ÿWPC Rÿ¾R`3’Þøÿ[w72þ^ôÑgB¼Ý¯;#[íŒæ¡Û+5 HµÏûCƳFjÛ'Ü)ø%äER ÐúîVìk„TNäìM$/dSŠH²’ÅQÙæT*5L±h;߈ §ãäýÇ,‹º­l¬@zQx‰{N~Ññ¬xÜèy|a‹x„Ä5z=dá©çFĺDN~¸Ò aÀþÿŸ,G=*–T©Låá\m ,d8 'ׯ»÷p/þgƒÞ`aÌí¶p‹þ ‡b#Á\w %! 0ˆ' UN¯ ^ ý 4 z Ò— i x mz ‘ Æ™ Æ_ Æ% Æë ë N±±±E³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³bµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµµ 0ë½½½½ B¨¨ 0¤Å D5i D-ž 0KËË ASÆi 0¤/ 0DÓ A«˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular+—~) õ}|)¢Ø+00 ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5- ù-(|G2Ë$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€B-»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€X ‘X»»Ô d(|3Gv$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€B-»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Gv$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€B-»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€B-»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€¼B-»»»ÔÑ8€ ‘XXdì»»d8Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îWœî»¼B-ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼B-»îîWœô#ԈРÖ& Ðà@!ìàMay€4,€1998€SessionˆÐ üL ÐÔ‡X ‘X»¼B-ÔÌò òÔ#†¼B-»XX ‘ß#ÔÓ  ÓROGER€EDWARD€KENNEDYòòóó€v.€DELORES€RAE€ROSE€KENNEDYòòóóÔ‡X ‘X»¼B-Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÓ%ÓÌà@6 6 ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Davidson€CountyˆÐ ú J Ðà@ ìàNo.€92D„2061€€€€€€Muriel€Robinson,€JudgeˆÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` A߈Ð ªú  ÐÌà@? ? ìàNo.€M1997„00219„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€November€30,€Ô_Ô2000Ô_ԈР¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÔ#†¼B-»XX ‘m#ÔÔ€X ‘X»¼B-ÔThis€appeal€involves€a€manððs€efforts€to€use€his€voluntary€early€retirement€as€a€basis€for€ending€hisÐ xÈ  Ðspousal€support€obligation.€€Three€years€after€the€divorce,€the€man€filed€a€petition€in€the€CircuitÐ d´ ÐCourt€for€Davidson€County€seeking€to€end€his€responsibility€to€pay€child€support.€€His€former€wifeÐ P  Ðresponded€by€filing€a€petition€seeking€to€hold€him€in€contempt€for€failure€to€pay€spousal€support.€Ð <Œ ÐFollowing€a€bench€trial,€the€trial€court€dismissed€the€manððs€petition,€held€him€in€contempt,€andÐ (x Ðentered€a€$3,106€judgment€against€him€for€back€spousal€support.€€On€this€appeal,€the€man€asserts€thatÐ d Ðthe€trial€court€erred€by€declining€to€relieve€him€of€his€alimony€obligation€because€of€his€inability€toÐ P Ðpay€and€his€former€spouseððs€lack€of€need.€€We€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€judgment.Ð ì< ÐÌò òà@°°ìàTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Affirmedó óˆÐ Ä ÐÌòòWilliam€C.€Koch,€Jr.,€óóJ.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHenry€F.€Todd,€P.J.,€M.S.,óóÐ œì Ðand€òòWilliam€B.€Cain,€J.óó,€joined.Ð ˆØ ÐÌRobert€L.€Jackson€and€Robert€Todd€Jackson,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Roger€EdwardÐ `° ÐKennedy.Ð L œ ÐÌMary€Frances€Lyle,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Delores€Rae€Rose€Kennedy.Ð $"t! ÐÌÌà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óˆÐ è$8 $ ÐÌà  àRoger€Edward€Kennedy€and€Delores€Rae€Rose€Kennedy€were€married€on€August€12,€1961.€Ð À&"& ÐThey€raised€two€children€together€during€their€33„year€marriage.€€Throughout€the€marriage,€Mr.Ð ¬'ü"' ÐKennedy€was€employed€by€the€United€States€Government€as€a€property€disposal€specialist€earningÐ ˜(è#( Ðapproximately€$64,000€per€year,€and€Ms.€Kennedy€was€a€homemaker.€€The€partiesðð€relationshipÐ „)Ô$) Ðunraveled€when€Mr.€Kennedy€had€an€affair€with€another€woman.Ð p*À%* ÐÌà  àIn€April€1994,€the€Circuit€Court€for€Davidson€County€granted€Ms.€Kennedy€a€divorce€basedÐ H,˜', Ðon€Mr.€Kennedyððs€adultery.€€As€part€of€its€division€of€the€marital€estate,€the€trial€court€awarded€Ms.Ð 4-„(-ý ÐKennedy€fifty€percent€of€Mr.€Kennedyððs€monthly€federal€retirement€benefits.€€The€trial€judge€alsoÐ ° Ðdirected€Mr.€Kennedy€to€pay€Ms.€Kennedy€long„term€spousal€support€in€graduated€amounts.€€TheÐ œì Ðorder€directed€Mr.€Kennedy€to€pay€$367€per€month€until€the€closing€of€the€sale€of€the€marital€home,Ð ˆØ Ðthen€$868€per€month€until€Ms.€Kennedy€was€no€longer€eligible€for€COBRA€insurance€coverage,€andÐ tÄ Ðthen€$1,000€per€month€until€Ms.€Kennedyððs€death€or€remarriage.Ð `° ÐÌà  àIn€January€1997,€at€the€age€of€fifty„four,€Mr.€Kennedy€voluntarily€retired€from€his€job€withÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€federal€government.€€He€immediately€stopped€paying€spousal€support€and,€in€February€1997,€filedÐ $ t Ða€petition€in€the€trial€court€requesting€the€termination€of€his€spousal€support€obligation€because€hisÐ  ` Ðretirement€rendered€him€unable€to€continue€making€his€support€payments.€€Ms.€KennedyÐ ü L  Ðimmediately€responded€with€a€petition€to€hold€Mr.€Kennedy€in€contempt€for€failing€to€make€hisÐ è 8  ÐFebruary€1997€support€payment.€€Following€a€hearing,€the€trial€court€entered€an€order€on€August€5,Ð Ô$  Ð1997,€dismissing€Mr.€Kennedyððs€petition,€holding€him€in€contempt,€and€entering€a€$3,106€judgmentÐ À  Ðagainst€him€for€the€spousal€support€arrearage.€€The€trial€court€concluded€that€its€1994€disposition€ofÐ ¬ü  ÐMr.€Kennedyððs€federal€retirement€had€been€part€of€the€division€of€marital€property€and,€therefore,Ð ˜è  Ðthat€it€was€not€relevant€to€his€continued€obligation€to€pay€spousal€support.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà@¬¬)ìàò òI.ˆÐ \¬ Ðà@ê ê ìàòòMr.€Kennedyððs€Spousal€Support€Obligationóóó óˆÐ H˜ ÐÌà  àMr.€Kennedy€contends€that€his€retirement€renders€him€unable€to€pay€spousal€support€and€thatÐ  p ÐMs.€Kennedyððs€portion€of€the€retirement€benefits€will€make€up€for€any€loss€in€spousal€support.€€HeÐ  \ Ðargues€that€his€retirement€is€a€substantial,€material€change€in€circumstances€that€justifies€terminatingÐ øH Ðhis€support€obligation.€€We€disagree€for€two€reasons.€€First,€Mr.€Kennedyððs€eventual€retirement€fromÐ ä4 Ðhis€government€job€was€foreseeable€when€the€original€divorce€decree€was€entered€in€1994€and€was,Ð Ð  Ðin€fact,€addressed€in€the€divorce€decree€itself.€€Second,€Mr.€Kennedyððs€retirement€was€voluntary.