ÿWPCz tŒIœ_³iCDö\½; õ¹›àIhÚ;†$;>B}Īàr‰'—Œ’z²Ÿ cq~[¤D¿šEÅý«nòz¿à%Y{.;سMÃ;ŽŠâ¡šÑ—,H o‘ÌORù+ +qÜ®MÝâˆýdÄ-ŸÃ7Ú%?ý\½3 &a7MÔ­È þ¹ƒØ6¡:p/@†6aÒYÐoÌQcñã±­'”3õXÀ¨ÇƒžØFª ؃ETS•OqòkÜðCÔÐjºçæ#z;ùÌó´ÞN ‹z\ÎFŽppz&$|ó* ÀáÃJfq" ÍË{Õ©^"KcZÚßö--°¥Ù­ A·] c­g¢ /àl##8±°Lr4­·Ë<ÿ9‹R§ä²ª'¨¹· éÿj-踻ƒß Á1Ú#Æ,ÓŒ‚ Æýùm½  dð­V÷X[ÇúΘ’F¤=²$cKöPióDºK\¤ÂÇ‹:ÏEŽÁ'ÃOwðÆnÍœè1à¢u¦¬v3 ïz÷Htb#Á\ % ^ # 0ˆ/ U N· w 4 z Ò— i x mz 6‘ ÆÇÆÆSÆ 0DßN#%%E-U@///////////////////////boooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 0ëwwww Bbb 0¤ D3# D-V 0Kƒƒ ASÎÆ! 0¤ç 0D‹ A«Ï˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»Qw) (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularõ}|)à  ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ,Ý ƒR|ˆ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôâ]ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€€Ô€ôâ]òòôâ]ÔThe€trial€court€ordered€that€the€appellee€pay€$3,400.00€of€the€$5,900.00€in€attorneyððs€fees€incurred€by€theÐ ° Ðappellant€between€the€September€30,€1999€hearing€and€the€October€11,€1999€hearing.€€However,€as€explained€earlier€inÐ tÄ Ðthis€opinion,€the€appellee€would€have€been€ordered€to€pay€the€entire€$5,900.00€but€for€the€trial€courtððs€rearrangementÐ 8ˆ Ðof€the€credit€card€debt.€€The€trial€court€originally€ordered€that€the€parties€split€the€entire€amount€of€credit€card€debtÐ üL Ð60%/40%.€€However,€recognizing€the€problems€that€could€occur€if€the€parties€were€made€to€split€each€monthly€paymentÐ À Ðon€each€credit€card,€the€trial€court€ordered€the€appellant€to€pay€the€balance€of€one€card€and€the€appellee€to€pay€the€balanceÐ „Ô Ðof€the€others.€€This€would€lead€to€the€appellee€paying€more€than€60%€of€the€credit€card€debt.€€In€order€to€make€sure€theÐ H ˜ Ðappellant€was€responsible€for€an€amount€equal€to€40%€of€the€credit€card€debt,€the€trial€court€ordered€that€she€payÐ  \ Ð$2,500.00€of€the€$5,900.00€in€these€attorneyððs€fees.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó (ÆúI Z‹(Times New Roman - ù-(|G2|ˆ$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€KÅ»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôâ]ò»»Ô d(|3‡‹$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€KÅ»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3‡‹$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€KÅ»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€KÅ»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼KÅ»»»ÔÑ8€ùXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼KÅ»»¼KÅÔà@ü ü ìàÔ‡î€XKÅÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼KÅ»îî€X+#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓSeptember€7,€2000€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XùX»¼KÅÔÌò òÔ#†¼KÅ»XXù#ÔNIGEL€M.€FONTENOT€òòóóv.€CATHERINE€FONTENOTòòóóÔ‡XùX»¼KÅÔó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Wilson€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€99015€€€€€€C.€K.€Smith,€ChancellorÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M1999„02322„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€December€13,€Ô_Ô2000Ô_ÔÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  Óò òÔ‡XùXXXùÔó óÌÓÎÓÓ  ÓÔ#†XùXXXùÝ#ÔThis€appeal€arises€from€the€trial€courtððs€division€of€marital€property€and€martial€debt,€award€ofÐ d´ Ðalimony,€and€award€of€attorneyððs€fees.€€After€reviewing€the€record€and€applicable€law,€the€trialÐ P  Ðcourtððs€judgment€is€affirmed€as€modified.Ð <Œ ÐÓÓÔ#†¼KÅ»XXùŽ#ÔÔ‡XùX»¼KÅÔÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€Court€Ð d ÐAffirmed€in€Part;€Reversed€in€Part;€and€Remandedó óÐ P ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼KÅ»àXù¤#ÔÔ‡XùX.