ÿWPC¼ Ð%BTµ¤Ò¡=€¡=š‘µ¤Ⱦ;ìëÑwÚâp[ÑÑSEÚ ïŸJQGò|¹é°ã–ž¦ ®jg¼d/­×ÄKØ}åUi íC§×è+Þ\Ö_;^¿AÃYÕ “R¨úJå<̤±ÔUiГ¹¹í k¶!©È¬ôêªCù˜JD;7±yÏWEê‘ïQ‰¿Ã“aºQØ?¿¥^#MÂÖÔ™ DÄ{uš:èN¾¹mr¥hŽ³BÔ¨ÊOçÒöò%–ªÛögæÌ—ÖX´½#Arñ;|yŸ'c`THÝÎÈ蘒Χ¬º…†äQ¼7;à¡0/ÊêXÇ;n¶(0üI F_OÖªâBÇקì!¨ÖY[œF¨ƒNfpôÖ½ùßBÂRbƒŸ¶62¿·×¹¯ÃIçb«iÆ ¹Ä¶ m@VÃmNfWÄ4£ÏñÎrò¸À@ 9yG…èï®pºáª´Ù/›Ê’|é^Ê㽉'€ânSfÎî4¹)AC 5"?ÙÒ¬µ¹k·åo5‘ :òøÈ,\Šd§â9Å%_K“ãjc\q¥Jˆ{wÑ•û1$3æ×VËU_IâÛ+CýÑ{ZnA)N{(#ÔYC4"ÎW#ÉÂUN‹ %Ù 0:ß UN ^ g ws 4w ‹ š mœ b³ Ì» •‡ 0OLLï›› 0 DŠŠEÎÐÐJÕ3úRRR¶LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL 0  BŸ˜\\ib01s01\clerk1nasÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman RegularX(üœ$¡¡ÔUSUS.,Ô(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regulara¢–1î INŽ1B013C13|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ- ù- ÂÝ ƒR«‚$ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôœòXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€parties€apparently€divorced€in€1984€and€remarried€in€1986. ‹Ý ƒR«‚$ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôœòXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔRule€60.02€provides€in€part:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àà ` àOn€motion€and€upon€such€terms€as€are€just,€the€court€may€relieve€a€party€or€the€partyððsÐ 8ˆ Ðlegal€representative€from€a€final€judgment,€order€or€proceeding€for€the€following€reasons:€€(1)Ð üL Ðmistake,€inadvertence,€surprise€or€excusable€neglect;€(2)€fraud€(whether€heretofore€denominatedÐ À Ðintrinsic€or€extrinsic),€misrepresentation,€or€other€misconduct€of€an€adverse€party;€(3)€the€judgmentÐ „Ô Ðis€void;€(4)€the€judgment€has€been€satisfied,€released€or€discharged,€.€.€.€;€or€(5)€any€other€reasonÐ H ˜ Ðjustifying€relief€from€the€operation€of€the€judgment.€.€.€.Ð \Ð Ð  ÐÌTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€60.02. &Ý ƒR«‚$ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôœòXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€divorce€court€adopted€the€plan€proposed€by€Father,€and€the€record€does€not€indicate€that€the€parties€inÐ ° Ðfact€agreed€on€the€Parenting€Plan. EÝ ƒR«‚$ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôœòXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔOn€August€16,€2004,€in€response€to€the€Courtððs€request€at€oral€argument,€Father€submitted€a€transcript€ofÐ ° Ðthe€legislative€history€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€36„5„101(p). åÝ ƒR«‚$ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôœòXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔMotherððs€annual€salary€was€$90,000€per€year,€and€Fatherððs€salary€was€$44,200€per€year€plus€bonuses.€€TheÐ ° ÐPlan€calculated€Motherððs€obligation€by€determining€the€difference€between€Motherððs€obligation€for€one€son€($1,673)Ð tÄ Ðand€Fatherððs€obligation€for€one€son€($890€per€month),€which€is€$783€per€month.(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ûÝ ƒR«‚$ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôœòXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔA€copy€of€the€December€31,€2003€order€was€entered€on€the€record€in€all€three€cases€ð!ð€the€divorce€case€andÐ ° Ðeach€of€the€conservatorship€cases.€€Mother€filed€separate€notices€of€appeal€in€all€three€cases,€and€the€appeals€wereÐ tÄ Ðconsolidated€by€this€Court€€òòÔ_ÔsuaÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔsponteÔ_Ôóó. @Ý ƒR«‚$ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôœòXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€addition,€for€the€support€to€extend€past€the€age€of€21,€the€child€must€be€ð ðliving€under€the€care€andÐ ° Ðsupervision€of€a€parent€and€the€court€[must]€determine[]€that€it€is€in€the€€childððs€best€interest€to€remain€under€suchÐ tÄ Ðcare€and€supervision€and€the€obligor€is€financially€able€to€continue€to€pay€child€support.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„Ð 8ˆ Ð101(p)(2)€(2001€&€Supp.€2003).€€ )Ý ƒR«‚$ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôœòXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSome€courts€limited€the€exception€to€cases€in€which€the€child€acquired€his€or€her€disability€during€minority.€Ð ° Ðò òòòSeeó óóó,€ò òòòe.g.ó óóó,€ò òòòHoward€v.€Howardó óóó,€991€S.W.2d€251,€256€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999);€ò òòòsee€generallyó óóó€Noralyn€O.€Harlow,€J.D.,Ð tÄ ÐAnnotation,€òòPostmajority€Disability€as€Reviving€Parental€Duty€to€Support€Childóó,€48€A.L.R.4th€919€(1986).€ ðÝ ƒR«‚$ÝÔUSUS.,Ôà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôœòXXÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔBoth€ò òòòKilby€ó óóóand€ò òòòScottó óóó€were€decided€by€the€same€court€one€day€apart€from€one€another.€  COA$conservatorshipsHighersb]othu]ntil D.R.Northland CmtyAssnSaltsmanDransfieldDePaulNoralynPostmajorityA.L.R.SayneCrainMallone S.W. W]eBarnhillHodge JurGatewoodT.C.A.HoltsingerElrodKilbynoncustodialChumneys]ubsequent T]hePenlandFeinburgobligor(.G2«‚$¤¤Ý ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôœòXXÔ dÝ ƒüœ!ÝÔUSUS.,ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡XçXXXÔÔ‡¼Pµ»XXçÔÑ€ ÑÑ8€çXXdìdÈ8ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ#†XçX»¼Pµ\#ÔÔ‡îSîXXçÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†XçXîîS#ÔÔ‡¼Pµ»XXçԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓAugust€3,€2004€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ#†XçX»¼Pµª#ÔÌò òÔ‡¼Pµ»XXçÔà @ àà @ àIN€RE€CONSERVATORSHIP€OF€Ð úJ ÐMICHAEL€THOMAS€JONES€òòand€TIMOTHY€ALAN€JONESóóÐ  ^ ÐÌBEVERLY€ANNE€JONES€Ð 6 † Ðòòóóv.€Ð J š ÐKEVIN€THOMAS€JONESòòóóÔ#†XçX»¼Pµ=#Ôó óÐ ^®  ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òA€Consolidated€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€(Probate€Division)€for€Davidson€CountyÐ ^®  Ðà@@øøìàNos.€95P„96,€95P„97à0 @ àà0 @ àà0 @ àà0 @ à,€No.€01D„1666€€€€€€€€€Frank€G.€Clement,€Jr.,€JudgeÐ Jš  Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð 6†  Ðà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<!` AßÐ "r ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2004„00173„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€December€22,€Ô_Ô2004Ô_ÔÐ m ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<ô` AßÐ õE Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€appeal€involves€the€courtððs€authority€to€order€a€parent€to€pay€support€for€an€adult€disabled€child.€Ð ð@ ÐThe€parties€were€married€with€two€severely€disabled€adult€sons.€€In€1995,€while€the€parties€were€stillÐ Ü, Ðmarried,€the€probate€court€established€them€as€co„conservators€for€their€sons.€€In€June€2001,€theÐ È Ðmother€filed€a€petition€for€divorce€in€circuit€court.€€Neither€party€informed€the€divorce€court€of€theÐ ´ Ðconservatorships€that€had€been€established€for€their€sons.€€The€circuit€court€entered€a€final€decree€ofÐ  ð Ðdivorce€which€incorporated€a€parenting€plan,€submitted€by€the€father,€which€provided€for€jointÐ ŒÜ Ðcustody€of€the€sons.€€The€divorce€decree€required€the€mother€to€pay€child€support€to€the€father.€€TheÐ xÈ Ðdivorce€decree€was€not€appealed.€€The€mother€later€filed€a€motion€requesting€that€the€decreeÐ d´ Ðrequiring€her€to€pay€child€support€be€vacated€pursuant€to€Rule€60.02(3),€asserting€that€the€divorceÐ P  Ðcourt€did€not€have€subject€matter€jurisdiction€to€require€her€to€pay€support€for€the€adult€sons.€€RatherÐ <Œ Ðthan€rule€on€the€motherððs€motion,€the€divorce€court€transferred€the€case€to€the€probate€court,€whichÐ ( x Ðhad€before€it€the€conservatorship€actions.€€The€father€then€filed€a€motion€in€the€probate€court€askingÐ !d Ðit€to€confirm€the€divorce€decree€entered€by€the€divorce€court.€€The€probate€court,€in€the€same€order,Ð "P  Ðdenied€the€motherððs€motion€to€vacate€and€granted€the€fatherððs€motion€to€confirm€the€decree€adoptingÐ ì"<! Ðthe€parenting€plan,€determining€that€the€divorce€decree€entered€by€the€divorce€court€was€valid.€€TheÐ Ø#(" Ðmother€now€appeals€that€order.€€We€reverse,€concluding€that€the€divorce€court€did€not€have€subjectÐ Ä$ # Ðmatter€jurisdiction€to€order€the€parent€to€pay€support€for€the€adult€disabled€children,€but€finding€thatÐ °%!$ Ðthe€probate€court€is€permitted€to€consider€requiring€the€parents€to€pay€support€in€the€context€of€theÐ œ&ì!% Ðconservatorship€proceedings.€€Ð ˆ'Ø"& ÐÓÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€is€Ð `)°$( ÐReversed€and€Remanded€ó óÐ L*œ%) ÐÌòòÓ  ÓHolly€M.€Kirby,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€Court,€in€which€òòAlan€E.€Highers,€J.,óó€and€òòDavidÐ $,t'+ ÐR.€Farmer,€J.óó,€joined.Ð -`(, ЇVicky€V.€Klein,€Madison,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Beverly€Anne€Jones.Ð ° ÐÌPhillip€Robinson,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Kevin€Thomas€Jones.Ð ˆØ ÐÓ‡ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÐ `° ÐÌòòóóÓ  Óà  àPlaintiff/Appellant€Beverly€Anne€Jones€(ð ðMotherðð)€and€Defendant/Appellee€Kevin€ThomasÐ 8 ˆ ÐJones€(ð ðFatherðð)€were€married€in€1970.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Two€sons€were€born€of€the€marriage,€Michael€ThomasÐ $ t ÐJones,€born€in€1971,€and€Timothy€Alan€Jones,€born€in€1975.€€Both€adult€sons€have€an€inheritedÐ  ` Ðmetabolic€disorder€with€mental€retardation€and€other€disorders.€€Both€are€severely€disabled€and€areÐ ü L  Ðunable€to€care€for€themselves.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àOn€January€17,€1995,€Mother€and€Father€filed€petitions€in€the€Seventh€Circuit€(Probate)€CourtÐ À  Ðfor€Davidson€County€(ð ðprobate€courtðð)€to€establish€conservatorships€for€their€adult€sons.€€The€casesÐ ¬ü  Ðwere€filed€under€the€probate€court€docket€numbers€95P„96€(Timothy)€and€95P„97€(Michael).€€In€theÐ ˜è  Ðpetitions,€the€parties€alleged€that€Michael€and€Timothy,€at€that€time€ages€twenty„three€and€nineteenÐ „Ô  Ðrespectively,€were€completely€unable€to€handle€their€own€affairs,€live€on€their€own,€or€earn€anÐ pÀ Ðincome.€€They€averred€that€the€only€income€available€to€each€son€was€a€social€security€payment€ofÐ \¬ Ð$303€per€month,€an€amount€not€sufficient€to€meet€their€financial€needs.€€Therefore,€the€partiesÐ H˜ Ðproposed€that€they€pay€the€sonsðð€excess€expenses€from€ð ðtheir€own€household€income,€since€they€areÐ 4„ Ðthe€parents€of€[Michael€and€Timothy].ðð€€In€light€of€those€facts,€the€parties€requested€that€they€beÐ  p Ðappointed€as€co„conservators€of€both€sons.€€On€February€17,€1995,€the€probate€court€appointed€theÐ  \ Ðparties€as€co„conservators.€€The€issue€of€support€was€not€addressed€in€the€order€because€the€partiesÐ øH Ðhad€agreed€to€provide€support.Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àOver€the€next€several€years,€the€parties€continued€as€co„conservators€of€Michael€and€Timothy,Ð ¼  Ðfiling€status€reports€on€January€22,€2001,€May€23,€2002,€and€April€1€2003.€€In€all€of€the€statusÐ ¨ø Ðreports,€the€parties€stated€that€the€social€security€payments€to€the€sons€did€not€cover€their€expenses,Ð ”ä Ðand€that€the€parties€had€paid€the€balance€of€their€sonsðð€expenses€from€their€own€resources.€Ð €Ð ЀÌà  àOn€June€27,€2001,€Mother€filed€a€petition€for€divorce€against€Father€in€the€Second€CircuitÐ X ¨ ÐCourt€for€Davidson€County€(ð ðdivorce€courtðð).€€In€her€complaint,€Mother€listed€Michael€and€TimothyÐ D!” Ðas€ð ðminor€childrenðð€of€the€marriage,€gave€their€birth€dates,€and€stated€that€ð ð[b]oth€children€areÐ 0"€  Ðmentally€retarded€and€the€parties€are€the€legal€guardians.ðð€€Mother€told€neither€her€attorney€nor€theÐ #l! Ðdivorce€court€about€the€conservatorships€established€by€the€probate€court€for€the€partiesðð€sons.Ð $X" ÐÌà  àOn€January€18,€2002,€Father€filed€a€motion€in€the€divorce€court€for€child€support€pending€theÐ à%0!$ Ðoutcome€of€the€divorce€proceedings.€€On€February€20,€2002,€the€divorce€court€ordered€Mother€to€payÐ Ì&"% ÐFather€$417€per€month€in€child€support€pending€the€outcome€of€the€case.Ð ¸'#& Ðâ  €€€€€€€€€€Ð ¤(ô#' Ðà  àOn€February€15,€2002,€Father€filed€an€answer€in€the€divorce€court€to€Motherððs€divorceÐ ° Ðâ âcomplaint€and€counterclaimed€for€divorce,€as€well.€€In€his€answer€and€counterclaim,€Father€statedÐ œì Ðthat€the€parties€were€the€parents€of€two€ð ðadult,€but€severely€disabled€children,ðð€who€would€never€beÐ ˆØ Ðself„sufficient€and€would€require€continued€financial€support€by€the€parties.€€Fatherððs€counterclaimÐ tÄ Ðnoted€that€the€parties€had,€by€agreement,€shared€custody€ð ðof€the€children€with€each€of€the€partiesÐ `° Ðhaving€both€children€for€a€one€week€period€of€time,€and€thereafter,€alternating€the€children€week€toÐ L œ Ðweek.ðð€€Like€Mother,€however,€Father€notified€neither€his€attorney€nor€the€divorce€court€about€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðconservatorships€established€by€the€probate€court.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àOn€June€3,€2002,€the€divorce€case€was€tried,€and€on€June€24,€2002,€the€divorce€court€enteredÐ ü L  Ða€final€decree€of€divorce.€€As€part€of€the€decree,€the€divorce€court€approved€a€Permanent€ParentingÐ è 8  ÐPlan€(ð ðthe€Parenting€Planðð)€that€had€previously€been€proposed€by€Father.€€The€Plan€stated€thatÐ Ô$  ÐMichael€and€Timothy€were€ð ðseverely€handicapped€and€will€require€continued€support€by€the€partiesÐ À  Ðafter€their€majority.ðð€€It€stated€that€the€parties€would€share€equally€the€rights€and€responsibilities€ofÐ ¬ü  Ðcaring€for€Michael€and€Timothy,€and€that€they€would€continue€their€arrangement€of€allowing€the€sonsÐ ˜è  Ðto€stay€together€with€each€parent€having€custody€of€both€every€other€week.€€The€Plan€designatedÐ „Ô  ÐMother€as€the€custodian€for€Timothy€and€Father€as€the€custodian€for€Michael€for€purposes€of€stateÐ pÀ Ðand€federal€statutes€that€require€such€designations.€€It€further€provided€that€Mother€would€pay€$783Ð \¬ Ðper€month€to€Father€in€child€support.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Mother€did€not€appeal€the€final€decree.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àOn€March€28,€2003,€Mother€filed€a€motion€in€the€divorce€court€to€set€aside€the€final€decreeÐ  p Ðof€divorce€pursuant€to€Rule€60.02(3)€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.׃Ü×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€€In€the€motion,Ð  \ ÐMother€alleged€that€the€decree€was€void€to€the€extent€that€it€adjudicated€matters€regarding€MichaelÐ øH Ðand€Timothy.€€She€argued€that,€because€Michael€and€Timothy€had€reached€the€age€of€majority€whenÐ ä4 Ðthe€matter€was€tried,€the€divorce€court€ð ðwas€without€subject€matter€jurisdiction€to€make€any€ordersÐ Ð  Ðregarding€said€children,€including,€but€not€limited€to,€those€pertaining€to€custody€and€child€support.ðð€Ð ¼  ÐBecause€it€was€void€òòab€initioóó,€Mother€argued,€the€divorce€courtððs€order€should€be€vacated€and€FatherÐ ¨ø Ðshould€be€required€to€return€to€her€the€$6,315€that€she€had€paid€in€child€support€to€date.€€Father€filedÐ ”ä Ðâ âhis€response€to€Motherððs€motion€on€June€2,€2003,€arguing€that€the€divorce€court€had€jurisdiction€toÐ €Ð Ðorder€support€for€a€severely€disabled€child€past€the€age€of€majority€pursuant€to€Tennessee€CodeÐ ° ÐAnnotated€ðð€36„5„101(p).€€That€statute€provides:Ð œì Ðâ âÌà8  àÔ#†XçXXXç=#Ôà ` à(p)(1)€Except€as€provided€in€subdivision€(p)(2),€the€court€may€continue€childÐ tÄ Ðsupport€beyond€a€childððs€minority€for€the€benefit€of€a€child€who€is€handicapped€orÐ `° Ðdisabled,€as€defined€by€the€Americans€with€Disabilities€Act,€until€such€child€reachesÐ L œ Ðtwenty-one€(21)€years€of€age.Ð8 ˆÐ Ð  Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(2)€Provided,€that€such€age€limitation€shall€not€apply€if€such€child€is€severelyÐ  ` Ðdisabled€and€living€under€the€care€and€supervision€of€a€parent€and€the€courtÐ ü L  Ðdetermines€that€it€is€in€the€childððs€best€interest€to€remain€under€such€care€andÐ è 8  Ðsupervision€and€the€obligor€is€financially€able€to€continue€to€pay€child€support.€InÐ Ô$  Ðsuch€cases,€the€court€may€require€the€obligor€to€continue€to€pay€child€support€for€suchÐ À  Ðperiod€as€it€deems€in€the€best€interest€of€the€child.Ьü Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` à(3)€In€so€doing,€the€court€may€use€the€child€support€guidelines.Ô‡XçXXXçÔÓR ÓÐ„Ô Ð Ð  ÐÓ¯1ÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(p)€(2001€&€Supp.€2003).€€It€is€undisputed€that€Michael€and€TimothyÐ \¬ Ðare€both€ð ðseverely€disabledðð€as€that€term€is€used€in€subsection€(p)(2).Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àOn€July€7,€2003,€the€divorce€court€issued€an€order€on€Motherððs€motion.€€The€divorce€courtÐ  p Ðagreed€with€Motherððs€contention€ð ðthat€it€in€fact€had€no€jurisdiction€over€the€persons€of€the€children,Ð  \ Ðas€to€parental€responsibility€and€residential€time€due€to€the€conservatorship€order.ðð€€Ô#†XçXXXç1#ÔÔ‡XçXXXçÔRather€thanÐ øH Ðgranting€or€denying€her€request€to€set€aside€the€divorce€decree,€the€divorce€court€transferred€the€caseÐ ä4 Ðto€the€probate€court€ð ðso€that€any€further€orders€may€be€consistent€with€the€conservatorship€in€thatÐ Ð  Ðcourt.ðð€€The€divorce€courtððs€order€provided€that€all€other€orders,€particularly€the€child€support€orders,Ð ¼  Ðwould€remain€in€effect€ð ð[u]ntil€the€Seventh€Circuit€[Probate]€Court€makes€any€further€orders.ðð€€Thus,Ð ¨ø Ðthe€divorce€case€was€transferred€to€the€probate€division€of€the€circuit€court€and€was€assigned€to€theÐ ”ä Ðsame€trial€judge€who€was€presiding€over€the€conservatorship€cases.€€The€divorce€case,€however,€wasÐ €Ð Ðnot€consolidated€with€the€conservatorship€cases.€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àAfter€the€divorce€case€was€transferred,€Father€filed€a€motion€in€the€conservatorship€cases€toÐ D!” Ðapprove€and€confirm€the€Parenting€Plan€entered€in€the€divorce€case€as€the€management€plan€forÐ 0"€  ÐMichael€and€Timothy.€€Mother€objected,€arguing€that€the€probate€court€had€no€authority€to€approveÐ #l! Ðor€confirm€a€void€order€entered€by€another€court.€€She€argued€further€that€the€probate€court€did€notÐ $X" Ðhave€jurisdiction€to€enter€a€ð ðparenting€planðð€for€Michael€and€Timothy,€because€such€parenting€plansÐ ô$D # Ðwere€applicable€only€to€minor€children.€€On€July€25,€2003,€the€probate€court€heard€arguments€onÐ à%0!$ ÐMotherððs€motion€in€the€divorce€action€to€set€aside€the€divorce€decree,€as€well€as€Fatherððs€motion€inÐ Ì&"% Ðthe€conservatorship€actions€to€approve€the€Parenting€Plan.€€The€matter€was€taken€under€advisement.€Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àOn€December€31,€2003,€the€probate€court€entered€identical€orders€in€the€divorce€case€and€inÐ )à$( Ðâ âthe€conservatorship€cases,€denying€Motherððs€motion€to€set€aside€the€final€divorce€decree€and€grantingÐ |*Ì%) ÐFatherððs€motion€to€approve€and€confirm€the€Parenting€Plan€entered€by€the€divorce€court.€€The€probateÐ ° Ðcourt€held:Ð œì Ðâ âÌà8  àThe€co„conservators/parents€of€the€children€and€their€respective€counsel€participatedÐ tÄ Ðin€the€formation€of€the€Parenting€Plan€and€they€voluntarily€agreed€to€the€Plan.€€TheÐ `° Ð[divorce€court]€judge€.€.€.€approved€the€Parenting€Plan€that€had€been€agreed€upon€byÐ L œ Ðthe€parties.€€This€Court€finds€nothing€irregular€in€the€Parenting€Plan€or€the€procedureÐ 8 ˆ Ðby€which€it€was€adopted€by€the€parties€or€the€trial€judge.€€Moreover,€this€Court€findsÐ $ t Ðnothing€in€the€Plan€that€is€adverse€to€the€rights€and€privileges€of€the€wards€of€theÐ  ` Ðconservatorships.€€Further,€this€Court€finds€no€basis€under€Rule€60,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,Ð ü L  Ðto€justify€relief€from€the€agreed€Parenting€Plan€or€the€order€approving€the€plan.Ðè 8 Ð Ð  ÐÌTherefore,€based€on€its€understanding€that€the€parties€had€voluntarily€agreed€to€the€Parenting€Plan,׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð À  Ðthe€probate€court€determined€that€there€was€no€basis€for€relief€under€Rule€60€from€the€divorce€courtððsÐ ¬ü  Ðdecree€and€confirmed€the€Parenting€Plan.€€From€that€order,€Mother€now€appeals.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àOn€appeal,€Mother€argues€that€the€probate€court€erred€in€refusing€to€set€aside€the€final€decreeÐ pÀ Ðof€divorce€insofar€as€it€addressed€issues€pertaining€to€Michael€and€Timothy,€particularly€theÐ \¬ Ðprovision€ordering€her€to€pay€child€support.€€Mother€maintains€that€the€divorce€court€lacked€subjectÐ H˜ Ðmatter€jurisdiction€to€adjudicate€matters€pertaining€to€the€partiesðð€adult€children.€€She€asserts€thatÐ 4„ Ðthere€was€no€agreement€between€the€parties€regarding€child€support,€and€argues€that€there€is€noÐ  p Ðstatutory€authority€for€ordering€her€to€pay€child€support€for€adult€children.€€Mother€contends€thatÐ  \ Ðsection€36„5„101(p)€did€not€give€the€divorce€court€authority€for€the€child€support€award€in€this€case.€Ð øH ÐShe€also€argues€that€Tennesseeððs€conservatorship€statutes€provide€no€statutory€authority€for€theÐ ä4 Ðprobate€court€to€enter€a€ð ðParenting€Planðð€as€a€management€plan€for€Michael€and€Timothy€in€theÐ Ð  Ðconservatorship€cases.€€Moreover,€Mother€argues,€there€is€no€need€for€such€a€Plan.€€On€the€contrary,Ð ¼  ÐMother€points€out,€the€status€reports€filed€by€the€parties€as€joint€conservators€indicate€that€the€partiesÐ ¨ø Ðwork€amicably€together€as€co„conservators.€€Therefore,€she€claims,€the€probate€courtððs€confirmationÐ ”ä Ðand€approval€of€the€divorce€courtððs€order€was€nothing€more€than€an€attempt€to€breathe€life€into€anÐ €Ð Ðotherwise€void€and€unnecessary€order.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThe€facts€in€this€case€are€not€disputed,€and€only€questions€of€law€are€involved.€€Therefore,Ð D!” Ðwe€review€the€issues€in€this€appeal€òòde€novoóó,€with€no€presumption€of€correctness.€€ò òòòNorthland€Ins.€Co.Ð 0"€  Ðv.€Stateó óóó,€33€S.W.3d€727,€729€(Tenn.€2000)€(stating€that€questions€of€subject€matter€jurisdiction€areÐ #l! Ðissues€of€law);€òòò òsee€Southwest€Williamson€County€Cmty.€Assððn€v.€Saltsmanó óóó,€66€S.W.3d€872,€876Ð $X" Ðâ â(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001)€(same).€€€€Ð ô$D # Ðà  àWe€first€address€Motherððs€argument€that€the€divorce€court€lacked€subject€matter€jurisdictionÐ ° Ðâ âto€order€her€to€pay€child€support€for€her€adult€disabled€children.€€Father€argues€that€section€36„5„Ð œì Ð101(p)€provides€such€authority.€€Issues€of€statutory€interpretation€are€questions€of€law,€which€weÐ ˆØ Ðreview€òòde€novoóó.€€ò òòòKilby€v.€Kilbyóóó ó,€No.€03A01„9712„CH„00549,€1999€WL€76065,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð tÄ ÐJan.€28,€1999).€€ð ðOur€role€in€construing€statutes€is€to€ascertain€and€give€effect€to€the€legislative€intentÐ `° Ðwithout€unduly€restricting€or€expanding€a€statuteððs€coverage€beyond€its€intended€scope.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€InÐ L œ Ðinterpreting€a€statute,€we€must€first€look€to€the€plain€and€ordinary€meaning€of€the€language€in€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðstatute€ð ðwithout€forced€or€subtle€construction€that€would€limit€or€extend€the€meaning€of€theÐ $ t Ðlanguage.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€If€the€meaning€of€the€statute€is€plain,€there€is€no€need€to€inquire€into€the€legislativeÐ  ` Ðintent,€because€the€legislature€will€be€presumed€to€intend€what€the€statute€says.€òòò òCarson€CreekÐ ü L  ÐVacation€Resorts,€Inc.€v.€Stateó óóó,€865€S.W.2d€1,€2€(Tenn.€1993).€€If,€however,€the€language€of€theÐ è 8  Ðstatute€is€ambiguous,€we€must€attempt€to€discern€the€legislatureððs€intent€from€the€statutory€schemeÐ Ô$  Ðas€a€whole,€as€well€as€the€legislative€history.€€ò òòòState€ex€rel.€Pope€v.€U.S.€Fire€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€145€S.W.3dÐ À  Ð529,€535€(Tenn.€2004).Ð ¬ü  Ѐ€Ð ˜è  Ðà  àApplying€this€familiar€standard,€we€look€first€to€the€language€of€the€statute€under€scrutiny.€Ð „Ô  ÐSection€(p),€quoted€in€full€above,€provides€that,€for€a€severely€disabled€child,€ð ðthe€court€mayòò€continueóóÐ pÀ Ðchild€support€beyond€a€childððs€minorityðð€so€long€as€continuing€that€support€is€in€the€best€interest€ofÐ \¬ Ðthe€child.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(p)(1),€(2)€(emphasis€added).€€In€this€case,€of€course,€thereÐ H˜ Ðwas€no€child€support€order€in€place€when€the€partiesðð€sons€reached€majority,€and€therefore€there€wasÐ 4„ Ðno€child€support€order€to€ð ðcontinue.ðð€€We€must€determine,€then,€whether€the€statute€authorizes€a€trialÐ  p Ðcourt€in€a€divorce€case€to€order€support€for€a€child€who€turned€eighteen€years€old€before€the€divorceÐ  \ Ðaction€was€filed.€Ð øH ÐÌà  àA€review€of€the€law€regarding€the€duty€to€support€adult€disabled€children€is€helpful€to€anÐ Ð  Ðunderstanding€of€the€partiesðð€arguments€on€appeal.€€In€England€and€in€early€American€common€law,Ð ¼  Ðthe€duty€of€a€parent€to€support€his€or€her€children,€regardless€of€age,€was€a€moral€obligation,€not€aÐ ¨ø Ðlegal€one.€€Thus,€in€many€jurisdictions,€there€was€no€legal€obligation€to€support€children€absent€aÐ ”ä Ðstatute€imposing€such€an€obligation.