ÿWPCó  Õ€7ÀËÂd÷ŽÑTêÊñV(Ì öÖ_jåQZ¤E9×VÔd×À`§·}Ô/Ù½jã]ÐD3íþ`e?ê!¿Ø‘^„Á0P©ˆw¹öæ áU8Õ6Cšñ§yƒEi'?>ÕîKÖêÄüU/ŒÃ|ýûL›– á5d2òØÌÃ&e3úvÕ‘4ÏéY:Þòfà¡ …µý·k|7*WóJ¤û¬1NLrØol¿Ÿ²õ7~“L?³}»þµŸÕ¶R¾ :QÕey'½ˆ’ó ¢M›L¾)_¿XȨ¸Be5zéøÄ6 #“¬±9R¡‹ûCz‡‘WR»éL«˜x[:‘çôç¿59.2ÒË}½ÙŠÊ$léÛYF>•GkÉÙG®MrÅödËÙúg¾E²ÇºmTfLÆá3¢×rãõ #Úd êðGô™G±ÀóÝšô+MDXâqþ3ý0ÝÌÙÂoCB±ð0ÏR¹,-èö05ÈS£–Ú“Š`µLd›^B¥ÕÁU9‰­Q 30.2btÚe‹ ZSgÀˆ[M[^9w€yìÞÌÙ&Ìz,,Õ+¨'Äèàün>ùó,‰øµR?–ÂÇ´DÕ°4.¢‡<ú$ôI’¼sç7#|r©Å¾R=’.^°Šb#Á\ % 0c# 0ˆ† UN 1‡\ UNã z1 Ò« Ï} 1uL 72Á 0Dó Æ7ÆýÆÃƉ^ ON[w]4aEuw† mˆ 1‡Ÿ 72&«XUˆXXàààààààààààààbèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèèè 0ëðððð BÛÛ 0¤ø D3œ D-Ï 0Küü ASGÆš 0¤` 0D A«H ˜HP LaserJet 8000 Series PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0»(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular(EhCEKQW]cioAutoList2I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt ÅÝ ƒRØX$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôTe ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔMr.€Ô_ÔSteversonÔ_Ô€died€in€November€of€1995.3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a) i)(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5-›()â ûr')3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(UhCEKQW]cioAutoList31.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. ¡Ý ƒRØX$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôTe ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔOur€conclusion€is€consistent€with€the€Comment€to€Section€12.42€of€the€Tennessee€Pattern€Jury€Instructions,Ð ° Ðwhich€states€in€pertinent€part€as€follows:Ð tÄ ÐÌà8  àIf€the€driver€is€required€to€obtain€specific€permission€for€each€use,€it€may€be€less€likely€that€the€vehicleÐ üL Ðis€maintained€as€a€family€purpose€vehicle,€in€which€case€the€owner€will€not€be€liable€unless€the€driverÐ À Ðis€found€to€be€the€ownerððs€agent,€servant€or€employee€under€other€principles€of€respondeat€superior.Ð „Ô Ð.€.€.€The€requiring€of€specific€permission€for€each€use,€however,€does€not€necessarily€make€the€familyÐ H ˜ Ðpurpose€doctrine€inapplicable.€€In€òòò òDriver€v.€Smithó óóó,€47€Tenn.€App.€505,€339€S.W.2d€135,€139€(1959),Ð  \ Ðthe€Court€held€the€doctrine€applicable,€noting€that€the€parentsðð€requirement€that€their€daughter€ð ðhaveÐ Ò " Ðspecial€permission€each€time€she€used€the€automobile€had€no€bearing€on€the€purpose€for€which€the€carÐ – æ  Ðwas€kept€and€furnished€but€related€only€to€their€general€parental€supervision€of€a€teenage€daughter€.Ð Z ª  Ð.€.ððÓ,"ÓÐ n Ð Ð  ÐT.P.I.ð"ð€CIVIL€12.42€cmt.Ó;Ó KÝ ƒRØX$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôTe ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThere€are€no€previous€Tennessee€cases€in€which€an€appellate€court€has€determined€whether€a€family€can€haveÐ ° Ðmore€than€one€ð ðhead€of€householdðð€for€purposes€of€the€application€of€the€family€purpose€doctrine.€€This€exact€issue€wasÐ tÄ Ðraised€in€ò òòòDroussiotisóóó ó,€but€the€court€declined€to€discuss€the€issue€and€decided€the€case€on€other€grounds.€€òòò òSee€Droussiotisóóó ó,Ð 8ˆ Ð958€S.W.2d€at€131.