ÿWPC+# qÔ%Å|Êñ6€ñ›±bÝ@+ç4MjŸOàžµ¢?έ‘TL%Æ„ئٰM“¸à›¡ÃGdÉéýõgv¸·ù˜ÁÁ†G•už£Ô XÈEN¢ï¥Õ•;L71Zî¯î›uU©í‡(õ}4]8©èÅæk¿\檑;xg’êñšÀâdÿÒÌ ÜU‡Um(ó÷Å )%éûµ¹KÄFkSž—x+>x‹æz4¦t…äÜ«u'”†š-eè~à<ÏñªÁß5¨Š7Ψ걗ÞkÆKl‡¿Ž’Ï5–Ý]NxJqÒ°9Ü¥ïh27àÊ>@wI•)ΊƒÒmå4¾ï#–ÉžN25—¥W©ö|œ%¦ëU@e‰®ÌT"ì7¥W`+¶71Òãã)ÖŒÌg"@°£ü©Ê3*Ž[@™xDh‹»m­×ê; {!PCå°‘˜z’oÔEr}iÁ/ªW“¯e˳œ!ó;NO\LïT=5üÜ™·: åõæ­š?Jm\²\ FÞ,#‰P)÷"­zÉ)&‘e'ÓÕÖÿ“ëÅ’òÈÛÂŒ§à¦¤ì°„ƒ_dJ’t"ŒT3¬’û/ØA‹/ä(^J)¢…ž¬oñŽ†9ŒàWº-yõ®e.È–‡ýó*# LUNW %¥ 0c«U <w@J4Šž­U<µ=ñ 0 §.™Õ-n c› =þ AQ; 0DŒÐ¼ÕU:‘ÂË=’U:Ï™      B¢Â¿Æ 0DG 0D‹ 0DÏ™ D/¬"¬" BÛ" D3ø"˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(;cW$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XaBXXXÔ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman 67E89 î:D;Ó€<Ó€=Ó€GHÖ…#%‡X3|xJ)LÀÄ  Z $Arrus BT Roman 3Ý ƒ oÀ$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ‡ Xz¼XXXÔÓÓÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€€Attached€as€an€addendum€to€this€opinion€are€parts€of€the€ordinanceÐ ° Ðpertinent€to€the€issues€under€consideration.(W(3Ѧ$¤¤Ý ƒcW!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€X´XXXÔÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó Ý ƒ oÀ$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ‡ Xz¼XXXÔÓÓÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€€Even€if€a€rule€of€law€existed€whereby€the€City€of€Lakewood€would€not€beÐ ° Ðheld€liable€for€more€than€the€judgment€against€it€in€the€original€trial,€an€equitableÏresult€would€not€ensue.€€First€of€all,€it€would€be€forced€to€represent€itself€in€theÏsecond€trial.€€Alternatively,€if€it€chose€not€to€represent€itself,€the€remainingÏdefendants€may€attribute€an€inequitable€amount€of€fault€to€the€defenseless€andÏdisinterested€defendant,€thus€prejudicing€the€plaintiff. #Ñ#€Xÿÿd#Ñ YÝ ƒ Ѧ$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€X4XXXÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Checker€Cab€analogizes€the€association€of€owner„operators€to€theÐ ° ÐTeamsters€Union,€suggesting€that€it€is€subject€to€the€whims€of€the€owners€andÏthat€its€only€recourse€for€dealing€with€an€errant€driver€is€to€request€that€the€boardÏtake€action.€Ô‡ X4XXX4ÔÔ#†X4XX X4…#ÔFurthermore,€each€owner„operator€is€free€to€hire€relief€drivers€on€hisÐ ° Ðown,€subject€only€to€approval€by€the€board€of€owners.€€ 3Ý ƒ oÀ$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ‡ Xz¼XXXÔÓÓÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€€Attached€as€an€addendum€to€this€opinion€are€parts€of€the€ordinanceÐ ° Ðpertinent€to€the€issues€under€consideration.!"$&Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý ûÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XM¾XXXÔÔ€½$XXM¾ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XM¾X½$ÔÐ  ÐÌSeptember€11,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó ²Ý ƒ oÀ$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ‡ Xz¼XXXÔÓÓÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€Ô‡Xz¼XXXz¼Ô€Plaintiffððs€construction€of€the€ordinances€would€essentially€place€strictÐ ° Ðliability€on€the€holder€of€a€Certificate€of€Public€Necessity€and€Convenience.€€WithoutÏbenefit€of€the€ordinance,€in€order€to€hold€Checker€Cab€vicariously€liable€for€theÏnegligence€of€a€taxi€driver,€plaintiff€would€have€to€show€that€the€driver€was€acting€inÏthe€course€and€scope€of€employment€when€the€alleged€negligent€act€occurred.€€SeeÏdiscussion€of€respondeat€superior€òòinfraóó.€€,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ¸Ý ƒ oÀ$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ‡ Xz¼XXXÔÓÓÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€Ô‡Xz¼XXXz¼Ô€Plaintiffððs€construction€of€the€ordinances€would€essentially€place€strictÐ ° Ðliability€on€the€holder€of€a€Certificate€of€Public€Necessity€and€Convenience.€€WithoutÏbenefit€of€the€ordinance,€in€order€to€hold€Checker€Cab€vicariously€liable€for€theÏnegligence€of€a€taxi€driver,€plaintiff€would€have€to€show€that€the€driver€was€acting€inÏthe€course€and€scope€of€employment€when€the€alleged€negligent€act€occurred.€€SeeÏdiscussion€of€òòrespondeat€superioróó€òòinfraóó.€€ ûÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XM¾XXXÔÔ€½$XXM¾ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XM¾X½$ÔÐ  ÐÌSeptember€14,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó 3Ý ƒ oÀ$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ‡ Xz¼XXXÔÓÓÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€€Attached€as€an€addendum€to€this€opinion€are€parts€of€the€ordinanceÐ ° Ðpertinent€to€the€issues€under€consideration.,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular Ý ƒ oÀ$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ‡ Xz¼XXXÔÓÓÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€€Even€if€a€rule€of€law€existed€whereby€the€City€of€Lakewood€would€not€beÐ ° Ðheld€liable€for€more€than€the€judgment€against€it€in€the€original€trial,€an€equitableÏresult€would€not€ensue.€€First€of€all,€it€would€be€forced€to€represent€itself€in€theÏsecond€trial.€€Alternatively,€if€it€chose€not€to€represent€itself,€the€remainingÏdefendants€may€attribute€an€inequitable€amount€of€fault€to€the€defenseless€andÏdisinterested€defendant,€thus€prejudicing€the€plaintiff. d ¸Ý ƒ oÀ$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ‡ Xz¼XXXÔÓÓÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€Ô‡Xz¼XXXz¼Ô€Plaintiffððs€construction€of€the€ordinances€would€essentially€place€strictÐ ° Ðliability€on€the€holder€of€a€Certificate€of€Public€Necessity€and€Convenience.€€WithoutÏbenefit€of€the€ordinance,€in€order€to€hold€Checker€Cab€vicariously€liable€for€theÏnegligence€of€a€taxi€driver,€plaintiff€would€have€to€show€that€the€driver€was€acting€inÏthe€course€and€scope€of€employment€when€the€alleged€negligent€act€occurred.€€SeeÏdiscussion€of€òòrespondeat€superioróó€òòinfraóó.€€ƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó Ý ƒ oÀ$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ‡ Xz¼XXXÔÓÓÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€€Even€if€a€rule€of€law€existed€whereby€the€City€of€Lakewood€would€not€beÐ ° Ðheld€liable€for€more€than€the€judgment€against€it€in€the€original€trial,€an€equitableÏresult€would€not€ensue.