ÿWPCM  ·I–ŒfIJ{­L¢ìWz1Î_H‹ò‹È¡;¥}˜ÍŸ&AZí)9qÇ–²¶`mæRÍ’2 äAÅɼ«¬ØŽóÄ›{¶9…”V~Î1ù㻉¾aúVpLw®Ò(–,@T*XæŘš9@4Ĭ±OÕAMiù‰„âåÉKx<±s]*u_úü[ÄNs¡øaØ]LpÙ@¤RoÐR\<ÁINTT"Qí¼˜ÿ¨“HS&0$¿éf F` *¹‹zPÆzÜÐVÙéò2M'šC}ËjÈHaç1ù}ᜫ<&Y‡ø:<·óÖGÅ Z¢Ê¢qØ_,^,}U†¶°®c7V_Ĩr›zw‰ÑÂøÙ‘)™Ý®xÙMTBBÃrÐÿhà<3•=ªpº•uŒÍ ÷póêðXÔcnoò>µçQ%I‚ËÍLC†ôÖ(ƒ²E3 –\‚†‰?Ø(]¬Œ:Úôý(›âë‡DѦ‹Ü/¢Bs§ZÑ>'Í\ê!ÛÙòþ{X¨Õ «kIÇñË£gàÑ,ou új9ØÿÞ+I³d¿“Ye·?  äñçûÕ¼§l‘ãÙãö(À,£;Œr°6Éž¼L¾ áƒ7{]Ÿ*# LU:W %‘ 0(—b ¿w@Ë4 .n6 0l¤ 0DTU:W ‘ U:” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” ” BÎ AQë Æ< 0D 0DF 0DŠ Š D/Î Î Bý D3 ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - BCDDEFDGHDIJÓ€Tìu[%3|xU dÒ€°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ôF›ôXXÔÓ  ÓÝ ƒ þÝÿÝà Ø àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝAlthough€the€courts€have€talked€in€terms€of€severability€in€these€cases,€the€more€precise€termsÐ  Ðare€dependent€vs.€independent€promises€or€conditions.€€òòSeeóó€Am.€Jur.€2d€òòContractsóó€ðð€473.((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ùÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XOÀXXXÔÔ€FXXOÀÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XOÀXFÔÐ  ÐÌDecember€3,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ùÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XOÀXXXÔÔ€FXXOÀÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XOÀXFÔÐ  ÐÌDecember€2,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular d!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝñJñ›ñJñÑ°ÑÒ€°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€ÑÑ7€OÀXXdæXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñò òÔ€¼¦G¼XXÔÓ  ÓñTññJñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@Eô ` 8ttxP,ð  rßñJññTññTññTññTññJñ›ñJññTññTñßt€ )>.*jxÂÿå` `€€@E¶í` 8ttxPî%ð È tß›ñTñà@  êàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌà@¦¦(êàAT€NASHVILLEó óÔ€XOÀX¼¼¦GԈР ÐÌÌÌÌROGER€P.€HOGAN,€FRED€C.€DANCE,à  à)Ð È À Ðand€MUSIC€CITY€DUST„TEX€à 8 àà  à)Ð ® ¦ ÐSERVICE,€INC.,à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð ”Œ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à 8 àà  à)Ð `X  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àAppeal€No.Ð F>  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è à01„A„01„9712„CH„00733Ð ,$  ÐVS.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð   Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àDavidson€ChanceryÐ øð  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àNo.€95„2911„IIIÐ ÞÖ  ÐCOYNE€INTERNATIONALà 8 àà  à)à è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H! àà  # àРļ ÐENTERPRISES€CORPORATIONà  à)Ð ª¢ Ðd/b/a€COYNE€TEXTILE€SERVICES,à  à)Ð ˆ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àDefendant/Appellee.à 8 àà  à)Ð \T ÐÌÌà@U U êàAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYˆÌà@#êàAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEˆÌÌà@Æ Æ êàTHE€HONORABLE€ELLEN€HOBBS€LYLE,€CHANCELLORˆÌÌÌÌHELEN€S.€ROGERSÌ2205€State€StreetÌNashville,€Tennessee€37203Ìà Ø àAttorney€for€Plaintiffs/AppellantsÌÌC.J.€GIDEON,€JR.ÌWILLIAM€S.€WALTONÌ414€Union€StreetÌSuite€1900,€œNationsBank›€PlazaÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219„1782Ìà Ø àAttorneys€for€Defendant/AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌà@  êàAFFIRMED€IN€PART;€REVERSED€IN€PART;ˆÌà0 Ø àà € àà@ºº$êØ T$Ø T$àMODIFIED€AND€REMANDEDˆÌÌÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àBEN€H.€CANTRELLÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌCONCUR:ÌKOCH,€J.ÌCAIN,€J.ÌÓÓò òÔ€„œ}„XXOÀÔòòà@tt(êàO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÔ€XOÀX„„œ}ԈРš:’39ç Їà Ø àà 0 àThis€action€is€based€on€a€series€of€contracts€executed€in€the€sale€of€anÏindustrial€dust€control€and€laundry€business.€€The€Chancery€Court€of€Davidson€CountyÏdismissed€the€claims€of€the€sellers,€held€that€œone€of€the›€sellers€had€breached€œone€ofÏthe›€œagreements›€but€that€the€buyer€had€failed€to€prove€its€damages,€and€awarded€theÏbuyer€attorneysðð€fees.€€We€reverse€the€dismissal€of€the€sellersðð€action€and€modify€theÏaward€of€attorneysðð€fees.ÌÌà@²²-êàò òI.ó óˆÐ œ”  ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àRoger€P.€Hogan€owned€seventy„five€percent€of€Music€City€Dust„TexÏService,€Inc.€(Dust„Tex),€a€Nashville€industrial€laundry€œbusiness;›€€Fred€Dance,€aÏNashville€attorney,€owned€the€other€twenty„five€percent.€€œHogan€owned€the€buildingÏthat€housed€the€operation.€€Dust„Tex›€rented€to€its€customers€dust€control€productsÏsuch€as€mats,€dust€mops,€wet€mops,€aprons,€bar€towels,€table€linens,€and€napkins.€ÏIn€addition,€Dust„Tex€cleaned€some€of€the€goods€that€actually€belonged€to€itsÏcustomers.€€(These€services€were€referred€to€in€the€record€as€ð ðœN.O.G.›ðð,€meaning€ð ðnotÏour€goods.ðð)ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€the€œfall›€of€œ1993,›€Mr.€Hogan€and€Mr.€Dance€met€with€the€president€andÏvice„president€of€Coyne€International€Enterprises€Corporation,€a€national€industrialÏlaundry€œbusiness,›€to€discuss€the€terms€of€a€sale€of€Dust„Tex€to€Coyne.