ÿWPC oxñnbn"‰Êu±DRDÈ}e‡9kÒ»–ñvWT&©_«I„ë2»}îqñ~:µÑ’%†+Òjs@ÜâJé:Ÿ‡m̆Þ~–‘×c>`o}“é IÔ\­> œŽÿ’²¯w†±å\Èøù‹ÞÓ>-ص)"­ZOæshóø x‘`K“Ò /$þóöÙø:aeúŒ÷D_½v³Å¶‹E»´4A3&›“až÷ª[«oJUãöB&ñ‡²ð›†>8¹}`_6ŸœwÁoR¢ñÙX"âר”“5k»cÆq¬–Wøq¬BoÑúéûàêá@> T‚tçd.Áq)wÙ+d F¨mÀìàᣋю+Xç‚Û²êQg#›î'­*‹Ðì§ý¸’¹? ú:Ãá¾¹K—KôËÿf=ÿ:¢º­©é ¤]»ÞÓÚ ~{V¢ÝÒì\öÀÐmÜ]tyHSgY èñr4Nk²Ë¥,q“p/ÎJ‘e*Bб›¥l3]~quÕ “üµ{à0ú»±¦$egM@#$ »ëôˆ`yOa—ï:«7#GOꂘÁ$‚»í.@Ž2;æ¸N®ý:sq¤Ä—‰úÒ<´st$r½¿¾âsÙ4»Ç—b#Á\ % ^ # 0ˆ/ UN· w 4 z Ò— i x mz UN‘ Æß Æ¥ Æk Æ1 0D÷N;=U>EEƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒb………………… 0: 06ÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇÇ 0ëýýýý Bèè 0¤ D3© D-Ü 0K   ASTƧ 0¤m 0D A«U˜HP LaserJet 4050ÈÈÈÈÈÈÈÈ0»kz-s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular¬|&-ê:i¢Ø+00 ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(uHš Z‹6Times New Roman RegularLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ô\  `‹&Times New Roman- ù-4ÿÿ2Emphasisòòóó0ÿÿ.Strongò òó ó(|G2*¢$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Vý»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€X©X»»Ô d(|3G•$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Vý»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3G•$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Vý»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Vý»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€¼Vý»»»ÔÑ8€©XXdì»»d8ÑÌà@¦ ¦ ìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  Ðà@””$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEˆÐ Ô$ Ðà@ooìàOctober€2,€2002€SessionˆÐ æ6 ÐÔ‡X©X»¼VýÔÌò òÔ#†¼Vý»XX©¢#ÔÓ  ÓLINDA€SUE€LONG€HATHAWAY€(BRANSTETTER),€v.€GLENNÐ ä 4 ÐJEFFERIES€HATHAWAYòòóóÔ‡X©X»¼VýÔó óÐ ø H ÐÓèÓÌà@¼ ¼ ìàò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Knox€CountyˆÐ ø H Ðà@w w ìàNo.€44828€€€€€€Hon.€Bill€Swann,€Circuit€JudgeˆÐ ä 4  ÐÌÔ_Ôà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àÔ_Ôà À àFILED€NOVEMBER€26,€Ô_Ô2002Ô_ÔÌà@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<§` A߈Ð ¨ø  ÐÌà@¶¶ìàNo.€E2002„00659„COA„R3„CV€ˆÐ £ó  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<z` AßÐ {Ë Ðó óÌÌThe€Trial€Court€ordered€father€to€pay€daughterððs€tuition€to€a€college€of€her€choice,€based€upon€aÐ b² Ðprovision€in€the€Marriage€Dissolution€Agreement.€€On€appeal,€we€modify.Ð Nž ÐÌÌÔ#†¼Vý»XX©P#ÔÔ‡X©X»¼VýÔò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Affirmed,€as€Modified.ó óÐ b ÐÌÌòòHerschel€Pickens€FranksÔ#†¼Vý»àX©ï#ÔÔ‡X©X.¼VýÔ,óó€J.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€whichòò€Houston€M.€Goddard,Ô#†¼Vý»àX©Â#ÔÔ‡X©X.¼VýÔÐ Ö& ÐP.J.,óó€andòò€D.€Michael€Swiney,Ô#†¼Vý»àX©P#ÔÔ‡X©X.¼VýÔ€J.óó,€joined.Ð Â ÐÌÌJames€H.€Snyder,€Jr.,€Alcoa,€Tennessee,€for€Appellant,€Glenn€Jefferies€Hathaway.Ð †Ö ÐÌRonald€J.€Zuker,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€Appellee,€Linda€Sue€Long€Hathaway€(Ô_ÔBranstetterÔ_Ô).Ð ^!®  ÐÌÌÌÌà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼Vý»XX©É#ÔÔ‡X©X»¼VýԈРú%J!