ÿWPC  ûÙK 4»œ:$N¤¢¬[.u«Ë;Ë¥ðlí‰çvzºÐ…´åŒ F©ºõjü]¾c¨Åàu쥮‹gØÙ•Á éæ¾dž/í€Á˜~pä‰x>Þð’KúMsÿYºç›û ïŽ H@:hT3…‚xÕŠÂÜIcꢓÏmVɇ!k²¶Ÿ´šïàm|À¶# uÕCdK;[pšÑ‰/dÑS2Ï1¸†)I{¤Ú¥<8( 3ý S‚n¯ÉMˆ$®W‰ˆfe‚!sšmrÖ–˦,-yà¥ø¸Ú_îæ¾çCí¦\G#ÔThe€proceedings€authorized€by€the€rulesÐ ˜è  Ðinclude€mediation,€judicial€settlement€conference,€non„binding€arbitration,€case€evaluation,€mini„Ð „Ô  Ðtrial,€and€summary€jury€trial.€€òòId.óó€at€ðð2.€€A€review€of€the€definitions€of€these€procedures€makes€itÐ pÀ Ðclear€that€each€of€them€requires€agreement€by€the€parties€for€any€resolution€of€the€dispute€as€anÐ \¬ Ðalternative€to€resolution€through€the€well„established€procedures€governing€litigation.€€They€areÐ H˜ Ðsettlement€procedures.€€Conspicuous€in€its€absence€is€a€procedure€for€ð ðbinding€mediation.ððÐ 4„ ÐÌà  àThe€case€was€transferred€for€mediation€by€a€judge.€€Rule€31€identifies€such€a€procedure€asÐ  \ Ða€judicial€settlement€conference,€which€is€ð ða€mediation€conducted€by€a€judicial€officer€other€than€theÐ øH Ðjudge€before€whom€the€case€will€be€tried.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31€ðð2(d).€€The€judicial€officer€to€whomÐ ä4 Ðthe€case€was€transferred€initially€treated€it€as€a€transfer€for€a€judicial€settlement€conference.€Ô‡XiXXXiÔ€TheÐ Ð  Ðmediating€judgeððs€first€order€required€certain€filings€prior€to€what€the€court€termed€a€settlementÐ ¼  Ðconference.€€This€pre„conference€order€also€referred€to€the€proceeding€as€a€ð ðVoluntary€Settlement.ðð€Ô#†XiXXXiøC#ÔÐ ¨ø ÐThus,€the€initial€order€by€the€mediating€judge€is€consistent€with€our€holding€that€the€case€wasÐ ”ä Ðtransferred€for€mediation€by€a€judicial€officer;€thus,€the€proceeding€was€a€judicial€settlementÐ €Ð Ðconference.€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àHaving€determined€that€the€matter€was€referred€for€mediation,€we€must€determined€whetherÐ D!” Ðthe€orders€entered€subsequent€to€the€mediation€or€settlement€conference€are€authorized€by€Rule€31.€Ð 0"€  ÐWe€find€there€are€two€problems€with€those€orders.€€First,€there€is€no€authority€for€a€mediator,Ð ° Ðincluding€a€judicial€officer,€to€enter€an€order€disposing€of€a€case.€€Second,€there€is€no€authorityÐ œì Ðallowing€a€mediator,€including€a€judge,€to€substitute€his€or€her€judgment€of€the€merits€of€the€case€forÐ ˆØ Ðagreement€of€the€parties€as€to€settlement.Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àMediation€is€ð ðan€informal€process€in€which€a€neutral€person,€called€a€mediator,€conductsÐ L œ Ðdiscussions€among€the€disputing€parties€designed€to€enable€them€to€reach€a€mutually€acceptableÐ 8 ˆ Ðagreement€among€themselves€on€all€or€any€part€of€the€issues€in€dispute.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31€ðð€2(c).€Ð $ t ÐA€mediator€has€limited€authority.Ð  ` ÐÌà8  àA€dispute€resolution€neutral,€including€a€judge€acting€in€that€capacity,€has€noÐ è 8  Ðauthority€to€dispose€of€a€case€or€to€enter€an€order€disposing€of€a€case.€€The€neutralððsÐ Ô$  Ðpowers€include€only€the€filing€of€a€report€indicating€whether€the€case€was€completelyÐ À  Ðsettled€or€partially€settled.€€Tenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31€ðð€8.€€Therefore€Rule€31€did€not€vestÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€settlement€judge€herein,€in€his€role€as€mediator,€with€authority€to€enter€an€orderÐ ˜è  Ðdisposing€of€the€case.€€Ð„Ô Ð Ð  ÐÌòòEnvironmental€Abatement,€Inc.€v.€Ô_ÔAstrumÔ_Ô€R.E.€Corp.óó,€27€S.W.3d€530,€540€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000).€Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àSignificantly,€Rule€31€specifically€limits€mediation€by€a€judicial€officer€to€one€who€is€not€theÐ 4„ Ðjudge€before€whom€the€case€will€be€tried€if€it€proceeds€to€trial.