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ÐÌJames€L.€Weatherly,€Jr.;€Joseph€T.€Howell,€Nashville,€For€Appellee,€Carolyn€FloydÐ ü#L# ÐÓÙ ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼AE»XX© #ÔÔ‡X©X»¼AEÔÐ Ô%$!% ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼AE»XX©ß #ÔÔ‡X©X»¼AEÔÓ  ÓÑ€zãÑà  àJohn€David€Floyd€(ð ðHusbandðð)€and€Carolyn€Floyd€(ð ðWifeðð)€were€married€in€1994.€€At€theÐ ¬'ü"' Ðtime€of€the€marriage,€Ms.€Floyd€had€one€minor€daughter,€Katie€Armstrong,€age€3,€born€of€a€previousÐ ˜(è#( Ðmarriage.€€Ms.€Floyd€had€sole€custody€of€Katie.€€€Mr.€Floyd€also€had€one€minor€daughter€from€aÐ „)Ô$) Ðprevious€marriage,€Stephanie.€€On€July€24,€1997,€Mr.€Floyd€filed€a€petition€for€divorce,€however€theÐ p*À%* Ðpartiesðð€separation€was€not€final€until€June€of€1999.€€On€August€18,€1999,€a€Final€Decree€of€DivorceÐ \+¬&+ Ðâ âwas€entered€incorporating€a€Marital€Dissolution€Agreement€(ð ðMDAðð),€€which€states€in€pertinent€part:Ð H,˜',ý ÐÑzãÑâ âÑ8€©XXdìXXdì8Ñâ âÑ  Ñà8  àà8` Ð Ð à8.€€Husband€shall€continue€to€visit,€and€be€allowed€to€visit,€wifeððsÐ ° Ðâ âchild€Katie€Armstrong€and,€further,€Husband€shall€pay€the€said€KatieÐ œì ÐArmstrongððs€college€expenses€for€a€period€of€four€(4)€years,€saidÐ ˆØ Ðexpenses€to€be€housing,€food,€books,€tuition€and€Husband€shallÐ tÄ Ðprovide€the€said€Katie€Armstrong€with€an€automobile.€€In€order€toÐ `° Ðsecure€future€payment€of€the€Six€Thousand€Dollars€($6,000.00)€perÐ L œ Ðmonth€referenced€herein€above,€Husband€shall€obtain€a€life€insuranceÐ 8 ˆ Ðpolicy€in€the€amount€of€One€Million€Dollars€($1,000,000.00)€withÐ $ t ÐWife€being€designated€as€beneficiary€in€the€amount€of€Five€HundredÐ  ` ÐThousand€Dollars€($500,000.00)€and€Katie€Armstrong€beingÐ ü L  Ðdesignated€as€beneficiary€for€the€remaining€Five€Hundred€ThousandÐ è 8  Ð($500,000.00).€€Said€life€insurance€policy€shall€be€maintained€for€aÐ Ô$  Ðperiod€of€one€hundred€and€twenty€(120)€months€from€and€after€theÐ À  Ðexecution€of€this€agreement€and€the€granting€of€the€divorce€in€thisÐ ¬ü  Ðcause.Иè ` x` x ÐÌÓ€  (‹sx3Óà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà8¸ ` x` xàà  àà h à*à À à*à  à*€ÐpÀ¸ ¸  Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð àÐ ` x` x Ðà8  àà8` Ð Ð à12.€€Husband€shall€leave€no€less€than€twenty„five€percent€(25%)€of€hisÐ H˜ Ðestate,€upon€his€death,€to€Katie€Armstrong€and€the€said€KatieÐ 4„ ÐArmstrong€shall€have€a€lien€against€the€estate€of€Husband€to€theÐ  p Ðextent€of€twenty„five€percent€(25%)€of€the€same.Ð \` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à13.€€Husband€shall€provide€health€care€insurance€covering€KatieÐ ä4 ÐArmstrong€until€such€time€as€the€child€graduates€from€college€or€untilÐ Ð  Ðshe€attains€the€age€of€twenty„three€(23)€years,€whichever€shall€firstÐ ¼  Ðoccur.€€Ð¨ø` x` x ÐÌà  àOn€May€3,€2000,€Wife€filed€Petition€to€Enforce€Final€Decree€of€Divorce€in€which€she€averredÐ €Ð Ðthat€a€dispute€had€arisen€between€the€parties€concerning€the€scope€of€the€right€vested€in€Husband€byÐ l¼ Ðthe€provision€of€the€Final€Decree€granting€him€the€right€ð ðto€visitðð€Katie€Armstrong.€€Wifeððs€petitionÐ X ¨ Ðcontends€that€she€offered€to€establish€regular€visits,€Friday€through€Sunday€one€weekend€per€month,Ð D!” Ðand€every€Wednesday€for€dinner€from€5:00€p.m.