ÿWPCà  cPãÂÎî“êº\Øî1{ ¸[ã`HòãñQP:¬^kpÁß$FGƒÆüHê*¨õndc´®®DoóÅ6²}GÓ:dTäu5Œ`GYÝ`¾ õ÷4uÈ}…¾ †‰½äß»VŒ$–lÁl ŽJ2‹5kÜ 7‘›t”rÒ‡‰òjœ¹…ŒÞ+¡á6<c0@?òGÜG·Þ=”wUåÒáê{íš$ûOþŠqRÏvÈ¿ÂÞJ’9“½àîðÏÐþ"Ü:‘ç¥t5WëÇ¥á8³4UƒZe# 8´Œ …|&9ÿŸ¶VÝb[뜵äú~Ð༖ѤLVâë×fÖ'– °£Íæï§2¢_'(n³)„ê?-€Nó{\Z=/x2ªôGOABþßßæ+“ÜnbX¤£eÜùà ª `EÞâµczdO|c”}Úæ+ð%ãwݶJ¿¹Q;¼aÓN¼ÄüCÛ<™Ýö™j§õ2Ÿ¾ôX°Ä"$¤ß}6¾~¨qø¢xãÔÉ3d|/jüËO:FmÃØ$\Ù”ôŸDÉSÉg0ŒoL|¦‚Ð àF<Í`vü’'ú÷hÐ’º31Î[´l©•!¢QoÈ Vrm€ºN§à ¸“t€ÆS˜ªç)# >UNI %— 0(w@Å4(UN0)~U:§)áU: AQD Æ• 0D[ 0DŸ 0Dã ã D/' BV Bs D3 ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ÑÒDÓÔ[ÕÖE×ØÓ€äçn~<$3|xç(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular Ý ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ Xœ XXXÔÔ€ ÃaX Xœ ÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ Xœ X ÃaÔÐ  ÐÌò òDecember€21,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ôŒ´ôX Xœ ÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular Ý ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ Xœ XXXÔÔ€ ÃaX Xœ ÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ Xœ X ÃaÔÐ  ÐÌò òDecember€18,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ôŒ´ôX Xœ ÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular !"#%Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'''÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd&&&&'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝñØñ›ñØñÑ7€Œ–XXdðdÈ7Ñò òÔ‡ X­)XXXÔÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑñäññØñßr€ (<,(j 8` `€€@Eȱ` ttx$°ð ÕrßñØññäññçññäñßr€ (<,(j 8` `€€@Eȱ` ttx$°ð ÕrßñäññçññçññçññçññØñ›ñØññçññçññçññçñ›ñçññçññçññçñ›ñçññçñßt€ (>.*jxÜe` `€€@E¤` ttx$Ü°Ð 9 tß›ñçñà@ ìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óˆÐ ° Ðò òà@kk%ìàAT€JACKSONˆÐ œì Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌóóÌLARRY€C.€GRANDERSON,€€€€à h àà À à)à  àà p àÐ L œ Ðó óà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò ò)ó óÐ 8 ˆ Ðà  àPlaintiff/Appellant,à  àà h àà À àò ò)à  àó óShelby€Juvenile€No.€104448€€€€Ð $ t Ðò òà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)ó óà  àà p àÐ  d Ðò òv.à  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  à€Ð  P  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àó óAppeal€No.€02A01„9801„JV„00007ò òÐ ì <  ÐLISA€STEPHENS€HICKS,à  à€à h àà À à)à  àÐ Ü,  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà  àó óDefendant/Appellee.€à  àà h àò òà À à)Ð ´  Ðà  àó óòòÌóóò òÌÌÌà@ ìàó óAPPEAL€FROM€THE€JUVENILE€COURT€OF€SHELBY€COUNTYˆÐ T¤ Ðà@%% ìàAT€MEMPHIS,€TENNESSEEˆÌÌÌà@ð ð ìàTHE€HONORABLE€A.€V.€McDOWELL,€€JUDGEˆÌòòÌÌÌFor€the€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:òòà  àà h àà À àFor€the€Defendant/Appelleeóó:òòÐ ´ ÐÌóóM.€Dell€Stiner€€€€€€€€à ¸ àà  àà h àà À àHarold€D.€ArchibaldÐ ŒÜ ÐMemphis,€Tennesseeà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àMemphis,€TennesseeÐ xÈ ÐÌÌÌÌò òÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àó óHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ð °($' ÐÌÌÌCONCURS:ÌòòÌóóALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.Ð 8.ˆ)- ÐÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ÌÔ#†XŒ–XX X­)`#ÔÐ  è18-1 ÐØØÓÓÑ7€Œ–XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  Ñà@55'ìàò òOPINIONó óˆÐ ° ÐÓ  Óà  àThis€is€a€paternity€case.€€The€putative€father€appeals€from€the€trial€courtððs€order€denying€aÏœmotion›€seeking€DNA€tests€to€determine€the€paternity€of€the€minor€œchild,€based€on€alleged€fraud€inÏthe€procurement€of€a€consent€acknowledgment€of€paternity.