€€ ~Ý ƒRØX$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôTe ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€instruction€given€to€the€jury€regarding€the€family€purpose€doctrine€is€identical€to€Section€12.42€of€theÐ ° ÐTennessee€Pattern€Jury€Instruction.€€ò òòòSee€ó óóóÔ_ÔT.P.I.Ô_Ôð"ð€CIVIL€12.42.òòòòóóò ò€óóó ó - ù-(|G2ØX$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€\„»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô1(ò»»Ô d(|3Ž$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€\„»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Ž$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€\„»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€QD»»d dÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼êÝ»»»ÔÑ8€?ÄXXdê»»d 8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îþìêÝÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@õõ%ìàAT€JACKSONÔ#†¼êÝ»îîþì #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓMay€2000€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡X³ÑX»¼êÝÔÌò òÔ#†¼êÝ»XX³Ñë#ÔMERTIS€JOHNSONòòóó€v.€WILLIE€A.€STEVERSONòòóóÔ‡X³ÑX»¼êÝÔó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Direct€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Shelby€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€83855€T.D.€€€€€€John€R.€McCarroll,€Jr.,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€W1999„00627„COA„R3„CV€„€Decided€August€30,€2000€Ð ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€appeal€arises€from€a€dispute€between€Plaintiff€Mertis€Johnson€and€Defendant€Willie€A.Ð xÈ  ÐSteverson€regarding€an€automobile€accident€involving€Ms.€Johnson€and€Virden€Steverson,€Mr.Ð d´ ÐSteversonððs€son.€€Ms.€Johnson€filed€a€complaint€against€Mr.€Steverson€alleging€that€the€negligenceÐ P  Ðof€Virden€was€the€cause€of€this€accident€and€seeking€damages€for€her€personal€injuries.€€At€theÐ <Œ Ðconclusion€of€a€jury€trial€on€the€matter,€Mr.€Steverson€made€a€motion€for€a€directed€verdict,€whichÐ (x Ðwas€denied€by€the€trial€court.€€The€jury€subsequently€returned€a€verdict€in€favor€of€Ms.€Johnson€andÐ d Ðawarded€her€damages€in€the€amount€of€$14,000.00.€€Mr.€Steverson€filed€a€motion€for€a€judgmentÐ P Ðnotwithstanding€the€verdict€or,€in€the€alternative,€for€a€new€trial,€which€was€also€denied€by€the€trialÐ ì< Ðcourt.€€For€the€reasons€set€forth€below,€we€affirm€the€ruling€of€the€trial€court.€€Ð Ø( ÐÓtÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Affirmed;€andÐ ° ÐRemandedó óÐ œì ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼êÝ»àX³Ñb#ÔÔ‡X³ÑX.¼êÝÔDavid€R.€Farmer,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòW.€Frank€Crawford,€P.J.,€W.S.óóÐ tÄ Ðand€òòAlan€E.€Highers,€Jóó,€joined.Ð `° ÐÌDouglas€R.€Pierce€and€Douglas€B.€Janney,€III,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Willie€A.Ð 8!ˆ  ÐSteverson.Ð $"t! ÐÌKendra€H.€Armstrong,€Cordova,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Mertis€Johnson.Ð ü#L# ÐÓ2 ÓÌÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼êÝ»XX³Ña #ÔÔ‡X³ÑX»¼êÝÔÐ À&"& ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼êÝ»XX³Ñn #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€X³ÑX»¼êÝÔò òà  àó óAt€the€time€of€the€accident€that€is€the€subject€of€the€case€at€bar,€Mr.