ÿWPC˜ 3# ÚUNå %3 0(9w@a4¡µÄ 0lÌ 0D8 0J| 0TÆ 0^ 0hx 0rà 0|R 0†Î 0T 1uä 0dY 0@½ D3ý B0 U>M B)‹ DC´ AM÷ U*D AQn Æ¿ 0D… 0DÉ D/ B< Y ç`v~GvÓŘHP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ f Dg Uh Di Uj Ek l Dm Ó€y | B\J#6Time3|x| ((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò""""'ÿÿdxd d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd* &Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd ýÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌò òNovember€14,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€(ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ÝÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ýò òòòRobertsó óóó€only€overruled€ò òòòMemphis€Gayoso€Gasó óóó€to€the€extent€that€it€held€that€theÏdetermination€of€the€reasonableness€of€a€defendantððs€actions€in€relation€to€the€question€of€probableÏcause,€once€the€facts€had€been€found€by€the€jury,€was€to€be€determined€by€the€court.€€ò òòòRobertsóóó ó,Ï842€S.W.2d€at€249.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  Ýò òÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óÌà@ àò òWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSON€€€Ìà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌóóÌÌKITSIE€LEE€HENDRIX,€€€€€à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant,ò òà àà àà à)à àó óShelby€Law€No.€45801€T.D.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌJAMES€S.€COX€&€ASSOCIATES,€€à à)à àó óAppeal€No.€02A01„9510„CV„00233Ìò òœÙ€*ÙßR€'/&A1-j|«ù` Å `€€@ÿRß›JAMES€S.€COX,€RUSSELL€FOWLER,à à)ÌSCOTT€F.€MAY,€and€KENNETHà àà à)ÌOWEN€KING,à àà àà àà à)ó óÌò òà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àDefendants/Appellees.ò òà àà à)à àÌòòó óÌò òóóÌ€€€ÌÌà@ àó óAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€SHELBY€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€MEMPHIS,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€WYETH€CHANDLER,€JUDGE€€€òòÌÌÌFor€the€Defendant/Appellee,à àóóà àà àà àòòFor€the€Defendant/Appellee,€óóÌòòKenneth€Owen€Kingóó:à àà àà àòòà àà àScott€F.€Mayóó:òòÌóóÌAlan€R.€Strainà àà àà àà àà àà àScott€F.€MayÌMemphis,€Tennessee€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àMemphis,€Tennessee€ÌÌòòFor€the€Defendants/Appelleesóó,à àà àà àòòFor€the€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:ÌòòJames€S.€Cox€&€Associates,€James€S.€CoxÌand€Russell€Fowler:óóà àà àà àà àà àDuncan€E.€RagsdaleÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TennesseeÌHal€Gerber€€€ÌLewie€R.€Polk,€IIIÌMemphis,€Tennessee€€€€€€€€€€€€Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìò òÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAFFIRMEDÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àó óHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòòÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ò òÇØØÙ  ÙÓÓÑ7€Œ˜XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  Ñà@ àOPINIONó óÌà àThis€is€a€malicious€prosecution€case.€€In€the€suit€underlying€the€malicious€prosecutionÏclaim,€the€trial€court€ruled€in€a€manner€favorable€to€the€Appellees,€and€the€trial€courtððs€ruling€wasÏreversed€on€appeal€by€this€Court.€€In€the€subsequent€malicious€prosecution€action,€the€trial€courtÏgranted€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€the€œDefendant/Appellees.