ÿWPC‚ .# ”U:Ÿ %Ù 0(ßb w@4Sgv 0J~ 0TÈ 0^ 0hz 0râ 0|T 0†Ð 0V 1uæ 0d[U *¿B)é AQ Æc 0D) 0@m 0D­ DCñ D/4 Bc B€ D3 AMÐ  v~1 vÓ¯˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - ˆE‰Š‹ŒDŽKeÓ€šê‚_#3|xš2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó7Border 1dd(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxd!#%Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌAugust€12,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ X ÑÑ\R AØ'\ћрÑÑ7€ÿÈXXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñò òÔ€¼ÔÓ  Ӝـ!ÙßR€*+%A1-j|éÿô` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEó óÔ€XÔÌÌÌÌÌWILLIAMSON€COUNTY€BROADCASTINGà à)ÌCOMPANY,€INC.,€and€WILLIAM€B.€ORMES,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9709„CH„00480Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌINTERMEDIA€PARTNERS,€a€Californiaà àà à)à àDavidson€ChanceryÌlimited€partnership;€INTERMEDIA€CAPITALà à)à àNo.€92„2930„IIÌMANAGEMENT;€a€general€partner€ofà àà à)ÌInterMedia€Partners;€LEO€J.€HINDERY,€JR.,à à)ÌManaging€General€Partner€and€Chiefà àà à)ÌExecutive€Officer€of€InterMedia€Capital€à àà à)à àÌManagement;€ROBIN€CABLE€SYSTEMS;à à)ÌROBIN€MEDIA€GROUP,€INC.;€FIRSTà àà à)ÌCABLEVISION,€INC.;€ROBIN€CABLE€à àà à)ÌSYSTEMS€LIMITED€PARTNERSHIP;à àà à)ÌTENNESSEE€VALLEY€CABLEVISION,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€CAROL€L.€MCCOY,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌALFRED€H.€KNIGHTÌALAN€D.€JOHNSONÌ215€Second€Avenue,€NorthÌNashville,€Tennessee€37201Ìà àAttorneys€for€Plaintiffs/AppellantsÌÌSTEPHEN€K.€RUSHÌ1209€16th€Avenue€SouthÌNashville,€Tennessee€37212ÌÌKathryn€A.€StephensonÌ414€Union€StreetÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219Ìà àAttorneys€for€Defendants/AppelleesÌÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED€IN€PART;€REVERSED€IN€PART;Ìà@ àAND€REMANDEDÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌCONCUR:ÌTODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌCAIN,€J.ÌÇÑ Ü ÑÑ ° ÑÓÓò òÔ€„Ôòòà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÔ€XÔÌÌà àà àIn€this€second€appeal€involving€a€written€agreement,€we€are€askedÏto€review€the€chancellorððs€findings€concerning€the€scope€of€the€agreement,€theÏproof€of€damages,€and€whether€the€agreement€should€be€specifically€performed.€ÏWe€reverse€the€order€of€specific€performance€but€affirm€in€all€other€respects.ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àà àIn€1979,€William€Ormes,€the€owner€of€radio€station€WAGG€inÏFranklin,€signed€a€letter€agreement€with€Matrix€Enterprises,€Inc.€whereby€Mr.ÏOrmes€was€to€be€compensated€for€his€efforts€in€helping€Matrix€secure€a€cableÏtelevision€franchise€in€Franklin,€Brentwood,€and€Williamson€County.€€In€addition€toÏother€inducements,€the€agreement€contained€the€following€paragraph:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à6.à àIf€the€corporation€is€successful€in€obtaining€theÏFranchise€in€the€City€of€Franklin,€Tennessee,€you,ÏWilliam€R.€Ormes,€or€your€designee€(subject€to€theÏprovisions€contained€herein),€will€receive€twenty€(20)Ïpercent€of€the€common€or€preferred€stock€of€theÏcorporation€to€which€the€Franchise€is€issued,€said€stockÏto€be€free€and€clear€of€all€liens,€charges€and€otherÏencumbrances,€except€as€otherwise€provided€herein.€ÏIn€addition,€you€are€to€be€the€exclusive€director€of€localÏprogramming,€both€audio€and€video,€and€the€exclusiveÏsales€agent€for€the€sale€of€advertising€andÏbroadcasting€time€on€the€local€channels.