ÿWPC  ø_ŠcYœ‡ùwG9P¡Á„õÐkGòõeºWïuÖ,oL¼;¦¸½:ˆ¸'ë(LOäÏY6ö­ª) ¹ZżӳŸFò• YfbbÒ[R5#;ìáÊú€ ~h’I8<ù?>=m¸žÆÏ’þûJ;,µw#Ɔc^ï 6eä¦ ¾þ-RFˆY1øDr£Ü´`èNQ ¦âa¦ˆTìe“Å;}xŒgÉÜaæ<åI•¯â´+úp£'hÂwzàÀ‡(¤:=꘬Ñ;~:¹r–•iÿänRù4¶°¦ÚºÙ æÀÖ¥Ä H·Èߢ賿SWÁÞ‘üž˜®˜Óǰâ×ú¾è µR=ǽ”©,µûD½<%ÞpAøÔuÄçÄ8F´i&,Áþ‰?Z£‡¨äºµ²™§LfgØÕ5M”åU?ÐþÒJ§Ìžê7ñóG¹ÎÎs@–»gC¯³šìpsn7öê blF=‚ߣ[þ7ݾ¸!£Ðƒ|¨w¹#ÿmθãý@„ü콟tʦ3Ž¡*'æÇµ$Zól¬òÒ±:‹Ÿ>^óáE¹ùw× ¢©«&ÊðíæÁ-»Zè¦aN"w㊉³”g;‚}ÎðøÅ×ëԾˎ¡û±÷È )# >UNI %— 0³U<Pw@Œ4Ìàïl÷ AQc 0D´ 0Dø(< U:d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d Bž Æ» 0D 0÷Å 0D¼ ¼ D/ B/ D3L ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(‹7ÿ$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÑ7€ü†XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€Xd|XXXÔ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman EE !D"U#U$î%Ó€1n~<$Ôô Î3|x1 bÝ ƒ"$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÔ‡XdgXXXÔà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€In€ò òòòTurner€v.€Turneró óóó,€No.€01A01›„9506„CV„00255,€22€TAM€18„16€(Tenn.Ð ° ÐApp.€1997),€disability€income€benefits€were€treated€as€gross€income€for€the€purposeÏof€the€child€support€guidelines. ! %Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó Ý ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X(%XXXÔÔ€·yXX(%ÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X(%X·yÔÐ  ÐÌò òOctober€22,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôø˜ôXX(%ÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(§(3°$¤¤Ý ƒ7ÿ!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÑ7€,áXXdðdð7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€X¤3XXXÔÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó'''÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ7ÿ!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÑ7€\çXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€XäXXXÔÝ  ÝÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€\çXXdðXXdð7Ññ1ññ%ñßr€ (<,(j 8` `€€@Eô±` ttx$,°ð Õrßñ%ññ1ññ1ññ1ñà@Ì Ì ®àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌà@éé!®àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONˆÌñ1ññ1ñà ` àà ¸ à€€€€______________________________________________Ìñ1ñßt€ (>.*jxþ0` `€€@Eòà` ttx$*°‚  tßñ1ñÌò òG.€WINSTON€GRAGG,ó óÐ ° ÐÌà ` àAppellant,ÌÌVs.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àShelby€Law€No.€02A01„9804„CV„00108Ð ²  ÐÌò òNELLIE€CASBURN€GRAGG,€ó óÐ ²  ÐÌà ` àAppellee.Ì____________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@H H ®àFROM€THE€SHELBY€COUNTY€CIRCUIT€COURTˆÌà@› › ®àTHE€HONORABLE€K.€S.€ROBILIO,€JUDGEˆÌÌÌñ!ñÌÌñ!ñÌÌà@õ õ ®àHal€Gerber,€Gerber€Law€Office€of€MemphisˆÌà@>>(®àFor€AppellantˆÌÌà@  ®àThomas€R.€Prewitt,€Sr.,€Armstrong€Allen€PrewittˆÌà@T T ®àGentry€Johnston€&€Holmes,€PLLC€of€memphisˆÌà@rr(®àFor€AppelleeˆÌÌÌÌÌà@] ] ®àò òòòREVERSED€IN€PART,€AFFIRMED€IN€PART€AND€REMANDEDˆÐ ´# ÐÌó óóóà@33'®àOpinion€filed:ˆÐ ´%!! ÐÌñ"ñÌñ"ññ"ñÌñ"ññ"ñÌñ"ñÌÌÌà ` àà ¸ àÌà ` àÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àò òññññwññññññW.€FRANK€CRAWFORDññññññÐ ´.** Ðñññññ ñ,Ð ´/++ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEñ ñó óñ#ñÐ Æ844 ÐÌÌÐ È;779 Ðñ#ññ$ñ›Ñ7€\çXXdðXXdð7ÑÓÓà ` àAppellant,€G.€Winston€Gragg€(Husband),€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€decreeÐ ° Ðgranting€divorce€to€œAppellee,›€Nellie€Casburn€Gragg€(Wife).€€The€sole€issue€for€reviewÏis€whether€benefits€received€by€Husband€from€two€disability€insurance€policies€areÏmarital€property€subject€to€distribution.€Ìà ` àThe€pertinent€facts€are€undisputed.€€The€parties€were€married€September€4,Ï1971,€separated€December€10,€1993,€and€Husband€filed€the€present€suit€for€divorceÏSeptember€12,€1994.€€Husband€is€a€medical€doctor,€specializing€in€anesthesiology.€ÏDuring€the€course€of€the€marriage,€Husband€purchased€two€policies€of€disabilityÏinsurance.€€A€policy€with€Provident€Life€&€Accident€Insurance€Company€was€issuedÏMay€13,€1978,€and€provides€for€total€disability€benefits€of€$2,000.00€per€month.€ÏThe€other€policy€with€Continental€Insurance€Company,€issued€June€27,€1988,Ïprovides€for€disability€benefits€of€$5,000.00€per€month€with€an€increase€of€fiveÏpercent€per€year€to€take€care€of€cost€of€living€increases.€€The€premiums€for€theÏpolicies€were€paid€with€marital€funds€earned€by€Husband€from€each€policyððsÏinception€until€his€total€disability€commenced€in€late€October,€1994,€and€totaledÏapproximately€$45,000.00.€€Each€policy€provides€for€waiver€of€premiums€during€totalÏdisability,€and€no€premiums€have€been€paid€since€Husbandððs€disability€commenced.€ÏIt€is€doubtful€that€Husband€will€ever€be€able€to€return€to€his€employment€as€anÏanesthesiologist.Ìà ` àAt€the€time€of€trial€it€was€stipulated€that€Husband€would€receive€$7,750.00Ïper€month€from€the€two€policies,€and€this€amount€would€increase€to€$8,000.00€perÏmonth€beginning€in€October€of€1998.€€The€parties€also€stipulated€that€all€maritalÏproperty€should€be€divided€equally€between€the€parties.€€The€trial€court€found€thatÏall€the€benefits€paid€by€the€two€insurance€policies€to€Husband,€both€before€and€afterÏthe€divorce,€constitute€marital€property€subject€to€division.€€The€court€ordered€thatÏbeginning€with€the€payments€due€in€March,€1998,€Wife€is€entitled€to€fifty€percentÏof€the€monthly€payments.€€The€decree€was€later€amended€to€provide€that€in€the€eventÐ °844 Ðthe€trial€courtððs€holding€concerning€the€disability€income€policies€is€reversed€onÐ °:66’ Ðappeal,€Wife€is€awarded€$2,500.00€per€month€as€alimony.Ìà ` àThe€sole€issue€for€review€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€holding€that€theÏbenefits€of€the€disability€income€insurance€policies€are€marital€property€subject€toÏdistribution.Ìà ` àThe€parties€have€not€cited,€nor€has€our€research€revealed,€any€Tennessee€caseÏdirectly€on€point.€€Other€jurisdictions€have€dealt€with€the€question€with€differingÏresults.€€We€will€briefly€examine€some€of€these€cases.€€Ìà ` àIn€òòò òGnerlich€v.€Gnerlichó óóó,€538€N.E.2d€285€(Ind.€App.€ññœññ1989),ññ›ññ€the€issue€wasÐ ° Ðwhether€benefits€of€disability€insurance€are€marital€property€subject€to€division€underÏthe€Indiana€Code.€€The€disability€insurance€was€purchased€by€monthly€contributionÏfor€a€disability€retirement€plan€offered€by€œññthe€hññññHññusbandððs›€employer.€€The€court€heldÏœthatññ,ññ›€under€the€statutory€definition€of€œpropertyññ,ññ›€the€term€property€means€all€of€theÏassets,€including€the€right€to€receive€pension€or€retirement€benefits.€€Thus,€disabilityÏbenefits€are€marital€property€subject€to€division.€€The€court€agreed€with€the€holdingÏof€an€Illinois€court€ð ðthat€a€disability€is€so€substantially€similar€in€nature€to€anÏordinary€retirement€pension€ññœññto€beññ›ññ€appropriately€characterized€as€marital€propertyÏsubject€to€division.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€288.Ð ´$  Ðà ` àññœññññœññIn€òòò òInññ›ññññ›ññ€Re€Marriage€of€Simonó óóó,€856€P.2d€47€(Col.€App.€1993)€ññœññthe€court€heldññ›ññ€thatÐ ¸&"" Мññthe€hññññHññusbandððs›€proceeds€from€a€private€disability€insurance€policy€acquired€withÏmarital€funds€during€the€marriage€was€not€excluded€from€the€statutory€definition€ofÏmarital€property€and€is€subject€to€division.Ìà ` àœIn€òòò òIn›€Re€Marriage€of€Michael€A.€Breweró óóó,€949€P.2d€404€(Wash.€App.€œ1998).ññ€ññññ›ññññ,ññ›Ð ¼. ** Мññthe€wññññWññife›€appealed€the€dissolution€decree€which€held€that€post„dissolution€disabilityÏpayments€received€by€œññthe€hññññHññusband›€was€œññhis€ññññHusbandððs›€ññseparate›€property.€€œññThe€hññññHññusband›€startedÏreceiving€disability€payments€from€a€private€insurance€policy€during€the€marriage.€ÏWashington€is€a€community€property€state,€and€the€premiums€for€the€insuranceÏpolicies€were€paid€with€community€property.€€The€court€relied€upon€the€holdings€ofÐ À844 Ðtwo€previous€cases€that€held€that€if€the€premiums€are€paid€with€community€funds,Ïthe€insurance€proceeds€are€community€property.€€The€court€followed€this€precedent,Ïalthough€noting€that€the€cases€made€no€distinction€between€a€disability€policy€andÏa€life€insurance€policy,€and€that€there€should€be€œaññnññ›€reexamination€of€these€holdings.€ÏThe€basis€of€the€courtððs€ruling€is€that€the€premiums€were€paid€with€communityÏproperty;€therefore,€the€insurance€proceeds€are€community€property.Ìà ` àIn€ò òòòSherman€v.€Shermanó óóó,€740€S.W.2d€203€(Mo.€App.€1987),€the€issue€wasÐ °  Ðwhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€œññWññññthe€wññife›€a€division€of€marital€propertyÏwhich€included€a€percentage€of€œññthe€hññññHññusbandððs›€disability€benefits€received€under€aÏprivate€insurance€policy.€€The€court€held€that€the€benefits€did€not€constitute€maritalÏproperty€subject€to€division€primarily€on€the€basis€that:€€(1)€the€disability€paymentsÏare€not€a€partial€consideration€for€past€employment€as€in€the€case€of€pension€benefitsÏand,€(2)€the€benefits€are€a€substitute€for€œññthe€hññññHññusbandððs›€lost€earnings€occasioned€byÏhis€inability€to€work€and€are€the€same€as€post„dissolution€earnings€which€areÏdenominated€non„marital€property€under€the€Missouri€Code.Ìà ` àIn€ò òòòHoag€v.€Hoagó óóó,€857€P.2d€208€œ(ññCt.ññññOr.€ññ›€App.€œññOre.›€ññ1993),›€the€court,€in€holding€thatÐ ´" Мññthe€hññññHññusbandððs›€disability€insurance€benefits€were€not€marital€assets€subject€to€division,Ïnoted€that€ð ðunder€certain€circumstances,€disability€payments€may€be€treated€as€aÏmarital€asset.€€If,€for€example,€the€payments€are€intended€to€provide€something€moreÏthan€wage€replacement€for€one€of€the€parties,€it€may€be€appropriate€to€treat€them€asÏa€marital€asset.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€211.€€The€court€found€nothing€in€the€record€to€indicate€thatÐ ¸,(( Ðthe€disability€insurance€benefits€were€for€any€purpose€other€than€to€provideÏreplacement€of€lost€income.€€Ìà ` àAnalogous€to€the€precise€issue€concerning€disability€income€insurance€policiesÏare€those€situations€involving€employee€disability€pensions.€€Here€again,€otherÏjurisdictions€dealing€with€the€question€have€reached€differing€results.Ìà ` àIn€ò òòòAllard€v.€Allardó óóó,€708€A.2d€554€(R.I.€1998),€the€court€held€that€a€disabilityÐ ¼8 44 Ðpension€is€subject€to€equitable€distribution€on€the€dissolution€of€the€marriage€to€theÏextent€that€it€represents€the€employed€spouseððs€vested€retirement€pay€earned€duringÏmarriage.€€To€the€extent€that€the€disability€pension€compensates€the€recipient€for€lostÏearning€capacity€and€suffering€caused€by€disability,€it€is€the€sole€and€separateÏproperty€of€the€employee€and€not€subject€to€equitable€distribution.Ìà ` àIn€ò òòòCiliberti€v.€Cilibertió óóó,€542€A.2d€580€(Pa.€Super€Ct.€1988),€the€issue€wasÐ °  Ðwhether€a€police€disability€pension€is€marital€property€subject€to€equitableÏdistribution.€€The€court€held€that€disability€payments€intended€to€compensate€theÏemployee€for€lost€earning€capacity€are€not€marital€property€subject€to€distribution,Ïexcept€for€any€portion€of€the€disability€benefits€which€represents€an€amount€receivedÏin€lieu€of€retirement€benefits.€€The€court€said:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àà  àWe€decline€to€hold€that€true€disability€paymentsÏare€marital€property€subject€to€equitable€distribution.€ÏSuch€benefits€are€intended€to€compensate€the€employeeÏspouse€for€lost€earning€capacity.€€They€are€paid€in€lieu€ofÏthe€earnings€which€would€have€been€paid€to€the€employeeÏif€he€or€she€had€been€able€to€work.€€They€replace€theÏfuture€salary€or€wages€which€the€employee,€because€ofÏphysical€or€mental€disability,€will€not€be€able€to€earn.€ÏThey€are€comparable€to€Workmenððs€CompensationÏdisability€payments.€€Post„divorce€payments€intended€toÏcompensate€for€an€inability€to€work€are€not€maritalÏproperty.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌò òòòId.ó óóó€at€582.Ð ´'## ÐÌÓÓà ` àIn€òòò òHoffner€v.€Hoffneró óóó,€577€So.2d€703€(Fla.€œDist›.€App.€1991),€the€issue€beforeÐ ¶)%% Ðthe€court€was€whether€and€to€what€extent,€if€any,€the€œññHññññhññusbandððs›€disability€pensionÏwas€a€marital€asset.€€The€court€said,€ð ð[W]e€are€of€the€view€that€a€disability€pensionÏupon€which€a€spouse€is€presently€receiving€benefits,€by€its€very€nature€replaces€futureÏlost€income,€and€thus€is€not€a€marital€asset€subject€to€equitable€distribution.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€atÐ º1 -- Ð704.Ìà ` àIn€òòò òMylette€v.€Myletteó óóó,€531€œN.Y.2d›€489€(N.Y.€Sup.€Ct.€1988),€the€court€notedÐ ¾511 Ðthat€a€disability€pension€differs€from€a€retirement€pension€to€the€extent€that€itÏconstitutes€compensation€for€personal€injury€and€represents€compensation€for€lostÐ Â955 Ðearnings€as€well€as€for€pain€and€suffering.€€The€court€held€that€œññthe€hññññHññusbandððs›Ïdisability€pension€was€not€marital€property€subject€to€distribution€except€ð ðwhere€aÏdisability€pension€may,€in€part,€represent€deferred€compensation,€it€isÏindistinguishable€from€a€retirement€pension€and€is,€to€that€extent,€subject€toÏequitable€distribution.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€491.Ð °  Ðà ` àIn€òòò òFreeman€v.€Freemanó óóó,€468€So.2d€326€(Fla.€œDist›.€App.€œññFla.›€ññ1985),›€the€court€heldÐ ´  Ðthat€the€disability€pension€was€designed€to€compensate€œññthe€hññññHññusband›€for€lost€earningsÏand€injury€and€was€the€property€of€the€œññhññññHññusband,›€distinguishable€from€a€retirementÏpension.€€Therefore,€it€is€not€a€marital€asset€for€the€purposes€of€equitableÏdistribution.€€ò òòòÐ ¸ Ðà ` àó óóóIn€òòò òœKruger›€v.€Kruger,€ó óóó375€A.2d€659€(N.J.€1977),€the€court€held€that€œññtheÐ ¸ ÐhññññHññusbandððs›€military€retirement€disability€benefits€were€property€subject€to€equitableÏdistribution.Ìà ` àThe€above€cases€illustrate€the€wide€divergence€of€opinion€in€dealing€with€the€Ïissue€before€us.€€We€have€not€exhaustively€reviewed€all€of€the€cases€involving€thisÏpoint,€as€it€would€serve€no€useful€purpose€to€prolong€the€opinion€in€that€manner.€€Ìà ` àTo€reach€our€decision,€we€first€look€to€the€Tennessee€statute€defining€maritalÏproperty.€€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121€(b)€(1)(A)(B):ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(1)(A)€€ð ðMarital€Propertyðð€means€all€real€and€personalÏproperty,€both€tangible€and€intangible,€acquired€by€eitherÏor€both€spouses€during€the€course€of€the€marriage€up€toÏthe€date€of€the€final€divorce€hearing€and€owned€by€eitherÏor€both€spouses€as€of€the€date€of€filing€of€a€complaint€forÏdivorce,€except€in€the€case€of€fraudulent€conveyance€inÏanticipation€of€filing,€and€including€any€property€to€whichÏa€right€was€acquired€up€to€the€date€of€the€final€divorceÏhearing,€and€valued€as€of€a€date€as€near€as€reasonablyÏpossible€to€the€final€divorce€hearing€date.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(B)€ð ðMarital€propertyðð€includes€income€from,€and€anyÏincrease€in€value€during€the€marriage€of,€propertyÏdetermined€to€be€separate€property€in€accordance€withÏsubdivision€(b)(2)€of€each€party€substantially€contributedÏto€its€preservation€and€appreciation€and€the€value€ofÏvested€pension,€retirement€or€other€fringe€benefit€rightsÏaccrued€during€the€period€of€the€marriage.м9 55¸ ¤¸ ¤ ЇÓÓà ` àUnder€the€definition€set€out€above,€pension€rights,€whether€vested€or€unvested,Ïhave€been€determined€to€be€marital€property€subject€to€distribution.€€ò òòòCohen€v.€Cohenó óóó,Ð ° Ð937€S.W.2d€823€(Tenn.€1996);€ò òòòKendrick€v.€Kendrickó óóó,€902€S.W.2d€918€(Tenn.€App.Ð ´ Ð1994).€€Future€income€does€not€fall€within€the€definition€of€marital€property.€€ò òòòFordÐ ¸  Ðv.€Fordó óóó,€No.€œ03A01›„9606„CH„00197,€1996€WL€555230€(Tenn.€App.€œE.S.›€Oct.€1,Ð ¼  Ð1996).Ìà ` àWife€asserts€that€because€the€disability€policies€were€issued€to€Husband€duringÏthe€marriage€and€the€premiums€were€paid€with€marital€funds,€coupled€with€the€factÏthat€Husbandððs€disability€and€receipt€of€benefits€commenced€during€the€marriage,€allÏbenefits€received€by€Husband€after€the€entry€of€the€divorce€decree€constitute€maritalÏproperty.€Ìà ` àWe€believe,€however,€that€the€proper€approach€would€be€to€first€determine€theÏpurpose€and€essence€of€a€disability€income€policy.€€Disability€insurance€protectsÏagainst€the€ð ðinability€of€an€individual€to€earn€the€salary€or€wages€to€which€he€or€sheÏwas€accustomed€in€the€immediate€past.ðð€€Lee€R.€Russ€&€Thomas€F.€œSegalla›,€1€CouchÏon€œIns›.€ðð€1:65€(œ3d›€ed.€1996).€€Disability€insurance€is€a€form€of€casualty€insurance.€ÏœT.C.A.›€ðð€56„2„201€(2)€(1980€&€œSupp›.€1998).€€Disability€income€insurance€has€noÏvalue€until€the€happening€of€the€ð ðcasualtyðð€which€causes€the€benefits€to€beÏapplicable.€€The€protection€sought€and€afforded€by€such€a€policy€is€the€assurance€ofÏa€stream€of€income€which€has€been€halted€because€of€the€happening€of€the€event.€ÏThus,€it€would€seem€logical€that€the€benefits€are€a€substitute€and€stand€in€the€placeÏof€what€would€have€been€except€for€the€ð ðcasualty.ðð€€We€can€analogize€this€to€a€fireÏinsurance€policy€or€any€other€property„type€insurance€policy€one€might€have€toÏprotect€against€losses€of€property.€€If€we€assume€that€the€partiesðð€dwelling€house€isÏmarital€property€as€it€mostly€commonly€is€and€assume€that€the€dwelling€house€wasÏdestroyed€prior€to€the€dissolution€of€the€marriage,€it€would€not€be€questioned€thatÏthe€proceeds€from€this€policy€would€stand€in€the€place€of€the€marital€property€andÐ À844 Ðcould€be€appropriately€divided€the€same€as€if€the€house€was€still€in€existence.€€ThisÏproperty€policy€has€no€value€until€the€ð ðcasualtyðð€occurs,€and€it€is€perfectly€logical€thatÏthe€proceeds€stand€in€place€of€the€insured€property.€€By€the€same€token,€a€disabilityÏincome€policy€has€no€value€until€such€time€as€the€casualty€occurs,€and€the€insuranceÏis€to€protect€against€the€inability€of€the€insured€to€earn€the€income€he€would€earnÏwithout€a€disability.€€Thus,€it€appears€logical€that€the€disability€income€benefitsÏshould€stand€in€the€place€of€earnings€the€insured€would€have€had€except€for€hisÏdisability.€€Pension€rights€are€likewise€distinguishable€because€such€benefits€can€beÏdefined€as€a€form€of€deferred€compensation€in€consideration€of€past€employment.€ÏMoreover,€pension€rights€accrue€value€as€the€rights€mature,€while€a€disability€incomeÏpolicy€has€no€value.Ìà ` àThe€fact€that€the€policy€premiums€were€paid€with€marital€funds€is€notÏcontrolling.€€Husband€was€the€primary€provider€for€the€family,€and€premiums€wereÏpaid€to€create€a€substitute€for€his€income€during€the€marriage€since€apparentlyÏdivorce€was€not€contemplated€at€the€time€the€policies€were€purchased.€€Wife€was€aÏprospective€beneficiary€of€this€income€and€ultimately€derived€benefit€from€this€sourceÏof€income€during€the€marriage.€€The€insurance€benefits,€as€a€substitute€for€earnedÏincome,€are€available€for€payment€of€alimony€òòin€futuroóó.€€The€payment€of€the€premiumÐ °&"" Ðwith€marital€funds€was€for€the€benefit€of€both€parties€to€the€marriage€and€cannot€beÏa€controlling€factor€in€determining€whether€the€benefits€are€marital€property.Ìà ` àWe€must€also€bear€in€mind€that€benefits€are€disability€benefits€and€payableÏonly€during€the€time€that€Husband€is€disabled.€€During€the€time€he€is€disabled,€theÏpremiums€on€the€policy€are€waived.€€Should€his€disability€cease,€he€will€again€becomeÏobligated€to€pay€the€premiums€on€the€policies€and€conceivably€start€earning€hisÏincome€as€a€physician.€€Should€his€disability€recur€down€the€road,€would€Wife€thenÏbe€entitled€to€a€distribution€of€marital€property€conceivably€some€years€after€the€finalÏdecree€of€divorce€has€been€entered?€€We€believe€not.€€The€distribution€of€maritalÐ °844 Ðproperty€should€be€accomplished€with€finality€at€the€time€of€the€final€decree.€€TheÏvery€nature€of€the€disability€payments€in€the€instant€case€prevents€such€a€finalityÏfrom€existing.€€For€all€of€these€reasons,€we€feel€that€the€disability€income€paymentsÏin€the€instant€case€are€not€marital€property€subject€to€distribution.€€The€benefitsÏconstitute€substituted€income€to€Husband€and€are€available€for€such€obligations€asÏmight€be€imposed€by€the€court.œ×ƒ ×Ý ƒ##ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  כР°  Ðà ` àAccordingly,€that€part€of€the€trial€courtððs€decree€awarding€Wife€a€part€of€theÏdisability€income€benefits€as€a€marital€distribution€is€reversed.€€The€decree€in€allÏother€respects€is€affirmed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€such€furtherÏproceedings€as€may€be€necessary.€€Costs€of€the€appeal€are€assessed€one„half€to€eachÏparty.ÌÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à_________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€Ð ° Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÐ ² ÐÌò òCONCUR:Ð ´ ÐÌÌó ó____________________________________Ð º!  Ðò òDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óÐ º"  ÐÌò ò____________________________________Ð ¼$  ÐHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEó óœÔ†ÿÿÔÔ†ÿÿÔÔ  ÔÔ  Ôñ$ñ