€Steverson€and€his€wifeÐ ˜(è#( ÐGeraldine€Steverson€were€co„owners€of€a€1989€Cadillac.€€Virden,€the€Steversonððs€eighteen€year€oldÐ „)Ô$) Ðson,€drove€a€1973€Cadillac,€which€was€also€titled€in€Mr.€Steversonððs€name.€€On€July€3,€1995,Ð p*À%* ÐVirdenððs€1973€Cadillac€was€in€need€of€repair€so€he€asked€his€mother€for€permission€to€use€theÐ \+¬&+ Ðâ âSteversonsðð€1989€Cadillac€to€run€some€errands.€€Mrs.€Ô_ÔSteversonÔ_Ô€gave€Virden€permission€to€use€theÐ H,˜',ý Ðvehicle.€€While€running€his€errands,€Virden€was€involved€in€an€automobile€accident€with€Ms.Ð ° ÐJohnson.€€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àIn€June€of€1996,€Ms.€Johnson€filed€an€action€in€general€sessions€court€against€Mr.€SteversonÐ tÄ Ðseeking€damages€for€the€injuries€that€she€sustained€as€a€result€of€the€accident.€€Following€an€adverseÐ `° Ðruling€in€general€sessions€court,€the€administrator€ad€litem€of€Mr.€Ô_ÔSteversonÔ_Ôððs€estate׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€appealed€theÐ L œ Ðmatter€to€circuit€court€and€demanded€a€jury€trial.€€Ms.€Johnson€filed€an€amended€complaint€with€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðcircuit€court€naming€Mr.€€Steverson€as€the€only€defendant€in€her€lawsuit.€€The€matter€was€heard€byÐ $ t Ða€jury€on€May€24„26,€1999.€€At€the€conclusion€of€the€proof,€the€administrator€ad€litem€of€Mr.Ð  ` ÐSteversonððs€estate€made€a€motion€for€a€directed€verdict,€which€was€denied€by€the€trial€court.€€TheÐ ü L  Ðcourt€then€submitted€the€case€to€the€jury,€instructing€them€regarding€the€family€purpose€doctrine.€Ð è 8  ÐThe€jury€returned€a€verdict€in€favor€of€Ms.€Johnson€and€awarded€Ms.€Johnson€a€judgment€in€theÐ Ô$  Ðamount€of€$14,000.00.€€The€administrator€ad€litem€of€Mr.€Steversonððs€estate€filed€a€motion€for€aÐ À  Ðjudgment€notwithstanding€the€verdict€or,€in€the€alternative,€for€a€new€trial,€which€was€denied€by€theÐ ¬ü  Ðtrial€court.€€This€appeal€followed.€€ò òÐ ˜è  ÐÌà  àó óThe€issues€raised€on€appeal,€as€stated€by€Mr.€Steverson,€are€as€follows:Ð pÀ ÐÌÓ€ (Uh83 ÓÝ"‚3£"ÝÝ  Ýò òó óà  àÝ‚3£çÝÔ2UhÔÚ  Ú1Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0 ` àÝ  ÝWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€not€granting€Appellantððs€motion€for€a€directed€verdictÐ H˜ Ðand/or€motion€for€judgment€notwithstanding€the€verdict,€and€in€instructing€the€juryÐ 4„ Ðto€decide€whether€the€family€purpose€doctrine€applies€to€the€facts€of€this€case.݃3£ç&݌Рp` (#` (# ÐŒÝ  Ýà  àÌÝ"‚3£"ÝÝ  Ýà  àÝ‚3£öÝÔ2UhÔÚ  Ú2Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0 ` àÝ  ÝWhether,€even€if€the€family€purpose€doctrine€does€apply,€the€trial€courtððs€instructionÐ øH Ðon€the€family€purpose€doctrine€was€inadequate€as€a€matter€of€law.Ó.Ó݃3£ö/ÝŒÐä4` (#` (# ÐŒÝ  ÝÓ7ÓAdditionally,€Ms.€Johnson€raises€the€issue€of€whether€she€should€be€awarded€damages€because€Mr.Ð ¼  ÐSteversonððs€appeal€is€frivolous.€€In€ruling€on€a€motion€for€a€directed€verdict,€the€court€must€take€theÐ ¨ø Ðstrongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party€and€must€accept€as€trueÐ ”ä Ðall€facts€and€reasonable€inferences€which€favor€the€opponent€of€the€motion€and€disregard€anyÐ €Ð Ðevidence€to€the€contrary.€€A€directed€verdict€is€proper€only€when€there€is€no€issue€as€to€any€materialÐ l¼ Ðfact€and€when€the€evidence€presented€is€clear€and€there€is€only€one€inference€that€a€reasonable€personÐ X ¨ Ðexercising€his€or€her€own€judgment€can€make.€€òòò òSee€Ô_ÔConatserÔ_Ô€v.€Clarksville€Coca„Cola€Bottling€Co.óóó ó,Ð D!” Ð920€S.W.2d€646€(Tenn.€1995);€òòò òWilliams€v.€Brownóóó ó,€860€S.W.2d€854,€857€(Tenn.€1993);€and€òòò òHolmesÐ 0"€  Ðv.€Wilsonóóó ó,€551€S.W.2d€682,€685€(Tenn.€1977).Ð #l! ÐÌà  àIn€hisò ò€ó ómotion€for€directed€verdict€and€hisò òó ó€motion€for€judgment€notwithstanding€the€verdictÐ ô$D # Ðor,€alternatively,€for€a€new€trial,€the€administrator€ad€litem€of€Mr.€Steversonððs€estate€argued€that€theÐ ä%4!$ Ðfamily€purpose€doctrine€is€inapplicable€to€the€case€at€bar€and,€consequently,€Mr.€Steverson€cannotÐ Ð& "% Ðbe€held€liable€for€the€negligence€of€his€son€Virden.€€Thus,€as€an€initial€matter,€we€must€considerÐ ¼' #& Ðwhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€these€motions€and€in€allowing€the€jury€to€determine€theÐ ¨(ø#' Ðapplicability€of€the€family€purpose€doctrine.€€The€family€purpose€doctrine€is€a€legal€doctrine€underÐ ”)ä$( Ðwhich€the€head€of€a€family€may€be€held€liable€under€the€theory€of€respondeat€superior€for€theÐ ° Ðnegligence€of€another€family€member€while€operating€a€motor€vehicle.€€ò òòòSee€Droussiotis€v.€Damronóóó ó,Ð œì Ð958€S.W.2d€127,€131„32€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997);€ò òòòGray€v.€Amosóóó ó,€869€S.W.2d€925,€926€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ˆØ ÐApp.€1993).€€€In€order€for€the€family€purpose€doctrine€to€be€applicable,€two€requirements€must€beÐ tÄ Ðmet.€€First,€the€head€of€the€household€must€maintain€the€motor€vehicle€for€the€purpose€of€providingÐ `° Ðpleasure€or€comfort€to€his€or€her€family.€€Additionally,€the€driver€of€the€vehicle€must€have€been€usingÐ L œ Ðthe€motor€vehicle€in€furtherance€of€that€purpose€and€with€the€permission€of€the€owner,€eitherÐ 8 ˆ Ðexpressed€or€implied,€at€the€time€that€negligence€occurred.€€ò òòòSee€Camper€v.€Minoróóó ó,€915€S.W.2d€437,Ð $ t Ð447€(Tenn.€1996);€€ò òòòDroussiotisó óóó,€958€S.W.2d€at€131;€ò òòòGrayóóó ó,€869€S.W.2d€at€927.€€ò òÐ  ` ÐÌòòóóà  àó óIt€is€undisputed€that,€at€the€time€of€the€accident,€Mr.€Steverson€was€terminally€ill€andÐ è 8  Ðphysically€incapacitated.€€Mrs.€Ô_ÔSteversonÔ_Ô€testified€at€trial€that,€because€of€Mr.€Steversonððs€illness,Ð Ô$  Ðshe€was€the€head€of€their€household.€€The€administrator€ad€litem€of€Mr.€Steversonððs€estate€thusÐ À  Ðargues€on€appeal€that€Ms.€Johnson€did€not€sue€the€head€of€their€household€and,€because€Mr.Ð ¬ü  ÐSteverson€was€not€the€head€of€their€household€at€the€time€of€the€accident,€his€estate€cannot€be€heldÐ ˜è  Ðliable€under€the€family€purpose€doctrine€for€the€negligence€of€Virden.€€We€disagree.€€Mr.€SteversonÐ „Ô  Ðwas€the€father€of€the€Steversonsðð€children€and€the€co„owner€of€the€1989€Cadillac€that€Virden€wasÐ pÀ Ðdriving€on€the€day€of€the€accident.