€to€7:00€p.m.,€and€has€requested€that€Katie€not€beÐ 0"€  Ðremoved€from€Rutherford€County€without€her€permission.€€Wife€stated€that€she€asked€that€HusbandÐ #l! Ðrefrain€from€the€excessive€consumption€of€alcohol€when€transporting€Katie€in€an€automobile.€€WifeÐ $X" Ðaverred€€that€Husband€refused€to€agree€to€these€proposals.€€Wife€requested€that€the€trial€court€orderÐ ô$D # Ðvisits€between€the€Husband€and€Katie€for€the€second€weekend€of€each€month€from€6:00€p.m.€onÐ à%0!$ ÐFriday€to€6:00€p.m.€on€Sunday,€and€each€Wednesday€from€5:00€p.m.€until€7:00€p.m.,€and€further€thatÐ Ì&"% Ðthe€court€order€that€Katie€not€be€removed€from€Rutherford€County€without€her€permission.€€WifeÐ ¸'#& Ðfurther€requested€that€the€trial€court€order€Husband€to€refrain€from€the€excessive€consumption€ofÐ ¤(ô#' Ðalcohol€while€in€the€presence€of€Katie€or€at€any€time€that€he€is€transporting€Katie.€€Ð )à$( Ðâ â€Ð |*Ì%) Ðà  àHusband€responded€by€filing€Petition€to€Establish€Specific€Visitation.€€Husbandððs€petitionÐ ° Ðâ âaverred€that€Wife€repeatedly€interfered€with€his€attempts€to€exercise€visitation€with€Katie.€€HusbandÐ œì Ðrequested€that€he€be€awarded€specific€visitation€with€Katie,€that€Wife€be€enjoined€from€makingÐ ˆØ Ðderogatory€comments€about€him€to€Katie,€and€that€Wife€be€held€in€contempt€of€the€trial€courtððsÐ tÄ Ðprevious€order.€€Wife€answered€denying€that€Husband€had€any€specific€rights€to€visitation.€€Ð `° ÐÌà  àA€hearing€was€held€on€July€19,€2000,€and€a€subsequent€order€was€entered€on€August€31,€2000Ð 8 ˆ Ðstating€in€part:Ð $ t ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThis€cause€came€to€be€heard€on€the€19òòthóó€day€of€July,€2000Ð ü L  Ðupon€the€petition€to€enforce€final€decree€of€divorce,€petition€toÐ è 8  Ðestablish€specific€visitation,€testimony€of€witnesses,€statement€ofÐ Ô$  Ðcounsel€and€the€record€as€a€whole€from€all€of€which€the€CourtÐ À  Ðdetermined€there€was€no€meeting€of€the€minds€with€regard€to€theÐ ¬ü  Ðvisitation€issues€and€the€responsibilities€set€forth€in€the€first€sentenceÐ ˜è  Ðof€paragraph€eight€(8)€and,€as€a€result,€no€valid,€binding€contract€wasÐ „Ô  Ðachieved.ÐpÀ` x` x ÐÌà0  àà0` (#(#àIT€IS€THEREFORE€ORDERED:ÐH˜` (#` (# ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à1.€€The€first€sentence€contained€in€paragraph€number€eight€(8)€of€theÐ  p ÐMarital€Dissolution€Agreement€be,€and€hereby€is,€declared€to€beÐ  \ Ðunenforceable€and€be,€and€hereby€is,€deleted€form€the€MaritalÐ øH ÐDissolution€Agreement.€€All€other€provisions€of€the€MaritalÐ ä4 ÐDissolution€Agreement€previously€incorporated€into€the€Final€DecreeÐ Ð  Ðof€Divorce€be,€and€hereby€are,€ratified€and€approved.м ` x` x ÐÌÓÓà  àHusband€appeals€the€order€raising€two€issues€as€stated€in€his€brief:Ð ”ä ÐÓÓà8  àà8` Ð Ð à1.€€Whether€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€Trial€CourtððsÐ l¼ Ðconclusion€there€was€no€meeting€of€the€minds€relative€to€the€portionsÐ X ¨ Ðof€the€Marital€Dissolution€Agreement€dealing€with€visitation.ÐD!”` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à2.€€If€there€was€no€meeting€of€the€minds€relative€to€visitation,€and€ifÐ #l! Ðhusband€is€not€awarded€visitation€with€the€minor€child,€whetherÐ $X" Ðhusband€should€be€relieved€of€all€obligations€voluntarily€assumed€inÐ ô$D # Ðexchange€for€visitation€privileges€with€wifeððs€child€from€a€previousÐ à%0!