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Y&M"¿åŒ$¬öÒz'» 0xW6>W ’™q¥—«ä•%ÁœÑü¼×½ì6dpf4ì`‰¡ªÑ=gMGê·K‘s<€—ßè^ãÂÖØÒ—[çÕ·Ù’ùÂ}òµ7‰O®Õ  r!ÆóõOdÒ&t÷@eý uêJ¸+Šƒ~)c[÷‰ùí&ç'¨gå?1¦`ƒ“›úi½¦SiéÒzS…XnøVc©ñ§ ×°¼½÷ËÑ…Çöí”æVŽ]ùÙz×–_Jžf3ðÖhXüLj[žÿ)x›ÝDÑùõø%c‚)UöæÄ}g­$F#YkÏÛ_¿Í‰ 6#zúOcÞ4kÞš×m«sêh¼XW®‘hÜj‚®&Þ׿£cæ¢Ó~piH¬aá§{Ö_b %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÁÐ Þ‘ Æo Æ5 Æû ÆÁ 0D‡NËËËEÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍÍbÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ 0ë×××× B 0¤ß D5ƒ D-¸ 0Kåå AS0ƃ 0¤I 0Dí A«1»u3-s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular¬|&-ØƤ4ã¢3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4050ÈÈÈÈÈÈÈÈ0 ÔÝ ƒR~r$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§Eò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€partiesðð€son€is€their€only€child€and€was€an€adult€at€the€time€of€their€divorce.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù-(|G2~r$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€}»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§Eò»»Ô d(|3¾ï$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€}»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3¾ï$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€}»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€}»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼}»»»ÔÑ8€CÑXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñ€€€€à@ü ü ìàÔ‡î,}ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼}»îî,#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓMay€14,€2002€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XCÑX»¼}ÔÌò òÔ#†¼}»XXCÑõ#ÔROY€WILLIAM€GRAY€v.€NANCY€JANE€GRAYÔ‡XCÑX»¼}Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Knox€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€82504€€€€€€Bill€Ô_ÔSwannÔ_Ô,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌFILED€SEPTEMBER€19,€Ô_Ô2002Ô_ÔÐ ¾   Ðà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2001„02470„COA„R3„CVÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓIn€this€divorce€case€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Knox€County€the€Appellant,€Roy€William€Gray,Ð xÈ  Ðcontends€that€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€failing€to€disqualify€counsel€for€the€Appellee,€Nancy€Jane€Gray.Ð d´ ÐMr.€Gray€further€contends€that€the€Court€erred€in€dividing€the€marital€assets,€in€granting€both€partiesÐ P  Ða€divorce,€and€in€awarding€Ms.€Gray€post€trial€attorney's€fees.€€Ms.€Gray€asserts€that€she€should€beÐ <Œ Ðreimbursed€for€attorney's€fees€incurred€by€her€in€responding€to€this€appeal€upon€the€grounds€that€theÐ (x Ðappeal€is€frivolous€and€devoid€of€merit.€€The€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€affirmed€in€part€andÐ d Ðreversed€in€part.Ð P ÐÓ§ÓÌò òTenn.R.App.P.€3;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Affirmed€in€Part€and€Reversed€in€Part;Ð Ø( ÐCause€Remanded€€ó óÐ Ä ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼}»àXCÑ^#ÔÔ‡XCÑX.¼}ÔHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHerschel€P.€Franksóó€andÐ œì ÐòòÔ_ÔD.MichaelÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔSwineyÔ_Ô,€JJ.óó,€joined.Ð ˆØ ÐÌÔ_ÔRickyÔ_Ô€A.W.€Curtis,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellant,€Roy€William€GrayÐ `° ÐÌSarah€Y.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellee,€Nancy€Jane€GrayÐ 8!ˆ  ÐÓUÓÌò òOPINIONÐ #`" ÐÌó óÔ#†¼}»XXCÑ„#ÔÓ  Óà0  àÔ€XCÑX»¼}ÔIn€this€appeal€from€a€judgment€for€divorce€entered€by€the€Circuit€Court€for€Knox€County€fiveÐè$8 $(#(# Ѐissues€are€presented€for€our€review€which€we€restate€as€follows:Ð Ô%$!% ÐÌà  à1.€Did€the€Trial€Court€err€in€failing€to€disqualify€the€attorney€for€Nancy€Jane€Gray,€theÐ ¬'ü"' ÐAppellee,€when€it€was€shown€that€such€attorney€had€prepared€the€will€of€the€Appellant,€Roy€WilliamÐ ˜(è#( ÐGray,€approximately€ten€years€prior€to€the€present€divorce€action?Ð „)Ô$) ÐÌà  à2.€Did€the€Trial€Court€err€in€its€division€of€the€marital€estate?Ð \+¬&+ ÐÌà  à3.€Did€the€Trial€Court€err€in€granting€a€divorce€to€both€parties?Ð 4-„(-ý Їà  à4.€Did€the€Trial€Court€err€in€awarding€attorney's€fees€to€Ms.€Gray?Ð ° ÐÌà  à5.€Should€Ms.€Gray€be€reimbursed€for€attorney's€fees€incurred€by€her€in€defending€thisÐ ˆØ Ðappeal?Ð tÄ Ðà  à€Ð `° Ðà  àThis€is€a€non„jury€case€and,€accordingly,€our€review€is€òòde€novo€óóupon€the€record€of€the€TrialÐ L œ ÐCourt.€€A€trial€court's€findings€of€fact€are€entitled€to€a€presumption€of€correctness€and,€absentÐ 8 ˆ Ðevidence€preponderating€to€the€contrary,€we€must€affirm€those€findings€pursuant€to€Ô_ÔT.R.A.P.Ô_Ô€13(d).Ð $ t ÐòòÔ_ÔKincaidÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔKincaidÔ_Ôóó,€912€S.W.2d€140€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€There€is€no€presumption€of€correctness€Ð  ` Ðas€to€the€correctness€of€a€trial€court's€conclusions€of€law.€€òòCampbell€v.€Florida€Steel€Corp.óó,€919Ð ü L  ÐS.W.2d€26€(Tenn.€1996).Ð è 8  Ѐ€€Ð Ô$  Ðà  àThis€case€began€in€May€of€1999€when€Mr.€Gray€filed€a€complaint€for€divorce€in€the€KnoxÐ À  ÐCounty€Circuit€Court€to€which€Ms.€Gray€responded€by€answer€and€counter„complaint.€€By€motionÐ ¬ü  Ðfiled€on€May€1,€2000,€and€subsequent€amendment€thereto€on€May€2,€2000,€Mr.€Gray€requested€thatÐ ˜è  Ðthe€Trial€Court€discharge€Ms.€Gray's€attorney,€Sara€Sheppeard,€on€the€grounds€that€Ms.€SheppeardÐ „Ô  Ðhad€previously€prepared€Mr.€Gray's€will.€€This€motion€was€denied€and€trial€began€on€May€2,€2000.€Ð pÀ ÐOn€September€13,€2000,€the€Court€entered€its€final€judgment€granting€both€parties€a€divorce€on€theÐ \¬ Ðgrounds€of€inappropriate€marital€conduct€and€ordering€that€the€marital€assets€be€divided€equallyÐ H˜ Ðbetween€the€parties.€€Thereafter,€Mr.€Gray€filed€a€motion€for€new€trial€and€Ms.€Gray€filed€a€motionÐ 4„ Ðseeking€payment€of€funds€due€her€pursuant€to€the€judgment€for€divorce.€€The€Court€granted€Ms.Ð  p ÐGray's€motion€by€order€entered€February€2,€2001,€òònunc€pro€Ô_ÔtuncÔ_Ôóó€as€of€January€19,€2001.€€Ð  \ ÐÌà  àOn€February€2,€2001,€Ms.€Gray€filed€an€additional€motion€averring€that€the€funds€which€theÐ ä4 ÐCourt€had€ordered€Mr.€Gray€to€pay€in€its€order€of€January€19,€2001,€had€still€not€been€paid,€that€Mr.Ð Ð  ÐGray€was,€€accordingly,€in€contempt€of€court€and€that€he€should€be€taxed€with€attorney€fees,€courtÐ ¼  Ðcosts€and€discretionary€costs€in€consequence.€€At€a€hearing€on€February€16,€2001,€the€Court€deniedÐ ¨ø ÐMr.€Gray's€motion€for€new€trial.€€At€this€time,€Mr.€Gray€paid€Ms.€Gray€the€monies€requested€in€herÐ ”ä Ðmotion€and€Ms.€Gray€voluntarily€dismissed€that€portion€of€her€motion€seeking€an€adjudication€ofÐ €Ð Ðcontempt.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àOn€June€8,€2001,€Ms.