€›€€The€trial€court€dismissed€the€case€priorÏto€a€hearing€on€the€motion.€€The€putative€father€appeals.€€We€reverse€and€remand€for€a€hearing.Ìà  àMyisha€Nicole€Stephens€was€born€out„of„wedlock€to€appellee€Lisa€Stephens€Hicks€(ð ðHicksðð)Ïon€October€3,€1985.€€Subsequently,€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Health€Services€filed€a€Petition€toÏEstablish€Paternity€and€named€appellant€Larry€Granderson€(ð ðGrandersonðð)€as€the€natural€father€ofÏthe€child.€€On€February€4,€1986,€the€parties€entered€into€a€voluntary€consent€order€of€paternityÏ(ð ðConsent€Orderðð).€€à ¸ àSubsequent€orders€were€entered,€establishing€visitation€for€Granderson€andÐ à Ðincreasing€œchild›€support.€€In€1994,€an€order€was€entered€awarding€both€parties€joint€custody€of€theÏœchild.›Ìà  àIn€1997,€Hicks€filed€another€motion€to€increase€child€support.€€In€response,€Granderson€filedÏa€motion€to€set€aside€the€paternity€and€child€support€order€or,€in€the€alternative,€for€blood€tests€toÏdetermine€if€Granderson€is€Myishaððs€father.€€Pursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€œ24„7„118(e),›ÏGranderson€alleged€fraud€in€the€procurement€of€the€Consent€Order.€€Granderson€claims€that€heÏsigned€the€original€Consent€Order€based€on€Hicksðð€fraudulent€representation€to€him€that€he€wasÏMyishaððs€father.€€œHe€asserts€that›€Hicks€later€disclosed€to€a€third€party€that€the€third€party€is€theÏchildððs€father.€€œGranderson›€claims€that€Hicks€introduced€Myisha€to€the€third€party€as€being€her€fatherÏand€has€openly€held€out€to€others€that€the€third€party€is€Myishaððs€father.Ìà  àœOn€October€3,€1997,€the›€trial€court€œentered€an€order€denying›€Grandersonððs€motion€to€set€asideÏpaternity€and€child€support€or€alternatively,€that€DNA€tests€be€conducted.€The€trial€court€did€notÏconduct€an€evidentiary€hearing€on€Grandersonððs€allegation€of€fraud€in€inducing€the€original€consentÏorder.Ìà  àœFive›€months€after€the€denial€of€Grandersonððs€motion,€and€after€Grandersonððs€notice€of€appealÏhad€been€filed,€the€trial€court€entered€an€order€granting€Grandersonððs€request€for€a€blood€test.€€TheÏrecord€does€not€reflect€any€further€action€on€this€order.€Ìà  àGranderson€now€appeals€the€denial€of€the€motion€and€its€dismissal€without€a€hearing.€€€InÏaddition,€we€must€address€the€trial€courtððs€order€granting€Grandersonððs€request€for€a€blood€test,Ïentered€after€notice€of€appeal€had€been€filed.Ð ;`6: Ðà  àAfter€entry€of€the€trial€courtððs€order€providing€for€a€blood€test,€the€record€does€not€reflect€anyÏfurther€action.€€On€appeal,€we€must€assume€that€the€blood€tests€have€not€been€performed.€ÏJurisdiction€of€the€appellate€court€attaches€upon€filing€of€the€notice€of€appeal.€€œò òòòState€v.€Givhanó óóó,€616Ð pÀ ÐS.W.2d€612,€613€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1981)€(citing€Tenn.€R.€App.€3e,€4a).›€€Consequently,€afterÏGrandersonððs€notice€of€appeal€was€filed,€the€trial€court€was€without€jurisdiction€to€enter€an€orderÏgranting€his€request€for€a€blood€test.€€Therefore,€this€order€must€be€considered€void.Ìà  àOn€appeal,€Granderson€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€his€motion€without€firstÏconducting€a€hearing.€€Granderson€contends€that€Tennessee€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ24„7„118(e)›€permits€aÏchallenge€to€a€consent€order€on€the€basis€of€fraud€in€the€procurement€of€the€order.