€€Tenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31ðð2(d).€Thus,€aÐ  p Ðjudge€who€is€acting€as€a€mediator€is€not€authorized€to€exercise€judicial€power€with€regard€to€theÐ  \ Ðmatter€being€mediated.€€In€addition,€a€specific€prohibition€exists:Ð øH ÐÌà8  àA€person€serving€as€a€Rule€31€dispute€resolution€neutral€in€an€alternative€disputeÐ Ð  Ðresolution€proceeding€shall€not€participate€as€attorney,€advisor,€judge,€guardian„ad„Ð ¼  Ðlitem,€master€or€in€any€other€judicial,€or€quasi„judicial€capacity€in€the€matter€in€whichÐ ¨ø Ðthe€alternative€dispute€resolution€proceeding€was€conducted.ДäÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31€ðð€12(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô).€€Thus,€an€order€of€reference€for€mediation,€or€for€judicial€settlementÐ l¼ Ðconference,€does€not€confer€authority€to€the€mediating€judge€to€enter€an€order,€in€the€exercise€ofÐ X ¨ Ðjudicial€power,€disposing€of€the€case.€€Rule€31€provides€no€such€authority,€and€in€fact€limits€theÐ D!” Ðmediatorððs€authority€to€a€report€to€the€court€before€whom€the€case€is€pending.Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àAbsent€authority€from€Rule€31,€the€question€arises€whether€the€parties€agreed€that€theÐ $X" Ðmediating€court€could€enter€an€order€disposing€of€the€case.€€òòEnvironmental€Abatementóó€dealt€with€theÐ ô$D # Ðauthority€of€the€mediating€judge€to€enter€an€order€reflecting€an€agreement€which€had€been€reachedÐ à%0!$ Ðat€a€settlement€conference€when€agreement€had€been€withdrawn€prior€to€entry€of€the€order.€€InÐ Ì&"% Ðaddition€to€other€holdings,€this€court€found€the€mediating€judge€had€no€authority€by€virtue€of€RuleÐ ¸'#& Ð31€to€enter€an€order€dismissing€the€case.€€In€addition,€we€also€found€that€there€was€no€agreement€byÐ ¤(ô#' Ðthe€parties€that€the€settlement€judge,€acting€as€a€mediator,€could€dispose€of€the€case.€€òòIdóó.€€InÐ )à$( ÐòòEnvironmental€Abatementóó,€we€left€open€the€question€of€whether€an€appropriate€agreement€andÐ |*Ì%) Ðtransfer€order€would€allow€the€mediating€judge€to€enter€an€order€of€compromise€and€settlementÐ h+¸&* Ðreached€after€mediation.€€We€still€leave€that€question€open€because,€although€the€transfer€order€hereinÐ ° Ðrecites€that€the€parties€waived€venue,€which€could€be€interpreted€as€agreement€that€the€mediatingÐ œì Ðcourt€could€enter€an€order€resulting€from€the€mediation,€the€orders€entered€by€the€mediating€courtÐ ˆØ Ðwere€not€the€product€of€settlement€agreement€by€the€parties.€€Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àThe€transfer€order€is€clear€that€the€transfer€was€agreed€to€and€made€solely€for€purposes€of€theÐ L œ Ðmediation.€€A€transfer€for€mediation€is€not€a€transfer€for€disposition€on€any€basis€other€thanÐ 8 ˆ Ðagreement€of€the€parties.€€There€is€nothing€in€Rule€31€which€authorizes€any€sort€of€alternative€disputeÐ $ t Ðresolution€process€which€removes€the€agreement€of€the€parties€as€a€requirement.€€Thus,€there€is€noÐ  ` Ðauthority€to€support€an€interpretation€of€the€term€ð ðbinding€mediationðð€€used€in€the€transfer€order€asÐ ü L  Ðgranting€authority€to€the€mediator€to€substitute€its€judgment€of€the€merits€of€the€dispute€for€anÐ è 8  Ðagreement€between€the€parties.€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àMethods€available€to€private€parties€for€resolution€of€their€disputes€without€recourse€to€courtsÐ ¬ü  Ðabound.€€The€Supreme€Court€has€recognized€that€in€the€private€sector€various€practices€exist€forÐ ˜è  Ðdispute€resolution.€€Rule€31€does€not€affect€those€practices.€€Tenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31€ðð€1.