€Gray€filed€an€additional€motion€seeking€remaining€assets€due€her€underÐ D!” Ðthe€divorce€decree€which€she€averred€that€Mr.€Gray€had€not€yet€turned€over€to€her€despite€the€Court'sÐ 0"€  Ðorders€that€he€do€so.€€In€this€motion€Ms.€Gray€also€averred€that€Mr.€Gray€should€be€responsible€for€Ð #l! Ðattorney€fees€incurred€by€her€since€the€Court€entered€its€final€judgment€on€September€13,€2000.€€ThisÐ $X" Ðmotion€was€heard€by€the€Court€on€June€15,€2001,€at€which€time€the€Court€ordered€that€Mr.€GrayÐ ô$D # Ðtransfer€assets€to€Ms.€Gray€as€required€by€the€final€judgment.€The€Court€further€ordered€that€Mr.Ð à%0!$ ÐGray€pay€Ms.€Gray€post„trial€attorney€fees€in€the€amount€of€$2,500.00.€€This€appeal€followed.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àThe€first€issue€we€address€is€whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€when€it€failed€to€disqualify€Ms.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐSheppeard€as€Ms.€Gray's€attorney.€€Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àOur€standard€of€review€of€the€Court's€ruling€with€respect€to€attorney€disqualification€isÐ ° Ðâ âwhether€the€Trial€Court€abused€its€discretion€and,€absent€a€finding€that€the€Trial€Court€abused€itsÐ œì Ðdiscretion,€its€ruling€will€be€affirmed€by€this€Court.€€òòClinard€v.€Blackwoodóó,€46€S.W.3d€177€(Tenn.Ð ˆØ Ð2001).€€Abuse€of€discretion€occurs€when€a€trial€court€€"Ô_Ôapplie[sÔ_Ô]€an€incorrect€legal€standard,€orÐ tÄ ÐÔ_Ôreache[sÔ_Ô]€a€decision€which€is€against€logic€or€reasoning€that€Ô_Ôcause[sÔ_Ô]€an€injustice€to€the€partyÐ `° Ðcomplaining."€òò€Ô_ÔClinardÔ_Ô,€ibid.€óóciting€òòState€v.€Shirleyóó,€6€S.W.3d€243€(Tenn.€1999).€€Applying€thisÐ L œ Ðstandard€to€the€Trial€Court's€ruling€in€the€present€case€we€are€compelled€to€find€that€the€Court€didÐ 8 ˆ Ðnot€abuse€its€discretion.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àThe€record€shows€that€at€some€point€in€1989€Mr.€and€Ms.€Gray€met€with€Ms.€Sheppeard€inÐ ü L  Ðher€office€to€discuss€the€preparation€of€their€wills€and€to€advise€her€as€to€how€they€wanted€theirÐ è 8  Ðproperty€to€be€distributed€in€the€event€of€their€death.€€Thereafter,€the€Grays€returned€to€Ms.Ð Ô$  ÐSheppeard's€office€and€signed€wills€prepared€by€her€in€compliance€with€their€instructions.Ð À  ÐÌà  àMr.€Gray€asserts€that,€in€consequence€of€Ms.€Sheppeard€having€prepared€€his€and€his€wife's€Ð ˜è  Ðwills€in€1989,€at€the€time€the€instant€divorce€proceedings€were€commenced€either€1)Ms.€SheppeardÐ „Ô  Ðwas€engaged€in€his€ongoing€representation€or€2)€he€was€Ms.€Sheppeard's€former€client.€€In€eitherÐ pÀ Ðevent,€Mr.€Gray€argues,€€Ms.€Sheppeard€should€not€be€allowed€to€represent€Ms.€Gray€in€this€caseÐ \¬ Ðover€his€objection.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àWith€respect€to€his€contention€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€should€be€disqualified€from€representingÐ  p ÐMs.€Gray€in€this€case,€Mr.€Gray€cites€Disciplinary€Rule€5„105€of€Rule€8€of€the€Rules€of€the€SupremeÐ  \ ÐCourt€of€the€State€of€Tennessee€which€states:Ð øH ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Ò(A)€A€lawyer€shall€decline€proffered€employment€if€the€exercise€of€independentÐ Ð  Ðprofessional€judgment€in€behalf€of€a€client€will€be€or€is€likely€to€be€adverselyÐ ¼  Ðaffected€by€the€acceptance€of€the€proffered€employment,€or€if€it€would€be€likelyÐ ¨ø Ðto€involve€the€lawyer€in€representing€differing€interests,€except€to€the€extentÐ ”ä Ðpermitted€under€DR€5„105(C).Ð €Ð ÐÌ(B)€A€lawyer€shall€not€continue€multiple€employment€if€the€exercise€ofÐ X ¨ Ðindependent€professional€judgment€in€behalf€of€a€client€will€be€or€is€likely€to€beÐ D!” Ðadversely€affected€by€the€lawyer's€representation€of€another€client,€or€if€it€wouldÐ 0"€  Ðbe€likely€to€involve€the€lawyer€in€representing€differing€interests,€except€to€theÐ #l! Ðextent€permitted€under€DR€5„105(C).Ð $X" ÐÌ(C)€In€the€situations€covered€by€DR€5„105(A)€and€(B),€a€lawyer€may€representÐ à%0!$ Ðmultiple€clients€if€it€is€obvious€that€the€lawyer€can€adequately€represent€theÐ Ì&"% Ðinterest€of€each€and€if€each€consents€to€the€representation€after€full€disclosure€ofÐ ¸'#& Ðthe€possible€effect€of€such€representation€on€the€exercise€of€the€lawyer'sÐ ¤(ô#' Ðindependent€professional€judgment€on€behalf€of€each.Ð )à$( Ðâ âÒ°€ÒÒ°€ÒÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àMr.€Gray€asserts€that,€because€he€and€Ms.€Gray€have€differing€interests€in€this€divorce€case,€Ð ° Ðâ âMs.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô's€ongoing€representation€of€himself€and€simultaneous€representation€of€Ms.€GrayÐ œì Ðwithout€his€consent€violates€parts€(A)€and€(B)€of€the€above€rule.€€Mr.€Gray€further€asserts€that€Ms.Ð ˆØ ÐÔ_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô's€€representation€of€Ms.€Gray€under€the€circumstances€in€this€case€violates€Tennessee€caseÐ tÄ Ðlaw,€citing€in€support€the€case€of€òòÔ_ÔClinardÔ_Ô€v.€Blackwoodóó,€òòibidóó.€which€provides€that€an€attorney€isÐ `° Ðprohibited€from€simultaneously€representing€two€persons€having€adverse€interests€in€the€same€subjectÐ L œ Ðmatter.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àMr.€Gray's€assertion€of€a€continuing€attorney€client€relationship€between€himself€and€Ms.Ð  ` ÐSheppeard€appears€to€be€based€on€his€averments€that€no€letter€terminating€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô'sÐ ü L  Ðemployment€relationship€with€Mr.€Gray€is€in€evidence,€that€€the€two€wills€prepared€by€Ms.€SheppeardÐ è 8  Ðnamed€each€spouse€as€personal€representative€of€the€other's€estate,€and€that€Ms.€Sheppeard€retainedÐ Ô$  Ðhis€original€will€for€probate€in€the€event€of€either€party's€death.€€Mr.€Gray€maintains€that,€"[u]nderÐ À  Ðsuch€circumstances€[he]€would€certainly€have€contacted€Ms.€Sheppeard€in€the€event€of€his€Wife'sÐ ¬ü  Ðdeath€to€assist€with€the€administration€of€his€Wife's€estate.€€Accordingly,€Ms.€Sheppeard€remainedÐ ˜è  Ðin€an€attorney„client€relationship€with€[him]€at€the€commencement€of€the€proceedings."Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àThe€record€before€us€shows€no€evidence€of€contact€between€Mr.€Gray€and€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_ԀР\¬ Ðfrom€the€time€she€prepared€his€and€Ms.€Gray's€wills€until€the€commencement€of€the€divorceÐ H˜ Ðproceedings€approximately€ten€years€thereafter.€€Mr.€Gray's€testimony€confirms€that€he€and€his€wifeÐ 4„ Ðconsulted€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€for€the€purpose€of€having€their€wills€drafted,€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€draftedÐ  p Ðthe€wills€and€that€they€signed€the€wills€after€reviewing€them.