$ Ðmarriage.ÐÌ&"%` x` x ÐÌÔ‡X©XXX©Ôà  àSince€this€case€was€tried€by€the€trial€court€sitting€without€a€jury,€we€review€the€case€òòde€novoóóÐ ¤(ô#' Ðupon€the€record€with€a€presumption€of€correctness€of€the€findings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court.€€UnlessÐ )à$( Ðâ âthe€evidence€preponderates€against€the€findings,€we€must€affirm,€absent€error€of€law.€€T.R.A.P.€13(d).€Ð |*Ì%) Ѐà  àIn€Husbandððs€first€issue,€he€contends€that€the€public€policy€of€this€state€is€to€provide€for€theÐ ° Ðâ âwelfare€and€betterment€of€children.€€He€asserts€that€he€contracted€to€provide€substantial€financialÐ œì Ðsupport€to€Katie€and€that€both€he€and€Wife€agreed€that€it€would€be€in€Katieððs€best€interest€for€himÐ ˆØ Ðto€continue€to€have€a€relationship€with€her.€€Husband€asserts€that€he€is€entitled€to€have€the€courtÐ tÄ Ðenforce€the€terms€of€the€MDA€with€regard€to€visitation€as€they€are€subject€to€the€continuingÐ `° Ðjurisdiction€of€the€court€for€the€purposes€of€future€modification.€€In€addition,€Husband€contends€thatÐ L œ Ðboth€he€and€Wife€understood€that€he€would€receive€standard€visitation€of€every€other€weekend,€andÐ 8 ˆ Ðthat€he€had€visitation€with€Katie€on€that€basis€for€6€to€8€months€following€the€execution€of€theÐ $ t Ðagreement.€€€Ð  ` ÐÌà  àÔ#†X©XXX©–*#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©Ôð ðTennessee€law€does€not€provide€for€any€award€of€custody€or€visitation€to€a€non„parent€òòexceptÐ è 8  Ðas€may€be€otherwise€provided€by€our€legislature.ððóó€€Ô#†X©XXX©^0#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©Ôòòò òIn€re€Thompson,ó óóó€11€S.W.€3d€913òòò òó óóó,€€919€(Tenn.Ð Ô$  ÐCt.€App.€1999)€(Emphasis€in€original)€(citing€Ô#†X©XXX©Q1#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©Ôòòò ò€ó óóóT.C.A€ðð€36„6„301€òòet€seq.)óó׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ô#†X©XXX©2#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔA€step„parent€whoÐ À  Ðprovides€child€support€may€be€granted€visitation€rights€by€a€court€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€ðð€36„6„303€(a),Ð ¬ü  Ðand€such€an€order€of€visitation€remains€under€the€control€of€the€court.€€T.C.A€ðð€36„6„303Ô#†X©XXX©ß2#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©Ô€(b).€Ð ˜è  ÐAlthough€it€is€apparent€that€Husband€has€provided€and€continues€to€provide€for€Katie,€we€are€notÐ „Ô  Ðwilling€to€apply€this€statute€to€support€Husbandððs€right€to€visitation€as€he€is€not€ð ðcontributing€towardsÐ pÀ Ðthe€support€of€the€childðð€in€the€manner€contemplated€by€the€Tennessee€Child€Support€GuidelinesÐ \¬ Ðpromulgated€by€the€Department€of€Human€Services€(ð ðchild€support€guidelinesðð).€€Ô#†X©XXX© 4#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔTherefore,€aòòÔ#†X©XXX©A6#Ôò òó óóóÔ‡X©XXX©ÔbsentÐ H˜ Ða€binding€contract,€Husband€has€no€right€protected€by€law€to€visit€Katie.€Ô#†X©XXX©›6#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔÐ 4„ ÐÌà  àÔ#†X©XXX©A7#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔIn€preparation€for€a€divorce,€a€husband€and€wife€often€enter€into€a€property€settlementÐ  \ Ðagreement€that€is€later€incorporated€into€a€final€decree.€€Such€agreements€may€contain€terms€as€toÐ øH Ðpartiesðð€legal€duties,€as€well€as€defining€obligations€outside€the€scope€of€the€partiesðð€legal€duties.