ÿWPC} @k-«¨ßw¾Pð ¿qײÏwÍÒ•8»Œ%oÔxàBBp3wjY:ïúÎC&P#j±Ç ôsà¯ÎxxL²SŸ6ÃßQ ƉX êÐdBê‰eãÎ$pP4ÐÀÑ}’ÕªiѬÒæþG ÊÛ¸ÔGõü–õ ñæú®œÑmoûÛ¨pŒÎDˆ2} gLÛ½dÒ,|­È…ð8/Á¬‡g>/ÅjÿoŠ¿3Ld×Ý%xg+è%hq»‚h`·Az ](¥8Š˜‹×%ZG¹ìr#Õ¬é»sÇ3Í@W€¨k¹^®¥’XñŒ§^AM4o– ä6rcÿ£5yú—ÈkÞÂ;‹ÆŠÊ ¶¥ÚÕ7+]kU[½zž¾¶ÉDR ¿OùQy×5BØ.Y:ÁªÆ×FRv ÛºOЧÚÄôÇö3.{»”jYçÝz€³æ¡ £HëøÉb·>ð:3 z­”¢2¡ÿ ô:N›&ˆŽ ó1Ì›‹~ƒIé‹á'7ú³ªû8OÍYÍ;Í¢f4çj%_­ßþÁÕ.}ÝÛ‘<„4 îÛ©å cÅCXª(³¤=Þ›W€‹G)ºsѸ$H‚ǃ`âÝȹ>šyÑWSr›aÑÄF ä" b %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ Ð #ÁØ Æ™ Æ_ Æ% Æë y±N* 0D,,Eppppppppppppppppppppppppbrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr 0ëzzzz Bee 0¤‚ D3& D-Y 0K†† ASÑÆ$ 0¤ê 0DŽ A«Ò»ƒr4+s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularÑB+E¥Ð_£œp£3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 oÝ ƒR¬Æ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§åò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Since€neither€the€previous€decision€of€the€Chancery€Court€nor€this€decision€of€the€Circuit€Court€were€appealed,Ð ° Ðwe€express€no€opinion€on€the€propriety€of€these€rulings.€€Plaintiff€is,€however,€bound€by€those€decisions.€€(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù-(|G2¬Æ$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ }»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§åò»»Ô d(|3¿l$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ }»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3¿l$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ }»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ }»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼ }»»»ÔÑ8€YQXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡î  }ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼ }»îî #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓAssigned€on€Briefs€August€17,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XYQX»¼ }ÔÌÌÌò òÔ#†¼ }»XXYQ#ÔJOE€T.€JONES€V.€MARY€ANN€MCMURRAY,€òòet€alóó.ó óÐ Ò " ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òÔ€XYQX»¼ }ÔAppeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Williamson€CountyÐ ø H Ðà@@øøìàNo.€II„99688€€€€€€Russ€Ô_ÔHeldmanÔ_Ô,€JudgeÐ ä 4  ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<§` AßÐ ¨ø  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2000„01959„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€September€20,€Ô_Ô2001Ô_ÔÐ £ó  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<z` AßÐ {Ë Ðó óÌÌÌÓ  ÓIn€this€malicious€prosecution€action,€Joe€T.€Jones€(ð ðPlaintiffðð)€appeals€the€Trial€Courtððs€grant€ofÐ Nž Ðsummary€judgment€to€the€defendants€after€concluding€there€was€no€genuine€issue€of€material€factÐ :Š Ðsupporting€Plaintiffððs€allegation€of€fraud€surrounding€entry€of€a€judgment€against€Plaintiff€in€theÐ &v Ðunderlying€lawsuit.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court.Ð b ÐÌÓâÓÌò òTenn€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€theÐ Ö& ÐCircuit€Court€Affirmed;€Case€Remanded.ó óÐ Â ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÌD.€Michael€Ô_ÔSwineyÔ_Ô,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHouston€M.€Ô_ÔGoddardÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,Ð †Ö Ðóóand€òòHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.,€óójoined.Ð r  ÐÌÌJoe€T.€Jones,€Franklin,€Tennessee,€òòpro€seóó€Appellant.Ð 6#†" ÐÌÌÔ_ÔMaclinÔ_Ô€P.€Davis,€Jr.,€and€Terrence€O.€Reed,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellees€Mary€AnnÐ ú%J!% ÐÔ_ÔMcMurrayÔ_Ô€and€R.E.€Lee€Davies.Ð æ&6"& ÐÌÐ  ¾($(ý ÐÔ_Ôà@66'ìàò òOPINIONˆÐ ° ÐÌà@ÛÛ%ìàòòBackgroundóóó óˆÐ ˆØ ÐÌà  àà ` àOn€December€13,€1999,€Plaintiff€sued€Mary€Ann€McMurray€(ð ðMcMurrayðð)€andÐ `° Ðattorney€R.E.€Lee€Davies€(ð ðDaviesðð)€for€malicious€prosecution.€€The€malicious€prosecution€claimÐ L œ Ðarises€out€of€a€previous€lawsuit€filed€by€McMurray€against€Plaintiff€in€the€General€Session€Court.€Ð 8 ˆ ÐDavies€represented€McMurray€in€this€underlying€lawsuit.€€Ð $ t ÐÌà  àà ` àIn€this€malicious€prosecution€lawsuit,€Plaintiff€claims€he€operated€Franklin€CarpetingÐ ü L  ÐCompany€(ð ðCompanyðð)€for€twenty€years,€but€he€ð ðgaveðð€the€Company€to€his€wife€in€1984€when€heÐ è 8  Ðretired.€€In€1989,€Plaintiffððs€wife€sold€the€Company€to€their€son,€Gary€Jones.€€Plaintiff€asserts€he€hasÐ Ô$  Ðhad€nothing€to€do€with€the€Company€and€has€not€shared€in€its€profits€for€more€than€ten€years.€Ð À  ÐPlaintiff€further€alleges€that€he€was€sued€in€the€General€Sessions€Court€for€$5,400.00€by€McMurray,Ð ¬ü  Ða€dissatisfied€customer€of€the€Company,€resulting€from€a€sale€that€occurred€well€after€the€CompanyÐ ˜è  Ðwas€sold€to€Plaintiffððs€son.€€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àà ` àInstead€of€taking€any€worthwhile€action€to€defend€against€the€original€claim,€PlaintiffÐ \¬ Ðsimply€wrote€on€the€civil€warrant€ð ðI€am€not€the€ownerðð€and€mailed€it€back€to€Davies.€€Plaintiff€didÐ H˜ Ðnot€attend€the€hearing€in€the€General€Sessions€Court.€€Since€Plaintiff€was€not€present€at€the€hearing,Ð 4„ Ðon€April€19,€1999,€a€default€judgment€was€entered€against€him€for€$5,400.00.€€Because€Plaintiff€tookÐ  p Ðno€action€other€than€to€mail€the€civil€warrant€back€to€Davies€prior€to€the€hearing,€he€did€not€knowÐ  \ Ða€judgment€had€been€entered€against€him,€at€least€not€until€a€deputy€sheriff€showed€up€at€his€homeÐ øH Ðand€ð ðlevied€an€execution€on€Plaintiffððs€1990€Lincoln€automobileðð€in€May€of€1999.€€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àà ` àPlaintiff€then€hired€an€attorney€and€filed€a€separate€lawsuit€in€Chancery€Court€seekingÐ ¼  Ðto€have€the€General€Sessions€Court€judgment€set€aside.€€On€August€9,€1999,€the€Chancery€CourtÐ ¨ø Ðdismissed€this€lawsuit,€stating:€ð ðWhen€collaterally€attacked,€the€judgment€of€a€court€of€generalÐ ”ä Ðjurisdiction€enjoys€a€presumption€of€validity€unless€the€record€affirmatively€shows€a€lack€of€personalÐ €Ð Ðjurisdiction.ðð€€€No€appeal€was€taken€from€the€dismissal€of€the€Chancery€Court€lawsuit.€€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àà ` àOn€September€7,€1999,€Plaintiff€filed€a€motion€for€relief€from€the€judgment€in€theÐ D!” ÐGeneral€Sessions€Court.