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àThe€agreement€did€not€contain€a€fixed€term,€and,€in€the€prior€action,Ïthe€chancellor€granted€summary€judgment€to€Intermedia€(Matrixððs€successor),Ïholding€that€the€agreement€was€terminable€at€will.€€We€reversed€and€remandedÏfor€a€trial€on€ð ðall€issues.ððÌÌà àà àOn€remand,€the€chancellor€held€that€paragraph€6€of€the€agreementÏgave€Mr.€Ormes€the€exclusive€right€to€place€advertising€on€the€local€originationÏchannel€òòonlyóó;€that€these€rights€were€unique€and€should€be€specifically€enforced;Ïand€that€Mr.€Ormes€had€not€proved€the€damages€he€had€already€suffered.ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌà@ àò òThe€Scope€of€the€AgreementÌà@ àa.€€All€Local€Advertising?ó óÌÌà àà àMr.€Ormes€contends€on€appeal€that€he€has€the€exclusive€right€to€sellÏòòallóó€local€advertising€„„€whether€it€is€for€the€local€origination€channels€or€whether€itÏis€local€advertising€for€insert€on€programs€picked€up€from€the€satellite.ÌÌà àà àThe€interpretation€of€an€unambiguous€written€agreement€is€aÏquestion€of€law€for€the€court,€òòHamblen€County€v.€City€of€Morristownóó,€656€S.W.2dÏ331€(Tenn.€1983),€and€the€courtððs€overriding€purpose€is€to€ascertain€the€intentionÏof€the€parties.€€òòPearsall€Motors,€Inc.€v.€Regal€Chrysler„Plymouth,€Inc.óó,€521€S.W.2dÍ578€(Tenn.€1975).€€The€court€should€consider€the€entire€contract,€òòCocke€Co.€Bd.€ofÏHighway€Commissioners€v€Newport€Utilities€Bd.óó,€690€S.W.2d€231€(Tenn.€1985),Ïand€the€ð ðsituation€involving€the€parties,€the€nature€of€the€business€in€which€theyÏare€engaged€and€the€subject€matter€to€which€the€contract€relates.ðð€€òòStovall€v.ÏDattelóó,€619€S.W.2d€125€at€127€(Tenn.€App.€1981).ÌÌà àà àThe€parties€agree€that€in€1979€when€the€agreement€was€signed,Ïadvertising€inserts€were€not€in€the€contemplation€of€the€parties.€€Mr.€OrmesÏtestified€that€he€was€unaware€in€1979€of€any€technology€that€would€allow€localÏadvertising€inserts.€€Therefore,€we€think€the€circumstances€existing€at€the€time€theÏparties€executed€the€agreement€supports€the€chancellorððs€interpretation.€€òòSeeÏHamblen€Co.€v.€City€of€Morristownóó,€656€S.W.2d€331€(Tenn.€1983).ÌÌà àà àMr.€Ormes€argues,€however,€that€in€reading€the€agreement€as€aÏwhole€it€is€clear€that€the€parties€divided€up€the€revenues€along€the€lines€of€theirÏinterests:€€he€was€interested€in€selling€advertising€and€Matrix€was€interested€in€theÏrevenues€to€be€derived€from€selling€subscriptions€to€the€cable€service.ÌÌà àà àWe€cannot€agree.€€The€only€reference€in€the€agreement€toÏadvertising€is€paragraph€6.€€The€other€parts€of€the€agreement€make€it€clear€thatÏthe€franchise€was€to€belong€to€the€company€to€be€formed€by€Matrix.€€Matrix€was€toÏbear€all€costs€and€to€make€all€decisions€relative€to€the€type€of€organization€theyÍwere€creating,€its€financial€structure,€and€its€method€of€operation.€€Mr.€Ormes€wasÏto€get€twenty€percent€of€the€company€and€the€right€to€be€the€exclusive€sales€agentÏfor€advertising€and€broadcasting€time€on€the€òòlocalóó€channelsÌà àà àÌà àà àMr.€Ormes€also€argues€that€he€in€fact€sold€advertising€on€the€satelliteÏchannels€for€several€years€and€that€this€ð ðpractical€constructionðð€of€the€agreementÏsupports€his€version€of€it.€€The€construction€placed€on€an€agreement€by€the€partiesÏis€a€valuable€construction€tool€where€the€agreement€is€ambiguous.€€òòGarner€v.ÏAmerican€Home€Assurance€Co.óó,€460€S.W.2d€358€(Tenn.€App.€1969).€€But€the€ruleÏloses€most€of€its€force€where€the€parties€are€not€aware€of€the€true€facts.€€òòYowell€v.ÏUnion€Central€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€141€Tenn.€70€(1918).€€Even€if€we€thought€the€termÏð ðlocalðð€was€ambiguous,€the€proof€in€the€record€does€not€show€when€the€otherÏparties€became€aware€that€Mr.€Ormes€was€selling€advertising€for€insertion€on€theÏsatellite€feed.ÌÌà àà àFinally,€Mr.€Ormes€argues€that€we€decided€in€the€former€appeal€thatÏhe€had€the€exclusive€right€to€sell€local€advertising,€including€the€satellite€inserts.€ÏThe€only€issue€decided€by€the€trial€court€on€the€former€appeal€was€that€theÏagreement€was€terminable€at€will.€€Since€the€jurisdiction€of€this€court€is€appellateÏonly,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€16„4„108,€that€is€the€only€issue€that€was€before€us.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòIrvin€v.€Binkleyóó,€577€S.W.2d€677€(Tenn.€App.€1978).€€Therefore,€when€weÍremanded€the€case€for€a€trial€on€ð ðall€issues,ðð€the€retrial€must€include€anÏinterpretation€of€Mr.€Ormesðð€rights€under€the€agreement.ÌÌà@ àò òb.€€The€Termó óÌÌà àà àIn€our€former€opinion€we€said€(in€deciding€that€the€agreement€wasÏnot€terminable€at€will):ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[I]t€was€the€intent€of€the€parties€that€Mr.€Ormes€wouldÏreceive€vested€property€rights€and€that€the€duration€ofÏthe€agreement€would€be€coextensive€with€the€length€ofÏthe€cable€system€franchise€used€by€Matrix€and€itsÏsuccessors.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àThat€language€would€ordinarily€be€conclusive€on€the€question€of€theÏterm€covered€by€the€agreement.€€But€in€remanding€the€case€for€trial€on€ð ðall€issues,ððÏwe€think€the€question€was€left€open.ÌÌà àà àAfter€hearing€the€proof,€the€trial€judge€held€that,€indeed,€Mr.€OrmesððÏrights€under€the€agreement€would€last€as€long€as€the€original€franchisee€or€itsÏsuccessors€held€the€franchise.€€We€are€satisfied€that€the€holding€was€correct.€ÏThere€is€nothing€in€the€proof€developed€on€remand€to€suggest€that€we€erred€in€ourÏoriginal€view€that€Mr.€Ormes€would€enjoy€the€fruits€of€his€labor€for€the€duration€ofÏthe€franchise€he€helped€secure.ÌÌà@ àò òc.€€Transferabilityó óÌÌà àà àThe€trial€judge€held€that€the€rights€given€Mr.€Ormes€by€theÏagreement€were€personal€to€him€and€could€not€be€assigned,€transferred,€orÏinherited.€€We€think€the€court€erred€in€drawing€this€conclusion.ÌÌà àà àContract€rights€ordinarily€survive€the€death€of€one€of€the€partiesÏunless€the€contract€is€one€of€a€personal€nature.€€òòSeeóó€17€Am.Jur.2d€òòContractsóó€ððÏ547.€€In€addition,€in€this€case€the€contract€bound€the€parties,€ð ðtheir€heirs€andÏassigns.ðð€€Such€language€surely€indicates€an€intent€that€the€contract€rights€willÏsurvive€the€death€of€one€of€the€parties,€and€it€is€a€strong€indication€that€theÏcontract€rights€are€assignable.€€òòSee€Teague€v.€Sowderóó,€121€Tenn.€132€(Tenn.Ï1908).€€But€even€in€the€absence€of€such€language,€contract€rights€are€generallyÏassignable€unless€the€assignment€would€materially€affect€the€obligorððs€rights€orÏburdens.€€òòPetry€v.€Cosmopolitan€Spa€Intern.,€Inc.óó,€641€S.W.2d€202€(Tenn.€App.Ï1982)(applying€the€òòRestatement€(Second)€of€Contractsóó€ðð€317(2)€(1981).ÌÌà àà àThere€is€nothing€in€the€agreement€restricting€its€assignment,€and€weÏdo€not€think€it€involves€personal€rights€that€fall€outside€the€general€rules€ofÏassignment€or€survivability.ÌÌà@ àò òIII.Ìà@ àSpecific€Performanceó óÌÌà àà àSpecific€performance€is€an€equitable€remedy.€€òòGibson€v.€Gillaóó,€321ÏS.W.2d€855€(Tenn.€App.€1959).€€It€is€available€only€when€the€remedy€at€law€isÏinadequate.€€òòGRW€Enterprises,€Inc.€v.€Davisóó,€797€S.W.2d€606€(Tenn.€App.€1990).€ÏWhen€the€injured€party€can€be€fully€and€adequately€compensated€with€damages,Ïthe€courts€will€not€grant€specific€performance.€€òòShuptrine€v.€Quinnóó,€597€S.W.2dÏ728€(Tenn.€19179).€€The€inability€to€prove€oneððs€damages€may€make€theÏdamages€remedy€inadequate.€€òòEastern€Rolling€Mill€Co.€v.€Michlovitzóó,€157€Md.€51,Ï145€A.€378€(Md.€App.€1929)(an€agreement€to€sell€all€the€defendantððs€scrap€metalÏfor€five€years€at€a€certain€fluctuating€price.)ÌÌà àà àWe€think€the€plaintiffððs€remedy€at€law€in€this€case€is€adequate.€€ThereÏis€nothing€in€the€record€to€suggest€that€Mr.€Ormes€cannot€be€made€whole€by€anÏaward€of€damages.€€After€all,€this€whole€dispute€is€about€money,€and€damages€forÏthe€breach€of€a€personal€contract€is€generally€an€adequate€remedy.€€òòSprunt€v.€Bd.Ïof€Trustees€of€University€of€Tennesseeóó,€443€S.W.2d€464€(Tenn.€1969).€€It€is€trueÏthat€the€inability€to€prove€oneððs€damages€may€make€the€damage€remedyÏinadequate.€€òòSee€Eastern€Rolling€Mills€Co.€v.€Michlovitzóó,€157€Md.€51,€145€A.€378Ï(Md.€App.€1929).€€In€that€case€the€seller€agreed€to€furnish€all€of€its€output€of€twoÏkinds€of€scrap€metal€for€a€period€of€five€years.€€The€price€was€to€be€adjusted€eachÏquarter€according€to€the€prices€quoted€in€a€trade€journal.€€Under€thoseÍcircumstances,€the€damages€suffered€by€the€plaintiff€would€be€a€pure€guess.€ÏTherefore,€the€remedy€was€inadequate.€€The€record€in€this€case€does€not€suggestÏthat€kind€of€difficulty€in€proving€the€plaintiffððs€damages.ÌÌà@ àò òIV.ó óÌÌà àà àFinally,€Mr.€Ormes€insists€that€his€proof€of€damages€that€had€alreadyÏaccrued€was€adequate€and€that€the€burden€shifted€to€the€defendants€to€disproveÏthe€amount.€€We€disagree.€€The€proof€offered€at€the€hearing€attempted€to€show€theÏdamages€for€the€loss€of€all€advertising€„„€on€the€local€channel€as€well€as€on€theÏsatellite€feed.€€Since€the€chancellor€found€that€Mr.€Ormes€was€only€entitled€to€sellÏadvertising€for€the€local€channel,€the€proof€was€largely€irrelevant.€€The€defendantsÏcannot€be€required€to€refute€proof€that€supports€a€theory€rejected€by€the€trialÏjudge.ÌÌà àà àMr.€Ormes€did€get€into€the€record€a€late„filed€offer€of€proof€attemptingÏto€segregate€out€the€revenue€attributable€to€the€rights€found€by€the€chancellor.€€OnÏappeal,€however,€he€does€not€insist€that€he€should€be€awarded€damages€basedÏon€his€offer€of€proof.€€Therefore€there€was€not€any€competent€evidence€on€whichÏto€base€an€award€of€damages€up€to€the€time€of€trial.€€Since€we€have€reversed€theÏspecific€performance€judgment,€we€remand€the€cause€for€further€proceedings€asÍto€the€damages€that€may€be€recovered€for€the€loss€of€earnings€from€the€date€of€theÏtrial€forward.ÌÌà àà àThe€judgment€of€the€court€below€awarding€Mr.€Ormes€specificÏperformance€of€his€contract€is€reversed.€€In€all€other€respects€the€judgment€isÏaffirmed€and€the€cause€is€remanded€for€further€proceedings€in€accordance€withÏthis€opinion.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€parties€equally.Ìà àà àÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÌÇÑ  ÑÑ ° ÑÑ X ÑÔ€¼Ôò òà@ àœó ó›