ÿWPC …# VU:a %› 0(¡b Éw@Õ4 ) 0l8 0D¤ è 0Jð 0T: 0^Ž 0hì 0rT 0|Æ 0†B 0È 1uX 0dÍ U*1B)[DC„ÆÇ 0@ 0KÍ AO Bg D3„÷· D+®®Ùv~‡vÓ AØ AOuÆÄ 0DŠ D/Î Bý˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0nLHÎ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - 6D78D9:D;<D=>Ó€HDÒ 3|xH((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d####7Border 1ddLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó€&'$Cþÿ << Gÿÿ d))))'ÿÿdxd íÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÔ€"ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€"XÔÌÌMay€23,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó'ÈÈÈÈdxd ¤Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€"ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÓ` °‰X‰x‘XÓIn€some€cases,€the€jury€may€have€to€answer€specific€questions€in€order€to€properly€performÏits€function.€€Cases€of€comparative€fault€are€a€good€example.€€òòSee€McIntyre€v.€Balentine›óó,€833€S.W.2dÏ52€(Tenn.€1992).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%&', I&mage <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKK€&‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€ÔXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÞ ÞÌEDGAR›€HAROLD€HARRIS,€II,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9609„CH„00444ÌœVS›.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àMontgomery€Chancery̜ـ€ÙßR€(+$A1-j|Õ` ç `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€91„68„153ÌDOMINION€BANK€OF€MIDDLEà àà à)ÌTENNESSEE€and€DOMINIONà àà à)ÌœBANKSHARES›€MORTGAGE€CORP.,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellants.à àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€MONTGOMERY€COUNTYÌAT€œCLARKSVILLE›,€TENNESSEEÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€JOHN€H.€œGASAWAY›,€III,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌH.€ROWAN€LEATHERS,€IIIÌRANDALL€C.€œFERGUSON›ÌœMANIER›,€HEROD,€œHOLLABAUGH›€&€SMITHÌFirst€Union€Tower€„€Suite€2200Ì150€Fourth€Avenue€NorthÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219Ìà àAttorneys€for€Plaintiff/AppelleeÌÌCHARLES€R.€RAYÌ211€Third€Avenue€NorthÌP.€O.€Box€198288ÌNashville,€œTennessee›€37219„8288Ìà àAttorney€for€Defendant/AppellantÌÌÌÌÌà@ àœREVERSED€IN€PART,€MODIFIEDÌà@ àAND€REMANDED›ÌÌÌà@ àÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌTODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌKOCH,€J.ÌÌÇÓÓÓ  Óà@ àò òòòÔ€"„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€œNó óóóÔ€"XÔÌ›Ìà àà àThe€plaintiff,€Edgar€Harold€Harris,€sued€the€Dominion€Bank€ofÏMiddle€Tennessee€for€firing€him€because€of€his€age.€€He€also€sued€DominionÏœBankshares›€Mortgage€Group€for€refusing€to€hire€him€œfor€the€same€reason.›€€In€eachÏcase€the€jury€returned€a€verdict€for€the€plaintiff€for€lost€pay€and€benefits€to€the€dateÏof€trial€and€for€past€and€future€humiliation€and€embarrassment.€€On€appeal€theÏdefendants€argue€that€the€facts€do€not€support€the€verdicts,€that€the€verdicts€awardÏMr.€Harris€a€double€recovery,€that€it€was€error€for€the€trial€judge€to€instruct€the€juryÏto€return€general€verdicts,€and€that€the€trial€judgeððs€charge€was€otherwiseÏerroneous.ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àà àœAt€the€age€of€fifty„five,€Mr.›€Harris€œjoined›€the€First€National€Bank€ofÏœClarksville›€in€1983€as€a€Mortgage€Loan€Officer.€€In€1987,€the€bank€was€acquiredÏby€Dominion€Bank€of€Middle€Tennessee€(hereafter€Dominion€Bank)€but€Mr.ÏHarrisðð€duties€remained€essentially€the€same.€€In€November€of€1990€the€bankÏterminated€Mr.€Harris€from€his€$33,800€per€year€job,€allegedly€because€of€aÏsystem„wide€reduction€in€force.€€In€1991,€Dominion€Bank€eliminated€its€mortgageÏdepartment,€and€an€affiliated€company,€Dominion€Bankshares€Mortgage€GroupÍ(hereafter€Mortgage€Group)€opened€an€office€in€Clarksville€for€the€purpose€ofÏobtaining€mortgages€that€could€be€sold€in€the€secondary€market.€€Mortgage€GroupÏadvertised€for€clerical€help€to€fill€a€position€of€mortgage€loan€processor.€€Mr.€HarrisÏapplied€for€the€job€paying€$13,000€to€$16,000€but€œMortgage›€Group€turned€downÏhis€application.ÌÌà àà àœMr.›€Harris€sued€Dominion€Bank€and€Mortgage€Group€forÏdiscrimination€under€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„401,€et€seq.€€The€trial€judge€instructed€the€jury€œto›€return€a€general€verdict€on€eachÏclaim.€€The€jury€found€for€Mr.€Harris€on€the€wrongful€discharge€claim€and€awardedÏhim€$304,254€for€œlost€wages€and€benefits€to€the€date€of€trial€and€for€humiliation›Ïand€embarrassment,€past€and€œfuture.›€€On€the€œfailure„to„hire›€claim,€the€juryÏreturned€a€œ$225,000€verdict›€for€Mr.€œHarris€for›€the€same€elements€of€œdamages.›€ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€judge€denied€Mr.€Harrisðð€motion€for€pre„judgment€interest,Ïfront€pay,€and€œreinstatement,›€but€awarded€him€discretionary€costs€and€attorneyððsÏœfees.ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌÌà àà àBefore€examining€the€verdicts€themselves€we€will€address€two€of€theÏother€issues€raised€by€the€appellants.€€The€first€is€the€issue€of€the€general€verdicts.€ÍThe€second€is€the€type€of€proof€required€to€establish€a€claim€for€humiliation€andÏembarrassment€under€the€Human€Rights€Act.ÌÌà@ àò òA.€€The€General€Verdictsó óÌÌà àà àThe€appellants€requested€that€the€jury€be€asked€to€answer€specificÏinterrogatories€on€the€issues€of€liability€and€damages.€€Mr.€Harris€objected,€andÏthe€trial€judge€instructed€the€jury€to€return€a€general€verdict€on€each€claim€„„Ïapparently€on€the€basis€of€our€decision€in€òòSasser€v.€Averitt€Expressóó,€839€S.W.2dÏ422€(1992).€€But€asking€the€jury€to€answer€special€interrogatories€or€to€makeÏspecial€findings€does€not€make€the€verdict€a€special€verdict.€€See€75B€Am.€Jur.€2dÏòòTrialóó€ðððð€1836€and€1837.€€In€the€case€most€often€cited€as€the€authority€for€a€partyððsÏright€to€a€general€verdict,€our€Supreme€Court€recognized€that€the€jury€could€beÏasked€to€make€special€findings€in€the€process.€ð ð[S]pecial€issues€or€interrogatoriesÏare€put€to€the€jury€to€elicit€their€answers€to€òòaccompany€their€general€verdictóó€for€theÏpurpose€of€ascertaining€the€basis€of€their€verdict€and€testing€its€consistency€withÏsuch€answers.ðð€€òòHarbison€v.€Briggs€Bros.€Paint€Mfg.€Co.óó,€354€S.W.2d€464€at€469Ï(Tenn.€1962)(emphasis€in€the€original).€€Therefore,€the€trial€judge€could€haveÏrequired€the€jury€to€answer€the€specific€interrogatories.€€€ÌÌà àà àWe€hasten€to€add,€however,€that€there€is€no€òòrightóó€to€have€specialÏinterrogatories€submitted€to€the€jury,€either.× ƒ- ××  ×€€While€our€job€would€be€made€muchÏsimpler€by€the€use€of€special€interrogatories€„„€the€instant€case€is€a€perfectÏexample€„„€we€think€the€question€must€be€left€to€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trialÏjudge.€€Therefore€we€cannot€find€that€asking€the€jury€to€return€a€single€findingÏcovering€back€wages€and€benefits€òòandóó€humiliation€and€embarrassment€isÏreversible.ÌÌò òà@ àB.€€Humiliation€and€Embarrassmentó óÌÌà àà àThe€appellants€argue€that€to€sustain€an€award€for€humiliation€andÏembarrassment€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„306€the€plaintiff€must€prove€moreÏthan€the€humiliation€and€embarrassment€typically€associated€with€losing€a€job.€ÏThe€authority€for€this€argument€comes€from€federal€cases€construing€federalÏstatutes€and€the€Sixth€Circuitððs€opinion€in€òòCampbell€v.€Rust€Engineeringóó,€No.€90„5679€(6th€Cir.,€filed€March€5,€1991).€€òòCampbellóó,€however,€sustained€an€award€forÏhumiliation€and€embarrassment€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„306(7)€where€theÏcourt€found€no€aggravating€circumstances,€and€the€injuries€suffered€were€merelyÏthose€normally€associated€with€losing€a€job.€€The€court€did€find€the€awardÍexcessive€but€merely€suggested€a€remittitur€rather€than€reverse€the€awardÏaltogether.ÌÌà àà àThe€cases€construing€other€statutes€are€not€very€helpful,€particularlyÏthe€cases€involving€statutes€that€allow€recoveries€for€mental€distress,€emotionalÏharm,€or€loss€of€enjoyment€of€life.€€While€these€are€not€necessarily€vaguer€itemsÏthan€humiliation€and€embarrassment,€we€typically€require€a€higher€standard€ofÏproof€for€mental€or€emotional€injuries€as€a€guard€against€spurious€claims.€€òòSeeÏSwallows€v.€Western€Electric€Co.,€Inc.óó,€543€S.W.2d€581€(Tenn.€1976);€òòCamper€v.ÏMinoróó,€915€S.W.2d€437€(Tenn.€1996).ÌÌà àà àIn€this€case,€however,€we€see€no€indication€that€the€legislatureÏintended€to€restrict€recoveries€for€humiliation€and€embarrassment€by€requiringÏcorroboration€or€by€requiring€a€higher€degree€of€proof.›ÌÌà@ àœò òIII.ó ó›Ìœà@ àò òThe€Double€Recoveryó óÌ›Ìà àà àThe€defendants€assert€that€the€two€verdicts€allow€Mr.€Harris€a€doubleÏrecovery€for€lost€wages€and€benefits€from€the€time€Mortgage€Group€refused€to€hireÏhim€until€the€date€of€the€trial.€€A€simple€inspection€of€the€two€verdicts€reveals€thatÏthe€appellantsðð€contention€is€true€„„€if€the€jury€truly€awarded€an€amount€for€lostÍwages€and€benefits€in€each€case€to€the€date€of€trial.€€Compensation€for€the€œtwoÏwrongs›€would€overlap€œfor›€the€period€between€the€œfailure„to„hire›€and€trial.ÌÌà àà àRecognizing€this€œdifficulty,›€Mr.€Harris€seeks€to€escape€it€by€urging€usÏto€assume€that€the€award€for€the€œfailure„to„hire›€is€all€for€past€and€future€humiliationÏand€embarrassment.€€He€asserts€that€our€duty€is€to€construe€the€verdict€in€a€wayÏthat€will€uphold€it.€€òòNewsom€v.€œMarkusóó,›€œ588›€S.W.2d€883€(Tenn.€App.€1979).€€WeÏnote,€however,€this€important€condition€precedent€in€œòòNewsomóó:€we›€must€firstÏexamine€the€terms€of€the€œverdicts›€to€see€if€œthey›€òòcanóó€be€construed€œas€consistent.›ÌœÌà@ àÌà@ àÌÌà àà àUpon€inspecting€the€second€verdict,€the€first€thing€we€note€is€theÏverdict€form€itself.€€€We€think€it€precludes€an€assumption€that€the€second€verdictÏcovered€only€humiliation€and€embarrassment.€€The€form€recites€that€the€verdictÏwas€for€ð ðlost€compensation€and€benefits€incurred€by€the€plaintiff€until€the€date€ofÏtrial€and€for€humiliation€and€embarrassment,€past€and€future,€.€.€.€.ðð€€In€addition,€theÏonly€evidence€touching€Mr.€Harrisðð€humiliation€and€embarrassment€over€not€beingÏhired€by€the€mortgage€company€was€his€testimony€that€he€was€upset€whenÏsomeone€told€him€that€his€application€had€been€thrown€aside€because€the€personÏdoing€the€hiring€thought€Mr.€Harris€was€ð ðtoo€old.ðð€€In€our€opinion,€that€evidenceÍdoes€not€entitle€Mr.€Harris€to€any€compensation€for€humiliation€andÏembarrassment.€€There€is€no€evidence€that€anyone€else€in€his€community€evenÏknew€that€he€had€applied€for€the€job,€except€for€the€persons€who€were€directlyÏinvolved.€€He€had€already€been€humiliated€and€embarrassed€by€losing€his€priorÏjob,€and€the€jury€rewarded€him€for€that,€both€ð ðpast€and€future.ðð€€The€additionalÏhurts€from€not€being€hired€to€a€much€lower€position€would€ordinarily€be€òòdeÏminimus›óó.€€œAn€award€to€Mr.€Harris€for€any€humiliation€and€embarrassment€from€theÏfailure„to„hire€would€involve€pure€speculation.›ÌÌà àà àWe€are€of€the€opinion,€œtherefore,›€that€the€verdict€for€Mr.€Harris€on€theÏfailure„to„hire€claim€œcannot€be€based€on€humiliation€and€embarrassment.€€Since€itÏcannot€include€back€pay€either€„„€because€he€was€awarded€compensation€at€aÏhigher€rate€for€the€wrongful€discharge€up€to€the€date€of€trial€„„€we€conclude€that€theÏaward€for€the€failure€to€hire€must€be€reversed€and€dismissed.ÌÇ›à@ àœò òIV.ó ó›ÌÌà àà àWe€next€examine€the€judgment€for€the€wrongful€discharge.€€TheÏbank€asserts€that€œage›€was€not€a€factor€in€Mr.€Harrisðð€discharge,€that€the€verdictÏwas€excessive,€and€that€the€jury€charge€was€inaccurate€and€confusing.ÌÌà@ àò òA.€€The€Age€Factoró óÌÌà àà àConsidering€the€evidence€as€a€whole,€we€are€convinced€that€theÏquestion€of€whether€age€was€the€reason€Mr.€Harris€was€fired€was€properlyÏsubmitted€to€the€jury.€€The€bankððs€employee€testified€that€they€discussed€Mr.ÏHarrisðð€age€in€making€the€decision€to€terminate€him.€€Although€the€bank€arguesÏthat€the€employeeððs€remarks€were€ð ðstray€remarksðð€under€the€authority€of€òòœLaÏMontagne›€v.€American€Convenience€Products,€Inc.óó,€750€F.œ2d›€1405€(œ7th›€Cir.€1984)Ïand€not€probative€of€age€discrimination,€when€coupled€with€other€evidence€ofÏdisparate€treatment€of€Mr.€Harris€and€younger€employees,€a€jury€question€wasÏcreated€on€the€age€discrimination€issue.€€Since€there€was€some€materialÏevidence€to€support€the€verdict,€it€may€not€be€set€aside€on€appeal.€€Rule€13(d),ÏTenn.€R.€App.€Proc.ÌÌà@ àò òB.€€The€Size€of€the€Verdictó óÌÌà àà àœMr.›€Harris€presented€expert€proof€showing€that€his€lost€wages€andÏbenefits€amounted€to€$204,254.00€at€the€date€of€the€trial.€€Therefore,€this€questionÏboils€down€to€whether€$100,000€for€past€and€future€humiliation€andÏembarrassment€is€excessive.ÌÌà àà àMr.€Harris€offered€the€only€testimony€about€his€humiliation€andÏembarrassment.€€His€testimony€was:€ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àQuestion€by€Mr.€Ray:€Now€after€your€termination€whatÏwas€your€state€of€mind€like,€Mr.€Harris?€€What€was€yourÏpsychological€well„being€like?€€€€ÌÌà8 àà8 àAnswer:€Well,€probably€one€of€the€scariest€positions€IÏhave€ever€been€in€because€I€owed€a€lot€of€money€onÏmy€development€in€the€subdivision.€€I€didnððt€have€anyÏincome€and€it€was€pretty€humiliating€to€be€the€age€that€IÏwas€and€to€suddenly€find€out€you€no€longer€have€a€job.ÌÌà8 àà8 àQuestion€by€Mr.€Ray:€Did€you€have€a€problemÏsleeping?ÌÌà8 àà8 àAnswer:€Well,€I€didnððt€have€a€problem€sleeping€to€theÏbest€I€remember,€but€I€had€problems€„„€you€know,€itððs€aÏlittle€embarrassing€to€get€out€in€public€and€people€thinkÏyouððre€still€at€the€bank€and€youððre€not.ÌÌà8 àà8 àQuestion€by€Mr.€Ray:€Did€you€have€to€tell€people,€ð ðIððveÏbeen€terminated,€I€no€longer€have€a€jobðð?ÌÌà8 àà8 àAnswer:€Thatððs€true.ÌÌà8 àà8 àQuestion€by€Mr.€Ray:€How€did€that€make€you€feel?ÌÌà8 àà8 àAnswer:€It€donððt€make€you€feel€good.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àWe€think€that€a€$100,000€award€for€the€type€of€harm€described€byÏMr.€Harris€is€clearly€excessive.€€He€did€not€suffer€any€aggravated€injuries;€theÏdiscomfort€he€felt€was€the€same€anyone€would€feel€over€losing€a€job.€€òòSeeÏCampbell€v.€Rust€Engineering,€supraóó.€€Therefore,€we€suggest€a€remittitur€toÏ$20,000€for€humiliation€and€œembarrassment,›€making€the€total€verdict€for€theÏwrongful€discharge€$224,254.ÌÌà@ àò òa.€€Mitigation€or€Interim€Earningsó óÌÌà àà àRelative€to€the€wrongful€discharge€verdict,€the€appellant€alleges€thatÏMr.€Harrisðð€claim€must€be€reduced€by€the€substantial€earnings€he€received€afterÏthe€discharge.ÌÌà àà àMr.€Harris€does€not€dispute€the€rule€that€says€his€damages€for€backÏpay€cease€when€he€begins€to€earn€higher€wages€than€he€would€have€receivedÏfrom€his€previous€job.€€òòœWatlington›€v.€University€of€Puerto€Ricoóó,€751€œF.Supp›.€318Ï(D.C.€Puerto€Rico€1990).€€Instead,€he€argues€that€the€income€from€his€outside€realÏestate€activities€were€the€result€of€the€continuation€of€a€business€he€hadÏconducted€in€prior€years€with€the€full€knowledge€and€consent€of€his€employer.€ÏThe€record€shows€a€substantial€increase€in€Mr.€Harrisðð€outside€earnings€in€theÍyears€following€his€discharge,€but€he€explained€that€his€outside€income€wouldÏhave€been€the€same€whether€he€worked€for€the€bank€or€not.€€The€efforts€he€hadÏbeen€making€began€to€pay€off€after€his€discharge.ÌÌà àà àWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€under€this€slate€of€facts,€whether€Mr.ÏœHarrisðð›€award€for€back€pay€should€have€been€reduced€by€his€outside€activitiesÏpresented€a€question€for€the€jury.€€Where€the€jury€resolved€that€question€againstÏthe€appellants€it€must€be€affirmed€if€there€is€any€material€evidence€in€the€record€toÏsupport€it.€€Rule€13(d),€Tenn.€R.€App.€Proc.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellants€charge€that€Mr.€œHarrisð𛀜failure›€to€mitigate€hisÏdamages€must€be€judged€by€the€same€rule.€€We€find€material€evidence€in€theÏrecord€to€support€a€conclusion€that€Mr.€Harris€made€reasonable€efforts€to€obtainÏother€employment.ÌÌà@ àœò òV.›€€The€Jury€Chargeó óÌÌà àà àThe€appellants€assert€that€the€jury€charge€on€the€burden€of€proofÏwas€erroneous€and€unduly€œprejudicial.›€€The€portion€of€the€charge€complained€ofÏwas€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àTo€prove€that€age€was€a€determining€factor€inÏDominionððs€decision€to€eliminate€Plaintiffððs€position,Ïyou€must€first€establish€a€prima€facie€case€ofÏdiscrimination.€€To€establish€a€prima€facie€case€throughÏcircumstantial€evidence,€Plaintiff€first€has€the€burden€ofÏproving€each€of€the€following€elements€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence:ÌÌà8 àà8 àà à1.à àHe€was€forty€years€or€older;ÌÌà àà àà à2.à àHis€employment€was€terminated;ÌÌà àà àà à3.à àHe€was€qualified€to€perform€his€job;€andÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 à4.à àHe€was€replaced€by€a€personÏunder€à àthe€age€of€forty.ÌÌà8 àà8 àPlaintiff€may€also€make€out€his€prima€facie€caseÏthrough€direct€evidence.€ÌÌà àà à.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àIf€you€determine€that€Plaintiff€has€established€aÏprima€facie€case€that€Dominion€eliminated€his€positionÏbecause€of€his€age€or€failed€to€offer€him€employmentÏbecause€of€his€age,€you€must€still€consider€the€reasonsÏgiven€by€Dominion€in€support€of€its€employmentÏdecisions€related€to€Plaintiff.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àThe€appellants€cite€òòSt.€Maryððs€Honor€Center€v.€Hicksóó,€509€U.S.Ï_____€(1993)€as€authority€for€the€rule€that€once€the€case€has€reached€the€jury€it€isÏerror€to€give€the€quoted€instruction.€€Assuming€that€the€ruling€in€that€case€wouldÏapply€to€a€state€court€trying€a€state€cause€of€action€under€the€Tennessee€HumanÍRights€Act,€we€would€still€have€to€determine€if€the€error€more€probably€than€notÏaffected€the€judgment.€€See€Rule€36,€Tenn.€R.€App.€Proc.ÌÌà àà àWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€quoted€part€of€the€charge€was€at€mostÏsurplusage€and€did€not€adversely€affect€the€appellantððs€rights.€€We€do€not€see€howÏthe€jury€could€have€been€confused€by€the€charge€or€how€it€might€have€led€the€juryÏto€return€a€verdict€for€the€plaintiff€where,€without€the€charge,€the€result€would€haveÏbeen€different.€€Therefore,€we€think€the€error,€if€any,€was€harmless.ÌÌœÌÌÌÌ›à@ àœò òVI.ó ó›ÌÌà àà àThe€final€issue€concerns€the€trial€judgeððs€decision€to€allow€theÏplaintiff€to€reopen€his€proof€to€prove€his€efforts€to€mitigate€his€damages.ÌÌà àà àWhen€the€plaintiff€closed€its€case€in€œchief,›€the€trial€judge€had€aÏconference€in€his€chambers€to€determine€what€issues€should€be€presented€to€theÏjury.€€In€the€course€of€that€conference€the€defendants€stated€their€belief€that€theÏplaintiff€had€failed€to€prove€he€had€made€efforts€to€mitigate€his€damages.€ÍAlthough€the€plaintiff€argued€that€the€record€contained€proof€of€his€efforts€toÏmitigate,€his€counsel€œmade›€a€motion€to€re„open€the€proof,€which€the€court€granted.ÌÌà àà àPermitting€additional€proof€after€a€party€has€announced€that€theÏproof€is€closed€is€a€matter€within€the€trial€judgeððs€discretion€and€should€not€beÏdisturbed€on€appeal€unless€the€action€results€in€injustice€to€one€of€the€parties.€ÏòòœHiggins›€v.€œSteide›óó,€œ47›€Tenn.€App.€œ42,›€335€S.W.2d€533€(1959).ÌÌà àà àWhen€we€consider€the€record€as€a€whole€and€note€that€the€plaintiffÏhad€proved€in€his€case€in€chief€that€he€did€apply€to€the€mortgage€company,€weÏconclude€that€the€trial€judge€did€not€abuse€his€discretion.ÌœÌà àà àWe€reverse€the€judgment€for€Mortgage€Groupððs€failure€to€hire€andÏdismiss€that€claim.€€Further,€we€suggest€a€remittitur€in€the€case€against€DominionÏBank€to€$224,254.€€Both€cases€are€remanded€to€the€Chancery€Court€ofÏMontgomery€County€for€further€proceedings.€€Tax€the€costs€one„half€to€theÏappellant€and€one„half€to€Dominion€Bank.›ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌœÌCONCUR:›ÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÇÑ  Ñœ›œ›