›€€Based€on€the€trial€courtððs€rulingÏin€the€underlying€lawsuit,€we€find€that€the€trial€œcourt€in€this€case›€œproperly›€granted€summaryÏjudgment,€and€therefore€affirm.Ìà àIn€1990,€Appellee€Kenneth€Owen€King€(ð ðKingðð)€and€Appellant€Kitsie€Lee€HendrixÏ(ð ðHendrixðð)€were€in€the€process€of€getting€a€divorce.€€Hendrix€eventually€retained€Appellee€JamesÏS.€Cox€(ð ðCoxðð)€to€replace€her€original€attorneys€in€the€divorce€action.€€Appellee€Scott€F.€MayÏ(ð ðMayðð)€represented€King.Ìà àIn€December,€1990,€after€representing€Hendrix€for€approximately€four€months,€CoxÏwithdrew€as€her€divorce€attorney.€€Hendrix€then€temporarily€retained€her€previous€attorneys.€€CoxÏthen€sued€Hendrix€for€unpaid€attorneysðð€fees.€€He€was€represented€œby€his›€law€partner,€AppelleeÏRussell€Fowler€(ð ðFowlerðð).€€On€January€28,€1991,€Cox€and€Hendrix€agreed€to€a€consent€judgmentÏawarding€him€$23,017.16.Ìà àAt€the€time,€King€and€Hendrix€had€a€marital€residence€located€at€811€Sweetbriar,€in€ÏMemphis,€Tennessee€(ð ðSweetbriarðð).€€The€property€was€owned€as€tenants€by€the€entirety.€€CoxÏfiled€to€levy€execution€upon€Hendrixðð€interest€in€Sweetbriar€in€satisfaction€of€the€consent€judgment.€ÏOn€February€19,€1991,€after€a€hearing€in€which€both€Cox€and€Hendrix€were€represented€and€inÏwhich€oral€arguments€were€heard,€the€Chancery€Court€ordered€that€Hendrixðð€interest€in€SweetbriarÏbe€sold.€€That€same€day,€Cox€filed€to€garnish€Hendrixðð€account€at€National€Bank€of€Commerce,Ïwhich€contained€funds€totaling€$1,368.95.€€On€March€7,€1991,€the€bank€answered€that€theÏgarnishment€had€been€accomplished.€€The€sale€of€Hendrixðð€Sweetbriar€interest€occurred€on€MarchÏ14,€1991.€€Hendrix€did€not€appear€or€bid€at€the€sale,€and€Cox€bought€her€interest€for€$3,500.Ìà àOn€April€8,€1991,€Cox€filed€a€Motion€to€Confirm€Sale,€and€to€Divest€and€Vest€Title.€€HeÏsent€a€letter€to€May€to€the€effect€that€Kingððs€interests€would€be€better€protected€if€King€supportedÍthe€motion.€€May€advised€King€that€he€should€do€so,€and€King€œagreed.›Ìà àOn€April€17,€1991,€Hendrix€hired€Stevan€Black€(ð ðBlackðð)€to€represent€her.€€The€next€day,€Ïthe€hearing€on€Coxðð€motion€was€held.€€That€morning,€May€filed€a€Petition€of€Co„owner€to€ConfirmÏSale€and€Divest€and€Vest€Title.€€Hendrix€appeared€in€court€with€œBlack.›€€When€May€handed€Black€aÏcopy€of€his€petition,€Black€requested€a€continuance€in€order€to€read€the€petition€and€prepare€aÏresponse.€€In€order€to€avoid€a€continuance,€May€withdrew€the€petition.€€Black€stated€that€he€mightÏcall€either€May€or€King€as€witnesses€during€the€hearing,€and€consequently€they€were€excludedÏfrom€the€courtroom.€€They€were€not€called€as€witnesses€and€left€after€the€hearing€was€over.Ìà àDuring€the€hearing,€Black€opposed€confirmation€of€the€sale€on€the€basis€that€no€òòò ònullaÏbonaó óóó€return€had€been€made€on€Hendrixðð€personalty€before€Cox€levied€execution€on€her€realty,€asÏrequired€by€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€26„3„101.€€Fowler,€representing€Cox,€argued€that€it€wasÏnow€too€late€to€object€to€the€sale.€€Black€responded€that€his€argument€would€have€been€prematureÏearlier€because€case€law€held€that€land€and€personalty€can€be€levied€on€at€the€same€time€so€long€asÏthe€personalty€is€sold€first.€€The€court€responded:ÌÓÓà8 àà àTHE€COURT:€€Iððm€familiar€with€that€statute.