€€The€fact€that€there€is€no€letterÐ  \ Ðterminating€the€employment€relationship€between€Mr.€Gray€and€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€does€not€compel€usÐ øH Ðto€the€conclusion€that€Ô_ÔthatÔ_Ô€relationship€continued€ten€years€later.€€On€the€contrary,€the€recordÐ ä4 Ðindicates€that€the€limited€task€for€which€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppardÔ_Ô€was€employed€by€the€Grays€in€1989€was€theÐ Ð  Ðdrafting€of€their€wills€commensurate€with€their€instructions€and€that€Ô_ÔthatÔ_Ô€task€was€satisfactorilyÐ ¼  Ðcompleted€ten€years€ago.€Mr.€Gray's€testimony€at€trial€does€not€compel€a€conclusion€to€the€contrary.€Ð ¨ø ЀÌÌà  àIt€is€undisputed€that€each€party€was€named€in€the€other's€will€as€the€personal€representativeÐ l¼ Ðof€the€other's€estate.€€However,€we€fail€to€see€how€this€fact€would€warrant€the€conclusion€that€thereÐ X ¨ Ðwas€a€continuing€attorney€client€relationship€between€Mr.€Gray€and€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô'sÐ D!” Ðcontinuing€participation€as€the€Grays'€attorney€would€have€been€absolutely€unnecessary€to€theÐ 0"€  Ðimplementation€of€such€a€provision€in€the€wills.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àFinally,€Mr.€Gray€asserts€in€his€brief€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€retained€his€original€will€for€probateÐ ô$D # Ðin€the€event€of€the€death€of€either€Ms.€Gray€or€himself.€€The€apparent€implication€of€this€assertionÐ à%0!$ Ðis,€of€course,€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€intended€that€she€would€continue€to€represent€the€Grays€in€mattersÐ Ì&"% Ðrelevant€to€the€disposition€of€their€estates.€€€However,€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€denies€that€she€retained€Mr.Ð ¸'#& ÐGray's€original€will€and€our€review€of€the€record€shows€that€his€present€assertion€to€the€contrary€isÐ ¤(ô#' Ðunsubstantiated€by€either€his€own€testimony€or€by€any€other€competent€evidence.€€The€only€allusionÐ )à$( Ðin€the€record€to€the€alleged€retention€of€the€original€will€by€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€lies€in€statements€madeÐ |*Ì%) Ðby€Mr.€Gray's€attorney.Ð h+¸&* Їà  àMr.€Gray€argues€that,€even€if€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô's€representation€of€him€was€not€ongoing€at€theÐ ° Ðtime€the€present€divorce€proceedings€began,€she€should€still€be€disqualified€based€on€her€formerÐ œì Ðrepresentation.€€Mr.€Gray€contends€that,€in€the€context€of€the€former€representation€€regarding€hisÐ ˆØ Ðwill,€he€divulged€information€to€Ô_ÔMs.SheppeardÔ_Ô€as€to€the€nature€and€extent€of€his€property.€€Mr.€GrayÐ tÄ Ðmaintains€that€the€decisive€issue€in€this€divorce€is€the€classification€and€division€of€the€parties'Ð `° Ðproperty€and,€therefore,€the€subject€matter€involved€in€the€former€representation€and€the€subjectÐ L œ Ðmatter€involved€in€the€current€divorce€case€are€identical.€€Mr.€Gray€further€asserts€that€the€Trial€CourtÐ 8 ˆ Ðspecifically€found€that€the€subject€matter€of€the€wills€preparation€and€the€subject€matter€of€the€presentÐ $ t Ðcase€are€substantially€related.€€Mr.€Gray€argues€that€case€law€requires€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€be€removedÐ  ` Ðas€counsel€for€Ms.€Gray.€In€support€Mr.€Gray€cites€òòÔ_ÔClinardÔ_Ôóó,€òòibid,óó€and€òòBuchanan€v.€Mortonóó,€25€Ô_ÔB.R.Ô_ÔÐ ü L  Ð162€(Ô_ÔBankrÔ_Ô.€E.€D.€Tenn.€1982)€for€the€proposition€that€a€lawyer€may€not€represent€interests€adverseÐ è 8  Ðto€those€of€a€former€client€if€the€subject€matter€of€the€new€representation€is€substantially€related€toÐ Ô$  Ðthe€subject€matter€of€the€previous€representation.Ð À  ÐÌà  àIn€addressing€the€question€of€whether€there€is€a€substantial€relationship€between€the€subjectÐ ˜è  Ðmatter€of€the€present€divorce€and€that€of€the€previous€estate€matter€we€are,€first€of€all,€€compelled€toÐ „Ô  Ðdisagree€that€the€Trial€Court€specifically€found€such€a€relationship.€€In€support€of€this€assertion€Mr.Ð pÀ ÐGray€appears€to€rely€upon€a€comment€of€the€Trial€Court€made€in€response€to€the€statements€of€Mr.Ð \¬ ÐGray's€attorney€at€the€hearing€on€February€16,€2001:Ð H˜ ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Òà Ø àMR.€CURTIS:€€Also,€when€you€look€at€the€substantially€related€matters,Ð  p Ðthe€case€there,€in€Re€Buchanan,€gives€us€some€assistance€as€to€whether€or€not€it'sÐ  \ Ðsubstantially€related.€€Here€common€sense€tells€it€is.€€We're€dealing€with€exactlyÐ øH Ðthe€same€subject€matter.€€It's€the€nature,€extent,€and€value€of€the€property.€€It€was„„Ð ä4 Ðthat's€all€that€was€discussed€in€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô's€office,€and€it€was€the€primary€issueÐ Ð  Ðat€the€trial€of€this€divorce„„€Ð ¼  ÐÌà Ø àTHE€COURT:€€I€think€you€can€take€that€as€established.Ð ”ä ÐÒ°€ÒÒ°€ÒÌà  àIt€is€apparent€to€us€that€the€import€of€the€Court's€comment€is,€not€that€it€is€established€thatÐ l¼ Ðthere€is€a€substantial€relationship€between€the€subject€matter€of€the€wills€drafting€and€the€divorce,Ð X ¨ Ðbut€rather€that€it€is€established€that€the€nature,€extent€and€value€of€the€parties'€property€was€theÐ D!” Ðprimary€issue€at€the€trial€of€the€divorce.€€The€Court's€assessment€in€this€regard€is€undisputed€by€theÐ 0"€  Ðrecord€it€being€evident€that€this€case€is€largely€concerned€with€the€division€of€marital€property.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àWe€do€not€find€a€substantial€relationship€between€the€subject€matter€of€the€current€divorceÐ ô$D # Ðcase€and€the€preparation€of€his€will€ten€years€ago.€€If€'subject€matter'€in€this€case€is€held€to€mean€'theÐ à%0!$ Ðnature€of€the€proceeding€involved'€then€there€is€not€a€substantial€relationship€because€the€presentÐ Ì&"% Ðmatter€is€a€divorce€matter€and€the€previous€matter€was€solely€an€estate€matter€and,€according€to€Mr.Ð ¸'#& ÐGray's€own€testimony,€occurred€at€a€time€when€divorce€was€not€contemplated.€€Mr.€Gray's€argumentÐ ¤(ô#' Ðappears€to€be€that€the€parties'€property€is€the€subject€matter€involved€in€both€the€drafting€of€the€willsÐ )à$( Ðand€the€divorce.€€Obviously,€by€€a€loose,€non„specific€definition€of€€'property'€the€parties€property€wasÐ |*Ì%) Ðinvolved€in€€the€estate€matter€and€the€parties'€property€is€involved€in€the€divorce€matter.€€However,Ð h+¸&* Ðwe€do€not€believe€such€a€general€definition€of€property€is€sufficient€in€making€a€conflict€of€interestÐ ° Ðdetermination.€€We€believe€that€'property'€must€be€viewed€to€mean€those€specific,€identifiable€thingsÐ œì Ðowned€by€the€Grays€at€the€time€their€wills€were€drafted€and€at€the€time€of€their€divorce.€€Upon€ourÐ ˆØ Ðreview€of€the€record€we€do€not€find€evidence€showing€that€the€items€of€property€owned€by€the€GraysÐ tÄ Ðwhen€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€drafted€their€wills€are€substantially€related€to€the€items€of€property€which€areÐ `° Ðthe€focus€of€this€divorce.