ÿWPC3 Ögº(VX†8ÒÎF² U]·WNæòáfÄó­DJ3¡Ä«l'÷[Áû²] *ü–|„Cþ‘­Û¢O¾ÄÑÒh9´øa$S¿Õ°ÑS¼.†ƒ K ï±A=¡È÷š3^.o› 6ÌãšðËø:™øíFIL­bc²Û#cr† p(RÇœ{Î;¹(øbØK³ *ø6³Ìº&I‚.ºy$f&™XB¤ƒ3x7A¥6³o%ô¢ÞkÉ먰¶!, ydŠ´go“‚ΡãºVŒ]ϹÍ> „7wÕ‚m6 M‚ÁÐðô»~ —Ýf"‹©FCÄPe[`4@T 0(c‹w“—UN™ 0lç 0DS m—#!®NÏ ^ Ñ UNÝ + + 3 3 5I U:~ ~ ~ ~ ~ UB¸ %ú ú ú ú ú ú ú ú ú ú ú ú B AQ Æn 0D4 0Dx 0D¼ ¼ D3tpO'ÔøÔô3|x($¡¡(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular((3úÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 8000 DN PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0³Š'L (ÈhH  Z‹6Times New Roman Regular  Ñ F Ñ +Ý ƒ[¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€X«¶XXXÔÔ€èª`çXX«¶ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€œNçèª`ÔÐ  ÐÌDecember€10,1999ÌÌCecil€Ô_ÔCrowsonÔ_Ô,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAxÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX dZ[\]_Cþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó&&&&'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔѰÑÒܰÒÑ ý ÑÑTR[° AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ8€Y¼XXdêdÈ8ÑÔ€X°BXXXÔÔ€Š„‚‹XX°BÔÑ€LÑßx€Y_B2.jz/ÿØ `€€@ÿEÇàÀtt¨Øÿ PxßÔ_Ô€€€€à@M M ‚àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  ÐÌà@44%‚àAT€KNOXVILLEˆà œ àà ô àà L àÐ   Ðó óÌÌÌÌSTEVEN€CLAY€HOLLEY,à0 ” àà0ì”(#”(#à)€C/A€NO.€03A01„9812„CH„00391Ð ì(#ì(# Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìà 4 àPlaintiff„Appellant,à0 < àà0”<(#<(#àà0ì”(#”(#à)€HAMILTON€CHANCERYÐ  ì(#ì(# Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìvs.à0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àà0ä Œ (#Œ (#àà0<ä (#ä (#àà0”<(#<(#àà0ì”(#”(#à)€HON.€R.€VANN€OWENS,Ð  ì(#ì(# Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€CHANCELLORÌSHERRI€LYNN€HUFFORD€HOLLEY,à0 ì à)Ð  ì(#ì(# Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€AFFIRMED€ANDÌà 4 àDefendant„Appellee.à0 ” àà0ì”(#”(#à)€REMANDEDÐ ì(#ì(# ÐÌÌÌÌALBERT€L.€WATSON,€III,€Chattanooga,€for€Plaintiff„Appellant.ÌÌJOHN€P.€KONVALINKA€and€MATHEW€D.€BROWNFIELD,€GRANT,ÏKONVALINKA€&€HARRISON,€P.C.,€Chattanooga,€for€Defendant„Appellee.ÌÌÌÌÌà@%‚àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óˆÐ  # ÐÌÌà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àà œ àFranks,€J.ÌÌÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àÔ‡Š„‚‹‹Š„‚ÔIn€this€divorce€action,€the€Trial€Judge€granted€the€parties€a€divorce,€andÐ  )"" Ðallocated€the€marital€and€separate€assets.€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€husband€has€appealed€and€raised€these€issues:€ÌÓÓà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#à1.€€The€Trial€Court€abused€his€discretion€in€the€division€of€the€partiesððÏmarital€and€separate€assets.Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#à2.€€The€Trial€Court€abused€his€discretion€by€failing€to€disqualifyÏhimself,€as€his€impartiality€might€reasonably€be€questioned.Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àThe€parties€were€married€in€June€of€1993,€and€no€children€were€born€toÏthe€union.€€The€parties€separated€in€1997,€and€stipulated€to€the€grant€of€a€divorce.€ÏDuring€the€marriage,€the€husband€became€involved€in€the€air€filtration€serviceÏbusiness.Ð  ;44ý  Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€Chancellor€awarded€the€Wife€all€items€of€household€furnishingsÐ  Ðthen€in€her€possession,€and€awarded€the€Husband€all€the€remaining€property,€includingÐ   Ðthe€real€estate€owned€at€7602€Ô_ÔAshertonÔ_Ô€Lane,€122€Cedar€Lane,€and€2811„2813€Ô_ÔDodsonÔ_ÔÐ   ÐAvenue,€in€Chattanooga.