% ÐÌòòÌÌà  àà ` àóóÔ‡ X©XXX©ÔThe€issue€before€the€Trial€Court€and€this€Court€is€the€extent€of€the€fatherððs€obligationÐ ª)ú$) Ðunder€the€partiesðð€Marital€Dissolution€Agreement€which€contains€this€provision:Ð –*æ%* ÐÌà0  àà0` (#(#àThe€husband€shall€pay€all€customary€and€reasonable€tuition€expenses€for€the€partiesððÐ n,¾', Ðminor€children€in€obtaining€a€bachelorððs€degree€or€its€equivalent.Ð#Z-ª(-` (#` (#ý$ #Їà  àà ` àò òó óThe€parties€were€divorced€on€irreconcilable€differences€in€1987.€€Their€two€childrenÐ ° Ðwere€5€and€2€years€old.€€The€ex„wife€and€children€now€reside€in€Florida.€€The€defendant€has€beenÐ œì Ðemployed€by€the€UT€Medical€center€for€19€years€as€of€the€date€of€trial.€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,Ð ˆØ Ðhis€gross€annual€salary€was€$37,200.00.€€At€the€time€of€trial,€his€gross€annual€salary€was€$50,016.00.€Ð tÄ ÐHe€pays€$550.00€per€month€child€support€and€he€has€another€child€from€the€second€marriage.Ð `° ÐÌà  àà ` àDefendant€does€not€dispute€his€obligation€or€his€willingness€to€pay€his€daughterððsÐ 8 ˆ Ðtuition.€€He€contends€that€the€MDA€should€not€be€interpreted€to€mean€there€are€no€limitationsÐ $ t Ðwhatsoever€on€the€amount€that€he€is€obligated€to€pay,€without€regard€to€the€reasonableness€of€theÐ  ` Ðprice,€under€any€circumstances.€€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€partiesðð€daughter,€Adrienne,€graduated€in€the€top€of€her€high€school€class€in€1999.€Ð Ô$  ÐShe€has€interest€and€aptitude€in€interior€design€and€architecture.€€She€applied€and€was€accepted€toÐ À  Ðthe€Maryland€Institute€of€Art.€€The€annual€tuition€for€the€Maryland€Institute€of€Art€is€$19,800.00€forÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€1999„2000€academic€year.€€Adrienne€received€a€scholarship€for€$1,000.00€per€semester,€andÐ ˜è  Ðobtained€loans€which€reduced€the€outstanding€tuition€to€$8,972.78€for€her€freshman€year.€€DefendantÐ „Ô  Ðpaid€€$2,400.00€toward€the€bill,€and€loaned€her€$10,000.00.€Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àà ` àAt€the€hearing€the€Court€ruled€based€upon€ð ðthe€pleadings€touching€upon€the€questionÐ H˜ Ðof€college€tuition,€the€trial€briefs€with€attached€authorities,€and€the€legal€argument€of€counsel€todayÐ 4„ Ðin€court€that€this€is€a€matter€of€law,€and€not€a€factðð.€€The€Court€focused€upon€the€agreement€asÐ  p Ðð ðimportant€language€in€what€it€says€and€what€it€does€not€sayðð,€stating:€Ð  \ ÐÌà0  àà0` (#(#àIt€could€have€had€limiting€terms.€€It€does€not€say,€for€example,€at€the€level€of€a€stateÐ ä4 Ðinstitution.€€It€does€not€say€at€the€level€of€the€University€of€Tennessee,€the€UniversityÐ Ð  Ðof€Maryland.€€It€does€not€say€that€reasonable€shall€be€interpreted€bearing€in€mind€theÐ ¼  Ðpayorððs€circumstances€as€they€obtain€at€the€time€of€the€enrollment€of€the€child.Шø` (#` (# ÐÌà  àà0 ` àAll€of€those€things€could€have€been€here,€and€they€are€not€here.