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€M.€C.€Dransfield,ò òòòó óóó€Annotation,€òòParentððs€Obligation€toÐ €Ð ÐSupport€Adult€Childóó,€1€A.L.R.2d€910,€ðð€2€(1948);€Comment,€òòThe€Parental€Duty€to€Support€DisabledÐ l¼ ÐAdult€Childrenóó,€9€DePaul€L.€Rev.€45€(1960).€€Over€time,€it€became€generally€accepted€in€mostÐ X ¨ Ðjurisdictions€that,€under€the€common€law,€a€parent€has€a€legal€obligation€to€support€his€minor€child,Ð D!” Ðbut€has€no€obligation€to€support€a€child€past€the€age€of€majority.€€ò òòòSee€ó óóóNoralyn€Harlow,€J.€D.,Ð 0"€  ÐAnnotation,òò€Postmajority€Disability€as€Reviving€Parental€Duty€to€Support€Childóó,€48€A.L.R.4th€919,Ð #l! Ðat€ðð€2€(1986);€Dransfield,€ò òòòsupraó óóó,òòóó€1€A.L.R.2d€910,€at€ðð€3.€€Many€jurisdictions,€however,€recognize€anÐ $X" Ðexception€to€this€general€rule,€either€by€common€law€or€by€statute,€and€require€a€parent€to€supportÐ ô$D # Ðhis€or€her€child€beyond€majority€if€the€child€is€mentally€or€physically€incapacitated€or€otherwiseÐ à%0!$ Ðunable€to€care€for€him€or€her€self.€€Harlow,€ò òòòsupraó óóó,€48€A.L.R.4th€919,€at€ðð€2;€Dransfield,€ò òòòsupraó óóó,€1Ð Ì&"% ÐA.L.R.2d€919,€at€ðð€5.€€This€exception€is€generally€based€on€the€theory€that€a€disabled€child€isÐ ° Ðprevented€from€being€emancipated€from€his€parents€and,€thus,€is€still€a€minor€in€the€eyes€of€the€law.€Ð œì ÐHarlow,€ò òòòsupraó óóó,€48€at€A.L.R.4thÔ#†XçXXXçM4#ÔÔ‡XçXXXçÔ€919,€at€ðð€2.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àIn€ò òòòSayne€v.€Sayneó óóó,€284€S.W.2d€309€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1955),€Tennessee€joined€the€majorityÐ `° Ðof€jurisdictions€in€recognizing€a€common€law€duty€of€parents€to€support€their€adult€disabled€child.€Ð L œ ÐIn€ò òòòSayneó óóó,€a€divorce€case,€the€partiesðð€twenty„seven€year„old€daughter€had€been€disabled€sinceÐ 8 ˆ Ðchildhood.€€The€trial€court€awarded€custody€of€the€daughter€to€the€mother€and€ordered€the€father€toÐ $ t Ðpay€child€support.€€The€father€appealed,€arguing€that€he€had€no€duty€to€support€his€daughter€becauseÐ  ` Ðshe€was€past€the€age€of€majority.€€ò òòòSee€Sayneó óóó,€284€S.W.2d€at€310.€€ò òó óThe€appellate€court€rejected€theÐ ü L  Ðfatherððs€position€and€held€that€the€trial€court€had€the€authority€to€order€the€father€to€pay€child€supportÐ è 8  Ðfor€his€adult€disabled€child.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€311„12.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àThe€ò òòòSayneó óóó€court€recognized€a€split€in€authority€on€the€subject€of€whether,€absent€a€statuteÐ ¬ü  Ðimposing€such€an€obligation,€a€parent€can€be€required€to€support€an€adult€disabled€child.€€It€noted€thatÐ ˜è  Ða€minority€of€jurisdictions€had€held€that,€ð ðin€the€absence€of€a€statute€imposing€liability,€the€parent,Ð „Ô  Ðeven€though€able€to€provide€support,€is€under€no€obligation€to€support€an€adult€child€unable€toÐ pÀ Ðsupport€and€care€for€itself.ðð€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€311.€€The€ò òòòSayneó óóó€court€observed,€however,€that€the€majority€ofÐ \¬ Ðjurisdictions€demonstrated€ð ða€growing€tendencyðð€to€require€such€support,€even€in€the€absence€of€aÐ H˜ Ðstatute,€calling€it€the€ð ðhumanitarian€rule.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€reasoning,€the€court€stated,€was€that€a€disabledÐ 4„ Ðchild€cannot€care€for€himself,€and€would€have€the€same€need€for€support,€care,€and€maintenance€bothÐ  p Ðbefore€and€after€he€becomes€an€adult.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€(citing€ò òòòWells€v.€Wellsó óóó,€44€S.E.2d€31,€34€(N.C.€1947)).€€TheÐ  \ Ðò òòòSayneó óóó€court€cited€with€approval€ò òòòCrain€v.€Malloneó óóó,€113€S.W.€67,€68€(Ky.€Ct.€App.€1908),€in€whichÐ øH Ðthe€court€opined,€ð ð[W]e€see€no€difference€in€the€principle€between€the€duty€imposed€upon€the€parentÐ ä4 Ðto€support€the€infant€and€the€obligation€to€care€for€the€adult,€who€is€equally,€if€not€more,€dependentÐ Ð  Ðupon€the€parent.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€312.€€The€ò òòòSayne€ó óóócourt€stated€that€the€child€support€statute€did€not€limit€theÐ ¼  Ðpower€of€the€court€to€award€child€support€only€to€minor€children.€€Thus,€the€court€adopted€theÐ ¨ø Ðð ðhumanitarian€ruleðð€and€held€that€a€parentððs€obligation€to€pay€child€support€may€extend€past€theÐ ”ä Ðchildððs€age€of€majority€when€the€child€is€disabled.€€ò òòòId.óóó óÐ €Ð ÐÌà  àUntil€1999,€the€holding€in€ò òòòSayneó óóó€was€cited€as€the€basis€for€the€proposition€that€TennesseeÐ X ¨ Ðrecognized€the€common€law€rule€that€parents€have€a€duty€to€continue€to€support€a€disabled€child€pastÐ D!” Ðthe€age€of€majority.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€ò òòòSeeó óóó,òòò ò€e.g.ó óóó,€ò òòòSandusky€v.€Sanduskyó óóó,€No.€M2000„00288„COA„R3„CV,€2001€WLÐ 0"€  Ð327898,€at€*4€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Apr.€5,€2001);€ò òòòHoward€v.€Howardó óóó,€991€S.W.2d€251,€256€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð #l! ÐApp.€1999);ò òòò€Smith€v.€Smithó óóó,€No.€03A01„9410„GS„00391,€1995€WL€140763,€at€*1€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð $X" ÐMar.€31,€1995);€ò òòòó óóó€ò òòòMingle€v.€Mingleó óóó,€No.€01„A01„9305„CH„00197,€1993€WL€377609,€at€*2€(Tenn.Ð ô$D # ÐCt.€App.€Sept.€24,€1993);€Ô#†XçXXXç^#ÔÔ‡XçXXXçÔòòò òBurks€v.€Burksó óóó,€No.€6,€1991€WL€12846,€at€*4€n.2€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Feb.Ð à%0!$ Ð8,€1991);òòò òóó€òòBarnhill€v.€Barnhillóóó ó,€826€S.W.2d€443,€451€n.4€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991);€ò òòòStevens€v.Ð Ì&"% ÐRaymondó óóó,€773€S.W.2d€935,€938€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989);€ò òòòHodge€v.€Hodgeó óóó,€No.€753,€1988€WL€55729,Ð ¼' #& Ðat€*1€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€June€2,€1988);€ò òòòsee€also€Sanders€v.€Sandersó óóó,€902€P.2d€310,€315€(Ala.€1995)Ð ° Ð(relying€on€ò òòòSayneó óóó€as€persuasive€authority€for€establishing€that€a€parent€has€a€continuing€duty€toÐ œì Ðsupport€adult€dependent€children);€Ô#†XçXXXçÏm#ÔÔ‡XçXXXçÔòòò òRiggs€v.€Riggsó óóó,€578€S.E.2d€3,€5€&€n.1€(S.C.€2003)€(identifyingÐ ˆØ Ðò òòòSayneó óóó€as€authority€for€the€proposition€that€Tennessee€recognizes€a€common€law€duty€of€parentalÐ tÄ Ðsupport€for€an€adult€disabled€child);€òòò òó óóó59€Am.€Jur.€2d€òòParent€and€Childóó€ðð€78€&€n.1€(citing€ò òòòSayneó óóó€forÐ `° Ðproposition€that€parentsðð€duty€to€support€child€remains€unchanged€after€majority€for€a€child€ð ðof€weakÐ L œ Ðbody€or€mind,€and€unable€to€care€for€himself€after€coming€of€ageðð).€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àIn€early€1999,€however,€a€trilogy€of€Court€of€Appeals€cases€were€decided€that€appeared€toÐ  ` Ðreverse€the€holding€in€ò òòòSayneóóó ó.€€ò òòò€See€Day€v.€Gatewoodó óóó,€No.€02A01„9805„CV„00141,€1999€WL€269928Ð ü L  Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Apr.€30,€1999);€ò òòòScott€v.€Scottó óóó,€No.€03A01„9708„CH„00305,€1999€WL€39506€(Tenn.Ð è 8  ÐCt.€App.€Jan.€29,€1999);€ò òòòKilby€v.€Kilbyó óóó,€No.€03A01„9712„CH„00549,€1999€WL€76065€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð Ô$  ÐApp.€Jan.€28,€1999).׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€the€parties€were€divorced€at€a€time€when€their€disabled€daughter€wasÐ À  Ða€minor.€€In€the€divorce€decree,€the€parties€were€awarded€joint€custody€of€the€child,€but€no€provisionÐ ¬ü  Ðwas€made€for€child€support.€€òòò òKilbyó óóó,€1999€WL€76065,€at€*1.€€Later,€just€after€the€daughter€turnedÐ ˜è  Ðeighteen€years€old,€the€mother€filed€a€petition€for€primary€physical€custody.€€The€father€objected,Ð „Ô  Ðarguing€that€the€divorce€court€no€longer€had€jurisdiction€over€custody€matters€because€the€daughterÐ pÀ Ðhad€become€an€adult.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€*2.€€The€trial€court€rejected€that€argument€and€awarded€primary€physicalÐ \¬ Ðcustody€to€the€mother.€€The€trial€court€further€ordered€the€father€to€pay€the€mother€child€support€andÐ H˜ Ðto€pay€for€hospitalization€insurance€for€the€child.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€*2.€€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àOn€appeal,€the€father€again€argued€that€the€divorce€court€had€no€jurisdiction€to€consider€theÐ  \ Ðmatter€of€custody€and€financial€support€for€an€adult€child.€€The€appellate€court€agreed,€reasoning€thatÐ øH ÐTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€36„6„101,€which€gives€a€trial€court€authority€to€award€custody€andÐ ä4 Ðchild€support€in€a€divorce€case,€applies€only€to€ð ðminor€children.ðð€€That€statute€reads€in€part:Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  à(a)(1)€In€a€suit€for€annulment,€divorce€or€separate€maintenance,€where€the€custody€ofÐ ¨ø Ða€minor€child€or€minor€children€is€a€question,€the€court€may,€notwithstanding€a€decreeÐ ”ä Ðfor€annulment,€divorce€or€separate€maintenance€is€denied,€award€the€care,€custodyÐ €Ð Ðand€control€of€such€child€or€children€to€either€of€the€parties€to€the€suit€or€to€bothÐ l¼ Ðparties€in€the€instance€of€joint€custody€or€shared€parenting,€or€to€some€suitableÐ X ¨ Ðperson,€as€the€welfare€and€interest€of€the€child€or€children€may€demand,€and€the€courtÐ D!” Ðmay€decree€that€suitable€support€be€made€by€the€natural€parents€or€those€who€standÐ 0"€  Ðin€the€place€of€the€natural€parents€by€adoption.€Such€decree€shall€remain€within€theÐ #l! Ðcontrol€of€the€court€and€be€subject€to€such€changes€or€modification€as€the€exigenciesÐ $X" Ðof€the€case€may€require.Ðô$D #Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà8¸ ` x` xàà8¸ ¸ àà8hÈÈàà8Àhphpà*€*€*ÐÌ&"%ÀÀ ÐÌà8  à(b)€Notwithstanding€any€provision€of€this€section€to€the€contrary,€the€party,€or€parties,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðor€other€person€awarded€custody€and€control€of€such€child€or€children€shall€beÐ )à$( Ðentitled€to€enforce€the€provisions€of€the€courtððs€decree€concerning€the€suitableÐ ° Ðsupport€of€such€child€or€children€in€the€appropriate€court€of€any€county€in€this€stateÐ œì Ðin€which€such€child€or€children€reside;€provided,€that€such€court€shall€have€divorceÐ ˆØ Ðjurisdiction,€if€service€of€process€is€effectuated€upon€the€obligor€within€this€state.€Ð tÄ ÐJurisdiction€to€modify€or€alter€such€decree€shall€remain€in€the€exclusive€control€of€theÐ `° Ðcourt€which€issued€such€decree.ÐL œÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36-6-101(a)(1)€&€(b)€(2001€&€Supp.€2004).€€The€ò òòòKilbyó óóó€court€determined€thatÐ $ t Ðð ðminorðð€means€ð ðany€person€who€has€not€attained€18€years€of€age.ðð€€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€1999€WL€76065,€at€*3.€Ð  ` ÐThe€court€acknowledged€the€ò òòòSayneó óóó€decision,€which€held€that€a€trial€court€could,€in€the€context€ofÐ ü L  Ðdivorce€proceedings,€order€a€parent€to€pay€support€for€an€adult€disabled€child.€€It€noted,€however,€thatÐ è 8  Ðsince€ò òòòSayneóóó ó€was€decided,ò òòòó óóó€legislation€had€been€enacted€specifically€addressing€mentally€ill€andÐ Ô$  Ðmentally€retarded€persons.€€ò òòòSee€óóó óTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€33„1„101€(2001).€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€*4„*5.€€Moreover,€theÐ À  Ðò òòòKilbyó óóó€court€observed€that€the€conservatorship€statutes,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€34„11„101,€òòetÐ ¬ü  Ðseq.óó,€and€ðð€34„13„101,€òòet€seq.óó,€were€enacted€in€1993.€€Those€statutes€defined€ð ðminorðð€as€ð ðany€personÐ ˜è  Ðwho€has€not€attained€eighteen€(18)€years€of€age€and€who€has€not€otherwise€been€emancipated,ðð€whileÐ „Ô  Ðð ðdisabled€personðð€was€defined€as€ð ðany€person€eighteen€(18)€years€of€age€or€older€determined€to€beÐ pÀ Ðin€need€of€partial€or€full€supervision,€protection,€and€assistanceðð€because€of€his€disability.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€*5.€Ð \¬ ÐIn€light€of€this€legislation,€the€ò òòòKilbyóóó ó€court€held,€it€was€ð ðclear€that€the€meaning€of€the€word€minor€inÐ H˜ Ðthe€Tennessee€Code€designates€a€person€under€the€age€of€18,ðð€and€that€section€36„6„101,€therefore,Ð 4„ Ðwas€not€a€basis€on€which€the€trial€court€had€jurisdiction€to€modify€custody.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€5.€€The€appellateÐ  p Ðcourt€observed€that€the€procedures€outlined€in€the€conservatorship€statutes€should€have€beenÐ  \ Ðfollowed,€and€commented€that€a€ð ðconservator€would€have€the€authority€to€seek€a€decree€requiringÐ øH Ðthe€parents€to€contributeðð€to€the€support€of€the€partiesðð€adult€disabled€child.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€*5„*6.Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àIn€ò òòòScottó óóó,€as€in€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€the€parties€were€divorced€when€their€disabled€daughter€was€a€minor.€Ð ¼  ÐIn€the€divorce€decree,€the€paternal€grandparents€were€awarded€custody€of€the€partiesðð€child.€€ò òòòScottó óóó,Ð ¨ø Ð1999€WL€39506,€at€*1.€€After€the€daughter€reached€the€age€of€majority,€the€mother€filed€a€petitionÐ ”ä Ðin€the€divorce€court€for€primary€custody€of€her€daughter.€€The€father€and€the€grandparents€objectedÐ €Ð Ðto€the€motherððs€petition.€€In€the€same€proceeding,€the€father€and€his€parents€filed€a€petition€toÐ l¼ Ðestablish€a€conservatorship€for€the€adult€disabled€child,€requesting€that€the€court€appoint€theÐ X ¨ Ðgrandparents€as€co„conservators.€€The€trial€court€dismissed€the€motherððs€petition€for€custody€andÐ D!” Ðgranted€the€conservatorship€petition.€€The€trial€court€stated€that€the€motherððs€petition€for€custodyÐ 0"€  Ðpursuant€to€the€divorce€statutes€was€ð ðthe€inappropriate€avenue€through€which€to€address€the€present,Ð #l! Ðspecial€needs€of€[the€daughter],ðð€and€that€ð ðthe€proper€proceeding€is€an€action€for€conservatorship.Ð $X" Ð.€.€.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court€in€ò òòòScottó óóó€concluded€that€the€daughterððs€best€interest€was€servedÐ ô$D # Ðby€appointing€the€grandparents€as€her€co„conservators.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€mother€appealed.Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àThe€appellate€court€in€ò òòòScottó óóó€determined,€as€in€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€that€the€term€ð ðminorðð€in€section€36„6„Ð ¸'#& Ð101€means€any€person€who€has€not€reached€age€eighteen.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€*2„*3.€€Because€section€36„6„101Ð ¤(ô#' Ðauthorized€the€trial€courtððs€jurisdiction€only€over€cases€involving€minor€children,€the€appellate€courtÐ )à$( Ðreasoned,€the€trial€court€properly€dismissed€the€motherððs€petition€for€custody€under€that€statute.€€ò òòòId.ó óóóÐ |*Ì%) Ðat€*4.€€The€mother€argued€that,€under€ò òòòSayneó óóó,€the€trial€court€retained€jurisdiction€over€mattersÐ h+¸&* Ðinvolving€adult€children€who€were€disabled,€even€absent€statutory€authority.€€The€appellate€courtÐ ° Ðrejected€that€argument€and€distinguished€ò òòòSayne,ó óóó€because€that€case€did€not€address€the€issue€ofÐ œì Ðcustody€of€the€adult€disabled€child.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€*3.€€The€appellate€court€in€ò òòòScottó óóó€held€that€the€trial€courtÐ ˆØ Ðhad€properly€adjudicated€the€conservatorship€petition,€stating€that€ð ðT.C.A.€34„11„121€conveysÐ tÄ Ðplenary€powers€to€the€court€in€conservatorship€actions,ðð€and€that€ò òòòó óóóð ðthe€state€has€the€constitutionalÐ `° Ðpower€to€act€for€incompetents€and€for€partial€incompetents€to€the€extent€of€the€partial€incompetency.ðð€Ð L œ Ðò òòòId.ó óóó€(footnote€omitted).€€Thus,€the€ò òòòScottó óóó€court€held€that€the€trial€court€properly€adjudicated€the€issueÐ 8 ˆ Ðof€the€adult€disabled€childððs€custody€pursuant€to€the€conservatorship€statutes€and€not€the€divorceÐ $ t Ðstatutes.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€*4.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àA€few€months€later,€the€Court€of€Appeals€decided€a€similar€issue€in€ò òòòDay€v.€Gatewoodó óóó,€No.Ð è 8  Ð02A01„9805„CV„00141,€1999€WL€269928€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Apr.€30,€1999).€€In€that€case,€the€partiesÐ Ô$  Ðdivorced€when€their€son,€who€was€not€disabled,€was€a€minor.€€The€mother€was€granted€custody€ofÐ À  Ðthe€child,€and€the€father€was€ordered€to€pay€child€support.€€ò òòòDayó óóó,€1999€WL€269928,€at€*1.€€A€fewÐ ¬ü  Ðmonths€after€the€sonððs€eighteenth€birthday,€but€one€month€before€he€had€graduated€from€high€school,Ð ˜è  Ðthe€son€was€involved€in€a€car€accident€that€left€him€disabled.€€The€mother€obtained€custody€of€theÐ „Ô  Ðpartiesðð€son.€€When€the€son€was€twenty„four€years€old,€the€mother€filed€a€petition€in€the€divorce€courtÐ pÀ Ðseeking€an€order€requiring€the€father€to€continue€to€pay€child€support€based€on€the€sonððs€severeÐ \¬ Ðdisability.€€A€consent€order€was€later€entered,€in€which€the€father€agreed€to€continue€to€pay€childÐ H˜ Ðsupport.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€When€the€son€was€twenty„eight€years€old,€the€father€filed€a€petition€to€terminate€hisÐ 4„ Ðchild€support€obligation,€asserting€that€the€son€was€no€longer€completely€disabled.€€The€petition€wasÐ  p Ðdenied.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àOn€appeal,€the€father€in€ò òòòDayó óóó€asserted€that€the€trial€court€did€not€have€subject€matterÐ ä4 Ðjurisdiction€to€entertain€the€motherððs€petition€for€continued€support€and€that,€consequently,€theÐ Ð  Ðconsent€order€requiring€him€to€pay€support€was€void€and€unenforceable.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€appellate€courtÐ ¼  Ðagreed.€€The€ò òòòDayó óóó€court€acknowledged€the€holding€in€ò òòòSayneó óóó,€but€noted€that€ò òòòSayneó óóó€had€been€premisedÐ ¨ø Ðon€the€fact€that€there€was,€at€that€time,€no€statutory€authority€expressly€or€implicitly€limiting€the€trialÐ ”ä Ðcourtððs€authority€to€award€support€for€adult€children.€€Relying€on€ò òòòKilbyó óóó€and€ò òòòScottó óóó,€the€ò òòòDayó óóó€courtÐ €Ð Ðconcluded€that€the€Tennessee€divorce€statutes€applied€only€to€ð ðminorðð€children€and,€therefore,€didÐ l¼ Ðnot€authorize€the€court€to€exercise€continuing€jurisdiction€pursuant€to€the€divorce€statutes€after€theÐ X ¨ Ðchild€had€turned€eighteen.€€Like€the€ò òòòKilbyó óóó€and€ò òòòScottó óóó€courts,€the€ò òòòDayó óóó€court€commented€thatÐ D!” Ðð ðTennesseeððs€conservatorship€statutes€provide€an€appropriate€avenue€for€addressing€the€needs€of€theÐ 0"€  Ðpartiesðð€adult€child.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€*5€(footnote€omitted).€€It€remarked€that,€if€a€conservator€were€appointedÐ #l! Ðfor€the€son,€then€ð ðthe€individual€appointed€as€his€conservator€may€then€request€an€order€requiringÐ $X" Ð[the€father]€and/or€[the€mother]€to€contribute€to€[the€sonððs]€support.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€Ð ô$D # ÐÌà  àEffective€May€26,€1999,€about€a€month€after€ò òòòDayó óóó€was€decided,€the€Tennessee€GeneralÐ Ì&"% ÐAssembly,€obviously€in€response€to€ò òòòDayó óóó,€amended€section€36„5„101(p)€to€include€subsection€(p)(2),Ð ¸'#& Ðquoted€above.€€Subsection€(p)(2)€ð ðrequires€(as€did€the€common€law)€continuing€support€of€a€severelyÐ ¤(ô#' Ðdisabled€child,€subject€to€findings€of€the€childððs€best€interest€and€the€obligor[ððs]€ability€to€pay.ðð€€òòò òStateÐ )à$( Ðex€rel.€Holtsinger€v.€Elrodó óóó,€No.€E2001„00257„COA„R3„CV,€2002€WL€62984,€at€*1€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð |*Ì%) ÐJan.€17,€2002).Ð h+¸&* Ðà  àIn€the€instant€case,€Father€acknowledges€that€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€ò òòòScott,ó óóó€and€ò òòòDayó óóó€reversed€the€holding€inÐ ° Ðò òòòSayne€óóó óby€concluding€that€a€trial€court€has€no€authority€under€the€divorce€statutes€to€award€childÐ œì Ðsupport€with€respect€to€a€child€beyond€the€age€of€majority.€€He€argues,€however,€that€by€enactingÐ ˆØ Ðsubsection€(p)(2),€the€Legislature€indicated€clearly€that€it€intended€to€reject€the€ò òòòKilby„Scott„Dayóóó ó€casesÐ tÄ Ðand€ð ðenshrineðð€ò òòòSayneó óóó€as€the€applicable€law.€€Furthermore,€he€claims,€the€phrase€ð ðcontinues€childÐ `° Ðsupportðð€in€subsection€(p)(1)€should€be€interpreted€to€apply€to€parties€who€have€been€providingÐ L œ Ðsupport€for€their€disabled€adult€child€continuously€before€and€after€the€child€reached€majority€andÐ 8 ˆ Ðwho€should€be€required€to€continue€to€pay€such€support,€even€if€the€support€was€not€paid€pursuantÐ $ t Ðto€a€court€order.€€To€hold€otherwise,€he€argues,€would€impose€an€irrational€distinction€betweenÐ  ` Ðseverely€disabled€children€whose€parents€divorce€before€they€turn€eighteen,€and€those€whose€parentsÐ ü L  Ðdivorce€after€they€turn€eighteen.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àMother€argues€that,€under€the€circumstances€of€this€case,€the€amendment€to€the€divorceÐ À  Ðstatutes€does€not€alter€the€application€ofòòò ò€Kilbyó óóó,€òòò ò€Scottó óóó,€and€òòò òDayó óóó.€€Mother€contends€that€the€additionÐ ¬ü  Ðof€subsection€(p)(2)€to€section€36„5„101€authorizes€a€trial€court€to€ð ðcontinueðð€a€child€support€orderÐ ˜è  Ðindefinitely€for€a€severely€disabled€child,€but€only€if€there€is€an€existing€support€order€to€ð ðcontinueððÐ „Ô  Ðthat€was€entered€when€the€child€was€a€minor.€€Mother€maintains€that€the€divorce€statutes€do€notÐ pÀ Ðauthorize€a€trial€court€to€order€support€for€an€adult€disabled€child€if€no€child€support€order€wasÐ \¬ Ðentered€during€the€childððs€minority.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àIn€support,€Mother€notes€that€the€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€ò òòòScottó óóó,€and€ò òòòDayó óóó€cases€were€cited€with€approval€in€aÐ  p Ðcase€with€facts€similar€to€those€in€the€instant€case€and€decided€after€the€effective€date€of€the€statute,Ð  \ Ðòòò òMora€v.€Moraó óóó,€No.€W1999„02483„COA„R3„CV,€2001€WL€609567€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€June€4,€2001).€Ð øH ÐIn€ò òòòMoraó óóó,€the€parties€had€an€adult€disabled€daughter.€€They€divorced€in€1991.€€In€post„divorceÐ ä4 Ðproceedings,€the€divorce€court€granted€the€motherððs€petition€for€custody€of€the€partiesðð€45„year„oldÐ Ð  Ðdisabled€daughter€and€ordered€the€father€to€pay€child€support.€€The€appellate€court€reversed,€citingÐ ¼  Ðtheò òòòó óóó€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€ò òòòScottó óóó,€and€ò òòòDayó óóó€cases€and€holding€that€the€trial€court€did€not€have€subject€matterÐ ¨ø Ðjurisdiction€to€appoint€a€guardian€or€to€order€the€father€to€pay€support€for€the€partiesðð€adult€disabledÐ ”ä Ðchild.€€ò òòòMoraó óóó,€2001€WL€609567,€at€*4„*6.€€It€observed€that€the€conservatorship€statutes€would€be€ð ðanÐ €Ð Ðappropriate€avenueðð€to€address€the€disabled€daughterððs€needs.€€Therefore,€Mother€relies€on€ò òòòMoraóóó ó€asÐ l¼ Ða€case€decided€after€the€amendment€to€section€36„5„101(p)€that€reaffirms€the€holding€in€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€ò òòòScottó óóó,Ð X ¨ Ðand€ò òòòDayó óóó.€Ð D!” ЀÌà  àò òòòMora€v.€Moraó óóó,€ò òòòsupraó óóó,€however,€did€not€address€the€issue€of€whether€the€enactment€of€sectionÐ #l! Ð36„5„101(p)(2)€conferred€jurisdiction€in€the€context€of€divorce€proceedings€for€a€court€to€pay€childÐ $X" Ðsupport€for€an€adult€disabled€child,€where€no€such€order€was€entered€while€the€disabled€child€wasÐ ô$D # Ða€minor.€€The€appellate€court€does€not€mention€the€statute,€and€it€appears€that€the€trial€courtððs€orderÐ à%0!$ Ðpredated€the€amendment.€€In€any€event,€the€issue€presented€here€was€not€addressed€in€ò òòòMoraó óóó.€€Indeed,Ð Ì&"% Ðwe€have€found€no€controlling€Tennessee€decision.€€Therefore,€it€appears€that€whether€section€36„5„Ð ¸'#& Ð101(p)(2)€provides€the€statutory€authority€necessary€for€a€divorce€court€to€enter€an€order€requiringÐ ¤(ô#' Ða€noncustodial€parent€to€pay€child€support€indefinitely€for€an€adult€disabled€child€,€where€there€wasÐ )à$( Ðno€child€support€order€entered€during€the€childððs€minority,€is€an€issue€of€first€impression€inÐ |*Ì%) ÐTennessee.€€Ô#†XçXXXç£p#ÔÔ‡XçXXXçÔÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àSection€36„5„101(p)€states€that€it€confers€jurisdiction€on€a€trial€court€to€ð ðòòcontinueóó€childÐ ° Ðsupportðð€for€a€severely€disabled€child€beyond€the€childððs€minority.€€This€language€indicates€that€theÐ œì Ðtrial€court€is€authorized€to€do€so€only€where€there€was€in€existence€a€child€support€order€that€wasÐ ˆØ Ðentered€when€the€child€was€a€minor,€or€as€a€modification€of€a€child€support€order€that€was€valid€whenÐ tÄ Ðit€was€entered.€€We€note€that€prior€to€the€addition€of€subsection€(p)(2),€section€(p)€included€the€sameÐ `° Ðlanguage€as€in€the€current€subsection€(a),€which€allowed€a€trial€court€to€ð ðcontinue€child€supportðð€forÐ L œ Ða€handicapped€or€disabled€child,€but€the€provision€limited€the€continuation€of€that€support€to€ð ðuntilÐ 8 ˆ Ðsuch€child€reaches€twenty„one€(21)€years€of€age.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(p).€€The€legislatureððsÐ $ t Ðaddition€of€subsection€(p)(2)€merely€eliminated€the€twenty„one„year„old€age€limitation€in€the€caseÐ  ` Ðof€a€child€that€is€severely€disabled€ð ðsubject€to€findings€of€the€childððs€best€interest€and€the€obligorððsÐ ü L  Ðability€to€pay.ðð€€òòò òHoltsingeró óóó,€2002€WL€62984,€at€*1.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àFather€argues€that€this€interpretation€leads€to€an€absurd€result,€because€it€creates€two€classesÐ À  Ðof€severely€disabled€children€ð!ð€those€whose€parents€divorce€before€they€turn€eighteen€and€childrenÐ ¬ü  Ðwhose€parents€divorce€after€they€turn€eighteen.€€He€contends€that€the€only€sensible€interpretation€ofÐ ˜è  Ðthe€amended€statute€is€that€the€trial€court€may€order€support€payments€for€an€adulò òó ót€disabled€childÐ „Ô  Ðwhere€the€parent€has€continuously€provided€support€prior€to€the€petition,€regardless€of€whether€theÐ pÀ Ðsupport€was€paid€pursuant€to€a€court€order.€€Father€maintains€that€this€would€be€an€orderÐ \¬ Ðð ðcontinuingðð€child€support€within€the€meaning€of€the€amended€statute.Ð H˜ ЀÔ#†XçXXXçOº#ÔÔ‡XçXXXçÔÐ 4„ Ðà  àFather€argues€that€the€legislative€history€of€Section€36„5„101(p)(2)€supports€his€position€thatÐ  p Ðthe€legislature€intended€to€reverse€by€statute€the€holdings€in€the€ò òòòKilby„Scott„Dayó óóó€line€of€cases.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€TheÐ  \ Ðlegislative€debates€over€the€1999€amendment€in€fact€reflect€that€the€main€goal€in€enacting€the€newÐ øH Ðprovision€was€to€eliminate€the€age€limitation€applicable€to€ð ðhandicapped€or€disabledðð€Ô#†XçXXXç'Ã#ÔÔ‡XçXXXçÔchildren€inÐ ä4 Ðsituations€in€which€the€child€is€severely€disabled€and€residing€with€a€parent.€€It€indicates€that€theÐ Ð  Ðword€ð ðcontinueðð€was€not€included€casually€in€the€amendment;€indeed,€its€inclusion€was€importantÐ ¼  Ðto€its€passage.€€Concern€was€expressed€that€the€statute€as€amended€might€be€overly€broad.€€In€theÐ ¨ø ÐMarch€23,€1999€House€of€Representatives€debate,€Representative€Carol€Chumney€asked€a€questionÐ ”ä Ðabout€whether€the€statute€would€apply€in€a€€hypothetical€situation€in€which€a€healthy€forty„year„oldÐ €Ð Ðchild€of€divorced€parentsÔ#†XçXXXç«Å#ÔÔ‡XçXXXçÔ€suddenly€became€disabled€and€it€was€necessary€for€the€adult€disabled€childÐ l¼ Ðto€live€with€one€of€the€parents.€€Representativeò òó ó€L.€Mike€Williams€stated€that€ð ðafter€age€21€there€isÐ X ¨ Ðno€custodial€parentðð€unless€that€parent€wants€to€òòcontinueóó€care.€€In€such€a€case,€the€RepresentativeÐ D!” Ðstated,€the€non„custodial€parent€should€be€obligated€to€help.€€Representative€Chumney€then€expressedÐ 0"€  Ðher€opinion€that€ð ðthe€word€ððcontinueðð€is€important€to€be€in€there.ðð€€In€the€Senate€debates,€the€newÐ #l! Ðprovision€was€described€as€merely€ð ða€housekeeping€clarification€billðð€eliminating€the€twenty„oneÐ $X" Ðyear€old€age€limitation€for€support€of€severely,€as€opposed€to€mildly,€disabled€children.€€Overall,€theÐ ô$D # Ðlegislative€debate€regarding€this€provision€does€not€reflect€an€intent€to€reinstate€the€holding€in€ò òòòSayneó óóóÐ à%0!$ Ðas€the€law€in€Tennessee.€Ð Ì&"% Ðâ â€Ð ¸'#& ÐÔ#†XçXXXç{È#ÔÔ‡XçXXXçÔà  àSince€there€are€no€controlling€Tennessee€decisions€and€the€legislative€intent€is€not€clearlyÐ ° Ðâ âindicated€in€the€legislative€history,€we€look€to€other€jurisdictions€for€persuasive€authority.€€A€similarÐ œì ÐTexas€statute€was€interpreted€in€ò òòòRed€v.€Redó óóó,€552€S.W.2d€90€(Tex.€1977).€€In€that€case,€the€partiesÐ ˆØ Ðwere€divorced€in€1963,€and€the€mother€was€awarded€custody€of€the€partiesðð€fourteen„year„oldÐ tÄ Ðdisabled€daughter.€€The€father€was€ordered€to€pay€child€support€until€the€daughter€reached€ageÐ `° Ðeighteen.€€The€father,€however,€voluntarily€continued€to€provide€support€for€the€daughter€until€sheÐ L œ Ðbecame€twenty„six€years€old€in€1975.€€ò òòòRedó óóó,€552€S.W.2d€at€91.€€In€May€1975,€after€the€father€stoppedÐ 8 ˆ Ðmaking€his€voluntary€payments,€the€mother€filed€a€petition€in€the€divorce€court€to€modify€the€1963Ð $ t Ðdivorce€decree€to€provide€that€the€father€had€a€continuing€duty€to€pay€support€for€the€disabledÐ  ` Ðdaughter.€€The€applicable€Texas€statute€provided€that€a€divorce€court€had€the€authority€to€order€thatÐ ü L  Ðchild€support€payments€for€a€disabled€child€ð ðbe€continued€after€the€18th€birthday€and€extended€forÐ è 8  Ðan€indefinite€period.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€92€(quoting€Tex.€Fam.€Code€ðð€14.05€(1974)).€€The€ò òòòRedó óóó€court€held€thatÐ Ô$  Ðthe€trial€court€was€only€authorized€to€require€child€support€payments€to€ð ðbe€continuedðð€past€majorityÐ À  Ðif€the€request€for€continuation€of€such€support€were€made€before€the€child€turned€eighteen.€€The€courtÐ ¬ü  Ðdetermined€that€the€original€divorce€decree€was€a€final€order,€that€the€fatherððs€duties€thereunder€hadÐ ˜è  Ðbeen€fully€performed€and€discharged,€and€that€ð ð[s]ubsequent€thereto€the€divorce€court€ceased€to€haveÐ „Ô  Ðjurisdiction€over€the€subject€matter.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó;€òòò òsee€also€In€re€Jacobsonó óóó,€842€A.2d€77,€79€(N.H.€2004)Ð pÀ Ð(holding€that€a€statute€allowing€a€court€to€extend€support€beyond€the€time€of€majority€presupposesÐ \¬ Ðthat€an€existing€child€support€order€was€entered€before€the€child€reached€the€age€of€majority).€Ð H˜ ÐTherefore,€in€ò òòòRedó óóó,€the€divorce€courtððs€jurisdiction€to€ð ðcontinueðð€the€original€child€support€orderÐ 4„ Ðended€when€the€original€child€support€obligation€expired€because€the€child€reached€majority.Ð  p ÐÌà  àIn€the€instant€case,€there€was€no€child€support€order€entered€while€Michael€and€Timothy€wereÐ øH Ðminors;€the€divorce€petition€was€not€filed€until€well€after€they€were€eighteen.€€Father€makes€a€cogentÐ ä4 Ðargument€that€it€does€not€make€sense€to€distinguish€between€adult€disabled€children€whose€parentsÐ Ð  Ðdivorce€before€the€child€turns€eighteen€and€those€whose€parents€divorce€afterward,€provided€the€childÐ ¼  Ðwas€disabled€and€receiving€financial€support€prior€to€reaching€majority.€€Nevertheless,ò òòòó óóó€the€languageÐ ¨ø Ðof€the€Texas€statute€in€ò òòòRedó óóó€and€the€language€of€the€Tennessee€statute€in€the€instant€case€is€similarÐ ”ä Ðò òòòóóó óin€that€both€statutes€permit€a€divorce€court€to€ð ðcontinueðð€support€payments€indefinitely€for€adultÐ €Ð Ðdisabled€children.€€Under€the€reasoning€in€ò òòòRedó óóó,€and€in€view€of€the€legislatureððs€emphasis€on€the€wordÐ l¼ Ðð ðcontinueðð€in€the€legislative€history,€we€must€conclude€that€the€word€ð ðcontinueðð€in€the€amendedÐ X ¨ Ðstatute€refers€to€the€continuation€of€a€valid€child€support€order.€€Neither€the€language€of€the€statuteÐ D!” Ðnor€the€legislative€history€supports€Fatherððs€argument€that€the€addition€of€subsection€(p)(2)€wasÐ 0"€  Ðmeant€to€reaffirm€or€ð ðenshrineðð€the€holding€in€ò òòòSayneó óóó€Ð #l! ÐÌà  àTherefore,€in€applying€section€36„5„101(p)(2),€we€must€conclude€that€a€trial€court€has€theÐ ô$D # Ðauthority€to€ð ðcontinue€child€supportðð€for€a€severely€disabled€child€only€where€an€order€awardingÐ à%0!$ Ðsupport€was€entered€when€the€child€was€a€minor,€or€as€a€modification€of€any€other€valid€child€supportÐ Ì&"% Ðorder.€€In€this€case,€where€the€partiesðð€disabled€sons€had€turned€eighteen€before€the€divorce€petitionÐ ¸'#& Ðwas€filed,€the€trial€court€was€without€jurisdiction€to€order€Father€to€pay€child€support.€€òòò òSee€Dayó óóó,€1999Ð ¤(ô#' ÐWL€269928,€at€*2€(ð ð[T]he€express€language€of€the€[applicable€divorce€statutes]€suggests€that€theÐ )à$( Ðdivorce€courtððs€authority€to€order€child€support€is€limited€to€cases€in€which€the€partiesðð€child€orÐ |*Ì%) Ðchildren€are€under€the€age€of€eighteen.ðð).€€For€these€reasons,€we€conclude€that€section€36„5„101(p)(2)Ð h+¸&* Ðdid€not€provide€authority€for€the€divorce€courtððs€award€of€child€support€for€Michael€and€Timothy€inÐ ° Ðthe€instant€case.Ð œì ÐÌà  àOf€course,€the€parties€can€agree€to€obligate€the€non„custodial€parent€to€provide€support€forÐ tÄ Ðsuch€a€disabled€adult€child€in€a€marital€dissolution€agreement€or€otherwise.€€ð ðThese€agreements€areÐ `° Ðenforceable€as€contractual€obligations€even€after€they€have€been€incorporated€into€a€divorce€decree.ðð€Ð L œ Ðò òòòSanduskyó óóó,€2001€WL€327898,€at€*4;€òòò òsee€Penland€v.€Penlandó óóó,€521€S.W.2d€222,€at€224„25€(Tenn.Ð 8 ˆ Ð1975)€(enforcing€provision€in€the€partiesðð€property€settlement€agreement€requiring€the€father€to€payÐ $ t Ðcollege€expenses€for€adult€children);€ò òòòIn€re€Lovelace€(Lovelace€v.€Lovelace)ó óóó,€No.€M2003„01274„Ð  ` ÐCOA„R3„CV,€2004€WL€1459409,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€June€28,€2004)€(in€a€conservatorship€case,Ð ü L  Ðenforcing€the€fatherððs€obligation€to€provide€child€support€for€his€adult€disabled€son,€where€the€fatherÐ è 8  Ðhad€agreed€to€provide€such€support€in€the€partiesðð€marital€dissolution€agreement).€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àIn€the€instant€case,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€parties€agreed€on€the€Parenting€Plan€in€theÐ ¬ü  Ðdivorce€case€and€apparently€determined€that€it€had€the€authority€to€order€Mother€to€pay€child€supportÐ ˜è  Ðon€that€basis.€€The€record€in€this€case,€however,€includes€no€indication€of€any€agreement€between€theÐ „Ô  Ðparties€regarding€Motherððs€obligation€to€provide€support.€€To€the€contrary,€it€appears€that€FatherÐ pÀ Ðproposed€the€Parenting€Plan,€and€the€divorce€court€adopted€it.€€Under€these€circumstances,€we€findÐ \¬ Ðthat€the€Probate€Court€erred€in€asserting€jurisdiction€over€the€child€support€issues€on€the€basis€of€anÐ H˜ Ðagreement€between€the€parties.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àIn€summary,€in€the€context€of€the€divorce€proceedings,€the€divorce€court€was€withoutÐ  \ Ðjurisdiction,€either€by€statute€or€by€agreement€of€the€parties,€to€enter€a€child€support€order€forÐ øH ÐMichael€and€Timothy.€€Consequently,€any€order€entered€by€the€divorce€court€regarding€the€care€andÐ ä4 Ðsupport€of€Michael€and€Timothy€was€ð ða€nullity€and€is€therefore€unenforceable.ðð€€ò òòòDayóóó ó,€1999€WLÐ Ð  Ð269928,€at€*1.€€We€must€now€consider€whether€the€Probate€Court€had€jurisdiction€to€approve€theÐ ¼  Ðprovisions€in€the€Parenting€Plan€in€the€context€of€the€conservatorship€proceedings.€Ð ¨ø Ѐ€€Ð ”ä Ðà  àMother€argues€that,€because€the€divorce€courtððs€order€was€null€and€void,€then€the€ProbateÐ €Ð ÐCourtððs€decision€to€approve€the€order€was€a€futile€attempt€to€breathe€life€into€a€void€order.€€SheÐ l¼ Ðclaims€that€there€is€no€authority€for€a€court€in€conservatorship€proceedings€to€adopt€a€divorceÐ X ¨ ÐParenting€Plan€as€a€management€plan€for€adult€wards.€€In€response,€Father€argues,€that€the€cases€onÐ D!” Ðwhich€Mother€relied€in€support€of€her€other€arguments€on€appeal€ð!ð€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€ò òòòScottó óóó,€ò òòòDayó óóó,€and€ò òòòMoraó óóó€ð!ðÐ 0"€  Ðall€indicate€that€the€conservatorship€statutes€are€the€appropriate€avenue€for€addressing€the€needs€ofÐ #l! Ðan€adult€disabled€child.€€He€notes€that€under€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðððð€34„1„121€and€34„3„101Ô#†XçXXXçëÌ#ÔÔ‡XçXXXçÔ,Ð $X" Ðcourts€are€given€broad€discretion€to€require€additional€actions€in€conservatorship€cases.€€FatherÐ ô$D # Ðmaintains€that€these€statutes€authorized€the€probate€court€to€enter€any€such€orders€that€would€beÐ à%0!$ Ðnecessary€for€the€support€of€Michael€and€Timothy€in€this€case.Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àFather€is€correct€in€his€assertion€that€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€ò òòòScottó óóó,€ò òòòDayó óóó,€and€ò òòòMora€ó óóóimply€that€the€probate€courtÐ ¤(ô#' Ðin€a€conservatorship€proceeding€has€the€authority€to€require€a€parent€to€pay€support€for€an€adultÐ )à$( Ðdisabled€child€if€such€support€is€needed.€€In€òòò òScottó óóó,€the€court€specifically€approved€of€the€trial€courtððsÐ |*Ì%) Ðaction€in€adjudicating€the€conservatorship€petition€to€establish€the€proper€custody€arrangement€forÐ h+¸&* Ðthe€adult€disabled€child.€€ò òòòScottó óóó,€1999€WL€39506,€at€*3.€€In€doing€so,€the€court€stated€that€ð ðT.C.A.€34„Ð ° Ð11„121€conveys€plenary€powers€to€the€court€in€conservatorship€actions.€€Moreover,€the€state€has€theÐ œì Ðconstitutional€power€to€act€for€incompetents€.€.€.€.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€Section€34„11„121,€which€is€now€codifiedÐ ˆØ Ðat€34„1„121,€provides:Ð tÄ ÐÌà8  àThe€court€has€broad€discretion€to€require€additional€actions€not€specified€in€theÐ L œ Ðprovisions€of€this€chapter,€and€chapters€2€and€3€of€this€title€as€the€court€deems€in€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðbest€interests€of€the€minor€or€disabled€person€and€the€minorððs€or€disabled€personððsÐ $ t Ðproperty.€€The€court€also€has€discretion€to€waive€requirements€specified€in€theÐ  ` Ðprovisions€of€this€chapter,€and€chapters€2€and€3€of€this€title€if€the€court€finds€it€is€inÐ ü L  Ðthe€best€interests€of€the€minor€or€disabled€person€to€waive€such€requirements,Ð è 8  Ðparticularly€in€those€instances€where€strict€compliance€would€be€too€costly€or€placeÐ Ô$  Ðan€undue€burden€on€the€fiduciary€or€the€minor€or€the€disabled€person.ÐÀ Ð Ð  Ѐ€Ð ¬ü  ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€34„1„121(a)€(2001)ò òòòó óóó.€€In€addition,€the€courts€in€ò òòòKilbyó óóó,€ò òòòDayóóó ó,€and€ò òòòMoraó óóó€indicated,Ð ˜è  Ðalbeit€in€dicta,€that€a€conservator€in€a€conservatorship€proceeding€ð ðwould€have€the€authority€to€seekÐ „Ô  Ða€decree€requiring€the€parents€to€contributeðð€to€the€support€of€the€adult€disabled€child.€€òòò òKilbyó óóó,€1999Ð pÀ ÐWL€76065,€at€*6;€ò òòòseeóóó ó€ò òòòMoraó óóó,€2001€WL€609567,€at€*5;€òòò òDayó óóó,€1999€WL€269928,€at€*5.ò òòòÐ \¬ ÐÌó óóóà  àNonetheless,€in€the€case€at€bar,€the€Probate€Court€did€not€simply€order€the€payment€of€supportÐ 0€ Ðfor€Michael€and€Timothy€pursuant€to€the€conservatorship€statutes.€€While€the€Probate€Court€statedÐ l Ðthat€it€considered€ð ðthe€rights€and€privileges€of€the€wards€of€the€conservatorships,ðð€it€approved€theÐ X Ðorder€entered€in€the€divorce€court€because€it€deemed€the€order€to€have€been€valid,€and€it€confirmedÐ ôD Ðthe€Parenting€Plan€set€forth€in€the€order€of€the€divorce€court.€€Since€the€order€of€the€divorce€court€wasÐ à0 Ðvoid€for€lack€of€subject€matter€jurisdiction,€the€order€of€the€probate€court€denying€Mother€Rule€60Ð Ì Ðrelief€from€the€order€must€be€reversed.€€In€the€context€of€the€conservatorship€proceedings,€however,Ð ¸ Ðthe€probate€court€clearly€had€jurisdiction€to€consider€the€substantive€issue,€namely,€the€financialÐ ¤ô Ðsupport€of€the€partiesðð€two€disabled€adult€sons.€€Therefore,€we€remand€the€cause€to€the€probate€courtÐ à Ðfor€consideration€of€the€issue€of€financial€support€for€Michael€and€Timothy.€€On€remand,€the€probateÐ |Ì Ðcourt€is€not€precluded€from€considering€the€Parenting€Plan€proposed€by€Father.€€However,€in€theÐ h¸ Ðconservatorship€proceeding,€the€trial€court€is€not€bound€by€the€child€support€guidelines€inÐ T ¤ Ðdetermining€the€amount€of€any€award€that€might€be€necessary.€€ò òòòSee€Mingle€v.€Mingleó óóó,€No.€01„A01„Ð @! Ð9305„CH„00197,€1993€WL€377609,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Sept.€24,€1993)€(concluding€that€theÐ ,"|  Ðguidelines€do€not€apply€to€cases€ð ðinvolving€a€parentððs€continuing€obligation€to€support€a€disabledÐ #h! Ðadult€childðð);€òòò òsee€also€Feinburg€v.€Diamantó óóó,€389€N.E.2d€998,€1002€(Mass.€1979)€(reversing€supportÐ $T" Ðorder€for€adult€disabled€child€entered€in€divorce€case,€but€giving€the€probate€court€the€opportunityÐ ð$@ # Ðto€determine€whether€the€order€was€reasonable€in€light€of€all€the€relevant€factors).Ð Ü%,!$ ÐÌà  àAccordingly,€we€reverse€the€probate€courtððs€decision€to€confirm€the€order€entered€in€theÐ ´'#& Ðdivorce€proceedings,€and€remand€for€reconsideration€of€the€issue€of€financial€support€for€TimothyÐ  (ð#' Ðand€Michael,€as€well€as€any€other€pertinent€issues,€in€the€discretion€of€the€probate€court.€€Ð Œ)Ü$( ÐÐ  x*È%) Ðà  àThe€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed€and€the€cause€is€remanded€for€further€proceedingsÐ ° Ðnot€inconsistent€with€this€Opinion.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€to€be€taxed€to€Appellee€Kevin€Thomas€Jones,Ð œì Ðfor€which€execution€may€issue,€if€necessary.€€€Ð ˆØ Ѐ€€€Ð tÄ ÐÌÌà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#à________________________________________€Ð8 ˆÀ(#À(# Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àHOLLY€M.€KIRBY,€JUDGEÔ#†XçXXXç‹ï#Ô