€€First€of€all,€it€would€be€forced€to€represent€itself€in€theÏsecond€trial.€€Alternatively,€if€it€chose€not€to€represent€itself,€the€remainingÏdefendants€may€attribute€an€inequitable€amount€of€fault€to€the€defenseless€andÏdisinterested€defendant,€thus€prejudicing€the€plaintiff.(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒcW!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€X4XXXÔÝ  ÝÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€ÌØXXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓñGññ=ñßr€)<,(j 8` `€€@Eô±` 8ttxP,°ð  rßñ=ññGñà@Ì Ì ®àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@¢¢(®àAT€NASHVILLEˆÌà ` àà ¸ à€€€€______________________________________________ÌÌò òMICHAEL€C.€GLEAVES,ó óÐ ° ÐÌà ` àPlaintiff„Appellee,Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àDavidson€Circuit€No.€95C„1706ÌñHññGñßt€)>.*jx*Ä` `€€@Ev ` 8ttxPV² ð Ä tßñGññHññHñßt€)>.*jx*Ä` `€€@Ev ` 8ttxPV² ð Ä tßñHñVs.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àC.A.€No.€01A01„9710„CV„00577Ð ²  ÐÌò òCHECKER€CAB€TRANSITÐ ²  ÐCORPORATION,€INC.,€ó óÐ ´  ÐÌà ` àDefendant„Appellant.Ì____________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@— — ®àFROM€THE€DAVIDSON€COUNTY€CIRCUIT€COURTˆÌà@Ê Ê ®àTHE€HONORABLE€HAMILTON€V.€GAYDEN,€JR.,€JUDGEˆÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@®àWilliam€D.€Leader,€Jr.,€Melissa€S.€Herring,ˆÌà@  ®àBoult,€Cummings,€Conners€&€Berry,€PLC€of€NashvilleˆÌà@ÊÊ®àFor€Appellee,€Michael€C.€GleavesˆÌÌà@òò®àSteven€D.€Parman,€Matthew€A.€Boyd,ˆÌà@† † ®àWatkins,€McGugin,€McNeilly€&€Rowan,€P.L.L.C.,€of€NashvilleˆÌà@>>(®àFor€AppellantˆÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@& & ®àò òòòREVERSED€IN€PART€AND€AFFIRMED€IN€PARTó óóóˆÐ ¶)%% ÐÌà@33'®àOpinion€filed:ˆÌÌÌÌÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àò òñ7ññ6ñw.€fñ6ññ7ññ8ñW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ð ¶1-- Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEñ8ñó óÐ È:66 ÐÐ Ê;77Š Ðñ;ñÓÓñ;ñà ` àñ9ñ›Ñ€úÑœñ9ññ:ññ9ñà ¸ àñ9ññ:ññ9ñThis›€case€arises€from€an€automobile€accident€involving€a€taxicab€in€which€theÏtaxicab€company€was€held€liable€for€the€negligence€of€the€taxi€driver.€ÏDefendant/Appellant€Checker€Cab€Transit€Corporation€appeals€the€judgment€of€theÏtrial€court€on€the€jury€verdict€awarding€plaintiff€$300,000.00€in€compensatoryÏdamages.Ìà ` àDefendant/Appellant€Checker€Cab€Transit€Corporation€(Checker€Cab)€is€aÏprovider€of€dispatching€services€to€a€group€of€independent€taxicab€owner„operatorsÏin€the€greater€Nashville,€Tennessee€area.€€Checker€Cab€has€nine€employees€who€serveÏas€dispatchers€for€approximately€sixty€taxis.€€Each€taxi€operator€owns€his€or€her€ownÏvehicle€and€pays€a€flat€weekly€fee€to€Checker€Cab€in€exchange€for€dispatchingÏservices.€€In€addition,€Checker€Cab€provides€each€operator€with€Checker€insignia,Ïlights,€radios,€and€fare€meters.€€The€arrangement€between€Checker€Cab€and€theÏowner„operators€is€unusual€in€that€Checker€Cab€claims€to€have€no€control€over€theÏhiring€and€firing€of€drivers.׃×Ý ƒ##ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€€The€independent€owner„operators€meet€periodically€toÐ ° Ðelect€members€to€a€governing€board€composed€of€three€members.€€The€board,€whichÏis€responsible€for€promulgating€rules€for€the€operation€of€Checker€cabs,€has€the€soleÏauthority€to€admit€new€owner„members€and€must€approve€of€all€drivers€who€wish€toÏwork€for,€or€in€effect€sublease,€a€taxicab€from€an€owner„operator.€€In€addition,€theÏboard€acts€on€complaints€against€drivers€and€disciplines€those€who€violate€the€rules.€Ïà ` àAll€Checker€taxicabs€operate€under€a€single€ð ðCertificate€of€Public€ConvenienceÏand€Necessityðð€which€Checker€Cab€obtained€through€the€city€of€Nashvilleððs€TaxicabÏ&€Wrecker€Licensing€Board€pursuant€to€the€Code€of€the€Metropolitan€GovernmentÏof€Nashville€and€Davidson€County€(Nashville€Metro€Code)€6.72.020.€€The€NashvilleÏñ9ññ=ññ9ñÑúÑÑ#€Xÿÿd#ÑÑ  Ññ9ññ=ññ9ñordinances€governing€the€operation€of€taxicabs€include:Ð °2.. ÐÑúÑÑ7€ܪXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  Ññ9ññ<ñÓÓñ<ññ9ñà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àNashville€Metro€Code€6.72.210:€Liability€InsuranceÏAgreement.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àA.€€All€taxicab€companies€shall€be€required€to€file€aÏliability€insurance€agreement€with€the€taxicab€and€wreckerÏlicensing€board€for€each€taxicab€operated€under€theirÏfranchise.€€A€copy€of€such€agreement€is€on€file,€attachedÏto€Ordinance€81„530,€codified€in€this€section.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àB.€€These€agreements€shall€place€the€vehicles€operatedÏunder€their€franchise€in€the€taxicab€companyððs€completeÏpossession€and€control,€and€the€taxicab€company€shallÏassume€complete€liability€for€each€and€every€vehicle€forÏwhich€it€enters€into€this€agreement.€€Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðœñ9ññ;ññ9ñÓÓñ9ññ;ñ›ñ9ñÌà ` àThe€Liability€Insurance€Agreement€executed€by€Checker€Cab€requires€that€allÏvehicles€operated€under€Checker€Cabððs€Certificate€of€Public€Convenience€andÏNecessity€be€covered€by€a€policy€of€liability€insurance€that€meets€the€minimum€limitsÏestablished€by€the€State€of€Tennessee.€€The€agreement€also€provides:Ìœñ9ññ;ññ9ñÑúÑÑ7€ܪXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  Ññ9ññ;ññ<ññ9ñÓÓñ9ññ<ñ›ñ9ñà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à3.€€That€the€above„named€taxicab€company,€partnershipÏor€sole€proprietorship€shall€assume€complete€liability€forÏeach€vehicle€being€operated€under€its€name,€color,Ïemblem,€design€and€insignia€and€shall€be€liable€for€anyÏpersonal€injuries€or€property€damage€to€third€parties€asÏthe€result€of€the€negligent€use€of€this€(these)€vehicle(s).Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓà ` àDefendant€Robert€Mosley€(Mosley)€is€an€independent€owner„operatorÏaffiliated€with€Checker€Cab.€€Mosley€is€a€manic„depressive€with€a€history€of€erraticÏand€violent€behavior€who€must€take€lithium€to€control€his€emotions€and€behavior.