ЀÐ` (#` (# Ðà  àà0 ` à.€.€.Ðl¼` (#` (# ÐÌà8  àà0` Ð Ð àThis€contract€does€not€mean€that€the€father€shall€make€payments€on€tuitionÐ D!” Ðwhich€is€reasonable€for€his€economic€circumstances.€€It€could€have€said€that,Ð 0"€  Ðor€it€could€have€put€a€cap€on€it.€€None€of€those€things€was€done.Ð#l!` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  àà0` Ð Ð àSo€the€question€for€the€Court€is€whether€the€tuition€incurred€by€this€child,Ð ô$D # ÐAdrienneð!ð€and€the€Court€is€very€much€aware€in€todayððs€ruling€that€òòthere€is€yetÐ à%0!$ Ðanother€child€who€may€well€consider€college€in€the€future€and€that€this€rulingÐ Ì&"% Ðwill€obtain€in€that€case,€as€well.€€The€question€for€the€Court€is€whether€theÐ ¸'#& Ðtuition€incurred€by€this€child,€Adrienne,€is€reasonable€given€her€abilitiesóó,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðgiven€the€schoolððs€course€of€study,€given€the€schoolððs€standing.€€In€otherÐ )à$( Ðwords,€is€this€an€appropriate€school€for€this€child?€€Is€this€a€good€school?€Ð |*Ì%) ÐDoes€this€college€make€sense€for€her?€€(Emphasis€supplied).Ðh+¸&*` Ð ` Ð  ЇThe€Court€then€said:Ð ° ÐÌÌà8  àà0` Ð Ð àÐ ` Ð ` Ð  Ðà0  àà0` (#(#àThis€Court€holds€that€in€the€matter€of€Branstetter€and€Hathaway€that€òòit€is€not€for€theÐ `° ÐCourt€to€determine€reasonableness€óóin€the€sense€of€comfort,€reasonableness€in€theÐ L œ Ðsense€of€is€that€what€I€would€choose€to€do,€reasonableness€in€is€this€too€large€aÐ 8 ˆ Ðpercentage€of€my€income.€€This€is€a€contract€that€the€father€made€which€was€open„Ð $ t Ðended€and€is€absolute.€€(Emphasis€supplied).Ð `` (#` (# Ðà  àÌUltimately,€Judgment€was€entered€for€the€plaintiff€for€$8,972.78€for€the€first€year€of€tuition,€andÐ è 8  Ð$14,000.00€for€the€second€year.€€The€Trial€Court,€responding€to€a€post„judgment€Motion€by€theÐ Ô$  Ðdefendant€requesting€to€present€evidence€on€the€issue€of€the€reasonableness€of€the€amount€and€onÐ À  Ðthe€issue€of€the€schoolððs€being€an€appropriate€fit,€was€denied,€but€the€Court€did€set€an€evidentiaryÐ ¬ü  Ðhearing€for€the€defendant€to€present€evidence€on€the€issue€of€absurdity€and/or€impossibility€only.€€AtÐ ˜è  Ðthe€hearing,€the€Court€strictly€limited€the€proof€to€the€issue€of€absurdity/impossibility,€specificallyÐ „Ô  Ðrefusing€to€permit€proof€on€the€issue€of€reasonableness€and€whether€the€school€was€an€appropriateÐ pÀ Ðfit.€€Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àà ` àAt€the€hearing,€the€defendant€testified€that€he€could€not€pay€the€tuition€on€his€yearlyÐ 4„ Ðgross€income,€but€always€intended€to€provide€a€college€education€for€his€children;€that€he€paysÐ  p Ð$550.00€per€month€child€support,€and€that€he€has€personal€savings€of€$2,000.00.€€He€has€no€stocksÐ  \ Ðand€bonds€or€401(k).€€When€Adrienne€told€him€she€could€not€get€further€loans€or€financial€assistance,€Ð øH Ðhe€loaned€her€$7,500.00€from€a€trust€fund,€of€which€he€is€a€trustee,€established€by€his€parents€forÐ ä4 Ðtheir€grandchildren.€€The€trust€now€has€a€balance€of€$400.00.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` àHe€further€testified€that€the€full€tuition€at€the€Maryland€Institute€of€Art€isÐ ¨ø Ðapproximately€one„half€of€his€annual€salary,€and€there€is€no€fat€in€his€budget€that€could€be€cut.€Ð ”ä ÐFollowing€the€hearing,€the€Court€explicitly€reiterated€and€adopted€its€previous€opinion,€andÐ €Ð Ðadditionally€found€there€was€no€absurdity€or€impossibility€in€the€fatherððs€present€circumstances€asÐ l¼ Ðto€financing€the€tuition.€€The€Court€concluded:Ð X ¨ ÐÌà0  àà0` (#(#àThe€Court€has€construed€the€language€of€the€contract€that€the€father€made.€€Itððs€notÐ 0"€  Ðone€that€he€likes€today.€€It€is,€however,€the€contract€that€he€made.€€It€is€the€holding€ofÐ #l! Ðthis€Court€that€persons€live€up€to€a€contract.€.€.€.€€Ð$X"` (#` (# ÐÌà  àà ` àò òó óThe€interpretation€of€a€written€contract€is€a€matter€of€law€and€the€scope€of€appellateÐ à%0!$ Ðreview€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€with€no€presumptions€of€correctness€of€the€lower€courtððsÐ Ì&"% Ðconclusions€of€law.€€òòRainey€v.€Stansell,óó€836€S.W.2d€117,€118€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€€1992).€€The€appellateÐ ¸'#& Ðcourtððs€role€is€to€review€the€agreement€anew€and€make€an€independent€determination€of€its€meaning.€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐòòSee,€Hillsboro€Plaza€Enter.€v.€Moon,óó€860€S.W.2d€45,€47€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€Ð )à$( Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ à€à  àà0 h àÐ|*Ì%)h(#h(# Ðà  àà ` àAgreements€in€marital€dissolution€agreements€for€post„majority€support€areÐ h+¸&* Ðenforceable€contracts,€and€the€payment€of€college€tuition€is€a€valid€contractual€subject€for€a€husbandÐ ° Ðand€wife€in€the€throes€of€a€divorce.€€òòPenland€v.€Penland,óó€521€S.W.2d€222,€224€(Tenn.€1975).€€SuchÐ œì Ðcontractual€obligations€are€binding€upon€the€parties,€and€will€be€construed€by€courts€by€principlesÐ ˆØ Ðof€interpretation€as€any€other€contract.€€òòJones€v.€Jones,óó€503€S.W.2d€924,€929€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1973);Ð tÄ ÐòòBoutin€v.€Boutin,óó€1996€Tenn.€App.€Lexis€770,€No.€01„A01„9601„CH„00014.€Ð `° ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€cardinal€rule€in€interpreting€contracts€is€to€ascertain€and€effectuate€the€intent€ofÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€parties,€consistent€with€legal€principles.€€òòRainey€v.€Stansell,óó€836€S.W.2d€117€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð $ t Ð1992).€€To€arrive€at€that€intent,€it€is€appropriate€to€consider€the€circumstances€of€the€parties€at€theÐ  ` Ðtime€the€contract€was€formed.€€òòHamblen€County€v.€City€of€Morristown,€óó656€S.W.2d€331€(Tenn.Ð ü L  Ð1983).€€Ð è 8  Ðà  àà ` àThe€Trial€Court€found€that€the€defendant€must€pay€all€of€the€tuition,€no€matter€howÐ Ô$  Ðmuch€or€how€difficult,€because€he€had€not€put€any€limitation€upon€the€obligation€in€the€MDA.€Ð À  ÐHowever,€it€is€well€settled€that€ð ð[a]€qualifying€word€which€must€be€read€into€every€contract€is€theÐ ¬ü  Ðword€ððreasonableðð€or€its€equivalent€ððreasonablyðð.€€òòMinor€v.€Minor,óó€863€S.W.2d€51,€54€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ˜è  ÐApp.€1993).€€In€this€case,€the€parties€put€ð ðreasonableðð€in€the€express€language,€which€negates€theÐ „Ô  ÐTrial€Courtððs€interpretation€that€it€is€ð ðopen„ended€and€absoluteðð.€€Moreover,€a€reasonable€andÐ pÀ Ðequitable€construction€is€given€to€all€contracts€by€the€courts.€€òòSee€óó17€Ô_ÔACJSÔ_Ô,€Contracts€ðð333.Ð \¬ ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€use€of€the€term€ð ðreasonableðð€does€not€create€an€ambiguity.€òòHennigan€v.Ð 4„ ÐHennigan,óó€1999€Tenn.€App.€Lexis€329,€No.€01„A01„9807„CH„00380.€€The€Trial€Court€restrictedÐ  p Ðreasonableness€to€ð ðreasonable€in€terms€of€the€appropriate€fit€for€the€childðð.€€ð ðReasonable€for€theÐ  \ Ðeconomic€circumstances€of€the€payorðð€was€held€immaterial.€€However,€the€contractual€languageÐ øH Ðincludes€no€such€limitation€on€the€meaning€of€reasonableness.€€The€term€must€be€interpreted€inÐ ä4 Ðaccordance€with€traditional€contract€law€which€is€reasonable€under€all€the€circumstances.€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€Trial€Court€opined€that€this€case€is€governed€by€òòHennigan,€óófocusing€upon€itsÐ ¨ø Ðlanguage,€wherein€the€Court€observed€that€had€the€defendant€intended€to€limit€either€the€total€amountÐ ”ä Ðor€a€percentage€of€his€obligation€for€educational€expenses,€he€could€have€done€so€in€the€agreementÐ €Ð Ðhe€signed.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àà ` àòòHenniganóó€is€distinguishable€in€several€respects.€€In€that€case€the€Trial€Court€heardÐ D!” Ðevidence€relative€to€a€consideration€of€reasonableness.€€The€opinion€went€on€to€state:€ð ðWhile€fatherÐ 0"€  Ðtestified€that€his€current€monthly€expenses€exceed€his€monthly€income,€the€trial€court€was€notÐ #l! Ðpersuaded€that€the€college€expenses€of€his€daughter€were€unreasonable€in€light€of€his€ability€to€payðð.€Ð $X" ÐòòId.óó€€In€that€case,€the€father€had€been€aware€for€some€time€the€daughter€was€considering€expensiveÐ ô$D # Ðinstitutions,€and€received€a€letter€two€years€earlier€from€the€mother€that€if€he€planned€on€limiting€theÐ à%0!$ Ðchildððs€choices€based€on€tuition,€he€needed€to€talk€to€the€daughter€so€she€wouldnððt€plan€on€thoseÐ Ì&"% Ðschools.€€Also,€he€knew€she€was€visiting€expensive€colleges,€and€he€had€taken€her€to€visit€VanderbiltÐ ¸'#& ÐUniversity€himself.€€Finally,€this€was€a€high€income€case€in€which€it€would€not€have€been€out€of€theÐ ¤(ô#' Ðrealm€or€reason€to€expect€that€expensive€schools€were€an€option.€€The€fatherððs€income€ranged€fromÐ )à$( Ð$343,690.00€to€$583,793.00.€€We€conclude€the€Trial€Court€misapplied€the€òòHenniganóó€case.