€€But€I€think€the€idea€behind€itÏwas€that€you€could€do€it€at€the€same€time€but€if€you€had€it€all€at€one€time€then€youÏexhaust€the€personalty€before€you€went€on€the€land.€€That€was€the€idea€behind€it.€ÏSo,€Iððm€familiar€with€it,€very€familiar€with€it.ÌÌÓÓThe€court€overruled€the€objection€and€confirmed€the€sale.Ìà àHendrix€appealed€the€decision.€€This€Court€ruled€that€it€was€a€ð ðrequirement€that€theÏsheriffððs€return€indicate€no€personal€property€is€to€be€found€in€his€county€before€realty€can€beÏexecuted€upon.ðð€€òòò òJames€S.€Cox€&€Assocs.€v.€Kingó óóó,€No.€020A1„9109„CH„00213,€1992€WLÏ58498,€at€*2€(Tenn.€App.€Mar.€27,€1992).€€Because€no€such€return€had€been€made,€this€CourtÏreversed€the€trial€courtððs€order€to€sell€Hendrixðð€interest€in€Sweetbriar€and€the€order€confirming€thatÏsale.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€*2„3.Ìà àBefore€this€Court€issued€its€decision,€Hendrix€and€King€entered€into€a€marital€dissolutionÏagreement€and€their€divorce€became€final.€€Coxðð€judgment€against€Hendrix€was€paid€by€funds€fromÍKing€and€from€Hendrixðð€bond€for€a€prematurely„filed€redemption€suit.€Ìà àSubsequently,€Hendrix€filed€this€lawsuit€for€malicious€prosecution€and€outrageous€conductÏagainst€the€law€firm€of€James€S.€Cox€&€Associates€and€individually€against€Cox,€Fowler,€May,Ïand€œKing€(ð ðDefendant/Appelleesðð).›€€Hendrix€alleged€that€they€had€maliciously€and€withoutÏprobable€œÌcause›€levied€execution€on€Hendrixðð€interest€in€Sweetbriar€when€they€knew€that€they€could€not€doÏœso€without›€first€acquiring€a€òòò ònulla€bonaó óóó€return.€€Hendrix€asserted€that€May€and€King€acted€inÏfurtherance€of€the€malicious€prosecution€by€supporting€Coxðð€motion€to€confirm€the€sale€ofÏSweetbriar.Ìà àThe€defendants€in€the€malicious€prosecution€action€moved€for€dismissal€or€for€summaryÏjudgment.€€After€a€hearing,€the€trial€court€denied€summary€judgment€on€the€malicious€prosecutionÏissue€but€granted€summary€judgment€on€the€charge€of€outrageous€conduct.€€The€defendantsÏsubsequently€moved€the€court€to€reconsider€its€denial€of€summary€judgment€on€maliciousÏprosecution.€€After€another€hearing,€the€trial€court€granted€the€defendants€summary€judgment€onÏthe€€allegations€of€malicious€prosecution.€€In€its€order,€the€court€found:ÌÓÓà8 àà àFrom€the€pleadings,€affidavits,€and€depositions€filed€in€this€cause€and€theÏentire€record,€including€briefs€of€all€parties,€the€Court€is€of€the€opinion€that€in€theÏprior€civil€proceeding€in€the€case€of€òòCox€v.€Hendrixóó€the€defendants€had€probableÏcause€to€undertake€or€participate€in€the€civil€proceedings€against€the€plaintiff.ÌÌà8 àà àThe€Court€further€finds€that€at€the€hearing€on€the€petition€of€the€defendantÏCox€to€confirm€the€Clerk€and€Master€sale€(April€18,€1991)€Chancellor€AaronÏBrown,€in€considering€said€petition,€announced€to€the€parties€that€he€was€familiarÏwith€the€law€pertaining€to€execution€and€ruled€on€the€said€petition€based€on€hisÏunderstanding€of€the€law€and€the€facts.€€This€Court€is€of€the€opinion€that€the€partiesÏ(the€defendants€herein)€had€a€right€to€rely€on€the€statement€and€ruling€of€saidÏChancellor:€€that€said€ruling€is€conclusive€that€there€was€probable€cause€to€bringÏsaid€civil€proceeding,€and€said€ruling€was€not€procured€by€fraud.ÌÌà8 àà àAs€to€the€defendant€King€only,€the€Court€further€finds€that€said€defendant€inÏgood€faith€sought€the€advice€of€an€attorney€before€participating€in€the€civilÏproceeding€against€the€plaintiff.