€Ð ä4 ÐÔ#†X©XXX©¥7#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔWhere€parties€to€a€divorce€contract€with€regard€to€terms€that€do€not€include€a€legal€duty,€theÐ Ð  Ðagreement€maintains€its€contractual€nature€after€incorporation€into€a€court€order€and€may€be€enforcedÐ ¼  Ðas€any€other€contract.€€ò òòòPenland€v.€Penland,€óóó ó521€S.W.2d€222,€224€(Tenn.€1975).€€Where€partiesÐ ¨ø Ðcontract€with€respect€to€the€legal€duty€of€child€support€€or€alimonyòò€in€futuro,óó€upon€approval€by€theÐ ”ä Ðcourt,€the€agreement€becomes€merged€into€the€divorce€decree,€losing€its€contractual€nature.€€ð ð[Ô_ÔO]nlyÔ_ÔÐ €Ð Ðthat€portion€of€a€property€settlement€agreement€between€husband€and€wife€dealing€with€€the€legalÐ l¼ Ðduty€of€child€support,€or€alimony€over€which€the€court€has€continuing€statutory€power€to€modify,Ð X ¨ Ðloses€its€contractual€nature€when€merged€into€a€decree€for€divorce.ðð€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€224.Ô#†X©XXX©L9#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔÐ D!” ÐÌà  àÔ#†X©XXX©]=#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔIn€the€instant€case,€parties€have€contracted€regarding€terms€that€do€not€include€a€legal€duty,Ð #l! Ðbut€does,€however,€involve€visitation€of€a€minor€child,€which€must€stay€under€the€authority€of€theÐ $X" Ðcourt€to€be€changed€or€modified€as€circumstances€indicate.€€Therefore,€a€sort€of€hybrid€agreementÐ ô$D # Ðhas€been€created:€€€one€that€involves€no€legal€duty,€but€one€that€should€remain€under€the€jurisdictionÐ ° Ðof€the€court.€€Ð œì ÐÌà  àIn€interpreting€the€terms€of€a€marital€dissolution€agreement€incorporated€into€a€final€decreeÐ tÄ Ðof€divorce€this€Court€stated:€€Ð `° ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ à€A€divorce€decree€which€incorporates€a€marital€dissolutionÐ 8 ˆ Ðagreement€is€to€be€construed€like€other€written€instruments,€with€theÐ $ t Ðcourt€seeking€to€determine€the€apparent€purposes€in€the€minds€of€theÐ  ` Ðdraftsmen€and€the€trial€court.€€òòò òSee€€Livingston€v.€Livingstonó óóó,€58Ð ü L  ÐTenn.App.€271,€429€S.W.2d€452€(Tenn.App.1967).€€The€general€rulesÐ è 8  Ðof€evidence€regarding€the€admission€of€parol€evidence€and€theÐ Ô$  Ðconstruction€of€written€instruments€also€apply€to€such€decrees.€€òòò òId.€ó óóóÐ À  ÐAs€with€other€instruments,€parol€evidence€is€inadmissible€to€vary,Ð ¬ü  Ðalter,€or€contradict€such€a€decree€where€the€decree€is€complete,Ð ˜è  Ðunambiguous,€and€valid,€or€where€there€is€no€fraud,€accident€orÐ „Ô  Ðmistake,€or€claim€or€allegation€thereof€with€respect€to€the€agreementÐ pÀ Ðincorporated€in€the€instrument.€€òòò òSee€€€Livingstonó óóó,€òòò òsupra,ó óóó€at€457€andÐ \¬ ÐC.J.S.,€Evidence€ðð€51,€pp.€214-215€(1981).ò òòò€€As€with€theÐ H˜ Ðinterpretation€and€construction€of€contracts,€however,€the€courtÐ 4„ Ðmay€admit€evidence€which€will€enable€the€court€to€place€itself€in€theÐ l Ðsituation€of€the€parties€at€the€time€they€entered€into€the€maritalÐ T Ðdissolution€agreement€which€the€decree€incorporates.€€See€Ð ì< ÐNashville€Life€Ins.€Co.€v.€Matthews,ó óóó€76€Tenn.€499€(1881).ÐÔ$` x` x ÐÌòòò òBarzizza€v.€Barzizza,€ó óóóNo.