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àà ` àThe€case€before€us€more€closely€akin€to€òòMoscheo€v.€Moscheo,óó€838€S.W.2d€226€(Tenn.Ð ° ÐCt.€App.€1992)€where€the€interpretation€of€€ð ðwhat€is€reasonableðð€was€an€issue.€€The€operativeÐ œì Ðlanguage€in€the€òòMoscheo€óóagreement€was€that€ð ðhusband€agrees€to€pay€on€behalf€of€the€minor€childÐ ˆØ Ða€reasonable€college€tuition.€.€.ðð€for€a€four„year€program.€€The€child€attended€three€differentÐ tÄ Ðinstitutions;€the€first€one€cost€$7,000.00.€per€semester,€the€second€was€$2,690.00.€€The€father€paidÐ `° Ðthese€obligations,€but€limited€the€amount€to€$6,000.00€for€the€third€school.€€In€construing€theÐ L œ Ðcontract,€this€Court€held€that€€ð ðreasonableðð€did€not€mean€ð ðunlimitedðð.€€The€Court€said:Ð 8 ˆ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà8  àà0hÈÈàÐ hÈhÈ Ðà0  àà0` (#(#àð ðThe€question€then€becomes€what€is€a€ððreasonableðð€amount€of€tuition?€€òòWe€think€theÐ  ` Ðanswer€to€that€question€will€vary€according€to€the€circumstances.€.€.óó€€We€thinkÐ ü L  Ð$6,000€per€year€is€a€reasonable€amount€of€tuition€under€the€circumstances€of€thisÐ è 8  Ðcase.€€It€is€in€the€middle€range€between€the€cost€of€tuition€at€a€good€state„supportedÐ Ô$  Ðuniversity€and€a€moderately€priced€private€institution.€€The€agreement€does€not€setÐ À  Ða€specific€figure,€but€it€could€hardly€be€argued€that€the€agreement€obligated€Mr.Ð ¬ü  ÐMoscheo€to€pay€an€unlimited€amount,€or€that€the€agreement€allowed€Mrs.€MoscheoÐ ˜è  Ðand/or€Angela€to€unilaterally€decide€on€the€college€Angela€would€attend.ðð€(EmphasisÐ „Ô  ÐÔ_Ôadded).Ô_ÔÐpÀ` (#` (# ÐÌId.€at€227„228.òò€€óó€òòÔ_ÔMoscheoÔ_Ôóó€was€decided€after€a€full€evidentiary€hearing,€and€the€opinion€points€out€thatÐ H˜ Ðthe€Court€was€not€modifying€or€altering€the€contract,€but€only€interpreting€the€reasonableness€termsÐ 4„ Ðin€light€of€the€litigantsðð€circumstances.€€Ð  p ÐÌà  àà ` àIn€the€context€of€interpretation€of€divorce€settlement€agreements€containing€languageÐ øH Ðostensibly€obligating€a€parent€to€pay€for€college€expenses€with€no€limitation€stated,€this€Court€€inÐ ä4 Ðreviewing€and€considering€the€issue,€found€there€was€a€split€of€authority€among€jurisdictions.€€òòVickÐ Ð  Ðv.€Vick,óó€1999€Tenn.€App.€Lexis€373,€No.€02A01„9802„CH„00051.€€This€Court€was€persuaded€thatÐ ¼  Ðthe€majority€view€is€the€better€reasoned€approach,€which€requires€determining€whether€the€childððsÐ ¨ø Ðchoice€of€college€is€reasonable,€considering€both€the€childððs€needs€and€the€parentððs€ability€to€pay.€Ð ”ä ÐId.€at€19òò.€€óóThe€Court€concluded€that€this€rule€is€more€consistent€with€the€contractððs€implied€conditionÐ €Ð Ðof€reasonableness,€as€held€in€òòMoore.óó€€The€òòVickóó€opinion€relied€heavily€upon€the€rationale€and€analysisÐ l¼ Ðof€òòIn€re€Marriage€of€Schmidt,óó€684€N.E.2d€1355€(Ill.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€òòSchmidtóó€is€consistent€withÐ X ¨ ÐòòMoscheo€óóin€its€finding€that€because€the€agreement€contained€no€limitation€on€the€defendantððsÐ D!” Ðobligation,€that€did€not€mean€the€child€ð ðcould€attend€any€college,€regardless€of€costðð.€€òòId.óó€at€1362.Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àà ` àð ðReasonableðð€in€this€case€must€be€viewed€in€light€of€the€partiesðð€situation€at€the€timeÐ $X" Ðof€the€divorce.€€Hathaway€has€been€a€state€employee€for€19€or€20€years.€€His€income€and€earningÐ ô$D # Ðcapacity€would€be€fairly€predictable,€and€obvious€to€the€parties€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€Ð à%0!$ ÐReasonable€for€these€parties€in€this€income€level€would€not€be€the€same€as€in€òòHennegar€óówhere€theÐ Ì&"% Ðearnings€were€well€into€six€figuresòò.óó€€€The€parties€in€this€economic€bracket€could€not€reasonablyÐ ¸'#& Ðcontemplate€ð ðthe€sky€is€the€limitðð.€€ð ð[A]€tuition€amount€need€not€be€outrageous€in€order€to€beÐ ¤(ô#' Ðunreasonable.€€If€parents€cannot€pay€what€one€may€consider€a€modest€tuition,€that€amount€is€stillÐ )à$( Ðunreasonable€as€to€them.ðð€€òòCarlton€v.€Carlton,óó€670€So.2d€1129,€1130€(Fla.€Ct.€App.€1996).€Ð |*Ì%) ÐHathaway€testified€that€Ô#†X©XX X©  #ÔÔ‡ X©XXX©ÔÔ#† ¼Vý»X X©J #ÔÔ‡ X©X» ¼VýÔas€a€state€employee,€he€was€eligible€for€a€substantial€tuition€discount€at€theÐ h+¸&* ÐUniversity€of€Tennessee,€and€that€Adrienne,€as€a€Florida€resident,€had€options€at€FloridaððsÐ ° Ðuniversities.€€He€did€not€insist€that€she€attend€any€of€these€schools,€but€cited€them€as€more€in€lineÐ œì Ðwith€his€financial€ability€to€pay.€€The€Supreme€Courtððs€analysis€in€òòBarnett€v.€Barnett,óó€27€S.W.3d€904Ð ˆØ Ð(Tenn.€2000),€is€instructive€where€it€considered€the€effect€of€an€obligation€for€extraordinaryÐ tÄ Ðeducational€expenses€like€private€school€tuition€and€applying€the€child€support€guidelines.€€TheÐ `° ÐCourtððs€analysis€pointed€out€that€the€courtsðð€duty€was€to€achieve€equity€between€the€parties€andÐ L œ Ðshould€not€lead€to€an€interpretation€of€the€guidelines€that€would€achieve€an€absurd€result.€€The€lowerÐ 8 ˆ ÐCourts€were€directed€to€consider€the€income€of€each€parent€in€order€to€allocate€the€extraordinaryÐ $ t Ðexpense,€and€in€light€of€that,€consider€whether€a€downward€deviation€was€appropriate€for€the€obligor.Ð  ` ÐThe€Supreme€Court€said€that€wholesale,€automatic€imposition€of€educational€expenses€upon€anÐ ü L  Ðobligor,€without€considering€all€the€circumstances,€€could€conceivably€amount€to€a€large€percentageÐ è 8  Ðof€income,€ð ðeven€to€the€extent€of€absorbing€every€penny€of€the€obligorððs€income€.€.€.ðð€and€result€inÐ Ô$  Ðimpoverishing€one€parent.€€Such€a€result€would€be€an€absurdity,€the€Court€noted.€Courts€mustÐ À  Ðconsider€the€practical€results€of€their€decisions,€and€not€inflexibly€apply€a€rule€with€no€thought€to€theÐ ¬ü  Ðconsequences.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àà ` àIn€this€case,€the€Trial€Court€acknowledged€that€his€decision€would€impact€the€futureÐ pÀ Ðyearsðð€payment€obligations€as€well€as€the€second€child,€but€seemingly€ignored€the€potentialÐ \¬ Ðconsequences€of€imposing€an€unlimited€obligation€upon€Hathaway.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€Trial€Court€was€in€error€in€holding€that€Mr.€Hathawayððs€income€and€ability€to€payÐ  p Ðwere€not€to€be€considered€in€construing€the€MDA€and€limiting€defendantððs€evidence€to€proof€ofÐ  \ Ðimpossibility€or€absurdity.€€The€Court€further€erred€in€making€a€finding€of€fact€on€the€reasonablenessÐ øH Ðof€the€daughterððs€choice€of€the€Maryland€Institute€of€Art,€finding€that€it€was€an€excellent€fit,€absentÐ ä4 Ðevidence€in€the€record€and€in€denying€defendant€the€opportunity€to€present€proof€on€the€issue.€€TheÐ Ð  ÐCourt€also€found€the€defendant€had€not€explored€the€possibility€of€utilizing€his€home€equity€withoutÐ ¼  Ðevidentiary€support€for€this€conclusion.€€The€Court€admitted€it€was€making€a€finding€withoutÐ ¨ø Ðevidence,€because€the€issue€is€a€matter€of€law.€€Statements€of€counsel€are€not€evidence€or€a€substituteÐ ”ä Ðfor€testimony,€and€judgment€based€upon€neither€evidence€nor€stipulation€of€the€parties€may€beÐ €Ð Ðvacated€if€evidence€is€the€basis€of€the€holding.€€òòState€v.€Clevelandóó,€959€S.W.2d€548,€555€(Tenn.Ð l¼ Ð1997);€òòMetropolitan€Govððt€of€Nashville€v.€Shacklettóó,€554€S.W.2d€601,€605€(Tenn.€1977);€€òòValleyÐ X ¨ ÐUtility€District€v.€Cantwellóó,€2002€Tenn.€App.€Lexis€30,€No.€M2001„00627„R3„CV.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àà ` àTaking€into€account€the€circumstances€of€the€parties€at€the€time€of€the€divorce€andÐ #l! Ðat€the€time€of€hearing,€we€hold€that€it€is€reasonable€for€the€father€to€pay€the€tuition€of€the€daughterÐ $X" Ðto€obtain€a€bachelor€of€arts€degree€at€any€accredited€public€institution€of€higher€learning€in€either€theÐ ô$D # ÐState€of€Florida€or€the€State€of€Tennessee,€whichever€is€higher.€€The€daughter€is€not€required€toÐ à%0!$ Ðattend€any€of€these€institutions,€but€this€formula€will€be€utilized€as€a€measure€of€her€fatherððsÐ Ì&"% Ðobligation,€which€he€will€be€required€to€pay€should€she€attend€another€institution€of€her€choice.€Ð ¸'#& ÐUpon€remand,€if€the€parties€cannot€agree€upon€the€amount,€a€further€evidentiary€hearing€will€beÐ ¤(ô#' Ðconducted€to€determine€that€amount,€and€Judgment€entered€in€accordance€with€this€Opinion.Ð )à$( ÐÌà  àà ` àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€we€modify€the€Judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€and€remand,Ð h+¸&* Ðwith€the€cost€of€the€appeal€assessed€one„half€to€each€party.Ð ° ÐÌÌÌà  àÌà  àÌÔ#†X©XX X©FN#ÔÔ‡X©XXX©ÔòòÌóóÔ#†X©XXX©‚a#ÔÔ‡ X©XXX©ÔÌà  àòòÔ#†X©XX X©Ëa#ÔÔ#†¼Vý»XX©ˆN#ÔóóÔ‡X©X»¼VýÔÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à_________________________Ð ü L  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àòòHerschel€Pickens€Franks,€J.Ð è 8  Ðóó