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àA€court€cannot€modify€a€spousal€support€award€unless€there€has€been€a€substantial,€materialÐ ”ä Ðchange€in€circumstances€since€the€entry€of€the€previous€support€decree.€€òòóóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„Ð €Ð Ð101(a)(1)€(Supp.€2000);€òòBrewer€v.€Breweróó,€869€S.W.2d€928,€934€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993);€òòCranfordÐ l¼ Ðv.€Cranfordóó,€772€S.W.2d€48,€50€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€€In€order€to€be€material,€a€change€inÐ X ¨ Ðcircumstances€must€have€been€unforeseeable€at€the€time€the€decree€was€entered.€€òòMcCarty€v.Ð D!” ÐMcCartyóó,€863€S.W.2d€716,€719€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);€òòElliot€v.€Elliotóó,€825€S.W.2d€87,€Ô_Ô91Ô_Ô€(Tenn.Ð 0"€  ÐCt.€App.€1991).€€It€must€also€affect€the€obligor€spouseððs€ability€to€pay€or€the€obligee€spouseððsÐ #l! Ðcontinuing€need€for€support.€€òòBowman€v.€Bowmanóó,€836€S.W.2d€563,€568€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).€€Ð $X" ÐÌà  àThe€party€seeking€the€modification€bears€the€burden€of€proving€there€has€been€a€substantial,Ð à%0!$ Ðmaterial€change€in€circumstances.€€òòElliot€v.€Elliotóó,€825€S.W.2d€at€90;€òòSeal€v.€Sealóó,€802€S.W.2d€617,Ð Ì&"% Ð620€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).€€Once€the€party€meets€its€burden,€the€trial€court€then€utilizes€the€sameÐ ¸'#& Ðfactors€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)€(Supp.€2000)€that€were€considered€in€making€the€initialÐ ¤(ô#' Ðaward.€€òòBrewer€v.€Breweróó,€869€S.W.2d€at€936;€òòNorvell€v.€Norvellóó,€805€S.W.2d€772,€774€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð )à$( ÐApp.€1990).€€While€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)€allows€the€court€to€consider€many€factors,€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðreal€need€of€the€obligee€spouse€is€the€single€most€important€factor,€òòCranford€v.€Cranfordóó,€772Ð h+¸&* ÐS.W.2d€at€50;€òòLancaster€v.€Lancasteróó,€671€S.W.2d€501,€503€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984),€with€the€obligorÐ ° Ðspouseððs€ability€to€pay€another€critical€consideration.€€òòSmith€v.€Smithóó,€912€S.W.2d€155,€159€(Tenn.Ð œì ÐCt.€App.€1995).Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àWe€give€wide€latitude€to€a€trial€courtððs€decision€regarding€spousal€support€because€it€isÐ `° Ðfactually€driven€and€involves€considering€and€balancing€numerous€factors.€€òòóóAccordingly,€we€reviewÐ L œ Ðthe€decision€pursuant€to€the€familiar€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d)€standard,€and€we€will€uphold€the€trialÐ 8 ˆ Ðcourtððs€decision€unless€it€is€based€on€an€improper€application€of€the€law€or€is€against€theÐ $ t Ðpreponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòCranford€v.€Cranfordóó,€772€S.W.2d€at€50.Ð  ` ÐÌà  àWe€agree€with€the€trial€courtððs€conclusion€that€Mr.€Kennedyððs€retirement€was€not€aÐ è 8  Ðsubstantial,€material€change€in€circumstances.òòóó€€Retirement€is€not€an€unforeseeable€event,€but€ratherÐ Ô$  Ðis€one€that€is€planned€and€anticipated€far€in€advance.€òò€Horn€v.€Hornóó,€No.€02A01„9401„CH„00011,Ð À  Ð1995€WL€290475,€at€*2€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€May€15,€1995)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed).€Ð ¬ü  ÐThere€was€also€testimony€showing€that€Mr.€Kennedy€had€planned€for€some€time€to€take€earlyÐ ˜è  Ðretirement€and€that€he€had€discussed€it€with€Ms.€Kennedy€prior€to€the€divorce.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àThe€fact€that€the€division€of€Mr.€Kennedyððs€pension€benefits€occurred€earlier€than€expectedÐ \¬ Ðhas€no€bearing€on€his€spousal€support€obligation.€€It€is€only€after€the€trial€court€equitably€divides€theÐ H˜ Ðmarital€property€that€the€issue€of€support€or€maintenance€can€properly€be€considered.€€òòóóTenn.€CodeÐ 4„ ÐAnn.€ðð€36„4„121(a)(1)€(Supp.€2000).€€When€the€trial€court€contemplates€whether€to€award€spousalÐ  p Ðsupport,€the€division€of€property€is€one€of€the€factors€it€weighs€when€dividing€the€marital€estate.€Ð  \ ÐòòóóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)(H).€€It€is€clear€from€the€terms€of€the€divorce€decree€that€the€trialÐ øH Ðcourt€anticipated€Mr.€Kennedyððs€retirement.€€The€court€first€awarded€fifty€percent€of€the€retirementÐ ä4 Ðbenefits€to€Ms.€Kennedy€as€marital€property€and€then€ordered€graduated€spousal€support€in€order€toÐ Ð  Ðcover€Ms.€Kennedyððs€expected€expenses€such€as€health€insurance.€€The€distribution€of€the€pensionÐ ¼  Ðbenefits€was€merely€a€liquidation€of€each€partyððs€share€of€a€marital€asset.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àMr.€Kennedy€continues€to€be€able€to€pay€support,€and€Ms.€Kennedy€clearly€needs€the€supportÐ €Ð Ðin€order€to€maintain€even€a€modest€lifestyle.€€Mr.€Kennedy€voluntarily€retired€from€his€$64,000„per„Ð l¼ Ðyear€government€job€and€then€voluntarily€remarried€and€assumed€the€financial€obligations€of€his€newÐ X ¨ Ðwife.€€Although€he€lives€with€his€wife€in€a€new€three„bedroom€home€that€is€titled€in€her€name€only,Ð D!” Ðhe€pays€$961€of€her€$1200€mortgage€payment€and€has€continued€to€do€so€after€his€retirement€ð!ð€anÐ 0"€  Ðamount€that€is€almost€equal€to€his€$1,000€alimony€obligation.€€He€also€pays€for€the€utilities,€cable,Ð #l! Ðtrash€pick„up,€and€has€money€for€entertainment,€a€housekeeper,€eating€out,€a€cellular€phone,€andÐ $X" Ðchurch€contributions.€€Many€of€his€expenses€are€discretionary.€€Although€he€has€retired,€there€hasÐ ô$D # Ðbeen€no€allegation€that€his€earning€capacity€has€changed.€€At€the€time€of€his€retirement,€he€was€fifty„Ð à%0!$ Ðfour€years€old€and€in€good€health.€€He€is€also€working€approximately€thirty€hours€a€week€at€theÐ Ì&"% ÐAtlanta€Auto€Auction.€€€Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àFor€her€part,€Ms.€Kennedy€now€works€full€time€as€a€law€office€receptionist€earning€$6.50€perÐ )à$( Ðhour.€€Her€net€take€home€pay€per€month€is€$900.€€She€has€few€marketable€skills€and€is€unlikely€toÐ |*Ì%) Ðincrease€her€earning€capacity,€although€she€testified€that€she€has€looked€for€higher„paying€jobs.€Ð h+¸&* ÐSince€the€divorce,€she€has€been€forced€to€deplete€her€assets€for€living€expenses€and€now€has€aÐ ° Ðnegative€net€worth.€€She€lives€in€a€one„bedroom€apartment€and€has€the€added€expense€of€a€carÐ œì Ðpayment€that€she€did€not€have€when€the€parties€divorced.€€Even€with€the€addition€of€the€pensionÐ ˆØ Ðpayments,€she€will€just€be€able€to€meet€her€monthly€expenses.€€Accordingly,€we€have€determined€thatÐ tÄ ÐMr.€Kennedy€has€failed€to€show€there€has€been€a€substantial,€material€change€in€circumstances€sinceÐ `° Ðthe€divorce€that€would€justify€terminating€his€obligation€to€continue€paying€spousal€support€to€Ms.Ð L œ ÐKennedy.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌÓ  Óò òII.ó óÐ  ` Ðòòò òThe€Award€for€Ms.€Kennedyððs€Legal€Expensesó óóóÐ ü L  ÐÌÓ½3Óà  àAs€a€final€matter,€Ms.€Kennedy€has€asked€this€court€to€award€her€attorneyððs€fees€related€toÐ Ô$  Ðthis€appeal€because€of€her€bleak€financial€condition.€€The€trial€court€awarded€her€attorneyððs€fees€forÐ À  Ðher€defense€of€Mr.€Kennedyððs€petition€and€for€the€prosecution€of€her€contempt€petition.€€Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àAn€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€in€a€divorce€action€is€treated€as€an€additional€award€for€spousalÐ „Ô  Ðsupport.€€òòSmith€v.€Smithóó,€912€S.W.2d€at€161;€òòGilliam€v.€Gilliamóó,€776€S.W.2d€81,€86€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð pÀ Ð1988).€€Although€courts€have€wide€discretion€to€award€attorneyððs€fees,€they€should€do€so€only€whenÐ \¬ Ðthe€spouse€seeking€them€lacks€sufficient€funds€to€pay€his€or€her€legal€expenses,€or€would€be€requiredÐ H˜ Ðto€deplete€other€assets€in€order€to€do€so.€€òòBrown€v.€Brownóó,€913€S.W.2d€163,€170€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð 4„ Ð1994);€òòKincaid€v.€Kincaidóó,€912€S.W.2d€140,€144€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€Ð  p ÐÌà  àWe€have€determined€that€the€disparate€financial€circumstances€of€the€parties€supports€anÐ øH Ðaward€of€Ms.€Kennedyððs€attorneyððs€fees€for€this€appeal.€€When€Mr.€Kennedy€stopped€paying€hisÐ ä4 Ðspousal€support€in€February€1997,€Ms.€Kennedy€was€forced€to€subsist€on€$900€a€month,€which€leftÐ Ð  Ðher€in€arrears€on€her€rent€and€other€monthly€bills.€€She€was€unable€to€pay€any€of€the€attorneyððs€feesÐ ¼  Ðshe€incurred€in€the€lower€court.€€Because€Ms.€Kennedy€does€not€have€adequate€financial€resources,Ð ¨ø Ðwe€find€that€Mr.€Kennedy€should€be€required€to€pay€for€her€attorneyððs€fees€related€to€this€appeal.€€OnÐ ”ä Ðremand,€the€trial€court€shall€take€proof€regarding€the€amount€of€these€expenses€and€award€Ms.Ð €Ð ÐKennedy€a€judgment€for€the€reasonable€legal€expenses€she€has€incurred€as€a€result€of€this€appeal.€€Ð l¼ ÐÌÓ  Óò ò€€III.ó óÐ D!” ÐÌÓI<Óà  àWe€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€for€furtherÐ #l! Ðproceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€We€also€tax€the€costs€of€this€appeal€to€Roger€EdwardÐ $X" ÐKennedy€and€his€surety€for€which€execution,€if€necessary,€may€issue.€Ð ô$D # ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à_________________________________Ð ¤(ô#' Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE€