€Rose€were€willful,€thusÏrendering€him€personally€liable€for€the€decedentððs€death€and€rendering€the€countyÏliable€for€an€amount€in€excess€of€$130,000.€€This€argument€is€based€on€anÏinterpretation€of€the€rather€confusing€language€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„310(c):ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àNo€claim€may€be€brought€against€an€employeeÏor€judgment€entered€against€an€employee€for€injuryÏproximately€caused€by€an€act€or€omission€of€theÏemployee€within€the€scope€of€the€employeeððsÍemployment€for€which€the€governmental€entity€isÏimmune€in€any€amount€in€excess€of€the€amountsÏestablished€for€governmental€entities€in€ðð€29„20„403Ïunless€the€act€or€omission€was€willful,€malicious,Ïcriminal€or€performed€for€personal€financial€gain,€.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àWe€are€of€the€opinion,€however,€that€this€section€has€nothing€to€doÏwith€the€countyððs€liability.€€It€provides€a€limited€immunity€for€the€countyððsÏemployees.€€The€countyððs€immunity€has€been€abolished€in€other€sections€of€theÏAct,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„202,€203,€204€and€205,€but€the€countyððs€liabilityÏis€limited€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„311:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àNo€judgment€or€award€rendered€against€aÏgovernmental€entity€may€exceed€the€minimumÏamounts€of€insurance€coverage€for€death,€bodily€injuryÏand€property€damage€liability€specified€in€ðð€29„20„403,Ïunless€such€governmental€entity€has€securedÏinsurance€coverage€in€excess€of€said€minimumÏrequirements,€in€which€event€the€judgment€or€awardÏmay€not€exceed€the€applicable€limits€provided€in€theÏinsurance€policy.ÌÌÓÓThe€minimum€limits€of€liability€are€now€set€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„403(B)(2)(A)€at€$130,000€for€an€injury€to€or€death€of€a€single€person.€€We€findÏnothing€in€the€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act€that€would€increase€that€liabilityÏunless€the€county€obtains€liability€insurance€in€a€greater€amount.€€òòId.óóÌÌà àà àWith€respect€to€the€employee,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„310(c)Ïshould€be€read€in€conjunction€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„310(b):ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àNo€claim€may€be€brought€against€an€employeeÏor€judgment€entered€against€an€employee€for€damagesÏfor€which€the€immunity€of€the€governmental€entity€isÏremoved€by€this€chapter€unless€the€claim€is€one€forÏmedical€malpractice€brought€against€a€health€careÏœpractitioner.›ÌÌÓÓReading€the€two€sections€together,€it€is€obvious€that€the€legislature€wished€to€limitÏthe€exposure€of€municipal€employees€while€œit€selectively›€œremoved›€the€immunity€ofÏthe€municipality€itself.€€It€did€so€in€two€ways:€(1)€by€giving€the€employee€absoluteÏimmunity€in€cases€where€the€municipalityððs€immunity€was€removed€(subsectionÏ(b)),€and€(2)€by€limiting€the€employeeððs€liability€in€œcases›€œin€which€the€municipalityÏwas€yet€immune€to›€the€limits€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„403€„„€unless€theÏemployeeððs€acts€were€willful,€malicious,€criminal,€or€performed€for€personalÏfinancial€gain€(subsection€(c)).ÌÌà àà àœThe›€countyððs€immunity€for€injuries€caused€by€the€negligent€operationÏof€an€automobile€has€been€removed€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„202.€€Thus,€ifÏwe€are€correct€in€our€interpretation€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„310(b),€œDeputyÏRose›€has€an€absolute€immunity€for€the€acts€that€led€to€the€countyððs€liability.€€TheÏtrial€judge€acted€correctly€in€dismissing€Deputy€Rose,€whether€his€actions€underÏthe€circumstances€could€be€labeled€willful€or€not.ÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌÌà àà àThe€appellants€also€assert€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€dismissing€theÏclaims€based€on€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983.€€The€federal€act€states:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àEvery€person€who,€under€color€œof›€any€statute,Ïordinance,€regulation,€custom€or€usage,€of€any€State€orÏTerritory€or€the€District€of€Columbia,€subjects€or€causesÏto€be€œsubjected,›€any€citizen€of€the€United€States€orÏother€person€within€the€jurisdiction€thereof€to€theÏdeprivation€of€any€rights,€privileges€or€immunitiesÏsecured€by€the€Constitution€and€œlaws,›€shall€be€liable€toÏthe€party€injured€in€an€action€of€law,€suit€in€equity,€orÏother€proper€proceeding€for€redress.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àAs€the€trial€judge€noted,€ð ðThere€is€no€convenient€place€this€side€ofÏthe€Magna€œCarta›€to€start€this€analysis.ðð€€Therefore,€the€only€way€to€proceed€is€toÏplunge€in€and€note€at€the€outset€that€the€liability€of€the€deputy€rests€on€significantlyÏdifferent€factors€than€does€the€liability€of€the€county.€€The€countyððs€liability€cannotÏbe€based€on€œrespondeat›€superior,€òòœMonell›€v.€œDepððt›€of€Soc.€œServs›.óó,€436€U.S.€œ658,Ï692›€(1978),€but€the€county€may€be€liable,€based€on€its€own€conduct,€even€ifÏDeputy€Rose€did€not€commit€a€constitutional€violation€in€his€individual€capacity.€ÏòòWilliams€v.€City€and€County€of€Denveróó,€99€F.œ3d›€1009€(œ10th›€Cir.€1996).ÌÌà@ àò òa.€€Deputy€Roseó óÌÌà àà àIn€order€to€establish€a€claim€against€an€individual€under€ðð€1983,€theÏplaintiff€must€show€more€than€a€mere€act€of€negligence.€€òòDaniels€v.€Williamsóó,€474ÏU.S.€œ327,€330›€(1986).€€In€òòœNishiyama›€v.€œDickson›€Co.óó,€814€F.œ2d›€277€(œ6th›€Cir.€1987),Íthe€Sixth€Circuit€Court€of€Appeals€held€that€something€on€the€order€of€grossÏnegligence€or€outrageous€conduct€was€necessary€to€œgive›€rise€to€an€action€underÏðð€1983€(something€showing€a€deliberate€indifference€to€the€public€safety).€€OtherÏcircuits€have€also€adopted€something€less€than€the€ð ðconscience„shockingððÏstandard€initially€set€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€in€òòœRochin›€v.€Californiaóó,Ï342€U.S.€165€(1952).€€òòSee€Medina€v.€City€and€County€of€Denveróó,€960€F.œ2d›€1493Ï(œ10th›€Cir.€1992);€òòLewis€v.€Sacramento€Countyóó,€98€F.œ3d›€434€(œ9th›€Cir.€1996).€€TheÏSupreme€Court,€however,€reiterated€its€ð ðconscience„shockingðð€standard€in€œòòCollinsÏv.€City›€of€œHarker›€Heightsóó,€503€U.S.€115€(1992),€and€the€Sixth€Circuit€had€toÏconcede€that€òòœNishiyama›óó€probably€did€not€survive€òòœHarker›€Heightsóó.€€òòSee€œLewellen›Ïv.€Metropolitan€Government€of€Nashvilleóó,€34€F.œ3d›€345€(œ6th›€Cir.€1994).€€What€isÏrequired€is€a€deliberate€act,€an€act€that€is€ð ðarbitrary€in€the€constitutional€sense.ðð€€òòId.óóÏat€œ351.›ÌÌà àà àEven€under€its€lesser€òòœNishiyama›óó€standard€the€Sixth€Circuit€held€thatÏengaging€in€a€high€speed€chase€that€results€in€a€tragic€death€did€not€result€inÏliability€under€ðð€1983.€€òòSee€Jones€v.€œSherrill›óó,€827€F.œ2d›€1102€(œ6th›€Circ.€1987).€€TheÏonly€difference€between€òòJonesóó€òòv.€Sherrillóó€and€this€case€is€the€œfact›€that€DeputyÏRoseððs€car€had€some€mechanical€problems€that€were€known€to€him€and€thatÏaffected€the€carððs€safety.€€We€are€persuaded,€however,€that€those€facts€do€notÏmake€this€a€case€involving€œan€arbitrary,€deliberate€deprivation€of€constitutionalÍrights.›€€The€trial€judge€found€that€the€acts€of€Deputy€Rose€were€negligent€but€notÏintentional.€€We€agree.ÌÌà0 àà àà@ àò òb.€€The€Countyó óÌÌà àà àAs€we€have€indicated,€the€countyððs€liability€in€a€ðð€1983€claim€is€notÏbased€on€œrespondeat›€superior.€€œTo€be€liable,€the›€county€itself€must€be€found€toÏhave€engaged€in€the€same€conduct€that€would€give€rise€to€liability€on€the€part€ofÏan€individual.€€òòœTemkin›€v.€Frederick€County€Commissionersóó,€945€F.œ2d›€716€(1991).ÌÌà àà àIn€this€case,€the€appellants€assert€that€the€countyððs€failure€to€trainÏDeputy€Rose€amounts€to€a€deliberate€indifference€to€the€rights€of€the€public.€€òòSeeÏSanford€v.€Metropolitan€Governmentóó,€No.€œ01A01„9606„CV„00251,€(filed€inÏNashville,›€Jan.€24,€œ1997,€òòperm.›€to€appeal€œgranted€Oct.€6,€1997,€settled€while€onÏappealóó).›€€We€do€not€agree.€€Even€if€òòSanfordððsóó€ð ðdeliberate€indifferenceðð€standard€isÏcorrect,€the€record€shows€that€Deputy€Rose€was€trained€at€the€Tennessee€LawÏEnforcement€Training€Academy€and€that€he€received€the€same€amount€of€trainingÏas€any€other€police€officer€in€the€state.€€He€had€been€furnished€a€copy€of€theÏpursuit€policy€developed€and€used€by€the€Metropolitan€Government€of€Nashville.€€Ìà àÌà àà àTo€establish€their€inadequate€training€claim,€the€appellants€offeredÏthe€testimony€of€an€expert€who€looked€at€Deputy€Roseððs€training€and€classified€itÍas€broad€and€vague,€leaving€too€much€to€the€discretion€or€judgment€of€theÏindividual€officer.€€He€testified€that€the€ð ðjudgmentalðð€policy€adopted€by€MauryÏCounty€was€not€a€bad€policy€but€required€much€more€training€to€teach€an€officerÏhow€to€react€to€a€pursuit€situation.ÌÌà àà àœWhile›€a€finding€of€negligence€might€be€based€on€the€expertððsÏtestimony,€we€cannot€accept€his€conclusion€that€the€Maury€County€trainingÏregimen€amounted€to€a€deliberate€indifference€to€the€rights€of€the€public.€€DeputyÏRose€was€trained€at€the€academy€that€œtrains›€most€of€the€officers€in€Tennessee.€ÏœHis›€training€might€have€fallen€short€of€the€œideal,›€but€the€county€did€not€deliberatelyÏand€knowingly€put€an€untrained€officer€on€the€streets.ÌÌà@ àò òIV.ó óÌÌà àà àThe€appellants€also€argue€that€the€trial€judge€erred€in€dismissing€theÏclaim€against€Tennessee€Farmers€Mutual€Insurance€Co.€under€its€underinsuredÏmotorist€coverage.€€While€acknowledging€that€the€claim€would€be€barred€by€theÏprior€decisions€of€our€Supreme€Court€and€this€court,€the€appellants€cite€anÏunpublished€opinion€of€the€Eastern€Section€of€this€court€holding€that€afterÏòòMcIntyre€v.€œBalentine›óó,€the€payments€received€from€other€tort„œfeasors›€cannot€beÏcredited€to€the€insurance€company.€€òòSee€Cox€v.€Neway„Love€Distributors,€Inc.óó,ÏNo.€œ03A01›„9510„CV„00335€(filed€in€Knoxville,€Jan.€11,€œ1996,€òòperm.›€to€appealÍgranted€June€3,€1996,€settled€while€on€appealóó).€€The€Eastern€Section€reasonedÏthat€since€defendants€are€no€longer€jointly€œliable,›€a€payment€by€one€defendantÏdoes€not€apply€to€the€liability€of€another.€€Therefore,€a€payment€by€oneÏdefendantððs€insurance€company€would€not€benefit€the€insurance€carrier€havingÏthe€uninsured„underinsured€coverage.ÌÌà àà àWhile€òòMcIntyre€v.€œBalentine›óó€did€abolish€joint€liability,€we€do€not€thinkÏit€changed€the€statutes€that€govern€uninsured„underinsured€motorist€insurance€orÏthe€private€contract€policy€provisions€that€have€been€consistently€construed€toÏgive€the€insurance€company€the€credit€it€seeks€in€this€case.