ÿWPCÑ àœ¬‡‡Š§%?Çúdo¯¡ºFÒ+æ æLÊË0ìùž¬y¶47xÙ­Ô!ìçÌcCS’ôGÌ#Fidü0PýÚ…Ù^`qåÔÕWm¶Â)O£Hc¿þ ¦C ¿”Û‰ÞÙ—§3Æ-'ØÙϋԺ0X¢¿ã%‹ÞƑʸ)±›ØÀÑ ìúÀŬª]4¾CS›Ï¥QûløÄa¶<(a0ôHé‡Ù!T»Õ*ÃðXmœ¢ûxåÍc·ã§n5žsõ–™’¬Ý\2é½»c’‘Ž`´ußBËŽUúgS$÷€¼}Ü)A,;áíg\K*+¨â_ÉûÓqÎ~³È‘9qÁøŠ3¹ËíƒØÂ Õ%-ÅWÕøˆˆH[Š(}Óå‘LìqO ¶Þê ¢äп9éÕµ˜f:£Û<íè,$ý°€­Å'­}—óÉÊ!n"ú„-CdY1í„W•¥•¦(T¨Q%e«’xβ‰¡&Å3õþµZ ¦"½Ó\`Û:—¹ôÕLwGËŽ ozødßÄ1bä!Ö:¥¬ o¿zUɲÝHC;Lú—U4#œ zÄV)ŸËXŒUç/ÀR_ƒE#‡è¨À[Ü^áãšì$WP|jÆHb#Á\ % ^ # 0ˆ/ UN· w 4 z Ò— i x mz ¢‘ Æ3Æùƿƅ 0DKN 04‘ôÅE¹"»‘ÝUNnnn¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼¼bÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 0ëÌÌÌÌ B·· 0¤Ô D5x D-­ 0KÚÚ AS%Æx 0¤> 0Dâ A«&˜HP LaserJet 8000 Series PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0»ó‘5)â (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularûr') œ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ˜Ý ƒRÓ¸$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¨‚ ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWe€acknowledge€that€Justice€Holder€has€criticized€the€balancing€approach€adopted€by€the€Court€to€analyzeÐ ° Ðthe€issue€of€duty.€€Justice€Holder€has€noted€that€the€weighing€of€these€factors€is€normally€a€function€for€the€jury€inÐ tÄ Ðdetermining€whether€a€party€was€negligent.€€òòSee€ò òStaples,ó óóó€15€S.W.3d€at€93€(Holder,€J.,€concurring);€ò òòòRice,ó óóó€979€S.W.2dÐ 8ˆ Ðat€310€(Holder,€J.,€dissenting).€€To€date,€a€majority€of€the€High€Court€has€rejected€Justice€Holderððs€approach.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó&c$"ð"ðà0 à êÝ ƒRÓ¸$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¨‚ ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€plaintiffs€eventually€settled€their€suit€against€Peels,€and€that€action€is€not€a€subject€of€this€appeal. Ý ƒRÓ¸$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¨‚ ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔDr.€Richards€explained€in€his€deposition€that€ð ðconflictsðð€is€a€traffic€engineering€term€meaning€ð ðpotential€forÐ ° Ðcollision.ðð ‡Ý ƒRÓ¸$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¨‚ ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€support€of€her€contention€that€Peelsðð€vision€was€blocked,€the€plaintiffs€cite€Ms.€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_Ôðð€deposition€in€whichÐ ° Ðshe€asserts€that€she€could€see€only€the€front€end€of€Peelsðð€vehicle€before€it€pulled€out€onto€the€highway.€€The€fact€thatÐ tÄ ÐMs.€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_Ô€could€only€see€the€front€end€of€Peelsðð€vehicle,€however,€does€not€shed€any€light€on€what€Peels€could€or€couldÐ 8ˆ Ðnot€see€from€her€vantage€point.(ÆúI Z‹6Times New Roman Regular - ù-(|G2Ó¸$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€S,»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô%@ò»»Ô d(|3Mú$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€S,»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Mú$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€S,»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Q\»»d dÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼º»»»ÔÑ8€?œXXdê»»d 8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îºÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼º»îî #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓJune€2000€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XGFX»¼ºÔÌò òÔ#†¼º»XXGFî#ÔBRENDA€D.€Ô_ÔESTESÔ_Ô,€òòet€al.óó€v.€SANDRA€H.€PEELS,€òòet€alóó.Ô‡XGFX»¼ºÔó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Jefferson€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€12,587€€€€€€Ben€W.€Hooper,€II,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌfiled€September€21,€2000Ð ¾   Ðà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E1999„00582„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€Ð ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€case€arises€out€of€a€motor€vehicle€accident€that€occurred€when€a€vehicle€exited€a€manufacturingÐ xÈ  Ðplantððs€parking€lot€and€collided€with€the€plaintiffððs€vehicle€on€a€public€highway.€€Brenda€D.€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_ÔÐ d´ Ðand€her€husband€sued€the€owner€of€the€plant€for€negligence.€€The€trial€court€granted€the€plant€ownerÐ P  Ðsummary€judgment.€€We€hold€that,€under€the€circumstances€of€this€case,€the€plant€owner€did€not€oweÐ <Œ Ða€duty€of€care€to€the€plaintiff€and€therefore€affirm€the€grant€of€summary€judgment.Ð (x ÐÓÈÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€CourtÐ P ÐAffirmed;€Case€Remandedó óÐ ì< ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼º»àXGF’#ÔÔ‡XGFX.¼ºÔCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHouston€M.€Ô_ÔGoddardÔ_Ô,Ð Ä ÐÔ_ÔP.J.Ô_Ôóó€and€òòD.€Michael€Ô_ÔSwineyÔ_Ô,€J.óó,€joined.Ð ° ÐÌStanley€F.€Ô_ÔRodenÔ_Ô€and€Jody€S.€Ô_ÔRodenbornÔ_Ô,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellants,€Brenda€D.€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_ÔÐ ˆØ Ðand€Richard€W.€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_Ô.Ð tÄ ÐÌGene€P.€Gaby,€Ô_ÔGreenevilleÔ_Ô,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Magnavox€Corporation€and/or€NorthÐ L œ ÐAmerican€Philips€d/b/a€Philips€Consumer€Electronics€Corporation.€Ð 8!ˆ  ÐÓãÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼º»XXGF#ÔÔ‡XGFX»¼ºÔÐ #`" ÐòòóóÔ#†¼º»XXGF” #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€XGFX»¼ºÔÌÓ  ÓI.€€òòFactsÐ è$8 $ ÐóóÌÓ Óà  àOn€December€10,€1991,€the€plaintiff€Brenda€D.€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_Ô€was€driving€eastbound€on€Old€AndrewÐ À&"& ÐJohnson€Highway€near€the€entrance€to€a€manufacturing€plant€belonging€to€the€defendant€MagnavoxÐ ¬'ü"' ÐCorporation€and/or€North€American€Philips,€doing€business€as€Philips€Consumer€ElectronicsÐ ˜(è#( ÐCorporation€(ð ðPhilipsðð).€€Sandra€H.€Peels,€an€employee€of€Philips,€had€just€finished€her€work€shiftÐ „)Ô$) Ðand€was€attempting€to€exit€the€parking€lot€of€the€plant€to€proceed€westbound€on€the€highway.€€At€theÐ p*À%* Ðpoint€where€Peels€exited,€the€parking€lot€is€wide€enough€to€allow€two€vehicles€to€exit€simultaneously.€Ð \+¬&+ Ðâ âPeels€was€on€the€right€side€of€this€exit,€with€a€pickup€truck€parallel€to€her€vehicle€on€the€left.€€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_ÔÐ H,˜',ý Ðwas€approaching€the€plant€from€Peelsðð€left€when€Peels€pulled€out€onto€Old€Andrew€JohnsonÐ ° ÐHighway,€resulting€in€a€collision€with€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_Ô.€€Ð œì Ðâ âà  àÌà  àMs.€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_Ô€and€her€husband,€Richard€W.€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_Ô,€filed€this€action,€alleging€that€both€Peels€andÐ tÄ ÐPhilips€were€negligent.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Specifically,€the€plaintiffs€charged€that€Philips€had€failed€to€adequatelyÐ `° Ðcontrol€the€access€of€its€employees€to€the€highway,€which€allegedly€resulted€in€employees€being€ableÐ L œ Ðto€enter€the€highway€ð ðwithout€visual€sighting€of€oncoming€traffic.ðð€€The€plaintiffs€charged€thatÐ 8 ˆ ÐPhilips€had€prior€notice€or€knowledge€of€this€hazardous€condition€but€had€failed€to€take€correctiveÐ $ t Ðmeasures€to€restrict€access€onto€the€public€highway.€Ð  ` ÐÌà  àPhilips€moved€for€summary€judgment.€€In€support€of€its€motion,€Philips€submitted€theÐ è 8  Ðaffidavit€of€Bill€J.€Ô_ÔPetreÔ_Ô.€€In€his€capacity€as€manager€of€manufacturing€services€at€the€plant,€Ô_ÔPetreÔ_Ô€wasÐ Ô$  Ðresponsible€for€all€maintenance,€industrial€engineering,€and€manufacturing€engineering,€includingÐ À  Ðthe€plantððs€layout,€access€to€the€plant,€and€traffic€flow€patterns€on€the€premises.€€In€his€affidavit,€Ô_ÔPetreÔ_ÔÐ ¬ü  Ðstated€that€the€exit€at€which€the€accident€occurred€had€been€there€since€he€began€working€at€the€plantÐ ˜è  Ðin€1957.€€He€stated€that€he€knew€of€only€one€other€accident€at€that€location€during€that€time,€and€thatÐ „Ô  Ðaccident€had€involved€an€intoxicated€driver€driving€eastbound€on€the€highway€who€lost€control€andÐ pÀ Ðran€into€a€concrete€abutment.€€In€his€supplemental€affidavit,€Ô_ÔPetreÔ_Ô€stated€that€over€the€past€40€years,Ð \¬ Ðthe€plant€had€employed€an€average€of€800€employees€per€year€and€that€he€could€not€recall€any€otherÐ H˜ Ðaccidents€involving€vehicles€attempting€to€enter€or€exit€the€plant.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àIn€response€to€Philipsðð€motion,€the€plaintiffs€submitted€two€affidavits.€€First,€they€submittedÐ  \ Ðthe€affidavit€of€Britt€Farrar,€a€resident€of€Jefferson€County€for€a€number€of€years,€who€stated€that€heÐ øH Ðhad€personally€observed€the€traffic€leaving€the€Philips€plant€at€the€end€of€the€afternoon€shift€on€hisÐ ä4 Ðway€to€and€from€work.€€In€his€opinion,€the€traffic€situation€at€the€plant€ð ðhas€been€a€very€dangerousÐ Ð  Ðsituation€for€a€great€number€of€years.ðð€€He€stated€that€he€has€observed€vehicles€pull€out€from€theÐ ¼  Ðplant€ð ðin€mass€with€little€regard€for€oncoming€trafficðð€and€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôt]hereÔ_Ô€are€no€traffic€controls€of€anyÐ ¨ø Ðtype€which€would€limit€the€ability€of€automobiles€exiting€the€Philips€Plant€from€pulling€out€abreastÐ ”ä Ðof€each€other.ðð€€The€plaintiffs€also€submitted€the€affidavit€and€deposition€of€Dr.€Stephen€Richards,Ð €Ð Ðan€engineer€and€professor€of€civil€and€environmental€engineering.€€Dr.€Richards€opined€as€follows:€Ð l¼ ÐÌÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à1.€€The€plant€access€driveways€and€parking€lot€circulation€patterns€areÐ 0"€  Ðnot€designed€and€operated€in€accordance€with€recognized€safetyÐ #l! Ðprinciples€and€guidelines,€compromising€the€safety€of€the€motoristsÐ $X" Ðusing€these€facilities€and€the€adjoining€public€roads.Ðô$D #` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à2.€€The€lack€of€adequate€traffic€controls€at€the€access/egress€pointsÐ Ì&"% Ðserving€the€Philips€plant€parking€area€results€in€a€safety€hazard€forÐ ¸'#& Ðmotorists€exiting€and€entering€the€plant,€as€well€as€motorists€on€OldÐ ¤(ô#' ÐAndrew€Johnson€Highway.Ð)à$(` x` x Їà8  àà8` Ð Ð à3.€€Conflicts׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€between€exiting€vehicles€from€the€plant€and€vehicles€onÐ ° ÐOld€Andrew€Johnson€Highway€are€very€common€during€the€afternoonÐ œì Ðshift€change;€these€conflicts€are€evidence€of€the€deficient€accessÐ ˆØ Ðdesign€and€lack€of€traffic€control.€€The€high€rate€of€vehicle€conflictsÐ tÄ Ðis€also€evidence€of€the€increased€likelihood€of€accidents.Ð`°` x` x ÐÌRichards€opined€that€ð ðthe€management€of€the€Philips€plant€knew€or€should€have€known€of€thisÐ 8 ˆ Ðdangerous€condition€and€taken€steps€to€correct€this€traffic€situation.ðð€€Plaintiffs€also€relied€upon€BillÐ $ t ÐÔ_ÔPetreÔ_Ôððs€deposition€to€prove€that€Philips€knew€of€the€parking€lotððs€condition.€€In€his€deposition,€Ô_ÔPetreÔ_ÔÐ  ` Ðadmitted€that€two€cars€could€exit€the€lot€and€enter€the€highway€at€the€same€time€and€that€this€situationÐ ü L  Ðhad€existed€for€a€long€time.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€granted€Philipsðð€motion€for€summary€judgment,€finding€that€the€legal€causeÐ À  Ðof€the€accident€was€Peelsðð€conduct€in€pulling€into€the€path€of€Ms.€Ô_ÔEstesÔ_Ôðð€vehicle€and€that€ð ðthere€wereÐ ¬ü  Ðno€other€legal€causes.ðð€€The€trial€court€found€that€neither€affidavit€submitted€by€the€plaintiffs€€createdÐ ˜è  Ða€genuine€issue€of€material€fact.€€The€trial€court€also€noted€the€plaintiffsðð€ð ðtotal€failureðð€to€establishÐ „Ô  Ðthat€Philips€was€on€notice€of€a€dangerous€situation€existing€at€the€site€of€the€accident.€€The€court€alsoÐ pÀ Ðfound€that€the€plaintiffs€failed€to€ð ðshow€that€Philips€could€have€reasonably€foreseen€that€the€plaintiffsÐ \¬ Ðwould€be€injured€in€the€manner€they€wereðð€and€that€there€had€ð ðbeen€no€showing€that€Philips€wasÐ H˜ Ðnegligent.ðð€€This€appeal€followed.€Ð 4„ ÐÌÓ,ÓII.€€òòStandard€of€ReviewóóÐ  \ ÐÓ )ÓÓ  ÓÌà  àOur€standard€of€review€of€a€grant€of€summary€judgment€is€well„settled.€€Our€inquiry€involvesÐ ä4 Ðonly€a€question€of€law,€with€no€presumption€of€correctness€as€to€the€trial€courtððs€decision.€€ò òòòRobinsonÐ Ð  Ðv.€Ô_ÔOmerÔ_Ô,ó óóó€952€S.W.2d€423,€426€(Tenn.€1997);€ò òòòByrd€v.€Hall,ó óóó€847€S.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993).€€TheÐ ¼  Ðmoving€party€„„€in€this€case,€Philips€„„€has€the€initial€burden€of€producing€competent,€materialÐ ¨ø Ðevidence€reflecting€that€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€that€it€is€entitled€to€summaryÐ ”ä Ðjudgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€òòSee€ò òByrd,ó óóó€847€S.W.2d€at€211.€€This€burden€may€be€met€byÐ €Ð Ðaffirmatively€negating€an€essential€element€of€the€nonmoving€partyððs€claim€or€by€conclusivelyÐ l¼ Ðestablishing€an€affirmative€defense.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€215€n.5.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àIf€the€moving€party€successfully€carries€its€burden,€the€burden€then€shifts€to€the€nonmovingÐ 0"€  Ðparty€to€establish€that€there€are€disputed€material€facts€creating€at€least€one€genuine€issue€that€mustÐ #l! Ðbe€resolved€by€a€trier€of€fact.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€215.€€The€nonmoving€party€may€contradict€the€factual€predicateÐ $X" Ðof€the€summary€judgment€motion€by€presenting€competent€and€admissible€evidence€by€way€ofÐ ô$D # Ðaffidavits€or€discovery€materials.€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€211.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àIn€evaluating€the€evidence€in€the€summary€judgment€context,€we€must€view€the€evidence€inÐ ¸'#& Ðthe€light€most€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€party,€and€we€must€draw€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favorÐ ¤(ô#' ÐÔ_Ôof€that€party.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€210.€€Summary€judgment€is€appropriate€only€when€there€are€no€genuine€issuesÐ ° Ðof€material€fact€and€when€the€undisputed€material€facts€entitle€the€moving€party€to€a€judgment€as€aÐ œì Ðmatter€of€law.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.04;€ò òòòByrd,ó óóó€847€S.W.2d€at€211.Ð ˆØ ÐÓr)ÓÌÓ  ÓIII.€€òòAnalysisÐ `° ÐÓ2ÓÌÓ  Óà  àóóTo€successfully€assert€a€negligence€claim,€a€plaintiff€must€establish€the€following€elements:Ð 8 ˆ ÐÓI2ÓÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(1)€a€duty€of€care€owed€by€the€defendant€to€the€plaintiff;€(2)Ð  ` Ðconduct€by€the€defendant€falling€below€the€standard€of€careÐ ü L  Ðamounting€to€a€breach€of€the€duty;€(3)€an€injury€or€loss;€(4)Ð è 8  Ðcausation€in€fact;€and€(5)€proximate€causation.ÐÔ$ ` x` x ÐÌò òòòÓ  ÓRice€v.€Sabir,ó óóó€979€S.W.2d€305,€308€(Tenn.€1998).€€Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àWe€focus€first€upon€whether€Philips€owed€a€duty€to€the€plaintiffs€in€this€case;€for€without€theÐ „Ô  Ðestablishment€of€a€duty,€there€can€be€no€negligence.€€ò òòòDoe€v.€Linder€Constr.€Co.,ó óóó€845€S.W.2d€173,Ð pÀ Ð178€(Tenn.€1992).€€Whether€a€defendant€owes€a€duty€to€the€plaintiff€is€a€question€of€law€for€the€court.€Ð \¬ Ðò òòòCarson€v.€Headrick,ó óóó€900€S.W.2d€685,€690€(Tenn.€1995).€€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àð ðDutyðð€has€been€defined€as€ð ðthe€legal€obligation€owed€by€defendant€to€plaintiff€to€conformÐ  p Ðto€a€reasonable€person€standard€of€care€for€the€protection€against€unreasonable€risks€of€harm.ðð€Ð  \ Ðò òòòMcCall€v.€Wilder,ó óóó€913€S.W.2d€150,€153€(Tenn.€1995).€€In€determining€whether€a€duty€exists,€weÐ øH Ðmust€consider€whether€ð ðsuch€a€relation€exists€between€the€parties€that€the€community€will€imposeÐ ä4 Ða€legal€obligation€upon€one€for€the€benefit€of€others€„„€or,€more€simply,€whether€the€interest€of€theÐ Ð  Ðplaintiff€which€has€suffered€invasion€was€entitled€to€legal€protection€at€the€hands€of€the€defendant.ðð€ò òòòÐ ¼  ÐBradshaw€v.€Daniel,ó óóó€854€S.W.2d€865,€869„70€(Tenn.€1993)€(quotingòòóó€ò òòòLindsey€v.€Miami€Dev.€Corp.,ó óóóÐ ¨ø Ð689€S.W.2d€856,€858„59€(Tenn.€1985)).€€A€duty€to€act€with€due€care€arises€when€a€risk€isÐ ”ä Ðunreasonable,€that€is,€ð ðif€the€foreseeable€probability€and€gravity€of€harm€posed€by€defendantððsÐ €Ð Ðconduct€outweigh€the€burden€upon€defendant€to€engage€in€alternative€conduct€that€would€haveÐ l¼ Ðprevented€the€harm.ðð€€ò òòòMcCall,ó óóó€913€S.W.2d€at€153.€€The€Supreme€Court€has€set€forth€several€factorsÐ X ¨ Ðto€be€considered€in€determining€whether€a€risk€is€unreasonable,€including€Ð D!” ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àthe€foreseeable€probability€of€the€harm€or€injury€occurring;€theÐ #l! Ðpossible€magnitude€of€the€potential€harm€or€injury;€the€importance€orÐ $X" Ðsocial€value€of€the€activity€engaged€in€by€defendant;€the€usefulness€ofÐ ô$D # Ðthe€conduct€to€defendant;€the€feasibility€of€alternative,€safer€conductÐ à%0!$ Ðand€the€relative€costs€and€burdens€associated€with€that€conduct;€theÐ Ì&"% Ðrelative€usefulness€of€the€safer€conduct;€and€the€relative€safety€ofÐ ¸'#& Ðalternative€conduct.€Ð¤(ô#'` x` x ÐÌò òòòId.ó óóó€€After€consideration€of€these€factors,€we€must€then€balance€ð ðthe€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðpotential€harm€against€the€burden€imposed€in€preventing€that€harm.ðð€€ò òòòColn€v.€City€of€Savannah,ó óóó€966Ð h+¸&* ÐS.W.2d€34,€39€(Tenn.€1998);€òòsee€also€ò òStaples€v.€CBL€&€Associates,€Inc.,ó óóó€15€S.W.3d€83,€89€(Tenn.Ð ° Ð2000);€òòò òRice,ó óóó€979€S.W.2d€at€308;€òòò òMcClung€v.€Delta€Square€Ltd.€Partnership,ó óóó€937€S.W.2d€891,€902Ð œì Ð(Tenn.€1996);€ò òòòMcCall,ó óóó€913€S.W.2d€at€153.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àThe€Supreme€Courtððs€decisions€regarding€the€existence€of€a€duty€on€the€part€of€an€owner€orÐ `° Ðoccupier€of€premises€have€consistently€utilized€this€balancing€approach.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€ò òòòMcClung€v.€DeltaÐ L œ ÐSquare€Ltd.€Partnership,ó óóó€937€S.W.2d€891€(Tenn.€1996),€a€customer€was€raped€and€killed€after€beingÐ 8 ˆ Ðabducted€from€a€shopping€center€parking€lot.€€The€plaintiff€alleged€that€the€owner€of€the€shoppingÐ $ t Ðcenter€and€its€anchor€tenant€were€negligent€in€failing€to€provide€security€in€the€lot.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€894.€€TheÐ  ` Ðtrial€court€and€the€Court€of€Appeals€held€that€a€business€owner€owes€no€duty€to€protect€customersÐ ü L  Ðagainst€the€criminal€acts€of€third€parties€unless€the€owner€knows€that€the€acts€are€occurring€or€areÐ è 8  Ðabout€to€occur.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€895.€€The€Supreme€Court€reversed,€holding€that€a€premises€owner€or€occupierÐ Ô$  Ðmay€owe€a€duty€to€protect€customers€from€crimes€committed€by€third€parties€on€its€premises€if€theÐ À  Ðbusiness€knows€or€should€have€known€that€criminal€acts€against€its€customers€are€reasonablyÐ ¬ü  Ðforeseeable.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€902.€€The€Court€concluded€that€the€proof€would€support€a€finding€that€the€risk€ofÐ ˜è  Ðinjury€to€the€decedent€was€reasonably€foreseeable,€given€the€recent€and€numerous€reports€of€crimeÐ „Ô  Ðon€and€near€the€defendantsðð€premises.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€904.€òòò òó óóó€The€Court€directed€the€trial€court€upon€remandÐ pÀ Ðto€determine€whether€imposing€a€duty€to€take€reasonable€measures€to€protect€patrons€from€theÐ \¬ Ðcriminal€acts€of€third€persons€would€place€ð ðan€onerous€burdenðð€on€the€defendants.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€904.€€If€theÐ H˜ Ðburden€was€not€found€to€be€ð ðonerous,ðð€the€Supreme€Court€directed€the€trial€court€to€consider€whetherÐ 4„ Ðthe€burden€outweighs€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€the€potential€harm,€so€as€to€preclude€anÐ  p Ðimposition€of€a€duty€on€the€part€of€the€defendants.€€ò òòòId.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àColn€v.€City€of€Savannah,ó óóó€966€S.W.2d€34€(Tenn.€1998),€was€a€consolidation€of€two€cases.€Ð à0 ÐIn€the€first€case,€the€plaintiff€was€injured€when€she€tripped€over€the€edge€of€a€sidewalk€that€wasÐ Ì Ðslightly€higher€than€the€adjoining€brick€pavers.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€37.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€concluded€that€givenÐ ¸ Ðthe€open€and€obvious€nature€of€the€condition,€the€plaintiff€was€at€least€50%€responsible€for€herÐ ¤ô Ðinjuries.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€38.€€In€the€second€case,€the€plaintiff,€who€was€a€guest€in€the€defendantsðð€home,€wasÐ à Ðinjured€when€her€knee€went€into€an€opening€in€the€defendantsðð€deck.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€Court€of€AppealsÐ |Ì Ðaffirmed€a€grant€of€summary€judgment€on€the€basis€that€the€opening€was€open€and€obvious.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€TheÐ h¸ ÐSupreme€Court€reversed€the€Court€of€Appeals€in€both€cases,€holding€that€a€premises€owner€orÐ T ¤ Ðoccupier€has€a€duty€to€exercise€due€careòòò òó óóó€in€regard€to€social€guests€and€business€invitees€on€itsÐ @! Ðpremises,€and€the€fact€that€a€danger€was€ð ðopen€and€obviousðð€does€not€automatically€relieve€aÐ ,"|  Ðpremises€owner€or€occupier€from€that€duty.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€46.€€Instead,€the€Court€held€that€ð ðthe€duty€issueÐ #h! Ðmust€be€analyzed€with€regard€to€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€harm,€and€the€feasibility€andÐ $T" Ðavailability€of€alternative€conduct€that€would€have€prevented€the€harm.ðð€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€43.€€Applying€theseÐ ð$@ # Ðâ âprinciples,€the€Court€concluded€that€the€defendants€in€both€cases€owed€a€duty€of€care,€despite€theÐ Ü%,!$ Ðð ðopen€and€obviousðð€nature€of€the€condition,€because€the€risk€of€harm€was€unreasonable€andÐ ° Ðoutweighed€the€burden€imposed€in€protecting€against€the€harm.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€44,€46.Ð œì Ðâ âòòò òÌó óà  àóóIn€ò òòòRice€v.€Sabir,ó óóó€979€S.W.2d€305€(Tenn.€1998),€a€contractor€who€was€hired€to€trim€trees€andÐ pÀ Ðclean€gutters€was€injured€when€he€slipped€and€fell€as€a€result€of€mildew€on€the€homeownerððs€roof.€Ð \¬ ÐThe€trial€court€granted€the€homeowner€summary€judgment€on€the€basis€that€the€condition€of€the€roofÐ H ˜ Ðwas€obvious€and€readily€observable.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€308.€€The€Supreme€Court,€relying€upon€ò òòòColn,ó óóó€found€thatÐ 4 „ Ðð ðmerely€labeling€the€injury„causing€condition€ððopen€and€obviousðð€does€not€end€the€inquiry€as€toÐ  p Ðduty.ðð€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€310.€€After€weighing€the€various€factors,€the€Court€concluded€that€the€condition€wasÐ  \ Ðnot€one€that€the€homeowner€knew€about€or€could€have€discovered€through€the€exercise€of€due€care;Ð ø H  Ðaccordingly,€the€Court€held€ð ðthat€it€is€not€probable€that€the€injury€was€reasonably€foreseeable€and€thatÐ ä 4  Ðno€action€of€[the€homeowner]€could€more€probably€than€not€have€prevented€the€injury.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€€òòÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àóóMost€recently,€the€Supreme€Court€applied€the€balancing€approach€in€ò òòòStaples€v.€CBL€&Ð ¨ø  ÐAssociates,€Inc.,ó óóó€15€S.W.3d€83€(Tenn.€2000).€€In€that€case,€the€plaintiff€had€advised€two€departmentÐ ”ä  Ðstore€employees€that€she€was€being€followed.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€86.€€The€plaintiff€then€left€the€store€withoutÐ €Ð  Ðincident.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€She€returned€to€the€store€a€short€time€later,€however,€and€was€assaulted€and€abducted.€Ð l¼ Ðò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€defendants€argued€that€the€plaintiffððs€abduction€was€not€foreseeable€because€she€did€not€alertÐ X¨ Ðthe€mallððs€security€and€she€reentered€the€mall€after€leaving€safely.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€90.€€The€Supreme€CourtÐ D” Ðdisagreed,€finding€that€the€exchange€between€the€plaintiff€and€the€two€store€employees€triggered€aÐ 0€ Ðduty€on€the€part€of€the€defendants€to€protect€the€plaintiff€from€the€abduction.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€Upon€balancingÐ l Ðthe€relevant€factors,€the€Court€concluded€that€ð ðthe€gravity€of€the€foreseeable€harm€was€great€and€thatÐ X Ðalternative€conduct€on€the€part€of€the€defendants,€which€at€the€least€would€have€included€callingÐ ôD Ðsecurity,€was€readily€available€and€would€not€have€unduly€burdened€the€defendants.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€91.Ð à0 ÐòòóóÌà  àThe€foregoing€cases€involve€the€liability€of€an€owner€or€occupier€of€property€for€a€dangerousÐ ¸ Ðcondition€on€the€premises€that€resulted€in€an€injury€to€a€plaintiff€òòwhile€on€or€beginning€on€theÐ ¤ô Ðpremisesóó.€€In€the€instant€case,€however,€the€plaintiffs€seek€to€impose€a€duty€on€the€landowner€toÐ à Ðprotect€a€plaintiff€òòfrom€an€accident€that€occurred€off€the€premisesóó.€€Tennessee€has€recognized€thatÐ |Ì Ðunder€certain€circumstances,€an€owner€or€occupier€of€premises€may€owe€a€duty€to€persons€on€a€publicÐ h¸ Ðthoroughfare€adjacent€to€the€premises.€€In€ò òòòDe€Ark€v.€Nashville€Stone€Setting€Corp.,ó óóó€38€Tenn.€App.Ð T ¤ Ð678,€279€S.W.2d€518€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1955),€the€plaintiff€was€injured€when€she€fell€into€anÐ @! Ðexcavation€on€the€defendantððs€property€which€was€adjacent€to€a€public€sidewalk.€€This€court€foundÐ ,"|  Ðthat€the€defendant€owed€a€duty€of€care€to€the€plaintiff€ð ðto€use€reasonable€care€not€to€endanger€suchÐ #h! Ðpassage,€by€excavations€or€other€hazards€so€close€to€the€public€way€as€to€make€it€unsafe€to€personsÐ $T" Ðusing€it€with€ordinary€care.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€521.€€The€court€went€on€to€hold€as€follows:Ð ð$@ # ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€general€rule€is€that€one€who€creates€or€maintains,€on€premisesÐ È&"% Ðadjacent€to€a€highway,€a€condition€of€such€character€that€danger€ofÐ ´'#& Ðinjury€therefrom€to€persons€lawfully€using€the€highway€may€orÐ  (ð#' Ðshould,€in€the€exercise€of€ordinary€care,€be€foreseen€or€apprehendedÐ Œ)Ü$( Ðis€under€the€duty€or€[sic]€exercising€reasonable€care,€by€means€ofÐ x*È%) Ðguards,€barriers,€or€otherwise,€to€prevent€such€injury,....Ðd+´&*` x` x Їò òòòId.ó óóó€(quoting€25€Am.Jur.€òòHighwaysóó€ðð€530).Ð ° ÐÌà  àSection€368€of€the€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€states€a€similar€duty:Ð ˆØ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àA€possessor€of€land€who€creates€or€permits€to€remain€thereon€anÐ `° Ðexcavation€or€other€artificial€condition€so€near€an€existing€highwayÐ L œ Ðthat€he€realizes€or€should€realize€that€it€involves€an€unreasonable€riskÐ 8 ˆ Ðto€others€accidentally€brought€into€contact€with€such€condition€whileÐ $ t Ðtraveling€with€reasonable€care€upon€the€highway,€is€subject€to€liabilityÐ  ` Ðfor€physical€harm€thereby€caused€to€persons€whoà8@˜` x` xàà8  àÐü L Ð Ð  Ðà  àà ` à(a)€are€traveling€on€the€highway,€orÐ è 8  Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(b)€foreseeably€deviate€from€it€in€the€ordinary€course€of€travel.ÐÔ$ ` x` x ÐÌBoth€ò òòòDe€Arkó óóó€and€the€Restatement€contemplate€a€situation€where€a€plaintiff€comes€into€contact€withÐ ¬ü  Ða€condition€on€the€ownerððs€premises€that€causes€the€injury.€€In€the€instant€case,€however,€the€plaintiffÐ ˜è  Ðdid€not€enter€onto€Philipsðð€property,€nor€did€she€come€into€contact€with€any€condition€on€theÐ „Ô  Ðproperty.€€We€must€determine,€by€using€the€balancing€approach€set€forth€in€the€cases€discussedÐ pÀ Ðabove,€whether€some€conditionò òòòó óóó€on€Philipsðð€property€created€an€unreasonable€risk€of€harm€to€theÐ \¬ Ðplaintiff€despite€this€lack€of€contact.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àPhilipsðð€parking€lot€is€connected€to€the€public€highway€by€several€driveways.€€The€drivewayÐ  p Ðfrom€which€Peels€exited€was€wide€enough€to€allow€two€vehicles€to€exit€simultaneously.€€TheÐ  \ Ðplaintiffs€contend€that€this€condition€results€in€vehicles€being€able€to€pull€out€ð ðwithout€any€visualÐ øH Ðsighting€of€oncoming€traffic.ðð€€The€plaintiffsðð€argument,€as€it€relates€to€the€facts€of€this€case,€reliesÐ ä4 Ðupon€the€assumption€that€a€vehicle€on€the€right„hand€side€of€the€driveway€would€not€be€able€to€seeÐ Ð  Ðtraffic€on€the€highway€coming€from€the€left€if€a€vehicle€pulled€up€on€the€left„hand€side€of€theÐ ¼  Ðdriveway.€€The€plaintiffsðð€theory,€however,€is€not€supported€by€the€evidence€in€this€case.€€There€isÐ ¨ø Ðno€proof€in€the€record€to€indicate€that€Ms.€Peelsðð€vision€was€blocked€„„€either€by€another€vehicle€orÐ ”ä Ðby€any€structure€on€the€property€„„€when€she€exited€the€driveway.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Thus,€the€fact€that€Peels€pulledÐ €Ð Ðout€in€front€of€the€plaintiffððs€vehicle€is€not€attributable€to€any€condition€on€Philipsðð€property;€PeelsÐ l¼ Ðsimply€failed€to€yield€to€oncoming€vehicles,€in€violation€of€her€statutory€duty.€€òòSee€óóT.C.A.ðð€55„8„131Ð X ¨ Ð(1998).€€We€conclude€that€there€is€nothing€dangerous€about€the€defendantððs€parking€lot€absent€theÐ D!” Ðfailure€of€a€driver€to€obey€traffic€laws€and€yield€to€oncoming€traffic.€€Thus,€the€question€becomesÐ 0"€  Ðwhether€it€was€foreseeable€to€Philips€that€Peels€would€violate€her€statutory€duty€when€exiting€theÐ #l! Ðplant.€€Upon€reviewing€the€record,€we€conclude€that€such€conduct€was€not€foreseeable.€€PhilipsððÐ $X" Ðmanager€of€manufacturing€services,€Bill€Petre,€testified€that€over€the€past€40€years,€the€plant€hadÐ ô$D # Ðemployed€an€average€of€800€employees€a€year€and€that€there€had€never€been€an€accident€involvingÐ à%0!$ Ðone€of€its€employees€leaving€the€plant.€€There€is€also€no€evidence€to€suggest€that€Philips€was€everÐ Ì&"% Ðadvised€by€anyone€that€the€situation€was€dangerous€or€that€there€was€a€potential€for€this€type€ofÐ ° Ðaccident€to€occur.€€Thus,€we€conclude€that€it€was€not€foreseeable€to€Philips€that€a€person€wouldÐ œì Ðattempt€to€exit€the€plant€without€yielding€to€oncoming€traffic.Ð ˆØ Ѐ€Ð tÄ Ðà  àEven€if€such€conduct€were€foreseeable,€however,€we€find€that€imposing€a€duty€on€Philips€toÐ `° Ðprevent€a€driver€from€pulling€out€on€a€highway€without€yielding€to€oncoming€traffic€would€be€anÐ L œ Ðonerous€burden.€€Philips€could€not,€without€governmental€approval,€install€lights€or€signs€upon€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðhighway€to€control€traffic€exiting€its€facility.€€The€responsibility€for€the€placement€and€maintenanceÐ $ t Ðof€traffic€controls€on€the€public€way€rests€with€the€government,€not€a€private€entity€such€as€Philips.€Ð  ` ÐòòSee€ò òGorman€v.€Earhart,ó óóó€876€S.W.2d€832,€836€(Tenn.€1994)€(holding€Manual€on€Uniform€TrafficÐ ü L  ÐControl€Devices€applies€only€to€public€authorities€and€those€entities€with€a€contractual€relationshipÐ è 8  Ðwith€public€authorities€for€the€construction,€operation,€or€maintenance€of€public€roads€andÐ Ô$  Ðhighways);€òòsee€also€óóT.C.A.€ðð€55„8„113€(1998)€(prohibiting€the€display€of€any€unauthorized€sign€orÐ À  Ðdevice€on€a€highway€attempting€to€direct€traffic).€€Moreover,€to€prevent€a€vehicle€temporarilyÐ ¬ü  Ðblocking€another€vehicleððs€visibility€while€exiting€the€plant€would€essentially€require€the€plant€toÐ ˜è  Ðhave€an€exit€that€allows€only€one€vehicle€to€leave€the€premises€at€a€time.€€For€a€facility€that€employsÐ „Ô  Ðseveral€hundred€people,€this€would€simply€be€impracticable.€€Finally,€we€note€that€despite€anyÐ pÀ Ðmeasures€Philips€could€have€taken€to€limit€the€number€of€vehicles€exiting€its€premises,€Philips€stillÐ \¬ Ðcould€not€have€prevented€the€plaintiffððs€injuries.€€Philips€had€no€control€over€the€instrumentality€thatÐ H˜ Ðcaused€her€injuries;€it€could€not€prevent€Peels€from€failing€to€yield€to€oncoming€traffic€as€she€enteredÐ 4„ Ðthe€highway.€€Ð  p ÐÌà  àWe€have€considered€the€affidavits€and€the€deposition€submitted€by€the€plaintiffs€in€oppositionÐ øH Ðto€the€defendantððs€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€The€admissible€evidence,€òòsee€ò òByrdó óóó,€847€S.W.2dÐ ä4 Ðat€211,€contained€in€these€documents€does€not€establish€a€duty€of€care€running€from€the€defendantÐ Ð  Ðto€these€plaintiffs.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àIn€sum,€we€hold€that€Philips€owed€no€duty€to€the€plaintiffs€in€this€case.€€We€therefore€affirmÐ ”ä Ðthe€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment.Ð €Ð ÐÌÓQ4ÓÓ¨ÓIV.òò€€ConclusionóóÐ X ¨ ÐÓU~ÓÓ8ÓÌà  àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€granting€Philips€summary€judgment€is€affirmed.€€All€otherÐ 0"€  Ðissues€on€appeal€are€pretermitted.€€This€case€is€remanded€for€collection€of€costs€assessed€below,Ð #l! Ðpursuant€to€applicable€law.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€appellants.Ð $X" ÐÓŸ~ÓÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð ¸'#& Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àCHARLES€D.€SUSANO,€JR.,€JUDGE