€€The€General€Sessions€Court€denied€this€motion,€concluding€that€itsÐ 0"€  Ðprevious€judgment€had€become€final€after€10€days,€and€that€Rule€60€of€the€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,€whichÐ #l! Ðprovides€a€mechanism€for€obtaining€relief€from€a€judgment,€was€not€applicable€in€a€general€sessionsÐ $X" Ðcourt.€€Accordingly,€the€General€Sessions€Court€concluded€there€was€no€basis,€statutory€or€otherwise,Ð ô$D # Ðto€grant€Plaintiff€the€requested€relief.€€Plaintiff€appealed€this€ruling€to€the€Circuit€Court.€€OnÐ à%0!$ Ðâ âNovember€30,€1999,€the€Circuit€Court,€applying€the€same€rationale€as€the€General€Sessions€Court,Ð Ì&"% Ðconcluded€that€the€sessions€court€judgment€was€final€and€dismissed€the€appeal.€€Plaintiff€did€notÐ ° Ðappeal€to€this€Court€the€Circuit€Courtððs€dismissal€of€the€motion€for€relief€from€the€judgment.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  àà ` àIn€the€malicious€prosecution€action€now€before€this€Court,€Plaintiff€claims€thatÐ tÄ ÐMcMurray€and€Davies€did€not€conduct€a€proper€investigation€to€determine€exactly€who€was€theÐ `° Ðowner€of€the€Company€and,€therefore,€brought€the€original€lawsuit€against€him€without€probableÐ L œ Ðcause€and€with€malice.€€Jones€later€amended€his€complaint€to€allege€fraud€on€the€part€of€McMurrayÐ 8 ˆ Ðand€Davies,€claiming€they€knew€he€was€not€the€owner€of€the€Company.€Ð $ t ÐÌà  àà ` àMcMurray€and€Davies€filed€a€motion€for€judgment€on€the€pleadings€without€anyÐ ü L  Ðdiscovery€taking€place.€€The€Trial€Court€concluded€that€since€Jonesðð€allegations€must€be€deemed€toÐ è 8  Ðbe€true€when€ruling€on€a€motion€for€judgment€on€the€pleadings,€the€motion€had€to€be€denied.€€TheÐ Ô$  ÐTrial€Courtððs€basis€for€this€ruling€was€essentially€Jonesðð€claim€that€McMurray€ð ðknewðð€Jones€was€notÐ À  Ðthe€proper€owner€of€the€Company€when€suit€was€filed€and€that€Davies€was€also€aware€of€this€fact.€Ð ¬ü  ЀÌà  àà ` àAfter€discovery,€McMurray€and€Davies€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgmentÐ „Ô  Ðpursuant€to€Rule€56€of€the€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€€McMurray€and€Davies€relied,€in€large€part,€upon€answersÐ pÀ Ðto€interrogatories€and€responses€to€requests€for€admissions€which€were€not€before€the€Trial€CourtÐ \¬ Ðwhen€it€denied€their€motion€for€judgment€on€the€pleadings.€€McMurray€and€Davies€essentially€arguedÐ H˜ Ðthere€was€no€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€as€to€whether€there€was€any€fraud.€€Plaintiff€respondedÐ 4„ Ðby€asserting€there€was€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€as€to€whether€McMurray€knew€Plaintiff€wasÐ  p Ðno€longer€involved€in€the€Company€and€whether€Davies€was€made€aware€of€facts€sufficient€to€requireÐ  \ Ðhim€to€cease€pursuing€the€action.€€The€Trial€Court€granted€McMurrayððs€and€Daviesðð€motion€forÐ øH Ðsummary€judgment,€concluding€there€was€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€material€fact€and€no€evidenceÐ ä4 Ðof€ð ðextrinsic€fraudðð.€€Plaintiffððs€motion€to€alter€or€amend€the€judgment€was€denied€by€the€Trial€Court.€Ð Ð  ÐThis€appeal€followed.€€Ð ¼  ÐÌà@))%ìàò òòòDiscussionóóó óˆÐ ”ä ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€standard€for€review€of€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€is€set€forth€in€òòStaples€v.Ð l¼ ÐCBL€&€Associates,€Inc.óó,€15€S.W.3d€83€(Tenn.€2000):Ð X ¨ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€standards€governing€an€appellate€courtððs€review€of€aÐ 0"€  Ðmotion€for€summary€judgment€are€well€settled.€€Since€our€inquiryÐ #l! Ðinvolves€purely€a€question€of€law,€no€presumption€of€correctnessÐ $X" Ðattaches€to€the€lower€courtððs€judgment,€and€our€task€is€confined€toÐ ô$D # Ðreviewing€the€record€to€determine€whether€the€requirements€of€Tenn.Ð à%0!$ ÐR.€Civ.€P.€56€have€been€met.€€òòSee€Hunter€v.€Brownóó,€955€S.W.2d€49,Ð Ì&"% Ð50„51€(Tenn.€1997);€òòCowden€v.€Sovran€Bank/Central€Southóó,€816Ð ¸'#& ÐS.W.2d€741,€744€(Tenn.€1991).€€Tennessee€Rule€of€Civil€ProcedureÐ ¤(ô#' Ð56.04€provides€that€summary€judgment€is€appropriate€where:€(1)€thereÐ ° Ðis€no€genuine€issue€with€regard€to€the€material€facts€relevant€to€theÐ œì Ðclaim€or€defense€contained€in€the€motion,€òòsee€Byrd€v.€Hallóó,€847Ð ˆØ ÐS.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993);€and€(2)€the€moving€party€is€entitledÐ tÄ Ðto€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law€on€the€undisputed€facts.€€òòSeeÐ `° ÐAnderson€v.€Standard€Register€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2d€555,€559€(Tenn.Ð L œ Ð1993).€€The€moving€party€has€the€burden€of€proving€that€its€motionÐ 8 ˆ Ðsatisfies€these€requirements.€€òòSee€Downen€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.óó,€811Ð $ t ÐS.W.2d€523,€524€(Tenn.€1991).€€When€the€party€seeking€summaryÐ  ` Ðjudgment€makes€a€properly€supported€motion,€the€burden€shifts€to€theÐ ü L  Ðnonmoving€party€to€set€forth€specific€facts€establishing€the€existenceÐ è 8  Ðof€disputed,€material€facts€which€must€be€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact.€Ð Ô$  ÐòòSee€Byrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€215.ÐÀ ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àTo€properly€support€its€motion,€the€moving€party€must€eitherÐ ˜è  Ðaffirmatively€negate€an€essential€element€of€the€non„moving€partyððsÐ „Ô  Ðclaim€or€conclusively€establish€an€affirmative€defense.€€òòSee€McCarleyÐ pÀ Ðv.€West€Quality€Food€Serv.óó,€960€S.W.2d€585,€588€(Tenn.€1998);Ð \¬ ÐòòRobinson€v.€Omeróó,€952€S.W.2d€423,€426€(Tenn.€1997).€€If€the€movingÐ H˜ Ðparty€fails€to€negate€a€claimed€basis€for€the€suit,€the€non„movingÐ 4„ Ðpartyððs€burden€to€produce€evidence€establishing€the€existence€of€aÐ  p Ðgenuine€issue€for€trial€is€not€triggered€and€the€motion€for€summaryÐ  \ Ðjudgment€must€fail.€€òòSee€McCarley€v.€West€Quality€Food€Serv.óó,€960Ð øH ÐS.W.2d€at€588;€òòRobinson€v.€Omeróó,€952€S.W.2d€at€426.