€€As€such,€Mr.€Steverson€had€both€the€legal€and€parental€authorityÐ \¬ Ðto€grant€or€deny€any€request€by€Virden€to€use€the€vehicle.€€Although€it€is€true€that€Mr.€Steverson€wasÐ H˜ Ðsuffering€from€an€illness€at€the€time€of€the€accident€that€rendered€him€unable€to€perform€mostÐ 4„ Ðphysical€tasks,€there€is€no€proof€in€the€record€suggesting€that€Mr.€Steverson€was€mentally€impairedÐ  p Ðin€any€way€or€unable€to€communicate€with€his€family.€€To€the€contrary,€it€is€presumed€that€Mr.Ð  \ ÐSteverson€was€mentally€fit€during€this€period€of€time€because,€subsequent€to€the€accident,€Mr.Ð øH ÐSteverson€was€transported€to€a€car€dealership€where€he€signed€the€papers€necessary€to€purchase€andÐ ä4 Ðfinance€a€1988€Oldsmobile€for€Virden.€€Simply€because€an€individual€becomes€physicallyÐ Ð  Ðincapacitated€does€not€necessarily€mean€that€the€individual€is€stripped€of€his€or€her€status€as€a€headÐ ¼  Ðof€his€or€her€household.€€In€the€instant€case,€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Steverson€were€partners€in€marriage,Ð ¨ø Ðpartners€in€the€rearing€of€their€children,€and€co„owners€of€the€1989€Cadillac.€€Thus,€although€Mrs.Ð ”ä ÐSteverson€may€have€taken€on€extra€household€duties€as€a€result€of€Mr.€Steversonððs€illness,€we€thinkÐ €Ð Ðthat€both€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Steverson€may€be€classified€as€a€head€of€the€their€household.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€We€thereforeÐ l¼ Ðreject€the€contention€that€Mr.€Steverson€was€not€a€head€of€the€Steversonððs€household€at€the€time€ofÐ X ¨ Ðthe€accident.€€Ð D!” ÐÌò òà  àó óThe€administrator€ad€litem€of€Mr.€Steversonððs€estate€next€argues€that€the€family€purposeÐ #l! Ðdoctrine€is€inapplicable€to€the€case€at€bar€because€Mr.€Steverson€did€not€maintain€the€1989€CadillacÐ $X" Ðfor€the€purpose€of€providing€pleasure€or€comfort€to€his€family.€€In€support€of€this€position,€he€notesÐ ô$D # Ðthe€undisputed€fact€that,€each€time€Virden€wanted€to€use€the€Steversonððs€1989€Cadillac,€he€wasÐ à%0!$ Ðrequired€to€obtain€specific€permission€from€one€of€his€parents.€€In€ò òòòRedding€v.€Barkeróóó ó,€230€S.W.2dÐ Ì&"% Ð202€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1950),€this€Court€stated€that€ð ð[t]he€family€purpose€doctrine€does€not€apply€whereÐ ° Ðthe€members€of€the€family€must€obtain€special€permission€on€each€occasion€of€the€vehicleððs€use€byÐ œì Ðthem.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€at€205.€€ò òòòóóó óInòòò ò€Harber€v.€Smithóóó ó,€292€S.W.2d€468€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1956),€this€Court€quotedÐ ˆØ Ðwith€approval€the€above€language€from€ò òòòReddingóóó ó.€€ò òòòSee€id.€óóó óat€470„71.€€ò òòòóóó óIn€ò òòòDriver€v.€Smithó óóó,€339€S.W.2dÐ tÄ Ð135€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1959),€this€Court€held€that€the€family€purpose€doctrine€was€applicable€evenÐ `° Ðthough€the€owners€of€the€vehicle€required€their€daughter€to€obtain€special€permission€each€time€sheÐ L œ Ðused€the€vehicle.€€ò òòòSee€id.€óóó óat€139.€€In€reaching€this€conclusion,€this€Court€distinguished€òòò òReddingó óóó€andòòò òÐ 8 ˆ ÐHarber€óóó óas€follows:Ð $ t ÐÌà8  àà ` àHowever,€a€study€of€these€two€cases€indicates€to€us€that€the€language€quotedÐ ü L  Ðabove€is€broader€than€the€facts€of€the€two€cases€would€justify.€€In€the€case€of€ReddingÐ è 8  Ðv.€Barker,€supra,€the€vehicle€involved€in€the€collision€was€a€one€and€one„half€tonÐ Ô$  Ðtruck€driven€by€the€20„year€old€son€of€the€defendant€owner€and€accompanied€byÐ À  Ðanother€son€of€the€owner€of€the€truck.€€The€two€boys€were€returning€home€fromÐ ¬ü  ÐJackson,€Tennessee,€where€they€had€attended€a€picture€show.€€The€opinion€of€JudgeÐ ˜è  ÐAnderson€discussed€the€cases€involving€the€Family€Purpose€Doctrine€in€TennesseeÐ „Ô  Ðand€then€made€a€finding€that€the€car€was€not€being€furnished€by€the€owner€for€theÐ pÀ Ðconvenience€of€his€family€and€hence,€the€Family€Purpose€Doctrine€did€not€apply.Ð\¬Ð Ð  Ðà@ìì*ìàˆÌà  àà ` à.€.€.€.Ð 4„ ÐÌà8  àà ` àIn€the€case€of€Harber€v.€Smith,€supra,€the€son€was€driving€his€fatherððs€car€withÐ  \ Ðspecial€permission€while€on€leave€from€the€army.€€The€proof€was€that€when€the€sonÐ øH Ðhad€lived€at€home€he€kept€the€key€to€the€car€and€drove€his€father€back€and€forth€toÐ ä4 Ðwork€and€occasionally€used€the€automobile€with€the€special€permission€of€his€fatherÐ Ð  Ðfor€his€personal€use.€€The€court€held€that€the€Family€Purpose€Doctrine€did€not€apply.м Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àà ` à.€.€.€.Ð ”ä ÐÌà8  àà ` àIn€our€opinion,€the€.€.€.€cases€above€referred€to€are€readily€and€clearlyÐ l¼ Ðdistinguishable€from€the€case€at€bar€in€that€in€each€of€these€.€.€.€cases€the€higher€courtÐ X ¨ Ðfound€as€a€fact€that€the€owner€of€the€vehicle€involved€in€the€accident€had€notÐ D!” Ðfurnished€the€same€for€the€convenience€and€pleasure€of€his€family;€whereas€in€theÐ 0"€  Ðpresent€case€Mr.€Driver€unequivocally€testified€that€he€furnished€the€car€for€the€useÐ #l! Ðand€convenience€of€the€members€of€his€family€including€his€teen„age€daughter,€GayleÐ $X" ÐDriver.€€Thus€it€clearly€appears€that€the€requirement€of€Mr.€and€Mrs.€Driver€that€theirÐ ô$D # Ðdaughter,€Gayle,€have€special€permission€each€time€she€used€the€automobile€had€noÐ à%0!$ Ðbearing€on€the€purpose€for€which€the€car€was€kept€and€furnished€but€related€only€toÐ Ì&"% Ðtheir€general€parental€supervision€of€a€teen„age€daughter€which€is€certainlyÐ ¸'#& Ðcommendable.€€Therefore,€we€hold€that€the€Family€Purpose€Doctrine€is€applicable€toÐ ¤(ô#' Ðthe€present€case.Ð)à$(Ð Ð  Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðòòò òId.ó óóó€at€137„39.€€More€recently€in€ò òòòGrayóóó ó,€this€Court,€relying€on€ò òòòReddingó óóó€and€òòò òHarberóóó ó,€again€commentedÐ ° Ðâ âthat€the€family€purpose€doctrine€is€inapplicable€when€the€driver€of€the€vehicle€is€required€to€obtainÐ œì Ðspecial€permission€on€each€occasion€that€he€or€she€uses€the€vehicle.€€òòò òSee€Grayó óóó,€869€S.W.2d€at€òòò òóóó ó926.€Ð ˆØ ÐThis€Court€did€not,€however,€discuss€or€attempt€to€distinguish€its€earlier€ruling€in€ò òòòDriveróó.òò€Ð tÄ Ðóóó óFurthermore,€the€driver€of€the€vehicle€in€òòò òGrayóóó ó€was€not€required€to€seek€permission€before€using€hisÐ d´ Ðfatherððs€vehicle.€€òòò òSee€id.€ó óóóat€927.€€Thus,€the€above€comment€made€by€this€Court€in€òòò òGrayó óóó€is€merelyÐ P   Ðdicta€in€that€it€did€not€have€any€effect€on€the€ultimate€conclusion€of€the€case.€€We€therefore€concludeÐ < Œ Ðthat€the€correct€statement€of€the€law€in€Tennessee€with€respect€to€this€matter,€as€developed€inÐ ( x Ðòòò òReddingó óóó,€òòò òHarberó óóó,€and€òòò òDriveró óóó,€is€that€òòò òó óóóalthough€the€fact€that€the€driver€must€obtain€special€permissionÐ  d Ðmay€suggest€that€the€vehicle€is€not€maintained€by€the€owner€for€the€pleasure€and€comfort€of€theÐ  P  Ðownerððs€family,€this€fact€is€not€conclusive€and€does€not€necessarily€preclude€the€application€of€theÐ ì <  Ðfamily€purpose€doctrine.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð Ø(  ÐÌà  àWith€respect€to€his€argument€that€Mr.€Steverson€did€furnish€or€maintain€the€1989€CadillacÐ °  Ðfor€the€purpose€of€providing€pleasure€or€comfort€to€his€family,€the€administrator€ad€litem€of€Mr.Ð œì  ÐSteversonððs€estate€also€contends€that€this€vehicle€was€maintained€for€the€use€of€Mrs.€Steverson€andÐ ˆØ  Ðnot€for€the€use€of€the€entire€family.€€Mrs.€Ô_ÔSteversonÔ_Ô€testified€that€when€she€and€Mr.€SteversonÐ tÄ Ðpurchased€the€1989€Cadillac,€it€was€intended€only€for€their€use€but,€by€the€time€of€the€accident,Ð `° ÐVirden€was€using€the€car€with€their€permission€approximately€one€time€per€week.€€Virden€alsoÐ Lœ Ðtestified€that€he€drove€the€1989€Cadillac€approximately€one€time€per€week.€€Thus,€there€is€evidenceÐ 8ˆ Ðin€the€case€at€bar€supporting€the€conclusion€that€the€1989€Cadillac€was€maintained€solely€for€Mrs.Ð $t ÐSteversonððs€use,€as€well€as€the€conclusion€that€this€vehicle€was€maintained€for€use€by€the€entireÐ ` ÐSteverson€family.€€Under€such€circumstances,€it€was€for€the€trier€of€fact€to€determine€whether€theÐ üL Ð1989€Cadillac€was€a€family€purpose€vehicle.€€We€therefore€conclude€that€the€trial€court€appropriatelyÐ è8 Ðdenied€the€administratorððs€motion€for€a€directed€verdict€and€submitted€the€matter€to€the€jury.€Ð Ô$ ÐLikewise,€we€conclude€that€the€court€properly€denied€the€administratorððs€motion€for€a€judgmentÐ À Ðnotwithstanding€the€verdict€or,€in€the€alternative,€for€a€new€trial.€€Ð ¬ü ÐÌà  àFinally,€the€administrator€ad€litem€of€Mr.€Steversonððs€estate€contends€that€the€instructionÐ „Ô Ðgiven€to€the€jury€by€the€trial€court€was€inadequate€as€a€matter€of€law.€€When€reviewing€juryÐ pÀ Ðinstructions,€this€Court€must€examine€the€challenged€portion€in€the€context€of€the€entire€instruction.€Ð ° Ðò òòòSee,€e.g.,€Hunter€v.€Burkeóóó ó,€958€S.W.2d€751,€756€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€If€the€instruction€fairlyÐ œì Ðdefines€the€legal€issues€of€the€case€and€does€not€mislead€the€jury,€the€instruction€will€be€upheld€onÐ ˆØ Ðappeal.€€ò òòòSee,€e.g.,€id.€€óóó óWith€respect€to€the€family€purpose€doctrine,€the€court€in€the€case€at€barÐ tÄ Ðinstructed€the€jury€as€follows:Ð `° ÐÌà8  àà ` àAs€I€said€before,€the€first€issue€you€have€to€decide€is€whether€or€not€theÐ 8 ˆ ÐFamily€Purpose€Doctrine€applies€to€this€case.