€ÏMosley€was€operating€his€taxi€all€day€on€April€7,€1995€until€contacting€the€dispatcherÏand€notifying€her€that€he€was€going€off„duty€at€9:20€p.m.€€There€is€some€dispute€asÏto€whether€Mosley€continued€to€pick€up€passengers€after€this€time,€but€it€isÏundisputed€that€Mosley€was€on€his€way€home€when€the€accident€occurred.€On€hisÏway€home,€Mosley,€who€was€off€his€medication,€passed€a€City€of€Lakewood€police€carÏat€a€high€rate€of€speed.€€Officer€Darin€Kelley€initiated€pursuit€and€chased€Mosley€aÏdistance€of€between€four€and€five€miles€at€speeds€upwards€of€90€mph.€The€chaseÏended€abruptly€when€Mosley€ran€a€red€light€and€collided€with€Plaintiff/AppelleeÏMichael€Gleavesððs€(Gleaves)€car€at€the€intersection€of€Old€Hickory€Blvd.€andÏDelaware€Ave.€€Gleaves€suffered€severe€injuries€to€his€right€leg€and€is€permanentlyÏdisabled€as€a€result.€Ð °844 Ðà ` àPlaintiff€filed€suit€against€Mosley,€Checker€Cab,€the€City€of€Lakewood,€andÏOfficer€Darin€Kelley€seeking€$600,000.00€in€compensatory€damages.€€PlaintiffÏalleged,€òòinter€aliaóó,€that€Checker€Cab€was€liable€to€plaintiff€on€a€theory€of€òòrespondeatÐ ° Ðsuperior,€óóthat€plaintiff€was€negligent€in€its€hiring,€supervision,€and€licensing€ofÐ °  Ðdefendant,€and€that€Checker€Cab€was€liable€for€plaintiffððs€injuries€pursuant€to€theÏTaxicab€Liability€Insurance€Agreement€and€the€provisions€of€the€Nashville€MetroÏCode€cited€above.€€In€its€answer,€Checker€Cab€denied€that€Mosley€was€an€employeeÏor€agent€of€Checker€Cab€and€asserted€that€because€Mosleyððs€vehicle€was€not€beingÏoperated€as€a€taxicab€at€the€time€of€the€collision,€there€was€no€liability€under€theÏNashville€ordinances.€€Ìà ` àThe€trial€court€granted€summary€judgment€to€Checker€Cab€ð ðon€the€issues€ofÏrespondeat€superior,€agency,€negligent€hiring,€negligent€supervision,€and€ðð€317€of€theÏRestatement€(Second)€of€Torts€(1964).ðð€€In€addition,€the€trial€court,€òòsua€sponteóó,Ð ° Ðgranted€ð ðsummary€judgment€to€[plaintiff]€against€Checker€Cab€for€damages€resultingÏfrom€Mosleyððs€negligence€pursuant€to€Metropolitan€Government€Code€ðððð€6.72.010Ïthrough€6.72.440.ðð€€The€case€proceeded€to€trial€by€jury.€€At€the€close€of€all€proof,€theÏcourt€directed€a€verdict€in€favor€of€Officer€Kelley€and€dismissed€him€as€a€party.€€TheÏjury€returned€a€verdict€in€favor€of€plaintiff€and€awarded€compensatory€damages€in€theÏamount€of€$300,000.00.€€The€jury€apportioned€seventy€(70%)€percent€fault€toÏMosley€and€thirty€(30%)€percent€fault€to€the€City€of€Lakewood.€€Pursuant€to€the€trialÏcourtððs€prior€grant€of€summary€judgment,€the€trial€court€ordered€that€Checker€CabÏwas€jointly€€responsible€for€Mosleyððs€$210,000.00€share€of€the€judgment.€€Ìà ` àChecker€Cab€appeals€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court,€asserting€that€it€was€errorÏto€grant€summary€judgment€to€plaintiff€against€Checker€Cab€and€hold€it€liable€for€theÏnegligence€of€Mosley€pursuant€to€the€Nashville€ordinances€governing€the€operationÏof€taxicabs.€Checker€Cab€asserts€that€the€intent€of€the€ordinances€was€not€to€imposeÏliability€upon€the€holder€of€a€Certificate€of€Public€Convenience€and€Necessity€forÐ °844 Ðevery€act€of€drivers€operating€thereunder,€but€merely€to€ð ð(1)€ensure€that€minimumÏlevels€of€liability€insurance€are€in€place€while€a€taxicab€is€operating€on€the€streets€ofÏNashville,€and€(2)€provide€incentive€to€the€holders€of€a€Certificate€of€PublicÏConvenience€and€Necessity€to€assist€in€the€procurement€of€such€insurance€byÏimposing€liability€on€them€while€a€taxicab€is€being€operated€under€their€franchise.ðð€ÏGleaves€requests€that€in€the€event€this€Court€reverses€the€trial€court€on€this€issue,Ïthat€we€reconsider€the€propriety€of€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€his€other€causes€ofÏaction.€Ìà ` àA€motion€for€summary€judgment€should€be€granted€when€the€movantÏdemonstrates€that€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€that€the€movingÏparty€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.04.€€The€partyÏmoving€for€summary€judgment€bears€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€no€genuineÏissue€of€material€fact€exists.€€ò òòòBain€v.€Wellsó óóó,€936€S.W.2d€618,€622€(Tenn.€1997).€€OnÐ °  Ða€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€court€must€take€the€strongest€legitimate€viewÏof€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€inÏfavor€of€that€party,€and€discard€all€countervailing€evidence.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€In€ò òòòByrd€v.€Halló óóó,€847Ð ´&"" ÐS.W.2d€208€(Tenn.€1993),€our€Supreme€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àOnce€it€is€shown€by€the€moving€party€that€there€is€noÏgenuine€issue€of€material€fact,€the€nonmoving€party€mustÏthen€demonstrate,€by€affidavits€or€discovery€materials,Ïthat€there€is€a€genuine,€material€fact€dispute€to€warrant€aÏtrial.€€In€this€regard,€Rule€56.05€provides€that€theÏnonmoving€party€cannot€simply€rely€upon€his€pleadingsÏbut€must€set€forth€òòspecific€factsóó€showing€that€there€is€aÐ ¸0,, Ðgenuine€issue€of€material€fact€for€trial.à8ȸ ¤¸ ¤àи1--ÈLÈL Ðò òòòÌÓÓId.ó óóó€at€211€(citations€omitted)€(emphasis€in€original).Ð ¸3// Ðà ` àSummary€judgment€is€only€appropriate€when€the€facts€and€the€legalÏconclusions€drawn€from€the€facts€reasonably€permit€only€one€conclusion.€€ò òòòCarvell€v.Ð ¼7 33 ÐBottomsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).€€Since€only€questions€of€law€are€involved,Ð À955 Ðthere€is€no€presumption€of€correctness€regarding€a€trial€court's€grant€of€summaryÏjudgment.€€ò òòòBainó óóó,€936€S.W.2d€at€622.€€Therefore,€our€review€of€the€trial€courtððs€grantÐ ° Ðof€summary€judgment€is€òòde€novoóó€on€the€record€before€this€Court.€€ò òòòWarren€v.€EstateÐ ´ Ðof€Kirkó óóó,€954€S.W.2d€722,€723€(Tenn.€1997).òòò òÐ ¸  Ðó óóóà ` àThe€extent€of€the€liability€created€by€the€Nashville€ordinances€is€purely€aÐ ¼  Ðquestion€of€statutory€interpretation.€€This€Court€must€construe€a€municipalÏordinance€using€the€same€rules€of€construction€applied€to€statutes.€€òòò òTennessee€Manuf.Ð ¼  ÐHous.€Assððn€v.€Metropolitan€Govððt€of€Nashvilleó óóó,€798€S.W.2d€254€(Tenn.€App.€1990).Ð À ÐWhen€interpreting€a€statute€or€ordinance,€the€role€of€the€Court€is€to€ð ðascertain€andÏgive€effect€to€the€legislative€intent.ðð€€ò òòòSharp€v.€Richardsonó óóó,€937€S.W.2d€846,€850Ð Ä Ð(Tenn.€1996).€€To€this€end,€the€meaning€of€a€statute€is€not€to€be€determined€fromÏspecial€words€in€a€single€sentence€or€section,€but€from€the€statute€taken€as€a€whole.òòò òÐ È ÐState€ex€rel.€Bastnagel€v.€City€of€Memphisó óóó,€224€Tenn.€514,€457€S.W.2d€532€(1970).Ð È ÐIn€the€absence€of€ambiguity,€legislative€intent€is€derived€from€the€face€of€a€statute,Ïand€the€Court€may€not€depart€from€the€ð ðnatural€and€ordinaryðð€meaning€of€theÏstatuteððs€language.€€ò òòòDavis€v.€Reaganó óóó,€951€S.W.2d€766,€768€(Tenn.€1997);€ò òòòWestlandÐ Ì" ÐWest€Community€Assððn€v.€Knox€Countyó óóó,€948€S.W.2d€281,€283€(Tenn.€1997).€Ð Ð$  ÐHowever,€it€is€also€presumed€that€in€enacting€the€statute€the€legislature€did€notÏintend€an€absurdity.€€òòò òEpstein€v.€Stateó óóó,€211€Tenn.€633,€366€S.W.2d€914€(1963).€ToÐ Ô($$$ Ðavoid€an€absurd€result,€the€obvious€intention€of€the€law€must€prevail€over€the€literalÏsense€of€the€words.€€òòò òByrd€v.€Pioneer„Jellico€Coal€Co.ó óóó,€180€Tenn.€396,€175€S.W.2dÐ Ø,((( Ð542€(1944).Ìà ` àGleaves€asserts€that€the€ordinances€are€unambiguous€and€impose€completeÏliability€upon€the€holder€of€the€Certificate€of€Public€Convenience€and€Necessity,€inÏthis€case€Checker€Cab,€whether€or€not€the€negligent€acts€complained€of€occurred€onÏor€off€duty.€€In€response,€Checker€Cab€asserts€that€the€ordinances€create€liability€onlyÏwhen€the€taxicab€is€ð ðoperated€under€[the€ññcabññññCabññ€companyððs]€franchiseðð€and€that€theÐ Ü8,44 Ðindependently€owned€vehicles€are€only€so€operated€when€the€drivers€are€actually€onÏduty€and€either€carrying€or€soliciting€passengers.€€A€cursory€review€of€the€selectedÏprovisions€could€lead€to€either€conclusion.€€However,€since€we€do€not€have€theÏbenefit€of€legislative€history€to€assist€in€determining€the€intent€of€the€drafters,€thisÏCourt€must€look€to€the€ordinance€as€a€whole€to€determine€the€extent€of€liabilityÏintended.€€If€we€were€to€hold€as€the€plaintiff€urges,€and€as€did€the€trial€court,€theÏordinance€would€place€liability€upon€Checker€Cab€in€derogation€of€the€common€lawññññ׃×ññññ׃ ×ññññññ׃×ññÝ ƒ##ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×,Ð °  Ðtherefore,€the€ordinance€must€be€strictly€construed.€€€òòò òPerry€v.€Sentry€Ins.€Co.,ó óóó€938Ð ° ÐS.W.2d€404€(Tenn.€1996).Ìà ` àUpon€review€of€the€entire€chapter€of€the€Nashville€Metro€Codeññññ׃×ññññ׃ ×ññññññ׃×ññÝ ƒ##ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€governing€theÐ ´ Ðoperation€of€taxicabs,€we€find€several€provisions€that€are€inconsistent€with€theÏplaintiffððs€construction.€€The€ordinance€defines€a€taxicab€as€ð ða€motor€vehicle€regularlyÏengaged€in€the€business€of€carrying€passengers€for€hire,€donation,€gratuity€or€anyÏother€form€of€remuneration,€having€a€seating€capacity€of€less€than€ten€persons€andÏnot€operated€on€a€fixed€route.ðð€€Nashville€Metro€Code€6.72.010.€€We€read€this€toÏmean€that€a€vehicle€ð ðregularly€engaged€in€the€business€of€carrying€passengers€for€hireððÏis€a€ð ðtaxicabðð€twenty„four€hours€per€day,€whether€or€not€passengers€are€being€carriedÏor€solicited.€€This€interpretation€is€bolstered€by€section€6.72.110€which€provides€thatÏð ð[n]o€person€shall€operate€a€taxicab€òòfor€hireóó€upon€the€streets€and€roads€of€theÐ ´($$ Ðmetropolitan€government€.€.€.€unless€the€driver€of€such€taxicab€shall€first€obtain€.€.€.Ïa€taxicab€driverððs€permit.ðð€(emphasis€added).€€The€inclusion€of€the€phrase€ð ðfor€hireððÏimplies€that€a€taxicab€may€be€operated€around€town€on€personal€business,€or€by€oneÐ ´.** Ðwho€is€not€a€licensed€taxicab€driver,€such€as€the€spouse€of€the€owner€for€example,Ïprovided€that€paying€passengers€are€not€carried€or€sought.€€Indeed,€no€party€to€thisÏlawsuit€has€questioned€either€the€right€of€an€owner€to€use€his€or€her€vehicle€forÏpersonal€business,€or€the€right€to€allow€another€to€use€the€vehicle€for€personalÏbusiness.€€However,€if€we€interpret€the€ordinances€literally,€as€plaintiff€would€haveÏus€do,€then€any€personal€use€of€the€vehicle€would€be€prohibited€by€section€6.72.430,Ïwhich€provides€that€ð ð[n]o€taxicab€driver€shall€.€.€.€use€his€vehicle€for€any€purposeÏother€than€the€transporting€of€fare„paying€passengers.ðð€€Furthermore,€Checker€CabÏhas€contracts€with€approximately€150€Nashville€area€businesses€for€the€delivery€ofÏpackages.€€Did€the€drafters€intend€for€this€to€be€a€prohibited€activity?€€We€think€not.€ÏThe€question€we€face€is€whether€the€drafters€intended€to€extend€liability€twenty„fourÏhours€per€day,€no€matter€who€is€operating€the€vehicle,€or€for€what€purpose.€€€Ìà ` àAlso€enlightening€is€section€6.72.370€of€the€Code€which€provides:€ð ðThe€driverÏof€any€taxicab€shall€remain€in€the€driverððs€compartment€or€immediately€adjacent€toÏhis€vehicle€at€all€times€when€such€vehicle€is€on€the€public€streets;€except€that,€whenÏnecessary,€a€driver€may€be€absent€from€his€taxicab€for€not€more€than€ten€consecutiveÏminutes.ðð€€The€language€ð ðat€all€timesðð€is€certainly€very€broad,€and€arguablyÏencompasses€every€moment€a€taxicab€is€upon€the€public€streets.€€However,€by€noÏstretch€of€the€imagination€can€we€believe€that€the€drafters€meant€this€literally.ÏCertainly,€the€drafters€did€not€intend€to€require€that€an€off„duty€driver€remainÏadjacent€to€the€vehicle€when€it€is€parked€on€the€street€in€front€of€his€or€her€home€forÏthe€night.€€The€only€logical€construction€of€this€provision€is€that€it€only€applies€whenÏthe€taxicab€is€being€operated€for€hire.€€Ìà ` àThere€is€another€anomaly€that€we€find€persuasive.€By€signing€the€liabilityÏinsurance€agreement,€Checker€Cab€ð ðassumed€complete€liability€for€each€vehicle€beingÏoperated€under€its€name,€color,€emblem,€design€and€insignia€and€shall€be€liable€forÏany€personal€injuries€or€property€damage€to€third€parties€as€the€result€of€the€negligentÐ °844 Ðuse€of€this€(these)€vehicle(s).ðð€Gleaves€asserts€that€this€provision€unambiguouslyÏplaces€complete€liability€upon€Checker€Cab€without€regard€to€whether€payingÏpassengers€are€being€carried€or€sought.€€Checker€Cab€asserts€that€the€vehicles€areÏð ðoperated€underðð€the€name,€color,€emblem€and€insignia€of€Checker€Cab€only€whenÏthey€are€carrying€passengers€for€hire,€or€are€available€to€do€so.€€If€we€were€to€adoptÏGleavesððs€interpretation€of€this€language,€Checker€Cab€would€arguably€be€liable€if€aÏtaxicab€were€stolen€and€a€traffic€accident€ensued€while€the€thief€was€making€his€getÏaway.€€We€do€not€believe€that€the€drafters€intended€to€create€such€sweeping€liability.Ìà ` àThese€examples€lend€credence€to€Checker€Cabððs€assertion€that€despite€theÏbroad€sweeping€language€used,€the€ordinances€governing€taxicabs€were€intended€toÏapply€only€when€the€vehicles€are€operated€for€hire.€€We€think€this€is€the€only€rationalÏconclusion.€€òòò òCf.ó óóó€òòò òFarrell€v.€Greater€Houston€Transp.€Co.ó óóó,€908€S.W.2d€1€(Tex.€App.Ð ° Ð1995)€(holding€that€a€Houston€municipal€ordinance€making€a€ññcabññññCabññ€companyÏð ðresponsible€for€anyone€operating€under€[its]€permitðð€was€not€intended€to€make€theÏtaxicab€company€strictly€liable€for€the€torts€of€its€drivers).€€Ìà ` àFrom€our€review€of€the€ordinance€as€a€whole,€we€conclude€that€Checker€CabððsÏliability€under€the€ordinance€is€limited€for€those€circumstances€when€a€taxicab€isÏoperating€under€the€franchise€and€carrying€passengers€or€otherwise€available€for€hire.€ÏAccordingly,€the€order€of€the€trial€court€granting€summary€judgment€in€favor€ofÏplaintiff€against€Checker€Cab€on€the€issue€of€the€liability€created€by€the€NashvilleÏordinances€is€reversed.€€€However,€this€does€not€end€our€inquiry€concerning€CheckerÏCabððs€liability.€€We€must€now€determine€whether€there€is€any€genuine€issue€ofÏmaterial€fact€on€the€question€of€whether,€at€the€time€of€Mosleyððs€accident,€the€taxicabÏwas€operated€under€the€franchise.€€This€is€essentially€the€appelleeððs€issue€presentedÏfor€review€of€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€Checker€Cab€summary€on€theÏtheory€of€òòrespondeat€superioróó.Ð ´622 ÐÐ ´844 Ðà ` àAn€employer€is€held€vicariously€liable€for€torts€committed€by€its€employeesÏthat€are€committed€within€the€course€and€scope€of€their€employment.€€ò òòòTennesseeÐ ° ÐFarmers€Mut.€Ins.€Co.€v.€American€Mut.€Liabññ›ññ.€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€840€S.W.2d€933,€937Ð ´ Ð(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€Thus,€for€an€employer€to€be€liable,€the€plaintiff€bears€the€burdenÏof€proving€three€elements:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(1)€that€the€person€who€caused€the€injury€was€anÏemployee,€(2)€that€the€employee€was€on€the€employerððsÏbusiness,€and€(3)€that€the€employee€was€acting€within€theÏscope€of€his€employment€when€the€injury€occurred.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌò òòòÓÓId.€€óóó óAlthough€this€inquiry€is€generally€a€question€of€fact,€it€becomes€a€question€of€lawÐ ¸ Ðð ðwhen€the€facts€are€undisputed€and€cannot€support€conflicting€conclusions.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó;Ð ¼  Ðò òòòSmoot€v.€Marksó óóó,€564€S.W.2d€231,€236€(Mo.€App.€1978).€€Notwithstanding€itsÐ À Ðfinding€that€the€issue€of€whether€Mosley€was€an€employee€of€Checker€Cab€is€aÏð ðdisputed€jury€question,ðð€the€trial€court€ruled€that€resolution€of€the€issue€is€irrelevantÏsince€the€accident€occurred€outside€the€scope€of€Mosleyððs€employment€relationshipÏwith€Checker€ññœññCab.Ìà ` àWhile€it€is€not€essential€for€Mosley€to€be€an€employee€of€Checker€Cab€in€orderÏto€hold€Checker€Cab€liable€under€the€ordinance,€it€is€essential€that€the€taxicab€beÏoperated€under€the€franchise,€that€is€carrying€passengers€or€available€for€hire.€€SuchÏa€determination€would€be€analogous€to€a€finding€that€driver€Mosley€was€acting€in€theÏcourse€and€scope€of€his€authority€when€the€accident€occurred.ññ›ññÌññœññà ` àTheññ›ññ€Restatement€(Second)€of€Agency€has€been€utilized€by€courts€in€this€stateÏas€a€framework€for€determining€whether€an€employee€has€acted€within€the€course€andÏscope€of€his€or€her€employment.€€ò òòòTennessee€Farmers,ó óóó€840€S.W.2d€at€937„38.€€SectionÐ Ä/++ Ð228€states€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(1)€Conduct€of€a€servant€is€within€the€scope€ofÏemployment€if,€but€only€if:Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(a)€it€is€of€the€kind€he€is€employed€to€perform;Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(b)€it€occurs€substantially€within€the€authorized€time€andÏspace€limits;Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(c)€it€is€actuated,€at€least€in€part,€by€a€purpose€to€serveÐ È955 Ðthe€master;€€andÐ ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(d)€if€force€is€intentionally€used€by€the€servant€againstÏanother,€the€use€of€force€is€not€unexpectable€by€theÏmaster.€€Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(2)€Conduct€of€a€servant€is€not€within€the€scope€ofÏemployment€if€it€is€different€in€kind€from€that€authorized,Ïfar€beyond€the€authorized€time€and€space€limits,€or€tooÏlittle€actuated€by€a€purpose€to€serve€the€master.€€Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓRestatement€(Second)€of€Agency€ðð€228€(1957).€€Section€229€states:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(1)€To€be€within€the€scope€of€employment,€conduct€mustÏbe€of€the€same€general€nature€as€that€authorized,€orÏincidental€to€the€conduct€authorized.€€Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(2)€In€determining€whether€or€not€the€conduct,€althoughÏnot€authorized,€is€nevertheless€so€similar€to€or€incidentalÏto€the€conduct€authorized€as€to€be€within€the€scope€ofÏemployment,€the€following€matters€of€fact€are€to€beÏconsidered:Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(a)€whether€or€not€the€act€is€one€commonly€done€by€suchÏservants;Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(b)€the€time,€place€and€purpose€of€the€act;Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(c)€the€previous€relations€between€the€master€and€theÏservant;Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(d)€the€extent€to€which€the€business€of€the€master€isÏapportioned€between€different€servants;Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(e)€whether€or€not€the€act€is€outside€the€enterprise€of€theÏmaster€or,€if€within€the€enterprise,€has€not€been€entrustedÏto€any€servant;Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(f)€whether€or€not€the€master€has€reason€to€expect€thatÏsuch€an€act€will€be€done;Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(g)€the€similarity€in€quality€of€the€act€done€to€the€actÏauthorized;Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(h)€whether€or€not€the€instrumentality€by€which€the€harmÏis€done€has€been€furnished€by€the€master€to€the€servant;Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àññœññ(i)ññ›ññ€the€extent€of€departure€from€the€normal€method€ofÏaccomplishing€an€authorized€result;€€andÐ ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(j)€whether€or€not€the€act€is€seriously€criminal.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓRestatement€(Second)€of€Agency€ðð€229€(1957);€ò òòòsee€also€Tennessee€Farmersó óóó,€840Ð °.** ÐS.W.2d€at€938.Ìà ` àGleaves€ññœññasserts€thatññ›ññ€there€is€some€dispute€concerning€whether€Mosley€wasÏworking€at€the€time€of€the€accident.€€The€record€indicates€that€at€9:20€P.M.€on€theÏdate€of€the€accident,€Mosley€reported€to€the€Checker€Cab€dispatcher€that€he€wasÏgoing€off€duty€and€stated€that€he€was€going€home.€€Joe€Rakes,€another€Checker€CabÐ ´844 Ðdriver,€testified€that€he€was€with€Mosley€at€the€Nashville€International€AirportÏshortly€after€Mosley€had€checked€out€with€the€dispatcher.€€Gleaves€contends€that€theÏfollowing€portion€of€Rakesððs€testimony€indicates€that€Mosley€may€have€been€workingÏeven€after€he€checked€out€with€the€dispatcher:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àQ.€€It€was€after€he€checked€out€that€you€told€him€to€goÏhome?Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àA.€€Yeah.€€Like€I€say,€he€was€tying€up€the€radio,€runningÏhis€mouth.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àQ.€€You€told€Mr.€Mosley€to€go€home€after€he€had€checkedÏout€from€the€dispatcher?Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àA.€€Yes.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àQ.€€It€was€after€he€had€checked€out€with€the€dispatcherÏand€he€was€off€duty€when€you€told€him?Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àA.€€Yeah.€€He€was€still€out€there€running€around€andÏtalking€„„€tying€up€that€radio.€€And€Carol€„„€I€donððt€knowÏwhat€her€last€name€is€now€„„€but€either€she€told€me€or€IÏtalked€to€her€back€and€forth€about€him€and€he€shouldnððtÏbe€out€there€working€and€running€his€mouth€on€thatÏradio,€as€far€as€him€getting€on€the€radio€and€tying€up€theÏradio.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àQ.€€And€he€was€off€duty€at€the€time?Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àA.€€Yes.€€Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓRakes,€however,€also€testified€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àQ.€€Did€you€see€him€leave€the€airport?Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àA.€€Yes,€sir.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àQ.€€And€where€was€he€heading?Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àA.€€Going€home.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àQ.€€Did€he€say€he€was€going€home?Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àA.€€Yeah,€because€I€told€him€if€he€didnððt,€the€cab€inspectorÏor€somebody€would€get€him.€€Somebody€would€sayÏsomething€about€him€and€all€that€because€he€was€„„Ïwasnððt€working.€€If€a€cab€inspector€sees€you,€theyððre€liableÏto€take€your€permit€away€from€you€again.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àQ.€€Had€he€already€clocked€out€that€night?Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÐ °955 Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àA.€€Yeah.€€I€think€he€had.€€Yeah.òò€€óóHe€wasnððt€out€thereÐ ° Ðworkingòò.€€óóHe€was€just€talking€to€drivers.а¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓGleaves,€nevertheless,€notes€evidence€in€the€record€indicating€that€Mosley€may€notÏhave€gone€directly€home€from€the€airport€and€may€have€driven€passengers€toÏdowntown€Nashville.Ìà ` àNotwithstanding€this€testimony,€there€is€no€question€that€Mosley€did€not€haveÏpassengers€in€his€cab€at€the€time€of€the€accident.€€There€is€also€no€evidence€to€disputeÏMosleyððs€testimony€that€at€the€time€of€the€accident,€he€was€on€his€way€home:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àAll€I€remember€is€that€I€was€going€home.€€Thatððs€all€IÏremember.€€You€know,€I€told€them€I€was€going€home,€andÏI€headed€towards€home.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓThus,€even€if€there€is€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€concerning€whether€Mosley€wasÏworking€after€he€checked€out€with€the€dispatcher,€the€record€supports€the€trial€courtððsÏfinding€there€is€no€genuine€dispute€that€at€the€time€of€the€accident€he€was€notÏworking€and€was€traveling€home.Ìà ` àOrdinarily,€an€employer€is€not€vicariously€liable€for€an€employeeððs€negligenceÏwhile€the€employee€is€traveling€to€and€from€work.€€ò òòòSharp€v.€Northwestern€Nat.€Ins.Ð °! ÐCo.ó óóó,€654€S.W.2d€391,€392€(Tenn.€1983).€€However,€under€certain€circumstances€anÐ ´# Ðemployer€may€be€held€vicariously€liable€under€the€ð ðtraveling€menðð€exception.€€ò òòòSmithÐ ¸%!! Ðv.€Royal€Globe€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€551€S.W.2d€679,€681€(Tenn.€1977).€€This€exception€wasÐ ¼' ## Ðdiscussed€in€òòò òCraig€v.€Gentryó óóó,€792€S.W.2d€77€(Tenn.€App.€1990):Ð À)%% ÐÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àThe€test€in€brief€is€this:€If€the€work€of€the€employeeÏcreates€the€necessity€for€travel,€he€is€in€the€course€of€hisÏemployment,€though€he€is€serving€at€the€same€time€someÏpurpose€of€his€own.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€at€79€(quoting€ò òòòPratt€v.€Duckó óóó,€28€Tenn.€App.€502,€512,€191€S.W.2d€562,€566Ð Ä0,, Ð(1945));€ò òòòsee€also€Tennessee€Farmersó óóó,€840€S.W.2d€at€938;€Annotation,€òòEmployerððsÐ È2.. ÐLiability€for€Employeeððs€Negligence€in€Operating€Employerððs€Car€in€Going€to€or€from€Work€orÏMealsóó,€52€A.L.R.