€€TheÏnegotiations€led€to€a€series€of€agreements€on€December€28,€1993€in€which€CoyneÏagreed€to€purchase€the€assets€of€Dust„Tex,€including€the€trade€name,€the€goodwill,Ïand€the€customer€contracts.€€œIn€separate€agreements,€Coyne€hired€Hogan€as€theÏgeneral€manager€of€the€Nashville€operation,€and€leased€the€building€from€him.›€€ÏHogan€and€Dance€executed€a€negative€covenant€agreement€in€which€they€agreed€toÏrefrain€from€competing€with€Coyne€in€the€industrial€laundry€œbusiness,›€or€from€assistingÏany€others€in€such€competition.€€œHogan›€signed€a€similar€negative€covenant€agreementÏon€œbehalf›€of€Dust„Tex.Ð d9\28 Їà Ø àà 0 àCoyne€agreed€to€pay€œthe€sellers€$552,500.€€Although€the€sellers€quotedÏa€lump€sum€price€based€on€$85€per€dollar€of€weekly€rental€business,€Coyne€got€theÏsellers€to€agree€at€the€closing€to€allocate€the€sales€price€in€the€following€manner.ÌÓÓÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àòòPayableóóà ð àòòDateóó€à H! àà  # àÐ øð Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€òòtoóóà ˜ àà ð àòòDueóóÐ èà ÐLaundry€Equipment,€Office:ÌFurniture,€etc.à ˆ àà à àà 8 à$€€32,500à è àà @ àcorp.€€€€€€€€€€€€€July€1,€1994Ð ÈÀ ÐÌMerchandise€Inventory:ÌSupplies,€etc.à ˆ àà à àà 8 à$100,000à è àà @ àcorp.à ˜ àà ð àDec.€31,€1993Ð ˜ ÐÌBuilding€Rent:à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àRogerà ð àmonthlyÐ xp Ð$2,000€per€month€x€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€$120,000à è àà @ àHoganà ð àstartingÐ h` Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€60€monthsà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àJan.€1,€1994Ð X P ÐÌSales€Commission:à ˆ àà à àà 8 à€$175,000à è àà @ àRogerà ð à$17,500Ð 8"0 Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àHoganà ð àApr.€1€andÐ (#  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àOct.€1,Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð à10€paymentsÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àstartingÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àApr.€1,€1994ÌÌConsulting€&€Neg.€Covenant:à 8 à€$125,000à è àà @ àjointlyà ˜ àà ð à$12,500Ð È(À!$ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àRogerà ð àApr.€1€andÐ ¸)°"% Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àHogan€&à ð àOct.€1,Ð ¨* #& Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àFredà ˜ àà ð à10€paymentsÐ ˜+$' Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àDanceà ð àstartingÐ ˆ,€%( Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à________à è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àApr.€1,€1994Ð x-p&) Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à$552,500ÌÌ›ÌÓÓœWithin€four€months€of€the€purchase,€Coyne€moved€the€cleaning€and€processingÏoperation€to€London,€Kentucky.€€Hogan€had€to€terminate€his€sales€people€and€pick€upÏthe€duties€of€a€salesman€and€route€person.€€He€viewed€this€change€as€a€demotionÏfrom€the€position€of€general€manager,€and€he€experienced€a€drop€in€efficiencyÏbecause€of€the€problem€of€getting€the€goods€back€from€Kentucky.€€In€the€Spring€ofÐ ¸8°15 Ð1995,€Hogan€went€on€sick€leave€for€surgery.€€After€the€surgery,€he€did€not€return€toÏwork,€and€he€filed€suit€against€Coyne€for€a€breach€of€the€employment€agreement€inÏSeptember€of€1995.ÌÌ›à Ø àà 0 àCoyne€paid€the€$100,000€down€œpayment,€the€$32,500€on€July€1,€1994,›Ïand€the€installment€payments€through€April€œof1995.›€€Coyne€also€tendered€the€OctoberÏ1995€payments€but€stopped€payment€on€the€checks€when€Hogan€sued€Coyne€overÏhis€employment€agreement.€€When€Coyne€refused€to€make€the€payments€called€forÏin€the€purchase€agreement,€Hogan,€Dance,€and€Dust„Tex€sued€to€collect€theÏremaining€payments.€€Coyne€œcounterclaimed›€for€damages,€alleging€that€the€plaintiffsÏbreached€the€agreement€and€that€they€were€guilty€of€fraudulent€misrepresentations.€ÏCoyne€continued€to€make€the€lease€payments€through€August€of€1996,€when€theyÏmoved€œout,›€œalleging›€the€building€was€unsafe€and€had€not€been€repaired€by€Hogan.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà@––-êàò òII.ˆÐ H!@ Ðà@îî%êàThe€Sales€Agreementó óˆÐ (#  ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€contract€of€sale€œincludes›€several€parts.€€The€principal€part€is€a€letterÏfrom€Coyne€dated€December€28,€1993€in€which€Coyne€confirms€an€agreement€toÏpurchase€the€assets,€inventory,€goodwill,€customer€contracts,€and€the€Dust„Tex€tradeÏname.€Hogan€and€Dance€warranted€that€the€Dust„Tex€rental€volume€amounted€toÏ$6,336€per€week€and€the€œN.O.G.›€volume€amounted€to€$465€per€week.€€The€twoÏfigures€were€to€be€verified€in€a€four€week€test€period€in€January€of€1994,€and€if€theÏvolume€fell€below€the€warranted€figures,€the€purchase€price€would€be€reduced€by€$85Ïfor€every€one€dollar€of€rental€volume€below€$6,336€per€week€and€$30€for€every€œN.O.G.›Ïdollar€below€$465€per€week.Ìâ âÐ È7À04 Ðà Ø àà 0 àœCoyne€signed€two›€purchase€œorders.€€One€covered€the€inventory€andÏâ âsupplies€($100,000)€and€the€other›€the€laundry€equipment€and€office€œfurnitureÏ($32,500).›€€Another€sheet€attached€to€the€letter€agreement€called€for€payments€toÏHogan€for€ð ðsales€commissionsðð€of€$175,000€in€ten€installments€of€$17,500€each€dueÏon€April€1€and€October€1€beginning€in€1994.€€The€final€attachment€called€for€paymentsÏto€Hogan€and€Dance€jointly€for€ð ðConsulting€and€Agreement€Not€to€Competeðð€ofÏ$125,000,€payable€in€ten€installments€on€the€same€schedule€as€the€installmentÏpayments€to€Hogan.€€Coyne€also€bargained€for€the€right€to€designate€$120,000€of€theÏpurchase€price€as€ð ðbuilding€rent,ðð€consisting€of€$2,000€per€month€for€sixty€months.€Ï(The€building€was€actually€owned€by€œHogan,›€and€was€leased€by€Coyne€in€a€separateÏlease.)ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWhen€Coyne€stopped€payment€on€the€checks€issued€to€Hogan€andÏDance€for€the€October€1,€1995€installment,€Hogan€and€Dance€filed€œan€action€forÏbreach€of€contract.›€€Coyne€did€not€plead€an€affirmative€defense€to€the€œcontract€action;›Ïinstead€Coyne€filed€a€counter„claim€based€on€(1)€a€breach€of€the€restrictive€covenantÏin€Hoganððs€employment€agreement,€(2)€Hoganððs€failure€to€perform€his€duties€under€theÏemployment€agreement,€(3)€fraudulent€misrepresentations€concerning€the€volume€ofÏDust„Texððs€business,€and€(4)€a€violation€of€the€negative€covenants€signed€by€HoganÏand€Dance.€€Coyne€asked€for€rescission€and€restitution,€damages,€and€a€declarationÏthat€it€had€no€further€obligations€under€the€agreement€to€purchase€Dust„Tex€or€œunderÏthe›€lease€agreement€with€Hogan.€€In€an€amendment€to€its€œcounterclaim,›€CoyneÏalleged€that€the€plaintiffs€had€induced€a€breach€of€Coyneððs€contract€with€its€customers.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€chancellor€dismissed€the€fraud€claims,€citing€a€lack€of€proof€of€anyÏmisrepresentations€by€Hogan€or€Dance.€€(The€proof€shows€that€the€figures€warrantedÏin€the€contract€checked€out€in€the€1994€test€period€„„€although€Coyne€alleged€that€theÏtest€period€billings€were€inflated.)€€On€the€negative€covenants,€the€chancellor€foundÐ ¨9 26 Ðthat€Dance€had€not€breached€the€agreement€but€that€Hogan€had€committed€a€breachÏby€being€involved€in€a€company€known€as€Dust„Tex€œMat›€and€œMop.›€€As€to€anyÏdamages€suffered€by€Coyne,€the€court€found€that€Coyneððs€losses€were€attributable€toÏits€own€ð ðpoor€service€to€its€customers,€including€rudeness,€forgery€and€shortages.ððÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€chancellor€refused€to€rescind€the€agreement€because€the€partiesÏcould€not€be€placed€in€status€quo.€€œThe›€court€dismissed€Coyneððs€damage€claims,€but€Ïheld€that€Coyne€had€no€further€obligation€to€make€the€installment€payments€on€theÏpurchase€price.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àHogan€and€Dance€allege€that€the€chancellor€erred€in€holding€that€CoyneÏhad€no€further€obligation€on€the€asset€purchase€agreement.€€We€agree.€€Although€weÏagree€with€the€chancellorððs€findings€of€fact,€the€findings€do€not€support€a€cancellationÏof€the€balance€of€the€contract.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àA€contract€may€have€several€parts.€€A€breach€of€one€part€will€excuse€allÏof€the€promised€performance€by€the€other€party€where€œthe›€contract€is€to€be€performedÏonly€as€a€œwhole.›€€œ€òòBrockett€v.€Pipkinóó,€149€S.W.2d€478,€483€(Tenn.€App.€1941).›€€In€œsuchÐ è&à" Ða€case,›€we€call€the€contract€œð ðentire,ðð›€and€œð ðthe›€complete€fulfillment€of€the€contract€byÏeither€side€is€required€as€a€condition€precedent€to€the€fulfillment€of€any€part€of€theÏcontract€by€the€other.ðð€€òòBradford€&€Carson€v.€Montgomery€œFurniture›€Co.óó,€92€œS.W.›€1104Ð ˆ,€%( Ðat€1109€(Tenn.€œ1906).›ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àIf,€however,€œð ðseveral›€things€are€to€be€done€under€a€contract,€and€theÏmoney€consideration€to€be€paid€is€apportioned€to€each€of€the€items,€the€contract€isÏordinarily€regarded€as€severable.ðð€€œ17A›€œAm.Jur›.œ2d›€òòContractsóó€ðð€418.€€In€that€case,Ð è5à.2 Ðâ âð ðneither€party€can€claim€more€than€an€equivalent€for€the€actual€consideration€on€hisÐ È7À04 Ðœpart.ð𛀀òòBradford€and€Carson€v.€Montgomery€Furniture€Co.óó,€92€œS.W.›€1104€at€1109Ð  Ð(Tenn.€œ1906).›Ìâ âÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€this€case,€Coyne€specifically€assigned€a€money€value€to€the€separateÏparts€of€the€agreement.€€We€think€it€is€clear€that€the€contract€was€œseverable,›€and€aÏbreach€of€one€part€would€not€excuse€the€promised€performance€for€the€other€parts.€ÏœIt›€should€œbe›€œobvious›€œtherefore€that›€Mr.€Hoganððs€breach€of€the€negative€covenant€orÏhis€breach€of€his€separate€employment€agreement€would€not€defeat€Danceððs€right€toÏrecover€what€was€promised€to€him.€€Coyne€received€full€performance€from€Dance€andÏshould€deliver€what€was€promised€in€return.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWhat€about€Hogan?€€There€is€another€level€of€severability€that€has€beenÏapplied€by€our€courts.€€That€is€severability€within€a€specific€part€of€a€contract.œ×ƒ ×Ý ƒ %ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€€œThe›Ð ˆ€ Ðpoint€is€best€illustrated€by€òòBradford€and€Carson€v.€œMontgomeryóó,€òòsupraóó,€where›€theÐ h` Ðsellers€sold€their€furniture€business€and€entered€into€a€covenant€not€to€engage€in€theÏfurniture€business€for€a€period€of€three€years.€€The€parties€valued€the€goodwill€of€theÏbusiness€and€the€covenant€not€to€compete€at€$3,000€and€the€purchaser€gave€theÏsellers€a€note€for€that€amount,€due€in€one€year.€€œThe›€sellers€breached€the€covenantÏnot€to€œcompete€within€a€year,€but›€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€the€sellers€could€collectÏthe€note.€€œThe›€court€recognized€that€the€buyers€did€have€a€claim€for€the€amount€theyÏhad€been€damaged€by€the€sellersðð€breach,€but€the€buyers€had€the€burden€of€provingÏthe€amount€of€their€damages.€€The€Court€reasoned€that€the€note€covered€two€differentÏthings€and€that€the€buyers€ð ðhave€received€by€œfar›€the€larger€part€of€the€considerationÏof€their€note,€the€œgood€will›€of€the€firm€of€Bradford€and€Carson,€and€the€performanceÏâ âof€their€contract€to€close€business€for€nearly€one„third€of€the€time€agreed€upon.ðð€€œ92›Ð 4-0 ÐœS.W.›€at€œ1110.›€€The€performance€of€the€contract€not€to€re„enter€the€furniture€businessÏwas€œtherefore€not›€a€condition€precedent€to€collecting€the€note.Ìâ âÌà Ø àà 0 àThis€court€reached€a€similar€result€in€òòYoung€v.€Jonesóó,€255€S.W.2d€703Ð ¨   Ð(Tenn.€App.€1952),€where€the€plaintiff€sold€his€veterinary€business€for€$10,000€andÏagreed€not€to€practice€veterinary€medicine€ð ðfor€as€long€as€the€contract€was€notÏbreachedðð€(by€the€buyer,€we€assume).€€œThe€purchase€price€was€to€be€paid€in€monthlyÏinstallments€of€$166.67.€€When›€the€seller€resumed€a€veterinary€practice,€the€buyerÏasked€for€œa€cancellation€of€the€upaid€purchase€price.›€€Relying€on€òòBradford€and€CarsonÐ  Ðv.€€œMontgomeryóó,›€this€court€held€that€the€contract€was€severable€and€that€performanceÐ èà Ðby€either€party€was€not€subject€to€performance€by€the€other€as€a€condition€precedent.€ÏTo€demonstrate€the€independence€of€the€covenant€and€the€promise€to€pay€theÏpurchase€price€the€court€said:€€ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àà ˆ àThe€only€difference€in€those€facts€and€the€instantÏcase€is€the€covenant€not€to€compete€was€to€run€for€theÏrest€of€Jonesðð€life€and€the€price€was€to€be€paid€inÏinstallments€over€approximately€a€five€year€period.€€It€isÏobvious€that,€if€Jones€lived€longer€than€five€œyears,›€theÏprice€would€have€been€applied€before€he€could€fullyÏperform,€and€if€Jones€had€died,€say€the€first€year,€theÏpurchaser€was€not€bound€to€perform€fully€for€five€years€inÏpaying€the€œnote;›€immediate€performance€by€neither€wasÏexpected,€nor€was€performance€of€one€dependent€uponÏperformance€by€the€other€of€these€parts€of€the€contract.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌœ255€S.W.2d€at€706.ÌÌÌÌ›ÓÓà Ø àà 0 àœThe€order€of€time€in€which€promises€are€to€be€performed€may€controlÏwhether€they€are€independent€of€dependent.€€ð ð[W]here€the€acts€to€be€done€are€to€beÏdone€at€different€times€the€stipulations€are€to€be€construed€as€independent€of€eachÏother.ðð€€17€Am.€Jur.€2d€òòContractsóó€ðð€474.€€In›€this€case€Coyne€was€obligated€to€pay€theÐ 4-0 Ðbalance€of€the€purchase€price€over€five€years.€€The€negative€covenants€signed€byÏHogan€and€Dance€included€a€five€year€provision€(not€to€engage€in€or€assist€anotherÏin€engaging€in€the€industrial€laundry€business)€and€a€ten€œyear›€provision€(not€to€solicitÐ ¨9 26 ÐCoyneððs€customers€or€any€Dust„Tex€employees€hired€by€Coyne).€€Although€theÏchancellor€held€that€the€ten€year€provision€was€unreasonable€(and€thereforeÏunenforceable€beyond€five€years)€the€contract€demonstrates€that€payment€was€notÏconditioned€on€performance€by€the€sellers.€€Coyne€could€set€off€against€the€purchaseÏprice€any€damages€it€suffered€from€the€sellersðð€breach,€but€Coyne€had€the€burden€ofÏproof.€€œThe›€chancellor€found€that€Coyne€had€failed€to€carry€that€œburdenñ?ñ,€ñ?ññ@ñ€and€Coyne€hasÏnot€taken€issue€with€thatñ@ññEñ€determinationñEññFññ@ñ_________ñ@ññFññ@ñ€on€appeal.€€We€have€examined€the€record€andÏwe€are€satisfied€that€there€is€no€proof€on€which€to€base€a€juñ@ññGñdgñGññ@ñment€for€damages€forÏa€breach€of€the€negative€covenant.€€ñ@ñCoyneñAñ›€ñAññBñ,€therefore,€ñBñremains›€obligated€to€pay€theÏbalance€of€the€purchase€œprice,€except€for€the€balance€due€on€the€lease€payments.€€WeÏwill€deal€with€that€part€of€the€ñCñcaseñCññDñcontroversyñDñ€in€Part€IV€of€this€opinion.›ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àOne€other€thing€remains€to€be€said€about€this€part€of€the€controversy.€ÏThe€breakdown€of€the€contract€into€its€several€parts€was€Coyneððs€own€invention€„„€forÏtax€purposes,€apparently.€€The€reference€to€ð ðcommissionsðð€in€Hoganððs€payments€andÏð ðconsultingðð€in€the€payments€to€Hogan€and€Dance€were€merely€Coyneððs€œlabels,›€andÏnot€an€indication€œof€specific›€services€œthat€were›€actually€due€from€Hogan€and€Dance.€ÏHogan€was€not€due€any€commissions€under€the€sales€agreement.€€He€had€a€separateÏemployment€agreement€under€which€he€could€earn€a€bonus€if€the€company€achievedÏa€certain€sales€level,€but€there€is€no€proof€in€the€record€of€how€he€was€to€earn€theÏ$175,000€Coyne€was€to€pay€him€over€five€years.€€The€same€is€true€of€the€ð ðconsultingððÏservices€for€Dance.€€There€is€no€proof€of€any€duties€he€had€in€that€regard.€€œWeÏtherefore›€conclude€that€the€separate€categories€were€just€for€Coyneððs€convenience€inÏaccounting€for€the€purchase€price.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€sellers€should€be€allowed€to€recover€the€œbalance€of€the€$175,000Ïdue€to€Hogan€and€the€$125,000€due€to€Hogan€and€Dance€jointly.›ÌœÐ ¨9 26 ЇñHñÌñHñ›à@zz,êàò òIII.ˆÐ  Ðà@Ãà êàHoganððs€Employment€Agreementó óˆÐ èà ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àHogan€sued€Coyne€for€a€breach€of€his€separate€employment€agreement.€ÏHe€alleged€that€he€was€employed€as€a€general€manager€of€the€Nashville€plant,€butÏthat€he€was€reduced€to€the€position€of€a€route€salesman.€€He€was€not€consulted€onÏlong€range€planning€or€corporate€policy€decisions,€and€he€did€not€receive€any€specialÏinstructions€or€proprietary€information€on€pricing,€customer€relations,€or€adjustingÏcomplaints.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€chancellor€found€that€Hogan€abandoned€his€job€with€Coyne€andÏbreached€the€employment€agreement€by€acting€contrary€to€Coyneððs€interests€andÏengaging€in€other€employment.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWe€agree€with€the€chancellorððs€findings€and€conclusion€in€this€respect.€ÏFirst,€the€agreement€did€not€define€the€duties€of€a€general€manager,€but€it€did€provideÏthat€Hogan€would€ð ðcarry€out€and€perform€such€duties€as€may€be€assigned€byÏemployerððs€president,€its€chairman€of€the€board€or€its€vice€president.ðð€€Coyne€was€freeÏto€make€the€business€decision€to€move€most€of€the€operations€to€London,€KentuckyÏand€to€œredirect€Hoganððs›€activities€in€light€of€that€decision.€€But€Coyne€continued€to€payÏHogan€his€full€salary.€€Therefore,€Coyne€did€not€breach€the€employment€agreementÏor€constructively€discharge€Hogan.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€the€œspring›€of€1995€Hogan€went€on€sick€leave€for€surgery.€€œHe›€did€notÏreturn€to€work€for€Coyne,€and€he€filed€an€action€for€the€breach€of€his€agreement€inÏSeptember€of€1995.€€Since€we€concur€in€the€chancellorððs€findings€and€conclusionsÏregarding€the€alleged€breach€by€Coyne,€we€also€agree€with€her€conclusion€that€HoganÏvoluntarily€abandoned€his€employment€contract.Ð ¨9 26 Їà@oo-êàò òIV.ˆÐ  Ðà@ÿÿ*êàThe€Leaseó óˆÐ èà ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àWhen€Coyne€acquired€Dust„Tex€in€December€of€1993,€it€also€enteredÏinto€a€five€year€lease€of€the€space€owned€by€œHogan,›€that€formerly€served€as€the€baseÏof€Dust„Texððs€operations.€€The€lease€stipulated€that€the€premises€were€received€inÏgood€order€and€condition.€€It€also€included€a€provision€that€Coyne€would€maintain€theÏpremises€in€good€order€and€make€all€necessary€repairs€except€for€pre„existing€andÏstructural€conditions.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€proof€showed€that€in€1996€the€roof€leaked€to€such€an€extent€thatÏCoyne€employed€a€roofing€expert€to€assess€the€problem.€€The€expert€concluded€thatÏthe€leaks€made€the€building€unsafe€and€that€the€deficiencies€in€that€respect€existedÏprior€to€December€of€1993.€€Coyne€called€on€Hogan€to€make€the€necessary€repairs,Ïbut€Hogan€refused€to€do€so.€€On€July€23,€1996€Coyne€vacated€the€building.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€chancellor€found€that€ð ðthe€premises€were€not€in€good€order€andÏcondition€upon€receipt€by€Coyne€and€that€the€problems€which€required€Coyne€toÏvacate€the€premises€were€œpre„existing.ðð›ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àHogan€maintains€that€the€proof€showing€the€defective€roof€was€a€œpre„¼existing›€condition€violated€the€parol€evidence€œrule;›€it€contradicted€the€lease€provisionÏthat€the€premises€were€received€in€good€order€and€condition.€€It€should€be€noted,Ïhowever,€that€the€two€lease€provisions€should€be€read€together.€€œThe›€provisionÏimposing€on€the€tenant€a€duty€to€make€repairs€œð ðexcept›€for€pre„existing€conditions,€andÏstructural€repairsðð€indicates€that€the€parties€knew€such€œthings›€might€exist.€€Therefore,Ïparol€evidence€that€the€roof€was€defective€on€the€date€of€the€lease€would€not€vary€orÏcontradict€the€contract.Ð ¨9 26 Їà Ø àà 0 àWe€think€the€chancellorððs€findings€œare›€supported€by€the€proof.€ÏTherefore,€the€building€condition€amounted€to€a€constructive€œeviction.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWith€respect€to€the€lease€payments€of€$2,000€per€month€mentioned€inÏthe€sales€agreement,€Hogan€argues€that€the€true€rent€was€$4,500€per€month€and€thatÏthe€$2,000€payment€was€actually€part€of€the€purchase€price.€€In€effect,€Hogan€arguesÏthat€the€reference€to€rent€in€the€sales€agreement€was€just€another€of€Coyneððs€slickÏaccounting€practices.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWe€note,€however,€that€the€lease€actually€recites€that€$6,500€per€monthÏwill€be€paid€for€forty„eight€months€and€that€$2,000€per€month€will€be€paid€for€anÏadditional€twelve€months.€€If€Mr.€Hogan€is€correct€it€means€that€in€the€fifth€year€CoyneÏwould€be€occupying€the€building€rent„free.€€The€issue€is€not€free€from€doubt,€so€we€willÏaccept€Coyneððs€argument€that€the€$2,000€monthly€payments€in€the€sales€agreementÏactually€represented€rent.€€Therefore,€the€chancellorððs€finding€that€Hogan€breachedÏthe€lease€is€a€defense€to€any€further€claim€for€the€$2,000€lease€payments.Ì›Ìà@‹‹-êàò òV.ˆÐ è&à" Ðà@^^#êàThe€Negative€Covenantsó óˆÐ È(À!$ ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àHogan€asserts€that€the€restrictive€covenant€in€his€employmentÏagreement€and€the€negative€covenant€he€and€Dance€signed€are€void€because€theyÏare€used€to€restrain€ordinary€competition.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€employment€contract€contained€the€following€provision:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!à1)à ˆ àEmployee€agrees€that,€for€a€period€of€three€(3)Ð è5à.2 Ðyears€from€the€date€of€termination€of€his€employment,Ïòòregardless€of€the€cause€of€that€terminationóó,€he€will€notÐ È7À04 Ðdirectly€or€indirectly,€engage€in,€re„engage€in,€conduct,Ïoperate,€or€assist€any€person,€partnership,€corporation€orÐ ¨9 26 Ðother€entity€as€an€officer,€director,€partner,€consultant,Ïemployee,€or€otherwise,€in€the€industrial€laundry€businessÏnor€will€he€do€industrial€laundry€for€sale€or€rental€byÏanyone€else.€€œThe›€covenant€contained€in€this€paragraphÏapplies€to€all€of€the€geographic€area€within€seventy€(70)Ïmiles€of€Nashville,€Tennessee.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!à2)à ˆ àEmployee€further€agrees€that,€for€a€period€of€tenÐ ˜  Ð(10)€years€from€the€termination€of€his€employment,Ïòòregardless€of€the€cause€of€that€terminationóó,€he€will€not€callÐ xp  Ðupon€or€cause€to€be€called€upon,€or€assist€in€theÏsolicitation€of€industrial€laundry€business€from€any€person,Ïpartnership,€corporation€or€other€entity€served€by€CoyneÏfrom€any€location€during€Employeeððs€employment€or€withÏwhom€the€Employee€became€acquainted€while€in€theÏEmployerððs€employ€or€whose€name€and/or€addressesÏwere€furnished€to€him€by€Employer€or€procured€byÏEmployee€while€in€said€employ€and€that€he€will€not€furnishÏin€writing€or€otherwise€or€disclose€in€any€conversation,Ïdirectly€or€indirectly,€any€of€said€names€and/or€addressesÏor€any€other€information€concerning€these€persons,Ïpartnerships,€corporations€or€other€entities€or€agencies,€toÏany€person,€partnerships,€corporations€or€other€entities€orÏagencies,€to€any€person,€partnership,€corporation€or€otherÏentity.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!à3)à ˆ àThese€covenants€will€also€apply€to€any€newÐ h` Ðlocation€to€which€Employee€may€be€transferred€duringÏEmployeeððs€employment.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!à4)à ˆ àEmployee€also€agrees€that€for€a€period€of€three€(3)Ð (#  Ðyears€from€the€termination€of€his€employment,€òòregardlessÐ $ Ðof€the€cause€of€that€terminationóó,€he€will€not€solicit€orÐ %  Ðattempt€to€solicit€or€otherwise€attempt€to€cause€CoyneÏemployees€to€leave€their€employment.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àThe€negative€covenant€signed€by€Hogan€and€Dance€provided:ÌÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àa)à ˆ àExcept€for€any€employment€with€œCTS›,€œCovenantors›Ð h.`'* Ðwill,€within€the€territory€set€forth€in€Exhibit€C,€immediatelyÏcease€all€their€activities€in€the€industrial€laundry€businessÏand€will€withdraw€their€business€connections€and€servicesÏof€every€kind€and€nature€in€any€way€connected€with€theÏindustrial€laundry€business€in€any€of€its€phases,€whichÏincludes,€but€is€not€limited€to,€the€rental€of€such€items€asÏwork€clothes,€shop€towels,€wiping€cloths,€coats,€pants,Ïjackets,€coveralls,€frocks,€smocks,€work€gloves,€fenderÏcovers,€dust€control€equipment€and€supplies,€glassÏtowels,€caps,€roll€towels,€dust€bags,€protective€garments,Ïreusable€absorbents€and€other€similar€items€and€anyÏother€items€rented€by€Dust„Tex€or€œCTS›.€€œThis›€restrictionÐ ¨9 26 Ðshall€apply€for€a€period€of€three€(3)€years€from€the€dateÏhereof.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àb)à ˆ àœCovenantors›€agree€that€for€a€period€of€five€(5)Ð Ø Ð Ðyears,€they€will€not,€within€the€territory€set€forth€in€ExhibitÏœA,›€reengage€in,€conduct,€operate€or€assist€another€as€aÏlender€of€money,€shareholder,€consultant,€agent,Ïemployee,€or€otherwise€in€the€industrial€laundry€business,Ïnor€will€they€do€industrial€laundry€for€sale€or€rental€byÏanyone€else.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àc)à ˆ àœCovenantors›€agree€that€for€a€period€of€ten€(10)Ð XP  Ðyears€they€will€not€cause€to€be€called€upon€or€assist€in€theÏsolicitation€of€business€from,€any€customer€purchased€byÏœCTS›€(the€ð ðCustomersðð).€€œCovenantors›€shall€not€at€any€timeÏdisclose€in€any€manner€any€Proprietary€InformationÏrelating€to€the€Customers€including,€but€not€limited€to,€anyÏof€the€names€and/or€addresses€of€these€Customers€orÏany€other€information€concerning€the€names€and/orÏaddresses€of€these€Customers€to€any€other€person,Ïpartnership,€firm,€corporation€or€agency.€€œCovenantors›Ïfurther€agree€that€they€will€not€at€any€time€or€in€any€wayÏinterfere€with€or€impede€the€business€being€œpurchased›€byÏœCTS›€and€that€they€will€not€at€any€time€solicit,€directly€orÏindirectly,€any€of€the€Dust„Tex€employees€hired€by€œCTS›.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àOur€Supreme€Court€has€said€that€such€covenants€are€enforceable€ð ðifÏthey€are€reasonable€under€the€particular€circumstances.ðð€€òòHasty€v.€Rent„a„Driver,€Inc.óó,Ð (#  Ð671€S.W.2d€471€at€472€(Tenn.€1984).€€ð ðReasonablenessðð€includes€a€time€andÏgeographical€component.€€òòCentral€Adjustment€Bureau,€Inc.€v.€œIngram›óó,€678€œS.W.2d›€œ28Ð è&à" Ðat€33›€(Tenn.€1984).€€But€it€also€includes€a€requirement€that€the€restraint€imposed€mustÏnot€exceed€what€is€needed€to€protect€the€employerððs€legitimate€interests.€€òòœSelox›,€Inc.Ð ¨* #& Ðv.€Fordóó,€675€œS.W.2d›€œ474€at€475›€(Tenn.€1984).€€The€employerððs€legitimate€interests€doÐ ˆ,€%( Ðnot€include€a€restraint€on€ð ðordinaryðð€competition.€€òòHasty€v.€Rent„a„Driver,€Inc.óó,€671Ð h.`'* ÐS.W.2d€471€(Tenn.€œ1984).€›€But€it€is€reasonable€for€an€employer€to€restrict€a€formerÏemployeeððs€contact€with€the€employerððs€customers€where€customers€tend€to€associateÏthe€employerððs€business€with€the€employee.€€òòId.óó€at€473.€€Outside€theÐ 4-0 Ðemployer/employee€œrelationship,›€covenants€restricting€competition€have€generallyÏâ âbeen€upheld€when€they€are€incidental€to€the€sale€of€a€business.€€òòGreen€Co.€Tire€Co.Ð È7À04 Ðv.€œSparlin›óó,€338€S.W.2d€597€(Tenn.€1960);€òòButts€v.€œBirdwell›óó,€503€œS.W.2d›€930€(Tenn.Ð  Ð1973).Ìâ âÌà Ø àà 0 àWe€think€Coyne€had€a€legitimate€business€interest€to€protect€by€puttingÏHogan€under€a€non„compete€agreement.€€œHogan›€òòwasóó€the€business€in€this€area,€andÐ ˆ€ Ðhe€agreed€to€the€restrictions€in€connection€with€the€sale.€€He€posed€more€than€anÏordinary€threat€of€competition€to€Coyne.€€On€œappeal,›€Hogan€argues€at€length€that€theÏproof€shows€he€did€not€personally€cause€any€of€Coyneððs€customers€to€take€theirÏbusiness€elsewhere.€€Therefore,€he€argues,€he€was€œnot€closely›€associated€with€theÏbusiness€in€the€customerððs€minds.€€The€reasonableness€of€the€restriction,€however,Ïmust€be€measured€as€of€the€time€of€the€agreement.€€òòœAllright›€Auto€œParks,›€œInc.›€v.€Berryóó,Ð ÈÀ Ð409€S.W.2D€361€(Tenn.€1966).ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àAs€to€the€time€restrictions,€Hogan€does€not€argue€on€appeal€that€theÏagreements€were€òòper€œse›óó€invalid.€€While€a€ten€year€restriction€might€be€œunreasonable,›€Ð H!@ Ðthe€court€has€the€option€to€refuse€to€enforce€a€restriction€beyond€a€reasonable€timeÏor€outside€a€reasonable€area.€€òòCentral€Adjustment€Bureau,€Inc.€v.€œIngram›óó,€678€S.W.2dÐ %  Ð28€(Tenn.€1984).€€Since€the€chancellor€held€that€the€negative€covenants€would€not€beÏenforced€beyond€a€three€year€period,€the€problem€with€the€length€of€the€restriction€hasÏnow€become€moot.ÌÌà@oo-êàò òVI.ˆÐ h.`'* Ðà@úú'êàAttorneysðð€Feesó óˆÐ H0@), ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€chancellor€awarded€Coyne€$65,000€in€attorneysðð€fees€againstÏHogan.€€On€appeal€Hogan€argues€that€the€fees€were€not€justified€by€the€negativeÏcovenant€agreement€nor€by€the€proof€in€this€case.ÌÐ ¨9 26 Ðà Ø àà 0 àThe€American€Rule€prohibits€an€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€as€a€part€of€theÏcosts€of€litigation€except€where€the€award€is€provided€by€statute€or€contract.€€òòœGoings›Ð èà Ðv.€œAetna›€Casualty€and€œSurety›€Companyóó,€491€œS.W.2d›€847€(Tenn.€œApp.€1972).›€€In€thisÐ È À Ðcase€the€€Negative€Covenant€agreement€signed€by€Hogan€provided:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àIn€the€event€of€a€breach€of€this€Agreement,€the€partyÏenforcing€the€Agreement€shall€be€entitled€to€reasonableÏattorneysðð€fees€and€reasonable€costs€and€expensesÏassociated€with€the€enforcement€thereof.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àThe€trial€court€held€a€hearing€on€the€attorneysðð€fees€issue.€€The€onlyÏproof€on€the€amount€was€contained€in€the€records€kept€by€Coyneððs€lawyers,€one€firmÏin€Nashville€and€another€in€New€York.€€The€records€detailed€the€time€and€expensesÏspent€on€the€series€of€cases€consolidated€for€trial,€but€the€records€do€not€break€downÏthe€costs€incurred€in€defending€or€enforcing€the€negative€covenant.€€The€total€fees€andÏexpenses€for€the€two€firms€came€to€$129,388.52.€€œThere›€is€no€dispute€over€theÏreasonableness€of€the€hourly€rates€charged€or€the€total€hours€spent€in€the€litigation.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€sole€question€here,€then,€is€how€much€of€the€overall€fee€should€beÏapportioned€to€the€controversy€over€Hoganððs€breach€of€the€Negative€Covenant.€€ThereÏwere€actually€three€actions€consolidated€for€trial.€€The€first€was€an€action€by€œHogan›Ïalleging€a€breach€of€his€employment€agreement.€€Coyne€filed€a€counterclaim€againstÏHogan,€Dance€and€Dust„Tex,€alleging€a€violation€of€the€negative€covenant€by€HoganÏand€Dance,€a€breach€of€the€employment€contract,€and€fraud€on€the€part€of€all€of€theÏcounter„defendants.€€The€second€action€was€filed€by€Hogan,€Dance,€and€Dust„Tex€forÏa€breach€of€the€asset€purchase€agreement.€€Coyne€filed€a€counterclaim,€essentiallyÏraising€the€same€issues€that€were€raised€in€the€prior€action.€€In€addition,€Coyne€allegedÏin€the€counterclaim€that€it€was€no€longer€obligated€on€the€lease.€€Hogan€joined€issueÏâ âon€that€allegation.€€œThe›€third€action€was€an€appeal€of€a€General€Sessions€action€inÐ Ø6Ð/3 Ðwhich€Hogan€and€Dance€sought€to€repossess€the€equipment€transferred€to€Coyne€inÏthe€sale.Ìâ âÌà Ø àà 0 àAs€we€have€œindicated,›€the€only€provision€for€the€recovery€of€attorneysððÏfees€is€in€the€Negative€Covenant.€€œA›€major€part€of€the€whole€controversy€involvedÏother€œmatters€„„›€the€fraud€œclaims,›€the€œallegation›€that€Dance€violated€the€NegativeÏCovenant,€the€lease,€and€Hoganððs€employment€agreement.€€œWhile›€we€acknowledgeÏthat€Hoganððs€Negative€Covenant€played€a€part€in€all€of€the€claims,€we€are€satisfied€thatÏallocating€almost€one„half€of€the€total€fees€and€expenses€to€that€items€alone€resultsÏin€an€unreasonable€fee€for€its€enforcement€or€defense.€€We€are€handicapped,€as€theÏtrial€court€was,€by€the€refusal€of€Coyneððs€attorneys€to€make€any€allocation€on€theirÏown.€€In€fact,€the€summaries€in€the€record€delete€all€references€to€the€specific€activitiesÏfor€which€the€charges€were€made.€€If€the€specifics€are€to€be€kept€secret,€some€otherÏmethod€could€have€been€employed€to€give€a€better€approximation€of€the€time€devotedÏto€the€Negative€Covenant.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àBased€on€our€review€of€the€record,€we€think€one„fourth€of€the€expenseÏshould€be€allocated€to€the€enforcement€of€the€Negative€Covenant.€€We,€therefore,Ïmodify€the€judgment€against€Hogan€for€attorneysðð€fees€to€$32,347.13.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€judgment€of€the€court€below€is€reversed€in€part,€and€modified€in€part,Ïas€indicated€herein.€€In€all€other€respects€it€is€affirmed.€€The€cause€is€remanded€to€theÏChancery€Court€of€Davidson€County€for€the€entry€of€a€judgment€in€accordance€withÏthis€opinion.€€Pre„judgment€interest€on€the€award€to€Hogan€and€Dance€for€the€breachÏof€the€asset€purchase€agreement€in€the€amount€of€10%€per€annum€shall€run€from€theÏœdates€the€installment€payments€came€due.€€Post„judgment›€interest€on€Coyneððs€œÌâ âÐ È7À04 Ð$32,347.13›€judgment€against€Hogan€shall€run€from€œNovember€17,€1997,€the€date€ofÏâ âthe€final€judgment€below.›€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€equally€to€Hogan€and€Coyne.Ì̛̜ÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à______________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌÌÌœÌCONCUR:›ÌÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÐ  8"0 ÐÑ°ÑÑX°ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼‡¼XXYÔò òà@êê.êàœñIñIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@™™(êàAT€NASHVILLEˆÌÌÌñIñó óñIñÔ‡XYX¼¼‡ÔROGER€P.€HOGAN,€FRED€C.€DANCE,à  à)Ð  X Ðand€MUSIC€CITY€DUST„TEX€à 8 àà  à)Ð ø H ÐSERVICE,€INC.,à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð è 8 Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àAppeal€No.Ô#†¼‡¼XXYš#ÔÔ‡XYX¼¼‡ÔÐ Ø ( Ðà Ø àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à 8 àà  à)à è àÔ#†¼‡¼XXY›#ÔÔ‡XYX¼¼‡Ô01„A„01„9712„CH„00733Ô#†¼‡¼XXY-œ#ÔÔ‡XYX¼¼‡ÔÐ È  Ðœà Ø àà 0 à›à ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àÔ#†¼‡¼XXY„œ#ÔÔ‡XYX¼¼‡ÔÐ ¸   ÐVS.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àœDavidson€ChanceryÔ#†¼‡¼XXY2#ÔÔ‡XYX¼¼‡ÔÐ ¨ø  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àNo.€95„2911„IIIÔ#†¼‡¼XXYó#ÔÔ‡XYX¼¼‡ÔÐ ˜è  ÐCOYNE€INTERNATIONALà 8 àà  à)à è àà @ àÐ ˆØ  ÐENTERPRISES€CORPORATIONà  à)à è àÔ#†¼‡¼XXY®ž#ÔÔ‡XYX¼¼‡ÔReversed€in€Part;€Affirmed€inÐ xÈ  Ðd/b/a€COYNE€TEXTILE€SERVICES,à  à)à è àPart;€Modified€in€Part;€andÔ#†¼‡¼XXYŽŸ#ÔÔ‡XYX¼¼‡ÔÐ h¸  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àRemandedÔ#†¼‡¼XXYS #ÔÔ‡XYX¼¼‡ÔÐ X¨ Ðà Ø àDefendant/Appellee.à 8 àà  à)Ð H˜ ÐÔ#†¼‡¼XXY¡#ÔÔ€XYX¼¼‡ÔÌÔ€¼‡¼XXYÔò òòòà@uu'êàJ€U€D€G€M€E€N€Tóóó óˆÐ (x ÐÌÓÓÔ€XYX¼¼‡Ôà Ø àà 0 àThis€cause€came€on€to€be€heard€upon€the€record€on€appeal€from€theÐ T¤ ÐChancery€Court›€of€œDavidson€County,›€briefs€and€argument€of€counsel;€uponÏconsideration€whereof,€this€Court€is€of€the€opinion€that€œthe›€decree€of€the€Chancellor€Ïœshould€be›€œreversed€as€to€the€dismissal€of€the€sellerððs€claim€that€the€asset€purchaseÏagreement€was€breached,€modified€as€to€the€award€of€attorneysðð€fees€to€the€buyer,Ïand€in€all€other€respects€affirmed.›Ìà Ø àà 0 àIn€accordance€with€the€opinion€of€the€Court€filed€herein,€it€is,€therefore,Ïordered€and€decreed€by€this€Court€that€the€decree€œis€affirmed€in€part,€reversed€in€part,Ïand€modified.›€€The€cause€is€remanded€to€the€œChancery€Court›€of€œDavidson€County›€œforÏthe€award€of€pre„judgment›€œand€post„judgment€interest,€and€for€any›€œfurtherÏproceedings€necessary€in€accordance€with€the€opinion€filed€herein€and›€for€theÏcollection€of€the€costs€accrued€below.Ìà Ø àà 0 àCosts€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€œequally€against›€œRoger€P.€Hogan€andÏCoyne€International€Enterprises€Corporation,€for›€which€execution€may€issue€ifÏnecessary.ÌÓÓÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àœ_____________________________________›Ìœà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à_____________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à_____________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEñIñ›