ÿWPC§ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µU:Ýw@ 4W k z L‚ Î 0JÖ 0T 0^t 0hÒ 0r: 0|¬ 0†( 0® 1u> 0d³ U>U*UB)DC¨ AMë B8éUv~>vÓ¼ D3 0@ AOÆQ 0D D/[ BŠ˜HP LaserJet 4HPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÒ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡, øð AZ"Arial Regular bcdUefgUhiUjÓ€vf|œ$tdBdpX3|xxC:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d""""7Border 1dd€-#Cþÿ << Gÿÿ d ßÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÔ€!ÔÔ€!ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€!XÔÌÌò òJuly€30,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€!ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÔ€!ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€,ÉXXdðdÈ7ÑÙ€€ÙßR€$&#A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌDELBERT€L.€HOLLINGSWORTH,à à)ÌREBECCA€MARY€LEQUIREà àà à)ÌBUCHANAN,€KATHRYNE€à àà à)ÌHOLLINGSWORTH€BARBEE,à àà à)€€€Blount€Chancery€No.€96„033ÌSARA€JEANNE€HOLLINGSWORTHà à)ÌCHANIOTT,€ANTON€KILGORE€à àà à)€€€Appeal€No.€03A01„9707„CH„00278ÌLEQUIRE,€EVELYN€B.€OððMEARA,à à)ÌMARY€HOLLINGSWORTH€SHARP,à à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óPlaintiffs/Appellees,à àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌJACK€L.€EDEN,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óDefendant/Appellant.à àò ò)ó óÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€BLOUNT€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€MARYVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€CHESTER€S.€RAINWATER,€JR.,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌò òDAN€W.€HOLBROOKÌHOLBROOK€&€PETERSON,€PLLCÌó óKnoxville,€TennesseeÌò òSTEPHEN€A.€McSWEENÌEGERTON,€McAFEE,€ARMISTEAD€&€DAVIS,€PCÌó óKnoxville,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€AppellantÌÌò òROBERT€S.€MARQUISÌCHRISTINA€M.€CONDONÌMcCAMPBELL€&€YOUNG,€P.C.Ìó óKnoxville,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€AppelleesÌÌÌÌÌÌò òREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ó óà àœÌÑ7€ŒsXXdðXXdð7ÑÓÓà àIn›€this€will€construction€case,€œdefendant/appellant,€Jack€L.€Eden€(ð ðdefendantðð),›Ïappeals€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€finding€(1)€that€the€will€of€Amos€J.€LeQuireÏ(ð ðdecedentðð)€gave€Irene€LeQuire€Eden€a€gift€over€of€the€exact€œinterest›€œthat›€was€held€byÏher€father,€S.€Clay€LeQuire,€namely,€a€contingent€remainder€subject€to€the€conditionÏprecedent€of€surviving€Trissie€Lee€LeQuire;€(2)€that€Irene€LeQuire€Edenððs€interestÏnever€vested€and€was€therefore€not€transmissible€by€her€will;€and€(3)€that€the€interest€ofÏS.€Clay€LeQuire€passed€to€the€surviving€lineal€descendants€of€decedent,€òòper€stirpesóó.€ÏFor€reasons€stated€hereinafter,€we€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àThe€facts€of€this€case€are€not€in€dispute.€€œIn€1944,€decedent›€died€œin›€BlountÏCounty,€Tennessee,€leaving€a€Last€Will€and€Testament€dated€March€28,€1941€(ð ðwillðð).€ÏThe€will€was€probated€in€the€Probate€Court€for€Blount€County€in€the€November€term€ofÏ1944.€€The€decedent€had€œfive›€children.€€Article€II€of€the€will€established€a€life€estate€inÏall€of€decedentððs€real€and€personal€property€for€the€benefit€of€one€daughter,€Trissie€LeeÏLeQuire.€€In€Article€III€of€the€will,€decedent€made€provisions€for€the€distribution€of€theÍreal€and€personal€property€upon€the€death€of€Trissie€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àAfter€the€death€of€Trissie€Lee€LeQuire€the€residue€of€myÏproperty€is€to€be€divided€equally€between€my€other€children,ÏJennie€Belle€Hollingsworth,€S.€Clay€LeQuire,€Elmer€A.ÏLeQuire,€and€Mary€Rebecca€Buchanan.€€If€any€of€theseÏchildren€should€die€before€Trissie€Lee€dies€their€childrenÏare€to€have€the€interest€or€share,€hereby€willed€to€theirÏparent,€should€one€or€more€of€the€four€children€die€leavingÏno€children€the€residue€of€my€estate€is€to€be€divided€amongÏthe€surviving€children€or€grand„children€as€the€case€may€be.€ÏIn€other€words€my€four€children€are€to€each€receive€a€one„fourth€undivided€interest€in€my€estate€after€the€death€ofÏTrissie€Lee€or€in€case€of€the€death€of€one€or€more€of€the€fourÏchildren,€without€children,€the€residue€of€my€estate€is€to€beÏdivided€among€those€who€survive,€each€to€share€equally.Ìà àÌÓÓà àœÌà àTrissie›€died€on€April€23,€1991.€€S.€Clay€LeQuire€survived€the€decedent€butÏpredeceased€Trissie.€€He€was€survived€by€one€daughter,€Irene€LeQuire€Eden€who€diedÏon€September€6,€1974,€also€predeceasing€Trissie.€€Irene€LeQuire€Eden€died€withoutÏissue,€but€was€survived€by€her€husband,€œdefendant›€in€this€matter€and€the€soleÏbeneficiary€of€Irene€LeQuire€Edenððs€last€will€and€testament€(ð ðdefendantðð).€€AfterÏTrissieððs€death€in€April€of€1991,€the€real€property€located€in€Blount€County€that€wasÏsubject€to€the€life€tenancy€œwas›€sold€and€the€proceeds€were€to€be€divided€pursuant€toÏArticle€III€of€the€will.Ìà àÌà àPlaintiffs/Appellees,€Delbert€Hollingsworth,€Rebecca€Mary€LeQuire€Buchanan,ÏKathryne€Hollingsworth€Barbee,€Sara€Jeanne€Hollingsworth€Chaniott,€Anton€KilgoreÏLeQuire,€Evelyn€B.€OððMeara,€and€Mary€Hollingsworth€Sharp€(collectively€œð ðplaintiffsðð),›Ïfiled€a€complaint€on€April€8,€1996,€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€Blount€County,ÍTennessee,€to€quiet€title€to€certain€real€property€in€Blount€County,€by€construing€the€willÏof€the€decedent.€€On€cross€motions€for€summary€judgment,€the€trial€court€granted€aÏsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€appellees€stating:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€Court€finds€that€the€Will€granted€a€contingent€remainderÏwith€a€condition€precedent€to€S.€Clay€LeQuire.€€TheÏcondition€precedent€was€that€he€survive€Trissie€LeQuire.€€AsÏS.€Clay€LeQuire€did€not€satisfy€the€condition€precedent,€heÏhad€no€interest€in€the€remainder€at€his€death.€€Irene€LeQuireÏtook€a€gift€over€of€the€exact€same€interest€as€her€father,Ïsubject€to€the€same€condition€precedent.€€Therefore,€sheÏalso€had€a€contingent€remainder€subject€to€the€conditionÏprecedent€of€surviving€Trissie€LeQuire.€€Since€she€alsoÏpredeceased€the€life€tenant,€the€Court€holds€that€IreneððsÏinterest€never€vested,€and€was,€therefore,€not€transmissibleÏunder€her€Will.€€The€Court€further€holds€that€theÏremaindermanððs€share€that€would€have€devolved€to€S.€ClayÏLeQuire€and€his€heirs€had€one€survived€the€life€tenantÏpassed€to€the€remaining€surviving€siblings€and€the€survivingÏlineal€descendants€of€the€nonsurviving€siblings,€òòper€stirpesóó.ÌÌœThis›€appeal€ensued.ÌÌÓÓà àœÌà àAt›€the€heart€of€the€summary€judgment€procedure€is€the€language€contained€inÏRule€56.03€and€Rule€56.05€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.€€€According€toÏRule€56.03,€summary€judgment€is€to€be€granted€if€the€"pleadings,€depositions,€answersÏto€interrogatories,€and€admissions€on€file,€together€with€the€affidavits,€if€any,€show€thatÏthere€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€toÏa€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law."€€€Rule€56.05€provides€that€the€nonmoving€party€"mayÏnot€rest€upon€the€mere€allegations€or€denials€of€his€pleading,€but€his€response,€byÏaffidavits€or€[otherwise],€must€set€forth€specific€facts€showing€that€there€is€a€genuineÏissue€for€trial."