ÌÌà àà àStarting€with€òòTerry€v.€œAetna›€Casualty€and€Surety€Co.óó,€510€S.W.2dÏ509€(Tenn.€1974),€our€Supreme€Court€interpreted€the€uninsured€motorist€statutesÏas€requiring€only€limited€coverage€up€to€the€statutory€required€minimum€forÏfinancial€responsibility.€€In€òòTerryóó€the€Court€said:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIt€results,€and€we€so€hold,€by€enactment€of€œT.C.A.›€œðð›€56„11„1152€òò(now€56„7„1205)óó€as€a€section€of€ourÏuninsured€motorist€statute,€it€is€the€legislative€purposeÏto€provide€an€insured€motorist€a€right€of€recovery€underÏthe€uninsured€motorist€provision€of€his€policy€only€toÏthe€statutory€requirement€minimum€(œT.C.A.›€œðð€56„7„1148)›€and€œprovisions›€in€such€policies,€approved€by€theÏCommissioner€of€Insurance,€operating€to€reduce€suchÏcoverage€where€such€coverage€or€benefits€areÏavailable€to€the€insured€arising€from€œaccident›€causingÏthe€loss,€are€valid€if€such€provisions€do€not€operate€toÏdeny€œpayments›€to€the€insured€of€less€than€the€statutoryÏœminimum.ÌÌ510€S.W.2d€at€513.›ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àFurthermore,€an€uninsured€motor€vehicle€is€defined€in€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€56„7„1202(a)€as:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àFor€the€purposes€of€this€coverage,€ððuninsured€motoristÏvehicleðð€means€a€motor€vehicle€whose€ownership,Ïmaintenance,€or€use€has€resulted€in€the€bodily€injury,Ïdeath€or€damage€to€property€of€an€insured,€and€forÏwhich€the€sum€of€the€limits€of€liability€available€to€theÏinsured€under€all€valid€and€collectible€insuranceÏpolicies,€bonds,€and€securities€applicable€to€the€bodilyÏinjury,€death,€or€damage€to€property€is€less€than€theÏapplicable€limits€of€uninsured€motorist€coverageÏprovided€to€the€insured€under€the€policy€against€whichÏthe€claim€is€made.ÌÌÌÌà àà àTennessee€Farmersðð€policy€specifically€provides:ÌÌà8 àà8 àOur€limit€of€liability€for€this€Uninsured€MotoristÏCoverage€shall€be€reduced€by€the€sum€of€the€limitsÏpayable€under€all€liability€and/or€primary€uninsuredÏmotorist€insurance€policies,€bonds€and€securitiesÏapplicable€to€the€bodily€injury€or€the€death€of€theÏcovered€person.ÌÌà àà à.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà8 àDamages€payable€under€this€coverage€to€or€for€aÏcovered€person€shall€be€reduced€by:ÌÌà8 àà8 à1.à àthe€amount€paid€under€the€Liability€and€MedicalÏpayments€Coverages€of€this€policy€or€any€otherÏautomobile€insurance€policy;Ìà8 àà8 à2.à àthe€amount€paid€or€payable€under€any€workersððÏcompensation€law,€disability€benefit€law,€or€similar€law;Ìà8 àà8 à3.à àa€payment€made€by€or€on€behalf€of€the€owner€orÏoperator€of€the€uninsured€motor€vehicle€or€by€or€onÏbehalf€of€the€person€or€entity€who€may€be€legally€liable.ÌÌà àà à.€.€.€ÌÌà8 àà8 àWe€shall€not€be€obligated€to€make€any€payment€underÏthis€Uninsured€Motorist€Coverage€until€after€the€limitsÏof€liability€under€all€bodily€injury,€liability€bonds€orÏinsurance€policies€applicable€at€the€time€of€theÏaccident€have€been€exhausted€by€payments€ofÏjudgments€or€settlements.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àPerhaps€the€strongest€œstatement›€of€the€effect€of€these€statutory€andÏpolicy€provisions€can€be€found€in€òòThompson€œv.€Parker,€óó606€S.W.2d€538€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1980).€€In€applying›€the€Supreme€œCourtððs›€decision€in€òòState€AutomobileÏMutual€Insurance€Co.€v.€Cummingsóó,€519€S.€W.œ2d›€773€(Tenn.