ÿWPC 2# ÌUN× %% 0(+bSw@[4›¯¾ 0JÆ 0T 0^d 0h 0r* 0|œ 0† 0ž 1u. 0d£ AQ ÆX 0D 0@b 0D¢ D/æ B B2 D3O U>‚ B)À DCé AM, U*y &£ v~É vÓG˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- ¿4À4Á4DÂ4Ã4Ä4EÅ4Æ4UÇ4Ó€Ñ4ê‚_#3|xÑ42 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d++++7Border 1dd!#,Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€*ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€.ÔÔ€.ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€.XÔÌÌMay€29,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHØ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€*ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€fsXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñò ò›Þ ÞÌDWAYNE€HAWKINS€and€ALà àà à)ÌGOSSETT,à àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€Circuit̜ـ!ÙßR€-/,A1-j|.+` ç `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€96C„2528Ìà àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌPATRICK€A.€HART,€SUPERIORà àà à)ÌMOTORS,€INC.,€NELSON€BOWERS,€II,€)Ìand€BOWERS€TRANSPORTATION€à à)ÌGROUP,€LLC,à àà àà àà à)à àœAppeal›€œNo.›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01A01„9707„CV„00294Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà à)à àÌÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÓ  ÓHONORABLE€BARBARA€N.€HAYNES,€JUDGEÌó óÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌSteven€A.€Riley,€#6258ÌBOWEN,€RILEY,€WARNOCK€&€JACOBSON,€PLCÌ1906€West€End€AvenueÌNashville,€TN€37203ÌATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTSÌÌJohn€P.€Branham,€#2552ÌKathryn€Barnett,€#15361ÌBRANHAM€&€DAY,€P.C.Ì150€Fourth€Avenue€NorthÌFirst€Union€Tower,€Suite€1910ÌNashville,€TN€37219ÌATTORNEY€FOR€DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES,ÌPATRICK€A.€HART€and€SUPERIOR€MOTORS,€INC.€ÌÌH.€Wayne€Grant,€#1573ÌDavid€M.€Elliott,€#17966ÌGRANT,€KONOALINKA€&€HARRISON,€P.C.ÌSuite€900€Republic€CentreÌ633€Chestnut€StreetÌChattanooga,€TN€37450ÌATTORNEYS€FOR€APPELLEES,€NELSON€E.€BOWERS,€II€Ìand€BOWERS€TRANSPORTATION€GROUP,€LLCÌÌÓ  Óò òMODIFIED€AND€REMANDED.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àHENRY€F.€TODDÌà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€MIDDLE€SECTIONÌCONCUR:ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌò òDWAYNE€HAWKINS€and€œAL€GOSSETT,)›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ€€)€›à àÌà àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à àà àœ€€)›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ€€)›ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà àœ€€)à àDavidson€Circuit›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ€€)›à àœNo.€96C„2528›ÌPATRICK€A.€HART,€SUPERIORà àà àœ€€)›ÌMOTORS,€INC.,€NELSON€BOWERS,€II,€œ€€)›Ìand€BOWERS€TRANSPORTATION€à àœ€€)›ÌGROUP,€LLC,à àà àà àà àœ€€)›à àœAppeal›€œNo.›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ€€)›à à01A01„9707„CV„00294Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà àœ€€)›à àÌó óÌà@ àòòò òÔ€*¼ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€*XÔó óóóÌÓ  Ӝ̛ÓÓà àœThis€appeal€represents€a€consolidation€of€two€appeals€in€the€same€case€by€order€of€thisÏCourt€entered€on€October€22,€1997,€since€which€time€the€captioned€number€€has€appeared€onÏall€proceedings.€These›€consolidated€appeals€are€from€rulings€of€the€Trial€Court€in€a€single€caseÏinvolving€the€efforts€of€plaintiffs€to€purchase€an€automobile€dealership.€€The€issues€are€bestÏunderstood€from€a€detailed€narration€of€the€facts€and€subsequent€proceedings.ÌÔ€*ŠÔÌÔ€*XÔà àPatrick€Hart€is€a€wealthy€Seattle€businessman.€€In€February€1993€he€struck€up€aÏconversation€with€Mark€Chmelar€at€a€yacht€show€in€Miami.€€Mr.€Chmelar€owned€automobileÏdealerships€in€Nashville€and€Tallahassee.€€Mr.€Chmelar€suggested€that€Mr.€Hart€acquire€anÏinterest€in€the€Nashville€dealership,€and€Mr.€Hart€eventually€agreed€even€though€he€had€noÏprior€experience€in€the€automobile€business.€€Accordingly,€in€November€1993,€Mr.€HartÏacquired€a€50%€interest€in€Superior€Motors,€Inc.€€Mr.€Hart€agreed€that€Mr.€Chmelar€wouldÍcontinue€to€manage€the€day„to„day€operations€of€the€dealership.€€At€the€outset,€the€arrangementÏproved€satisfactory€enough€that€Mr.€Hart€agreed€in€mid„1995€to€purchase€an€interest€in€anotherÏautomobile€dealership€owned€by€Mr.€Chmelar€in€Tallahassee,€Florida.ÌÌà àFirst€Tennessee€Bank€informed€Mr.€Hart€in€March€œ1995,›€that€the€Superior€Motors€Ïdealership€in€Nashville€was€$1,000,000€out€of€trust€on€its€floor€plan€loan.€€Even€though€Mr.ÏChmelar€assured€Mr.€Hart€that€there€were€no€problems€with€the€dealership,€Mr.€Hart€receivedÏanother€call€from€the€bank€in€June€1995€stating€that€the€dealership€was€now€$1,600,000€out€œofÌ›€trust.