ÌÌà à€In€determining€whether€or€not€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€exists€forÏpurposes€of€summary€judgment,€courts€in€this€state€have€indicated€that€the€questionÏshould€be€considered€in€the€same€manner€as€a€motion€for€directed€verdict€made€at€theÏclose€of€the€plaintiff's€proof,€i.e.,€the€trial€court€must€take€the€strongest€legitimate€view€ofÏthe€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favorÏof€that€party,€and€discard€all€countervailing€evidence.€€òòDownen€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.óó,€811ÏS.W.2d€523,€524€(Tenn.1991);€òòPoore€v.€Magnavox€Co.óó,€666€S.W.2d€48,€49€(Tenn.Ï1984);€òòDunn€v.€Hackettóó,€€833€S.W.2d€78,€80€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);€òòWyatt€v.€WinnebagoÏIndustries,€Inc.óó,€566€S.W.2d€276,€279€(œTenn.€Ct.€App.€›1977);€òòTaylor€v.€Nashville€BannerÏPub.€Co.óó,€573€S.W.2d€476,€480€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1978).€€Then,€if€there€is€a€dispute€as€toÏany€material€fact€or€any€doubt€as€to€the€conclusions€to€be€drawn€from€that€fact,€theÏmotion€must€be€denied.€€òòPooreóó,€666€S.W.2d€at€49.ÌÌà àRule€56€comes€into€play€only€when€there€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€materialÏfact€and€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€€Thus,€the€issuesÏthat€lie€at€the€heart€of€evaluating€a€summary€judgment€motion€are:€€(1)€whether€aÏfactual€dispute€exists;€€(2)€whether€the€disputed€fact€is€material€to€the€outcome€of€theÏcase;€€and€(3)€whether€the€disputed€fact€creates€a€genuine€issue€for€trial.€€òòSee€Byrd€v.ÏHallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€214€(Tenn.€1993).€€ÌÌà àWhen€the€facts€material€to€the€application€of€a€rule€of€law€are€undisputed,€theÏapplication€is€a€matter€of€law€for€the€court€since€there€is€nothing€to€submit€to€the€jury€toÍresolve€in€favor€of€one€party€or€the€other.€€€In€other€words,€when€there€is€no€disputeÏover€the€evidence€establishing€the€facts€that€control€the€application€of€a€rule€of€law,Ïsummary€judgment€is€an€œappropriate€means€of€deciding€that€issue.›ÌÌà àTo€preclude€summary€judgment,€a€disputed€fact€must€be€"material".€€A€disputedÏfact€is€material€if€it€must€be€decided€in€order€to€resolve€the€substantive€claim€or€defenseÏat€which€the€motion€is€directed.€€€Consequently,€when€confronted€with€a€disputed€fact,Ïthe€court€must€scrutinize€the€elements€of€the€claim€or€defense€at€issue€in€the€motion€toÏdetermine€whether€the€resolution€of€that€fact€will€œaffect›€the€disposition€of€any€of€thoseÏclaims€or€defenses.€€€By€this€process,€courts€and€litigants€can€ascertain€which€issuesÏare€dispositive€of€the€case,€thus€rendering€other€disputed€facts€immaterial.ÌÌà àWhen€the€evidence€or€proof€in€support€of€or€in€opposition€to€a€summaryÏjudgment€motion€establishes€a€disputed€fact,€and€the€fact€is€material,€the€court€mustÏthen€determine€whether€the€disputed€material€fact€creates€a€genuine€issue€within€theÏmeaning€of€Rule€56.03.€€€The€test€for€determining€whether€an€issue€is€ð ðgenuine"€or€notÏis€whether€a€reasonable€jury€could€legitimately€resolve€that€fact€in€favor€of€one€side€orÏthe€other.€€€If€the€answer€is€yes,€summary€judgment€is€inappropriate;€if€the€answer€is€no,Ïsummary€judgment€is€proper€because€a€trial€would€be€pointless€as€there€would€beÏnothing€for€the€jury€to€do€and€the€judge€œneeds›€only€œto€apply›€the€law€to€resolve€the€case.€€ÏIn€making€this€determination,€the€court€is€to€view€the€evidence€in€a€light€favorable€to€theÏnonmoving€party€and€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€his€favor.€€€And,€again,Ï"genuine€issue"€as€used€in€Rule€56.03€refers€to€disputed,€material€facts€and€does€notÍinclude€mere€legal€conclusions€to€be€drawn€from€those€facts.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€under€submission,€the€facts€material€to€the€application€of€the€rule€ofÏlaw€are€undisputed.€€The€only€question€remaining€is€whether€Irene€LeQuire€possessedÏa€vested€interest€in€residue€of€decedentððs€property€after€the€termination€of€the€lifeÏestate€upon€the€death€of€Trissie€Lee€LeQuire.ÌÌà àThe€chief€object€in€the€construction€of€wills€is€to€discover€and€effectuate€theÏintention€of€the€testator,€unless€to€do€so€would€contravene€some€rule€of€law€or€publicÏpolicy.òò€€Stickley€v.€Carmichaelóó,€850€S.W.2d€127,€132€(Tenn.€1992).€€€In€applying€thisÏrule€and€ascertaining€the€testator's€intent,€it€is€necessary€to€look€to€the€manifestÏlanguage€of€the€entire€will.€€The€testator's€intent€must€be€determined€from€the€languageÏof€what€he€has€written,€not€from€mere€surmise€or€supposition.€€òòMartin€v.€Tayloróó,€521ÏS.W.2d€581,€584€(Tenn.1975).€€Where€the€language€of€a€will€is€clear€andÏunambiguous,€the€language€must€control.€€òòMoore€v.€Neelyóó,€370€S.W.2d€537,€540€(ÏTenn.1963).ÌÌà àAppellant€cites€this€Court€to€òòJamison€v.€Pooróó,€18€Tenn.€(10€Yer.)€218€(1837),€aÏcase€strikingly€similar€to€the€one€at€bar.€€In€òòJamisonóó,€testator€devised€the€residue€of€hisÏproperty€to€his€wife€by€a€second€marriage€during€her€life€or€widowhood,€and€at€herÏdeath€or€marriage,€œto€be›€equally€divided€among€his€children€of€the€second€marriageÏwith€this€additional€provision:€ð ðIf€any€of€my€children€of€the€second€marriage€die€beforeÏmy€wife,€and€before€the€division€of€the€property,€without€lawful€issue,€it€is€my€will€thatÍthe€share€of€such€child€form€a€part€of€the€general€stock,€to€be€divided€among€the€otherÏchildren€of€the€second€marriage;€if€any€of€said€children€die€before€my€wife,€leavingÏlawful€issue,€such€issue€is€to€take€the€share€of€the€deceased€parent.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€219.€ÏSubsequently,€one€of€wifeððs€children,€a€daughter,€died€during€the€life€of€wife,€leaving€aÏchild€(wifeððs€grandchild)€born€in€lawful€wedlock.€€œThis›€grandchild,€however,€died€shortlyÏthereafter€during€the€life€of€the€wife.€œ€The€Supreme€Court€of€Tennessee€held€that€theÏgrandchild€took€a€vested€and€transmissible€interest€in€her€motherððs€share,€which,€uponÏthe€grandchildððs€death,€went€to€her€father.€€òòId.óó€at€220.›€€ÌÌà àIn€òòJamisonóó,€the€surviving€children€of€the€testator€argued€that€the€testatorððsÏapparent€intent€in€postponing€absolute€vesting€of€the€estate€in€them€until€after€theÏtermination€of€the€life€estate€was€to€secure€the€property€in€his€own€blood€until€thatÏperiod€of€time€had€passed.€€The€òòJamisonóó€Court€disagreed€and€focused€on€theÏtestatorððs€will€in€its€entirety€and€correctly€interpreted€the€will€with€a€meaning€in€accordÏwith€its€general€intent.€€In€doing€so,€the€Court€€recognized€the€reason€why€the€œdecedentÏdisallowed€absolute›€œvesting›€in€the€children€until€after€the€termination€of€the€life€estate.€ÏIndeed,€the€Court€œnoted€that€decedent€expressly€stated€his€reason€for€such€delay€inÏvesting,›€namely,€for€the€support€of€wife€and€children€during€her€natural€life€orÏwidowhood.€€œAlong€those€lines,›€the€Court€reasoned:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àHe,€no€doubt,€supposed€it€probable€that€of€so€many€childrenÏsome€of€them€might€die€without€issue€before€the€death€ofÏtheir€mother,€as€some€of€them€were€very€young,€and€for€thatÏevent€he€provided€by€directing€that€the€share€of€such€a€oneÏshould€form€a€part€of€the€general€stock€to€be€divided.€€ButÏwe€do€not€think€the€œwill›€affords€evidence€that€heÏcontemplated€it€as€probable€that€any€of€his€children€wouldÍhave€issue€and€die,€and€then€that€issue€would€die€beforeÏthe€life€estate€would€terminate.€€Few€men€look€beyond€theirÏgrandchildren€in€disposing€of€their€estates;€and€we€think€theÏtestator€in€this€case€was€content,€after€providing€for€hisÏgrandchildren,€as€in€the€latter€part€of€the€clause€underÏconsideration,€to€leave€his€estate€to€the€disposition€of€theÏlaw.€.€.€ÌÌà8 àà8 àWe€do€not€think€such€general€intention€existed€in€his€mind,Ïand€we€therefore€give€to€the€words€employed€their€obviousÏsense,€which€is€that,€if€one€of€his€children€die,€leaving€aÏchild€or€children€living,€such€issue€should€be€vested€with€anÏabsolute€title€to€such€portion€of€the€estate€as€the€deceasedÏparent€would€have€been€entitled€to€have€received€if€living.ÌÌÓÓÌà àWe€are€hard€pressed€to€find€a€point€at€which€òòJamison€óóisòò€óómateriallyÏdistinguishable€from€the€case€under€submission.€€Like€the€testator€in€òòJamisonóó,Ïdecedent€stated€his€reason€for€disallowing€absolute€vesting€in€the€œchildren›€until€afterÏthe€termination€of€the€life€estate,€namely,€for€the€use€and€benefit€of€Trissie€œduring›€herÏlifetime.ÌÌà àWe€agree€with€the€reasoning€in€òòJamisonóó.€€Undoubtedly,€decedent€imagined€aÏsituation€in€which€it€would€be€probable€that€of€so€many€children€some€of€them€mightÏdie€before€Trissie€œwithout›€having€children€of€their€œown.›€œ€In€fact,€he›€provided€for€thatÏoccurrence€by€instructing€that€the€share€of€such€child€should€be€ð ðdivided€among€theÏsurviving€children€or€grandchildren.ðð€€However,€when€reviewing€the€entirety€of€the€will,Ïwe€are€unconvinced€€that€the€will€contains€evidence€that€decedent€entertained€it€asÏprobable€that€any€of€his€children€would€have€children€of€their€own€and€die,€and€thenÏthat€child€die€shortly€thereafter€before€the€termination€of€the€life€estate.€€œUnlike›€hisÍchildrenððs€interest,€œabsolute€vesting€of€decedentððs›€œgrandchildrenððs€interest€was€notÏmade›€œcontingent›€œon€their›€survival€of€œTrissieððs€life›€œestate.›€€If€decedent€had€desired€toÏmake€his€grandchildrenððs€interest€contingent€upon€their€survival€of€œTrissieððs›€lifeÏtenancy,€he€could€have€easily€done€œso.€€Decedent›€chose€not€to€do€œso.€€DecedentððsÏfailure€to€make€his€grandchildrenððs€interest€contingent€upon€surviving€the€life€estate€Ïreveals€his€contentment€in€leaving€his€estate€to€the€disposition€of€the€law€afterÏproviding€for€his€grandchildren.€€In€light€of€decedentððs€will€in€its€entirety€and€theÏcontentment€implied€therein,€Irene›€œLeQuire€Edenððs›€interest€in€decedentððs€estate€œÌwas€not€contingent,€either€expressly€or€impliedly,€upon€her€surviving€Trissieððs€lifeÏtenancy.€€As€such€Ireneððs€interest€absolutely›€vested€upon€the€death€of€her€father,€S.ÏClay€LeQuire.€€œTherefore,€defendant,€Jack€L.€Eden,€is›€entitled€to€the€portion€of€his€lateÏwife,€Irene.€€€Ìà àœÌà àIn›€light€of€the€foregoing€and€after€a€careful€review€of€the€record,€it€is€theÏconsidered€opinion€of€this€Court€that€œafter€providing€for€his€grandchildren,€decedent›Ïwas€œsatisfied€in€leaving€his€estate€to€the€disposition€of€the€law.›€€Accordingly,€theÏjudgment€of€the€trial€court€is€œreversed.€€This›€case€œis€remanded›€to€the€trial€court€forÏproper€disposition€of€decedentððs€estate.€€€€€€€€ÌÌÌÓÓœà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌLILLARD,€J.›Ìà à€€€€ÌÌà à€€Ìà àÌà àÌÌà àÌà à€ÌÌà à€€€ÌÌà àà àÌÌà à€€€€€ÌÌà àÌ