€€One€exampleÐ „Ô  Ðof€such€private€procedures€allowing€for€a€binding€decision€made€without€recourse€to€the€rulesÐ pÀ Ðgoverning€litigation€is€arbitration€pursuant€to€Tennesseeððs€version€of€€the€Uniform€Arbitration€Act,Ð \¬ ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€29„5„301€et.€seq.€€Arbitration€is€a€procedure€resulting€from€an€agreement€by€theÐ H˜ Ðparties€to€substitute€ð ða€tribunal€of€their€own€choosing€for€the€one€provided€and€established€by€law.ðð€Ð 4„ ÐòòArnold€v.€Morgan€Keegan€&€Co.,€Inc.óó,€914€S.W.2d€445,€452€(Tenn.€1996).€€Thus,€arbitration€is€anÐ  p Ðextra€judicial€procedure.€€Although€the€Act€authorizes€courts€to€enforce€agreements€to€arbitrate€andÐ  \ Ðto€enter€judgment€on€the€award€resulting€from€an€arbitration,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„5„302,€we€find€Ð øH Ðno€authority€for€a€judge€to€act€as€an€arbitrator.€€Because€arbitration€is€an€extra€judicial€procedure€andÐ ä4 Ðnot€available€as€a€court„annexed€alternative€dispute€resolution€method,€the€procedure€herein€cannotÐ Ð  Ðbe€accurately€described€as€an€arbitration.€€In€addition,€the€Act€€includes€protections€ð ðto€preventÐ ¼  Ðparties€from€being€victimized€by€the€very€finality€that€makes€arbitration€the€procedure€of€choice€forÐ ¨ø Ðcertain€types€of€disputes.ðð€€òòSmith€v.€Smithóó,€989€S.W.2d€346,€348€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€€AmongÐ ”ä Ðthose€protections€is€a€written€agreement€to€arbitrate.€€òòIdóó.€€There€is€no€such€written€agreement€in€theÐ €Ð Ðrecord€before€us.€€Therefore,€to€the€extent€the€defendant€argues€that€the€orders€herein€constitute€anÐ l¼ Ðarbitration€award€which€cannot€be€vacated€absent€certain€statutorily€defined€circumstances,€we€findÐ X ¨ Ðsuch€argument€inapplicable€to€the€orders€which€resulted€from€the€mediation€procedures€herein.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àWe€conclude€that€the€case€was€transferred€to€the€judicial€officer€in€Davidson€County€for€theÐ #l! Ðpurpose€of€conducting€a€mediation€as€that€term€is€defined€in€Rule€31€of€the€Rules€of€the€TennesseeÐ $X" ÐSupreme€Court.€€Accordingly,€òòóówe€conclude€that€the€mediating€court€was€without€authority€to€order€Ð ô$D # Ðdismissal€of€the€case€or€to€enjoin€action€by€any€party.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌÓ  ÓII.Ð ¸'#& ÐÌÓÆfÓà  àThe€issue€before€us€is€whether€the€trial€court€in€Williamson€County€properly€denied€Ms.Ð )à$( ÐHarrisððs€motion€for€relief€from€judgment€or€orders,€filed€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02.€€As€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðdefendant€correctly€asserts,€this€courtððs€review€of€that€decision€is€limited€to€whether€the€trial€courtÐ h+¸&* Ðabused€its€discretion.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòUnderwood€v.€Zurich€Ins.€Co.óó,€854€S.W.2d€94,€97€(Tenn.€1993).€€Ô‡XiXXXiÔThe€abuseÐ ° Ðof€discretion€standard€requires€us€to€consider:€(1)€whether€the€decision€has€a€sufficient€evidentiaryÐ œì Ðfoundation;€(2)€whether€the€trial€court€correctly€identified€and€properly€applied€the€appropriate€legalÐ ˆØ Ðprinciples;€and€(3)€whether€the€decision€is€within€the€range€of€acceptable€alternatives.€€òòState€ex€rel.Ð tÄ ÐVaughn€v.€Kaatrudeóó,€21€S.W.3d€244,€248€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000).€€While€we€will€set€aside€aÐ `° Ðdiscretionary€decision€if€it€does€not€rest€on€an€adequate€evidentiary€foundation,€or€if€it€is€contrary€toÐ L œ Ðthe€governing€law,€we€will€not€substitute€our€judgment€for€that€of€the€trial€court€merely€because€weÐ 8 ˆ Ðmight€have€chosen€another€alternative.Ô#†XiXXXii#Ô€€òòId.