€€The€Court€further€finds€that€the€defendant€KingÏmade€a€full,€fair€and€complete€disclosure€to€his€attorney€of€the€pertinent€materialÏfacts€of€which€he€had€knowledge€tending€to€prove€the€civil€allegations€against€theÏplaintiff,€and€thereafter€said€defendant€acted€upon€the€advice€of€his€attorney€and€inÏthe€belief€of€the€plaintiffððs€liability.ÌÌÓÓFrom€this€decision,€Hendrix€now€appeals.€€On€appeal,€Hendrix€argues€that€there€were€genuineÏissues€of€material€fact€which€should€have€precluded€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment.Ìà àA€motion€for€summary€judgment€should€be€granted€when€the€movant€demonstrates€thatÏthere€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€aÏmatter€of€law.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.03.€€The€party€moving€for€summary€judgment€bears€theÏburden€of€demonstrating€that€no€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€exists.€€ò òòòByrd€v.€Hallóóó ó,€847ÏS.W.2d€208,€211€(Tenn.€1993).€€On€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€court€must€take€theÏstrongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonableÏinferences€in€favor€of€that€œÌparty,›€and€discard€all€countervailing€evidence.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€210„11.€€Summary€judgment€is€onlyÏappropriate€when€the€facts€and€the€legal€conclusions€drawn€from€the€facts€reasonably€permit€onlyÏone€conclusion.€€ò òòòCarvell€v.€Bottomsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).€€Since€only€questionsÏof€law€are€involved,€there€is€no€presumption€of€correctness€regarding€a€trial€court's€grant€ofÏsummary€judgment.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€Therefore,€our€review€of€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment€isÏò òòòde€novoó óóó€on€the€record€before€this€Court.€€ò òòòId.óóó óÌà àIn€order€for€a€plaintiff€to€prevail€in€an€action€for€malicious€prosecution,€he€must€prove€thatÏ(1)€the€defendant€initiated€a€previous€suit€or€judicial€proceeding€without€probable€cause,€(2)€theÏdefendant€acted€with€malice€in€bringing€the€suit€or€proceeding,€and€(3)€the€earlier€suit€or€proceedingÏended€in€a€result€which€favored€the€plaintiff€in€the€malicious€prosecution€action.€€òòò òLantroop€v.ÏMorelandó óóó,€849€S.W.2d€793,€797€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€ð ðProbable€cause€is€the€linchpin€ofÏmalicious€prosecution.ðð€€òòò òCarter€v.€Bakerððs€Food€Rite€Storeó óóó,€787€S.W.2d€4,€6€(Tenn.€App.Ï1989).€€Probable€cause€is€established€when€there€exists€ð ðsuch€facts€and€circumstances€sufficient€toÏexcite€in€a€reasonable€mind€the€belief€that€the€accused€is€guilty€of€the€crime€charged.ðð€€òòò òRoberts€v.ÏFederal€Express€Corp.ó óóó,€842€S.W.2d€246,€248€(Tenn.€1992).€€Furthermore,€ð ð[p]robable€causeÏis€to€be€determined€solely€from€an€objective€examination€of€the€surrounding€facts€andÍcircumstances.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóóÌà àIn€this€malicious€prosecution€case,€the€trial€court€granted€summary€judgment€to€theÏœDefendant/Appellees›€in€this€case€solely€on€the€basis€that€probable€cause€existed€for€the€decision€toÏlevy€execution€on€Hendrixðð€interest€in€Sweetbriar.€€This€finding€was€based€on€the€fact€that€theÏChancellor€who€ordered€and€confirmed€the€sale€considered€the€applicable€law€during€theÏconfirmation€hearing€and€ruled€in€Coxðð€favor.