¼KÅÔBen€H.€Ô_ÔCantrellÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,€M.S.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòWilliam€C.€Koch,€Jr.óóÐ Ø( Ðand€òòWilliam€B.€Cainóó,€JJ.,€joined.Ð Ä ÐÌFred€C.€Dance,€Franklin,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Catherine€Ô_ÔFontenotÔ_Ô.€€Ð œì ÐÌVicky€V.€Klein,€Madison,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Nigel€M.€Fontenot.Ð tÄ ÐÓnÓÌÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼KÅ»XXù#ÔÔ‡XùX»¼KÅÔÐ 8!ˆ  ÐÌò òI.ó óÐ #`" ÐòòóóÔ#†¼KÅ»XXùÖ #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€XùX»¼KÅÔÌà  àThe€parties€were€divorced€on€November€12,€1999€after€six€years€of€marriage.€€There€wereÐ è$8 $ Ðno€children€born€of€the€marriage.€€When€the€parties€married,€the€appellee€was€employed€as€aÐ Ô%$!% Ðphysician€and€the€appellant€was€a€program€director€for€Jenny€Craig.€€The€appellant€earnedÐ À&"& Ðapproximately€$18,000.00€per€year€at€Jenny€Craig€and€was€working€toward€a€management€position.€Ð ¬'ü"' ÐApproximately€three€or€four€weeks€after€the€partiesðð€married,€the€appellant€quit€her€job€and€becameÐ ˜(è#( Ða€full„time€homemaker€for€the€duration€of€the€marriage.€€However,€the€appellant€did€work€in€theÐ „)Ô$) Ðappelleeððs€office€for€a€short€period€of€time.€€The€appelleeððs€monthly€income€during€the€marriageÐ p*À%* Ðranged€from€$15,000.00€to€$20,000.00.€€When€the€parties€married,€the€appellee€owned€a€car€withÐ \+¬&+ Ð$5,000.00€equity€and€minimal€furniture.€€The€appellant€owned€a€1989€Grand€Am€and€some€furniture.€Ð H,˜', ÐIn€addition,€the€appellee€had€$60,000.00€„€80,000.00€in€student€loans€outstanding€and€a€$50,000.00Ð 4-„(-ý Ðbusiness€loan.€€The€appellant€had€a€$6,000.00€student€loan.€€By€the€time€the€parties€divorced,€theÐ ° Ðappellantððs€student€loan€was€paid€in€full€but€the€appellee€was€still€making€payments€on€his€loans.€€Ð œì ÐÌà  àAfter€an€evidentiary€hearing€on€September€30,€1999,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€appelleeððsÐ tÄ Ðcurrent€monthly€income€was€$18,700.00€per€month.€€The€trial€court€further€found€that€the€appellantÐ `° Ðhas€a€degree€in€dental€hygiene€but€is€not€licensed€because€she€has€not€passed€the€licensing€exam.€Ð L œ ÐAlthough€she€was€unemployed,€the€trial€court€found€that€she€was€capable€of€working€and€earningÐ 8 ˆ Ð$12,000.00€to€$14,000.00€per€year€as€a€salesperson€or€a€dental€assistant.€€With€regard€to€assets,€theÐ $ t Ðtrial€court€€found€that€the€parties€had€acquired€a€house€with€a€present€value€of€$210,000.00€with€aÐ  ` Ðfirst€and€second€mortgage€on€the€house€totaling€$180,000.00.€€The€trial€court€further€found€thatÐ ü L  ÐÌà8  àà ` àThey€own€time„shares€valued€at€$26,000.00,€with€an€indebtedness€against€itÐ Ô$  Ðin€the€amount€of€$20,698.€€Parties€own€a€Mercedes€valued€at€$40,000,€with€aÐ À  Ð$43,991.49€indebtedness€on€it.€€The€parties€own€a€Mitsubishi€automobile€with€theÐ ¬ü  Ðvalue€of€40,000,€with€an€indebtedness€against€it€47,000.Иè Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àParties€own€a€401(k)€that€was€totally€acquired€during€the€marriage€valued€at€ÐpÀÐ Ð  Ðà8  à$45,199.67.€€Thereððs€a€brokerage€account€in€the€amount€of€$2,647.44€that€the€partiesÐ \¬ Ðown.€ÐH˜Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àThey€own€household€furnishings,€and€equipment,€tools,€et€cetera.€€DependingÐ  p Ðon€whose€values€you€place€on€this,€the€husband€valued€all€those€things€at€$27,414,Ð  \ Ðthe€wife€$41,729.€€The€parties€also€acquired€a€great€deal€of€indebtedness€during€theirÐ øH Ðmarriage:€first€mortgage€on€the€home,€$152,428.81;€a€second€mortgage€on€the€homeÐ ä4 Ð$27,533.80;€an€IRS€indebtedness€for€year€of€1998,€$25,000;€credit€card€indebtedness,Ð Ð  Ðbalance€at€$46,000;€wifeððs€attorney€fee€at€$9,813;€husbandððs€attorney€fee€$6,412.40.м Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àTheyððve€lived€a€very€high€lifestyle,€expensive€lifestyle,€theyððve€taken€severalÐ ”ä Ðvacations€a€year,€just€used€their€credit€cards€wildy.€€Both€of€them€have€charged€on€itÐ €Ð Ðand€bought€some€things€I€feel€like€was€[sic]€a€waste.€€But€neither€party€tried€toÐ l¼ Ðconserve€the€marital€property,€but€continued€to€spend€as€if€the€money€was€unlimited.€Ð X ¨ ÐÐ Ð Ð  Ðà  àThe€trial€court€went€on€to€find€that€the€appellant€had€made€substantial€contributions€to€theÐ 0"€  Ðmarriage€as€a€homemaker€and€that€this€was€a€marriage€of€relatively€short€duration.€The€trial€court,Ð #l! Ðin€spite€of€appellantððs€claim€that€it€was€a€birthday€present,€found€that€the€Mercedes€was€joint€propertyÐ $X" Ðtitled€in€both€of€the€partiesðð€names.€€The€trial€court€stated€that€each€party€was€relatively€young€butÐ ô$D # Ðthat€the€appellee€had€the€capability€of€earning€10€to€25€times€more€than€the€appellant.€€Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àAfter€making€these€findings,€the€trial€court€set€out€the€partiesðð€items€of€separate€property.€Ð ¸'#& ÐThe€trial€court€then€gave€the€appellant€the€partiesðð€marital€residence€with€a€net€equity€of€$30,000.€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐThe€court€awarded€the€appellant€sixty€percent€of€the€time€shares€with€an€equity€of€$3,180.66.€€TheÐ )à$( Ðappellant€was€awarded€the€Mercedes€as€well€as€the€responsibility€for€the€balance€owed€on€the€car,Ð |*Ì%) Ða€negative€value€of€$3,991.00.€€The€trial€court€then€awarded€the€appellant€a€couch€valued€atÐ h+¸&* Ð$8,000.00€and€a€mirror€worth€$400.00.€€In€all,€the€appellant€received€$21,855.00€worth€of€householdÐ ° Ðitems.€€The€appellant€also€received€the€330,000€honor€points€the€parties€had€accumulated€withÐ œì ÐMarriott.€Ð ˆØ Ðà  àÌà  àThe€trial€court€awarded€the€appellee€the€401(k)€valued€at€$45,198.92€and€the€MitsubishiÐ `° Ðautomobile€having€a€negative€value€of€$7,000.€€The€appellee€received€the€remaining€€forty€percentÐ L œ Ðof€the€equity€in€the€time€shares€and€various€household€items€that€the€trial€court€valued€at€$19,244.00.€Ð 8 ˆ ÐThe€appellee€was€also€awarded€the€77,000€air€miles€the€parties€had€accumulated.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€ordered€that€the€appellant€pay€forty€percent€of€the€$46,000.00€credit€cardÐ ü L  Ðindebtedness€and€that€the€appellee€pay€sixty€percent.€€The€appellee€was€further€ordered€to€pay€theÐ è 8  Ðentire€balance€of€$25,000.00€owed€to€the€IRS€for€the€partiesðð€1998€taxes€and€any€taxes€owed€forÐ Ô$  Ð1999.€€The€court€ordered€him€to€pay€his€own€attorneyððs€fees€of€$6,412.44€and€the€appellant€to€payÐ À  Ðher€own€attorneyððs€fees€of€$9,813.00.€€After€calculating€the€appellantððs€debts€at€$32,204.00€andÐ ¬ü  Ðassets€of€$55,035.66,€the€trial€court€found€that€she€had€a€net€of€$22,831.66.€€The€appelleeððs€assetsÐ ˜è  Ðwere€valued€at€$69,170.80€and€debts€at€$66,012.44€with€a€net€of€only€$3,158.36.€€Ð „Ô  Ѐ€Ð pÀ Ðà  àAfter€a€hearing€on€October€11,€1999,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€appellant€was€entitled€toÐ \¬ Ða€divorce€on€the€basis€of€the€appelleeððs€acts€of€adultery€that€occurred€after€he€moved€out€of€theÐ H˜ Ðmarital€residence.€€The€trial€court€then€added€up€the€appelleeððs€expenses€per€month€minus€theÐ 4„ Ðappellantððs€ordered€obligations€regarding€the€partiesðð€debt€and€found€that€the€appellee€had€$9,717.00Ð  p Ðin€expenses€per€month.€€As€the€trial€court€determined€that€the€appellee€had€$13,500.00€in€net€incomeÐ  \ Ðper€month,€the€court€found€that€he€had€$3,783.00€in€expendable€income.€€That€amount€did€not€takeÐ øH Ðinto€account€all€of€the€appelleeððs€obligations€to€the€IRS.€€The€trial€court€then€looked€at€the€appellantððsÐ ä4 Ðlisted€expenses€and€found€that€there€was€ð ðat€least€a€couple€of€$1000€worth€of€fat€in€here€that€.€.€.Ð Ð  Ðcould€go.ðð€€€The€trial€court€then€considered€the€partiesðð€situation€in€terms€of€the€division€of€propertyÐ ¼  Ðwhere€the€appellee€netted€only€$3,158.36€and€the€appellant€netted€$22,831.66,€and€the€trial€court€Ð ¨ø Ðordered€that€the€appellee€pay€the€appellant€rehabilitative€alimony€of€$3,500.00€per€month€for€a€periodÐ ”ä Ðof€48€months.€€The€trial€court€specifically€found€that€the€appellant€was€an€educated€woman€that€couldÐ €Ð Ðbe€rehabilitated.€€The€trial€court€stated€that€she€ð ðis€probably€the€exact€type€of€person€that€[theÐ l¼ Ðrehabilitative€alimony]€statute€was€designed€to€rehabilitate.ððÐ X ¨ ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€then€addressed€the€issue€of€attorneyððs€fees€incurred€since€the€hearing€inÐ 0"€  ÐSeptember.€€The€appellee€was€again€ordered€to€pay€his€own€attorneyððs€fees.€€The€court€found€that€theÐ #l! Ðappellant€had€incurred€$5,900.00€in€fees€since€the€last€hearing€and€ordered€the€appellee€to€pay€all€butÐ $X" Ð$2,500.00€of€that€amount.€€The€$2,500.00€figure€resulted€from€a€modification€of€the€previous€orderÐ ô$D # Ðregarding€the€credit€card€debt.€€In€an€effort€to€make€the€payments€of€such€debts€easier,€the€appellantÐ à%0!$ Ðwas€ordered€to€pay€off€the€balance€of€$16,531.71€on€one€of€the€partiesðð€MBNA€credit€cards.€€As€herÐ Ì&"% Ðforty€percent€share€of€the€credit€card€debt€amounted€to€$18,400.00,€the€trial€court€made€up€theÐ ¸'#& Ðdifference€by€ordering€the€appellant€to€pay€$2,500.00€of€her€own€attorneyððs€fees.€€The€appellee€wasÐ ¤(ô#' Ðthen€ordered€to€pay€off€the€balance€of€the€two€remaining€credit€cards€of€$23,391.73€and€$7,717.01.€Ð )à$( Ðâ âThe€trial€court€reasoned€that€ordering€the€appellant€to€pay€off€one€credit€card€and€the€appellee€to€payÐ |*Ì%) Ðoff€the€rest€of€the€cards€would€be€easier€than€trying€to€split€the€monthly€payments€of€each€credit€cardÐ ° Ð60%€/€40%.€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àThe€appellantððs€appeal€takes€issue€with€several€elements€of€the€decree.€€These€are€(1)€the€trialÐ tÄ Ðcourtððs€division€of€martial€property€and€allocation€of€marital€debt,€(2)€the€trial€courtððs€award€ofÐ `° Ðrehabilitative€alimony€of€$3,500.00€per€month€for€48€months,€(3)€the€trial€courtððs€refusal€to€requireÐ L œ Ðthe€appellee€to€pay€all€of€the€appellantððs€attorneyððs€fees,€and€(4)€the€trial€courtððs€failure€to€order€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðappellee€to€repay€an€$8,000.00€loan€he€borrowed€after€the€parties€separated€and€added€to€the€secondÐ $ t Ðmortgage€on€the€marital€residence.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àWe€will€discuss€each€of€these€issues€in€turn.Ð è 8  ÐÓ  ÓÌò òII.ó óÐ À  ÐÓ  Óà@·· ìàòòò òThe€Marital€Propertyóóó óˆÐ ¬ü  ÐÌÓ  Óà  àThe€appellant€first€takes€issue€with€the€trial€courtððs€division€of€marital€property€and€allocationÐ „Ô  Ðof€marital€debt.Ð pÀ ÐÓþ4ÓÓ  ÓÌà  àA€trial€court€has€wide€discretion€concerning€the€manner€in€which€it€divides€marital€property.€Ð H˜ ÐòòWallace€v.€Wallaceóó,€733€S.W.2d€102€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987);€€òòPennington€v.€Penningtonóó,€592€S.W.2dÐ 4„ Ð576€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1979).€€Additionally,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121€does€not€mandate€an€equalÐ  p Ðdivision€of€the€marital€estate€but€requires€an€equitable€division€considering€the€factors€in€the€statute.€Ð  \ ÐòòEllis€v.€Ellisóó,€748€S.W.2d€424,€427€(Tenn.€1988).€€In€making€an€equitable€division,€the€trial€courtÐ øH Ðmust€consider€the€factors€set€out€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(c)€which€include:Ð ä4 ÐÓÅ5ÓÌÓ  Óà8  àà ` à(1)€The€duration€of€the€marriage;м Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(2)€The€age,€physical€and€mental€health,€vocational€skills,€employability,Ð ¨ø Ðearning€capacity,€estate,€financial€liabilities€and€financial€needs€of€each€of€the€parties;€Ð”äÐ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(3)€The€tangible€or€intangible€contribution€by€one€(1)€party€to€the€education,Ð €Ð Ðtraining€or€increased€earning€power€of€the€other€party;Ðl¼Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(4)€The€relative€ability€of€each€party€for€future€acquisitions€of€capital€assetsÐ X ¨ Ðand€income;ÐD!”Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(5)€The€contribution€of€each€party€to€the€acquisition,€preservation,Ð 0"€  Ðappreciation€or€dissipation€of€the€marital€or€separate€property,€including€theÐ #l! Ðcontribution€of€a€party€to€the€marriage€as€homemaker,€wage€earner€or€parent,€with€theÐ $X" Ðcontribution€of€a€party€as€homemaker€or€wage€earner€to€be€given€the€same€weight€ifÐ ô$D # Ðeach€party€has€fulfilled€its€role;Ðà%0!$Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(6)€The€value€of€the€separate€property€of€each€party;ÐÌ&"%Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(7)€The€estate€of€each€party€at€the€time€of€the€marriage;и'#&Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(8)€The€economic€circumstances€of€each€party€at€the€time€the€division€ofÐ ¤(ô#' Ðproperty€is€to€become€effective;Ð)à$(Ð Ð  Ðâ âà8  àà ` à(9)€The€tax€consequences€to€each€party;€andÐ|*Ì%)Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(10)€Such€other€factors€as€are€necessary€to€consider€the€equities€between€theÐ ° Ðâ âparties.МìÐ Ð  ÐÓ¾8ÓÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(c).€€Ð tÄ ÐÌÓ  Óà  àIn€this€case,€the€parties€were€married€only€six€years.€€We€agree€with€the€trial€courtððsÐ L œ Ðdetermination€that€this€was€a€marriage€of€relatively€short€duration.€€We€further€note€that€the€appelleeÐ 8 ˆ Ðwas€a€practicing€doctor€when€the€parties€married€and€that€the€appellant€was€working€toward€aÐ $ t Ðmanagement€position€with€Jenny€Craig.€€Neither€party€entered€into€the€marriage€with€substantialÐ  ` Ðassets.€€However,€as€the€trial€court€found,€the€appellee€has€a€much€greater€earning€capacity€than€theÐ ü L  Ðappellant.€€The€evidence€established€that€her€earning€capacity€at€the€time€of€the€partiesðð€marriage€wasÐ è 8  Ðapproximately€$18,000.00€a€year€whereas€the€appellee€has€an€earning€capacity€of€$18,700.00€perÐ Ô$  Ðmonth.€€€Rule€13(d)€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure€provides€that:€ð ð[Ô_ÔR]eviewÔ_Ô€ofÐ À  Ðfindings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court€in€civil€actions€shall€be€de€novo€upon€the€record€of€the€trial€court,Ð ¬ü  Ðaccompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€the€finding,€unless€the€preponderance€of€theÐ ˜è  Ðevidence€is€otherwise.ððÐ „Ô  ÐÌà  àWith€one€exception€we€think€the€trial€judge€correctly€divided€the€marital€property.€€TheÐ \¬ Ðappellant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€require€the€appellee€to€repay€$8,000.00€thatÐ H˜ Ðhe€borrowed€on€the€second€mortgage€of€the€marital€residence€after€the€parties€separated.€€We€noteÐ 4„ Ðthat€the€marital€residence€and€the€accompanying€mortgage€payments€were€awarded€to€the€appellant.€Ð  p ÐThe€record€indicates€that€the€$8,000.00€was€used€by€the€appellee€toward€the€purchase€of€a€new€carÐ  \ Ðafter€the€parties€separated.€€The€trial€court€did€not€specifically€address€the€$8,000.00€loan€whenÐ øH Ðdividing€the€marital€property€and€setting€alimony.€€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àThis€Court€has€previously€held€that€marital€debts€are€those€debts€incurred€during€the€marriageÐ ¼  Ðfor€the€joint€benefit€of€the€parties€or€those€directly€traceable€to€the€acquisition€of€marital€property.€Ð ¨ø ÐòòÔ_ÔMondelliÔ_Ô€v.€Howardóó,€780€S.W.2d€769,€773€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€€When€practicable,€the€maritalÐ ”ä Ðdebts€should€follow€the€assets€that€the€debts€purchased.€€òòId.óó€at€773.€€However,€one€spouse€should€notÐ €Ð Ðbe€held€responsible€for€debts€the€other€spouse€incurs€between€the€separation€and€divorce€unless€theÐ l¼ Ðdebts€were€for€a€marital€purpose€or€for€the€joint€benefit€of€the€parties.€€òòGoodman€v.€Goodmanóó,€No.Ð X ¨ Ð02A01„9809„CV„00255,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€filed€August€9,€1999,€at€Jackson).òò€óó€TheÐ D!” Ðappellant€has€never€driven€or€in€any€way€used€the€car€purchased€with€these€funds€nor€did€she€agreeÐ 0"€  Ðto€its€purchase.€€Therefore,€the€appellant€should€not€be€held€responsible€for€such€debt.€€We€thereforeÐ #l! Ðmodify€the€trial€courtððs€final€order€to€require€the€appellee€to€pay€the€appellant€$8,000.00€for€paymentÐ $X" Ðon€the€second€mortgage€of€the€marital€residence.€€Ð ô$D # ÐÌà@^^(ìàò òIII.ˆÐ Ì&"% Ðà@RR'ìàòòAlimonyóóó óˆÐ ¸'#& ÐÌà  àWe€next€address€the€appellantððs€contention€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€its€award€ofÐ )à$( Ðrehabilitative€alimony.€€The€trial€court€awarded€the€appellant€$3,500.00€per€month€for€a€period€ofÐ |*Ì%) Ð48€months.€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€the€appellantððs€expense€statement€listed€monthly€expensesÐ h+¸&* Ðof€$9,318.25€per€month€which€included€monthly€payments€of€$950.00€on€a€Mercedes€automobile,Ð ° Ð$350.00€in€beauty€parlor€and€cosmetic€expenses,€$250.00€in€charitable€contributions€to€a€church,€andÐ œì Ð$600.00€for€clothing€with€an€additional€$100.00€for€dry€cleaning€and€laundry.€€The€trial€court€foundÐ ˆØ Ðthe€appellantððs€expenses€excessive€and€awarded€her€only€$3,500.00€per€month.€€The€trial€courtÐ tÄ Ðspecifically€stated€that€this€was€an€award€of€rehabilitative€alimony€and€that€the€appellant€was€theÐ `° Ðexact€type€of€person€the€statute€for€rehabilitative€alimony€was€designed€to€rehabilitate.Ð L œ ÐÌà  àWe€first€note€that€the€trial€court€is€vested€with€great€latitude€when€making€decisions€withÐ $ t Ðregard€to€alimony.€€òòLancaster€v.€Lancasteróó,€671€S.W.2d€501,€502€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984);€òòRaskindÐ  ` Ðv.€Raskindóó,€325€S.W.2d€617,€622€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1959).€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)€sets€outÐ ü L  Ðthe€relevant€factors€for€the€court€to€consider€in€making€its€determination.€€For€the€purposes€of€thisÐ è 8  Ðcase,€the€most€important€factors€are€the€relative€earning€capacity€of€the€parties;€the€duration€of€theÐ Ô$  Ðmarriage;€the€age,€physical€and€mental€condition€of€each€party;€the€standard€of€living€established€byÐ À  Ðthe€parties€during€their€marriage;€and€the€relative€fault€of€each€party.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)Ð ¬ü  Ð(Supp.€1999).€€However,€this€Court€has€consistently€held€that€the€most€important€factors€in€settingÐ ˜è  Ðthe€amount€of€alimony€are€the€obligeeððs€need€and€the€obligorððs€ability€to€pay.€€òòLoyd€v.€Loydóó,€860Ð „Ô  ÐS.W.2d€409,€412€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993);€€òòCampanali€v.€Campanalióó,€695€S.W.2d€193,€197€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð pÀ ÐApp.€1985);€òòBarker€v.€Barkeróó,€671€S.W.2d€843,€847€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984);òò€Lancasteróó,€671€S.W.2dÐ \¬ Ðat€503.òòóóÐ H˜ ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€determined€that€the€appellee€could€only€afford€to€pay€$3,500.00€per€monthÐ  p Ðafter€his€monthly€expenses€were€paid.€€These€expenses€included€the€majority€of€the€partiesðð€debtÐ  \ Ðincurred€during€the€course€of€the€marriage.€€In€addition,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€appellantððsÐ øH Ðexpenses€were€excessive.€€€The€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€courtððs€findings.€€Ð ä4 ÐThe€appellant€admitted€that€before€the€marriage€she€was€pursuing€a€management€position€with€JennyÐ Ð  ÐCraig.€€The€appellant€also€already€has€a€dental€hygienist€degree€but€has€failed€to€pass€the€examÐ ¼  Ðrequired€to€acquire€a€license.€€We€believe€that€the€appellant€is€entitled€to€rehabilitative€alimony€whileÐ ¨ø Ðshe€adjusts€her€life€style€to€a€post„divorce€status.€€We€are€of€the€opinion€that€$3,500.00€inÐ ”ä Ðrehabilitative€alimony€until€she€reaches€that€status€is€sufficient.Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àThe€next€question€we€must€address,€then,€is€how€long€the€rehabilitative€support€should€beÐ X ¨ Ðpaid.€€The€same€factors€we€considered€in€arriving€at€the€proper€amount€of€support€are€to€beÐ D!” Ðconsidered€here.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d).€€As€we€have€noted,€the€duration€of€theÐ 0"€  Ðmarriage€is€one€of€the€statutory€factors,€and€we€are€required€to€consider€the€tangible€and€intangibleÐ #l! Ðcontributions€of€each€party€to€the€marriage.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(5).€€In€marriages€ofÐ $X" Ðshort€duration€rehabilitative€support€may€be€denied€altogether€where€the€spouse€seeking€support€hasÐ ô$D # Ðcontributed€little€to€the€marriage.€€òòÔ_ÔCrainÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔCrainÔ_Ôóó,€925€S.W.2d€232€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àThe€courts€have€not€dealt€with€the€question€of€the€length€of€rehabilitative€support€in€manyÐ ¸'#& Ðreported€cases.€€In€òòSelf€v.€Selfóó,€the€court€chose€a€period€of€forty„eight€months,€ð ðto€allow€her€to€be€selfÐ ¤(ô#' Ðsupporting€and€obtain€a€Bachelorððs€Degree€in€a€field€of€her€choosing.ðð€€861€S.W.2d€360€(Tenn.Ð )à$( Ð1993).€€In€òòÔ_ÔHerreraÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔHerreraÔ_Ôóó,€944€S.W.2d€379€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996),€we€looked€only€at€the€amountÐ |*Ì%) Ðand€not€the€duration.€€In€òòÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôóó,€986€S.W.2d€220€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998),€we€recognizedÐ h+¸&* Ðthat,€due€to€the€limited€resources€available€in€most€divorces,€the€courts€must€be€satisfied€withÐ ° Ðawarding€ð ðclosing€in€money,ðð€which€would€allow€the€disadvantaged€spouse€to€return€as€closely€asÐ œì Ðpossible€to€his/her€pre„divorce€lifestyle.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àWe€think€that€the€award€of€rehabilitative€alimony€for€forty„eight€months€is€generous,€butÐ `° Ðgiven€the€trial€judgeððs€discretion€in€these€matters,€òòÔ_ÔGarfinkleÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔGarfinkleÔ_Ôóó,€945€S.W.2d€744€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð L œ ÐApp.€1996),€we€cannot€say€that€the€award€was€an€abuse€of€that€discretion.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà@dd)ìàò òIV.ó óˆÐ  ` Ðà@ææ#ìàò òòòAttorneyððs€Feesóóó óˆÐ ü L  ÐÌà  àWe€next€address€the€issue€of€attorneyððs€fees.€€The€appellant€takes€issue€with€the€trial€courtððsÐ Ô$  Ðrefusal€to€order€the€appellee€to€pay€the€entire€amount€of€her€attorneyððs€fees€rather€than€a€portion€ofÐ À  Ðthe€fees.€€In€divorce€actions,€the€trial€court€is€vested€with€wide€discretion€in€the€allocation€ofÐ ¬ü  Ðattorneyððs€fees.€€òòThreadgill€v.€Threadgillóó,€740€S.W.2d€419,€426€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987).€€An€awardÐ ˜è  Ðof€attorneyððs€fees€is€appropriate€in€cases€where€the€final€decree€does€not€provide€the€obligee€withÐ „Ô  Ðfunds€out€of€which€counsel€may€be€paid€or€where€payment€of€those€expenses€would€require€depletionÐ pÀ Ðof€other€assets.€€òòóó€€òòHarwell€v.€Harwellóó,€612€S.W.2d€182,€185€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1980);€òòsee€also€BrownÐ \¬ Ðv.€Brownóó,€913€S.W.2d€163,€170€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994)òò;€€Luna€v.€Lunaóó,€718€S.W.2d€673€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð H˜ ÐApp.€1986)€(holding€that€an€award€of€attorney€fees€may€be€justified€in€order€to€avoid€requiring€theÐ 4„ Ðspouse€to€deplete€her€source€of€income).Ð  p ÐÌà  àWe€note€that€the€appellant€has€incurred€attorneyððs€fees€in€the€amount€of€$18,221.34.€Ð øH ÐHowever,€the€appellee€has€already€paid€$2,500.00€of€this€fee€as€the€appellantððs€retainer.€€At€the€endÐ ä4 Ðof€the€second€hearing,€the€appellant€had€$15,721.34€remaining€in€attorneyððs€fees.€€The€trial€courtÐ Ð  Ðordered€the€appellee€to€pay€$3,400.00€of€this€amount.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€This€leaves€the€appellant€with€$12,321.34Ð ¼  Ðin€attorneyððs€fees.€€As€attorney€fees€are€considered€an€award€of€alimony,€the€trial€court€shouldÐ ¨ø Ðconsider€the€relevant€factors€set€out€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)€before€making€such€an€award.€Ð ”ä ÐòòStorey€v.€Storeyóó,€835€S.W.2d€593,€598€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);€€òòsee€also€Raskindóó,€325€S.W.2d€at€617.òòóóÐ €Ð ÐÌà  àUnder€the€ruling€of€the€trial€court,€the€appellant€will€receive€the€$30,000.00€equity€in€theÐ X ¨ Ðmarital€residence,€the€$3,180.66€of€equity€in€the€partiesðð€timeshares,€and€household€items€with€aÐ D!” Ðâ âvalue€of€$21,855.00.€€Taking€into€account€both€the€property€settlement€and€the€relative€income€levels€Ð 0"€  Ðof€the€parties,€it€appears€to€us€that€the€appellant€has€been€provided€with€a€sufficient€source€of€fundsÐ ° Ðâ âfrom€which€to€pay€the€rest€of€her€attorneyððs€fees.€€We€therefore€affirm€the€trial€judge€in€this€respect.€Ð œì ÐÌà@‹‹)ìàò òV.ó óˆÐ tÄ ÐÌà  àThe€order€of€the€trial€court€is€modified€as€indicated€herein€and€otherwise€affirmed.€€RemandÐ L œ Ðthis€cause€to€the€Chancery€Court€for€Wilson€County€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€thisÐ 8 ˆ Ðopinion.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€equally€between€the€appellant€and€appellee.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________€Ð À  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.