óó€Ð $ t ÐÌà  àRule€60.02€€provides:Ð ü L  ÐÌà8  àOn€motion€and€upon€such€terms€as€are€just,€the€court€may€relieve€a€party€or€theÐ Ô$  Ðpartyððs€legal€representative€from€a€final€judgment,€order€or€proceeding€for€theÐ À  Ðfollowing€reasons:€(1)€mistake,€inadvertence,€surprise€or€excusable€neglect;€(2)€fraudÐ ¬ü  Ð(whether€heretofore€denominated€as€intrinsic€or€extrinsic),€misrepresentation,€or€otherÐ ˜è  Ðmisconduct€of€an€adverse€party;€(3)€the€judgment€is€void;€(4)€the€judgment€has€beenÐ „Ô  Ðsatisfied,€released€or€discharged,€or€a€prior€judgment€upon€which€it€is€based€has€beenÐ pÀ Ðreversed€or€otherwise€vacated,€or€it€is€no€longer€equitable€that€a€judgment€shouldÐ \¬ Ðhave€prospective€application;€or€(5)€any€other€reason€justifying€relief€from€theÐ H˜ Ðoperation€of€the€judgment.Ð4„Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àRelief€under€Rule€60.02€is€considered€ð ðan€exceptional€remedy.ðð€€òòNails€v.€Aetna€Ins.€Co.óó,€834Ð ä4 ÐS.W.2d€275,€294€(Tenn.€1992).€€The€function€of€the€rule€is€ð ðto€strike€a€proper€balance€between€theÐ Ð  Ðcompeting€principles€of€finality€and€justice.ðð€€òòBanks€v.€Ô_ÔDementÔ_Ô€Constr.€Co.,€Incóó.,€817€S.W.2d€16,€18Ð ¼  Ð(Tenn.€1991)€(quoting€òòJerkins€v.€McKinneyóó,€533€S.W.2d€275,€280€(Tenn.€1976)).€€In€examining€theÐ ¨ø Ðpurpose€of€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02,€our€Supreme€Court€has€said:Ð ”ä ÐÌà8  àð ðRule€60.02€acts€as€an€escape€valve€from€possible€inequity€that€might€otherwise€ariseÐ l¼ Ðfrom€the€unrelenting€imposition€of€the€principle€of€finality€imbedded€in€ourÐ X ¨ Ðprocedural€rules.€.€.€.ðð€€Because€of€the€importance€of€this€ð ðprinciple€of€finality,ðð€theÐ D!” Ðð ðescape€valveðð€should€not€be€easily€opened.Ð0"€ Ð Ð  ÐÌòòBanksóó,€817€S.W.2d€at€18òò€óó(quoting€òòÔ_ÔToneyÔ_Ô€v.€Mueller€Co.óó,€810€S.W.2d€145,€146€(Tenn.€1991)).€€Ð $X" ÐÌà  àThe€defendant€asserts€that€Ms.€Harrisððs€motion€cited€only€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(5)€as€itsÐ à%0!$ Ðbasis,€and€that€she€cannot€now€seek€relief€under€any€other€subsection€of€the€rule,€primarily€referringÐ Ì&"% Ðto€her€arguments€in€support€of€relief€under€subsections€(1)€and€(2).€€However,€at€the€time€of€the€filingÐ ¸'#& Ðof€the€motion€for€relief€from€judgment,€Ms.€Harris€was€unrepresented€by€counsel€and€filed€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðmotion€òòpro€se.óó€€Ð )à$( Їà  àParties€who€represent€themselves€are€entitled€to€fair€and€equal€treatment€by€the€courts.€Ð ° ÐòòWhitaker€v.€Whirlpool€Corpóó.,€32€S.W.3d€222,€227€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000).€€Courts€should€take€intoÐ œì Ðaccount€that€many€òòpro€seóó€litigants€have€no€legal€training€and€little€familiarity€with€the€judicialÐ ˆØ Ðsystem.€€òòIrvin€v.€City€of€Clarksvilleóó,€767€S.W.2d€649,€652€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€While€courts€mayÐ tÄ Ðnot€allow€òòpro€seóó€litigants€to€shift€the€burden€of€litigation€to€the€courts€or€the€opposing€party€and€mayÐ `° Ðnot€excuse€a€òòpro€seóó€litigant€from€complying€with€the€same€substantive€and€procedural€rules€thatÐ L œ Ðrepresented€parties€are€expected€to€observe,€òòEdmunson€v.€Prattóó,€945€S.W.2d€754,€755€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð 8 ˆ ÐApp.€1996),€courts€give€òòpro€seóó€litigants€who€are€untrained€in€the€law€a€certain€amount€of€leeway€inÐ $ t Ðdrafting€their€pleadings€and€other€legal€filings.€€òòWhitakeróó,€32€S.W.3d€at€227.€€Accordingly,€weÐ  ` Ðmeasure€the€papers€prepared€by€òòpro€seóó€litigants€using€standards€that€are€less€stringent€than€thoseÐ ü L  Ðapplied€to€papers€prepared€by€lawyers.€€òòHughes€v.€Roweóó,€449€U.S.€5,€9„10,€101€S.€Ct.€173,€176Ð è 8  Ð(1980);€òòWinchester€v.€Littleóó,€996€S.W.2d€818,€824€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€Even€though€courtsÐ Ô$  Ðcannot€create€claims€or€defenses€for€òòpro€seóó€litigants€where€none€exist,€òòRampy€v.€ICI€Acrylics,€Incóó.,Ð À  Ð898€S.W.2d€196,€198€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994),€they€should€give€effect€to€the€substance,€rather€than€theÐ ¬ü  Ðform€or€terminology,€of€a€òòpro€seóó€litigantððs€papers.òò€€Brown€v.€City€of€Manchesteróó,€722€S.W.2d€394,Ð ˜è  Ð397€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1986);òò€Usrey€v.€Lewisóó,€553€S.W.2d€612,€614€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1977).Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àMs.€Harrisððs€motion€clearly€questions€the€validity€of€the€orders€of€the€mediating€judge.€€WeÐ \¬ Ðthink€a€fair€reading€of€that€motion€would€include€a€claim€that€those€orders€were€void.€€A€voidÐ H˜ Ðjudgment€lacks€validity€anywhere€and€is€subject€to€attack€from€any€angle.€€òòState€ex€rel.€Ragsdale€v.Ð 4„ ÐSandefuróó,€215€Tenn.€690,€701,€389€S.W.2d€266,€271€(1965);€òòAcuff€v.€Danielóó,€215€Tenn.€520,€525,Ð  p Ð387€S.W.2d€796,€798€(1965).€€Neither€the€trial€court€nor€this€court€can€enforce€a€judgment€which€isÐ  \ Ðvoid.€€The€issue€of€the€validity€of€the€judgments€and€orders€herein€has€been€raised,€and,€if€theÐ øH Ðjudgment€is€void,€Ms.€Harris€has€stated€a€claim€for€relief€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02(3).Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àTo€be€found€void,€a€judgment€must€have€been€rendered€by€a€court€lacking€jurisdiction€overÐ ¼  Ðthe€subject€matter€or€the€parties€or€acting€in€some€other€manner€inconsistent€with€the€requirementsÐ ¨ø Ðof€due€process.€€òòMagnavox€Co.€v.€Boles€&€Hite€Constr.€Co.óó,€583€S.W.2d€611,€613€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ”ä Ð1979).€€In€òòNew€York€Casualty€Co.€v.€Lawsonóó,€160€Tenn.€329,€24€S.W.2d€881€(1930),€our€SupremeÐ €Ð ÐCourt€said:Ð l¼ ÐÌà8  àA€void€judgment€is€one€which€shows€upon€the€face€of€the€record€a€want€ofÐ D!” Ðjurisdiction€in€the€court€assuming€to€render€the€judgment,€which€want€of€jurisdictionÐ 0"€  Ðmay€be€either€of€the€person,€or€of€the€subject„matter€generally,€or€of€the€particularÐ #l! Ðquestion€attempted€to€be€decided€or€the€relief€assumed€to€be€given.€€(CitationsÐ $X" Ðomitted).Ðô$D #Ð Ð  ÐÌ160€Tenn.€at€336,€24€S.W.2d€at€883.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àA€court€cannot€validly€adjudicate€upon€a€subject€matter€which€does€not€fall€within€itsÐ ¤(ô#' Ðprovince€as€defined€and€limited€by€law.€€òòSee€Chickamauga€Trust€Co.€v.€Lonasóó,€139€Tenn.€228,€201Ð )à$( Ðâ âÔ_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€777€(1917).€€As€stated€in€the€Restatement,€ð ðA€judgment€may€properly€be€rendered€against€aÐ |*Ì%) Ðparty€only€if€the€court€has€authority€to€adjudicate€the€type€of€controversy€involved€in€the€action.ðð€Ð ° ÐòòRestatement€(Second)€of€the€Law€of€Judgmentsóó€ðð€11€(1982).€€In€òòChickamaugaóó,€the€Court€said:Ð œì Ðâ âÌà8  àð ðEven€where€a€court€has€jurisdiction€over€the€parties€and€the€subject„matter,€yet€if€itÐ tÄ Ðmakes€a€decree€which€is€not€within€the€powers€granted€it€by€the€law€of€itsÐ `° Ðorganization,€its€decree€is€void.€€Thus,€a€judgment€may€be€collaterally€attacked€whereÐ L œ Ðthe€court€had€jurisdiction€of€the€parties€and€the€subject„matter€of€action,€but€did€notÐ 8 ˆ Ðhave€jurisdiction€of€the€question€which€the€judgment€assumed€to€determine,€or€toÐ $ t Ðgrant€the€particular€relief€which€it€assumed€to€afford€to€the€litigants.€.€.€.ððÐ `Ð Ð  ÐÌ139€Tenn.€at€235„36,€201€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€at€778„79€(citation€omitted).Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àWe€have€already€determined€that€the€mediating€judge€had€no€authority€to€dispose€of€this€caseÐ À  Ðon€the€merits.€€While€authorized€to€mediate€the€dispute,€the€court€dismissed€Ms.€Harrisððs€case€andÐ ¬ü  Ðenjoined€Ms.€Harris€from€contacting€the€defendant.€€Authority€to€dismiss€complaints€and€to€issueÐ ˜è  Ðinjunctions€lies€in€those€authorized€to€wield€the€judicial€power€of€the€state,€and€a€mediating€judgeÐ „Ô  Ðhas€no€such€authority€regarding€a€matter€submitted€for€mediation€or€judicial€settlement€conference.€Ð pÀ ÐThe€limits€of€the€mediating€judgeððs€authority€were€established€by€Rule€31€of€the€Tennessee€SupremeÐ \¬ ÐCourt€and€by€the€transfer€order€based€upon€that€rule.€€Thus,€the€order€entered€by€the€mediating€courtÐ H˜ Ðon€April€5,€1999,€was€void.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àIt€is€well€settled€that€a€void€judgment€cannot€be€enforced€and€that€ð ðjudgments€or€decreesÐ  \ Ðwhich€have€been€declared€to€be€void€bind€nobody,€bar€nobody,€are€nullities,€and€justify€no€act€doneÐ øH Ðthereafter.ðð€€òòHinton€v.€Robinsonóó,€51€Tenn.€App.€1,€6,€364€S.W.2d€97,€99€(1962).€€ð ðFrom€its€inception,Ð ä4 Ða€void€judgment€continues€to€be€absolutely€null.€€It€is€incapable€of€being€confirmed,€ratified,€orÐ Ð  Ðenforced€in€any€manner€or€to€any€degree.ðð€òòÔ_ÔGuinnÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔGuinnÔ_Ôóó,€No.€W1999„01809„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV,€2001Ð ¼  ÐWL€359243,€at€*5€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€April€6,€2001)€(no€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed)€(quotingÐ ¨ø ÐòòBlackððs€Law€Dictionaryóó€848€(7th€ed.€1999).€€Accordingly,€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€Ms.Ð ”ä ÐHarrisððs€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60€motion€on€the€basis€that€it€violated€the€April€5€order€of€the€DavidsonÐ €Ð ÐCounty€court€is€reversed.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àUnder€Tenn.€R.€Sup.€Ct.€31,€the€action€available€to€the€mediating€judge€in€the€event€that€a€Ð D!” Ðsettlement€was€not€reached€by€the€parties€was€to€report€back€to€the€trial€court€(the€court€withÐ 0"€  Ðauthority€to€dispose€of€the€litigation).€€Had€such€a€report€been€made€in€this€case€after€the€judicialÐ #l! Ðsettlement€conference€or€mediation,€the€litigation€would€have€been€lodged€in€the€Williamson€CountyÐ $X" ÐCircuit€Court€for€trial€or€other€appropriate€resolution.€€None€of€the€orders€subsequent€to€the€voidÐ ô$D # ÐApril€5€order€should€have€been€entered€in€Davidson€County€Circuit€Court€because€that€court€had€noÐ à%0!$ Ðjurisdiction€beyond€reporting€the€results€of€the€mediation.€€Additionally,€a€void€order€cannot€beÐ Ì&"% Ðamended.€€The€attempt€at€settlement€through€alternative€dispute€resolution€pursuant€to€Rule€31Ð ¸'#& Ðhaving€been€unsuccessful,€the€case€is€at€the€same€procedural€posture€as€it€was€prior€to€the€transferÐ ¤(ô#' Ðfor€mediation.Ð )à$( ÐÌÐ h+¸&* ЇÓ  ÓIII.Ð ° ÐÓK˜ÓÌà  àThe€defendant€asserts,€however,€that€Ms.€Harris€is€precluded€from€seeking€post€judgmentÐ ˆØ Ðrelief€from€an€agreed€order,€relying€on€the€principle€that€€ð ð[Ô_Ôw]hereÔ_Ô€a€decree€is€made€by€consent€ofÐ tÄ Ðcounsel,€there€lies€not€an€appeal€or€re„hearing,€though€the€party€did€not€really€give€his€consent€.€.€.Ð `° Ð.ðð€€òòKelly€v.€Walkeróó,€208€Tenn.€388,€392,€346€S.W.2d€253,€255€(1961).€€Because€her€attorneysÐ L œ Ðexecuted€the€ð ðagreed€orders,ðð€the€defendant€asserts€that€Ms.€Harris€is€deemed€to€have€made€aÐ 8 ˆ Ðdeliberate€decision€to€consent€to€their€provisions,€because€ð ðcounselððs€knowledge€must€be€attributedÐ $ t Ðto€his€client,€if€the€actions€of€the€court€are€to€have€any€efficacy.ððòò€€Davidson€v.€Davidsonóó,€916€S.W.2dÐ  ` Ð918,€921€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àThe€effect€of€the€ð ðagreed€ordersðð€is€not€entirely€clear.€€First,€they€were€entered€after€theÐ Ô$  ÐDavidson€County€court€transferred€the€case€back€to€Williamson€County€and€after€the€DavidsonÐ À  ÐCounty€court€reaffirmed€its€transfer.€€In€addition,€the€signature€of€the€attorneys€is€preceded€by€theÐ ¬ü  Ðwords€ð ðApproved€for€Entry,ðð€generally€an€indication€that€the€attorneys€merely€agree€that€theÐ ˜è  Ðsubstance€of€the€order€coincides€with€the€ruling€of€the€court,€not€that€the€substance€of€the€orders€isÐ „Ô  Ðthe€result€of€agreement€of€the€parties.€€Since€the€ð ðAgreed€Amended€Ordersðð€simply,€in€large€part,Ð pÀ Ðrepeat€the€findings€and€orders€of€the€court€as€set€out€in€the€April€5€order,€the€ð ðApproved€for€EntryððÐ \¬ Ðdesignation€is€consistent€with€the€generally€accepted€understanding€of€that€term.€€The€only€portionÐ H˜ Ðof€the€order€which€purports€to€represent€an€agreement€of€the€parties€regards€the€waiver€of€any€rightÐ 4„ Ðof€appeal.€€The€fact€that€no€agreement€of€the€parties€existed€with€regard€to€the€other€portions€of€theÐ  p Ðorder€is€evidenced€by€the€correction€made€in€the€Second€Agreed€Amended€Order€which€removed€theÐ  \ Ðð ðparties€have€agreedðð€language€from€the€injunction€from€further€contact.€€Thus,€in€large€part,€theÐ øH Ðamending€ð ðagreed€ordersðð€are€simply€further€orders€of€the€mediating€judge.Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àIn€any€event,€the€two€orders€attempt€to€amend€an€order€we€have€determined€was€void.€€AsÐ ¼  Ðthis€court€has€stated,€ð ða€void€judgment€or€decree€cannot€be€amended€because€such€a€judgment€orÐ ¨ø Ðdecree€is€a€complete€nullity.ðð€€òòÔ_ÔGuinnÔ_Ôóó,€2001€WL€359243,€at€*5.€€Therefore,€we€find€the€attemptedÐ ”ä Ðamendment€ineffective€and€the€ð ðagreed€ordersðð€entered€subsequent€to€the€void€order€also€void€andÐ €Ð Ðof€no€effect.€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThe€one€portion€of€the€Second€Agreed€Order€which€purported€to€constitute€an€agreementÐ D!” Ðbetween€the€parties€stated€ð ðthe€parties€have€agreed,€as€is€evidenced€by€the€signatures€of€theirÐ 0"€  Ðrespective€counsel,€below,€that€each€shall€waive€any€right€of€appeal€in€this€cause€that€either€may€haveÐ #l! Ðhad.ðð€€Had€the€original€order€of€April€5€or€the€attempts€to€amend€that€order€not€been€void,€it€couldÐ $X" Ðbe€argued€that€Ms.€Harris€waived€her€right€to€challenge€the€disposition€set€out€in€the€April€5€order.€Ð ô$D # ÐWaiver€is€a€voluntary€relinquishment€of€a€known€right€or€privilege.€€òòEstate€Ô_ÔFaughtÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔFaughtÔ_Ôóó,€730Ð à%0!$ ÐS.W.2d€323,€325€(Tenn.€1987);€òòÔ_ÔChattemÔ_Ô,€Inc.€v.€Provident€Life€&€Accident€Ins.€Co.óó,€676€S.W.2d€953,Ð Ì&"% Ð955€(Tenn.€1984).€ð ðThus,€when€an€individual€does€not€know€of€his€rights€or€when€he€fails€toÐ ¸'#& Ðunderstand€them,€there€can€be€no€effective€waiver€of€those€rights.ðð€€òòÔ_ÔFaughtÔ_Ôóó,€730€S.W.2d€at€326.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌÐ  |*Ì%) Ðà  àThe€April€5€order€stated€that€ð ðfurther€litigation€of€this€matter€would€not€be€judiciallyÐ ° Ðefficientðð€and€had€ordered€that€ð ðany€further€litigation€of€this€issue€would€be€moot€and€the€plaintiffÐ œì Ðis€therefore€enjoined€from€pursuing€further€litigation€involving€this€defendant,€his€family€orÐ ˆØ Ðassociates.ðð€€Thus,€at€the€time€of€the€attempted€amended€orders,€Ms.€Harris€had€been€precluded€byÐ tÄ Ðcourt€order€from€further€attempts€at€judicial€relief€in€this€matter.€€The€Williamson€County€courtÐ `° Ðobviously€found€this€order€to€be€enforceable.€€Thus,€the€question€of€whether€Ms.€Harris,€through€herÐ L œ Ðcounsel,€waived€a€right€she€knew€existed€at€the€time€of€the€ð ðagreedðð€orders€is€not€easily€answered.€Ð 8 ˆ ÐHowever,€we€need€not€determine€the€answer€to€that€question€because€the€April€5€order€and€allÐ $ t Ðsubsequent€orders€are€void.€€Thus,€no€portion€of€those€orders,€including€the€waiver€of€appeal,€mayÐ  ` Ðbe€enforced€as€a€court€judgment.€€Because€a€void€order€may€be€attacked€at€any€time€and€from€anyÐ ü L  Ðangle,€Ms.€Harris€is€not€precluded€from€seeking€relief€from€such€order€by€the€agreement€set€out€inÐ è 8  Ða€later€order€which€is€itself€void.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àWe€are€unaware€of€any€authority€for€a€trial€court€to€enjoin€a€party€from€appealing€an€orderÐ ¬ü  Ðof€that€court,€and€any€such€attempted€injunction€would,€in€our€opinion,€be€contrary€to€public€policyÐ ˜è  Ðand€to€constitutional€guarantees€of€access€to€the€courts.€€Although€the€trial€courtððs€orders€herein€wereÐ „Ô  Ðbased€upon€a€transfer€for€mediation,€no€mutually€agreeable€settlement€of€the€merits€of€the€disputeÐ pÀ Ðwas€reached.€€Thus,€while€parties€may,€as€part€of€a€settlement€agreement,€agree€not€to€pursue€theÐ \¬ Ðdispute€further,€the€orders€in€this€case€are€not€the€product€of€such€agreement.€We€can€only€concludeÐ H˜ Ðthat€the€orders€were€intended€to€be€an€exercise€of€judicial€authority,€and€we€have€determined€thatÐ 4„ Ðexercise€to€be€void.Ð  p ÐÌà  àEven€a€valid€consent€judgment€ð ðdoes€not€represent€the€reasoned€decision€of€the€court€but€isÐ øH Ðmerely€the€agreement€of€the€parties,€made€a€matter€of€record€by€the€court.ðð€€òòÔ_ÔHarbourÔ_Ô€v.€Brown€forÐ ä4 ÐUlrichóó,€732€S.W.2d€598,€599€(Tenn.€1987).òòóó€€To€the€extent€the€defendant€believes€the€SecondÐ Ð  ÐAmended€Order€includes€an€enforceable€agreement€between€the€parties,€he€is€not€without€remedy.€Ð ¼  ÐBecause€an€agreement€to€compromise€and€settle€litigation€is€a€contract€between€the€parties€to€thatÐ ¨ø Ðlitigation,€issues€of€the€enforceability€and€interpretation€of€that€agreement€are€governed€by€contractÐ ”ä Ðlaw.€€òòEnvironmental€Abatementóó,€27€S.W.3d€at€539.€€Such€an€agreement€may€be€a€binding€contract,Ð €Ð Ðsubject€to€being€enforced€as€other€contracts.€€òòÔ_ÔHarbourÔ_Ôóó,€732€S.W.2d€at€599„600.€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThe€issue€before€us,€however,€is€not€whether€the€defendant€has€a€cause€of€action€to€enforceÐ D!” Ðan€agreement€with€Ms.€Harris€not€to€appeal€the€orders€entered€in€the€Davidson€County€court€by€theÐ 0"€  Ðmediating€judge.€€Rather,€the€question€is€whether€Ms.€Harris€is€entitled€to€relief€from€those€orders.€Ð #l! ÐWe€decline€to€enforce€any€part€of€the€void€orders€and€find€that€Ms.€Harris€is€not€precluded€fromÐ $X" Ðrelief€from€such€orders.€€Because€we€have€found€the€orders€are€void,€they€are€unenforceable;€Ð ô$D # Ðtherefore,€it€would€make€little€sense€for€this€court€to€refuse€to€vacate€them.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌÐ  ¸'#& Ðà  àWe€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€decision€denying€Ms.€Harrisððs€request€for€relief€from€orders€underÐ ° ÐTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02.€€Further,€we€vacate€all€orders€entered€in€the€Davidson€County€Circuit€Court.€Ð œì ÐThe€case€is€remanded€to€the€Circuit€Court€for€Williamson€County€for€appropriate€proceedings.€€CostsÐ ˆØ Ðare€taxed€to€the€Appellee.Ð tÄ ÐÌÌÌà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#à___________________________________à @Ä" àà @Ä" àà @Ä" àà @Ä" àà @Ä" àà @Ä" àÐ $ t ÐPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGEÐ `(#(# Ð