€2d€350€(1957).€€Applying€this€exception,€courts€have€foundÐ È622 Ðemployees€to€be€acting€within€the€scope€of€their€employment€during€travel€inÐ È844 Ðinstances€in€which€travel€was€an€essential€element€of€the€employment€relationship.€Ïò òòòSee,€e.g.,€Martin€v.€Free€Service€Tire€Co.ó óóó,€189€Tenn.€327,€225€S.W.2d€249€(1949)Ð ° Ð(exception€applied€to€account€collector€who€was€returning€home€after€attempting€toÏcollect€accounts€in€another€city);€ò òòòCarter€v.€Hodgesó óóó,€175€Tenn.€96,€132€S.W.2d€211Ð ´  Ð(1939)€(exception€applied€to€traveling€salesman€while€staying€at€a€hotel);€ò òòòEmployersððÐ ¸  ÐLiab.€Assurance€Corp.€v.€Warrenó óóó,€172€Tenn.€403,€112€S.W.2d€837€(1938)Ð ¼  Ð(exception€applied€to€insurance€adjuster€while€staying€at€a€hotel).€€In€ò òòòSharp€v.Ð À  ÐNorthwestern€ññœññNationalññ›ññ€ññœññInsuranceññ›ññ€Co.ó óóó,€654€S.W.2d€391€(Tenn.€1983),€the€CourtÐ Ä Ðcategorized€these€cases€applying€the€ð ðtraveling€menðð€exception:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àThese€cases€have€in€common€the€element€of€anÏundefinable€boundary€for€the€beginning€and€ending€of€theÏclaimantððs€work€environment.€€The€very€nature€of€theÏemployments€rendered€that€environment€amorphous.€ÏAnd€yet,€it€is€certain€the€claimants€were€placed€inÏcircumstances€which€were€directly€related€to€theirÏemployment.€€And,€therefore,€injuries€arising€out€of€thoseÏcircumstances€were€compensable.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€at€392.€Ð È Ðà ` àNo€Tennessee€cases€have€addressed€whether€the€ð ðtraveling€menðð€exceptionÏshould€be€extended€to€include€ññœññtaxicab€drivers€going€to€and€from€work.€€Citing€ò òòòSmootÐ Ì# Ðv.€Marksó óóó,€ò òòòsupraó óóó,€Gleaves€argues€that€the€issue€should€be€a€question€of€fact€for€theÐ Ð% !! Ðjury€and,€thus,€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€summary€judgment€to€Checker€Cab.€Ïò òòòSee€Smootó óóó,€564€S.W.2d€at€236„38;€ò òòòsee€also€Buffalo€Cab€Co.€v.€Gurleyó óóó,€213€S.E.2dÐ Ô)$%% Ð545,€546€(Ga.€App.€1975).Ìà ` àAlthough€there€may€be€occasions€when€this€exception€should€apply€to€taxiÏdrivers€traveling€to€and€from€work,€we€agree€with€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€MosleyÏwas€acting€beyond€the€scope€of€his€employment.€€A€reasonable€jury€simply€could€notÏfind€that€a€driver€of€a€passenger„less€taxicab€who€attempts€to€outrun€a€police€carÏwhile€on€his€way€home€was€acting€within€the€scope€of€his€employment.€€Not€only€wasÏMosleyððs€conduct€in€derogation€of€the€law,€it€is€inconceivable€that€Mosleyððs€conductÏwas€ð ðactuated,€at€least€in€part,€by€a€purpose€to€serve€the€master.ðð€€RestatementÐ Ø9(55 Ð(Second)€of€Agency€ðð€228€(1)(c).€€There€is€no€contention,€for€instance,€that€MosleyÏwas€attempting€to€elude€the€police€so€that€he€could€speedily€transport€a€passenger€toÏa€particular€destination€or€pick€up€a€passenger.€€Gleaves€has€failed€to€offer€anyÏsuggestion€whatsoever€that€Mosleyððs€conduct€was€intended€to€enure€to€the€benefitÏof€Checker€Cab.€€In€addition,€Mosleyððs€conduct€does€not€qualify€as€ð ðsimilar€to€orÏincidental€to€the€conduct€authorizedðð€by€Checker€Cab.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€ðð€229.€€Because€we€findÐ °  Ðthat€Mosleyððs€conduct€was€ð ðclearly€beyond€the€scope€of€his€authority,ðð€the€trial€courtÏproperly€granted€summary€judgment€to€Checker€Cab€on€the€issue€of€ññòòññrespondeatÐ ´ Ðsuperiorññóóññ.€€ò òòòTennessee€Farmersó óóó,€840€S.W.2d€at€937.€€Since€Mosleyððs€conduct€was€beyondÐ ´ Ðthe€scope€of€his€authority,€he€was€not€operating€the€taxicab€under€the€franchise,€andÏChecker€Cab€is€not€responsible€for€his€conduct.€€Thus,€it€follows€that€summaryÏjudgment€should€have€been€granted€to€Checker€Cab€under€the€ordinance.Ìà ` àIn€addition€to€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€the€common€law€òòrespondeat€superioróóÐ ¸ Ðclaim,€Gleaves€presents€issues€of€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€dismissing€hisÏactions€for€negligent€hiring,€negligent€supervision,€and€Restatement€(Second)€ofÏTorts,€ðð€€317€(1964).€€We€first€note€that€although€Gleaves€contends€that€the€trialÏcourt€erred€in€granting€summary€judgment€on€all€of€these€theories,€Gleaves€isÏprecluded€from€obtaining€a€new€trial€since€he€failed€to€appeal€his€judgment€againstÏthe€co„defendant,€City€of€Lakewood.€€ò òòòSamuelson€v.€McMurtryó óóó,€962€S.W.2d€473Ð ¸($$ Ð(Tenn.€1998).Ô#‡ Xz¼XX Xz¼#ÔÔ‡Xz¼XXXz¼ÔÐ ¼* && Ðà ` àIn€ò òòòSamuelsonó óóó,€the€plaintiff€sued€several€defendants,€including€Dr.€Mark€Totty,Ð ¼, (( Ðfor€medical€malpractice.€€The€trial€court€severed€the€action€against€Dr.€Totty€afterÏgranting€him€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€and€a€motion€to€dismiss.€€The€plaintiffÏproceeded€to€trial€and€the€jury€found€liability€and€apportioned€fault€among€theÏremaining€defendants.€€The€plaintiff€accepted€payment€of€this€judgment€against€theÏdefendants€and€did€not€appeal€any€action€of€the€trial€court€regarding€theseÏdefendants.€€The€plaintiff,€however,€appealed€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€sever€andÐ À844 Ðdismiss€his€suit€against€Dr.€Totty.Ìà ` àThe€Supreme€Court€held€that€although€the€trial€court€erred€in€dismissing€andÏsevering€the€plaintiffððs€claim€against€Dr.€Totty,€the€plaintiff€was€not€entitled€to€a€newÏtrial€since€he€failed€to€appeal€the€judgment€rendered€against€the€other€defendants.€Ð °  Ðò òòòId.€ó óóóat€476.€€The€Court€stated:Ð °  ÐÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à€€€€€Despite€the€plaintiffððs€insistence€that€relief€can€beÏgranted€on€the€record€before€the€Court,€the€Court€findsÏthat€the€plaintiffððs€failure€to€appeal€the€judgments€againstÏthe€defendants€other€than€Dr.€Totty€was€fatal€to€his€rightÏto€a€new€trial.€€Perhaps€the€plaintiff€could€not€haveÏanticipated€the€precise€decision€that€would€be€renderedÏby€the€Court€on€the€issues€presented,€but€the€plaintiffÏchose€to€accept€payment€in€satisfaction€of€the€judgmentÏagainst€the€defendant€Holland,€thereby€precluding€anÏappeal€that€would€have€allowed€the€Court€to€do€justiceÏfor€all€the€parties.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à€€€€€The€Court€has€been€referred€to€no€authority€thatÏwould€allow€it€to€set€aside€a€final€judgment€against€aÏdefendant€who€is€not€a€party€to€the€appeal€and€who€hasÏpaid€the€judgment€and€received€from€the€plaintiff€anÏacknowledgment€of€full€satisfaction.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€€€€€Ð ´  Ðà ` àIn€the€instant€case,€the€jury€attributed€seventy€(70%)€percent€of€the€fault€toÏMosley€and€thirty€(30%)€percent€to€the€City€of€Lakewood.€€If€a€new€trial€wereÏgranted,€the€City€of€Lakewood,€which€is€not€a€party€to€this€appeal,€may€beÏprejudiced:€€it€would€be€forced€to€expend€resources€defending€itself€again€in€a€newÏtrial€and€it€would€encounter€the€possibility€that€a€jury€would€assess€more€damagesÏto€it.ññññ׃ ×ññññ׃%×ññññññ׃×ññÝ ƒ##ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Accordingly,€under€the€principle€set€forth€in€ò òòòSamuelsonó óóó,€we€hold€that€GleavesÐ ¸,(( Ðis€barred€from€appealing€the€trial€courtððs€granting€of€summary€judgment€to€CheckerÏCab€on€the€issues€of€negligent€hiring,€negligent€supervision,€and€RestatementÐ ¼0 ,, Ð(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€317.€€Ìà ` àThe€ò òòòSamuelsonó óóó€rule€should€not€apply€to€the€òòrespondeat€superioróó€claim€becauseÐ ° Ðwhether€Checker€Cab€is€vicariously€liable€for€the€negligence€of€Mosley€has€no€bearingÏon€the€allocation€of€fault€assessed€by€the€jury€between€Mosley€and€the€City€ofÏLakewood.€€Thus,€the€unappealed€jury€verdict€assessing€seventy€(70%)€percent€of€theÏfault€to€Mosley€would€not€be€disrupted.€€If€a€new€trial€were€granted,€the€soleÏdetermination€would€be€whether€Checker€Cab€would€be€responsible€for€damagesÏcorresponding€with€that€percentage€of€fault€that€was€attributed€to€Mosley.€€TheÏpolicy€reasons€supporting€the€principle€articulated€in€ò òòòSamuelsonó óóó€would€not€beÐ ´ Ðapplicable,€since€the€City€of€Lakewood€could€not€be€prejudiced€by€such€a€trial€limitedÏto€this€œdetermination.ññ€ññ›œññ€€However,€as€we€previously€noted,€summary€judgment€wasÏappropriately€awarded€to€Checker€Cab€on€the€merits.ññññ›ññññ€›€›€›ññÔ#‡ Xz¼XX Xz¼Ó‡#ÔÔ‡Xz¼XXXz¼Ôññà h àññ›Ð ¸ Ðà ` àMoreover,€on€the€merits€of€Gleavesððs€negligent€hiring,€negligent€supervision,Ïand€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€317€claims,€we€find€that€summary€judgmentÏwas€appropriate€for€these€claims.€€Proximate€causation€is€an€ð ðessential€elementðð€forÏestablishing€a€claim€for€negligence.€€ò òòòDoe€v.€Linder€Constr.€Co.ó óóó,€845€S.W.2d€173,€181Ð ¸" Ð(Tenn.€1992).€€In€ò òòòCorder€v.€Metropolitan€Government€of€Nashvilleó óóó,€852€S.W.2d€910,Ð ¼$  Ð915€(Tenn.€App.€1992),€the€Court€held€that€an€employer€may€not€be€held€liable€forÏnegligent€hiring€in€the€event€that€the€employeeððs€tortious€conduct€was€committedÏoutside€the€scope€of€his€or€her€employment.€€The€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àThe€reason€for€this€is€that€the€hiring€of€the€employee€isÏnot€the€proximate€cause€of€his€acts€committed€outside€theÏscope€of€his€employment.€€€If€this€were€not€true,€everyÏemployer€who€hires€a€careless€employee€would€be€liableÏfor€every€careless€act€of€the€employee€even€though€notÏcommitted€in€connection€with€his€work.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€(citing€ò òòòNishan€v.€Godseyó óóó,€166€F.€Supp.€6€(E.D.€Tenn.€1958));€ò òòòsee€also€Phipps€v.Ð À3// ÐWalkeró óóó,€No.€03A01„9508„CV„00294,€1996€WL€155258,€at€*4€(Tenn.€App.€Apr.€4,Ð Ä511 Ð1996).€€Because€Mosleyððs€conduct€was€outside€the€scope€of€his€employment€due€toÏthe€aforementioned€reasons,€Gleaves€is€unable€to€satisfy€the€element€of€proximateÐ È955 Ðcausation€and,€thus,€summary€judgment€was€appropriate€for€his€negligent€supervisionÏand€hiring€claims.€€ò òòòSee€Linder€Constr.ó óóó,€845€S.W.2d€at€173€(ð ðOrdinarily,€theÐ ° Ðproximate€cause€of€an€injury€is€for€the€jury,€but€where€the€facts€are€not€controverted,Ïthe€question€of€proximate€or€intervening€cause€is€for€the€trial€court.ðð)€Ìà ` àIn€addition,€even€if€Gleaves€were€permitted€to€appeal€the€trial€courtððs€dismissalÏof€his€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€317€claim,€we€would€affirm€this€ruling€as€well.€ÏSection€317€states€that€a€master€has€a€duty€ð ðto€exercise€reasonable€care€so€to€controlÏhis€servant€while€acting€òòoutside€the€scopeóó€of€his€employmentðð€under€certainÐ ´ Ðcircumstances.€€(emphasis€added).€€Tennessee€has€never€expressly€adopted€thisÏprovision€as€creating€a€cause€of€action.€€In€ò òòòNichols€v.€Atnipó óóó,€844€S.W.2d€655€(Tenn.Ð ´ ÐApp.€1992),€the€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àThe€common€law€rule€that€persons€have€no€duty€toÏprotect€others€from€harm€they€did€not€cause,€while€harsh,Ïremains€the€law.€€It€is€perhaps€inevitable€that€extremeÏcases€involving€morally€outrageous€and€indefensibleÏconduct€will€cause€inroads€into€this€rule.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€at€662.€€We€would€not€find€that€the€instant€case€warrants€an€exception€to€theÐ ¸  Ðcommon€law€rule.Ìà ` àIn€sum,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€against€Checker€Cab€is€reversed,€andÏplaintiffððs€action€against€Checker€Cab€is€dismissed.€€The€judgment€in€all€otherÏrespects€is€affirmed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€such€proceedings€as€may€beÏnecessary.€€Costs€of€the€appeal€are€assessed€to€appellee.ÌÔ#‡ Xz¼XX Xz¼–—#ÔññÔ‡Xz¼XXXz¼ÔÔ#‡ Xz¼XX Xz¼€©#ÔññÓÓÔ‡Xz¼XXXz¼Ôà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à_________________________________Ð ¼, (( Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ð ¼- )) Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÔ#‡ Xz¼XX Xz¼S¥#ÔÐ ¾.** ÐÌò òññCONCUR:Ð À0,, ÐÌññññññó óññññò òññññññÔ‡Xz¼XXXz¼Ô____________________________________Ð Ä2.. ÐALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEó óÔ#‡ Xz¼XX Xz¼s§#ÔÐ Æ3// ÐÌÔ‡Xz¼XXXz¼Ô____________________________________Ð È511 Ðò òDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óÔ#‡ Xz¼XX Xz¼¨#Ôññññññó óññññœÔ†ÿÿÔÔ†ÿÿÔÔ  ÔÔ  Ôñ9ñ