€€The€plaintiff€claims€that€the€defendant,Ð $ t Ðthat€is€the€estate€of€Willie€Steverson,€is€resposible€for€any€fault€of€Virden€SteversonÐ  ` Ðunder€the€Family€Purpose€Doctrine.€€The€defendant,€the€estate€of€Willie€Steverson,Ð ü L  Ðdenied€such€responsibility.à8hÐ Ð àÐè 8 hphp ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€Family€Purpose€Doctrine€applies€when€one,€a€member€of€a€familyÐ À  Ðfurnished€a€motor€vehicle€for€the€general€use,€pleasure,€and€convenience€of€theÐ ¬ü  Ðfamily;€and€two,€a€person€furnishing€the€vehicle€gave€specific€or€general€consent€orÐ ˜è  Ðpermission,€either€express€or€implied,€for€a€member€or€for€members€of€the€family€toÐ „Ô  Ðuse€it€for€that€family€purpose;€and€three,€at€the€time€of€the€accident,€the€member€ofÐ pÀ Ðthe€family€was€driving€the€vehicle€in€connection€with€a€family€purpose.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€ÓIÓÐ\¬Ð Ð  ÐÓ©UÓThe€administrator€ad€litem€of€Mr.€Steversonððs€estate€complains€on€appeal€that€the€court€should€haveÐ 4„ Ðsubstituted€the€words€ð ðthe€head€of€the€householdðð€for€the€words€ð ða€member€of€a€familyðð€in€theÐ  p Ðinstruction€that€was€given€to€the€jury.€€In€an€earlier€portion€of€this€opinion,€we€concluded€that€Mr.Ð  \ ÐSteverson€was,€in€fact,€a€head€of€the€Steverson€household.€€Thus,€even€if€the€court€had€instructed€theÐ øH Ðjury€that€the€family€purpose€doctrine€applies€only€when€a€head€of€the€household€furnished€a€vehicleÐ ä4 Ðfor€the€use€of€his€or€her€family,€this€instruction€would€not€have€altered€the€ultimate€conclusionÐ Ð  Ðreached€by€the€jury.€€Assuming,€then,€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€using€the€words€ð ða€member€of€aÐ ¼  Ðfamilyðð€rather€than€the€words€ð ðthe€head€of€the€householdðð€in€the€instruction,€we€conclude€that€thisÐ ¨ø Ðerror€was€harmless.€€€€Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àMs.€Johnson€seeks€damages€pursuant€to€section€27„1„122€of€the€Tennessee€Code€Annotated,Ð l¼ Ðwhich€provides€that€ð ð[w]hen€it€appears€to€any€reviewing€court€that€the€appeal€from€any€court€ofÐ X ¨ Ðrecord€was€frivolous€or€taken€solely€for€delay,€the€court€may,€either€upon€motion€of€a€party€or€of€itsÐ D!” Ðown€motion,€award€just€damages€against€the€appellant,€which€may€include€but€need€not€be€limitedÐ 0"€  Ðto,€costs,€interest€on€the€judgment,€and€expenses€incurred€by€the€appellee€as€a€result€of€the€appeal.ðð€Ð #l! ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€27„1„122€(1980).€€We€do€not€think€that€this€appeal€is€frivolous€or€taken€solelyÐ $X" Ðfor€delay.€€Thus,€in€our€discretion,€we€deny€Ms.€Johnsonððs€request€for€damages€under€section€27„1„Ð ô$D # Ð122.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌò òó óÌÐ ¤(ô#' Їà  àBased€on€the€foregoing,€the€ruling€of€the€trial€court€is€in€all€respects€affirmed.€€The€costs€ofÐ ° Ðthis€appeal€are€assessed€to€the€estate€of€Willie€Steverson€and€its€surety,€for€which€execution€mayÐ œì Ðissue€if€necessary.€€à ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àÐ ˆØ ÐÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð L œ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGE