ÿWPCH µöÓ!ãúâ‰8¡Ce%kˆæ×4Ìü È×€Cã À]mן:X¨ÑÏÈ¢Á0K´o×iÝÉþmñ[ú‡©€R”’ 7üŸS{¤`ë)ú!.á$z#sÍ=4e@ Ás‰œ(n¬ÐÄ`ç_ìÆÎÎ÷‹MµzbR€Ï 1­dÌE÷pV²` hPãú|i%10ì}Fè1^ü1(¸Zg/hùË÷€¤LR¼#K9ˆtH\ŽÝC—ùR§v¹åÀØ tgÿƒ[i«™ãû•½ï‡zëã`xœÜ ØÞ9¼a$»pÙ×´“¨÷©LæE#_râŸ<4›ý¼fä Sx»úãÛ?7e c[»>íƒh…/#H›p1#ïÚ‚ÚìÌuð?QŸÂ½¡·Vå5Ê2ù™@[õ@nÅ,£_ò×ÌíGÏMz¹¬ 8:•Û/æß}AÎÔÇ`äÙ±æ^jÞ³pÍýÍR·ºÈ\ò0rÎÊ~>´Kû¢BÜíJ5•¡?1žª‹Hºp ]e®š~Rµs qÅñõ>îÖ˜U•°® $õÑV\)# >UNI %— 0(w@Å4( 0 lG 0D³f÷]àeE ^ UN| UNÊ  m Í1 àþ Þ füÍb/N 0Dg(«U:ÓÓ AQ Æ^ 0D$ Bh 0D…… D/ÉÉ Bø D3˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ K1UL1UM1N1EO1P1 +Q1DR1S1Ó€_1n~<$3|x_1 Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àThe€Commerce€Clause€of€the€United€States€Constitution€grants€Congress€theÐ ° Ðpower€ð ð[t]o€regulate€Commerce€.€.€.€among€the€several€States.ðð€€U.S.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€8,€cl.€3.((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó \Ñ\R AØ'ÿ Legal\Ñ ÖÝ ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àThe€Sixth€Circuit€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€Kentucky€federal€district€court€inÐ ° Ðan€opinion€dated€June€16,€1998.€ Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àThere€were€no€concomitant€restrictions€on€Guardsmark€to€disclose€to€employeesÐ ° Ðor€others€that€the€restrictive€covenant€may€òònotóó€be€enforceable€under€some€circumstances. Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àThe€record€in€this€case€includes€court€decisions€in€Arizona€and€Oklahoma€inÐ ° Ðwhich€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenant€was€not€enforced€under€the€facts€presented€in€thoseÏcases.(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularqÖd9 Z‹6Times New Roman RegularÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ÃÝ ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àThe€decision€of€the€Kentucky€federal€court€was€later€affirmed€on€appeal.€€SeeÐ ° Ðfootnote€2€herein. ÖÝ ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àThe€Sixth€Circuit€Court€of€Appeals€affirmed€the€Kentucky€federal€district€court€inÐ ° Ðan€opinion€dated€June€16,€1998.€ Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àThe€record€in€this€case€includes€court€decisions€in€Arizona€and€Oklahoma€inÐ ° Ðwhich€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenant€was€not€enforced€under€the€facts€presented€in€thoseÏcases. \Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àIt€is€arguable€that€the€choice„of„law€clause€in€the€covenants€mandate€thatÐ ° ÐTennessee€law€would€apply€in€subsequent€suits€involving€the€guards.€€However,€the€forumÏselection€clause€in€the€covenants€states€that€ð ð[t]he€law€of€the€State€of€Tennessee€will€govern€theÏinterpretation,€validity,€and€effect€of€this€Agreement.ðð€€This€language€indicates€that€the€provisionÏapplies€to€substantive€issues€on€interpretation€of€the€agreement,€not€to€procedural€issues,€such€asÏwhether€collateral€estoppel€applies. ÃÝ ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àThe€decision€of€the€Kentucky€federal€court€was€later€affirmed€on€appeal.€€SeeÐ ° Ðfootnote€2€herein. Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àThe€Commerce€Clause€of€the€United€States€Constitution€grants€Congress€theÐ ° Ðpower€ð ð[t]o€regulate€Commerce€.€.€.€among€the€several€States.ðð€€U.S.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€8,€cl.€3. Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ýà ` àThere€were€no€concomitant€restrictions€on€Guardsmark€to€disclose€to€employeesÐ ° Ðor€others€that€the€restrictive€covenant€may€òònotóó€be€enforceable€under€some€circumstances.(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý Ý ƒ!¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€Xê\XXXÔÔ€%JXXê\ÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€Xê\X%JÔÐ  ÐÌò òNovember€4,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôªèôXXê\ÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular !#%Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý d($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'''÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd""""'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý›Ó  ÓÑ€ †Ñò òÔ‡X·bXXXÔÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑœñ_1ññ_1ññ_1ññS1ñœñS1ñßr€(<,(j 8` `€€@Eȱ` ttx$°ð Õrßñ_1ññS1ññS1ññ_1ññ_1ñ›à@ ìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óˆÐ ° Ðà@ ìàò òWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONˆÐ œì Ðñ_1ñœßt€(>.*jx{` `€€@EL` ttx$„ˆ( O tß›ñ_1ñà  àà ` àà ¸ àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌóóÌÌ¢GUARDSMARK£,€INC.,€€€€€€€€€€€€€à h àà À àà  à)à p àÐ 8 ˆ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)à p àÐ $ t Ðà  àà ` àó óPlaintiff/Appelleeò òà h àà À àà  à)à p àó óShelby€Chancery€No.€104166„1€€Ð  ` Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àò ò)Ð  P  Ðv.à  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)à p à€Ð ì <  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)ÌBORG„WARNER€PROTECTIVE€SERVICES,€€à  à)à p àó óAppeal€No.€€¢02A01£„9409„CH„00207Ð Ä  Ðò òd/b/a€BURNS€INTERNATIONAL€SECURITYà  à)Ð ´  ÐSERVICES,à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)ó óÐ  ð  Ðò òà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à)Ð ŒÜ  Ðó óà  àà ` àDefendants/Appellants.à À àò òà  à)à p àÐ xÈ Ðó óòòÌóóò òÌ€€€ÌÌÌà@µµìàó óAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€SHELBY€COUNTY€ˆÐ T Ðà@%% ìàAT€MEMPHIS,€TENNESSEEˆÌÌÌÌà@c c ìàTHE€HONORABLE€C.€NEAL€SMALL,€CHANCELLOR€€€€€ˆÌòòÌÌÌFor€the€Plaintiff/Appelleeóó:òòà  àà h àà À àFor€the€Defendant/Appellantóó:òòÐ P!  ÐóóÌDavid€Wade€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à  àà h àà À àThomas€L.€HendersonÐ (#x! ÐMemphis,€Tennesseeà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àThomas€H.€LawrenceÐ $d" Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àMemphis,€TennesseeÌGerald€SternÌWashington,€D.C.ÌÌDavid€O.€BickartÌJonathan€D.€SchillerÌWashington,€D.C.Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌò òÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àAFFIRMED€IN€PART,€REVERSED€IN€PARTÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àAND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àó óHOLLY€KIRBY€¢LILLARD£,€JUDGEÐ Ô2$.2 ÐÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòòÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€¢P.J.£,€¢W.S.£Ð \8¬38 ÐÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.€€€€Ð  ;p6; ÐÔ#†XüÃXXX·b<#ÔØØÓÓÑ7€üÃXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  Ñœà@55'ìàò òOPINIONó óˆÐ ° Лà  àThis€case€involves€restrictive€employment€covenants.€€Ô‡X·bXXXüÃÔThe€plaintiff€and€the€defendant€areÐ à Ðboth€private€security€companies.€€The€trial€court€granted€the€plaintiff€a€restraining€order€enjoiningÏthe€defendant€from€inducing€former€employees€to€breach€the€restrictive€covenants€in€other€œstates,›Ïfrom€misrepresenting€facts€concerning€the€enforceability€of€the€covenants,€or€from€litigating€orÏassisting€others€in€litigating€in€other€states€regarding€the€enforceability€of€the€restrictive€covenants.€ÏWe€affirm€in€part,€reverse€in€part,€and€remand.€Ô#†XüÃXXX·b¸ #ÔÐ ð@  Ðà  àPlaintiff/Appellee€¢Guardsmark£€(ð ð¢Guardsmark£ðð)€and€Defendant/Appellant€Borg„WarnerÏ(ð ðBorg„Warnerðð)€are€competitors€in€the€private€security€industry.€€¢¢Guardsmark£€requires€its€securityÏguards€to€sign€a€restrictive€covenant€which€prevents€them€from€working€for€another€security€firmÏat€the€same€work€site€for€a€period€of€one€year€after€leaving€¢Guardsmark£.€€The€covenant€reads:ÌÓÓœà8  àEmployee›€hereby€agrees€that€following€the€termination€of€employment€withÏGUARDSMARK,€whether€voluntary€or€involuntary,€for€a€period€of€one€yearÏthereafter€he€(she)€will€not€perform€or€hire€others€to€perform€any€security€services€atÏthe€site,€place€or€location€where€he€(she)€performed€security€services€within€theÏimmediate€preceding€twelve€(12)€months€of€his€(her)€employment€withÏGUARDSMARK.à8Ð Ð àÐøHxx ÐÌÓÓThe€guards€may€request€a€transfer€to€another€¢Guardsmark£€site,€or€may€work€for€another€companyÏat€another€site€without€violating€the€covenant.€€The€guardððs€employment€contract€also€provides€œthat:›Ïð ð¢Each£€party€hereby€consents€to€the€jurisdiction€and€venue€of€the€U.S.€District€Court€for€the€WesternÏDistrict€of€Tennessee€and€any€court€of€the€State€of€Tennessee€in€any€action,€suit,€or€proceedingÏarising€out€of€or€relating€to€this€Agreement€or€the€employment€of€Employee€hereunder€.€.€.€.ðð€€OfÏœcourse,›€Borg„Warner€is€not€a€party€to€this€agreement;€the€contract€is€between€Guardsmark€and€theÏindividual€security€guard.€€Ìà  àOn€May€5,€1994,€¢Guardsmark£€filed€a€lawsuit€against€Borg„Warner€in€Chancery€Court€inÏShelby€County,€alleging€that€Borg„Warner€¢tortiously£€interfered€with€¢Guardsmark£ððs€contractualÏrelations€in€Seattle,€Washington.€€¢Guardsmark£€asserted€that,€after€Borg„Warner€took€over€the€securityÏservices€contract€at€UPS€facilities€in€Seattle,€Borg„Warner€actively€solicited€the€¢Guardsmark£€securityÏofficers€œon›€the€site€to€continue€working€at€the€site€as€Borg„Warner€employees,€in€breach€of€theÏrestrictive€covenant€between€¢Guardsmark£€and€its€employees.€€Guardsmark€argued€that€Borg„WarnerÏmisrepresented€to€Guardsmark€employees€that€the€restrictive€covenants€were€unenforceable.€€Ìà  àThe€day€the€complaint€was€filed,€the€Shelby€County€trial€œjudge,›€Chancellor€Neal€Small,Ïissued€a€restraining€œorder›€prohibiting€Borg„Warner€from€ð ðinterfering€with€or€attempting€to€cause€theÐ ø;H7; Ðbreach€of€the€restrictive€covenants€contained€in€the€employment€agreements€between€¢Guardsmark£Ïand€its€security€officers€servicing€the€Seattle,€Washington€area€facilities€of€UPS€and€the€agreementÏbetween€¢Guardsmark£€and€United€Parcel€Service.ðð€€On€May€20,€1994,€the€parties€entered€an€identicalÏConsent€Order€of€Temporary€Injunction.€€Ìà  àOn€July€28,€1994,€¢Guardsmark£€filed€a€Supplemental€Verified€Complaint€in€Shelby€CountyÏChancery€Court,€seeking€declaratory€and€injunctive€relief€based€on€Borg„Warnerððs€activities€inÏBirmingham,€Alabama.€€Guardsmark€alleged€that€Borg„Warnerððs€conduct€in€Birmingham€wasÏsimilar€to€that€in€Seattle,€and€also€alleged€that€Borg„Warner€represented€to€Guardsmark€clients€thatÏGuardsmark€could€not€enforce€its€restrictive€covenants.€€A€supporting€affidavit€filed€by€GuardsmarkÏstated€that€a€representative€of€Borg„Warner€œshowed›€a€Guardsmark€supervisor€a€ð ðlegal€paperðð€andÏtold€him€that€Borg„Warner€ð ðhad€beaten€Guardsmark€in€Tucson,€Arizona€and€that€the€opinion€ofÏJudge€Tinney€which€was€attached€discussed€that.ððœñP1ñ׃×ñP1ññP1ñ׃×ñP1ñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€€The€affidavit€stated€that€the€Borg„WarnerÐ P  Ðrepresentative€ð ðnever€said€anything€to€me€about€whether€Guardsmark€had€been€successful€in€otherÏcases€in€enforcing€its€restrictive€covenants€with€its€employees.ðð€€Guardsmark€asserted€that€Borg„¼Warner€had€ð ðestablished€a€patternðð€of€ð ðcausing€Guardsmark€security€officers€to€breach€theirÏrestrictive€covenantsðð€and€that€Borg„Warner€had€ð ðforced€Guardsmark€to€engage€in€litigationÏthroughout€the€United€States€to€enforce€and€defend€its€restrictive€covenants.ððÌà  àOnce€again,€the€Shelby€County€Chancellor€entered€a€temporary€restraining€order€the€day€theÏsupplemental€complaint€was€filed€regarding€Borg„Warnerððs€activities€in€Birmingham,€Alabama.€€AsÏwith€the€earlier€restraining€order,€Borg„Warner€was€enjoined€from€attempting€to€cause€the€breachÏof€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants.€€However,€this€restraining€order€also€œenjoined›€Borg„WarnerÏfrom:ÌÓÓà8  àmisrepresenting€to€anyone,€including€former,€present€or€prospective€GuardsmarkÏclients€and€employees€that€Guardsmark€cannot€or€will€not€enforce€its€restrictiveÏcovenants€and€to€require€[Borg„Warner],€if€it€chooses€to€discuss€GuardsmarkððsÏemployment€restrictive€covenants,€to€present€to€those€with€whom€it€discusses€suchÏmatters€copies€of€all€orders€signed€by€Courts€throughout€the€United€States€whichÏhave€upheld€the€enforceability€of€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants.Ð Ð Ð  ÐñP1ñœñP1ñÌÓӜР €4Ð/3 ÐÑ †ÑÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÑ  Ñ›à  àShortly€thereafter,€on€August€10,€1994,€Borg„Warner€and€one€of€¢Guardsmark£ððs€formerÐ ° Ðemployees€filed€a€lawsuit€in€Birmingham,€Alabama,€citing€difficulties€caused€by€the€TennesseeÏrestraining€order€and€challenging€the€validity€of€the€restrictive€covenant.€€Immediately€uponÏreceiving€the€Alabama€complaint,€Guardsmark€sought€injunctive€relief€from€Chancellor€Small€inÏTennessee.€€On€August€12,€1994,€the€Shelby€County€trial€court€issued€an€order€extending€theÏeffective€date€of€the€Temporary€Restraining€Order€and€prohibiting€Borg„Warner€from€ð ðtaking€anyÏaction€to€prosecute€the€case€filed€in€Birmingham,€Alabama€on€August€10,€1994.ðð€€€On€August€29,Ï1994,€Guardsmark€filed€an€application€for€injunctive€relief€from€interference€with€GuardsmarkððsÏrestrictive€covenants€ð ðwith€its€past,€present€or€future€employees,ðð€from€any€misrepresentationsÏregarding€the€restrictive€covenants,€from€litigating€to€challenge€the€enforceability€of€the€restrictiveÏcovenants,€and€specifically€from€proceeding€with€the€Alabama€litigation.€€Guardsmark€alleged€thatÏBorg„Warner€was€engaged€in€wide„ranging€efforts€to€defeat€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants.€ÏChancellor€Small€entered€a€temporary€restraining€order€as€requested€by€Guardsmark€the€same€day.€Ïà  àOn€September€9,€1994,€the€Shelby€County€trial€court€issued€an€order€finding€GuardsmarkððsÏrestrictive€covenants€enforceable€under€the€laws€of€Tennessee€and€Alabama.€€The€September€9€orderÏgranted€Guardsmarkððs€motion€for€a€Temporary€Injunction€prohibiting€Borg„Warner€from€ð ðinterferingÏwith€or€attempting€to€cause€the€breach€of€the€restrictive€covenants€contained€in€the€employmentÏagreement€between€¢Guardsmark£€and€its€employeesðð€in€Alabama.€€€The€injunction€also€prohibitedÏBorg„Warner€from€misrepresenting€facts€concerning€the€enforceability€of€¢Guardsmark£ððs€restrictiveÏcovenants€to€former,€present€or€prospective€¢Guardsmark£€clients€and€employees.€€Borg„Warner€wasÏspecifically€prohibited€from€providing€to€any€persons€ð ðcopies€of€any€judicial€orders€or€opinionsÏconcerning€the€Guardsmark€restrictive€covenants€unless€it€provides€all€such€orders,€including€thoseÏwhich€have€upheld€the€enforceability€of€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants.ðð€€The€order€againÏprohibited€Borg„Warner€from€taking€part€in€the€Alabama€litigation.