€€During€the€next€two€months,€Mr.€Hart€discovered€that€Mr.€Chmelar€had€purchased€anÏairplane€using€Superior€Motors€credit,€that€the€dealershipððs€tax€returns€reported€that€theÏdealership€had€sustained€a€$714,000€operating€loss,€and€that€Mr.€Chmelar€had€been€payingÏhimself€an€annual€salary€of€$351,357€rather€than€the€$144,000€agreed€upon.€€Finally,€inÏAugust€1995,€First€Tennessee€Bank€informed€Mr.€Hart€that€it€intended€to€call€his€letter€of€creditÏand€require€him€to€honor€his€personal€guarantee€unless€the€dealershipððs€financial€problemsÏwere€quickly€rectified.ÌÌà àMr.€Hart€realized€that€he€was€in€a€precarious€situation€because€the€Nashville€dealershipÏwas€$3,500,000€in€debt.€€He€decided€to€get€out€of€the€automobile€business€as€quickly€as€heÏcould€and€retained€James€Cameron,€a€lawyer€in€Nashville,€to€assist€him€in€resolving€theÏproblem€with€the€Nashville€dealership.€€On€September€5,€1995,€Mr.€Hart€faxed€Mr.€Chmelar€aÏletter€stating€that€he€had€discovered€the€financial€irregularities€at€the€dealership€and€that€intendedÏto€remove€Mr.€Chmelar€as€president€of€the€corporation.ÌÌà àIn€the€meantime,€Mr.€Chmelar€had€entered€into€discussions€about€the€sale€of€theÏTallahassee€dealership€with€Dwayne€Hawkins,€a€Florida€businessman€engaged€in€theÏautomobile€business,€and€his€partner,€Al€Gossett€who€lived€in€Memphis€.€Mr.€Gossett€and€Mr.ÏHawkins€were€interested€in€purchasing€not€only€the€Tallahassee€dealership€but€also€theÏNashville€dealership.€€On€September€7,€1997,€Mr.€Gossett€telephoned€Mr.€Hart€in€Seattle€toÏinform€him€that€he€and€Mr.€Hawkins€were€interested€in€acquiring€both€dealerships.€€Seeing€thisÏas€an€opportunity€to€get€out€of€the€automobile€business€quickly,€Mr.€Hart€agreed€to€meet€inÏMemphis€on€September€10,€1995€to€discuss€the€sale€of€the€dealerships.€€Mr.€Gossett€and€Mr.ÏHawkins€agreed€to€make€an€offer€for€both€dealerships,€and€during€the€evening€of€SeptemberÏ10,€1995,€Mr.€Gossett€telephone€Mr.€Hart€in€Nashville€to€inform€him€that€he€would€present€anÏoffer€to€purchase€the€two€dealerships€the€next€day.€€ÌÌà àOn€the€morning€of€September€11,€1995,€Mr.€Hart€and€Mr.€Gossett€met€over€breakfastÏin€Mr.€Hartððs€hotel€room,€and€Mr.€Gossett€presented€Mr.€Hart€with€proposed€contracts€toÏacquire€both€the€Tallahassee€and€the€Nashville€dealerships.€€After€negotiating€several€of€theÏterms€and€interlineating€several€changes€in€the€documents,€both€Mr.€Hart€and€Mr.€GossettÏsigned€two€sets€of€contract€documents€„one€set€pertaining€to€the€Tallahassee€dealership€and€theÏother€set€pertaining€to€the€Nashville€dealership.€Each€set€of€documents€consisted€to€anÏð ðAgreement€for€the€Purchase€and€Sale€of€Assetsðð€and€an€ð ðAgreement€for€Interim€ManagementÏAgreementðð€[sic].€€After€Mr.€Hart€executed€the€agreements,€Mr.€Gossett€obtained€Mr.ÏChmelarððs€signature€on€both€sets€of€agreements.ÌÌà àMr.€Hart€and€Mr.€Gossett€met€later€in€the€day€with€Mr.€Hartððs€lawyer,€Mr.€Cameron.€ÏMr.€Hart€informed€Mr.€Cameron€ð ðI€got€this€thing€solved.€€Here€are€two€agreements.€€TheyððreÍall€signed,€put€to€bed,€and€I€can€go€home.ðð€€After€Mr.€Gossett€left€to€go€to€the€NashvilleÏdealership,€Mr.€Cameron€informed€Mr.€Hart€that€the€contracts€were€not€financiallyÏadvantageous€to€him€and€that€he€could€get€a€higher€price€for€the€dealerships.€€Later,€Mr.ÏCameron€informed€Mr.€Hart€that€there€was€not€enough€money€for€Hart€in€the€deal€and€that€ð ðtheÏagreements€would€not€work.ðð€€ÌÌà àOn€September€12,€1995,€Mr.€Cameron€sought€Mr.€Gossettððs€assistance€in€convincingÏMr.€Chmelar€to€relinquish€his€stock€in€the€Nashville€dealership.€€Mr.€Gossett€was€willing€toÏhelp€because€he€maintained€a€cordial€relationship€with€Mr.€Chmelar€and€because€he€understoodÏthat€his€contract€to€purchase€the€Nashville€dealership€would€be€worthless€if€the€bankÏforeclosed.€€Mr.€Gossett€convinced€Mr.€Chmelar€to€relinquish€his€stock€for€$1,000€and€Mr.ÏHartððs€agreement€to€pay€their€joint€obligation€to€the€bank.€€Mr.€Chmelar€conveyed€his€shares€toÏMr.€Hart€on€September€12,€1995,€and€on€September€13,€1995,€Mr.€Gossett€terminated€Mr.ÏChmelar€as€president€of€both€dealerships€with€Mr.€Hartððs€blessing.ÌÌà àOn€September€14,€1995,€Mr.€Cameron€demanded€that€Mr.€Gossett€release€theÏagreements€to€sell€both€the€Tallahassee€and€the€Nashville€dealership.€€He€stated€that€Mr.€HartÏwould€not€consider€performing€or€even€amending€the€agreements€unless€Mr.€Gossett€agreed€toÏrelease€the€agreements€executed€on€September€11,€1995.€€Mr.€Gossett€declined€to€sign€aÏrelease.ÌÌà àMr.€Hart€eventually€sold€the€Tallahassee€dealership€to€Mr.€Gossett€and€Mr.