€€The€trial€court€found€that€this€initial€ruling€in€CoxððÏfavor€created€a€presumption€of€probable€cause.€Ìà àProbable€cause€in€a€malicious€prosecution€action€was€considered€in€òòò òMemphis€GayosoÏGas€Co.€v.€Williamsonó óóó,€56€Tenn.€314€(1872),€òòò òoverruled€on€other€grounds€by€RobertsÏv.€Federal€Express€œÌCorp.ó óóó,›€842€S.W.2d€246,€249€(Tenn.€1992).× ƒ0 ××  ×€€€In€the€underlying€suit,€in€ò òòòMemphis€œGayosoó óóó,€theÏdefendants›€in€the€malicious€prosecution€case€had€initially€been€successful€in€obtaining€an€injunctionÏand€in€having€it€made€permanent.€€However,€the€lower€œcourtððs›€ruling€was€reversed€when€anÏopposing€party€appealed€to€the€United€States€Supreme€Court.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€œ323„24.›€€In€ò òòòMemphisÏGayosoó óóó,€œthe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court›€found€that€ð ðthe€great€weight€of€authority€may€be€regardedÏas€having€established€the€rule€that€the€judgment€of€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction,€in€favor€of€theÏplaintiff€œbelow,›€after€reversal€in€a€higher€court,€is€to€be€taken€as€òòprima€facieóó€evidence€of€probableÏcause.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€323.€€Such€evidence€can€only€be€rebutted€by€a€showing€that€the€judgment€wasÏprocured€through€fraud.€€òòò òSee€id.ó óóó€at€œ323„24,›€œ340.€€ò òòòSee›€alsoó óóó€òòò òChristian€v.€Lapidusó óóó,€833ÏS.W.2d€71,€œ74›€(Tenn.€1992)€(ð ð.€.€.€a€judgment€in€favor€of€the€original€plaintiff€is€conclusive€ofÏprobable€cause,€unless€procured€by€fraud.ðð).Ìà àIn€œaddition,€an€analogous€issue€is€discussed€in€ò òòòHall›€v.€Hodgeó óóó,€C.A.€No.€215,€1990€WLÏ131446€(Tenn.€App.€Sept.€14,€1990)€€in€which€€the€plaintiff€Hall€filed€a€malicious€prosecutionÍclaim€against€an€attorney.€€Hall€alleged€that,€in€the€underlying€suit,€the€attorney€had€filed€an€actionÏwithout€making€a€reasonable€inquiry€into€the€facts€and€legal€bases€for€that€suit.€€The€underlying€suitÏwas€non„suited,€but€œHall€sought›€sanctions€against€the€attorney€for€allegedly€violating€Rule€11€ofÏthe€€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.€€The€trial€court€in€the€underlying€suit€had€ruled€againstÏHall€in€his€application€for€sanctions.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€*2.€€This€Court€found:ÌÓÓà8 àà àIn€deciding€the€Rule€11€motion€in€the€underlying€case,€the€trial€court€wasÏrequired€to€consider€the€issue€of€whether€the€complaint€in€the€underlying€case€wasÏfiled€by€the€parties€and€the€attorney€after€making€reasonable€inquiry€and€was€well„grounded€in€fact€and€warranted€by€existing€law€or€an€extension€thereof.€€The€trialÏcourt€found€this€issue€in€the€affirmative.€€This€conclusively€precludes€any€findingÏthat€the€underlying€suit€was€filed€without€probable€cause€and€with€malice.ÌÌÓÓòòò òId.ó óóó€at€*3.€€Thus€œa›€judicial€finding€in€favor€of€the€plaintiff€in€the€underlying€suit€is€evidence€thatÏprobable€cause€existed€to€bring€that€suit,€even€if€the€defendant€finally€prevails.Ìà àOther€jurisdictions€have€also€ruled€that€a€judgment€for€a€plaintiff,€even€if€reversed€onÏappeal,€is€evidence€of€probable€cause,€rebuttable€only€upon€a€showing€that€the€first€judgment€wasÏprocured€through€fraud.€€ò òòòSee€Berger€v.€North€Am.€Co.€for€Life€&€Health€Ins.ó óóó,€694ÏF.2d€233,€235„36€(11th€Cir.€1982);€ò òòòVisco€v.€First€Natððl€Bankóóó ó,€415€P.2d€902,€906€(Ariz.€Ct.ÏApp.€1966);€ò òòòGoldstein€v.€Sabellaóóó ó,€88€So.€2d€910,€911„12€(Fla.€œ1956);€ò òòòColquitt›€v.ÏNetwork€Rental,€Inc.óóó ó,€393€S.E.2d€28,€30€(Ga.€Ct.€App.€1990);€ò òòòKeefe€v.€Aluminum€Co.Ïof€Am.ó óóó,€519€N.E.2d€955,€956€(Ill.€App.€Ct.€1988);€ò òòòLaughlin€v.€St.€Louis€Union€TrustÏCo.óóó ó,€50€S.W.2d€92,€93€(Mo.€1932).€Ìà àIn€the€unpublished€case€ò òòòBrannon€v.€Pyleóóó ó,€No.€03A01„9506„CV„00199,€1995€WLÏ571885€(Tenn.€App.€Sept.€29,€1995),€this€Court€considered€whether€the€presumption€of€probableÏcause€œÌcreated›€by€an€initial€favorable€determination€should€be€ð ðconclusiveðð€or€ð ðprima€facie.ðð€€TheÏœconclusive›€presumption€was€described€as€follows:€€ÌÓÓà8 àœ(1)€The›€conviction,€although€reversed€on€appeal,€is€conclusive€evidence€of€theÏexistence€of€probable€cause,€unless€obtained€by€fraud,€perjury€or€other€corruptÏœmeans.Ì›œÌ›ÓÓòòò òBrannonó óóó€at€œ*5.›€€The€prima€facie€presumption€was€also€described:ÌÓÓà8 àœ(2)€The›€overturned€conviction€is€òòprima€facieóó€evidence,€creating€a€presumption€ofÏprobable€cause,€which€the€plaintiff€may€rebut€by€providing€competent€andÏconvincing€evidence€which€clearly€overcomes€it.ÌÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€ò òòòBrannonó óóó€court€acknowledged€that€the€ð ðconclusive€presumptionðð€was€the€majority€rule.€ÏNevertheless,€it€adopted€the€minority€view,€that€a€favorable€initial€ruling€creates€only€a€prima€facieÏpresumption€of€probable€cause€which€may€be€overcome€by€ð ðcompetent€and€convincing€evidence.ðð€Ïò òòòId.ó óóóÌà àIn€this€case,€we€need€not€reach€the€issue€of€whether€the€presumption€of€probable€cause€isÏconclusive€or€prima€facie,€because€Hendrix€has€not€presented€proof€sufficient€to€overcome€theÏpresumption€under€either€rule.€€Here,€the€question€of€law€at€issue€was€argued€before€the€trial€courtÏby€counsel€for€both€parties.€€The€facts€were€fully€presented€to€the€trial€court,€including€the€fact€thatÏno€ò òòònulla€bonaó óóó€return€had€been€made.€€Hendrixðð€attorney€œargued›€the€correct€law,€that€in€theÏabsence€œof›€a€ò òòònulla€bonaó óóó€return,€no€levy€could€be€made€on€the€realty.€€The€issue€was€specificallyÏaddressed€by€the€trial€court,€with€a€ruling€favorable€to€the€œDefendant/Appellees.›€€The€only€evidenceÏto€rebut€the€presumption€of€probable€cause€is€the€eventual€reversal€of€the€trial€courtððs€decision€byÏthis€Court.€€In€and€of€itself,€a€reversal€by€this€Court€is€insufficient€to€overcome€the€presumptionÏunder€either€standard;€otherwise,€every€decision€reversed€by€this€Court€could€form€the€basis€for€aÏmalicious€prosecution€claim.€€Therefore,€the€evidence€was€insufficient€for€a€trier€of€fact€to€find€thatÏHendrix€had€satisfied€an€essential€element€of€her€malicious€prosecution€claim,€lack€of€probableÏcause,€and€the€trial€court€properly€granted€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€the€œDefendant/Appellees.›€Ìœ›à àThe€decision€of€the€€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€are€assessed€against€Appellant,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àò òóóHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ìó óà àò òÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.€J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€œJ.ó ó›