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X/&24Technical Document Style.. 23  Ԁ. 346789:; CRight ParRight-Aligned Paragraph NumbersI.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXx6X@JQX@MARVINBERKELESLIEMcWILLIAMS VANNLASLEYPINCHAKMcDONALDLUFKINFRIERSONErlanger z R(  s&XXXXX6+t'*d66+t'*d6HH1HH2HH3HH4HH5HH6HH7HH8HH910111213141516171819202122232425262728  .+<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi2 0Indent123  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  'C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23  ($$   1  ' dxdP Pdxyz{|}~ ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X<  9p`(&Times New Roman<  9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d7Border 1dd'BC << G<  9p`(Arial  !#d#     YYY FILEDX June26,1998CecilCrowson,Jr.AppellateCourtClerk  | !#d#   $       TheKennedysmovedforadirectedverdictattheconclusionoftheplaintiffsproofandagainatthecloseofalltheproof.Theyrenewedtheirmotionafterthejuryreturneditsverdict. - !#d#   $       NeitherofthejuriesinthiscasewasmadeawareofthefactthatthecaseagainsttheKellershadbeensettled. 4 !#d#   $       WithrespecttoFye,thejurysimplyfoundthatshewasguiltyofnegligencethatproximatelycausedherinjuries. o !#d#   $       Thejuryoriginallyreportedfaultasfollows:Kennedy0%,Keller90%,andFye10%.ThetrialjudgefoundthattheallocationofzerofaulttoKennedywasinconsistentwiththejurysfindingthatKennedywasguiltyofnegligencethatproximatelycausedtheaccident.Hedirectedthejurytoretireforfurtherdeliberations.Oneminutelater,thejuryreturnedandannounceditsrevisedverdict,whichwasacceptedbythecourt.  !#d#   $       TheplaintiffdidnotquestionthedismissalofGeneralMotorsCorporationandthedealer.  !#d#   $       T.C.A.558110provides,inpertinentpart,asfollows: 8 Whenevertrafficiscontrolledbytrafficcontrolsignalsexhibitingthewords Go, Cautionor Stop,orexhibitingdifferentcoloredlightssuccessivelyone(1)atatime,orwitharrows,thefollowingcolorsonlyshallbeusedandthetermsandlightsshallindicateandapplytodriversorvehiclesandpedestriansasfollows:@ *** 8 (2)Yellowaloneor Caution,whenshownfollowingthegreenor Gosignal: 8 (A)Vehiculartrafficfacingthesignalistherebywarnedthattheredor Stopsignalwillbeexhibitedimmediatelythereafterandsuchvehiculartrafficshallnotenterorcrosstheintersectionwhentheredor Stopsignalisexhibited;... ' !#d#   $       T.C.A.558129provides,inpertinentpart,asfollows: 8 Thedriverofavehiclewithinanintersectionintendingtoturntotheleftshallyieldtherightofwaytoanyvehicleapproachingfromtheoppositedirectionwhichiswithintheintersectionorsoclosetheretoastoconstituteanimmediatehazard,butthedriver,havingsoyieldedandhavinggivenasignalwhenandasrequiredbythischapter,maymakesuchleftturn,andthedriversofallothervehiclesapproachingtheintersectionfromtheoppositedirectionshallyieldtherightofwaytothevehiclemakingtheleftturn. ( !#d#   $       Harristestifiedatanearliertimethathewas60feetfromthecrosswalkwhenthelightturnedtoyellow.  !#d#   $       Fyewasthetriplets nanny.OneofthetripletswasinthefrontseatnexttoKennedywhiletheothertwowereinthesecondseatoneithersideofFye.Apparently,thechildrenwerenotinjuredintheaccident.  !#d#   $       Thiswouldstillbethecasetoday,absentanycomplicatingissuesofcomparativefault.  !#d#       11ContrarytoJudgeGoddardsstatementinhisseparateopinion,allofErlangerschargesthatwerepresentedtothejurywereincurredbyFye;itwasonlyaftertheyhadbeenincurredthataportionofthetotalbillwasforgiven. \\RA'\  !  #d#     YYY FILEDX June26,1998CecilCrowson,Jr.AppellateCourtClerk PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'`Styl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Geneva   ellan Geneva  ellan Geneva ! .   P 7vXXdd7\RA'\  RA1-j|`  `@Rߛ @ COURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE@ ATKNOXVILLEEDWARDFYE,individuallyand )C/ANO.03A019707CV00287ashusbandofthedeceased, )BARBARAMAYFYE,   )      )  PlaintiffAppellant,)      )      )      )APPEALASOFRIGHTFROMTHEv.      )HAMILTONCOUNTYCIRCUITCOURT      )      )      )      )ANNED.KENNEDYand   )JAMESD.KENNEDY,III,  )      )HONORABLESAMUELH.PAYNE,  DefendantsAppellees.)JUDGEForAppellant     ForAppelleesC.MARKWARREN     SAMUELR.ANDERSONDuncan,Mosley&Warren   E.MATTIASJANNERBOChattanooga,Tennessee   LutherAnderson,PLLP       Chattanooga,Tennessee       CAROLA.MUTTER       LookoutMountain,Tennessee@  OPINIONX̜VACATEDINPART̜AFFIRMEDINPART̜REMANDEDFORNEWTRIAL       Susano,J.Ӝ  Thisisawrongfuldeathandlossofservicesactionthataroseoutofatwovehicleaccident.Followingthesecondoftwojurytrials,thetrialcourt,actingpursuanttoRule50,ϜTenn.R.Civ.P.,setasidethejurysverdictfortheplaintiff,EdwardFye,anddirectedtheentryofajudgmentfortheremainingdefendants,AnneD.KennedyandJamesD.Kennedy,III.    ׀Plaintiffappealed,raisingtwoissues: 8 1.DidthetrialcourterringrantingtheKennedysadirectedverdict? 8 2.DidthetrialjudgewhopresidedoverthefirsttrialimproperlylimitthepercentageoffaultthatcouldbeassessedtotheKennedysinthesecondjurytrial?TheKennedysargue,bywayofaseparateissue,thatthe trialcourtimproperlyappliedthecollateralsourceruleindeterminingtheamountofdamagestowhichplaintiffwasentitled.@ I.  ThiscasefindsitsgenesisinanApril30,1991,accidentinvolvingavehicledrivenbythedefendantAnneD.Kennedy( Kennedy)inwhichvehicletheplaintiffsdecedent,BarbaraMayFye( Fye),wasridingasaguestpassengerandavehicledrivenbyJeffreyW.Keller( Keller).Justpriortotheaccident,Kennedywasproceedingeastintheleftthroughtrafficlaneof23rdStreetinHamiltonCounty,approachingtheintersectionof4thAvenue.Atthesametime,Kellerwasproceedingweston23rdStreet.AsKellerapproachedtheintersection,hemovedhisvehicletothemiddleorturnlaneof23rdStreet,intendingtoturnleftonto4thAvenue.23rdStreethastwolanesfortrafficproceedingeastandtwolanesforϜtrafficmovingwest.Thethroughtrafficlanesareseparatedbyamiddleorturnlane.AsKellerwasturningleft,hisChevroletBlazerwasstruckintherightfrontquarterpanelbythefrontofKennedys1988ChevroletSuburban.Asaresultofthecollision,Fyewasseriouslyinjured.ShewashospitalizedintheintensivecareunitofErlangerMedicalCenter,wheresheremainedforjustshortofsixmonths.ShediedfromherinjuriesonOctober20,1991.  Theplaintiffbroughtsuitforhiswifeswrongfuldeathandforlossofservices.InadditiontoKennedyandKeller,theplaintiffnamedasdefendants,(1)theownersofthetwovehicles,(2)GeneralMotorsCorporation,and(3)NewtonChevroletGEO,Inc.Thelattertwodefendantsweresuedonanumberoftheories,allofwhichwererelatedtotheplaintiffscontentionthatFyesseatbeltwasdefectivelydesigned.TheplaintiffclaimedthatFyesinjurieswereenhancedbecauseofthedefectivelydesignedseatbelt.  Priortotrial,Kellerandhisfathersettledtheirliabilitytotheplaintifffor$1,500,000,    כandtheyweredismissedasdefendants.Thereafter,theremainingclaimsproceededtotrial.Followingatendaytrial,thejuryexoneratedGeneralMotorsCorporationandNewtonChevroletGEO,Inc.Ontheverdictform,thejuryreportedthatitfoundKennedy,Keller,andFyeeachguiltyofnegligencethatwasaproximatecauseoftheaccidentandFyesinjuriesanddeath.    כItfound    כthepartiesfaultasfollows:  Kennedy    1%̛  Keller   90  Fye     9Ӝ̛Damagesinthewrongfuldeathcase,withoutregardtofault,weresetat$1,505,750.Thelossofservicesclaimwasvaluedat$500,000.  Onposttrialmotion,thetrialjudge,theHonorableWilliamM.Barker,statedthatwhilehecouldandwouldapprovethejurysverdictwithrespecttodamages,hecouldnotagreewiththejurysdeterminationthatFyewasguiltyofactionablenegligence.Hestatedthathedidnotbelieveshewasguiltyofanynegligence,muchless9%.HeopinedthathewassatisfiedwiththejurysfindingwithrespecttothefaultofKeller.Afteranextendeddiscussionamongcounselandthecourt,JudgeBarkerorderedanewtrialsolelyonliability,butsetlimitsontheretrial: 8 Now,hereswhatImgoingtodo,andIknowthatthereisnoauthorityforthis,butIalsoknowtheresnoauthorityagainstit.IamgoingtodirectthattherebeanewtrialasbetweenMrs.FyesestateandtheDefendantAnneKennedyandherhusbandJamesD.Kennedy,andthenewtrialwillbelimited.Therewillnotbeanewtrialwithregardtothetotalamountofthedamageawardassignedbytheformerjury.... 