€Hawkins€inÏFebruary€1996€based€on€an€amended€version€of€the€agreement€signed€on€September€11,€1995.€ÏThey€never€finalized€the€agreement€concerning€the€Nashville€dealership€because€Mr.€Hart€hadÍentered€into€negotiations€with€Nelson€Bowers,€II,€an€automobile€dealer€from€Chattanooga,€toÏsell€the€dealership€for€a€price€higher€than€the€price€agreed€to€in€the€September€11,€1995Ïagreement€with€Mr.€Gossett.€€When€Mr.€Gossett€learned€of€these€negotiations,€he€informedÏMr.€Bowers€in€a€June€25,€1996€letter€that€he€was€seeking€to€close€his€September€11,€1995Ïcontract€with€Mr.€Hart.ÌÌà àOn€July€8,€1996,€Mr.€Gossett€and€Mr.€Hawkins€filed€suit€against€Mr.€Hart€andÏSuperior€Motors,€Inc.€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€County€seeking€to€enforce€theÏSeptember€11,€1996€contract.€€They€sent€a€copy€of€their€complaint€to€Mr.€Bowers€severalÏweeks€later.€€Despite€the€notice€of€the€contractual€dispute,€Mr.€Bowers€signed€a€contract€onÏAugust€16,€1996,€to€purchase€the€Nashville€dealership.€€Mr.€Bowers€later€assigned€his€interestÏin€this€contract€to€European€Motors,€Inc.,€a€company€in€which€he€owns€a€50%€interest.€€OnÏSeptember€19,€1996,€Mr.€Gossett€and€Mr.€Hawkins€filed€an€amended€complaint€adding€Mr.ÏBowers€and€Bowers€Transportation€Group€as€defendants.€€On€October€17,€1996,€Mr.€Hart€andÏSuperior€Motors,€Inc.€conveyed€the€assets€of€the€dealership€to€European€Motors,€but€Mr.ÏBowers€also€required€Mr.€Hart€to€agree€to€indemnify€him€and€European€Motors€against€anyÏclaims€by€Mr.€Gossett€and€Mr.€Hawkins.ÌÌà àFollowing€substantial€discovery,€Mr.€Hart€and€Superior€Motors,€Inc.€moved€forÏsummary€judgment€on€the€ground€that€the€September€11,€1995€Agreement€for€the€Purchase€andÏSale€of€Assets€was€too€uncertain€and€indefinite€to€be€enforced.€€Specifically,€they€based€theirÏdefense€on€two€provisions€of€the€contract€„one€that€left€the€negotiation€of€the€lease€of€theÏpremises€open€for€future€negotiation€and€another€providing€that€the€parties€would€later€agreeÏupon€a€price€for€the€Nashville€dealershipððs€inventory€of€new€vehicles.€€Mr.€Hart€also€assertedÍthat€he€could€not€be€held€personally€liable€on€the€contract€even€though€he€had€signed€it€asÏguarantor.€€Mr.€Bowers€and€his€corporations€also€moved€for€summary€judgment€on€theÏconstructive€trust€claim.€€The€trial€court€granted€both€motions€in€orders€entered€on€April€21€andÏ28,€1997.€€The€trial€court€reasoned€that€the€September€11,€1995€agreement€was€too€indefinite€toÏbe€enforceable€under€Florida€law€and€that€impressing€a€constructive€trust€on€the€assets€ofÏSuperior€Motors€was€not€an€appropriate€equitable€remedy.€€The€trial€court€did€not€specificallyÏaddress€the€issue€of€Mr.€Hartððs€liability€as€guarantor€of€the€September€11,€1995€contract.à àÌÌà àSummary€judgment€is€not€a€substitute€for€the€trial€of€disputed€factual€issues.€€òòTaylor€v.ÏNashville€Banner€Publishing€Coóó.,€Tenn.€App.€1978,€573€S.W.2d€476;€Cert.€Den.€441,€U.S.Ï923,€99€S.Ct.€2032,€60€L.Ed.2d€396;€òòGonzales€v.€Allman€Constr.€Coóó.,€Tenn.€App.€1993,€857ÏS.W.2d€42.ÌÌà àA€summary€judgment€is€to€be€rendered€only€when€it€is€shown€that€there€is€no€genuineÏissue€as€to€a€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€ÏòòDaniels€v.€White€Consolidated€Industries,€Inc.óó,€Tenn.€App.€1985,€692€S.W.2d€422;€òòBlazerÏFin.€Svcs.,€Inc.,€v.€Diddleóó,€Tenn.€App.€1983,€648€S.W.2d€257.ÌÌà àOn€appeal,€no€presumption€of€correctness€attaches€to€decisions€granting€summaryÏjudgment,€because€they€involve€only€questions€of€law.€€òòHembree€v.€State,óó€Tenn.€1996,€925ÏS.W.2d€513.Ì€€Ìà àThe€imposition€of€sanctions€or€discretionary€costs€is€subject€to€the€discretion€of€the€trialÏcourt,€but€is€also€subject€to€review€on€appeal,€and€a€reversal€is€justified€where€the€result€isÍclearly€erroneous.€€òòBaker€v.€Nationwide€Mutual€Fin.€Ins.€Co.óó,€Tenn.€App.€1982,€646€S.W.2dÏ440.ÌÌà àIn€the€order€of€their€priority,€the€principal€issues€presented€to€this€Court€appear€to€be€asÏfollows:Ìà à1.à àDoes€the€September€11,€1995€agreement€for€the€purchase€and€sale€of€the€assetsÏof€the€Nashville€dealership€evidence€an€enforceable€contract?ÌÓ K ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌà à(This€agreement€was€executed€in€Tennessee,€its€subject€matter€was€TennesseeÏproperty€and€it€was€to€be€performed€in€Tennessee.€€Nevertheless,€paragraph€22€of€theÏagreement€provides:ÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` Ò22€€€Governing€Law:€the€laws€of€the€State€of€Florida€shallÏgovern€all€questions€concerning€the€construction,€validity,Ïand€interpretation€of€this€agreement.)ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àIn€òòTruly€Nolen€Inc.€v.€Atlas€Moving€&€Storage€Warehouse,€Incóó.,€Fla.ÏApp.3d,1961,€125€So.2d€903,€a€contract€requiring€plaintiff€to€pay€the€cost€of€ð ðanÏappropriate€advertising€signðð€was€held€unenforceable€for€vagueness€as€to€size€orÏspecifications€of€the€sign.ÌÌà àPlaintiff€citesòò€Blackhawk€Heating.€&€Plumbing,€Inc.,€v.€Data€Lease€Fin.€Corp.óó,ÏFla.,€1974,€302€S.W.2d€404,€wherein€plaintiff€brought€a€suit€for€specific€performance€ofÏan€option€to€purchase€bank€stock.€€The€Trial€Court€denied€specific€performance.€€TheÏintermediate€court€affirmed.€€The€Supreme€Court€reversed€and€said:€ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà àData€Lease€relies€upon€Truly€Nolen,€Inc.€v.€AtlasÏMoving€and€Storage€Warehouse,€Inc.,€125€So.2d€903Í(Fla.App.3d,€1961),€writ€discharged€137€So.2d€568Ï(Fla.1962),€which€holds€that€if€an€agreement€is€so€vague€andÏuncertain€in€the€specifications€of€the€subject€matter€that€theÏCourt€cannot€identify€that€subject€matter€or€determine€itsÏquality,€quantity€or€price,€it€will€be€unenforceable.€€This€caseÏinvolved€ð ða€latent€ambiguity€in€the€meaning€of€an€essentialÏword,ðð€which€was€not€reconciled€by€construction€of€theÏparties.€€ÌÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ  Óà àð ð[T]he€fact€that€an€executed€written€contract€containsÏwithin€itself€difficulties€of€construction€about€which€theÏparties€disagree€does€not€enable€the€parties€to€contend€thatÏthe€minds€of€the€parties€never€met,€since€by€signing€theÏwriting€the€€€parties€€€bind€€€themselves€€€to€€€such€€Ïinterpretation€€as€Ìthe€court€may€place€upon€the€words€and€symbols€employedÏby€them.ðð€€17€Am.Jur.2d,€Contracts,€ðð€22,€at€359.ÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÌÓ  Óà à[5]à àEven€though€all€the€details€are€not€definitelyÏfixed,€an€agreement€may€be€binding€if€the€parties€agree€onÏthe€essential€terms€and€seriously€understand€and€intend€theÏagreement€to€be€binding€on€them.€€A€subsequent€differenceÏas€to€the€construction€of€the€contract€does€not€affect€theÏvalidity€of€the€contract€or€indicate€the€minds€of€the€partiesÏdid€not€meet€with€respect€thereto.€€17€C.J.S.€Contracts€ððÏ31.ÌÌà àThe€aforementioned€rule€of€law€has€been€codifiedÏwith€respect€to€sales,€with€the€adoption€in€Florida€of€theÏUniform€Commercial€Code.€€Fla.Stat.€ðð€672.2„204,€F.S.A.€ÏHowever,€the€statute€relates€to€a€contract€for€the€sale€ofÏgoods.Ìà àÒ [ ÒÒ ¸ Ò€€€ð ð(1)€a€contract€for€sale€of€goodsÏmay€be€made€in€any€manner€sufficient€toÏshow€agreement,€including€conduct€by€bothÏparties€which€recognizes€the€existence€ofÏsuch€a€contract.ÌÌ€€€ð ð(2)€An€agreement€sufficient€to€constitute€aÏcontract€for€sale€may€be€found€even€thoughÏthe€moment€of€its€making€is€undermined.ÌÌ€€òòð ð(3)€Even€though€one€or€more€terms€areÏleft€open€a€contract€for€sale€does€not€fail€forÏindefiniteness€if€the€parties€have€intended€toÏmake€a€contract€and€there€is€a€reasonablyÏcertain€basis€for€giving€an€appropriateÏremedy.ððóó€€(Emphasis€supplied.)ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ  Óà à[7]€As€Professor€Corbin€stated€in€his€treatise,ÏCorbin€on€Contracts,€Vol.€I€(1963),€ðð€97,€at€424:ÌÌÒ [ ÒÒ m Ò€€ð ðIf€the€parties€provide€a€practicable,Ïobjective€method€for€determining€this€price€orÏcompensation,€not€leaving€it€to€the€future€willÏof€the€parties€themselves,€there€is€no€suchÏindefiniteness€or€uncertainty€as€will€preventÏthe€agreement€from€being€an€enforceableÏcontract.ððÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÌà àThe€contract€should€not€be€held€void€for€uncertaintyÏunless€there€is€no€other€way€out.€€As€was€stated€by€JusticeÏCardozo€in€òòHeyman€Cohen€&€Sons,€Inc.€v.€M.€LurieÏWoolen€Co.,€Incóó.,€232€N.Y.€112,€133€N.E.€370,€371,Ïð ðIndefiniteness€must€reach€the€point€where€constructionÏbecomes€futile.ððÌÌà àAgain€turning€to€Professor€Corbin,€he€states€at€ððÏ95,€page€400:ÌÌÒ [ ÒÒ m Ò€€ð ðIf€parties€have€concluded€a€transaction€inÏwhich€it€appears€they€intend€to€make€aÏcontract,€the€court€should€not€frustrate€theirÏintention€if€it€is€possible€to€reach€a€fair€andÏjust€result,€even€though€this€requires€a€choiceÏamong€conflicting€meanings€and€the€filling€ofÏsome€gaps€that€the€parties€have€left.ððÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌÒ  ÒÒ ` Òà àWilliston€on€Contracts,€(3rd€Edition,€1968),€Vol.Ï11,€ðð€1424,€page€813,€states:ÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌÒ [ ÒÒ ¸ Òð ðThe€law€does€not€favor,€but€leans€againstÏthe€destruction€of€contracts€because€ofÏuncertainty;€and€it€will,€if€feasible,€soÏconstrue€agreements€as€to€carry€into€effectÏthe€reasonable€intentions€of€the€parties€if€thatÏcan€be€ascertained.ððÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌÒ  ÒÒ ` Òà àProcessor€Corbin€again€states€at€ðð€95,€page€396:ÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌÒ [ ÒÒ ¸ Ò€€€ð ðIn€considering€expressions€of€agreement,Ïthe€court€must€not€hold€the€parties€to€someÏimpossible,€or€ideal,€or€unusual€standard.€€ItÏmust€take€language€as€it€is€and€people€asÏthey€are.€€All€agreements€have€some€degreeÍof€indefiniteness€and€some€degree€ofÏuncertainty.ððÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒProfessor€Williston€states€at€page€819:ÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌÒ [ ÒÒ m Ò€ð ðIt€seems€probable€that€the€difficultyÏregarding€uncertainty€has€beenÏoveremphasized;€òòcertainly,€it€should€not€beÏallowed€to€hamper€or€restrict€equitable€reliefÏfurther€than€necessity€requires.ððóó€€(EmphasisÏsupplied.)ÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌÒ  ÒÒ ` Òà àIn€òòStone€v.€Barnes„Jackson€Co.,€Inc.,óó€129€Fla.Ï816,€176€So.€767€(1937),€this€Court€held€that€specificÏperformance€could€be€granted€on€an€oral€contract€to€executeÏa€lease€ð ðin€the€usual€form€customarily€used€in€Miami.ððÌÌà àThe€option€agreement€in€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó€was€notÏso€uncertain€in€its€terms€as€to€require€dismissal€of€theÏspecific€performance€suit.€€òòÌÌ(Blackhawk€Heating€and€Plumbing€Co.,€Inc.€v.€Data€LeaseÏFinancial€Corpóó.,€302€So.2d€at€408„09.)ÌÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌà àIn€òò€Jacksonville€Port€Authority€v.€Johnsonóó,€Fla.App.€1993,€624€So.2d€313,€aÏcontractor€sued€the€authority€upon€a€work€order€to€repair€a€crane.€€The€order€was€laterÏawarded€to€another€contractor.€€A€jury€found€for€the€plaintiff.€€The€appellate€court€reversedÏand€said:ÌÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ` Òà à1,2€[w]hile€it€is€not€necessary€that€all€details€of€anÏagreement€be€fixed€in€order€to€have€a€binding€agreementÏbetween€parties,€if€there€has€been€no€agreement€as€toÏessential€terms,€an€enforceable€contract€does€not€exist.€ÏòòWilliams€v.€Ingramóó,€605€So.2d€890,€893€(Fla.€1stÏDCA1992);€òòBlackhawk€Heating€and€Plumbing€Co.,€Inc.€v.ÏData€Lease€Financial€Corpóó.,€302€So.2d€404€(Fla.€1974).ÌÌÒ [ ÒÒ ¸ ÒSo€long€as€any€essential€matters€remain€openÏfor€further€consideration,€there€is€noÏcompleted€contract.€€In€order€to€create€aÏcontract€it€is€essential€that€there€be€reciprocalÏassent€to€a€certain€and€definite€proposition.ÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÌòòMann€v.€Thompsonóó,€100€So.2d€634,€637€(Fla.€1stÏDCA1958).€€Failure€to€sufficiently€determine€quality,Ïquantity,€or€price€may€preclude€the€finding€of€anÏenforceable€agreement.€€òòSee€Blackhawk€Heating€andÏPlumbing€Co.,€Incóó.€at€408,€citing€òòTruly€Nolen,€Inc.€v.ÏAtlas€Moving€and€Storage€Warehouse,€Incóó.,€125€So.2d€903Ï(Fla.€3d€DCA1961),€òòcert.€dischargedóó,€137€So.2d€568Ï(Fla.1962).ÌÌ€€€€[3]€Where€the€parties€are€continuing€to€negotiate€as€toÏthese€essential€terms,€there€can€be€no€meeting€of€the€minds.€ÏòòCentral€Properties,€Inc.€v.€William€H.€Robbinsonóó,€450ÏSo.2d€277,€280€(Fla.€1st€DCA€1984),€modified,€468€So.2dÏ986€(Fla.1985).ÌÌ€€€€€[4]€In€the€instant€case,€while€a€general€understandingÏmay€have€existed€in€April€of€1989,€concerning€appelleesððÏcontinued€participation€as€to€phase€III€of€the€project,€clearlyÏno€enforceable€contract€existed.€€The€scope€of€the€work€ÌÌcontemplated€in€phase€III€was€not€presented€until€late€JulyÏof€1989.€€Additions€continued€to€be€made€after€that€time.€ÏThere€was€never€an€agreed„upon€price€between€the€parties.€ÏCorrespondence€between€the€parties€indicated€thatÏnegotiations€between€the€parties€as€to€these€essential€termsÏwere€continuing€as€late€as€January€1990.€€Letters€andÏcorrespondence€from€appellee€confirm€that€it€still€felt€that€itÏhad€not€been€awarded€these€projects,€but€was€still€seekingÏacceptance€of€its€proposals.€€Under€these€circumstances,€noÏbinding€agreement€existed€between€the€parties.€€Ìà àÌ(òòJacksonville€Port€Authority€v.€Johnsonóó,€624€So.2nd€atÏ315.)ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àIt€appears€from€the€foregoing€that€the€statutory€and€case€law€of€Florida€requires€thatÏthe€present€controversy€be€resolved€in€the€light€of€the€intent€of€the€parties€as€expressed€inÏtheir€written€instrument,€but€the€severability€of€the€various€undertakings€must€be€decided€inÏthe€light€of€the€circumstances€under€which€the€instrument€was€signed.ÌÌà àAppellees€insist€that€the€document€was€hurriedly€prepared€and€signed€as€anÏð ðagreement€to€agree.ðð€€Whatever€the€brief€time€frame€of€discussion€before€signing,€it€isÍuncontroverted€that€there€was€time€to€have€legal€counsel€prepare€a€10„page€document€whichÏwas€signed€by€the€parties€after€numerous€initialed€interlineations.ÌÌà àFor€the€purpose€of€summary€judgment,€it€cannot€be€found€conclusively€from€theÏpresent€record€that€no€part€of€the€buy„sell€agreement€contains€a€binding€contract.€€ParagraphÏ21€of€Exhibit€A€reads€as€follows:ÌÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ` Òà à21.à àòòSeverabilityóó:€Whenever€possible,€eachÏprovision€of€this€Agreement€shall€be€interpreted€in€suchÏmanner€as€to€be€effective€and€valid€under€applicable€law,Ïand€if€any€provisions€of€this€Agreement€are€determined€toÏbe€unenforceable€or€illegal,€such€provisions€shall€beÏdeemed€severed€from€the€other€provisions€which€shallÏremain€valid€and€enforceable.ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌà àAccording€to€this€provision,€a€part€of€the€agreement€may€be€enforceable€evenÏthough€other€parts€may€not€be€enforceable.ÌÌà àBy€paragraphs€1.1,€1.2,€5.1€and€5.2,€the€parties€unequivocally€agreed€to€the€saleÏand€purchase€of€specified€vehicles€at€specified€prices.ÌÌà àUnless€the€parties€subsequently€agreed€upon€prices€of€used€cars,€it€does€not€appearÏthat€a€binding€agreement€exists€as€to€used€cars.ÌÌà àUnless€the€parties€subsequently€agreed€upon€a€person€to€inventory€the€parts€andÏaccessories,€it€does€not€appear€that€there€is€a€binding€agreement€in€regard€to€this€asset.ÌÌà àIt€appears€that€the€parties€agreed€upon€the€prices€of€items€mentioned€in€paragraphsÏ1.5,€1.6,€5.5€and€5.6.ÌÌà àA€problem€exists€as€to€the€claim€against€Nelson€Bowers,€II€and€BowersÏTransportation€Group,€LLC.€€Before€these€defendants€can€be€held€liable,€it€must€appear€thatÏplaintiffs€had€an€enforceable€right€to€acquire€an€asset€which€was€acquired€by€theseÏdefendants.ÌÌà àA€further€problem€exists€regarding€the€right€of€plaintiffs€to€discover€certainÏdocuments€in€the€possession€of€counsel€for€defendant,€Hart,€in€spite€of€the€assertedÏattorney„client€privilege€and€other€documents€in€the€possession€of€the€banks€of€Hart€andÏSuperior€Motors.€€On€April€21,€1997,€the€Trial€Court€entered€the€following€order:ÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà àThe€matter€came€before€the€Court€upon€the€motionÏof€Defendants€Superior€Motors,€Inc.€and€Patrick€A.€HartÏfor€summary€judgment.€€Based€upon€the€arguments€ofÏcounsel,€the€memorandum€of€law€and€supportingÏdocuments,€the€Court€hereby€grants€the€Defendantsðð€MotionÏfor€Summary€Judgment€and€dismisses€this€case€based€uponÏthe€following€findings:ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓà à1.à àThe€parties€entered€into€a€contract€onÏSeptember€11,€1995€entitled€ð ðAsset€Purchase€AgreementððÏthat€called€for€the€application€of€Florida€law€to€all€questionsÏconcerning€the€construction,€validity,€and€interpretation€ofÏthe€agreement.ÌÌà à2.à àUnder€Florida€law,€the€provisions€of€theÏagreement€for€the€purchase€of€the€assets€were€too€uncertainÏand€indefinite€to€be€enforced.€€The€plaintiffs,€therefore,€areÏnot€entitled€to€enforce€the€purchase€of€the€assets€under€theÏprovisions€of€the€September€11,€1995€agreement.ÌÌà àWHEREFORE,€it€is€hereby€ORDERED€that€theÏDefendantsðð€Motion€for€Summary€Judgment€is€granted€andÏthis€€case€is€dismissed€€in€€its€€entirety€€with€the€costs€taxed€ÌÌÌagainst€the€plaintiffs€and€their€surety€for€which€executionÏmay€issue,€if€necessary.ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÌà àOn€April€28,€1997,€the€Trial€Court€entered€the€following€order:ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÓ  Óòòò òÓÓÌORDERó óóóÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€following€motions€were€heard€by€this€Court€onÏDecember€6,€1996:ÌÌà à1)à àPlaintiffsðð€Motion€to€Compel;ÌÌà à2)à àDefendants€Superior€Motors,€Inc.ððsÏà àà àà à(ð ðSuperior€Motorsðð)€and€Patrick€A.ÏHartððs€à àà à(ð ðHartðð)€Motion€for€a€protective€Order€andÏto€à àà àQuash€the€Subpoena€of€first€TennesseeÏBank€à àà àNational€Association€(ð ðFirst€Tennesseeðð);ÌÌà à3)à àMotion€of€Harwell€Howard€Hyne€GabbertÏ&€à àà àManner,€P.C.€(ð ðHarwell€Howardðð)€toÏModify€à àà àPlaintiffsðð€Subpoena€Duces€Tecum;ÌÌà à4)à àMotion€of€Harwell€Howard€for€a€ProtectiveÏà àà àOrder.ÌÌà àAfter€consideration€of€the€motions,€responses,Ïreplies€and€arguments€by€counsel,€this€Court€ORDERS:ÌÌÌòòò òÓ  ÓPlaintiffsðð€Motion€to€Compeló óóóÌÓ  ÓÌà àWith€respect€to€Interrogatory€#2€requesting€aÏdescription€of€withheld€documents,€Plaintiffððs€motion€toÏcompel€is€DENIED€at€this€time.€€After€the€deposition€ofÏJames€Cameron,€plaintiffs€may€for€good€cause€re„petitionÏthis€Court€to€review€òòin€cameraóó€the€withheld€documentsÏand/or€to€require€that€defendants€provide€the€Court€with€aÏgeneral€description€of€the€withheld€documents€and/or€toÏgrant€any€other€further€relief.ÌÌà àWith€respect€to€Document€Production€Request€#5Ïrequesting€personal€financial€statements,€Defendant€HartÏshall€produce€his€most€current€financial€statement€as€ofÏSeptember€11,€1995€(including€all€attachments€thereto)€thatÏwas€provided€to€First€Tennessee.ÌÌà àWith€respect€to€Document€Production€Request€#22,ÏDefendant€Hart€shall€produce€transcripts€of€all€depositionsÏin€which€he€was€deposed€in€any€lawsuit€that€arises€from€hisÏownership€interest€in€Superior€Motors€that€are€in€hisÍpossession€or€in€the€possession€of€his€past€or€presentÏattorneys.ÌÌòòò òÓ  ÓSuperior€Motorsðð€and€Hartððs€Motion€for€aÏProtective€Order€and€to€Quash€the€Subpoena€Ìof€First€Tennesseeó óóóÌÓ  ÓÌà àWith€respect€to€Superior€Motorsðð€and€Hartððs€motionÏto€quash€and€motion€for€a€protective€order,€the€subpoenaÏand€notice€of€deposition€of€First€Tennessee€is€modified€toÏlimit€its€scope€as€follows:ÌÌà à1)à àto€include€only€documents€dated,€signed,Ïà àà àreceived,€sent€out,€or€created€during€theÏà àà àperiod€from€April€1,€1993€to€September€15,Ïà àà à1995;ÌÌà à2)à àto€exclude€all€personal€financial€documentsÏof€à àà àHart€òòexceptóó€the€most€current€personalÏà àà àfinancial€statement€of€Hart€as€of€SeptemberÏà àà à11,€1995.ÌÓ  ÓÌòòò òMotion€of€Harwell€Howard€to€Modify€PlaintiffsððÏSubpoena€Duces€Tecumó óóóÓ  ÓÌÓ  Óà àHarwell€Howardððs€motion€to€modify€plaintiffsððÏsubpoena€is€GRANTED.€€The€subpoena€is€modified€to€limitÏthe€scope€of€the€subpoena€to€exclude€billing€statements€sentÏto€Superior€Motors€and€Hart.€€After€the€deposition€of€JamesÏCameron,€plaintiffs€may€for€good€cause€re„petition€thisÏCourt€to€review€òòin€cameraóó€the€withheld€documents€and/or€toÏrequire€that€defendants€provide€the€Court€with€a€generalÏdescription€of€the€withheld€documents€and/or€to€grant€anyÏother€further€relief.ÌÌòòò òÓ  ÓMotion€of€Harwell€Howard€for€a€Protective€Orderó óóóÌÓ  ÓÌà àHarwell€Howardððs€motion€for€a€protective€order€isÏGRANTED.€€Plaintiffsðð€counsel€shall€not€ask€any€questionsÏat€the€deposition€of€Harwell€Howardððs€custodian€of€recordsÏthat€are€designed€to€elicit€information€regarding€documentsÏthat€were€withheld€on€the€basis€of€attorney„client€privilegeÏor€work€product€doctrine.€€After€the€deposition€of€JamesÏCameron,€plaintiffððs€may€for€good€cause€re„petition€thisÏCourt€to€review€òòin€cameraóó€the€withheld€documents€and/or€toÏrequire€that€defendants€provide€the€Court€with€a€generalÏdescription€of€the€withheld€documents€and/or€to€grant€anyÏother€further€relief.ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÒ S ÒÒ ° ÒÓ ` ¸ ‹XÓà àDuring€discovery,€Messrs.€Gossett€and€Hawkins€submitted€interrogatories€and€aÏrequest€for€production€of€documents€requesting€both€Mr.€Hart€and€his€lawyer€to€produceÏdocuments€and€other€materials€that€were€discoverable€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€26.€€Mr.ÏHart€responded€with€a€blanket€refusal€to€provide€the€information€on€the€ground€that€it€wasÏð ðnot€required€by€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.ðð€€Even€though€the€defendantsÏindicated€that€they€were€withholding€two€file€boxes€containing€approximately€twoÏthousand€pages€of€documents€based€on€their€claim€of€privilege,€the€trial€court€declined€toÏorder€the€defendants€to€identify€the€documents€they€were€withholding.ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€embody€a€broad€policy€favoring€theÏdiscovery€of€relevant,€nonprivileged€information.€€òòSee€Pettus€v.€Hurstóó€,€882€S.W.2d€783,Ï786€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€Since€claims€of€privilege€are€contrary€to€the€general€ruleÏfavoring€discovery,€òòsee€Jaffee€v.€Redmondóó,€518€U.S.€1,€___,€116€S.€Ct.€1923,€1928Ï(1996),€they€should€be€construed€narrowly,€and€the€burden€of€establishing€the€existenceÏof€the€privilege€is€on€the€party€asserting€it.€€òòSeeóó€4€James€W.€Moore,€et.€al.,€òòMooreððsÏFederal€Practiceóó€ðð€26.11[1]€(2d€ed.€1996)€(ð ðMooreððs€Federal€Practiceðð).€€Accordingly,€theÏcourts€should€not€permit€parties€to€use€a€bald€assertion€of€privilege€as€grounds€for€aÏwholesale€refusal€to€participate€in€discovery.€€Instead,€they€should€require€parties€assertingÏa€privilege€to€provide€them€with€a€log€or€index€of€the€materials€being€held€under€a€claim€ofÏprivilege€in€order€to€enable€them€to€rule€on€the€privilege€claim.€€òòSeeóó€8€Charles€A.€Wright,Ïet.€al.,€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€2016.1,€at€230„235€(2d€ed.€1994);€MooreððsÏFederal€Practice€ðð€26.11[1].ÌÌà àThe€purpose€of€the€attorney„client€privilege€invoked€by€Mr.€Hart€is€to€shelter€hisÏcommunications€with€his€lawyer.€€òòSeeóó€òò€Smith€County€Educ.€Assððn€v.€Andersonóó,€676ÏS.W.2d€328,€333€(Tenn.€1984);€òòHazard€v.€Hazardóó,€833€S.W.2d€911,€914€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1991);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€23„3„105€(1994).€€Mr.€Cameron€has€become€a€pivotalÏfact€witness€in€this€case€because€of€his€investigation€of€Mr.€Chmelarððs€activities€and€hisÏnegotiations€with€Messrs.€Gossett€and€Hawkins€and€others€concerning€the€variousÏcontracts€to€sell€the€Nashville€dealership.€€Based€on€the€facts€before€us,€many€of€hisÏcommunications€do€not€appear€to€be€privileged.€€Accordingly,€on€remand,€the€trial€courtÏshould€require€Mr.€Hart€to€provide€an€index€containing€a€description€of€the€materials€beingÏwithheld€in€order€to€enable€the€court€to€determine€whether€the€claim€of€privilege€is€beingÏproperly€asserted.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€also€limited€Messrs.€Gossettððs€and€Hawkinsððs€discovery€of€Mr.ÏHartððs€and€the€dealershipððs€records€at€First€Tennessee€Bank€to€the€period€of€April€1,€1993Ïto€September€15,€1995.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€26.02(1)€permits€the€discovery€of€informationÏthat€ð ðappears€reasonably€calculated€to€lead€to€the€discovery€of€admissible€evidence.ðð€€TheÏevidence€indicates€that€Mr.€Hart€and€the€Nashville€dealership€continued€its€relationshipÏwith€First€Tennessee€Bank€until€October€1996.€€Accordingly,€we€do€not€perceive€a€basisÏfor€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€limit€this€discovery€request.€€On€remand,€the€trial€courtÏshould€modify€its€order€to€permit€additional€discovery€of€the€First€Tennessee€BankÏrecords,€subject€of€course€to€Mr.€Hartððs€right€to€seek€a€protective€order€with€regard€toÏspecific€documents€for€good€cause€shown.ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àMeanwhile,€the€judgment€for€discretionary€costs€is€vacated,€subject€toÏreinstatement,€if€justified.ÌÌà àPlaintiffsðð€fourth€issue€raises€the€question€of€the€tort€of€interference€with€economicÏadvantage.€€That€question€is€not€controlled€by€Florida€law,€but€òòlex€fori,óó€Tennessee€law.€InÏòòNelson€v.€Martinóó,€Tenn.€1997,€958€S.W.2d€643,€the€Supreme€Court€refused€to€recognizeÏthe€tort€of€interference€with€prospective€economic€advantage.ÌÌà àBased€upon€the€present€record,€the€foregoing€disposes€of€the€issues€presented€byÏthe€parties€as€follows:ÌÌà àThe€purchase€of€certain€assets€of€the€dealership€is€enforceable€despite€failure€toÏagree€upon€the€price€of€other€assets.ÌÌà àThe€agreement€imposes€individual€liability€upon€Hart€as€guarantor€to€the€extent€ofÏthe€liability€of€Superior€Motors,€Inc.ÌÌà àUnder€the€circumstances€of€the€present€case,€it€was€not€error€for€the€Trial€Court€toÏrefuse€to€impose€a€constructive€trust€on€assets€conveyed€to€a€third€party.€€The€equitableÏremedy€of€constructive€trust€is€appropriate€only€when€the€remedy€of€damages€isÏunavailable.€€òòBrowder€v.€Hiteóó,€Tenn.€App.€1980,€602€S.W.2d€489,€and€authorities€citedÏtherein.€€Plaintiffs€have€the€remedy€of€recovery€of€damages.ÌÌà àTennessee€does€not€recognize€the€tort€of€prospective€economic€advantages.€€TheÏTrial€Court€correctly€dismissed€the€counterclaims€of€œMessrs.›€Gossage€and€Hart€forÏinterference€with€prospective€economic€advantage.ÌÌà àPlaintiffs€have€a€limited€right€of€discovery€to€be€fixed€by€the€Trial€Court€afterÏfurther€pleading€and€hearing.€€As€above€indicated,€the€Trial€Court€in€effect€reservedÏjudgment€upon€the€claim€of€confidential€privilege€awaiting€the€tender€or€general€descriptionÏof€material€claimed€to€be€privileged.€ÌÌà àNo€reversible€error€is€found€in€the€discretionary€denial€of€leave€to€amend€theÏcomplaint.ÌÌà àThe€award€of€discretionary€costs€is€vacated.ÌÌà àThe€dismissal€of€the€counterclaim€should€await€further€hearings€by€the€Trial€Court.ÌÌà àAs€a€result€of€all€the€foregoing,€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€modified€toÏconform€to€the€holdings€herein,€and€the€cause€is€remanded€to€the€Trial€Court€for€further€Ìœprocedure›€in€conformity€with€this€opinion.€Costs€are€assessed€against€the€appellees.Ìœò òÓ  ÓÔ€*¼ÔÌMODIFIED›€AND€REMANDEDÔ€*XÔó ó.ÌÓ  ÓÓÓÌœ›à àà àà àà àà àà à__________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àHENRY€F.€TODDÌà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€MIDDLE€SECTIONÌÒ ½ ÒÒ ° ÒÌÒ ½ ÒÒ ` ÒœCONCUR:›ÌÌœ›Ì____________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌœ›Ì____________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` ÒÌÌÌà àÌÒ ½ ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