€€€€Ìà  àThis€provoked€yet€another€lawsuit€in€another€forum.€€On€September€22,€1994,€Borg„WarnerÏfiled€suit€against€Guardsmark,€the€trial€judge€in€this€œcase,›€Shelby€County€Chancellor€Neal€Small,€andÏthe€Shelby€County€Chancery€Court€in€the€United€States€District€Court€for€the€Eastern€District€ofÏKentucky,€alleging€that€the€Tennessee€injunction€violated€Borg„Warnerððs€First€Amendment€right€ofÏfree€speech,€right€to€petition€the€government,€the€full€faith€and€credit€clause€and€28€U.S.C.€ðð€1738,Ð 09€48 Ðand€the€Supremacy€clause€of€the€United€States€Constitution.€€Chancellor€Small€modified€theÏTennessee€injunction€to€permit€Borg„Warner€to€prosecute€the€Kentucky€œlawsuit.€€The›€KentuckyÏdistrict€court€determined€that€it€lacked€personal€jurisdiction€over€Chancellor€Small€and€the€ChanceryÏCourt,€but€granted€summary€judgment€to€Guardsmark€on€the€remaining€claims.€€òòò òSee€Borg„WarnerÐ P   ÐProtective€Servs.€Corp.€v.€Guardsmark,€Inc.ó óóó,€946€F.€Supp.€495€(E.D.€Ky.€1996).œñP1ñ׃ ×ñP1ññP1ñ׃×ñP1ñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  כР0 € Ðà  à¢On€December€20,€1995,€Guardsmark£€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€in€this€case.€ÏChancellor€Small€granted€Guardsmarkððs€motion€in€an€order€filed€January€26,€1996.€€The€Order€statesÏin€part:ÌÓÓà8  àTHIS€COURT€THEREFORE€DECLARES€THAT,€after€reviewing€the€law€ofÏTennessee,€Alabama,€Washington€and€Kentucky,€Guardsmarkððs€covenants€are€validÏand€enforceable€under€the€laws€of€Tennessee,€Alabama,€Washington€and€Kentucky.€ÏThe€Guardsmark€covenants€state€they€are€to€be€construed€under€Tennessee€law,€and,Ïas€has€been€said,€are€valid€under€Tennessee€law.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àIT€IS€THEREFORE€ORDERED,€ADJUDGED€AND€DECREED€that:Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à1.€€Defendant€Borg„Warner€is€hereby€permanently€enjoined€from€interfering€with€orÏattempting€to€cause€the€breach€of€the€restrictive€covenants€contained€in€theÏemployment€agreements€between€Guardsmark€and€its€employees;€andÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à2.€€Defendant€Borg„Warner€is€hereby€permanently€enjoined€from€initiating€andÏencouraging€or€assisting€others€to€initiate€litigation€to€challenge€the€enforceability€ofÏGuardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants€with€its€employees.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓœThe›€trial€courtððs€final€and€permanent€order€does€not€state€explicitly€whether€Borg„Warner€isÏpermanently€enjoined€from€misrepresenting€facts€concerning€the€enforceability€of€GuardsmarkððsÏrestrictive€covenants.€€In€the€final€order,€the€trial€court€states,€ð ðThis€court€hereby€makes€permanentÏits€orders€of€temporary€injunction€with€respect€to€the€foregoing€points€which€were€previously€enteredÏin€this€case.ðð€€Since€the€final€order€is€unclear€on€this€point,€for€purposes€of€this€appeal,€we€willÏassume€that€the€trial€courtððs€final€œorder€permanently›€enjoined€Borg„Warner€from€misrepresentingÏfacts,€either€expressly€or€by€implication,€concerning€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants,€andÏprohibited€Borg„Warner€from€providing€any€person€copies€of€judicial€orders€from€other€œstatesÏfinding€the€restrictive€covenants€unenforceable›€unless€it€also€provided€copies€of€orders€upholdingÏthe€enforceability€of€the€œcovenants.€€Borg„Warner€now€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€final€order.›€€€€ÌœÐ  p5À04 Лà  àOn€appeal,€Borg„Warner€raises€twelve€issues:ÌÓÓà8  à1.€€Should€this€Court€reverse€the€decision€of€the€Chancery€Court€based€on€òòresÐ à Ðjudicataóó€because€the€issues€litigated€in€this€case€have€already€been€litigated€to€finalÐ €Ð Ðjudgment€in€another€action€between€Borg„Warner€and€Guardsmark?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à2.€€Did€the€Chancery€Court€err€in€failing€to€dismiss€this€action€for€lack€of€personalÏjurisdiction€over€Borg„Warner€since€the€events€on€which€this€suit€is€based€occurredÏoutside€of€Tennessee,€and€Borg„Warnerððs€contacts€to€Tennessee€are€irrelevant€to€thisÏaction?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à3.€€Did€the€Chancery€Court€err€in€failing€to€dismiss€this€action€based€on€òòforum€nonÐ P  Ðconveniensóó€since€this€suit€arose€out„of„state,€since€the€contracts€on€which€the€suit€isÐ ð@  Ðbased€were€signed€out„of„state,€since€all€the€witnesses€are€out„of„state,€and€since€thisÏaction€could€have€been€conveniently€joined€to€a€prior€federal€action€in€Kentucky?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à4.€€Does€the€Chancery€Court€injunction€violate€the€Full€Faith€and€Credit€Clause€byÏprohibiting€Borg„Warnerððs€actions€in€other€states,€even€though€other€states€haveÏfound€Guardsmarkððs€covenants€unenforceable?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à5.€€Does€the€Chancery€Court€injunction€violate€the€First€Amendment€and€TennesseeÏlaw€as€a€prior€restraint€on€speech€where€it€prohibits€Borg„Warner€from,€among€otherÏthings,€interfering€with€the€restrictive€covenants€of€Guardsmarkððs€future€employees?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à6.€€Does€the€Chancery€Court€injunction€violate€the€First€Amendment€andÏcorresponding€Tennessee€constitutional€free€speech€rights€since€the€Chancery€CourtÏneither€determined€that€there€was€a€significant€government€interest,€nor€did€it€tailorÏthe€injunction€to€burden€no€more€speech€than€was€necessary?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à7.€€Is€the€Chancery€Court€injunction€unconstitutionally€vague€and€over€broad€sinceÏit€prohibits€Borg„Warner€ð ðfrom€taking€any€action€to€interfere€with€GuardsmarkððsÏcovenants€.€.€.€and€from€making€any€misrepresentations€regarding€Guardsmark?ððÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à8.€€Did€the€Chancery€Court€err€by€entering€a€nationwide€injunction€declaring€all€ofÏGuardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants€valid€regardless€of€other€statesðð€laws€andÏdecisions€on€this€issue?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à9.€€Does€the€Chancery€Court€injunction€violate€the€Commerce€Clause€since€it€has€theÏeffect€of€regulating€conduct€wholly€outside€of€Tennessee?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à10.€€Did€the€Chancery€Court€err€by€allowing€Guardsmark€to€litigate€the€validity€ofÏits€restrictive€covenants€without€joining€the€security€guards€who€signed€theÏcovenants?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à11.€€Did€the€Chancery€Court€abuse€its€discretion€by€failing€to€grant€Borg„Warner€aÏcontinuance€to€obtain€controverting€affidavits€when€Guardsmark€filed€a€late€affidavitÏin€support€of€summary€judgment,€or€by€failing€to€grant€Borg„Warnerððs€motion€toÏstrike€the€late€affidavit?Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à12.€€Did€the€Chancery€Court€err€in€granting€Guardsmarkððs€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment€when€there€were€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€precluding€summaryÏjudgment?€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓà  àA€motion€for€summary€judgment€should€be€granted€when€the€movant€demonstrates€that€thereÏare€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matterÏof€law.