8 Two,thejurywillnotbetoldofthepriorallocationoffaultforthisaccidentasbetweenMr.KellerandtheKennedys.However,oncethejuryverdictisacceptedandrendered,thepreviousJurysfindingof90percentofthefaultastoMr.Kellerwillbewrittenintotheirverdict,sothattheKennedyswillbeexposedinanewtrialtoonlyareconsiderationofwhethertheirfaultwaszeropercentorupto10percent. 8 Thatistosay,ajuryhearingthissecondtrialmayassign60percentofthefaulttotheKellersand40percenttotheKennedys.Ifthatsthecase,theKennedyswillbeliablefor10percentofthedamagespreviouslydetermined.Thejurymayfind95percentofthefaultagainsttheKellers,andonly5percentagainsttheKennedys.Thatbeingthecase,theKennedyswouldpay5percentofthosedamages. 8 Now,ImdoingthatbecauseIsimplyfeelthatwithoutanylawonthesubject,thatsjustandthatsfair.IdoagreewiththedefensethattoreexaminealloftheallocationoffaultbetweenthenegligentdefendantsornegligencechargeddefendantswouldbegivingthePlaintifftoomuchofabiteattheappleagain.TheissueofFyesnegligencewasnottobepresentedforresolutiontothesecondjury,forthesimplereasonthattheKennedys,whowerethentheonlyremainingdefendantsinthecase,hadneverclaimedthatFyewasguiltyofanynegligence.Fyesallegednegligencewas inplayatthefirsttrialonlybecausethedefectivelydesignedseatbeltdefendantshadclaimedthatFyeϜhadimproperlyfastenedherseatbelt.Withtheseatbeltissueoutofthesecondtrial,    ׀therewastobenotestimonypresentedtothesecondjuryregardingFyesuseormisuseofherseatbelt.SeeT.C.A.559604(a).  Atthesecondtrial,theHonorableSamuelH.Paynepresided.Followingatwodaytrialsolelyontheissueoftheliability/comparativefaultofKennedyandKeller,thejuryfoundbothguiltyofactionablenegligenceandassigned60%ofthefaulttoKellerand40%toKennedy.Coincidentally,thiswasoneoftheϜhypotheticalscenariosthathadbeenusedbyJudgeBarkerwhenheexplainedhowthemechanismhehadsetinplacewouldbeappliedtoensurethatKennedywouldnot,underanycircumstances,beassignedmorethan10%fault.  Kennedypursuedhermotionforadirectedverdictfollowingtheentryofthejudgmentconfirmingthesecondjurysverdict.Aspreviouslyindicated,JudgePaynegrantedthemotion,findingthatreasonablemindscouldonlyconcludethatKennedywasnotguiltyofanynegligencethatproximatelycausedorcontributedtotheaccidentandFyesinjuriesanddeath.HeconcludedthatKellersactofturninginfrontofKennedywasthesoleproximatecauseoftheaccident.JudgePaynestatedontherecord,andconfirmedinhissubsequentlyenteredorderthat 8 [s]houldthedirectedverdictforthesedefendantsbevacatedorreversedonappeal,theCourtconditionallygrantspursuanttoRules50.03and59oftheTennesseeRulesofCivilProcedurethealternativeMotionofDefendantsAnneD.andJamesD.Kennedy,III,foraNewTrial.TheCourtfindsinthealternative,uponreviewoftheevidence,thattheevidencepreponderatesagainsttheverdictofthejuryandthatifthejudgmentinfavorofthedefendantsJamesD.Kennedy,IIIandAnneKennedyisreversedonappeal,anewtrialshouldbegrantedthesedefendants.@ II.  Wereviewadirectedverdictunderwellestablishedrules: 8 Inrulingonthemotion,thecourtmusttakethestrongestlegitimateviewoftheevidenceinfavorofthenonmovingparty.Inotherwords,thecourtmustremoveanyconflictintheevidencebyconstruingitinthelightmostfavorabletothenonmovantanddiscardingallcountervailingevidence.Thecourtmaygrantthemotiononlyif,afterassessingtheevidenceaccordingtotheforegoingstandards,itdeterminesthatreasonablemindscouldnotdifferastotheconclusionstobedrawnfromtheevidence. Saulsv.Evans ,635S.W.2d377(Tenn.1982); Holmesv.Wilson ,551S.W.2d682(Tenn.1977).Ifthereisanydoubtastotheproperconclusionstobedrawnfromtheevidence,themotionmustbedenied. Crosslinv.Alsup ,594S.W.2d379(Tenn.1980). Eatonv.McLain ,891S.W.2d587,590(Tenn.1994).Seealso Williamsv.Brown ,860S.W.2d854,857(Tenn.1993).  Negligenceisordinarilyanissuetobedecidedbyajury,andcanbewithdrawnfromthejuryonlyinthosecaseswherethefactsareestablishedbyevidencefreefromconflictandtheinferencefromthefactsissocertainthatallreasonablemindsmustagree.𛀀 Id .  Therecanbemorethanoneproximatecauseofaninjury. Stokesv.Leung ,651S.W.2d704,708(Tenn.App.1982).Seealso Kelleyv.Johnson ,796S.W.2d155,159(Tenn.App.1990).  