€02A01„9110CV00246,€òòò òÔ#†X©XXX©Á=#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©Ôó óóó€1992€WL€139862,€€*4€Ô#†X©XXX©gG#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©Ô(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€JuneÐ ¬ü Ð23,1992).€(Emphasis€added).€€€Evidence€of€intent€is€found€in€the€language€used€by€the€partiesÐ ˜è Ðconsidered€in€the€light€of€their€interest€and€other€relevant€circumstances€at€the€time€the€contract€wasÐ „Ô Ðexecuted,€and€in€the€practical€construction€given€to€the€language€by€the€parties€€ð ðas€disclosed€by€theirÐ pÀ Ðactions€subsequent€to€its€execution.ðð€€ò òòòCity€of€Columbia€v.€Ô_ÔC.F.W.Ô_Ô€Const.€Co.,€óóó ó557€S.W.2d€734,€739Ð \¬ Ð(Tenn.€1977).€€According€to€the€rule€of€practical€construction,€an€interpretation€given€the€contractÐ H ˜ Ðby€the€parties,€as€shown€by€their€actions€and€declarations,€will€be€adopted€by€the€court.€€ò òòòHamblenÐ 4!„ ÐCounty€v.€City€of€Morristown,€ó óóó656€S.W.2d€331,€335€(Tenn.€1983).€€Additionally,€in€interpreting€theÐ  "p  Ðterms€of€a€contract€under€Tennessee€law,€a€condition€of€reasonableness€is€implied,€even€where€theÐ  #\! Ðterm€ð ðreasonableðð€is€not€used€in€the€contract.€€ò òòòMoore€v.€Moore,€óóó ó603€S.W.2d€736,€739€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ø#H" ÐApp.€1980).€€In€òòò òCagle€v.€Cagle,€ó óóóNo.€02A01„9710„CH„00265,€1998€WL€802019€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ä$4 # ÐNov.€18,€1998)€the€court€held€that€a€€fatherððs€agreement€to€pay€his€sonððs€college€expenses€was€subjectÐ Ð% !$ Ðto€the€implied€condition€of€reasonableness.€€òòò òó óóóBecause€a€contract€contains€terms€of€difficultÐ ¼& "% Ðconstruction€about€which€parties€disagree,€that€does€not€allow€parties€to€contend€that€they€did€notÐ ¨'ø"& Ðhave€a€meeting€of€the€€minds.€€òòò ò€€Hawkins€v.€Hart,€ó óóóNo.€01A01„9707„CV„00294,€1998€WL€272926Ð ”(ä#' Ð*4€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€May€29,€1998)€(citing€17€Ô_ÔAm.JurÔ_Ô.2d€Contracts€ðð€22,€at€359).€€Ô#†X©XXX©ÄG#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔBy€signing€theÐ €)Ð$( Ðagreement€the€parties€bind€themselves€to€the€interpretation€that€a€court€may€place€on€the€languageÐ l*¼%) Ðof€their€agreement.€€ò òòòId.ó óóóÐ X+¨&* Ðà  àÔ#†X©XXX©O#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔThe€cardinal€rule€for€interpretation€of€contracts€is€to€ascertain€the€intention€of€the€parties€andÐ ° Ðto€give€effect€to€that€intention€consistent€with€legal€principles.€€ò òòòRainey€v.€Stansell,€ó óóó836€S.W.2d€117Ð œì Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€€€Ô#†X©XXX©®P#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔCourts€are€to€interpret€and€enforce€the€contract€as€written,€giving€terms€theirÐ ˆØ Ðò òó óplain€and€usual€meaning.€€€ò òòòPetty€v.€Sloanóóó ó,€197€Tenn.€630,€277€S.W.2d€355,€358€(1955);€€ò òòòHomeÐ tÄ ÐBeneficial€Ass'n€v.€Whiteóóó ó,€180€Tenn.€585,€177€S.W.2d€545,€546€(1944).€€òòò òó óóó€€In€construing€a€contract,Ð `° Ðcourts€must€look€at€the€language€of€the€agreement€and€to€the€partiesðð€intent€and€impose€aÐ L œ Ðconstruction€that€is€fair€and€reasonable.€ò òòòÔ_ÔACGÔ_Ô,€Inc.€v.€Southeast€Elevator,€Inc.ó óóó,€912€S.W.2d€163Ð 8 ˆ Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€Absent€fraud€or€mistake,€contracts€will€be€enforced€according€to€their€terms,Ð $ t Ðeven€though€they€contain€arguably€unjust€or€harsh€terms.€€ò òòòWhaley€v.€Underwood,€óóó ó922€S.W.2d€110Ð  ` Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€€€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àIn€other€jurisdictions,€agreements€by€step„parents€to€support€a€child€which€are€supported€byÐ Ô$  Ðconsideration€have€been€held€to€be€enforceable.€€The€Court€of€Appeals€of€Maryland€held€that€aÐ À  Ðstepparent€may€create€a€contractual€right€to€support€a€child,€€òòò òBrown€v.€Brown,€ó óóó412€A.2d€396€(Md.Ð ¬ü  Ð1980),€but€that€the€step„father€could€not€be€imprisoned€for€falling€behind€in€his€child€supportÐ ˜è  Ðpayment€as€the€agreement€maintained€its€contractual€nature.€€€In€ò òòòDewey€v.€Dewey,€ó óóó886€P.2d€623Ð „Ô  Ð(Alaska€1994)€the€Supreme€Court€of€Alaska€enforced€an€agreement€by€a€step„father€€to€support€hisÐ pÀ Ðstepchild€finding€that€the€step„fatherððs€contractual€obligation€was€supported€by€considerationÐ \¬ Ðincluding€his€right€to€claim€the€stepchild€as€a€dependant€and€to€receive€visitation€rights.€Our€ownÐ H˜ ÐEastern€Section€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€upheld€the€denial€of€a€petition€for€rehearing€by€a€mother€inÐ 4„ Ða€case€involving€an€agreement€incorporated€into€a€final€decree€of€divorce€which€provided€forÐ  p Ðreasonable€step„parent€visitation€where€parties€both€acknowledged€under€oath€that€this€was€theirÐ  \ Ðagreement.€€ò òòòMayfield€v.€Mayfield,€óóó óNo.€03A01„9803„CV„00112,€1998€WL€512973€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð øH ÐAug.€19,€1998).€€Ð ä4 ÐÌÔ#†X©XXX©R#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©Ôà  àWith€that€in€mind,€we€proceed€to€Husbandððs€first€issue,€whether€the€trial€court€erred€inÐ ¼  Ðfinding€that€there€was€no€meeting€of€the€minds€with€regard€to€the€€agreement€that€Husband€wouldÐ ¨ø Ðbe€permitted€ð ðto€visitðð€the€child.€€Generally,€in€the€absence€of€a€specific€visitation€schedule€in€aÐ ”ä Ðmarital€dissolution€agreement€and/or€a€final€decree€of€divorce,€the€implied€ð ðreasonableðð€standardÐ €Ð Ðshould€apply.€€The€child€support€guidelines€set€out€what€is€intended€to€be€reasonable€visitation.€€TheÐ l¼ Ðintention€of€the€parties€is€paramount€in€considering€the€meaning€of€a€contract.€€Additionally,Ð X ¨ Ðaccording€to€the€rule€of€practical€construction,€we€may€look€to€the€conduct€and€declarations€of€partiesÐ D!” Ðto€the€agreement€and€their€own€interpretation€of€the€same.€€ò òòòHamblen€County€v.€City€of€Morristownó óóó,Ð 0"€  Ð656€S.W.2d€331,€335€(Tenn.€1983).€€The€record€indicates€conduct€by€the€parties€which€supportsÐ #l! Ðinterpretation€of€the€term€ð ðto€visitðð€as€meaning€the€standard€visitation€as€defined€by€the€guidelines.€Ð $X" ЀHusband€claims€that€for€six€to€eight€months€following€the€execution€of€the€agreement,€he€hadÐ ô$D # Ðvisitation€with€Katie€every€other€weekend.€€Wife€does€not€deny€this,€and€indicates€that€Katie€wasÐ à%0!$ Ðwith€Husband€at€the€times€that€he€had€standard€visitation€with€his€own€daughter.€€Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àIn€addition,€we€must€consider€this€contract€as€a€whole€in€determining€its€meaning.€€ò òòòÔ_ÔCookevilleÔ_ÔÐ ¤(ô#' ÐGynecology€&€Obstetrics,€P.C.€v.€Southeastern€Data€Systems,€Inc.,€óóó ó884€S.W.2d€458€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð )à$( ÐApp.€1994).€€€Considering€the€agreement€of€the€parties€as€a€whole€with€an€implied€term€ofÐ |*Ì%) Ðreasonableness,€it€is€clear€that€the€parties€intended€that€the€consideration€for€Wifeððs€allowingÐ h+¸&* ÐHusband€ð ðto€visitðð€Katie€be€that€he€provide€Katie€with€college€tuition€plus€books€and€livingÐ ° Ðexpenses,€a€car,€health€insurance€for€her,€that€Katie€is€listed€as€a€beneficiary€on€a€policy€of€insuranceÐ œì Ðon€Husbandððs€life,€and€that€Katie€inherit€not€less€than€one€quarter€of€Husbandððs€estate.€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àCourts€are€charged€with€the€duty€of€enforcing€contracts€as€written.€ò òòòWinfree€v.€EducatorsÐ `° ÐCredit€Union,€óóó ó900€S.W.2d€285€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€Therefore,€we€find€that€the€parties€haveÐ L œ Ðcontracted€for€Husband€to€visit€Katie,€and€that€the€intended€meaning€of€the€term€ð ðto€visitðð€should€beÐ 8 ˆ Ðinterpreted€according€to€the€child€support€guidelinesðð€description€of€standard€visitation.€€ò òòòSee€óóó óTenn.Ð $ t ÐComp.€R.€&€Ô_ÔRegsÔ_Ô.€1240„2„4„.02(6)€(1994)€(describing€standard€visitation€as€every€other€weekend,Ð  ` ÐFriday€through€Sunday,€two€weeks€in€the€summer,€and€two€weeks€during€the€holidays).€€ImportantÐ ü L  Ðto€our€holding€is€the€indication€by€both€parties€that€they€share€a€desire€that€Husband€continue€hisÐ è 8  Ðrelationship€with€Katie,€a€mutual€expression€that€the€relationship€between€Husband€and€Katie€is€inÐ Ô$  ÐKatieððs€best€interest,€€and€our€conclusion€that€Husbandððs€continued€contributions€to€Katieððs€supportÐ À  Ðare€in€Katieððs€best€interest.€€€We€believe€that€this€holding€is€consistent€with€our€public€policy€that€inÐ ¬ü  Ðmatters€concerning€child€custody,€support€and€visitation,€the€welfare€of€the€child€has€always€beenÐ ˜è  Ðthe€paramount€consideration.€€ò òòòLuke€v.€Luke,€ó óóó651€S.W.2d€219,€221€(Tenn.€1983).€€Having€so€held,Ð „Ô  ÐHusbandððs€second€issue€is€moot.€€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àAccordingly,€we€reverse€the€ruling€of€the€trial€court€and€remand€the€case.€€On€remand€the€trialÐ H˜ Ðcourt€is€to€hold€a€hearing€on€the€issue€of€visitation€to€consider€evidence€including€Wifeððs€allegationsÐ 4„ Ðof€excessive€consumption€of€alcohol€in€the€presence€of€Katie€and€Husbandððs€disregard€of€WifeððsÐ  p Ðefforts€to€discipline€Katie,€as€well€as€Husbandððs€contentions€of€Wifeððs€efforts€to€interfere€with€hisÐ  \ Ðvisitation.€€In€absence€of€a€finding€that€standard€visitation€would€not€be€in€Katieððs€best€interest,Ð øH Ðvisitation€should€be€set€as€contracted€by€the€parties€and€interpreted€by€this€Court€to€indicate€standardÐ ä4 Ðvisitation€as€set€forth€in€the€child€support€guidelines.€€Further,€the€trial€court€may€in€its€discretionÐ Ð  Ðlimit€the€visitation€if€it€deems€such€limitation€to€be€in€the€best€interest€of€the€child.€€€The€order€ofÐ ¼  Ðvisitation€shall€stay€within€the€jurisdiction€of€the€trial€court€for€future€modification.€€€Costs€of€theÐ ¨ø Ðappeal€are€taxed€against€the€Appellee,€Carolyn€Floyd.€€€à p à€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ”ä Ѐ€€€Ð €Ð ÐÔ#†X©XXX©½[#ÔÔ#†¼AE»XX©= #ÔÔ€X©X»¼AEÔÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à__________________________________________Ð X ¨ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.