€€If€the€movingÐ ä4 Ðparty€successfully€negates€a€claimed€basis€for€the€action,€the€non„Ð Ð  Ðmoving€party€may€not€simply€rest€upon€the€pleadings,€but€must€offerÐ ¼  Ðproof€to€establish€the€existence€of€the€essential€elements€of€the€claim.Шø` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àThe€standards€governing€the€assessment€of€evidence€in€theÐ €Ð Ðsummary€judgment€context€are€also€well€established.€€Courts€mustÐ l¼ Ðview€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€partyÐ X ¨ Ðand€must€also€draw€all€reasonable€inferences€in€the€nonmovingÐ D!” Ðpartyððs€favor.€€òòSee€Robinson€v.€Omeróó,€952€S.W.2d€at€426;€òòByrd€v.Ð 0"€  ÐHallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210„11.€€Courts€should€grant€a€summaryÐ #l! Ðjudgment€only€when€both€the€facts€and€the€inferences€to€be€drawnÐ $X" Ðfrom€the€facts€permit€a€reasonable€person€to€reach€only€oneÐ ô$D # Ðconclusion.€€òòSee€McCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€150,€153€(Tenn.Ð à%0!$ Ð1995);€òòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).ÐÌ&"%` x` x ÐÌòòStaplesóó,€15€S.W.3d€at€88„89.€A€fact€is€ð ðmaterialðð€for€summary€judgment€purposes,€if€it€ð ðmust€beÐ ¤(ô#' Ðdecided€in€order€to€resolve€the€substantive€claim€or€defense€at€which€the€motion€is€directed.ðð€€òòLutherÐ )à$( Ðv.€Comptonóó,€5€S.W.3d€635,€639€(Tenn.€1999)(quoting€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€211).Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àà ` àThe€best€we€can€surmise€from€Plaintiffððs€òòpro€se€óóBrief,€Plaintiff€appears€to€argue,€atÐ ° Ðmost,€only€that€summary€judgment€was€inappropriate€because€there€is€a€material€factual€dispute€onÐ œì Ðthe€issue€of€fraud.€€In€òòChristian€v.€Lapidusóó,€833€S.W.2d€71€(Tenn.€1992),€our€Supreme€Court€heldÐ ˆØ Ðthat€in€order€to€state€a€claim€for€malicious€prosecution,€a€plaintiff€must€show€that:€(1)€a€prior€suit€orÐ tÄ Ðjudicial€proceeding€was€brought€against€plaintiff€without€probable€cause;€(2)€defendant€brought€suchÐ `° Ðprior€action€with€malice;€and€(3)€the€prior€action€was€finally€terminated€in€favor€of€plaintiff.€€òòIdóó.€atÐ L œ Ð73.€€òòChristianóó€went€on€to€state€that€the€ð ðfavorableðð€component€in€the€third€element€is€necessaryÐ 8 ˆ Ðð ðbecause€a€judgment€in€favor€of€the€original€plaintiff€is€conclusive€of€probable€cause,€òòunlessÐ $ t Ðprocured€by€fraudóó.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€74€(emphasis€added).€€In€the€present€case,€it€is€undisputed€that€PlaintiffÐ  ` Ðdid€not€receive€a€favorable€outcome€in€the€underlying€action.€€Accordingly,€his€only€way€to€attackÐ ü L  Ðthat€unfavorable€outcome€is€to€prove€it€was€procured€by€fraud.€€Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àà ` àIt€is€important€to€note€that€Plaintiffððs€malicious€prosecution€lawsuit€is€nothing€shortÐ À  Ðof€an€independent€action€collaterally€attacking€the€judgment€previously€entered€against€Plaintiff.