ÿWPC  öR:J<À|Ô¶Ë<Ëü+Õîšê1ᣉ벵ûÁ!e¦WÄ®•UOðøÂÖÝI¤ò ožöd ÒÔŽKó©E/Zü–.Þ@U­i/òh­éý8 l†.b%H×Á*uSó;_öùëøÊüØ+°å7RpMU°¨lúª4ïÑ'rìcÓ\ô¢m&à§°o]ÒÜH¨ö¬Jj.E¡‘Ð* ®”j3ßžˆÂvÇžÃãòhóªÊÛ‚Ñü™^\¹2¸Ý”ᢠzŽ1Óž½[Žòßg§#¾Ö7}Wâ¿‚GïfúJ$`ºÒGQO ïÞW›«Áî]í¬Ð¤Ý¨è™KÙJ´’]=XŠÖK­ù&¦b#Á\ % ^ # 0ˆ/ UN· w 4 z Ò— i x mz ¤‘ Æ5ÆûÆÁƇ 0DMN‘“›E±UN³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³b 0ë     Bôô 0¤ D3µ D-è 0K AS`Ƴ 0¤y 0D A«a˜HP LaserJet 8000 Series PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0»®“O+â (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularòK+ê:i¢Ø+00 ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ šÝ ƒRôO$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€XÌÍX»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€marriage€settlement€agreement€approved€by€the€Illinois€CourtÐ ° Ðunder€Illinois€was€valid€as€between€the€parties.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔSlagelÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔWesselsÔ_Ôóó,€732€N.E.2d€720€(Ill.€Ct.€App.Ð œì Ð2000);€òòIn€re:€Marriage€of€Ô_ÔFreesenÔ_Ôóó,€655€N.E.2d€1144€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1995);€òòIllinois€Dept.€of€Public€AidÐ ˆØ Ðv.€Flightóó,€675€N.E.2d€985€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1997);€òòGay€v.€Ô_ÔDunlapÔ_Ôóó,€664€N.E.2d€88€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1995);€Ð tÄ ÐòòIn€re:€Marriage€of€Ô_ÔPihalyÔ_Ôóó,€627€N.E.2d€1297€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1994);€òòIn€re:€Marriage€of€Ô_ÔStegbauerÔ_Ôóó,€404Ð `° ÐN.E.2d€1140€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1980);€òòIn€re:€Marriage€of€McBrideóó,€519€N.E.2d€1095€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1988);Ð L œ Ðand€òòIn€re:€€Marriage€of€Milleróó,€595€N.E.2d€1349,€1351€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1992).Ð 8 ˆ ÐLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó  Ñ ° Ñ(ÆúI Z‹6Times New Roman Regular- ù-(|G2ôO$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€H´»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€X'äX»»Ô d(|3Ž$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€H´»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Ž$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€H´»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€D<»»d dÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€¼q»»»ÔÑ8€"¼XXdê»»d 8ÑÑ€OYÑà@¦ ¦ ìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@””$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEˆÐ  Ðà@==ìà€August€29,€2001€SessionˆÐ Ô$ ÐÔ‡XÌÍX»¼qÔÌò òÔ#†¼q»XXÌͳ#ÔÓ  ÓDENISE€B.€FRAZIER€v.€ROBERT€G.€FRAZIERòòóóÔ‡XÌÍX»¼qÔó óÐ Ò" ÐÓùÓÌà@M M ìàò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Knox€CountyˆÐ Ò " Ðà@? ? ìàNo.€136528„3€€€€€€Hon.€Sharon€Bell,€ChancellorˆÐ ¾  ÐÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àFILED€OCTOBER€15,€2001Ð – æ  Ðà@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<` A߈Ð ‚Ò  ÐÌà@¶¶ìàNo.€E2000„02929„COA„R3„CV€ˆÐ }Í  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<T` AßÐ U¥  Ðó óÌÌAppellant€ask€the€Court€to€void€portions€of€the€marital€settlement€agreement€incorporated€in€theÐ <Œ Ðpartiesðð€Divorce€Decree€in€the€State€of€Illinois.€€The€Trial€Court€refused€and€granted€appelleeÐ (x Ðsummary€judgment.€€We€affirm.Ð d ÐÌÔ#†¼q»XXÌÍ1#ÔÔ‡XÌÍX»¼qÔÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€Court€Affirmed.ó óÐ Ø( ÐÌòòÌHerschel€Pickens€FranksÔ#†¼q»àXÌÍá#ÔÔ‡XÌÍX.¼qÔ,óó€J.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€whichòò€Houston€M.€Goddard,Ô#†¼q»àXÌÍ©#ÔÔ‡XÌÍX.¼qÔÐ œì ÐP.J.,óó€andòò€Charles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€Ô#†¼q»àXÌÍ7#ÔÔ‡XÌÍX.¼qÔJ.óó,€joined.Ð ˆØ ÐÌJudy€Pinkston€McCarthy€and€Dennis€McCarthy,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€Appellant,€Denise€B.Ð `° ÐFrazier.Ð Lœ ÐÌWanda€G.€Sobieski,€Diane€M.€Messer€and€Nanette€J.€Landen,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€Appellee,Ð $ t ÐRobert€G.€Frazier.Ð !`  ÐÌÌÌà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼q»XXÌͶ#ÔÔ‡XÌÍX»¼qԈРÀ$ $ ÐòòóóÔ#†¼q»XXÌÍd #ÔÔ‡XÌÍX»¼qÔÌÌà  àà ` àThis€action€is€essentially€a€collateral€attack€on€a€divorce€decree€and€marital€settlementÐ „'Ô"' Ðagreement,€seeking€to€void€certain€provisions€in€the€marital€settlement€agreement€incorporated€inÐ p(À#( Ðthe€divorce€decree.Ð \)¬$) ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€parties€were€divorced€in€Illinois€in€June€of€1995.€€The€marital€settlementÐ 4+„&+ Ðagreement€was€approved€by€the€Court,€and€provided€for€a€division€of€marital€property,€spousalÐ  ,p', Ðsupport€and€maintenance,€child€support€and€visitation€for€two€minor€children.€€No€choice€of€lawÐ  -\(-ý Ðprovision€or€severability€clause€was€contained€in€the€document.Ð ° ÐÌà  àà ` àWhen€the€settlement€was€negotiated,€the€parties€were€aware€that€the€husband€had€theÐ ˆØ Ðopportunity€for€stock€option€plans€offered€by€his€employer.€€In€the€final€decree,€one€provisions€statedÐ tÄ Ðthat€for€purposes€of€calculating€husbandððs€maintenance€payments€to€wife,€his€stock€options€wouldÐ `° Ðbe€included€in€determining€his€gross€income.€€However,€the€provision€for€child€support€paymentsÐ L œ Ðrequired€that€the€husband€would€pay€$1,164.00€per€month,€based€upon€his€income€of€$8,750.00€perÐ 8 ˆ Ðmonth,€plus€25%€of€his€other€net€income.€€The€agreement€stated:€ð ðFor€calculating€this€additionalÐ $ t Ð25%,€net€income€shall€not€include€investment€income€from€his€Schwab€One€account€or€the€like,Ð  ` Ðreimbursed€business€expenses,€use€of€a€company€automobile,€sale€of€options€including€options€forÐ ü L  Ðstock€in€Gregððs€past,€future,€or€present€employer,€and€interest€on€bank€accounts.ðð€€The€provisionÐ è 8  Ðfurther€stated€that€in€the€event€25%€of€the€husbandððs€net€income€exceeds€$50,000.00€per€year,€heÐ Ô$  Ðshall€only€be€required€to€pay€$4,166.00€per€month,€for€a€maximum€of€$50,000.00€per€calendar€year.Ð À  ÐÌà  àà ` àFinal€judgment€was€entered€reciting€that€ð ðsaid€agreement€was€entered€into€freely€andÐ ˜è  Ðvoluntarily€between€the€parties€hereto,€it€is€not€unconscionable€and€it€receives€the€approval€of€theÐ „Ô  ÐCourt€and€is€incorporated€and€made€a€part€hereof.ðð€€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àà ` àLater,€both€parties€relocated€to€Tennessee€and€the€Illinois€judgment€was€domesticatedÐ H˜ Ðin€Knox€County,€Tennessee,€on€December€11,€1998€at€the€instance€of€the€wife.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àà ` àThis€action€was€instituted€in€September€1999,€challenging€that€portion€of€the€marriageÐ  \ Ðsettlement€agreement€pertaining€to€the€definition€of€husbandððs€net€income€for€purposes€of€calculatingÐ øH Ðchild€support€payment.€€Specifically,€her€cause€of€action€asks€the€Court€to€find€that€excludingÐ ä4 Ðhusbandððs€stock€options€from€the€calculation€for€child€support€payments€and€capping€the€totalÐ Ð  Ðpayment€at€a€maximum€of€$50,000.00€per€year,€is€void.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€husband€moved€for€summary€judgment,€asserting€the€wifeððs€claim€was€barredÐ ”ä Ðby€òòres€judicataóó€and€that€she€was€judicially€estopped€from€challenging€the€terms€of€the€judgmentÐ €Ð Ðwhich€she€previously€relied€on€in€both€Illinois€and€Tennessee€courts.€€Summary€judgment€wasÐ l¼ Ðgranted€and€this€appeal€ensued.Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àà ` àJudgments€obtained€in€sister€states€are€valid€and€enforceable€when€properlyÐ 0"€  Ðdomesticated€in€the€courts€of€this€State.€€The€domesticated€judgment€has€the€same€legal€effect€as€oneÐ #l! Ðoriginating€in€Tennessee,€and€is€governed€by€the€same€law€regarding€finality€of€judgments,€subjectÐ $X" Ðto€collateral€attack€for€grounds€set€forth€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð60.02,€assuming€the€original€judgmentÐ ô$D # Ðis€valid.€€òòSee€óóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð26„6„104(c).€€The€final€judgments€of€sister€states€are€presumedÐ à%0!$ Ðconclusive€and€valid.€€A€party€seeking€to€undermine€the€validity€of€a€foreign€judgment€carries€ð ðaÐ Ì&"% Ðstern€and€heavy€burdenðð€to€show€that€it€should€be€denied€the€full€faith€and€credit€afforded€by€ArticleÐ ¸'#& Ð4,€Section€1€of€the€United€States€Constitution.€€Two€limited€exceptions€to€the€full€faith€and€creditÐ ¤(ô#' Ðprinciple€are€where€it€can€be€shown€that€the€rendering€court€lacked€personal€or€subject€matterÐ )à$( Ðjurisdiction.€€òòBiogen€Distrib.,€Inc.,€v.€Tanneróó,€842€S.W.2d€253,€256€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€Ð |*Ì%) ÐHowever,€factual€inquiries€into€other€underlying€legal€issues€adjudicated€by€a€foreign€court€areÐ h+¸&* Ðimproper.€€òòBenham€v.€Fisheróó,€650€S.W.2d€759,€760€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983).€€òòAlso€see,€Williams€v.Ð ° ÐNorth€Carolinaóó,€325€U.S.€226,€232€(1945)€(divorce€decrees€of€foreign€state€are€conclusiveÐ œì Ðadjudication€of€all€issues€except€jurisdictional€facts,€such€as€domicile).Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àà ` àTo€mount€a€successful€collateral€attack€upon€the€final€decree€of€divorce€entered€inÐ `° ÐIllinois,€it€must€be€shown€that€Illinois€lacked€jurisdiction,€as€determined€by€Illinois€law.€€òòFourÐ L œ ÐSeasons€Gardening€&€Landscaping,€Inc.,€v.€Crouchóó,€688€S.W.2d€439,€432€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€Ð 8 ˆ ÐConversely,€if€€Illinois€determined€that€it€had€jurisdiction€over€the€issue,€then€Tennessee€must€respectÐ $ t Ðthat€finding.€€òòId.óóÐ  ` ÐÌà  àà ` àòòð ðRes€judicata€óóis€an€absolute€bar€to€a€subsequent€suit€between€the€same€parties€on€theÐ è 8  Ðsame€cause€of€action,€and€it€concludes€such€parties€not€only€as€to€all€matters€that€were€actually€putÐ Ô$  Ðat€issue€and€determined,€but€also€all€matters€which€might€have€been€put€at€issue€and€determined.ðð€Ð À  ÐòòCoastcom,€Inc.,€v.€Cruzenóó,€981€S.W.2d€179,€181€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àà ` àFull€faith€and€credit€principles€mandate€that€òòres€judicataóó€be€applied€in€the€forum€stateÐ „Ô  Ðto€the€full€extent€that€they€applied€in€the€rendering€state,€including€questions€of€subject€matterÐ pÀ Ðjurisdiction.€€òòDurfee€v.€Dukeóó,€375€U.S.€106,€111€(1963).€€The€wifeððs€position€that€she€did€not€actuallyÐ \¬ Ðlitigate€the€jurisdictional€issue€in€the€Illinois€divorce€is€untenable.€€Illinois€has€cited€with€approvalÐ H˜ Ðthe€Restatement€(Second)€of€Judgments€ðð12,€at€120,€that€even€if€subject€matter€jurisdiction€has€notÐ 4„ Ðbeen€raised€and€determined,€a€final€judgment€should€ð ðordinarily€be€treated€as€wholly€valid€if€theÐ  p Ðcontroversy€has€been€litigated€in€any€other€respect,€pursuant€to€the€doctrine€of€claim€preclusion.ðð€Ð  \ ÐòòSee,€In€Re:€Marriage€of€Fieldsóó,€681€N.E.2d€166,€172€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1997).Ð øH ÐÌà  àà ` àUnder€Illinois€law,€the€Illinois€courts€have€determined€that€jurisdictional€questionsÐ Ð  Ðneed€be€addressed€by€a€particular€type€or€class€of€cases,€not€necessarily€by€a€specific€litigant.€Ð ¼  Ðð ðJurisdiction€of€the€subject€matter€does€not€mean€simple€jurisdiction€of€the€particular€case€thenÐ ¨ø Ðoccupying€the€attention€of€the€court,€but€jurisdiction€of€the€class€of€cases€to€which€the€particular€caseÐ ”ä Ðbelongs.ðð€€òòPeople€v.€Western€Tire€Auto€Stores,€Inc.óó,€207€N.E.2d€474,€476€(Ill.€1965).€€The€CourtÐ €Ð Ðapplied€this€rule€in€a€divorce€case€wherein€the€trial€court€did€not€adhere€to€a€statutory€mandateÐ l¼ Ðrequiring€bifurcation€of€contested€cases.€€Respondent€argued€that€this€error€deprived€the€court€ofÐ X ¨ Ðsubject€matter€jurisdiction,€but€the€Court€of€Appeals€disagreed:Ð D!” ÐÌà0  àà0` (#(#àWhere€the€subject€matter€of€the€litigation€is€within€the€general€jurisdiction€of€the€trialÐ #l! Ðcourt,€the€claim€of€want€of€jurisdiction€by€reason€of€the€existence€of€irregularities,€orÐ $X" Ðexceptional€or€special€circumstances,€or€because€the€court€had€no€jurisdiction€toÐ ô$D # Ðrender€the€particular€judgment€or€order€cannot€be€made€for€the€first€time€on€appeal.Ðà%0!