Generallyspeaking,whetherapartybreachedadutyandwhetherthatbreachproximatelycausedinjury are...questionsdecidedbythetrieroffact. Id .at157. Thesequestionsbecomequestionsoflawonlywhenthefactsandinferencesdrawnfromthefactspermitreasonablepersonstoreachonlyoneconclusion. Id .@ III.  ThecourtchargedthejurywithrespecttotheplaintiffsallegationsthatKennedywasguiltyofcommonlawϜnegligenceinfailingtousereasonablecare,infailingtohavehervehicleunderpropercontrol,infailingtokeepaproperlookout fortrafficonthestreet,indrivingatanexcessiverateofspeedfortheconditionsthenexistingonthehighway,andinfailingto observetrafficsignalsandrespondappropriately.ItalsochargedthejurywithrespecttoT.C.A.558110    כand͜T.C.A.558129.    @ IV.  OnthesubjectofKennedysnegligence,themostcriticalwitnesswasGeorgeDonaldHarris.Hetestifiedthatjustpriortotheaccidenthewasproceedingeastintherightthroughtrafficlaneof23rdStreet.Whenhereachedapointthatheestimatedwas60to80feet    ׀fromthesolidwhitelineforstoppedϜvehiclesatthe4thAvenueintersection,thelightchangedfromgreentoyellow.Hewasthentravelingat3035MPH.Whenthelightchanged,heputhisfootonthebrake ittookverylittlebreakingtostopandpulledofftotherightinavacantExxonstation.Hestoppedhiscarbeforereachingtheintersection.  Lessthanasecondafterthelightturnedfromgreentoyellow,KennedysSuburban immediatelycameintoHarrisviewtohisleftintheleftthroughtrafficlane.HeestimatedthattheKennedyvehiclewas5to10feetbehindhimwhenthelightchangedtoyellow.HetestifiedthatKennedywasgoing40to45MPH.HesawnoindicationthatKennedywasgoingtostop,doesnotrememberseeinganybrakelightsonKennedysvehicle,anddidnotdetectthatherspeedwasincreasingordecreasing.  HarrissaidthathesawKellersBlazerturningleftintheintersection,andthatitwasmovingwhenhefirstnoticedit.Harrisfurthertestifiedthatitwasapproximately2to3secondsfromthetimethelightchangedtoyellowuntilthemomentofimpact.  Thespeedlimiton23rdStreetatthesiteoftheaccidentwas40MPH.Therewasevidencefromwhichonecouldconcludethat23rdStreetand4thAvenueis,generallyspeaking,abusyintersection.Theaccidentoccurredatapproximately3:15p.m.  Anotherwitness,Ms.McLaughlin,wasinavehicletotherearofKellersBlazerandinthesamelaneoftraffic.ShetestifiedthattheBlazerwasatacompletestopoutintheintersectionpastthesolidwhitelinewhenthelightϜchangedfromyellowtored.Accordingtoher,whenthelightturnedtored,Kellerstartedhisturntotheleft.The veryinstantKellerturnedtotheleft,hewashitbyKennedysvehicle.  WhenthelightturnedredforKeller,italsoturnedredforKennedy.  KellertestifiedthathewasonehalftotwothirdsofthewaythroughthearcofhisturnwhenhewasstruckbyKennedyintherightfrontpartofhisvehicle.  Kennedytestifiedthattheaccidentoccurredat 3:15,3:17.Shewastakinghertriplets,age4,    כtoadoctorsappointment.Oneofthechildrensappointmentwasat3:15,whiletheotherchildrenwereduetoseethedoctorat3:30.Atthetimeoftheaccident,Kennedywasstillsomedistancefromthedoctorsoffice.  Kennedytestifiedthatsheneversawthelightchangefromgreentoyellow.  Admittedly,thereisevidencefromwhichonecouldconcludethatKennedywasnotguiltyofnegligencethatproximatelycausedorcontributedtotheaccident;butwecannotconsiderthisevidenceonthequestionofwhetherthetrialcourterredindirectingaverdictforthedefendantsKennedy.Aswearerequiredtodo,wehavediscardedallofthiscountervailingevidenceinconnectionwithouranalysisofthetrialjudgesdecisiontograntadirectedverdict.  WefindthatreasonablemindscouldreachdifferentconclusionsastowhetherKennedywasguiltyofactionablenegligence.Thereisevidencefromwhichthejurycouldreasonablyconclude:thatKennedywastravelingatanexcessiverateofspeedassheapproachedthisparticularintersection;Ϝthat,forwhateverreason,shedidnotseethelightgofromgreentoyellow;thatshewasinahurrytomakethechildrensappointments;that,exceptforherexcessivespeed,shecouldhavebrakedintimetostopbeforereachingtheintersection,asdidϜHarris;andthatshewasgenerallynotproceedinginasafemannerasshewasrequiredtodo.WefindthattheplaintiffscasemadeoutajuryquestionontheissueofKennedysnegligenceandwhetherthatnegligencewasaproximatecauseoftheaccident.WefindandholdthatthetrialcourterredindirectingaverdictfortheKennedys.  