€€In€fact,€there€is€proof€that€much€of€the€parties'€property,€such€as€their€€Ð L œ Ðresidence,€was€acquired€years€after€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€drafted€the€Grays'€wills.€€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àIn€any€event,€it€is€our€determination€that€the€basic€reason€for€prohibiting€an€attorney€fromÐ  ` Ðrepresenting€interests€adverse€to€those€of€a€former€client€where€there€òòisóó€a€substantial€relationship€inÐ ü L  Ðsubject€matter€is€that€the€attorney€will€use€confidences€or€secrets€divulged€to€him€by€the€former€clientÐ è 8  Ðto€that€client's€disadvantage.€€That€this€is€so€is€evident€from€€the€case€of€òòMills€v.€Craneóó,€an€unreportedÐ Ô$  Ðopinion€of€this€Court€filed€in€Knoxville€on€April€10,€1987.Ð À  ÐÌà  àIn€òòMillsóó€the€plaintiffs€argued€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€not€disqualifying€counsel€for€theÐ ˜è  Ðdefendants€because€of€his€prior€representation€of€the€plaintiffs.€€In€affirming€the€ruling€of€the€trialÐ „Ô  Ðcourt€this€Court€was€guided€by€Tennessee€case€law€as€well€as€by€case€law€from€other€states.€TheÐ pÀ Ðfollowing€language€cited€from€òòNational€Texture€Corp.€v.€Ô_ÔHymesÔ_Ôóó,€282€N.W.2d€890,€894€(1979)€makesÐ \¬ Ðit€clearòò€óóthat€the€essential€problem€to€be€addressed€in€matters€such€as€the€one€now€before€us€is€whetherÐ H˜ Ðcurrent€representation€of€interests€adverse€to€a€former€client€will€result€in€the€disclosure€ofÐ 4„ Ðconfidences€and€secrets€previously€disclosed€to€the€attorney€by€that€client:€€Ð  p ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Ò€An€attorney€should€not€use€information€he€received€in€the€course€of€representingÐ øH Ða€client€to€the€disadvantage€of€that€client.€€In€this€regard,€the€attorney€shouldÐ ä4 Ðexercise€care€to€prevent€disclosure€of€confidences€and€secrets€of€one€client€toÐ Ð  Ðanother€and€decline€employment€that€would€require€such€disclosure.€ABA€CodeÐ ¼  Ðof€Professional€Responsibility€Ô_ÔECÔ_Ô€4„5.€€See€also,€id.€DR€4„101.€€This€obligationÐ ¨ø Ðto€preserve€the€secrets€and€confidences€imparted€by€a€client€continues€even€afterÐ ”ä Ðthe€termination€of€employment.€€ABA€Code€of€Professional€Responsibility€€Ô_ÔECÔ_ÔÐ €Ð Ð4„6.€An€attorney€should€similarly€refrain€from€representing€a€party€in€an€actionÐ l¼ Ðagainst€the€former€client€where€[Ô_Ôt]hereÔ_Ô€is€an€appearance€of€a€conflict€of€interest€orÐ X ¨ Ða€possible€violation€of€confidence,€even€if€such€may€not€be€true€in€fact.€€2Ð D!” ÐAmerican€Bar€Association€Committee€on€Ethics€and€Professional€Responsibility,Ð 0"€  ÐInformal€Ethics€Opinions€23€(1975).€€The€purpose€for€disqualification€in€suchÐ #l! Ðsituations€is€to€ensure€the€attorney's€absolute€fidelity€and€to€guard€againstÐ $X" Ðinadvertent€use€of€confidential€information.€€òòÔ_ÔCeramcoÔ_Ô,€Inc.€v.€LeeÐ ô$D # ÐPharmaceuticalsóó,€510€F.2d€268,€271€(2€Cir.€1975).€Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà Ø àThe€test€generally€applied€to€determine€the€existence€of€a€conflict€ofÐ ¸'#& Ðinterest€is€whether€there€is€a€substantial€relationship€between€the€subject€matterÐ ¤(ô#' Ðof€a€pending€action€and€those€matters€in€which€the€attorney€is€alleged€to€haveÐ )à$( Ðpreviously€represented€the€client.€òòÔ_ÔReddÔ_Ô€v.€Shell€Oil€Co.,€óó518€F.2d€311€(10€Cir.Ð |*Ì%) Ð1975);€òòÔ_ÔT.C.Ô_Ô€Ô_ÔTheatreÔ_Ô€Corp.€v.€Warner€Bros.€Picturesóó,€113€Ô_ÔF.SuppÔ_Ô.€265€(Ô_ÔS.D.N.Y.Ô_ÔÐ h+¸&* Ð1953).€€Ô_ÔOn[c]eÔ_Ô€the€substantial€relationship€test€is€met,€it€will€be€assumed€thatÐ ° Ðconfidences€bearing€on€the€subject€matter€of€the€current€representation€wereÐ œì Ðdisclosed.€€€òòRichardson€v.€Hamilton€International€Corp.€óó,€469€F.2d€1382,€1385€(3Ð ˆØ ÐCir.€1972),€certiorari€denied,€411€U.S.€986,€Ô_ÔS.CtÔ_Ô.€2271,€36€Ô_ÔL.EdÔ_Ô.2d€964€(1973);Ð tÄ ÐòòÔ_ÔT.C.Ô_Ô€Ô_ÔTheatreÔ_Ô€[Ô_ÔC]orpÔ_Ô.€v.€Warner€Bros.€Picturesóó,€113€Ô_ÔF.SuppÔ_Ô.€265,€268€(Ô_ÔS.D.N.Y.Ô_ÔÐ `° Ð1953).€€Ð L œ ÐÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àÌà  àEven€had€Mr.€Gray€€shown€€a€substantial€relationship€between€the€subject€matter€of€the€twoÐ $ t Ðrepresentations€in€the€case€before€us€giving€rise€to€the€assumption€of€a€disclosure€of€confidence€Ð  ` Ðnoted€in€the€above€language€cited€from€the€òòNational€Texture€Corp.€óócase€we€find€that€such€anÐ ü L  Ðassumption€cannot€survive€given€the€following€testimony€elicited€from€Mr.€Gray€by€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_ÔÐ è 8  Ðat€trial:Ð Ô$  ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Òà Ø àQ.€€Did€you€and€your€wife€come€to€meet€with€me€sometime€in€1989€aboutÐ ¬ü  Ðhaving€wills€drafted?Ð ˜è  Ðà Ø àA.€Sometime€around€that€period,€yes.Ð „Ô  Ðà Ø àQ.€€Anything€you€disclosed€to€me€about€your€financial€situation€was€in€theÐ pÀ Ðpresence€of€your€wife?Ð \¬ Ðà Ø àA.€Yes.Ð H˜ Ðà Ø àQ.€Did€you€ever€call€me€and€say€I've€got€some€secret€things,€don't€tell€myÐ 4„ Ðwife€this,€but€you€need€to€know€them€to€prepare€the€wills?Ð  p Ðà Ø àA.€NoÐ  \ Ðà Ø à...Ð øH Ðà Ø àQ.€Tell€the€Court€what€we€talked€about€in€that€first€meeting.Ð ä4 Ðà Ø àA.€How€I€wanted€my€property€taken€care€of€in€the€case€of€my€death.Ð Ð  Ðà Ø àQ.€All€right.€€And€Mrs.€Gray€was€present?Ð ¼  Ðà Ø àA.€Yes.Ð ¨ø Ðà Ø àQ.€And€she€also€talked€about€how€she€wanted€her€property€taken€care€of,Ð ”ä Ðdidn't€she?Ð €Ð Ðà Ø àA.€Yes.Ð l¼ Ðà Ø àQ.€And€then€sometimes€later€I€drafted€a€will.€€Probably,€did€I€send€copiesÐ X ¨ Ðto€you€and€Mrs.€Gray€before€you€came€back€in?Ð D!” Ðà Ø àA.€Yes.Ð 0"€  Ðà Ø àQ.€Did€you€read€those€copies?Ð #l! Ðà Ø àA.€Yes.Ð $X" Ðà Ø àQ.€Did€they€say€what€you€wanted€them€to€say?Ð ô$D # Ðà Ø àA.€To€the€best€of€my€knowledge.€€There€was€only€a€minor€change€or€two.Ð à%0!$ Ðà Ø àQ.€Did€you€and€Mrs.€Gray€come€back€into€my€office?Ð Ì&"% Ðà Ø àA.€Yes.Ð ¸'#& Ðà Ø àQ.€Did€you€sign€those€wills?Ð ¤(ô#' Ðà Ø àA.€Yes.Ð )à$( Ðâ âà Ø à...Ð |*Ì%) Ðà Ø àQ.€Were€there€any€secrets?€€I'm€not€asking€you€what€they€were.€€Were€thereÐ ° Ðâ âany€deep€dark€secrets€that€you€told€me€when€you€came€in€to€have€that€will€done?Ð œì Ðà Ø àA.€Well,€the€way€I€structured€it,€the€way€I€wanted€it€structured€coveredÐ ˆØ Ðwhat€I€wanted€done.€€I€may€not€have€told€you€the€total€thing€I€wanted€conveyed,Ð tÄ Ðbut€I€gave€you€enough€information€to€get€it€done.Ð `° Ðà Ø àQ.€You€didn't€tell€me€about€any€hidden€offshore€accounts,€did€you?Ð L œ Ðà Ø àA.€€No.€I€don't€have€any.Ð 8 ˆ Ðà Ø àQ.€€All€right.€€You€didn't€tell€me€you€had€any€mistresses,€did€you?Ð $ t Ðà Ø àA.€€I€didn't€have€any.€€Ð  ` Ðà Ø àQ.€€Okay.€You€didn't€have€any€deep€dark€secrets€to€tell€me,€or€that€you€didÐ ü L  Ðtell€me,€and€everything€you€said€to€me€you€said€in€the€presence€of€Nancy€Gray;Ð è 8  Ðcorrect?Ð Ô$  Ðà Ø àA.€Yes.Ð À  Ðà Ø àQ.€You€haven't€had€any€conversations€with€me€since€those€wills€wereÐ ¬ü  Ðexecuted€until€this€lawsuit€started;€isn't€that€correct?Ð ˜è  Ðà Ø àA.€That's€correct.Ð „Ô  Ðà Ø àQ.€You€haven't€conveyed€any€secrets€to€me€in€any€fashion€during€thoseÐ pÀ Ðintervening€years,€have€you?Ð \¬ Ðà Ø àA.€€No.Ð H˜ ÐÒ°€ÒÒ°€ÒÌà  àIt€is€apparent€from€Mr.€Gray's€testimony€that€he€provided€no€information€to€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_ÔÐ  p Ðregarding€the€preparation€of€the€wills€outside€of€the€presence€of€Ms.€Gray.€€Thus,€whateverÐ  \ Ðinformation€he€may€have€disclosed€to€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€in€relation€to€that€matter€cannot€be€deemedÐ øH Ðconfidential€in€any€relevant€or€meaningful€sense.€€Based€upon€this€finding€and€our€review€of€theÐ ä4 Ðentire€record€in€this€case€we€are€compelled€to€conclude€that€the€Trial€Court€did€not€abuse€itsÐ Ð  Ðdiscretion€in€€ruling€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔSheppeardÔ_Ô€should€not€be€disqualified€as€counsel€for€Ms.€Gray€by€reasonÐ ¼  Ðof€her€former€representation€of€Mr.€Gray.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àThe€next€issue€addressed€is€whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€dividing€the€marital€propertyÐ €Ð Ðequally€between€the€parties.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àT.C.A.€36„4„121(c)€provides€that€the€court€shall€consider€the€following€factors€in€making€anÐ D!” Ðequitable€distribution€of€marital€property:Ð 0"€  ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Ò(1)€€The€duration€of€the€marriage;Ð $X" Ð(2)€€The€age,€physical€and€mental€health,€vocational€skills,€employability,€earningÐ ô$D # Ðcapacity,€estate,€financial€liabilities€and€financial€needs€of€each€of€the€parties;Ð à%0!$ Ð(3)€€The€tangible€or€intangible€contribution€by€one€(1)€party€to€the€education,Ð Ì&"% Ðtraining€or€increased€earning€power€of€the€other€party;Ð ¸'#& Ð(4)€€The€relative€ability€of€each€party€for€future€acquisitions€of€capital€assets€andÐ ¤(ô#' Ðincome;Ð )à$( Ð(5)€€€The€contribution€of€each€party€to€the€acquisition,€preservation,€appreciation,Ð |*Ì%) Ðdepreciation€or€dissipation€of€the€marital€or€separate€property,€including€theÐ h+¸&* Ðcontribution€of€a€party€to€the€marriage€as€homemaker,€wage€earner€or€parent,€withÐ ° Ðthe€contribution€of€a€party€as€homemaker€or€wage€earner€to€be€given€the€sameÐ œì Ðweight€if€each€party€has€fulfilled€its€role.Ð ˆØ Ð(6)€€The€value€of€the€separate€property€of€each€party;Ð tÄ Ð(7)€€The€estate€of€each€party€at€the€time€of€the€marriage;Ð `° Ð(8)€€The€economic€circumstances€of€each€party€at€the€time€the€division€of€propertyÐ L œ Ðis€to€become€effective.Ð 8 ˆ Ð(9)€€The€tax€consequences€to€each€party,€costs€associated€with€the€reasonablyÐ $ t Ðforeseeable€sale€of€the€asset,€and€other€reasonably€foreseeable€expenses€associatedÐ  ` Ðwith€the€asset;Ð ü L  Ð(10)€€The€amount€of€social€security€benefits€available€to€each€spouse;€and€Ð è 8  Ð(11)€€Such€other€factors€as€are€necessary€to€consider€the€equities€between€theÐ Ô$  Ðparties.Ð À  ÐÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àA€trial€court€is€allowed€wide€latitude€in€determining€an€equitable€division€of€marital€propertyÐ ˜è  Ðand€we€will€defer€to€the€trial€court's€determination€unless€its€decision€is€inconsistent€with€thoseÐ „Ô  Ðfactors€set€forth€at€T.C.A.€36„4„121(c)€or€the€preponderance€of€evidence€is€contrary.€€òòÔ_ÔBarnhillÔ_Ô€v.Ð pÀ ÐÔ_ÔBarnhillÔ_Ôóó,€826€S.W.2d€443€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àMr.€Gray€asserts€that€proper€consideration€of€several€of€the€factors€set€forth€under€T.C.A.€36„Ð 4„ Ð4„121(c)€prohibits€an€equal€division€of€the€marital€property€in€this€case€and€entitles€him€to€receiveÐ  p Ða€larger€portion€of€the€marital€estate€than€Ms.€Gray.€Ð  \ ÐÌà  à€First,€Mr.€Gray€argues€that,€with€respect€to€T.C.A.€36„4„121(c)(2),€he€is€financiallyÐ ä4 Ðdisadvantaged€in€that€his€age,€physical€and€mental€health,€vocational€skills,€and€employabilityÐ Ð  Ðprevent€him€from€working€whereas€Ms.€Gray€is€gainfully€employed€and€her€ability€to€earn€an€incomeÐ ¼  Ðis€not€impaired€by€disability.€€Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àThe€record€shows€that€at€the€time€of€trial€Mr.€Gray€was€fifty€eight€years€of€age€while€Ms.Ð €Ð ÐGray€was€fifty€four€and€that€the€age€discrepancy€between€the€parties€was€approximately€€three€yearsÐ l¼ Ðand€four€months.€€We€do€not€€find€this€discrepancy€to€be€significant€enough€to€warrant€a€finding€thatÐ X ¨ ÐMr.€Gray€was€relatively€disadvantaged€as€a€consequence€of€his€age.€€Ð D!” ÐÌà  àAlthough€Mr.€Gray€asserts€that€he€doesn't€think€he€can€hold€down€a€job€because€he€hasÐ #l! Ðtrouble€sleeping€and€can't€get€adequate€rest,€he€presents€no€medical€evidence€that€this€or€any€otherÐ $X" Ðphysical€problem€is€sufficiently€debilitating€to€justify€his€receipt€of€a€larger€portion€of€the€maritalÐ ô$D # Ðestate.€€Although€it€is€undisputed€that€Mr.€Gray€has€suffered€from€some€degree€of€depression€thereÐ à%0!$ Ðis€no€expert€evidence€in€the€record€as€to€the€severity€of€his€condition€or€as€to€whether€it€might€beÐ Ì&"% Ðcontrolled€or€eliminated€through€€therapy€and/or€medication.€€The€record€does€show€that,€althoughÐ ¸'#& ÐMr.€Gray€was€in€counseling€for€a€period€of€six€months€after€he€filed€his€complaint€for€divorce,€heÐ ¤(ô#' Ðchose€to€discontinue€such€counseling€and€there€is€no€indication€that€he€has€otherwise€sought€help€forÐ )à$( Ðâ âthis€problem.€€Although€we€are€sympathetic€to€Mr.€Gray,€at€the€same€time€we€believe€that€he€bearsÐ |*Ì%) Ðsome€responsibility€to€avail€himself€of€treatment€resources€which€could€alleviate€his€depression.€Ð ° ÐOther€than€the€six€months€of€treatment€noted,€there€is€no€proof€that€he€has€done€so.Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àFurthermore,€there€is€nothing€in€the€record€that€convinces€us€that€a€relative€disparity€betweenÐ tÄ Ðthe€parties€as€to€vocational€skills€and€employability€warrants€that€Mr.€Gray€€receive€a€larger€portionÐ `° Ðof€the€marital€estate€than€Ms.€Gray.€€Ms.€Gray's€highest€level€of€education€is€high€school.€€She€hasÐ L œ Ðjob€experience€as€a€cashier,€payroll€clerk,€and€phlebotomist.€While€working€as€a€phlebotomist€sheÐ 8 ˆ Ðreceived€on€the€job€training€as€a€histologist€and€she€is€€currently€employed€in€that€capacity€with€theÐ $ t ÐKnoxville€Ô_ÔDermatopathologyÔ_Ô€Laboratory€and€where€she€earns€$15.50€per€hour.€After€graduatingÐ  ` Ðfrom€high€school,€Mr.€Gray€received€a€year€of€training€in€drafting€and€was€subsequently€employedÐ ü L  Ðas€a€draftsman€at€Ô_ÔT.V.A.Ô_Ô€from€1966€until€his€retirement€in€1994.€€While€employed€at€Ô_ÔT.V.A.Ô_Ô€Mr.Ð è 8  ÐGray€obtained€a€two€year€associate€of€science€degree€in€mechanical€engineering€technology€and€forÐ Ô$  Ða€period€of€time€shortly€after€his€retirement€he€was€licensed€as€an€affiliate€real€estate€broker.€€Mr.Ð À  ÐGray€is€currently€unemployed€and€indicates€that€his€training€in€drafting€is€obsolete€because€draftingÐ ¬ü  Ðis€now€computer€aided€and€he€is€a€manual€drafter.€€However,€we€agree€with€the€Trial€Court'sÐ ˜è  Ðobservation€that€Mr.€Gray€has€a€computer€and,€if€he€wishes€to€remain€a€draftsman,€he€can€learn.€€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àMr.€Gray€also€argues€that€T.C.A.€36„4„121(c)(4)€supports€his€receiving€a€greater€share€of€theÐ \¬ Ðmarital€estate€because€Ms.€Gray€has€a€relatively€greater€ability€to€acquire€capital€assets€and€income.€Ð H˜ ÐIn€support€of€this€argument€Mr.€Gray€cites€page€64€of€the€trial€record;€however,€our€review€of€thisÐ 4„ Ðportion€of€the€record€shows€that€it€presents€evidence€of€the€circumstances€of€Ms.€Gray's€employmentÐ  p Ðas€a€histologist€including€the€fact€that€she€earns€$15.50€per€hour.€€We€do€not€find€this€€to€be€sufficientÐ  \ Ðevidence€to€support€Mr.€Gray's€argument€for€disparate€treatment€nor€do€find€evidence€elsewhere€inÐ øH Ðthe€record€preponderating€in€favor€of€his€argument€in€this€regard.Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àMr.€Gray€next€contends€that€under€T.C.A.€36„4„121(c)(5)€he€should€receive€a€larger€share€ofÐ ¼  Ðthe€marital€estate€asserting€that€he€acquired€almost€all€of€the€marital€property€with€minimalÐ ¨ø Ðcontribution€from€Ms.€Gray.€€We€disagree.€€The€record€shows€that€Ms.€Gray€took€on€the€role€ofÐ ”ä Ðhomemaker€in€this€marriage€and,€commensurate€with€that€role,€she€assumed€responsibilities€in€theÐ €Ð Ðmarriage€which€allowed€her€husband€to€concentrate€his€time€and€energy€upon€his€employmentÐ l¼ Ðoutside€the€home.€€Ms.€Gray€testifies€that€she€stayed€at€home€and€took€care€of€the€parties'€son׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€fromÐ X ¨ Ðthe€time€of€his€birth€until€he€began€kindergarten€and€that,€throughout€the€thirty€three€year€marriage€Ð D!” Ðshe€€cooked€and€did€laundry€and€cleaning€for€the€family€without€assistance€from€Mr.€Gray.€€Ms.€GrayÐ 0"€  Ðalso€testifies€that€during€the€marriage€she€made€clothes€for€herself€and€her€son,€did€yard€work€andÐ #l! Ðcanned€food€from€the€family's€garden.€€Ms.€Gray€further€testifies€that€she€performed€variousÐ $X" Ðnecessary€tasks€with€respect€to€rental€properties€owned€by€the€parties€such€as€cleaning,€answeringÐ ô$D # Ðthe€phone€and€showing€the€properties€and€that€she€also€assisted€in€the€properties'€painting€andÐ à%0!$ Ðupkeep.€€€Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àMr.€Gray€asserts€that,€although€Ms.€Gray€worked€during€the€marriage€she€did€not€contributeÐ ¤(ô#' Ðfinancially€to€the€marriage€and€that€she€spent€her€income€on€"incidentals"and€thereby€dissipatedÐ )à$( Ðmarital€assets.€€Mr.€Gray€does€not€refer€us€to€any€specific€evidence€in€the€record€to€support€thisÐ ° Ðassertion;€however,€we€do€note€evidence€to€the€contrary€in€the€following€testimony€from€Ms.€GrayÐ œì Ðwhen€asked€about€how€she€disposed€of€the€income€from€her€job:Ð ˆØ ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°Òà Ø àQ.€€What€did€you€do€with€the€money€that€you€earned€?Ð `° Ðà Ø àA.€€I€bought€groceries.€€I€paid€for€anything€that€I€needed,€anything€that€myÐ L œ Ðchild€or€our€child€needed.Ð 8 ˆ Ðà Ø àQ.€€Clothing?à ˆ àÐ $ t Ðà Ø àA.€€Clothing.Ð  ` Ðà Ø àQ.€€School€supplies?Ð ü L  Ðà Ø àA.€€School€supplies.Ð è 8  Ðà Ø àQ.€€Hair€cuts?Ð Ô$  Ðà Ø àA.€€Yes.€€When€we€ate€out,€I€always€paid€for€that,€you€know.€€When€RoyÐ À  Ðwas€home€on€the€weekends€or€any€time,€usually€if€we€took€„„€his€brother„in„lawÐ ¬ü  Ðwas€good€to€help€me€do€anything€that€I€couldn't€do€anything€when€he€was€out€ofÐ ˜è  Ðtown.€€We€would€take€them€out.€€I€would€give€Roy€the€money€before€we€got€to€theÐ „Ô  Ðdestination.€€Any€leisure€things€that€we€did,€I€paid€for€those.€€A€lot€of€times€I€paidÐ pÀ Ðfor€vacations,€maybe€not€all€of€it,€but€maybe€the€majority€of€it,€that€sort€of€thing.€Ð \¬ Ѐ€à Ø à€Ð H˜ ÐÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àNext€Mr.€Gray€refers€us€to€T.C.A.€36„4„121(c)(8)€and€argues€that€the€Court€failed€to€properlyÐ 4„ Ðconsider€the€economic€circumstances€of€the€parties€at€the€time€the€division€of€the€marital€propertyÐ  p Ðwas€to€become€effective.€€Had€the€Court€done€so,€Mr.€Gray€contends€that€he€would€have€beenÐ  \ Ðawarded€a€greater€portion€of€the€marital€estate,€his€economic€circumstances€being€worse€than€thoseÐ øH Ðof€Ms.€Gray.€€In€support€of€this€contention€Mr.€Gray€asserts€that€Ms.€Gray€is€gainfully€employedÐ ä4 Ðwhile€his€sole€source€of€income€consists€of€his€monthly€pension.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àWe€disagree€that€the€Mr.€Gray's€economic€circumstances€warrant€that€he€be€rewarded€a€largerÐ ¨ø Ðshare€of€the€marital€estate.€€As€Ms.€Gray€has€pointed€out€in€her€brief,€the€record€confirms€that,€inÐ ”ä Ðaddition€to€his€monthly€pension€of€$2,607.63,€Mr.€Gray€realizes€income€in€the€gross€amount€ofÐ €Ð Ð$1,300.00€from€three€separate€rental€properties€which€were€retained€by€him€after€the€divorce.€€TheÐ l¼ Ðtotal€of€these€two€figures,€$3,€907.63,€exceeds€Ms.€Gray's€monthly€gross€income€which€is€calculatedÐ X ¨ Ðto€be€$2,686.67€based€upon€her€working€forty€hours€a€week€at€her€current€earnings€of€$15.50€perÐ D!” Ðhour.€€Mr.€Gray's€argument€is€without€merit.Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  à€Next,€Mr.€Gray€contends€that€T.C.A.€36„4„121(c)(9)€supports€his€receiving€a€larger€portionÐ $X" Ðof€the€marital€estate€because€much€of€the€property€awarded€him€in€the€divorce€consists€of€real€estate.Ð ô$D # ÐMr.€Gray€argues€that€the€sale€of€this€real€property€will€involve€the€payment€of€capital€gains€taxes€andÐ à%0!$ Ðthat€he,€therefore,€bears€a€greater€tax€burden€than€does€Ms.€Gray.€€We€do€not€agree€that€the€recordÐ Ì&"% Ðsupports€a€greater€award€to€Mr.€Gray€on€this€basis.€There€is€no€proof€in€the€record€that€a€sale€of€theÐ ¸'#& Ðreal€property€awarded€to€Mr.€Gray€is€anticipated€nor€has€Mr.€Gray€offered€proof€as€to€the€taxÐ ¤(ô#' Ðconsequences€he€asserts.€€A€t€the€hearing€on€Mr.€Gray's€motion€for€new€trial€the€Trial€Court€statedÐ )à$( Ðâ âas€follows:Ð |*Ì%) ÐÒ€°ÒÒ€°Òà Ø àThe€adverse€tax€consequences€fall€substantially€on€both€sides.€€There€areÐ ° Ðâ âadverse€tax€consequences€on€each€side.€€We€don't€see€anything€there€to€disrupt€theÐ œì Ðequities€here.€€It€is€hard€to€weigh€one€kind€of€asset€against€another,€particularly€asÐ ˆØ Ðwe€look€at€prospective€growth€of€that€asset.Ð tÄ ÐÒ°€ÒÒ°€ÒÌà  àWe€do€not€disagree€with€the€Trial€Court's€statement€regarding€tax€consequences€in€this€case€Ð L œ Ðand€we€find€that€Mr.€Gray's€argument€is€without€merit.Ð 8 ˆ ЀÌà  àFinally,€with€respect€to€the€division€of€marital€property,€Mr.€Gray€refers€us€to€T.C.A.€36„4„Ð  ` Ð121(c)(10)€which€requires€that€in€dividing€the€marital€estate€the€Trial€Court€€consider€the€amount€ofÐ ü L  Ðsocial€security€benefits€available€to€each€spouse.€€Mr.€Gray€asserts€that€there€is€no€indication€that€the€Ð è 8  ÐCourt€valued€the€social€security€benefits€available€to€Ms.€Gray€and€that,€while€Mr.€Gray's€pensionÐ Ô$  Ðwas€assigned€a€present€day€value€and€credited€towards€his€portion€of€the€marital€estate,€Ms.€Gray'sÐ À  Ðsocial€security€earnings€were€not.€€Mr.€Gray€further€contends€that,€although€the€record€indicates€thatÐ ¬ü  Ða€€percentage€of€his€pension€was€his€separate€property,€when€the€Trial€Court€assigned€a€present€valueÐ ˜è  Ðto€the€pension€it€did€not€reduce€the€value€by€the€appropriate€percentage.€€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àWe€find€no€proof€in€the€record€that€Ms.€Gray€is€entitled€to€receive€social€security€benefits€atÐ \¬ Ðthe€present€time.€€Anticipated€€social€security€benefits€are€not€part€of€the€marital€estate€because€theyÐ H˜ Ðare€not€vested€as€required€by€T.C.A.€36„4„121(b)(1)(B).€€òòÔ_ÔReymannÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔReymannÔ_Ôóó,€919€S.W.2d€615Ð 4„ Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€Accordingly,€the€Trial€Court€did€not€err€in€failing€to€consider€Ms.€Gray'sÐ  p Ðsocial€security€benefits€as€part€of€the€marital€estate.Ð  \ ÐÌà  à€As€noted,€Mr.€Gray€also€contends€that,€although€a€percentage€of€his€pension€was€his€separateÐ ä4 Ðproperty,€the€Trial€Court€failed€to€take€this€into€account€when€it€assigned€a€present€value€to€theÐ Ð  Ðpension.€In€support€of€his€contention€that€a€portion€of€the€pension€was€his€separate€property€€Mr.Ð ¼  ÐGray€refers€us€to€his€testimony€at€€page€260€of€the€trial€record€which€includes€the€following:Ð ¨ø ÐÌÒ€°ÒÒ€°ÒQ.€€When€you€were€retired,€were€you€given€any€time€credit€with€TVA€for€yourÐ €Ð Ðmilitary€service?Ð l¼ ÐA.€€Yes,€I€was.€€It's€included€in€my€pension.Ð X ¨ ÐQ.€€And€were€you€married€before€or€after€you€got€out€of€the€service?Ð D!” ÐA.€€After.€€I€didn't€even€meet€her€until€after€I€was€out€of€the€service.Ð 0"€  ÐÌÒ°€ÒÒ°€Òà  àWe€do€not€find€that€the€issue€of€whether€the€Trial€Court€properly€considered€Mr.€Gray'sÐ $X" Ðseparate€ownership€of€part€of€his€pension€is€relevant€to€T.C.A.€36„4„121(c)(9)€although€raised€onÐ ô$D # Ðappeal€in€that€context.€€It€is€our€determination€that€this€issue€was,€in€fact,€never€raised€in€the€TrialÐ à%0!$ ÐCourt€and€it€cannot€be€raised€for€the€first€time€on€appeal.€€òòKnoxville's€Community€Development€v.Ð Ì&"% ÐWrightóó,€600€S.W.2d€745€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1980).€òò€óóAccordingly,€we€decline€to€review€this€issue.Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àThe€next€issue€we€address€is€whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€granting€both€parties€a€divorceÐ )à$( Ðrather€than€granting€a€divorce€to€Mr.€Gray€alone.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àThe€Trial€Court's€final€judgment€of€divorce€in€this€case€recites€that€"[a]€divorce€is€herebyÐ ° Ðgranted€to€the€parties€on€the€grounds€of€the€inappropriate€marital€conduct€of€each."€€Mr.€GrayÐ œì Ðcontends€that€the€record€shows€that€Ms.€Gray€engaged€in€inappropriate€marital€conduct€by€meetingÐ ˆØ Ðwith€other€men€in€Internet€chat€rooms€and€that€she€subsequently€met€with€these€men€in€person€andÐ tÄ Ðeven€spent€the€night€with€one€of€them€before€Mr.€Gray€filed€his€divorce€complaint.€€Mr.€GrayÐ `° Ðmaintains€that,€according€to€Ms.€Gray's€testimony,€€the€only€act€of€inappropriate€conduct€which€heÐ L œ Ðcommitted€during€the€marriage€occurred€years€before€the€divorce€was€filed.€€Mr.€Gray€argues€that,Ð 8 ˆ Ðeven€if€he€is€found€to€have€been€partially€at€fault€in€the€dissolution€of€the€marriage,€€Ms.€Gray€is€moreÐ $ t Ðat€fault€and,€therefore,€he€alone€should€have€been€granted€the€divorce.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àOur€review€of€the€record€reveals€inappropriate€conduct€on€the€part€of€each€of€these€partiesÐ è 8  Ðduring€the€time€they€were€married.€€Ms.€Gray's€attorney€conceded€in€closing€argument€that€Ms.Ð Ô$  ÐGray's€online€conversations€with€another€man€were€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€However,€we€alsoÐ À  Ðnote€evidence€presented€by€the€testimony€of€Ms.€Gray€with€respect€to€instances€of€inappropriateÐ ¬ü  Ðconduct€by€Mr.€Gray.€€As€stated,€Mr.€Gray€asserts€that€Ms.€Gray€testified€that€he€committed€only€oneÐ ˜è  Ðact€of€inappropriate€conduct,€apparently€referring€to€the€occasion€of€his€€having€contracted€a€venerealÐ „Ô  Ðdisease€as€a€result€of€his€encounter€with€another€woman.€€Although€this€particular€incident€took€placeÐ pÀ Ðseveral€years€prior€to€the€initial€filing€of€a€divorce€complaint€in€this€case,€we€find€that€the€testimonyÐ \¬ Ðof€Ms.€Gray€provides€evidence€of€additional€and€more€recent€inappropriate€conduct€by€Mr.€Gray€asÐ H˜ Ðfollows:Ð 4„ ÐÌÒ€°ÒQ.€€After€he€filed€for€divorce,€did€you€all€have€any€discussions€about€divorce?Ð  \ ÐA.€€Well,€he€filed€for€divorce€before€I€even€realized€that€he€had€done€that.€€We€sat€down€andÐ øH Ðwe€tried€to€discuss€it.€€He€had€a€gun€that€he€put€on€his€„„€I€just€observed€a€gun€laying€on€hisÐ ä4 Ðlap€while€we€were€talking.€€I€was€on€one€side€of€the€den€and€he€was€on€the€other€sofa.€€IÐ Ð  Ðasked€him,€is€that€a€gun€that€you€have.€€He€said,€yes,€it€is.€€And€I€tried€to€stay€as€calm€as€IÐ ¼  Ðcould,€but€I€was€very€frightened.€€He€told€me€that€I€would€never€get€any€assets€that€he€had,Ð ¨ø Ðthat€he€had€worked,€he€had€earned€the€money€and€that€therefore€I€could€leave€with€myÐ ”ä Ðclothes€if€I€wanted€to.Ð €Ð ÐQ.€€What€happened€after€that?Ð l¼ ÐA.€€As€I€said,€I€tried€to€stay€as€calm€as€I€could.€€I€was€very€upset.€€I€didn't€stay€downstairsÐ X ¨ Ðvery€long.€€I€went€upstairs.€He€stayed€downstairs.€€But€when€we€had€our€discussion,€I€toldÐ D!” Ðhim,€I€said,€surely€you€wouldn't€do€anything€crazy€like€that€because€of€our€son€and€both€ofÐ 0"€  Ðour€mothers€are€still€alive.€€He€told€me,€well,€if€I€tried€to€take€anything€that€he€had€that€heÐ #l! Ðdidn't€have€any€reason€for€living.€€And€if€he€didn't€live,€I€wasn't€going€to€live€either.€€€€€€Ð $X" Є„„ÌProbably€a€week€after€that€confrontation,€one€Sunday€afternoon€he€came€in€and€sat€downÐ à%0!$ Ðand€we€tried€to€talk.€€I€didn't€see€a€gun€that€he€had€then.€€I€don't€know€if€he€had€a€gun€or€not.€Ð Ì&"% ÐHe€told€me€that€he€just€wished€instead€of€contacting€an€attorney,€that€he€had€just€blown€myÐ ¸'#& Ðhead€off€and€blown€a€friend's€head€off.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌâ âÒ°€Òà  àMs.€Gray€further€testified€that€when€she€informed€Mr.€Gray€of€her€intent€to€obtain€an€order€Ð |*Ì%) Ðof€protection€he€told€her€that€it€wouldn't€do€her€any€good€and€that€if€he€wanted€to€do€away€with€herÐ ° Ðâ âhe€would€anyway.Ð œì ÐÌà  àTennessee€case€law€supports€a€finding€of€cruelty€(and,€therefore,€inappropriate€maritalÐ tÄ Ðconduct)€when€there€is€"willful,€persistent€causing€of€unnecessary€suffering,€whether€in€realizationÐ `° Ðor€apprehension,€whether€of€body€or€mind,€in€such€a€way€as€to€render€cohabitation€dangerous€andÐ L œ Ðunendurable."€€òòÔ_ÔSchwalbÔ_Ô€V.€Ô_ÔSchwalbÔ_Ôóó,€282€SW2d€661€(Tn.€Ct.€App.€1955).€€In€light€of€the€testimonyÐ 8 ˆ Ðcited€above€and€the€record€as€a€whole€€we€find€that€the€Trial€Court€did€not€err€in€granting€a€divorceÐ $ t Ðto€both€parties€in€this€case.€€Mr.€Gray's€contention€that€he€was€responsible€for€only€one€instance€ofÐ  ` Ðinappropriate€marital€conduct€and€that€€Ms.€Gray€was€more€at€fault€than€he€are€without€merit.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àThe€final€issue€presented€by€Mr.€Gray€in€this€appeal€is€whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€inÐ Ô$  Ðawarding€attorney€fees€to€Ms.€Gray€at€the€post€trial€hearing€on€June€15,€2001.€Ms.€Gray€maintainsÐ À  Ðthat€the€Trial€Court's€order€of€June€15,€2001,€€which€requires€that€Mr.€Gray€pay€Ms.€Gray's€attorneyÐ ¬ü  Ðfees€to€the€extent€€of€$2,500.00,€was€an€award€of€alimony€òòin€Ô_ÔsolidoÔ_Ô€óóas€was€requested€by€Ms.€Gray€Ð ˜è  Ðin€her€counterclaim€filed€on€June€15,€1999.€€Ms.€Gray€asserts€that€this€award€was€based€upon€theÐ „Ô  ÐTrial€Court's€finding€of€fault€on€behalf€of€Mr.€Gray€in€delaying€the€entry€of€a€final€order€in€the€caseÐ pÀ Ðand€in€failing€to€comply€with€the€requirements€of€the€Court's€decision.€Our€review€of€the€Court'sÐ \¬ Ðmemorandum€opinion€and€findings€of€fact€dated€June€15,€2001,€confirms€the€accuracy€of€theseÐ H˜ Ðassertions.€€The€Court€states€that€the€approach€of€Mr.€Gray€and€his€counsel€in€this€case€has€been€oneÐ 4„ Ðof€"delay,€delay€and€delay"€and€that€"this€husband€has€acted€with€malice€in€attempting€to€delay€theÐ  p Ðentry€of€that€order,€the€divorce€decree,€every€step€of€the€way."€€Ms.€Gray€argues€that,€in€consideringÐ  \ Ðthe€appropriateness€of€awarding€attorney€fees,€the€Court€is€obligated€to€consider€the€relevantÐ øH Ðstatutory€factors€regarding€alimony€set€forth€at€T.C.A.€36„5„101€and€that€one€of€these€factors€is€theÐ ä4 Ðrelative€fault€of€the€parties.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àA€trial€court€is€allowed€€discretion€in€awarding€attorney€fees€and€its€decision€to€do€so€will€beÐ ¨ø Ðaffirmed€absent€unless€there€is€a€showing€of€abuse€of€discretion.€€òòÔ_ÔHoughlandÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔHoughlandÔ_Ôóó,€844Ð ”ä ÐS.W.2d€619€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.1992).Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àIn€support€of€her€argument€that€she€is€entitled€to€attorney€fees€based€upon€a€finding€thatÐ X ¨ ÐÔ_ÔMr.GrayÔ_Ô€was€at€fault€in€this€case,€Ms.€Gray€cites€the€case€ofòò€Lindsey€v.€Lindseyóó,€976€S.W.2d€175Ð D!” Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€It€is€correct€that€in€òòLindsey€óówe€noted€that€the€trial€court€could€€properlyÐ 0"€  Ðconsider€the€relative€fault€of€the€parties€in€awarding€the€wife€attorney€fees.€€However,€we€also€noted€Ð #l! Ðin€that€case€that€"[a]€spouse€with€adequate€property€and€income€is€not€entitled€to€an€award€ofÐ $X" Ðadditional€alimony€to€compensate€for€attorney's€fees€and€expenses."Ð ô$D # ÐÌà  àInòò€Wilder€v.€Wilderóó,€66€S.W.3d€892€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001),€we€addressed€the€issue€of€whetherÐ Ì&"% Ðthe€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€ordering€the€wife€to€pay€$18,€000.00€of€the€husband's€attorney'sÐ ¸'#& Ðfees.€€Giving€reasons€for€its€ruling,€the€trial€court€in€òòWilder€óóstated€that€the€proceedings€were€createdÐ ¤(ô#' Ðby€the€wife's€adultery,€that,€had€the€divorce€€been€a€no„fault€divorce€each€party€would€have€paid€itsÐ )à$( Ðown€attorney's€fees€and€that€the€husband€€was€entitled€to€having€his€attorney's€fees€paid€because€"thisÐ |*Ì%) Ðwas€all€being€motivated€because€of€his€ex„wife's€behavior€in€this€case."€€This€Court€reversed€the€trialÐ h+¸&* Ðcourt's€ruling,€noting€that€the€trial€court€focused€singularly€upon€the€fault€and€behavior€of€the€wifeÐ ° Ðand€that€"the€record€[was]€devoid€of€any€indication€that€the€Judge€considered€the€husband's€financialÐ œì Ðneed€or€the€wife's€ability€to€pay"€€Citing€òòÔ_ÔGilliamÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔGilliamÔ_Ôóó,€776€S.W.2d€81€(Ô_ÔTennCtÔ_Ô.€App.€1988),Ð ˆØ Ðwe€further€noted€in€òòWilderóó€that€"while€fault€is€a€factor€to€be€considered,€it€must€not€be€applied€in€aÐ tÄ Ðpunitive€manner€against€a€guilty€party€in€determining€the€award€of€alimony."Ð `° ÐÌà  àBased€upon€the€record€presented€in€the€instant€case€it€appears€that€Trial€Court's€€award€ofÐ 8 ˆ Ðattorney€fees€to€Ms.€Gray€was€based€solely€up€on€its€finding€of€fault€on€the€part€of€Ô_ÔMr.GrayÔ_Ô€and€thereÐ $ t Ðwas€no€inquiry€made€as€to€Ms.€Gray's€financial€need.€€We€do€not€address€the€validity€of€the€Court'sÐ  ` Ðfindings€regarding€any€fault€on€the€part€of€Mr.€Gray€because€even€if€such€findings€are€valid€theyÐ ü L  Ðconstitute€an€inadequate€basis€for€the€award€of€attorney€fees€as€such€an€award€is€inappropriate€absentÐ è 8  Ða€showing€of€need€on€the€part€of€Ms.€Gray.€€Inquiry€was€not€made€as€to€Ms.€Gray's€need€and€had€suchÐ Ô$  Ðinquiry€been€made€it€would€have€shown€that€Ms.€Gray€should€not€receive€attorney€fees€given€theÐ À  Ðamount€of€property€awarded€her€in€this€case.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àFinally,€Ms.€Gray's€request€for€attorney€fees€incurred€by€her€in€defense€of€this€appeal€isÐ „Ô  Ðdenied€upon€our€finding€that€such€is€not€justified€under€the€circumstances€presented.€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  à€For€the€foregoing€reasons€the€judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€is€affirmed€in€part€and€reversedÐ H˜ Ðin€part€and€remanded€for€such€further€proceedings,€if€any,€as€may€be€necessary€and€for€collection€ofÐ 4„ Ðcosts€below.€€Costs€of€appeal€are€adjudged€equally€to€Roy€William€Gray€and€Nancy€Jane€Gray.Ð  p ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________Ð Ð  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àHOUSTON€M.€GODDARD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÐ ¼  Ѐ€€