$` (#` (# ÐÌòòIn€Re:€Marriage€of€Jeromeóó,€625€N.E.2d€1195,€1206€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€òòAccord:óó€òòIn€Re:€MarriageÐ ¸'#& Ðof€Fieldsóó,€681€N.E.2d€166€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€Illinois€Supreme€Court€discussed€the€legal€distinction€between€a€void€versusÐ |*Ì%) Ðvoidable€judgment€in€òòIn€re:€Marriage€of€Mitchellóó,€692€N.E.2d€281€(1998).€€In€òòMitchellóó,€a€litigantÐ h+¸&* ÐÑOYÑâ âѰ°Ñâ âÑ  Ñchallenged€a€child€support€order,€contending€that€the€lower€court€lost€its€jurisdiction€because€its€orderÐ ° Ðexpressed€the€child€support€award€in€terms€of€a€percentage€of€income,€rather€than€an€exact€dollarÐ œì Ðamount€as€required€by€the€applicable€statute.€€The€Supreme€Court€agreed€that€this€was€error€by€theÐ ˆØ Ðtrial€court,€but€held€that€ð ð[o]nce€a€court€has€acquired€jurisdiction,€an€order€will€not€be€rendered€voidÐ tÄ Ðmerely€because€of€an€error€or€impropriety€in€the€issuing€courtððs€determination€of€the€law.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€284.€Ð `° ÐThe€òòMitchellóó€court€acknowledged€that€a€judgment€may€be€attacked€collaterally€as€void€if€there€is€aÐ L œ Ðtotal€lack€of€jurisdiction,€but€since€subject€matter€jurisdiction€existed€as€to€the€dissolutionÐ 8 ˆ Ðproceedings,€the€child€support€determination,€although€erroneous,€was€merely€voidable,€not€void.€Ð $ t ÐòòId.óó€at€283„284.€€To€hold€otherwise,€the€Court€reasoned,€would€open€a€floodgate€of€litigation€on€finalÐ  ` Ðdecrees.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àà ` àTennessee€law€is€in€accord€with€òòMitchellóó.€€òòRes€judicataóó€will€protect€the€sanctity€of€aÐ Ô$  Ðfinal€judgment,€whether€ð ðthe€Decree€was€based€upon€good€law€or€upon€bad€law.€€If€no€appeal€wasÐ À  Ðtaken€therefrom,€it€may€not€now€be€attacked€because€of€some€defect€in€the€proceedings.€€That€is€whatÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€doctrine€of€òòres€judicataóó€is€all€about.ðð€€òòKolker€v.€Gelbóó,€600€S.W.2d€728,€730€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ˜è  Ð1980).€€òòAccord:óó€òòSpruce€v.€Spruce,€óó2€S.W.3d€192€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àà ` àAssuming€òòarguendoóó,׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€that€in€the€present€case€the€Court€erred€by€failing€to€make€theÐ \¬ Ðwritten€findings€for€its€deviation€from€the€statutory€child€support€guidelines,€by€permitting€husbandððsÐ H˜ Ðstock€options€to€be€excluded€from€his€income€calculation,€or€by€capping€the€total€amount€atÐ 4„ Ð$50,000.00,€these€defects€cannot€be€considered€as€revoking€the€Courtððs€jurisdiction.€€This€is€a€mereÐ  p Ðfailure€of€procedural€fidelity,€at€most€an€erroneous€ruling.€€The€wifeððs€position€is€contrary€to€theÐ  \ Ðstrong€policy€favoring€the€finality€of€judgments,€even€those€made€in€error,€once€the€time€for€directÐ øH Ðappeal€is€passed.Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àà ` àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€and€remand,Ð ¼  Ðwith€the€cost€of€the€appeal€assessed€to€Denise€B.€Frazier.Ð ¨ø ÐÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à_________________________Ð D!” Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àòòHerschel€Pickens€Franks,€J.Ð 0"€  Ðóó