Thetrialjudgeatthesecondtrial,inhisroleasthethirteenthjuror,concludedthathecouldnotapprovetheverdict.Hestatedthatifhewereinerrorindirectingaverdict,hewouldgrantanewtrial.Inviewofthisholding,wearecompelledtoremandthiscaseforanewtrial.SeeRule50.03,ϜTenn.R.Civ.P.Seealso Huskeyv.Crisp ,865S.W.2d451,45455(Tenn.1993).Wedonotbelievethatthisisanappropriatecasetoexerciseourdiscretionarypower,seeRule50.03,tovacatethetrialcourtsconditionalgrantofanewtrial,infavorofreinstatingtheverdictofthesecondjury.Wedonotfindthe exceptionalcircumstancesrequiredtojustifysucharesult.See Huskey ,865S.W.2dat455.@ V.  Wenowturnourattentiontotheappellantssecondissue,i.e.,whetherthetrialcourterredwhenitcappedKennedysfaultat10%,regardlessofwhatasubsequentjuryϜconcludedwasanappropriateallocationoffaultbetweenKennedyandthenonparty,Keller.Inreachingthisissue,werecognizethatthethirdtrialmayrenderthisissuemoot.This,ofcourse,ϜwouldbethecaseifthethirdjuryweretoconcludethatKennedywasnotguiltyofanylegallycognizablefault;but,asitstandsnow,JudgeBarkersrulingisapartofthelawofthiscase.Forthisreason,webelievethepartiesareentitledtoappellatereviewofthisrulingatthistime.  JudgeBarkerreasonedthatitwasnotfairtoKennedytoϜreopentheissueofthenonpartyKellersfault.SinceheagreedthatKellerwasatleast90%atfault,hefeltthatitwasfairtothepartiesto lock[][thatdetermination]inconcrete.Actingasthethirteenthjuror,JudgeBarkerapprovedthejurysverdictϜinthreeparticulars:astoKellerscomparativefault;astotheϜsuitagainstthetwodefendantsdismissedasaresultoftheverdict;andastotheissueofdamages.HereasonedthattheallocationoffaulttoFyewithwhichheadamantlydisagreedadverselyaffectedonly10%ofthefaultequation.Hesawnoneedtoreopentheentirequestionofcomparativefault,since,inhisϜjudgment,thebulkofthejuryverdictwasclearlysustainedbythepreponderanceoftheevidence.  Itisnotuncommonforatrialjudgetoapproveajurysassessmentofdamages,whiledisagreeingwithitsverdictastoliability.Insuchcases,thecourtwould,asJudgeBarkerdid,refusetograntanewtrialastodamagesbutgrantanewtrialastoliability.Pre McIntyre ,itwasclearthatatrialcourtcouldgrantanewtrialastoonepartysclaimwhiledenyinganewtrialastoanotherpartysclaim.    כSee,e.g., NashvilleStreetRailwayCo.v.Gore ,106Tenn.390,61S.W.777(1901).Seealso Leev.Melson ,387S.W.2d838(Tenn.App.1964).In Lee ,thiscourtmadethefollowingcommentinjustifyingjustsuchϜaruling:  8 Theguidingprincipleisfairnesstobothparties.Averdicttaintedwitherrororconfusionoughtnottostand.Ontheotherhand,thepartiesareentitledtoonlyonedayincourt.Onceapartyhasbeenaccordedafairtrialonthemerits,unaffectedbyerrorsoflaw,heisnotentitledtoanothertrialmerelybecauseanotherpartytothesuithasbeengrantedanewtrialtoreverseanerrorpeculiartohim.̜ Id .at841.Thiscourtscommentsin Lee couldbeappliedwithequalforcehere.TheplaintiffintheinstantcasehadafullandfairhearingastoKellerspercentageoffault.Thetrialcourtapprovedthejurysdeterminationinthatregard.Whyshouldtheplaintiffbeentitledtoanewtrialanother biteattheapple𛀄astothatdetermination?JudgeBarkersapproachisreasonableandfairtobothparties.ItisactuallyϜmorethanfairtotheplaintiffitgiveshimanopportunitytopersuadethejurytoincreaseKennedysfaultfrom1%,asfoundbythefirstjury,to10%,atenfoldincrease.  Otherstateshavepermittedatrialcourtto tinkerwithajurysallocationoffault.See Caldwellv.PigglyWigglyMadisonCo .,32Wis.2d447,145N.W.2d745(1966); McHaffiev.Bunch ,891S.W.2d822(Mo.banc1995); Kibbonsv.UnionElectricCompany ,823S.W.2d485(Mo.banc1992).  Havingsaidallofthis,wehastentonotethatsubsequenttoJudgeBarkersruling,theSupremeCourtreleaseditsopinioninthecaseof Turnerv.Jordan ,957S.W.2d815(Tenn.1997).In Turner ,theSupremeCourtheld 8 thatthetrialcourtmaynotreallocatethecomparativefaultafterweighingtheevidenceasthethirteenthjuror,butmustinsteadgrantanewtrial. Id. at824.Werecognizethatthefactsin Turner areinnowaysimilartothefactsoftheinstantcase.Furthermore,wehavealreadyexpressedouropinionthatthetrialjudgesrulingintheinstantcasecappingKennedysfaultat10%isafairandreasonablesolutiontoadifficultandunusualsituation.Wealsorecognizethattherulingin Turner isobiterdictum,inthattheSupremeCourtexpresslyacknowledgedthat,indeciding Turner ,itdidnothavetoreachtheissueofatrialcourtspowertoreallocatefaultfollowingajuryverdict.However,wefeelboundby Turner inviewofthefacttheSupremeCourtgrantedpermissiontoappealonthisspecificissue,see id .at816,andinviewoftheabsolutenatureofthecourtspronouncementonthesubjectatϜhand. Id .at824.Seealso Holderv.TennesseeJudicialϜSelectionCommission ,937S.W.2d877,882(Tenn.1996)( Accordingly,inferiorcourtsarenotfreetodisregard,onthebasisthatthestatementisobiterdictum,thepronouncementofasuperiorcourtwhenitspeaksdirectlyonthematterbeforeit,particularlywhenthesuperiorcourtseekstogiveguidancetothebenchandbar.)  WecannotescapetheconclusionthatJudgeBarkersruling,authorizingasitdidandstilldoes,apossibleincreaseinthejurysallocationoffaulttoKennedyfrom1%to10%,isclearlyachangeareallocationasitwereofthejurysassessmentofKennedysfault.Thefirstjurysaid1%;JudgeBarkersaiditcould floatfrom0%to10%.ThejuryatthesecondtrialassessedKennedysfaultat40%;hadJudgePayneapprovedtheverdictandappliedJudgeBarkersruling,Kennedysfaultwouldhavedecreased,withoutthesecondjurysapproval,from40%to10%.ItshouldalsobenotedthatunderJudgeBarkersruling,anyjuryverdictassessinglessthan10%faulttoKennedywouldmeanthatthetotalfaultfinallyassessedinthecasewouldbelessthan100%.Forexample,ifajuryweretofindthatKennedywas5%atfault,JudgeBarkersearlierrulingwouldconfirmsuchafinding.Inthissituation,95%offault90%toKellerinthefirsttrialand5%toKennedywouldbeallocatedwith5%faultunallocated.Suchajudgmentiscontraryto McIntyres edictthat100%offaultbesetbythejury.  Webelievethat Turner precludesevenapartialϜreallocationofajurysfindingastocomparativefault.Under Turner ,atrialjudge,who,inhisorherroleasthethirteenthjuror,cannotapprovesomepartofthejurysdeterminationwithrespecttocomparativefaultislimitedtograntinganewtrial.Accordingly,wevacatesomuchofJudgeBarkersrulingbelowaspermitsthetrialcourt,onretrial,toreallocatethefaultfoundbythethirdjury.@ VI. `  X   Inthefirsttrial,JudgeBarkerpermittedtheplaintifftoproveabillfromErlangerMedicalCenterintheamountof$748,384.08.TheKennedysstrenuouslyarguethatthiswaserror.Theycontendthattheplaintiffshouldhavebeenlimitedtoproving$75,264,theportionofthebillactuallypaidbyMedicaid.  JudgeBarkeraddressedthisissuebothbeforeandafterthefirsttrial.Onthelatteroccasion,hereaffirmedhisearlierruling.Hestatedthatifhewereinerrorinadmittingtheentirebill,hewouldhavetoconcludethatthejurysdeterminationof$1,505,750forthewrongfuldeathclaimwascontrarytothepreponderanceoftheevidence;inwhicheventhewouldgrantanewtrial.SeeRule50.03,Tenn.R.Civ.P.InviewofJudgeBarkerscontingentgrantofanewtrial,wewillnowaddressthisissue.  Aspresentedtothetrialcourt,therelevantfactsarethese.ErlangerMedicalCenterrenderedabilltotheFyeestatefor$748,384.08,representingthetotalofthechargesmadebythehospitalforthesixmonthsthatFyewasinitsintensivecareϜunit.    כAtsomeunspecifiedpointthereafter,thehospitalsubmittedthisbilltoMedicaidandreceivedpaymentintheamountof$75,264.ThepartiesagreethatthehospitalwasnotunderanylegalcompulsiontosubmitthebilltoMedicaid;butitisclearthatthehospitalchosetodoso.ThepartiesrepresentedtothecourtthatthebillwassubmittedtoMedicaid  withtheunderstandingthatthehospitalwouldaccepttheamounttenderedbyMedicaid,andwouldnotseektorecoverthebalanceofthebillτ$673,120.08fromFyesestate,herhusband,oranyothersource.Whilethepartiesdidnotanddonotpresentanystatutory,regulatory,orcontractualbasisforthisforbearance,itisclear,underthepartiesstipulation,thatthebalanceofthebillwas,insomeway,legallyforgiven.Theissueforusiswhether,sincethebalanceofthebillwasforgiven,theplaintiffisentitledtorecoverthefairvalueoftheservicesrenderedasopposedtotheactualamountpaidbyMedicaid.ThepartiesagreethatMedicaidwassubrogatedtotheamountpaidbyitandwasinfactpaidbytheplaintiff,apparentlyoutoftheproceedsofthesettlementwiththeKellers.  WeareunawareofanyauthorityinTennesseeonfactssimilartothoseinthiscase.TheKennedysarguethat,because͜$673,120.08ofthebillwasforgivenbeforetrial,weshouldtreatϜtheforgivenportionasnobillatallratherthanasanexpensesatisfiedfromacollateralsource.Wedisagree.Webelievetheforgivenessofthebillshouldbeanalyzedinthecontextofthecollateralsourcerule.  UndertheprovisionsofT.C.A.205113,aclaimantinawrongfuldeathactionisentitledtorecover,amongotherthings,the necessaryexpensesresultingtothedeceasedfromthepersonalinjuries...TheSupremeCourthasstatedthat the[wrongfuldeathstatutes],intheory,preservetherightofactionwhichthedeceasedwouldhavehad,ifheorshehadsurvived. Jonesv.Black ,539S.W.2d123(Tenn.1976).Itfollowsthataclaimantseekingtorecoverforthewrongfuldeathofanotherisentitledtorecoverthe reasonableandnecessaryexpensesformedicalcare,services,andsuppliesactuallygiveninthetreatmentof[thedeceased]asshownbytheevidence.SeeT.P.I.Ϝ3CIVIL14.11.  Aninjuredpartysrighttorecoverhisorher reasonableandnecessaryexpensesmustbeviewedinconnectionwiththecollateralsourcerule: 8 Normally,ofcourse,inanactionfordamagesϜintort,thefactthattheplaintiffhasreceivedpaymentsfromacollateralsource,otherthanthedefendant,isnotadmissibleinevidenceanddoesnotreduceormitigatethedefendantsliability. Donnellv.Donnell ,415S.W.2d127,134(Tenn.1967).Seealso Steelev.Ft.SandersAnesthesiaGroup,P.C. ,897S.W.2d270,282(Tenn.App.1994).  ThesubjectbeforeusisaddressedinRestatement(Second)OfTorts󛀜(1977)920A,whichweadopt: 8 920A.EffectofPaymentsMadetoInjuredϜParty̛̜ 8 (1)Apaymentmadebyatortfeasororbyapersonactingforhimtoapersonwhomhehasinjurediscreditedagainsthistortliability,asarepaymentsmadebyanotherwhois,orbelievesheis,subjecttothesametortliability.̛ 8 (2)Paymentsmadetoorbenefitsconferredontheinjuredpartyfromothersourcesarenotcreditedagainstthetortfeasorsliability,althoughtheycoverallorapartoftheharmforwhichthetortfeasorisliable.Emphasisadded.Subsection(2)of920AisexplainedintheϜcomments: 8 b.Benefitsfromcollateralsources.Paymentsmadeorbenefitsconferredbyothersourcesareknownascollateralsourcebenefits.Theydonothavetheeffectofreducingtherecoveryagainstthedefendant.Theinjuredpartysnetlossmayhavebeenreducedcorrespondingly,andtotheextentthatthedefendantisrequiredtopaythetotalamounttheremaybeadoublecompensationforapartoftheplaintiffsinjury.Butitisthepositionofthelawthatabenefitthatisdirectedtotheinjuredpartyshouldnotbeshiftedsoastobecomeawindfallforthetortfeasor....Ifthebenefitwasagifttotheplaintifffromathirdpartyorestablishedforhimbylaw,heshouldnotbedeprivedoftheadvantagethatitconfers.Thelawdoesnotdifferentiatebetweenthenatureofthebenefits,solongastheydidnotcomefromthedefendantorapersonactingforhim.Onewayofstatingthisconclusionistosaythatitisthetortfeasorsresponsibilitytocompensateforallharmthathecauses,notconfinedtothenetlossthattheinjuredpartyreceives.... 8 Perhapsthereisanelementofpunishmentofthewrongdoerinvolved.(See901).Perhapsalsothisisregardedasameansofhelpingtomakethecompensationmorenearlycompensatorytotheinjuredparty.(Cf.914A,Commentb). 8 c.Therulethatcollateralbenefitsarenotsubtractedfromtheplaintiffsrecoveryappliestothefollowingtypesofbenefits:@ *** 8 (3)Gratuities.Thisappliestocashgratuitiesandtotherenderingofservices.Thusthefactthatthedoctordidnotchargeforhisservicesortheplaintiffwastreatedinaveteranshospitaldoesnotpreventhisrecoveryforthereasonablevalueoftheservices. 8 (4)Sociallegislationbenefits.Socialsecuritybenefits,welfarepayments,pensionsunderspecialretirementacts,allaresubjecttothecollateralsourcerule.@ ***  In Bennettv.Haley ,132Ga.App.512,208S.E.2d302(1974),theGeorgiaCourtofAppeals,quotingverbatimfrom22ϜAm.Jur.2dDamages570(1988),emphasizedthatgratuitousbenefitsarecoveredbythecollateralsourcerule: 8 [A]sageneralrule,thefactthattheplaintiffreceivedgratuitousmedicalcare,continuedsalaryorwagepayments,proceedsfrominsurancepolicies,orwelfareandpensionbenefits,willnotbetakenintoaccountincomputingdamages.208S.E.2dat310.Tothesameeffectis Mitchellv.Moore ,406So.2d347,351(Ala.1981).  In Banksv.Crowner ,694P.2d101(Wyo.1985),theSupremeCourtofWyoming,relyingupontheabovequotedsectionoftheRestatement,heldthatevenassumingbillsfromaVeteransAdministrationfacilitywerefortreatment renderedgratuitously,aninjuredpartysuingintortwouldbeentitledtoprove thereasonablevalueofthemedicalservicesnecessarytotreattheinjury. Id .at105.  InTennessee,thefocushasalwaysbeenonthe reasonablevalueof necessaryservicesrendered.Aplaintiffmustprovethattheservicesrenderedwere necessarytotreattheinjuryorconditioninquestion;and,eveniftheserviceswerenecessary,thatthechargesinquestionwere reasonable.Thecollateralsourceruleprecludesadefendantfromattemptingtoprovethata reasonable𛀜chargefora necessaryserviceactuallyrendered,hasbeen,orwillbe,paidbyanothernotthedefendantorsomeoneactingonhisorherbehalforhasbeenforgiven,orthattheservicehasbeengratuitouslyrendered.However,adefendantispermittedtointroducerelevantevidenceregardingnecessity,reasonableness,andwhetheraclaimedservicewasactuallyrendered.  Thetheoryunderlyingthecollateralsourcerulingisthatatortfeasorshouldberesponsiblefor allharmthathe[orshe]causes.920A,Commentb.Inapplyingthecollateralsourceruleandthetheoryunderlyingit,thereisnoreasontodifferentiatebetweenapaymentfromacollateralsourceandagratuityfromacollateralsource.Ineitherevent,thereisabenefittotheinjuredpartythat shouldnotbeshiftedsoastobecomeawindfallforthetortfeasor. Id .  Intheinstantcase,theKennedystacitlyconcedethatsixmonthsofintensivecarehospitalizationwas necessary.Thereisnosuggestionthatthehospitalbillfor$748,384.08isotherthan reasonable.Therefore,itisclearthatthebillisϜforservicesactuallyrendered,thatitrepresentschargesfor necessarytreatment,andthatitisina reasonableamount.Thejurywasentitledtothisevidence.Itwasnotentitledtoknowthatthebillhadbeenpartiallyforgiven.  ThejudgmentofthetrialcourtdirectingaverdictfortheappelleesAnneD.KennedyandJamesD.Kennedy,III,isherebyvacated.ThejudgmentofthetrialcourtlimitinganassessmentoftheKennedyscomparativefaultto10%islikewisevacated.ThetrialcourtsconditionalgrantofanewtrialsolelyontheϜissuesoftheKennedysliabilitytotheplaintiffandthecomparativefaultofKennedyandKellerisherebyaffirmed,asisthetrialcourtsdecisionregardingthebillfromErlangerMedicalCenter.Theissuesforthejuryinthethirdtrialwillbethesameastheonesinthesecondtrial.Thiscaseisremandedtothetrialcourtforanewtrial.Costsonappealaretaxedtotheappellees.̜ӛ      _____________________________      CharlesD.Susano,Jr.,J.CONCUR:________________________HoustonM.Goddard,P.J.________________________WilliamH.Inman,Sr.J.  7sbsXXdXXd7 , 5   u` J;+'b|`  `@Jߛ@ COURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE@ ATKNOXVILLEEDWARDFYE,Individuallyand@ @ )  ashusbandofthedeceased,@ ) BARBARAMAYFYE@ ) @ ) PlaintiffAppellant@ )@ )  @ )    v.  @ ) HAMILTONCOUNTY@ ) 03A019707CV00287@ )ANNED.KENNEDYand@ ) JAMESD.KENNEDY,III@ )@ ) DefendantsAppellees@ )@ @ @ OPINIONCONCURRINGINPARTANDDISSENTINGINPART         Goddard,P.J.  IconcurinalloftheissuesaddressedinthemajorityopinionexcepttheonequestioningtheTrialCourt'spermittingthePlaintifftoprovetheentirebillfromErlangerMedicalCenter.  IrecognizethatJudgeSusanohassetoutconsiderableauthoritytosupportthepositionreachedbythemajority.However,itappearsthisisaquestionoffirstimpressioninTennesseeandIcannotconcurthatthelawshouldenableaninjuredplaintifftobeabletoproveand,presumably,recovermonetarydamagesformedicalexpenseswhichhehasinfactnotincurred,muchlesspaidorbecameobligatedtopay.  Assume,forinstance,thatinthecaseatbarthedeceasedhadonlyreceivedarelativelyminorinjuryfromwhichshefullyrecovered.However,thecostofhertreatmentandconvalescencetotaled$250,000,butshewasonlychargedandobligatedtopaythesumof$2500.Wouldshethenbeentitledtoprovethe$250,000asapartofherdamages?Ithinknot.Inmyview,fundamentalfairnessrequiresadifferentresolutionthanthatreachedbythemajorityopinion.  IwouldholdthattheintroductionoftheErlangerbillwasprejudicialerrorandinlightofJudgeBarker'sstatementrelativetograntinganewtrialremandthecasefortrialastoliabilityanddamages,whichwouldincludeonlythosemedicalbillswhichwerepaidortherewasanobligationtopay.      _______________________________      HoustonM.Goddard,P.J.Ԝ