€€ò òòòSee€ó óóóTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.03.€€The€party€moving€for€summary€judgment€bears€the€burden€ofÐ  :p59 Ðdemonstrating€that€no€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€exists.€€ò òòòSee€Byrd€v.€Hallóóó ó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€211Ð ° Ð(Tenn.€1993).€€On€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€court€must€take€the€strongest€legitimate€viewÏof€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€thatÏparty,€and€discard€all€countervailing€evidence.€€òòò òSee€id.ó óóó€at€210„11.€€Summary€judgment€is€onlyÐ P   Ðappropriate€when€the€facts€and€the€legal€conclusions€drawn€from€the€facts€reasonably€permit€onlyÏone€conclusion.€€ò òòòSee€Carvell€v.€Bottomsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).€€Since€only€questions€ofÐ `  Ðlaw€are€involved,€there€is€no€presumption€of€correctness€regarding€a€trial€court's€grant€of€summaryÏjudgment.€€ò òòòSee€id.ó óóó€€Therefore,€our€review€of€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment€is€œòòde€novoóó›Ð Ð  Ðon€the€record€before€this€Court.€€ò òòòSee€id.óóó óÐ ° Ðà  àOn€appeal,€Borg„Warner€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€not€dismissing€the€complaintÏfor€lack€of€personal€jurisdiction.€€Borg„Warner€asserts€that,€although€it€is€licensed€to€do€business€inÏTennessee,€its€contacts€with€this€state€are€unrelated€to€this€action€and€are€therefore€insufficient€toÏsupport€personal€jurisdiction.€€¢Guardsmark£€argues€¢that£€the€exercise€of€personal€jurisdiction€overÏBorg„Warner€is€appropriate€because€Borg„Warnerððs€contacts€are€sufficient€and€because€Borg„WarnerÏwaived€any€objection€to€personal€jurisdiction€by€failing€to€timely€object.€Ìà  àÔ‡XgQXXXÆÔRule€12.08€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€provides:Ð Ð  ÐÓÓà8  àA€party€waives€all€defenses€and€objections€which€the€party€does€not€present€either€byÏmotion€as€¢hereinabove£€provided,€or,€if€the€party€has€made€no€motion,€in€the€partyððsÏanswer€or€reply,€or€any€amendments€thereto,€(provided,€however,€the€defensesÏenumerated€in€12.02(2)€.€.€.€shall€not€be€raised€by€amendment)€.€.€.€œ.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓRule›€12.02(2)€œof€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€is›€the€defense€of€ð ðlack€of€jurisdiction€overÏthe€œperson.ð𛀀Under€this€œrule,€Ô#†XÆXXXgQ¹P#Ôð ðobjections›€to€personal€jurisdiction€and€venue€are€deemed€waivedÐ )l$' Ðunless€they€are€raised€in€a€timely€œmanner.ðð€€ò òòòDixie›€Sav.€Stores,€Inc.€v.€Turneróóó ó,€767€¢S.W.2d£€408,€410Ð +l&) Ð(Tenn.€App.€1988).€€If€a€party€makes€a€ð ðgeneral€appearanceðð€without€challenging€personalÏjurisdiction,€venue,€or€other€matters,€these€objections€are€deemed€waived.€€€òòò òSee€id.€€óóó óInò òòò€Landers€v.Ð Ü.,*- ÐJonesó óóó,€872€¢S.W.2d£€674€(Tenn.€1994)Ô‡XgQXXXÆÔ,€the€Court€stated:Ð ¼0 ,/ ÐÓÓà8  àInitially,€we€note€that€there€is€a€modern€legal€trend€away€from€the€technicalÏrequirement€that€a€defendant€must€enter€a€special€appearance€to€contest€personalÏjurisdiction.€.€.€.€€Under€both€the€state€and€federal€civil€procedure€rules,€therefore,€aÏdefendant€is€permitted€to€raise€the€defense€of€lack€of€personal€jurisdiction€at€the€sameÏtime€other€defenses€are€raised.€€Waiver€occurs€only€if€there€is€no€objection€toÏpersonal€jurisdiction€in€the€first€filing,€either€a€Rule€12€motion€or€a€answer.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓ872€¢S.W.2d£€at€676.€€Ô#†XÆXXXgQ`U#ÔTennessee€courts€have€defined€the€term€ð ðgeneral€appearance,ðð€as€ð ðacts€fromÐ 09€48 Ðwhich€it€can€reasonably€be€inferred€that€the€party€recognizes€and€submits€itself€to€the€jurisdiction€ofÏthe€court.€€Thus€a€partyððs€consent€to€the€entry€of€a€judgment€against€it€constitutes€a€generalÏappearance.ðð€€òòò òDixie€Sav.€Storesó óóó,€767€S.W.2d€at€410.€€In€òòò òPatterson€v.€Rockwell€Internationaló óóó,€665Ð pÀ ТS.W.2d£€96€(Tenn.€1984),€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€discussed€the€finding€of€an€appearance:ÌÓÓà8  à[¢B]efore£€an€appearance€will€be€found€by€implication,€it€must€be€shown€from€theÏdefendantððs€seeking,€taking,€or€agreeing€to€some€step€or€proceeding€in€the€causeÏbeneficial€to€himself€or€detrimental€to€the€plaintiff€other€than€one€contesting€only€theÏjurisdiction€of€the€court€or€by€reason€of€some€act€or€proceeding€recognizing€the€caseÏas€being€in€court.€€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌò òòòPattersonó óóó,€665€S.W.2d€at€99„100.€€Ó9ZÓÔ‡XgQXXXÆÔThe€ò òòòLandersóóó ó€court€cautioned:Ð Ð  ÐÓÓà8  àIn€accordance€with€the€modern€trend,€and€Rule€12.02€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€CivilÏProcedure€juvenile€courts€should€only€find€a€general€appearance€that€waives€aÏdefendantððs€right€to€contest€personal€jurisdiction€when€the€defendant€has€recognizedÏthe€proper€pendency€of€the€cause€by€making€a€motion€that€goes€to€the€merits€or€byÏfiling€an€answer,€without€challenging€personal€jurisdiction.€€To€the€extent€that€priorÏjudicial€decisions€can€be€read€as€requiring€otherwise,€they€are€overruled.€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÔ#†XÆXXXgQ\#ÔÓÓò òòòLandersó óóó,€872€S.W.2d€at€677.€€Given€these€parameters,€the€circumstances€in€this€case€must€beÐ D” Ðexamined.Ìà  à¢Guardsmark£€filed€its€original€complaint€on€May€5,€1994.€€Before€raising€the€issues€of€lackÏof€personal€jurisdiction€and€improper€venue,€Borg„Warner€took€the€following€actions:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` à1.à ¸ àConsent€Order€of€Temporary€Injunction,€entered€May€20,€1994,€andÐ Ä! Ðsigned€by€counsel€for€Borg„Warner.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à2.à ¸ àNotice€of€Appearance€of€counsel€for€Borg„Warner,€filed€May€23,Ð ¤#ô! Ð1994.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à3.à ¸ àDefendantððs€Notice€of€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€30.02(6)Ð „%Ô # ÐDeposition€of€the€Person(s)€Most€Knowledgeable€at€¢Guardsmark£,€Inc.,€filed€AugustÏ4,€1994,€and€signed€by€Borg„Warnerððs€counsel.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à4.à ¸ àDefendantððs€Objections€and€Response€to€Plaintiffððs€Request€forÐ T(¤#& ÐProduction€of€Documents,€filed€August€10,€1994,€and€signed€by€Borg„WarnerððsÏcounsel.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à5.à ¸ àOrder€Resetting€Date€of€Preliminary€Injunction€and€ExtendingÐ $+t&) ÐTemporary€Restraining€Order,€entered€August€12,€1994,€and€signed€by€Borg„¼Warnerððs€counsel.€Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à6.à ¸ àAffidavit€of€Ray€Sides,€submitted€on€behalf€of€Borg„Warner€and€filedÐ ô-D), Ðon€August€26,€1994.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à7.à ¸ àAffidavit€of€David€B.€Hicks,€submitted€on€behalf€of€Borg„Warner€andÐ Ô/$+. Ðfiled€on€August€26,€1994.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à8.à ¸ àAffidavit€of€Charles€Rodney€¢Weldon£,€submitted€on€behalf€of€Borg„Ð ´1-0 ÐWarner€and€filed€on€August€26,€1994.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à9.à ¸ àSupplemental€Notice€of€Appearance€of€counsel€for€Borg„Warner,€filedÐ ”3ä.2 Ðon€September€7,€1994,€and€signed€by€new€Borg„Warner€counsel.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à10.à ¸ àDefendantððs€Application€for€Permission€to€Appeal€and€Motion€to€StayÐ t5Ä04 ÐRestraining€Order€and€Temporary€Injunction€Pending€Appeal,€filed€on€September€8,Ï1994,€and€signed€by€Borg„Warner€counsel.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à11.à ¸ àApplication€on€Behalf€of€Defendant„Appellant€for€ExtraordinaryÐ D8”37 ÐAppeal€by€Permission€on€Original€Application€in€the€Appellate€Court€and€Motion€toÏStay,€filed€on€September€9,€1994,€and€signed€by€Borg„Warner€counsel.Ð$:t59Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à12.à ¸ àDefendantððs€Motion€for€Reconsideration€of€Order€GrantingÐ ° ÐRestraining€Order€and€Temporary€Injunction€or,€in€the€Alternative,€Motion€toÏDissolve€and/or€Modify€Restraining€Order€and€Temporary€Injunction,€filedÏSeptember€8,€1994,€and€signed€by€Borg„Warnerððs€counsel.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à13.à ¸ àOrder€Granting€Temporary€Injunction,€entered€by€the€Chancellor€onÐ pÀ ÐSeptember€9,€1994,€and€signed€by€Borg„Warnerððs€counsel.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓThe€first€time€Borg„Warner€raised€the€defense€of€lack€of€personal€jurisdiction€was€in€its€Answer,€andÏin€a€motion,€both€filed€on€September€14,€1994,€over€four€months€after€¢Guardsmark£€filed€itsÏComplaint.€€Under€these€circumstances,€we€find€that€Borg„¢Warner£€¢waived£€any€objection€to€the€trialÏcourtððs€lack€of€¢jurisdiction£€over€the€person.€€The€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€on€this€issue.Ìà  àBorg„Warner€also€asserts€on€appeal€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€its€motion€to€dismissÏon€the€grounds€of€€œòòforum€non€conveniens£óó.›€€Borg„Warner€notes€that€the€events€that€led€to€this€lawsuitÐ  ð Ðoccurred€outside€Tennessee€and€that€all€the€witnesses€with€knowledge€of€the€covenants€at€issueÏreside€in€Alabama€and€œWashington.€€Although€the€contracts€between€Guardsmark€and€the€individualÏsecurity€guards€are€governed€by€the€Tennessee€forum€selection€clauses€of€their€contracts,€of€courseÏthe€contractual€provision€between€Guardsmark€and€the€security€guards€would€not€govern€an€actionÏbetween€Guardsmark€and€Borg„Warner.€€Under›€these€circumstances,€Borg„Warner€argues€that€theseÏother€states€have€a€more€significant€relationship€to€the€controversy€and€a€legitimate€interest€in€thisÏsuit,€and€consequently€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€Borg„Warnerððs€motion€to€dismiss.€Ìà  àOn€appeal,€this€Court€must€determine€whether€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€Borg„WarnerððsÏmotion€to€dismiss€based€on€the€doctrine€ofò ò€òòó óforum€non€¢conveniensóó€was€an€£abuse€of€œdiscretion.€€òòò òSee›Ð €%Ð # ÐPackage€Exp.€Ctr.,€Inc.€v.€Snider€Foods,€Inc.ó óóó,€788€¢S.W.2d£€561,€564€(Tenn.€App.€1989)€(citingÐ `'°"% Ðòòò ò¢Zurick£€v.€¢Inman£ó óóó,€221€Tenn.€393,€404,€426€¢S.W.2d£€767,€772€(1968)).€€There€are€numerous€factorsÐ @)$' Ðconsidered€in€determining€the€applicability€of€the€doctrine€of€œòòforum€non€conveniensóó.›€€These€factorsÐ  +p&) Ðð ðgenerally€relate€to€the€parties,€witnesses,€subject„matter,€or€the€court.ðð€€ò òòòZurickó óóó,€426€S.W.2d€at€772.€Ð -P(+ ЀIt€is€necessary€that€the€cause€of€action€arise€outside€the€state€in€order€to€trigger€the€question€of€theÏapplicability€of€the€doctrine,€but€this€fact€in€and€of€itself€is€not€sufficient.€€ò òòòSee€id.€ó óóóat€773.€€In€addition,Ð À0,/ Ðwhile€the€necessity€of€out„of„state€witnesses€may€be€considered,ÌÓÓà8  àt¢he£€fact€[that]€there€are€out-of-state€witnesses€is€not€of€itself€enough€to€support€anÏapplication€of€the€doctrine.€€€This€factor€has€to€be€supported€by€facts€showing€why,Ïdue€to€out-of-state€witnesses,€there€is€a€strong€likelihood€defendant€will€be€done€anÏinjustice€if€forced€to€go€to€trial€in€the€forum€selected€by€plaintiff.€€€This€can€be€doneÏby€giving€the€names€of€the€witnesses,€nature€and€materiality€of€their€testimony,€andÏany€other€applicable€facts.€€It€is€upon€these€facts€the€trial€court€exercises€its€discretionÏin€the€application€of€the€doctrine.Ð :p59Ð Ð  Їòòò ò¢ÓÓId.£ó óóó,€221€Tenn.€at€410,€426€¢S.W.2d£€at€775.€€Other€factors€that€may€be€considered€include:Ð ° ÐÓÓà8  àthe€relative€ease€of€access€to€sources€of€proof;€€availability€of€compulsory€process€forÏattendance€of€unwilling,€and€the€cost€of€obtaining€attendance€of€willing,€witnesses;€Ïpossibility€of€view€of€premises,€if€view€would€be€appropriate€to€the€action;€€and€allÏother€practical€problems€that€make€trial€of€the€case€easy,€expeditious€andÏinexpensive.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌòòò òÓÓPackage€Exp.ó óóó,€788€S.W.2d€at€563€(quoting€òòò ò¢Zurick£ó óóó,€221€Tenn.€at€403,€426€¢S.W.2d£€at€772).€€€€Ð 0 € Ðà  àIn€this€case,€the€cause€of€action€arose€out„of„state,€and€one€of€the€parties,€Borg„Warner,€isÏlocated€outside€Tennessee€but€does€business€in€Tennessee.€€In€support€of€its€motion€to€dismiss,€Borg„¼Warner€submitted€affidavits€from€its€employees,€who€assert€that€they€have€no€contact€with€the€stateÏof€Tennessee.€€However,€the€employees€indicated€that€their€jobs€require€them€to€travel€from€OhioÏto€Kentucky€and€other€states.€€Under€these€circumstances,€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€find€that€theÏtrial€court€abused€its€discretion€by€denying€Borg„Warnerððs€motion€to€dismiss€on€the€basis€of€œòòforumÐ pÀ Ðnon€conveniensóó.›€€The€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€on€this€issue.Ð P  Ðà  àBorg„Warner€also€argues€that€the€doctrine€of€œòòres€judicataóó›€requires€dismissal€of€this€lawsuit.€Ð 0€ ÐBorg„Warnerððs€argument€is€based€on€its€litigation€against€Guardsmark€in€federal€court€in€Kentucky.€Ïà  àOn€September€15,€1994,€the€Tennessee€trial€court€in€this€case€issued€a€temporary€injunctionÏagainst€Borg„Warner,€prohibiting€Borg„Warner€from€interfering€with€Guardsmarkððs€restrictiveÏcovenants€and€prohibiting€Borg„Warner€from€litigating€against€Guardsmark€in€other€forums.€€OnÏSeptember€21,€1994,€Guardsmark€filed€a€petition€to€hold€Borg„Warner€in€contempt€for€violating€thisÏorder€and€previous€orders.€€Borg„Warner€then€filed€a€motion€for€modification€of€the€temporaryÏinjunction€in€order€to€file€suit€in€federal€court€against€Guardsmark,€asserting€certain€federal€claims.€ÏThe€Tennessee€trial€court€modified€the€injunction€to€allow€Borg„Warner€to€file€actions€in€the€UnitedÏStates€District€Court€for€the€Western€District€of€Tennessee,€and€later€also€modified€the€injunctionÏto€allow€Borg„Warner€to€file€a€complaint€in€the€United€States€District€Court€for€the€Eastern€DistrictÏof€Kentucky.€€On€September€22,€1994,€Borg„Warner€filed€a€complaint€in€the€Eastern€District€ofÏKentucky€against€Shelby€County€Chancellor€Neal€Small,€the€Shelby€County€Chancery€Court,€andÏGuardsmark.€€ò òòòSee€Borg„Warner€Protective€Servs.€Corp.€v.€Guardsmark,€Inc.óóó ó,€946€F.€Supp.€495Ð 3à.2 Ð(E.D.€Ky.€1996).€€Borg„Warner€asserted€that€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants€were€unenforceableÏand€sought€an€injunction€prohibiting€the€enforcement€of€the€Shelby€County€Chancellorððs€orders.€€ò òòòSeeÐ P7 26 Ðid.óóó ó€at€497.€€After€the€Kentucky€federal€court€determined€that€it€lacked€personal€jurisdiction€over€theÐ 09€48 ÐTennessee€trial€judge€and€the€Chancery€Court,€Borg„Warner€voluntarily€dismissed€those€claims.€€ÏThe€Kentucky€federal€court€heard€the€claims€against€Guardsmark€on€the€merits,€found€thatÏGuardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants€were€enforceable,€and€dismissed€Borg„Warnerððs€claims€againstÏGuardsmark.€€ò òòòSee€id.ó óóó€at€502.œñP1ñ׃×ñP1ññP1ñ׃×ñP1ñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€Ð P   Ðà  àIt€is€unclear€how€application€of€the€doctrine€of€œòòres€judicataóó›€is€favorable€to€Borg„WarnerÐ 0 € Ðunder€these€circumstances,€since€the€Kentucky€federal€court€refused€to€enjoin€enforcement€of€theÏTennessee€injunction€at€issue€here,€and€dismissed€Borg„Warnerððs€claims€against€Guardsmark.€ÏAlthough€the€Kentucky€federal€court€decision€was€rendered€ten€months€after€the€trial€court€in€thisÏcase€granted€summary€judgment€for€Guardsmark,€Borg„Warner€contends€that€the€doctrine€of€òòresÐ ° Ðjudicataóó€applies€because€the€federal€decision,€though€appealed,€was€final€and€the€trial€courtððsÐ à Ðdecision€in€this€case€was€not€final.€€Of€course,€since€the€Kentucky€federal€courtððs€decision€wasÏrendered€months€after€the€decision€in€this€Court,€the€issue€ofòò€res€judicataóó€was€not€raised€in€the€trialÐ P  Ðcourt.€€Under€all€of€these€circumstances,€we€find€this€argument€to€be€without€merit.€Ìà  àBorg„Warner€also€contends€on€appeal€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€summary€judgmentÏto€Guardsmark€and€in€issuing€the€injunctive€relief€sought.€€Borg„Warner€argues€in€part€that€theÏinjunction€is€overly€broad€and€violates€the€Commerce€Clause€of€the€United€States€Constitution.œñP1ñ׃p×ñP1ññP1ñ׃p×ñP1ñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€Ð Ð  ÐBorg„Warner€maintains€that€the€trial€courtððs€order€affects€interstate€commerce€in€security€guardÏservices€outside€Tennessee,€and€therefore€has€the€effect€of€regulating€interstate€commerce€whollyÏoutside€Tennessee.€€Ìà  àThe€initial€complaint€in€this€case€was€based€on€Borg„Warnerððs€actions€in€a€given€situationÏin€Seattle,€Washington.€€The€supplemental€complaint€sought€relief€based€on€Borg„Warnerððs€conductÏat€a€particular€facility€in€Birmingham,€Alabama.€€Subsequently,€Guardsmark€sought€broader€relief,Ïœalleging,›€and€submitting€documents€œindicating,›€that€Borg„Warner€was€engaged€in€wide„rangingÏefforts€to€challenge€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants.€€Guardsmark€sought€an€order€enjoining€œñI1ñÐ  Ð/ +. ÐñI1ñBorg„Warner›€œfromñG1ñ€ñG1ññI1ñ›ñI1ññH1ñ:ñH1ñ›ÌÓÓà8  à1.€€Taking€any€action€to€interfere€with€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants€with€itsÏpast,€present€or€future€employees;Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à2.€€Making€misrepresentations€regarding€Guardsmark€and€its€restrictive€covenants;Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à3.€œInitiating›€and€encouraging€or€assisting€others€in€litigation€to€challenge€theÏenforceability€of€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants€with€its€employees;€andÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à4.€€From€proceeding€with€or€taking€part€in€the€litigation€filed€by€Borg„Warner€inÏBirmingham,€Alabama,€in€the€Circuit€Court€of€Jefferson€County,€Alabama,€at€CivilÏAction€No.€CV„94„05690.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓGuardsmarkððs€request€for€injunctive€relief€was€granted€œòòin€totoóó›€the€same€day.Ð Ð  Ðà  àIn€support€of€its€argument,€Borg„Warner€cites€ò òòòHyatt€Corp.€v.€Hyatt€Legal€Servicesó óóó,€610€F.Ð ° ÐSupp.€381€(N.D.€Ill.,€E.D.€1985).€€In€ò òòòHyattó óóó,€the€plaintiff,€Hyatt€Corporation,€sought€a€nationwideÐ à Ðinjunction€prohibiting€the€defendant€from€using€the€trademarked€name€Hyatt€for€its€service,€HyattÏLegal€Services.€€The€trial€court€denied€the€plaintiffððs€motion€for€a€preliminary€injunction,€and€theÏSeventh€Circuit€Court€of€Appeals€reversed,€finding€that€use€of€the€name€Hyatt€Legal€Services€wasÏa€probable€violation€of€the€Illinois€Anti„Dilution€Act,€in€that€it€diluted€the€distinctiveness€of€theÏplaintiffððs€mark.€€ò òòòSee€id.ó óóó€at€381„82.€€The€appellate€court€remanded€the€action€to€the€trial€court€ð ðforÐ ð@ Ðentry€of€an€injunction€prohibiting€the€appellee€from€using€the€name€Hyatt€Legal€Servicesðð€andÏordered€the€defendant€to€select€a€new€name.€€ò òòòId.ó óóóÐ °"  Ðà  àOn€remand,€the€trial€court€examined€a€nationwide€injunction€in€order€to€enforce€HyattÏCorporationððs€protectable€property€right€against€dilution€of€its€mark,€under€Illinoisðð€anti„dilutionÏstatute.€€ò òòòSee€id.ó óóó€at€382.€€The€trial€court€noted€first€that€the€trial€court€had€the€power€to€issue€aÐ P( #& Ðnationwide€injunction,€by€virtue€of€its€jurisdiction€over€the€parties.€€ò òòòSee€id.ó óóó€at€383.€€However,€theÐ 0*€%( Ðò òòòHyattó óóó€court€œfound€that›€the€issuance€of€a€nationwide€injunction€in€that€case€would€conflict€with€theÐ ,`'* ÐCommerce€Clause€of€the€United€States€Constitution.€€ò òòòSee€id.ó óóó€at€383„85.€€The€court€noted,€under€theÐ ð-@), ÐCommerce€Clause,€ÌÓÓà8  à(1)€that€states€cannot€directly€regulate€interstate€commerce;€and€(2)€that€incidentalÏregulations€of€interstate€commerce€cannot€be€excessive€in€light€of€local€interestsÏfurthered€by€the€law.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€at€383€(citingò òòò€Edgar€v.€MITE€Corp.ó óóó,€457€U.S.€624,€640,€102€S.€Ct.€2629,€2639,€73€L.€œEd.›€2d€269Ð p5À04 Ð(1982)).€€Observing€that€advertising€is€a€ð ðvital€aspect€of€interest€commerce,ðð€the€court€found€that€a€Ï€state€injunction€directed€at€advertising€out€of€the€state€ð ðwould€appear€to€be€a€direct€interference€withÐ 09€48 Ðinterstate€commerce.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€court€found€that€such€a€direct€interference€with€interstate€commerceÐ ° Ðwould€conflict€with€the€Commerce€Clause.€€ò òòòSee€id.€ó óóóat€384.Ð à Ðà  àIn€the€alternative,€the€ò òòòHyattó óóó€court€examined€whether€the€injunction€would€be€an€ð ðincidentalððÐ pÀ Ðregulation€of€interstate€commerce€that€violated€the€Commerce€Clause.€€Quoting€ò òòòPike€v.€BruceÐ P   ÐChurch,€Inc.ó óóó,€397€U.S.€137,€90€S.€Ct.€844,€25€L.€Ed.€2d€174€(1970),€the€ò òòòHyattó óóó€court€stated:Ð 0 € ÐÓÓà8  àWhere€the€[state]€statute€regulates€evenhandedly€to€effectuate€a€legitimate€localÏpublic€interest€and€its€effects€on€interstate€commerce€are€only€incidental,€it€will€beÏupheld€unless€the€burden€imposed€on€such€commerce€is€clearly€excessive€in€relationÏto€the€punitive€local€benefits.€.€.€.€If€a€legitimate€local€purpose€is€found€then€theÏquestion€becomes€one€of€degree.€€And€the€extend€of€the€burden€that€will€be€toleratedÏwill€of€course€depend€on€the€nature€of€the€local€interest€involved,€and€on€whether€itÏcould€be€promoted€as€well€with€a€lesser€impact€on€interstate€activities.€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌò òòòÓÓId.ó óóó€at€384€(quoting€ò òòòPikeó óóó,€397€U.S.€at€142,€90€S.€Ct.€at€847).€€In€ò òòòHyattó óóó,€the€local€interest€was€theÐ à Ðprotection€of€the€corporationððs€trademark€within€the€state.€€ò òòòSee€id.ó óóó€€Noting€that€trademark€protectionÐ pÀ Ðdiffers€among€states,€the€ò òòòHyattó óóó€court€found€that€a€nationwide€injunction,€while€effective€to€protectÐ P  Ðthe€local€interest,€appeared€ð ðexcessive.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€385.€The€court€stated:Ð 0€ ÐÓÓà8  àThe€nationwide€injunction€proposed€by€plaintiff€would€eliminate€any€dilutionÏproblem.€€The€injunction€sought€by€plaintiff,€however,€would€also€reach€way€beyondÏthe€limits€of€Illinois,€affecting€advertising€and€promotion€in€areas€which€have€little,Ïif€any,€effect€on€the€strength€of€plaintiffððs€trademark€within€Illinois.€€The€thought€ofÏan€Illinois€statute,€in€the€absence€of€fraud,€affecting€the€advertising€of€an€Ohio€legalÏoffice€to€Ohio€citizens€in€Ohio,€where€no€anti„dilution€statute€exists,€is€particularlyÏdisquieting.€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓò òòòId.€€ó óóóThe€ò òòòHyattó óóó€court€concluded€that€a€nationwide€injunction,€even€if€it€only€incidentally€affectedÐ $à" Ðinterstate€commerce,€ð ðwould€place€an€excessive€burden€on€that€commerce€in€light€of€the€interestÏsought€to€be€protected.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó ó€€óóNevertheless,€because€the€appellate€court€had€directed€the€trial€court€Ð P( #& Ѐto€issue€a€nationwide€injunction,€the€trial€court€did€so.€€ò òòòSee€id.ó óóó€at€385„86.€€However,€the€trial€courtÐ 0*€%( Ðstayed€the€injunction€pending€appeal.€€ò òòòSee€id.€ó óóóat€386.€€The€record€shows€no€further€published€actionÐ ,`'* Ðon€the€case.Ìà  àGuardsmark€insists€that€the€trial€court€in€this€case€had€the€power€to€issue€a€nationwideÏinjunction,€and€argues€that€Tennessee€has€a€legitimate€interest€in€protecting€GuardsmarkððsÏcontractual€provisions€in€any€state.€€Guardsmark€cites€ò òòòCarson€v.€Hereððs€Johnny€Portable€Toilets,Ð 3à.2 ÐInc.ó óóó,€810€F.2d€104€(6th€Cir.€1987),€in€which€the€court€upheld€the€issuance€of€a€nationwide€injunctionÐ p5À04 Ðto€prevent€the€dilution€of€the€plaintiffððs€state„created€rights.€€Guardsmark€argues€that€Borg„WarnerÏmay€seek€modification€of€the€injunction€for€states€whose€laws€differ€from€Tennessee€regarding€theÐ 09€48 Ðenforcement€of€restrictive€covenants,€conceding€that€at€least€one€state,€California,€has€enactedÏstatutes€which€would€prevent€the€enforcement€of€Guardsmarkððs€covenants.Ìà  àDetermining€the€geographic€scope€of€an€injunction€is€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€Ïòòò òSeeó óóó€ò òòòDeere€&€Co.€v.€MTD€Prod.,€Inc.ó óóó,€41€F.3d€39€(2d€Cir.€1994).€€The€trial€court€in€this€case,€havingÐ P   Ðjurisdiction€over€the€parties,€had€the€power€and€authority€to€issue€an€injunction€crossing€state€lines.€Ïò òòòSeeó óóó,€ò òòòe.g.óóó ó,€ò òòòInstrumentalist€Co.€v.€Marine€Corps.€Leagueó óóó,€509€F.€Supp.€323,€340€(N.D.€Ill.€1981),Ð `  Ðòòaffððdóó,€694€F.2d€145€(7th€Cir.€1982);ò òòò€Champions€Golf€Club,€Inc.€v.€Sunrise€Land€Corp.ó óóó,€846€F.Ð ð@  ÐSupp.€742,€759€(W.D.€Ark.€1994)€(and€cases€collected€therein);€Restatement€(Second)€of€ConflictÏof€Laws€ðð€53.Ìà  àIn€this€case,€Guardsmarkððs€interest€is€protection€of€its€nationwide€right€to€prohibit€employeesÏfrom€providing€security€services€at€a€given€site€after€Guardsmark€no€longer€provides€securityÏservices€at€that€site.€€The€trial€court€found€that€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants€were€limited€inÏscope€and€reasonable,€and€therefore€enforceable€under€the€laws€of€Tennessee€and€other€states.€ÏHowever,€the€enforcement€of€any€restrictive€covenant€depends€greatly€on€the€facts€presented€in€aÏgiven€situation.€€As€between€the€parties€in€this€case,€the€courts€of€at€least€two€states,€Arizona€andÏOklahoma,€declined€to€enforce€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenant€under€certain€circumstances.€€InÏboth€of€those€cases,€the€employee€subject€to€the€restrictive€covenant€was€not€offered€another€positionÏby€Guardsmark€after€Guardsmarkððs€services€at€the€site€of€employment€were€terminated.€€In€theÏOklahoma€decision,€the€court€stated:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àViewed€without€regard€to€attendant€circumstances,€the€Guardsmark€covenantÏfalls€well€within€the€realm€of€reasonableness.€€It€is€clearly€limited€in€scope,€and€theÏprohibited€ð ðactivityðð€is€limited€to€protecting€the€employer€from€having€its€stock€ofÏemployees€at€a€facility€ð ðraidedðð€by€a€competitor.€€However,€viewing€the€restraint€inÏlight€of€all€the€circumstances€surrounding€Guardsmarkððs€implementation€of€it€hereÏmakes€the€covenant€much€less€reasonable.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àPlaintiffððs€evidence€showed€that€the€loss€of€the€Amoco€contract€„„€and€henceÏthe€loss€of€his€job€„„€occurred€solely€because€of€ò òòòGuardsmarkó óóó.€€Burns€had€already€wonÐ Ð/ +. Ðthe€contract€when€it€approached€plaintiff,€and€Guardsmark€had€no€other€jobsÏavailable.€€These€factors€alone€do€away€with€Guardsmarkððs€argument€that€theÏcovenant€was€needed€to€protect€its€ð ðinvestmentðð€in€its€employees,€since€by€the€timeÏplaintiff€was€contacted,€that€ð ðinvestmentðð€was€already€lost.€€There€is€no€allegationÏthat€plaintiff€possessed€any€trade€secrets€or€confidential€information,€that€he€had€aÏparticular€unique€or€unusual€talent,€or€that€the€nature€of€his€work€was€somethingÏother€than€work€in€the€nature€of€a€ð ðcommon€calling.ððÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àThus,€regardless€of€how€narrowly€the€covenant€was€drawn,€viewing€it€in€theÏtotality€of€the€circumstances€„„€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€plaintiff€„„€presentsÏconsiderable€evidence€of€its€unreasonable€harshness€to€plaintiff.€€Further,Ð  :p59 ÐGuardsmarkððs€attempt€to€enforce€the€covenant€occurred€at€a€time€when€the€value€ofÏthe€covenant€to€Guardsmark€was€minimal€at€best.€€In€other€words,€plaintiffððsÏevidence€is€such€that€„„€disregarding€conflicting€evidence€from€Guardsmark€whichÏmight€show€otherwise€„„€the€trial€court€should€have€deemed€the€covenantÏunenforceable€and€against€public€policy€under€the€specific€facts€and€circumstances.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓòòò òHankins€v.€Guardsmark,€Inc.ó óóó,€No.€80,€121,€at€9„10€(Okla.€Ct.€App.€Mar.€15,€1994)€(unpublishedÐ P   Мmem.ñR1ñop.ñR1ñ).›€€Clearly,€the€enforceability€of€a€restrictive€covenant€must€be€viewed€in€light€of€all€of€theÏcircumstances€in€a€given€situation.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€Restatement€(Second)€of€Contracts€ðð€186€œcmt.›€a,€ðð€188€œcmt.›Ð `  Ðg€(1981).€€Section€188,€comment€g,€to€the€Second€Restatement€of€Contracts€was€quoted€withÏapproval€in€ò òòòSelox,€Inc.€v.€Fordó óóó,€675€S.W.2d€474,€476€(Tenn.€1984):Ð Ð  ÐÓÓà8  àWhether€the€risk€that€the€employee€may€do€injury€to€the€employer€is€sufficient€toÏjustify€a€promise€to€refrain€from€competition€after€the€termination€of€the€employmentÏwould€depend€on€the€facts€of€the€particular€case.€€Post„employment€restraints€areÏscrutinized€with€particular€care€because€they€are€often€the€product€of€unequalÏbargaining€power€and€because€the€employee€is€likely€to€give€scant€attention€to€theÏhardship€he€may€later€suffer€through€the€loss€of€his€livelihood.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓò òòòSeloxó óóó,€675€S.W.2d€at€476€(quoting€Restatement€(Second)€of€Contracts€ðð€188€cmt.€g).€€Moreover,€theÐ @ Ðlevel€of€support€for€the€enforcement€of€restrictive€covenants€may€differ€from€state€to€state.€€ò òòòSee,€œe.g.,›Ð  p ÐAmerican€Protective€Servs.,€Inc.€v.€Guardsmark,€Inc.óóó ó,€BC€115277€(Cal.€Super.€Ct.€Los€AngelesÐ P ÐCounty)€(transcript€of€proceedings€on€Feb.€21,€1996)€(citing€section€16600€of€the€California€BusinessÏand€Professional€Code€as€prohibiting€the€enforcement€of€restrictive€covenants).€€Where€theÏenforceability€of€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenant€is€so€dependent€on€the€facts€in€a€particularÏsituation€and€the€laws€and€public€policy€of€the€state€in€which€the€employee€resides,€issuance€of€aÏnationwide€injunction€is€clearly€inappropriate.€€Therefore,€while€the€trial€court€in€this€case€hadÏjurisdiction€over€the€parties€and€the€power€and€authority€to€issue€a€nationwide€injunction€underÏappropriate€circumstances,€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€by€issuing€an€injunction,€nationwideÏin€scope,€prohibiting€Borg„Warner€from€ð ðinterfering€with€or€attempting€to€cause€the€breachðð€of€theÏrestrictive€covenants,€or€from€litigating€to€challenge€the€enforceability€of€the€covenants.Ìà  àAs€noted€above,€the€trial€courtððs€temporary€injunction,€made€permanent€in€its€final€order,Ïenjoins€Borg„Warner€from:ÌÓÓà8  àmisrepresenting€facts,€either€expressly€or€by€implication,€to€anyone,€includingÏformer,€present€or€prospective€Guardsmark€clients€and€employees,€concerningÏGuardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants.€€Specifically,€Defendant€is€prohibited€fromÏproviding€such€persons€or€entities,€copies€of€any€judicial€orders€or€opinionsÏconcerning€the€Guardsmark€restrictive€covenants€unless€it€provides€all€such€orders,Ïincluding€those€which€have€upheld€the€enforceability€of€Guardsmarkððs€restrictiveÏcovenants.Ð :p59Ð Ð  ЇÓÓAs€discussed€above,€the€enforceability€of€Guardsmarkððs€restrictive€covenants€depends€on€the€factualÏcircumstances€and€other€factors,€such€as€the€laws€and€public€policy€of€the€state€in€which€theÏemployee€is€located.œñP1ñ׃×ñP1ññP1ñ׃×ñP1ñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€€Consequently,€if€Borg„Warner€expresses€the€view€that€GuardsmarkððsÐ pÀ Ðrestrictive€covenant€may€not€be€enforceable€in€a€given€situation,€the€truth€of€the€statement€dependsÏon€the€factual€circumstances€and€the€law€in€the€state€involved.€€Therefore,€the€issuance€of€aÏnationwide€injunction€prohibiting€Borg„Warner€from€taking€the€position€that€GuardsmarkððsÏrestrictive€covenant€cannot€be€enforced€in€a€particular€situation€is€overly€broad€and€inappropriate.€ÏThe€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€ordering€such€a€broad,€nationwide€prohibition.€Ìà  àBorg„Warner€next€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€allowing€Guardsmark€to€seek€aÏdeclaratory€judgment€as€to€the€validity€of€its€restrictive€covenants€without€joining€as€defendants€theÏindividual€security€guards€who€signed€the€covenants.€€Borg„Warner€contends€that€the€guards€areÏindispensable€parties€under€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€29„14„107(a),€which€provides:€ð ðWhenÏdeclaratory€relief€is€sought,€all€persons€shall€be€made€parties€who€have€or€claim€any€interest€whichÏwould€be€affected€by€the€declaration,€and€no€declaration€shall€prejudice€the€rights€of€persons€notÏparties€to€the€proceedings.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„14„107(a)€(1980).€€Ìà  àð ðThe€non„joinder€of€necessary€parties€is€fatal€on€the€question€of€justiciability,€which,€in€a€suitÏfor€declaratory€judgment,€is€a€necessary€condition€of€judicial€relief.ðð€€€€òòò òHuntsville€Utility€District€v.Ð °"  ÐGeneral€Trustó óóó,€839€S.W.2d€397,€400€(Tenn.€App.€1992)€(quoting€òòò òWright€v.€Nashville€Gas€&Ð $à" ÐHeating€Coó ó.óó,€183€Tenn.€594,€598,€194€S.W.2d€459,€461€(1946)).€€Guardsmark€argues€that€aÐ p&À!$ Ðdeclaration€that€the€restrictive€covenants€are€enforceable€in€this€case€does€not€prejudice€the€rights€ofÏthe€security€guards€who€signed€the€covenants,€because€they€remain€free€to€challenge€the€covenantsÏin€individual€actions.€€Therefore,€Guardsmark€contends€that,€under€Section€29„14„107(a),€theÏdeclaratory€judgment€does€not€ð ðprejudice€the€rights€of€persons€not€parties€to€the€proceedings.ðð€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€29„14„107(a)€(1980).Ìà  àTo€determine€whether€the€guardsðð€interests€would€be€affected€by€a€declaratory€judgment€inÏthis€case,€it€must€be€determined€whether€Guardsmark€could€use€the€declaratory€judgment€against€theÏguards€in€subsequent€lawsuits€under€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel.€€Collateral€estoppelÐ p5À04 МñQ1ññK1ñÐ p5À04 ÐÐ p5À04 ÐñK1ññL1ñÐ p5À04 ÐñL1ññQ1ñð ðprecludes›€relitigation€of€issues€between€the€parties€or€their€privies€in€different€causes€of€actionÏprovided€resolution€of€the€issue€was€necessary€to€the€decision.ðð€€òòò òPhillips€v.€General€Motors€Corp.ó óóó,Ð à Ð669€S.W.2d€665,€667€(Tenn.€App.€1984)€(citing€òòò òScales€v.€Scalesó óóó,€564€S.W.2d€667€(Tenn.€App.Ð pÀ Ð1977)).€€If€Guardsmark€could€utilize€the€declaratory€judgment€in€this€case€to€prevent€relitigation€ofÏthe€validity€of€the€covenants€in€subsequent€actions€against€the€guards€in€Washington€and€Alabama,Ïthis€would€clearly€prejudice€the€rights€of€the€guards.€€œResolution›€of€this€issue,€therefore,€entails€aÏstudy€of€the€œlaws›€of€those€states€and€factual€circumstances€of€each€subsequent€case.œ×ƒ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€€The€law€onÐ ð@  Ðcollateral€estoppel€may€differ€from€state€to€state€as€to€whether€mutuality€of€parties€is€required,€theÏdefinition€of€privity,€and€other€relevant€issues.€€The€issue€may€turn€on€the€facts€of€the€particular€case.€ÏA€case€by€case€determination€is€necessary€to€ascertain€whether€a€guardððs€interests€are€affected€and,Ïthus,€whether€he€is€an€indispensable€party.€€Therefore,€in€this€case,€we€remand€for€the€trial€court€toÏdetermine€whether€the€individual€guards€in€Washington€and€Alabama€are€indispensable€parties.€€¼à  àBecause€we€find€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€issuing€a€sweeping,€nationwideÏinjunction€in€this€case,€it€is€unnecessary€to€reach€the€issue€of€whether€the€injunction€violates€theÏCommerce€Clause€of€the€U.S.€Constitution.€€Likewise,€the€remaining€issues€raised€by€Borg„WarnerÏare€pretermitted€by€this€holding.Ìà  àThe€order€of€injunction€issued€by€the€trial€court€in€this€case€is€hereby€reversed.€€The€causeÏis€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€a€determination€of€whether€Guardsmark€is€entitled€to€summaryÏœjudgment›€in€the€specific€factual€circumstances€presented€in€Seattle,€Washington€and€Birmingham,ÏAlabama€and€whether€the€guards€are€indispensable€parties€considering€the€doctrine€of€collateralÏestoppel€under€the€laws€of€Washington€and€Alabama.ÌœñJ1ñÐ  ,`'* ÐñJ1ñ›à  àThe€decision€of€the€trial€court€œisñM1ñ€affirmed€in€part,ñM1ññN1ññM1ñ€ñM1ññN1ñ›€œreversedñO1ñ€in€partñO1ñ,›€and€the€cause€is€remandedÏfor€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€Opinion.€€Costs€are€assessed€against€Appellee,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓÓÔ‡X—XXXX¬ƒÔà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð 0 € Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àò òóóHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ð  l  Ðó óà  àò òÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ¸  ÐóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.€J.,€W.S.Ð ¤ô  ÐÌÌó óòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð h¸ Ðóóò òDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ó ó€Ð T¤ Ðà  àÔ#†X¬ƒXXX—X¹Ü#Ô