€1975)€the€Court€said:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àœð ðWe›€œunderstandòò€Cummings›óó€to€mean€that€theÏuninsured€motorist€insurance€statutes€of€this€stateÏprovide€less€than€broad€coverage€since€the€legislatureÏhad€permitted€uninsured€motorist€policies€to€be€writtenÏso€as€to€ððinclude€such€terms,€exclusions,€limitations,Ïconditions,€and€offsets,€which€are€designed€to€avoidÏduplication€of€insurance€and€other€benefits.ðð€€(œT.C.A.›€ððÏ56„7„1205).€€We€further€understand€òòCummingsóó€toÏmean€that€the€legal€liability€of€more€than€one€tort„feasorÏor€the€involvement€of€multiple€vehicles€in€one€tortiousÏevent€or€accident€is€immaterial€as€to€the€interpretationÏof€exclusions,€permitted€by€œT.C.A.›€ðð€56„7„1205,€whichÏallow€an€œinsuror›€by€contract€to€reduce€its€liability€by€anyÏsums€paid€to€œits€insured›€by€other€parties€jointly€orÏseverally€liable€to€the€insured.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àœð ðIn›€addition€we€observe€uninsured€motoristÏinsurance€does€not€actually€insure€the€uninsuredÏmotorist.€€It€insures€the€insured€and€assures€him€œto›Ïsome€recovery€when€the€other€parties€do€not€haveÍliability€insurance.€€The€statute,€œT.CA›.€ðð€56„7„1205,Ïpermits€the€œinsuror,›€by€contract,€to€offset€its€liability€toÏthe€insured€by€whatever€amount€of€money€fromÏwhatever€source€the€insured€may€receive€it,€if€theÏmoney€from€the€outside€source€would€be€a€duplicationÏof€the€amount€agreed€to€be€paid€by€the€œinsuror.ððÌÌ606€S.W.2d€at€540.›ÌœÌ›ÌÌÓÓà àà àWe€are€persuaded€that€òòMcIntyre€v.€œBalentine›óó€did€not€affect€the€rightÏof€the€insurance€company€to€reduce€its€coverage€by€the€benefits€the€insuredÏreceives€from€whatever€source.ÌÌà@ àœò òV.ó ó›ÌÌà àà àThe€appellants€also€argue€that€liability€against€the€county€couldÏhave€been€imposed€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„8„301,€et€seq.€€In€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€8„8„301,€the€sheriff€is€given€an€absolute€immunity€for€the€acts€of€hisÏdeputies,€ð ðwhether€the€deputy€is€acting€by€virtue€of€office,€under€color€of€office€orÏotherwise.ðð€€But€the€following€section€œprovides:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àAnyone€incurring€any€wrong,€injury,€loss,Ïdamage€or€expense€resulting€from€any€act€or€failure€toÏact€on€the€part€of€any€deputy€appointed€by€the€sheriffÏmay€bring€suit€against€the€county€in€which€the€sheriffÏserves;€provided,€that€the€deputy€is,€at€the€time€of€suchÏoccurrence,€acting€by€virtue€of€or€under€color€of€theÏoffice.›Ìà8 àà8 àÌœTenn.›€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„8„302.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àIn€òòJenkins€v.€œLoudon›€Countyóó,€736€S.W.2d€603€(Tenn.€1987)€theÏSupreme€Court€had€to€parse€out€what€part,€if€any,€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„8„302Ïsurvived€the€adoption€of€the€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act€in€1973€œ(GTLA)€and›Ïits€subsequent€amendments.€€The€œCourt›€concluded€that€in€appropriate€cases€aÏcounty€could€still€be€sued€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„8„302€for€ð ðthe€non„negligent€conduct€of€deputies.ðð€€736€S.W.2d€at€609.€€The€œGTLA›€governed€œother›Ïcases.ÌÌà àà àWe€are€as€perplexed€as€the€trial€judge€œwas€as›€to€the€preciseÏmeaning€of€non„negligent€conduct.€€Perhaps€we€would€all€agree€that€intentionalÏconduct€is€non„negligent,€but€the€œGTLA›€retains€the€countyððs€immunity€for€manyÏintentional€torts,€for€instance,€ð ðmalicious€prosecution,€intentional€trespass,€abuseÏof€process,€libel,€slander,€deceit,€interference€with€contract€rights,€infliction€ofÏmental€anguish,€invasion€of€rights€or€privacy,€or€civil€rights.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ29„20„305(2).€€See€also€subsections€(5)€and€(6).ÌÌà àà àIf€we€ignore€the€immunities€retained€in€the€œGTLA›€for€certainÏintentional€conduct,€and€say€that€the€county€may€be€sued€therefor,€we€are€still€ofÏthe€opinion€that€the€conduct€of€Deputy€Rose€does€not€rise€to€œthat›€intentional€level.€ÏœÌÌà@ àò òVI.ó óÌÌà à›à àThe€county€has€raised€the€point€that€the€trial€judge€erred€in€enteringÏa€judgment€against€the€county€in€excess€of€the€$130,000€limit€set€in€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€29„20„404(a).€€The€excess€resulted€from€the€accrual€of€post„judgmentÏinterest€from€the€date€the€original€judgment€was€entered,€April€17,€1996,€until€itÏwas€paid€on€May€28,€1996.ÌÌà àà àIn€òòLucius€v.€City€of€Memphisóó,€925€S.W.2d€522€(Tenn.€1996),€theÏSupreme€Court€held€that€the€post„judgment€interest€statute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ47„14„121,€applied€to€judgments€against€governmental€entities€brought€under€theÏœGTLA›.€€In€that€case,€however,€the€judgments€were€for€$9,100€and€$35,000Ïrespectively,€and€the€addition€of€interest€did€not€increase€the€judgment€over€theÏlimit€set€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„404(a).ÌÌà àà àThe€county€argues€that€the€legislature,€when€it€said€in€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€29„20„404(a)€ð ða€governmental€entity€or€the€insurer€of€such€governmentalÏentity€shall€not€be€held€liable€for€an€judgment€in€excess€of€the€limits€of€liability€setÏforth€in€ðð€29„20„403,€unless€the€governmental€entity€has€expressly€waived€suchÏlimits,ðð€meant€that€the€€$130,000€limit€was€the€most€the€county€would€have€to€pay.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellants,€on€the€other€hand,€argue€that€òòLuciusóó€controls€or€thatÏthe€county€is€not€paying€more€than€a€œ$130,000›€judgment;€it€is€paying€oneÏjudgment€for€$130,000€and€another€for€the€post„judgment€interest.ÌÌà àà àWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€Supreme€Courtððs€opinion€in€òòLuciusóóÏdoes€not€address€this€issue.€€It€does€hold€that€judgments€against€governmentalÏentities€carry€post„judgment€interest,€but€it€did€not€involve€a€judgment€that€wasÏalready€at€the€maximum€allowed€by€law.€€We€are€also€of€the€opinion€that€theÏappellants€cannot€escape€the€prohibition€of€œðð€29„20„404(a)›€by€collecting€aÏjudgment€for€$130,000€and€another€for€post„judgment€interest€based€on€thatÏsame€judgment.€€In€that€case,€the€county€would€be€œð ðheld›€liable€for€a€judgment€inÏexcess€of€the€limits€of€liability€set€forth€in€œðð€29„20„403.ð𛀀Therefore,€we€reverse€theÏaward€of€post„judgment€interest€in€this€case.ÌÌà@ àœò òVII.ó ó›ÌÌà àà àThe€county€also€asserts€that€it€should€have€been€awardedÏdiscretionary€costs€under€Rule€54.04(2),€Tenn.€R.€œCiv›.€Proc.€€That€rule€allows€theÏcourt€to€award€certain€costs€other€than€those€prepared€by€the€clerk,€Rule€54.04(1),Ïð ðonly€in€the€courtððs€discretion.ðð€€We€œcannot›€say€that€the€court€œabused›€his€discretionÏin€this€case.€€This€issue€is,€therefore,€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àThe€judgment€of€the€court€below€awarding€post„judgment€interest€onÏthe€judgment€against€the€county€is€reversed.€€In€all€other€respects€it€is€affirmedÏand€the€cause€is€remanded€to€the€Circuit€œCourt›€of€Maury€County€for€any€furtherÏnecessary€proceedings.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€appellant.ÌÌà8 àà8 àÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÇÑ  ÑÑ X ÑÔ€%¼Ôò òà@ àœó ó›