€€InÐ ¬ü  Ðrelevant€part,€Rule€60.02(2)€of€the€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€provides€that€a€party€may€be€relieved€from€a€finalÐ ˜è  Ðjudgment€for€fraud€(whether€intrinsic€or€extrinsic)€if€the€motion€is€made€within€a€reasonable€time€andÐ „Ô  Ðwithin€one€year€after€the€judgment€was€entered.€€Rule€60.02€also€has€a€savings€clause€which€providesÐ pÀ Ðthat:€ð ðThis€rule€does€not€limit€the€power€of€a€court€to€entertain€an€independent€action€to€relieve€aÐ \¬ Ðparty€from€a€judgment€ð8ð€or€to€set€aside€a€judgment€for€fraud€upon€the€court.ðð€€While€the€first€partÐ H˜ Ðof€Rule€60.02€discussed€above€expressly€applies€to€intrinsic€or€extrinsic€fraud,€the€savings€clause€hasÐ 4„ Ðbeen€held€to€apply€only€to€extrinsic€fraud.€€òòSee€Brown€v.€Rainesóó,€611€S.W.2d€594,€597€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð  p ÐApp.€1980).€€òòSee€also€Whitaker€v.€Whirlpool€Corp.óó,€32€S.W.3d€222,€230€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000)(ð ðTheÐ  \ Ðdistinction€between€intrinsic€and€extrinsic€fraud€existed€at€common€law€ð8ð€and€is€maintained€today,Ð øH Ðboth€under€the€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€and€in€case€law.ðð).€€Furthermore,€the€savings€clause€foundÐ ä4 Ðin€Rule€60.02€has€been€interpreted€as€ð ðretaining€the€independent€action€in€equity€to€impeach€or€setÐ Ð  Ðaside€a€judgment€for€fraud€ð8ð.ðð€€òòBrownóó,€611€S.W.2d€at€597€(citing€òòJerkins€v.€McKinneyóó,€533€S.W.2dÐ ¼  Ð275,€281€(Tenn.€1976)).€Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àà ` àWe€are€not€dealing€with€the€denial€of€a€Rule€60.02€motion€on€this€appeal,€and€expressÐ €Ð Ðno€opinion€on€whether€a€Rule€60.02€motion€would€have€been€the€appropriate€manner€for€PlaintiffÐ l¼ Ðto€proceed.€€We€discuss€Rule€60.02€because€that€Rule€addresses€collateral€attacks€on€judgmentsÐ X ¨ Ðallegedly€obtained€by€fraud,€which,€as€stated€above,€is€what€the€present€case€actually€involves€sinceÐ D!” ÐPlaintiff€first€must€get€around€the€fact€that€the€underlying€€judgment€was€not€ð ðfinally€terminated€inÐ 0"€  Ðfavor€of€plaintiff.ðð€€òòChristian€v.€Lapidusóó,€833€S.W.2d€at€73.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àà ` àBecause€this€case€involves€a€collateral€attack€on€a€judgment,€we€believe€the€outcomeÐ ô$D # Ðof€this€appeal€is€resolved€by€our€Supreme€Courtððs€opinion€in€òòJerkins€v.€McKinneyóó,€533€S.W.2d€275Ð à%0!$ Ð(Tenn.€1976).€€In€òòJerkinsóó,€the€Court€discussed€collateral€attacks€on€judgments€and€adopted€theÐ Ì&"% Ðfollowing€reasoning€by€the€United€States€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€Tenth€Circuit€inòò€WinfieldÐ ¸'#& ÐAssociates,€Inc.€v.€Stonecipheróó,€429€F.2d€1087€(10th€Cir.€1970):Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àGenerally,€such€an€independent€action€must€show€a€recognizedÐ |*Ì%) Ðground,€such€as€fraud,€accident,€mistake€or€the€like,€for€equitableÐ h+¸&* Ðrelief€and€that€there€is€no€other€available€or€adequate€remedy.€€It€must€Ð ° Ðalso€appear€that€the€situation€in€which€the€party€seeking€relief€findsÐ œì Ðhimself€is€not€due€to€his€own€fault,€neglect€or€carelessness.€€In€thisÐ ˆØ Ðtype€of€action,€it€is€fundamental€that€equity€will€not€grant€relief€if€theÐ tÄ Ðcomplaining€party€'has,€or€by€exercising€proper€diligence€would€haveÐ `° Ðhad,€an€adequate€remedy€at€law,€or€by€proceedings€in€the€originalÐ L œ Ðaction€*€*€*€to€open,€vacate,€modify€or€otherwise€obtain€relief€against,Ð 8 ˆ Ðthe€judgment.'€€The€granting€of€relief€in€this€unusual€type€ofÐ $ t Ðproceeding€lies€largely€within€the€discretion€of€the€trial€judge.€€429Ð  ` ÐF.2d€at€1090.Ðü L ` x` x ÐÌòòJerkinsóó,€533€S.W.2d€at€281,€282.€€Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àà ` àIn€the€present€case,€Plaintiff€simply€wrote€on€the€General€Sessions€Court€civil€warrantÐ ¬ü  Ðð ðI€am€not€the€ownerðð€and€mailed€it€back€to€Davies.€€He€did€not€appear€at€the€trial€and€took€no€otherÐ ˜è  Ðsteps€to€protect€his€interests€or€otherwise€defend€against€the€lawsuit.€€This€was€the€only€action€takenÐ „Ô  Ðby€Plaintiff,€notwithstanding€the€fact€that€the€warrant€commanded€him€ð ðto€appearðð€at€the€hearing€toÐ pÀ Ðð ðthen€and€there€to€answer€in€a€civil€action€.€.€.€.ðð€€If€Plaintiff€was€not€the€proper€party€defendant€toÐ \¬ Ðthat€lawsuit€as€he€claims,€then€this€issue€could€have€been€litigated€in€the€General€Sessions€Court€and,Ð H˜ Ðif€Plaintiff€was€dissatisfied€with€the€result,€it€could€have€been€appealed€to€Circuit€Court.€€None€ofÐ 4„ Ðthis€happened€because€Plaintiff€chose€not€to€show€up€or€ascertain€what€happened€at€the€hearing.€€TheÐ  p Ðð ðfault,€neglect€or€carelessnessðð€of€Plaintiff€is€the€sole€cause€for€the€precarious€situation€in€which€heÐ  \ Ðfinds€himself.€€For€these€reasons,€he€cannot€collaterally€attack€on€the€basis€of€fraud€the€originalÐ øH Ðjudgment€entered€against€him€in€the€General€Sessions€Court.€€Since€the€General€Sessions€judgmentÐ ä4 Ðmust,€therefore,€stand,€it€necessarily€follows€that€Plaintiff€has€not€and€cannot€satisfy€a€necessaryÐ Ð  Ðelement€to€establish€a€claim€for€malicious€prosecution€because€the€prior€action€was€not€finallyÐ ¼  Ðterminated€in€his€favor.€€Defendants€negated€this€essential€element€of€Plaintiffððs€claim.€€Accordingly,Ð ¨ø Ðthe€Trial€Court€properly€granted€summary€judgment€to€McMurray€and€Davies.Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àà ` àMcMurray€and€Davies€have€requested€they€be€awarded€their€attorney€fees€on€appealÐ l¼ Ðbased€on€their€position€that€Plaintiffððs€appeal€is€frivolous.€€Exercising€our€discretion,€we€decline€toÐ X ¨ Ðaward€attorney€fees.Ð D!” ÐÌÔ& œ Ôà@  %ìàò òòòConclusionóóó óˆÐ #l! ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€affirmed.€€This€case€is€remanded€to€the€Trial€CourtÐ ô$D # Ðfor€further€proceedings€as€may€be€required,€if€any,€consistent€with€this€Opinion,€and€for€collectionÐ à%0!$ Ðof€costs€below.€€Costs€of€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€Appellant€Joe€T.€Jones€and€his€surety.€€Ô'œ#SÔÐ Ì&"% ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à____________________________________Ð |*Ì%) Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àD.€MICHAEL€SWINEY