€€Ð   Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€Chancellor€found€the€value€of€all€the€marital€assets€to€beÐ  Ð$601,981.00,€and€to€ð ðequalize€the€division€of€assets,ðð€the€Chancellor€ordered€theÐ   Ðhusband€to€ð ðpay€to€defendant€the€sum€of€$301,000.00€for€her€share€of€the€equity€in€theÐ   Ðmarital€assets.ðð€€The€Court€gave€the€husband€the€option€of€conveying€the€formerÐ  Ðresidence€of€the€parties€(7062€Ô_ÔAshertonÔ_Ô€Lane),€and€the€property€at€122€Cedar€Lane€toÐ  Ðthe€Wife,€in€lieu€of€$200,000.00€cash,€with€the€remainder€paid€within€six€months€ofÐ  Ðthe€final€order.Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àOur€review€of€a€division€of€marital€property€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€recordÐ  Ðwith€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€the€trial€court's€findings€of€fact.€Ô_ÔT.R.A.P.Ô_ÔÐ  ÐRule€13(d);€€òòÔ_ÔHassÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔKnightonÔ_Ôóó,€676€S.W.2d€554,€555€(Tenn.1984).€€Trial€courts€haveÐ ! Ðwide€discretion€in€the€manner€in€which€marital€property€is€divided,€and€their€decisionsÐ # Ðare€accorded€great€weight€on€appeal.€€òòWade€v.€Wadeóó,€897€S.W.2d€702,€715€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð % ÐApp.€1994).€€The€Trial€Court's€decision€on€the€distribution€of€marital€property€isÐ '  Ðpresumed€correct€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€otherwise.€€Ô_ÔT.R.A.P.Ô_Ô€Rule€13(d);€Ð )"" ÐòòWallaceóó,€733€S.W.2d€at€107.Ð +$$ Ðà 4 àà Œ àBefore€dividing€the€marital€estate,€the€trial€court€must€classify€theÐ -&& Ðpartiesðð€property€as€either€marital€or€separate,€because€only€marital€property€is€subjectÐ /(( Ðto€the€trial€court's€powers€of€equitable€distribution.€€òòÔ_ÔDunlapÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔDunlapÔ_Ôóó,€996€S.W.2dÐ 1** Ð803€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€In€classifying€the€parties'€property€as€either€marital€orÐ 3,, Ðseparate,€the€trial€court€is€vested€with€wide€discretion,€and€its€decision€is€entitled€toÐ 5.. Ðgreat€weight€on€appeal.€€òòFisher€v.€Fisheróó,€648€S.W.2d€244€(Tenn.1983);€òòEdwards€v.Ð 700 ÐEdwardsóó,€501€S.W.2d€283,€288€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1973).€Ð 922 Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€husband€argues€that€some€property€classified€by€the€Court€as€maritalÐ  Ðproperty€was€in€fact€his€separate€properties,€and€disputes€the€values€assigned€to€someÐ   Ðof€the€properties.€€The€dispute€focuses€on€the€valuation€of€the€Air€Filtration€ServiceÐ   Ð(Ô_ÔAFSÔ_Ô).€€Ð   Ðà 4 àà Œ àIn€early€1990,€prior€to€€the€marriage,€the€husband€and€two€othersÐ  Ðpurchased€Ô_ÔAFSÔ_Ô.€€There€was€a€factual€dispute€over€the€involvement€of€the€wife€in€theÐ   Ðacquisition€and€operation€of€the€business.€€However,€the€husband€admitted€that€theÐ   Ðwife€performed€some€limited€duties€at€the€business,€including€computer€work,€settingÐ  Ðup€the€office,€and€was€empowered€to€sign€the€company€checks.Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àIf€a€spouse€substantially€contributes€to€the€preservation€and€appreciationÐ  Ðof€separate€property,€an€increase€in€value€of€that€property€during€the€marriage€isÐ  Ðconsidered€marital€property.€€òòSee€óóÔ_ÔT.C.A.Ô_Ô€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(B).€€A€substantialÐ  Ðcontribution€may€be€made€by€a€spouse€as€a€homemaker€or€parent.€€Ô_ÔT.C.A.Ô_ÔÐ  Ððð36-4-121(b)(1)(C).€€òòAlso€seeóó€òòBrown€v.€Brownóó,€913€S.W.2d€163€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð ! Ð1994),€and€òòSmith€v.€Smithóó,€709€S.W.2d€588€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1985).Ð # Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€Chancellor€found€the€wife€had€made€contributions€to€the€marriage,Ð % Ðboth€indirectly€and€also€directly€as€a€wage„earner.€The€husband€admitted€at€the€hearingÐ '  Ðthat€the€wife€contributed€to€their€first€home€by€doing€such€things€as€planting€flowersÐ )"" Ðand€painting€the€house.€€Throughout€the€marriage,€the€wife€performed€such€tasks€asÐ +$$ Ðcooking,€cleaning,€doing€laundry,€and€generally€taking€care€of€the€home.€€The€wifeÐ -&& Ðalso€worked€at€various€jobs,€contributing€that€money€to€the€marriage€as€well.€€ThroughÐ /(( Ðher€contributions€as€homemaker€and€as€a€wage€earner,€she€enabled€her€husband€toÐ 1** Ðdevote€his€time€the€his€business,€and€by€so€doing,€the€wife€made€a€substantialÐ 3,, Ðcontribution€to€Ô_ÔAFSÔ_Ô,€which€was€the€basis€of€the€Chancellorððs€determination€that€theÐ 5.. Ðincrease€in€value€of€Ô_ÔAFSÔ_Ô€was€marital€property.Ð 700 Ðà 4 àà Œ àAs€for€the€value€of€the€increase,€the€Chancellorððs€decision€is€supportedÐ 922 Ðby€the€evidence.€€The€husband€offered€evidence€that€Ô_ÔAFSÔ_Ô€was€worth€$130,000€at€theÐ  Ðtime€of€the€marriage€and€$255,000€at€the€time€of€the€filing.€The€wife€offered€evidenceÐ   Ðthat€the€business€increased€by€$637,934€during€the€marriage.€€The€wifeððs€expertÐ   Ðtestified€the€business€was€worth€$234,790€in€1993€and€$872,724€in€1998.€€He€basedÐ   Ðhis€valuation€on€the€ð ðÔ_ÔIBITDAÔ_Ôðð€method,€which€is€cash„flow€before€interest,€taxes,Ð  Ðdepreciation€and€amortization.Ð   Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€Court€found€the€increase€in€value€was€marital€property€in€theÐ   Ðamount€of€$400,000.€€The€Trial€Court€may€place€a€value€on€marital€assets€that€isÐ  Ðwithin€the€range€of€the€evidence€submitted.òò€Koch€v.€Kochóó,€874€S.W.2d€571€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð  ÐApp.€1993).€€Accordingly,€we€affirm€the€value€placed€on€the€increase€by€theÐ  ÐChancellor,€as€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€otherwise.Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àNext,€the€husband€appeals€the€classification€and€valuation€of€theÐ  Ðproperty€at€122€Cedar€Lane,€classifying€the€equity€in€the€property€as€a€marital€asset.€Ð  ÐThe€property€was€purchased€by€the€husband€prior€to€the€marriage,€however,€theÐ ! Ðproperty€was€bought€six€months€before€the€parties€were€married.€€At€the€time€theÐ # Ðparties€had€been€living€together€for€a€number€of€years€and€intended€to€marry.€€TheÐ % ÐChancellor€emphasizes€in€his€memorandum€opinion€the€significance€of€the€partiesÐ '  Ðliving€together€prior€to€the€marriage€and€combining€their€resources€at€an€earlier€time.Ð )"" ÐThe€evidence€supports€the€Chancellorððs€determination.€€The€parties€were€livingÐ +$$ Ðtogether€at€the€time€of€the€purchase,€and€the€wife€offered€evidence,€which€theÐ -&& ÐChancellor€found€credible,€that€she€was€involved€in€the€husbandððs€business€venture,Ð /(( Ðfor€which€the€property€was€to€be€used.€€In€this€regard,€òòsee€Mullins€v.€Mullins,óó€1997Ð 1** ÐWL€672050€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997),€and€òòÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôóó,€769€S.W.2d€849,€856Ð 3,, Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€Ð 5.. Ðà 4 àà Œ àNext,€the€husband€objects€to€the€Courtððs€finding€as€to€the€1990€Ô_ÔInfinitiÔ_ÔÐ 700 ÐQ45,€saying€that€it€was€clearly€separate€property€and€ð ðworth€more.ðð€€The€husbandÐ 922 ÐÑLÑâ âÑFÑâ âÑ  Ñadmitted€that€he€listed€the€car€as€marital€property€before€the€Court.€€As€for€the€value,Ð F Ðthe€husband€assigned€a€value€of€$10,750,€while€the€Wife€said€it€was€worth€$5,000Ð F Ðbecause€of€damage€caused€by€a€flash€flood.€€The€Chancellor€determined€the€value€toÐ F  Ðbe€$5,000,€which€finding€was€within€his€discretion.€€òòSee€Kochóó.Ð F  Ðà 4 àà Œ àAs€to€the€furniture,€the€Chancellor€stated€that€it€had€already€been€dividedÐ F  Ðequitably€between€the€parties,€and€each€took€possession€of€a€portion€at€the€time€of€theÐ F  Ðdivorce.€€The€husband€argues€that€he€purchased€most€of€the€furniture€before€theÐ F  Ðmarriage€with€his€own€funds.€€However,€the€parties€treated€the€property€as€€maritalÐ F Ðproperty€during€the€marriage.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔNewberryÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔNewberryÔ_Ôóó,€493€S.W.2d€99€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð F ÐApp.€1972);€€òòMcClellan€v.€McClellanóó,€873€S.W.2d€350,€351€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993)òòóó.Ð F Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€husband€also€questions€the€Trial€Courtððs€finding€as€to€variousÐ F Ðinvestment€properties.€€In€this€regard,€the€Trial€Court€found€the€husbandððs€credibilityÐ F Ðto€be€in€doubt€with€reference€to€certain€ð ðinvestmentsðð€made€to€friends,€without€anyÐ F Ðdocumentation.€€The€Chancellor€relates:Ð F ÐÓÓà0 4 àà8Œ 4(#4(#à[Mr.€Ô_ÔHolleyÔ_Ô]€attempted€to€justify€an€ð ðinvestmentðð€of€$25,000.00Ð F! Ðin€a€friendððs€project€without€any€written€documentation€or€proofÐ F" Ðof€same.€€Likewise,€his€ð ðloanðð€to€a€friend€in€the€amount€ofÐ F# Ð$11,500.00€seemed€„€„€in€light€of€his€other€testimony€concerningÐ F$ Ðfinancial€difficulties€„€„€unbelievable.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔHolleyÔ_Ôððs€and€hisÐ F%  Ðsecretaryððs€testimony€in€regard€to€a€$25,000.00€ð ðnoteðð€betweenÐ F&!! Ðhim€and€the€business€was€highly€suspect.ÐF'""Œ Ð Œ Ð  ÐÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àThe€findings€of€the€trial€court€which€are€dependent€upon€determining€theÐ F)$$ Ðcredibility€of€witnesses€is€accepted€on€appeal€because€he€has€the€opportunity€toÐ F+&& Ðobserve€the€manner€and€demeanor€of€the€witnesses€while€testifying.€òòBowman€v.Ð F-(( ÐBowmanóó,€836€S.W.2d€563,€566€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).€€Accordingly,€we€find€no€basisÐ F/** Ðto€disturb€the€Chancellorððs€finding€of€values€as€to€these€equities.Ð F1,, Ðà 4 àà Œ àFinally,€the€husband€insists€the€Chancellor€should€be€disqualified€as€theÐ F3.. Ðjudge€in€this€case.Ð F500 Ðà 4 àà Œ àò òó óLitigants€are€entitled€to€the€ð ðcold€neutrality€of€an€impartial€court.ðð€Ð F722 ÐòòÔ_ÔLeightonÔ_Ô€v.€Hendersonóó,€414€S.W.2d€419,€421€(Tenn.€1967),€and€the€decision€ofÐ F944 ÐÔ_Ôwhether€recusal€is€warranted€must€in€the€first€instance€be€made€by€the€judge€himself.€Ð F ÐUnless€the€grounds€for€recusal€fall€within€those€enumerated€in€Tenn.€Const.€art.€6,€ððÐ F Ð11€or€T.C.A.€ðð€17„2„101€(1994),€the€Trial€Judgeððs€refusal€to€recuse€is€reviewed€as€anÐ F  Ðabuse€of€discretion.€€òòState€v.€Raspberryóó,€875€S.W.2d€678,€681€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ð F  Ð1993);€òòMemphis€Bd.€of€Realtors€v.€Cohenóó,€786€S.W.2d€951,€953€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð F  Ð1989).€€In€making€this€decision,€instead€of€basing€it€on€subjective€notions€of€hisÐ F  Ðimpartiality,€a€judge€must€be€objective€and€ask€what€a€reasonable,€disinterested€personÐ F  Ðknowing€all€the€relevant€facts€would€think€about€the€judgeððs€impartiality.€€òòKinard€v.Ð F ÐKinardóó,€986€S.W.2d€at€228;€òò€Alley€v.€Stateóó,€882€S.W.2d€810,€821€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ð F Ð1994).Ð F Ðà 4 àà Œ àWhen€the€wifeððs€expert€witness,€Bruce€Neal,€was€called€as€a€witness,€theÐ F ÐTrial€Court€advised€the€parties€that€Mr.€Neal€had€done€the€Judgeððs€tax€returns€forÐ F Ðseveral€years,€and€that€he€did€not€know€him€socially€or€otherwise,€other€than€on€theÐ F Ðoccasions€of€tax€preparation.€€He€further€observed€that€he€thought€someone€else€in€hisÐ F Ðoffice€had€done€95€percent€of€the€work.€€He€also€advised€the€parties€that€he€could€hearÐ F! Ðð ðMr.€Nealððs€testimony€without€any€bias,€any€prejudice€or€being€influenced€not€moreÐ F# Ðby€him€than€any€other€professional.€€In€fact,€I€have€criticized€him€at€work€a€time€orÐ F%  Ðtwo.€.€.€.ððÐ F'"" Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€husband€argues€that€the€Chancellor€should€have€recused€himself,Ð F)$$ Ðand€that€the€Chancellor€found€Mr.€Neal€to€be€a€credible€witness.€€The€wife€countersÐ F+&& Ðthat€no€motion€for€recusal€was€filed,€no€request€for€recusal€was€ever€clearly€made,€andÐ F-(( Ðthe€record€does€not€support€recusal.€€However,€the€Court€did€consider€the€issue€ofÐ F/** Ðrecusal,€and€in€his€discretion€found€that€recusal€was€unnecessary.€€Ð F1,, Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€exercise€of€discretion€by€a€trial€judge€to€sit€on€a€case€will€not€beÐ F3.. Ðreversed€ð ðunless€a€clear€abuse€appears€on€the€fact€of€the€record.ðð€€òòYoung€v.€Youngóó,€971Ð F500 ÐS.W.2d€386€at€390€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€The€relationship€between€the€ChancellorÐ F722 Ðand€the€witness€is€that€the€witness,€or€someone€in€his€office,€prepares€the€ChancellorððsÐ F944 Ðtax€returns.€€This€relationship,€without€more,€is€not€grounds€for€disqualification.€€TheÐ F Ðrules€governing€disqualification€of€a€judge€list€instances€in€which€ð ða€judge€shallÐ F Ðdisqualify€himselfðð:Ð F  ÐÓÓà8 4 àà0Œ 4Ð 4Ð à(a)€the€judge€has€a€personal€bias€or€prejudice€concerning€a€partyÐ F  Ðor€a€partyððs€lawyer,€or€personal€knowledge€of€disputedÐ F  Ðevidentiary€facts€concerning€the€proceeding;ÐF Œ Ð Œ Ð  Ðà8 4 àà0Œ 4Ð 4Ð à(b)€the€judge€served€as€a€lawyer€in€the€matter€in€controversy,€or€aÐ F  Ðlawyer€with€whom€the€judge€previously€practiced€law€servedÐ F  Ðduring€such€association€as€a€lawyer€concerning€the€matter,€or€theÐ F  Ðjudge€has€been€a€material€witness€concerning€it;€ÐF Œ Ð Œ Ð  Ðà8 4 àà0Œ 4Ð 4Ð à(c)€the€judge€knows€that€he€or€she€.€.€.€or€the€judgeððs€spouse,Ð F  Ðparent,€or€child€wherever€residing,€or€any€other€member€of€theÐ F Ðjudgeððs€family€residing€the€judgeððs€household,€has€an€economicÐ F Ðinterest€in€the€subject€matter€in€controversy€or€in€a€party€to€theÐ F Ðproceeding.€.€.€ÐFŒ Ð Œ Ð  Ðà8 4 àà0Œ 4Ð 4Ð à(d)€the€judge€or€the€judgeððs€spouse,€or€a€person€within€the€thirdÐ F Ðdegree€of€relationship€to€either€of€them,€or€the€spouse€of€suchÐ F Ðperson:ÐFŒ Ð Œ Ð  Ðà8 4 àà Œ àà0ä 4Ð 4Ð à(i)€is€a€party€to€the€proceeding,€or€an€officer,€director€orÐ F Ðtrustee€of€a€party;ÐFä Ð ä Ð  Ðà8 4 àà Œ àà0ä 4Ð 4Ð à(ii)€is€acting€as€a€lawyer€in€the€proceeding;ÐFä Ð ä Ð  Ðà8 4 àà0Œ 4Ð 4Ð àà0ä Œ Ð Œ Ð à(iii)€is€known€by€the€judge€to€have€more€than€de€minimusÐ F Ðinterest€that€could€be€substantially€affected€by€theÐ F Ðproceeding;ÐFä Ð ä Ð  Ðà8 4 àà0Œ 4Ð 4Ð àà0ä Œ Ð Œ Ð à(iv)€is€to€the€judgeððs€knowledge€likely€to€be€a€materialÐ F  Ðwitness€in€the€proceeding.ÐF!ä Ð ä Ð  ÐÌÓùGÓà 4 àà Œ àThe€relationship€does€not€fall€within€one€of€these€prohibited€categories.€Ð F# Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€case€of€òòWiseman€v.€Spauldingóó,€573€S.W.2d€490€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð F%  Ð1978)€presented€an€analogous€situation.€€In€that€case,€the€plaintiff€filed€a€motionÐ F'"" Ðasking€that€the€Trial€Judge€recuse€himself€because€of€a€personal€friendship€with€theÐ F)$$ Ðdefendant.€€The€motion€was€supported€by€affidavit€of€the€plaintiff€as€to€various€factsÐ F+&& Ðand€circumstances€from€which€she€concluded€that€the€judge€should€recuse.€€On€thisÐ F-(( Ðissue,€the€Court€held:Ð F/** Ðà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àÓÓ[A]t€this€point€that€the€issue€before€this€Court€is€not€the€propriety€of€theÐ F1,, Ðjudicial€conduct€of€the€Trial€Judge,€but€whether€he€committed€reversibleÐ F2-- Ðerror,€i.e.€committed€error€which€resulted€in€an€unjust€disposition€of€theÐ F3.. Ðcause.ÐF4//Œ (#Œ (# ÐÓ  Ó*****Ð F500 ÐÓ=TÓà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àà ä àThe€affidavit€of€appellant€contains€nothing€more€thanÐ F611 Ðcircumstances€from€which€it€might€be€inferred€that€the€Trial€Judge€mightÐ F722 Ðhave€some€reason€to€have€a€favorable€or€unfavorable€opinion€of€theÐ F833 Ðparties.€€The€result€being€correct,€the€facts€alleged€are€not€sufficient€toÐ F944 Ðwarrant€a€finding€by€this€Court€that€the€Trial€Judge€committed€Ô_ÔreversibleÐ F:55 Ðerror€in€refusing€to€recuse€himself€retroactively,€thereby€vacating€all€hisÐ F Ðprevious€actions€in€the€case.ÐFŒ (#Œ (# ÐÌÓéRÓòòÔ_ÔWisemanÔ_Ô€v.€Spauldingóó,€573€S.W.2d€at€493.Ð F Ðà 4 àà Œ àLikewise,€in€the€instant€case,€the€circumstances€are€not€sufficient€toÐ F  Ðwarrant€a€finding€by€this€Court€that€the€Trial€Judge€erred€in€refusing€to€recuse€himself.€Ð F  ÐAccordingly,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court.€€Ô#†ŠݾˆˆŠݾ; #ÔÐ F  Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€cost€of€the€appeal€is€assessed€to€Steven€Clay€Ô_ÔHolleyÔ_Ô.Ð F  ÐÓÓÌÌÌÌòòà 4 àÌóóà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à__________________________Ð F Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.Ð F ÐÌÌCONCUR:Ð F ÐÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________Ð F! ÐHouston€M.€Ô_ÔGoddardÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_ÔÐ F" ÐÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________Ð F(## ÐÔ‡ŠݾˆˆŠݾÔD.€Michael€Ô_ÔSwineyÔ_Ô,€J.Ô#†ŠݾˆˆŠݾb[#ÔÐ F)$$ ÐÌ