€€In€addition,ÏGranderson€asserts€that€the€plain€language€of€the€statute€provides€for€a€hearing€based€uponÏallegations€of€fraud,€duress€or€material€mistake€of€fact€in€the€procurement€of€a€voluntaryÏacknowledgment€of€paternity.€€He€asserts€the€trial€court€was€required€to€conduct€an€evidentiaryÏhearing€on€his€allegation€€of€fraud€in€the€procurement€of€the€Consent€Order.€Ìà  àHicks€responds€that€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€œ24„7„112(a)(1)›€required€Granderson€toÏcontest€paternity€in€the€ð ðinitial€appearance,ðð€which€occurred€when€Granderson€entered€into€theÏConsent€Order.€€She€notes€that€Grandersonððs€request€for€a€blood€test€occurred€some€thirteen€yearsÏafter€the€Consent€Order,€in€response€to€her€attempt€to€increase€child€œsupport.€€Hicks›€argues€there€wasÏno€ð ðfraud€in€the€procurementðð€of€the€Consent€Order,€and€that€Granderson€agreed€to€the€ConsentÏOrder€based€on€his€own€belief€that€he€was€Myishaððs€father.€€Since€there€was€no€fraud€in€theÏprocurement€of€the€agreement,€Hicks€maintains€that€Granderson€is€precluded€from€contestingÏpaternity€by€the€five€year€statute€of€limitations€set€out€in€the€statute.Ìà  àOur€review€of€this€case€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€with€a€presumption€of€correctness€of€theÐ ,`'* Ðfindings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court.€€Absent€error€of€law,€the€trial€courtððs€decision€will€be€affirmed,Ïunless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€factual€findings.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d).€€NoÏpresumption€of€correctness€attaches€to€the€trial€courtððs€conclusions€of€law.€€ò òòòSee€Carvell€v.€Bottomsó óóó,Ð °1-0 Ð900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).€Ìà  àTennessee€Code€Annotated€œðð›€24„7„112€œaddresses›€the€conditions€under€which€a€parentage€testÏis€œordered.€€Originally,€the€statute€gave€parties€the€right€to€a€parentage€test€if€requested€in€the€ð ðinitialñÖñððñÖñÏappearanceñ×ñððñ×ñ€in€the€case,€and€thereafter€the€trial€court€had€the€discretion€to€determine€whether€aÐ 09€48 Ðparentage€test€should€be€administered.€€ò òòòSee€State€v.€Williamsó óóó,€1997€WL€675459m€*3€(Tenn.€App.Ð ° Ð1997).€€However,€effective€July€1,€1997,€the€statute€was€amended€to€read€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8  à(a)(1)(A)€In€any€contested€paternity€case,€.€.€.€the€court,€.€.€.€shall€order€the€parties€andÏthe€child€to€submit€to€genetic€tests€to€determine€the€childððs€parentage€upon€theÏrequest€of€any€party€if€the€request€is€supported€by€an€affidavit€of€the€party€making€theÏrequest€.€.€.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà@  'ìà*€*€*€ˆÌÌà8  à(2)€During€any€other€civil€or€criminal€proceeding€in€which€the€question€of€parentageÏarises,€upon€the€motion€of€either€party€or€on€the€courtððs€own€motion,€the€court€shallÏat€such€time€as€it€deems€equitable€order€all€necessary€parties€to€submit€to€any€testsÏand€comparisons€which€have€been€developed€and€adapted€for€purposes€ofÏestablishing€or€disproving€parentage.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€24„7„112(a)(1)(A)„(a)(2)€(Supp.€1998).€€Therefore,€under€the€revised€statutes,Ïparentage€testing€is€mandatory€in€a€contested€paternity€case,€upon€request€of€a€party.€€If€the€issue€isÏraised€in€another€proceeding,€subsection€(a)(2)€gives€the€trial€court€discretion€to€determine€whetherÏto€permit€testing.€€ò òòòSee€Davis€v.€Davisó óóó,€No.€03A01„9509„CH„00327,€1996€WL€12584,€at€*1€(Jan.€11,Ð @ Ð1996);€ò òòòSteioff€v.€Steioffó óóó,€833€S.W.2d€94,€96€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€›Ð  p Ðà  àTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðððð€24„7„118€(e)(1)€and€(e)(2)€address€a€partyððs€right€to€challengeÏa€voluntary€acknowledgment€of€paternity:€€€€ÌÒ°ÒÒ°ÒœÓÓ(e)(1)›€If€the€voluntary€consent€acknowledgment€has€not€been€rescinded€pursuant€toÏsubsection€(c),€the€acknowledgment€may€only€be€challenged€on€the€basis€of€fraud,Ïwhether€extrinsic€or€intrinsic,€duress,€or€material€mistake€of€fact.ÌÌ(2)€The€challenger€must€institute€the€proceeding€upon€notice€to€the€other€signatoryÏand€other€necessary€parties€including€the€Title€IV„D€agency€within€five€(5)€years€ofÏthe€execution€of€the€acknowledgment,€and€if€the€court€finds€òòbased€upon€the€evidenceÐ `'°"% Ðpresented€at€the€hearingóó€that€there€is€a€substantial€likelihood€that€fraud,€duress,€orÐ P( #& Ðmaterial€mistake€of€fact€existed€in€the€execution€of€the€acknowledgment€of€paternity,Ïthen,€and€only€then,€the€court€shall€order€parentage€tests.€Such€action€shall€not€beÏbarred€by€the€five€(5)€year€statute€of€limitations€where€fraud€in€the€procurement€ofÏthe€acknowledgment€by€the€mother€in€the€procurement€of€the€acknowledgment€by€theÏmother€of€the€child€is€alleged€and€where€the€requested€relief€will€not€affect€theÏinterest€of€the€child,€the€state,€or€any€Title€IV„D€œagency.€.€.€.›ÌÌÒ°ÒÒ°ÒœÓÓTennessee›€Code€Annotated€œð𛀜24„7„118(e)(1)„(2)€(Supp.1998)€(emphasis›€added).Ìà  àThe€policy€considerations€underlying€the€paternity€statutes€must€be€noted.€€In€òòò òBass€v.Ð °1-0 ÐNormanó óóó,€the€Court€stated€that€ð ð[T]he€purpose€of€the€paternity€statute€is€to€require€a€biological€fatherÐ 3à.2 Ðto€support€his€child.ððò ò€€òòBass€v.€Normanó óóó,€1989€WL€15788€*471€œ(Tenn.›€App.€1989)€œ(citing›€òòò òFrazier€v.Ð p5À04 ÐœMcFerrinó óóó,€55€Tenn.›€App.€œ431,›€402€S.W.2d€467€œ(1964)).›€€The€Court€held€that€a€mother€could€bringÐ P7 26 Ða€petition€to€establish€paternity€and€support€against€the€alleged€father€even€though€she€was€marriedÐ 09€48 Ðto€another€at€the€time€the€child€was€born.€€òòò òId.€€óóó ó€òòò òShell€v.€Lawó óóó€again€addressed€the€policy€behind€theÐ ° Ðpaternity€statutes:òò€óóÐ à ÐÒ°ÒÒ°ÒœÓÓUnder›€the€authority€of€òòBassóó€and€T.€C.€A.€24„7„112,€we€believe€that€all€common€lawÐ pÀ Ðpresumptions€relating€to€paternity€and€legitimacy€are€rebuttable€and€the€public€policyÏhas€now€been€established€by€the€General€Assembly€that€true€parentage€is€the€end€thatÏshould€be€pursued€by€the€courts€in€paternity€actions.€€œÌà ` àÌÒ°ÒÒ°Òòòò òÓÓShell€v.€Lawó óóó,€935€S.W.2d€402,€408€(Tenn.ñÎñ€Ct.ñÎñ€App.€1996).€€The€interest€in€determining€true€parentageÐ  p  Ðmust,€of€course,€be€weighed€against€the€need€for€stability€for€the€child,€particularly€in€situations€inÏwhich€the€child€has€long€believed€that€the€party€requesting€the€blood€test€was€his€father.€Ìà  àIn€this€case,€Granderson€had€a€right€to€a€blood€parentage€test€pursuant€to€subsection€(a)(1)›œñÏñ(A)ñÏñ›Ïonly€if€requested€œin€the€contested€paternity€case.€€Code›€Ann.€ðð€24„7„112€œ(a)(1)ñÐñ(A)ñÐñ.€€Subsequently,€Ïhis›€motion€to€set€aside€paternity€and€child€support€and€his€request€for€a€blood€test€may€be€consideredÏpursuant€to€subsection€(a)(2)€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€œ24„7„112.›€€This€section€grants€the€trialÏcourt€the€discretion€to€determine€whether€to€grant€a€request€for€a€blood€test€œin€proceedings€other€thanÏa€contested€paternity€case.€€›€œò òòòSee€State€v.€Williamsó óóó,€1997€WL€675459m€*3€(Tenn.€App.€1997).›Ð  p Ðà  àHowever,€Tennessee€Code€œAnnotated€ðð€24„7„112›€must€be€construed€along€with€TennesseeÏCode€Annotated€œðð€ðð24„7„118(e)(1)›€and€œ(e)(2).€€ñÍñ›ñÍñò òòòStevens€v.€Lintonó óóó,€190€Tenn.€351,€354,€229€S.W.2dÐ à0 Ð510,€512€(1950)€(ð ðThe€rule€of€interpretation,€in€pari€materia,€is€that€if€divers€statutes€relate€to€theÏsame€thing,€they€are€all€to€be€taken€into€consideration€in€construing€any€one€of€them.ðð)ñÑñ.€€ñÑññÒñ€€ñÒñSections›€24„¼7„118(e)(1)€and€(e)(2)€address€a€challenge€to€a€voluntary€acknowledgment€of€paternity€based€onÏfraud€in€the€procurement,€as€alleged€in€this€case.€€œSection€24„7„118(e)(2)€states›€that€fraud€may€be€aÏbasis€for€challenging€such€a€voluntary€consent€acknowledgment,€if€ð ðbased€on€the€evidence€presentedÏat€the€hearingðð€the€court€finds€a€substantial€likelihood€that€fraud€ð ðexisted€in€the€execution€of€theÏacknowledgment€of€paternity.€.€.€œ.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€24„7„118(e)(1)€(Supp.€1998).€€Under›€theseÏcircumstances,€the€statute€provides€that€the€trial€court€ð ðshallðð€order€parentage€œtests.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€Moreover,›Ð à.0*- Ðthe€five„year€statute€of€limitations€is€not€a€bar€in€cases€of€fraud€in€the€procurement€ð ðwhere€theÏrequested€relief€will€not€affect€the€interest€of€the€child,€the€state,€or€any€Title€IV„D€œagency.ðð€€ò òòòId.óóó ó›Ð  2ð-1 Ðà  àApplying€these€statutes€to€the€facts€in€this€case,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð24„7„118(e)(2)Ïrequires€the€trial€court€to€conduct€a€hearing€in€cases€in€which€the€putative€father€alleges€fraud€in€theÏprocurement€of€the€voluntary€acknowledgment€of€paternity.€€After€the€hearing,€if€the€trial€court€finds€Ïð ða€substantial€likelihoodðð€of€fraud€ð ðin€the€execution€of€the€acknowledgment€of€paternity,ðð€it€mustÐ  :p59 Ðorder€parentage€tests,€even€if€the€relief€is€requested€after€the€five„year€statute€of€limitations€hasÏlapsed,€provided€the€trial€court€also€finds€that€this€relief€ð ðwill€not€affect€the€interest€of€the€child,€theÏstate,€or€any€Title€IV„D€œagency.ððñÓñ€€ò òñÓññÔñòòñÔññÕñId.ñÕññÔñóóñÔññÓñó óñÓñ›Ð pÀ Ðà  àTherefore,€in€the€case€at€bar,€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€Grandersonððs€motion€withoutÏan€evidentiary€hearing€on€his€allegation€of€fraud€in€the€procurement€of€the€Consent€œOrder.€ÏConsequently,›€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed.€€The€cause€must€be€remanded€to€the€trialÏcourt€for€an€evidentiary€hearing€on€Grandersonððs€allegations.Ìà  àThe€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed€and€remanded€as€set€forth€above.€€Costs€on€appealÏare€taxed€to€the€Appellee,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€œnecessary.ÌÌÔ‡ X}#XXXܤÔÓÓà  à›à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð pÀ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àò òóóHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ð \¬ Ðó óà  àò òÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ øH ÐALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ó óÐ ä4 ÐÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ¨ ø Ðóóò òDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ó óÔ#†XܤXX X}#:@#Ô