ÿWPC‚  VO|¯ÔÒ63­ÙÕcÞ…ø%¯µá½»L{kXèåºkËæÝšÖ’ç!t1¼¤Wmæ‡a‰b'!ó«K ¹Ç…<ƒÏÔã-jщ%´x2ÿ9øŒ[~{X\$ºr·ÂTƒÏ’ŽWTé{±CÈgø˜˜BÔ ®TAÇ–Q"’óje¤î¾ÉíØƒ„ûc++¹Eøð«Ö¥Gî±YSs …Xà,ƒÉ5Ìwºfù¯Tÿ·ÏQ~蛪EцüÇÆxkâíBZhù¼Ä\ÅÊl‡%táV&ýCÄÕ»úœP-„)8 zÈ'0öZ‡*ÀT0¡¼¨G}¶ÃpÕõ)‡ËÙJö˜…àFʳ X„1)•îs$ßj7ÅðXÚê™ÕrAÎILš9uÚ#)9ÓÞå}Yà «H|QÒí¬<…ZF#¾‡š¬…ç[\økOŒC¿Ü¹øsÈýƒænÊm\«EÊ5OÝwx»7“ippG)­ Tª‚£aÂèg¦ÙT¹ºâ›³°QÞ52o2dg(Hñ¯"NFeJ9Ê‚‘Ç*ŠÑFÏæÈý\àþ胡Ç> 3IД›_S·™ŠA§ûé Ó¾|ø  ×NC<¿iÕÅ$ ³ý¢“ ÓçCz*# LUNW %¥ 0(«bÓw@Û4/>FU:K…U:ŠÄU:É É É É É É É É É É É É É É É É É AQ ÆT 0D 0D^ 0D¢ ¢ D/æ B B2 D3O ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- éCêCEëCìCUíCDîCDïCðCÓ€úCûCÖ…#%3|xýC ûÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ X¬]XXXÔÔ€ 3cX X¬]ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ X¬]X 3cÔÐ  ÐÌSeptember€24,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ûÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ XÅÈXXXÔÔ€ ulX XÅÈÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ XÅÈX ulÔÐ  ÐÌSeptember€23,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ûÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€XÅÈXXXÔÔ€ulXXÅÈÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€XÅÈXulÔÐ  ÐÌSeptember€14,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝñðCñ›ñðCñѰÑÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€ÑÑ7€öjXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñò òñúCññðCñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@Eô ` 8ttxP,ð  rßñðCññðCñ›ñðCñ›ñúCññúCñ›ñúCñDORIS€KEOWN,à  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ð  ÐñûCñœßt€ )>.*jxÓ` `€€@EÇ` 8ttxPÿôð  tßñûCñ›ñûCñßt€ )>.*jxÓ` `€€@EÇ` 8ttxPÿôð  tßñúCñœñúCññûCññúCññúCñà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àDavidson€CircuitÐ ôì Ðà ` àPlaintiff/Appellant,à h àà À àà  à€€)à p àNo.€€€96C„2810Ð àØ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àÐ Ì Ä ÐVS.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ð ¸ ° Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àÐ ¤ œ ÐFIDDLERððS€INN,€d/b/a€FIDDLERS€INNà  à€€)à p àAppeal€No.Ð  ˆ ÐNORTH€and€JAH,€INC.,à h àà À àà  à€€)à p à01A01„9712„CV„00730Ð | t Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ìà ` àDefendants/Appellees.à À àà  à€€)Ð TL  ÐÌÌà@C C ®àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌà@¼¼(®àAT€NASHVILLEˆÌÌà@  ®àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYˆÌà@;;#®àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEˆÌà0 ` àÐ ` T$` T$ ÐÓ  ÓHONORABLE€BARBARA€N.€HAYNES,€JUDGEÌó óÓŽÓÌÌÌDavid€B.€Lyons,€#11046Ì601€Woodland€StreetÌNashville,€Tennessee€37206ÌATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTÌÌÌScott€A.€Rhodes,€#16870ÌBREWER,€KRAUSE€&€BROOKSÌP.O.€Box€23890ÌNashville,€Tennessee€37202„3890ÌATTORNEY€FOR€DEFENDANTS/APPELLEESÌÌÌÓ  Óœò òREVERSED€AND€REMANDED.ó óÐ L'D # ÐÌÌÓ¿ ÓÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àHENRY€F.€TODD,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ñìCñÌñìCñÌñéCñBEN€H.€CANTREñéCññêCññéCñEñéCññêCññëCñLL,€JUDGEÌWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEñëCñÌÌÌÌÐ ”;Œ49  ЇñíCñÌñíCñò òDORIS€KEOWN,à  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ð  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àDavidson€CircuitÐ ôì Ðà ` àPlaintiff/Appellant,à h àà À àà  à€€)à p àNo.€€€96C„2810Ð àØ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àÐ Ì Ä ÐVS.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ð ¸ ° Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)à p àÐ ¤ œ ÐFIDDLERððS€INN,€d/b/a€FIDDLERS€INNà  à€€)à p àAppeal€No.Ð  ˆ ÐNORTH€and€JAH,€INC.,à h àà À àà  à€€)à p à01A01„9712„CV„00730Ð | t Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à€€)Ìà ` àDefendants/Appellees.à À àà  à€€)Ð TL  ÐÌó óÌà@88(®àòòò òÔ‡„ í„XXÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ#†XöjX„„ í#Ôó óóóˆÐ   ÐÓÓÓ  ÓÌà ` àThis€is€a€premises€liability€case€in›€which€the€plaintiff,€Doris€œKeown,›€sued€the€œdefendants,Ïowner›€and€œtenant,›€for€injuries€sustained€by€plaintiff€in€a€fall€allegedly€caused€by€a€3€inch€riseÏfrom€a€parking€area€to€the€concrete€walkway€at€the€entrance€of€a€hotel.€€The€Trial€Judge€renderedÏsummary€judgment€for€the€defendants,€and€plaintiff€appealed.€€The€sole€issue€on€appeal€is€theÏcorrectness€of€the€summary€judgment.ÌÌà ` àHeretofore€actions€for€defective€premises€have€been€subject€to€summary€dismissal€underÏthe€ð ðopen€and€obvious€risk.ðð€€However,€on€March€30,€1998,€the€Supreme€Court€revised€the€ruleÏin€òòColn€v.€City€of€Savannahóó,€Tennessee,€Tenn.€1998,€òò€€€€€óó€S.W.2d€òò€€€€€óó,€in€which€the€Court€said:Ð $ ÐÒ` „ÒÒ¸ ÒÓÓà  àIn€June€of€1992,€the€City€of€Savannah€(ð ðCityðð)Ïcontracted€to€have€decorative€brick€pavers€installed€in€front€ofÏthe€entrance€of€its€City€Hall€building.€€The€brick€pavers€wereÏinstalled€on€top€of€a€bed€of€sand€in€an€area€approximatelyÏthirteen€and€one„half€feet€wide€by€sixteen€and€one„half€feetÏlong;€the€surface€of€the€pavers€when€installed€was€below€theÏlevel€of€the€adjacent€concrete€sidewalk€that€led€to€the€door€ofÏthe€City€Hall€building.ÌÌà  àOn€November€2,€1992,€the€plaintiff,€Hazel€Coln,€whoÏwas€68€years€of€age,€walked€across€the€brick€pavers€towardÏthe€entrance€of€the€building€and€tripped€on€the€lip€of€theÏconcrete€sidewalk€adjacent€to€the€brick€pavers.€€She€fell,Ïinjuring€her€left€wrist€and€arm.€€Coln€conceded€that€theÏweather€had€been€clear€and€sunny,€and€that€nothing€preventedÏher€from€seeing€the€brick€pavers€or€the€sidewalk.ÌÌà  àWilliam€Gilchrist,€the€landscape€designer€whoÏinstalled€the€brick€pavers,€testified€that€there€was€a€deviationÏapproximately€three„eighths€of€an€inch€between€the€paversÏand€sidewalk€when€the€pavers€were€installed.€€GilchristÏtestified€that€the€deviation€was€due€to€the€settling€of€sandÏbeneath€the€pavers.€€Gilchrist€told€Bill€Fox,€the€assistantÐ 0:(37 Ðmanager€of€the€City,€that€a€deviation€existed€and€that€half€ofÏthe€pavers€would€have€to€be€replaced€to€correct€the€deviation.ÌÌà  àFox€testified€that€he€knew€about€the€deviation€betweenÏthe€pavers€and€the€sidewalk,€but€felt€that€it€was€acceptable€andÏshould€not€be€corrected.€€Paul€Lebovitz,€a€landscape€architect,Ïtestified€that€it€is€reasonable€to€expect€some€deviationÏbetween€the€two€surfaces€when€pavers€are€installed€near€aÏconcrete€sidewalk€but€that€pavers€are€accepted€in€the€industryÏas€a€safe€walkway€material.€€There€was€also€evidence€that€theÏsize€of€the€deviation€was€several€inches€greater€at€the€time€theÏplaintiff€was€injured.ÌÌà  àThe€plaintiffs€alleged€that€the€City€ð ðhad€negligentlyÏand€carelessly€left€[the€area€of€the€new€brick€pavers]€defectiveÏand€in€disrepairðð€and€that€the€City€had€created€ð ða€dangerousÏcondition€for€the€plaintiff€and€any€other€person€walking€downÏsaid€sidewalk.ÌÓoÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓCÓÓÓà  àIn€each€of€these€premises€liability€cases,€the€plaintiffÏcontends€that€the€open€and€obvious€rule€does€not€precludeÏfinding€a€duty€owned€by€the€defendant€landowner€that€anÏopen€and€obvious€danger€is€merely€a€factor€for€considerationÏin€determining€comparative€fault€under€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentineóó.€Ð <4 ÐThe€landowner€defendants€in€both€cases€maintain€that€the€œruleÏis€intact;€that€there€is€no€duty€of€care€when€an€open€andÏobvious€condition€results€in€injury€to€the€plaintiff.€€The€CityÏof€Savannah€in€Coln€also€contends€that€the€plaintiff€was€atÏleast€50€percent€negligent,€barring€recovery€underÏcomparative€fault.€€The€Court€of€Appealsðð€analysis€in€›eachÏcase€reflects€the€conflicting€views€about€duty€and€comparativeÏfault€it€has€expressed€in€a€series€of€its€unpublished€decisions.ÌÓgÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ»ÓÓ#Óà  àA€negligence€claim€requires€proof€of€the€followingÏelements:€(1)€a€duty€of€care€owned€by€the€defendant€to€theÏplaintiff;€(2)€conduct€by€the€defendant€falling€below€theÏstandard€of€care€amounting€to€a€breach€of€that€duty;€(3)€anÏinjury€or€loss;€(4)€causation€in€fact;€and€(5)€proximate€or€legalÏcause.€€òòBradshaw€v.€Danielóó,€854€S.W.2d€865,€869€(Tenn.Ð *#& Ð1993).ÌÓßÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ‰Óò òÓ  ÓòòOPEN€AND€OBVIOUS€DOCTRINEóóó óÐ Ô,Ì%) ÐÓ°ÓÌÓ'Óà  àIn€premises€liability€cases,€application€of€dutyÏprinciples€resulted€in€imposing€a€duty€on€an€owner€orÏpossessor€of€premises€to€exercise€reasonable€care€under€theÏcircumstances€to€a€guest€(licensee)€or€business€œinvitee.›€€TheÏduty€includes€the€responsibility€of€either€removing€or€warningÏagainst€any€latent€or€hidden€dangerous€condition€on€theÏpremises€of€which€one€was€aware€or€should€have€been€awareÏthrough€the€exercise€of€reasonable€diligence.€€òòEaton€v.Ð  5.2 ÐMcLainóó,€891€S.W.2d€587,€594€(Tenn.€1994);€òòSmith€v.€InmanÐ  6/3 ÐRealty€Coóó.,€846€S.W.2d€819,€823€(Tenn.€App.€1992).Ð ø6ð/4 ÐÌà  àBecause€the€rationale€for€the€imposition€of€this€dutyÏwas€partly€the€ð ðownerððs€superior€knowledge€of€a€perilousÐ ¼9´27 Ðcondition€on€his€premises,ðð€a€rule€of€no„liability€also€wasÏderived:€that€a€premises€owner€has€no€liability€for€injuriesÏsustained€from€dangers€that€were€ð ðobvious,€reasonablyÏapparent,€or€as€well€known€to€the€invitee€[or€licensee}€as€toÏthe€owner.ðð€€òòKendall€Oil€Co.€V.€Payneóó,€293€S.W.2d€40,€42Ð ¸ ° Ð(Tenn.€App.€1955;€òòsee€also€McCormick€v.€Watersóó,€594Ð ¤ œ ÐS.W.2d€385,€387€(Tenn.€1980).ÌÓ ÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓû$ÓÓ+Óà  àNearly€every€jurisdiction€has€also€relied€upon€theÏRestatement€(Second)€of€Torts,€ðð€343A,€which€states€the€ruleÏas€follows:ÌÌÒ„` €ÒÒ¸ „ÒÒ¸ ŽÒÒÒ(1)€A€possessor€of€land€is€not€liable€to€hisÏœinvitees€for€physical€harm€caused€to€them€byÏany€activity€or€condition€on€the€land€whoseÏdanger€is€known€or€obvious€to€them,€òòunlessÐ ÜÔ  Ðthe€possessor€should€anticipate€the€harmÏdespite€such€knowledge€or€obviousness.›óóÐ ´¬ ÐÒí%ÒÒ„¸ Í%ÒÓ%ÓÒ¸ ÏÒÒ` ·„ÒÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÒ¸ `'ÒÒ„` r'ÒÓ„'ÓÒÒÒ¸ „ÒÓ2ÓSuch€reason€to€expect€harm€to€the€visitor€fromÏknown€or€obvious€dangers€may€arise,€forÏexample,€where€the€possessor€has€reason€toÏexpect€that€the€inviteeððs€attention€may€beÏdistracted,€so€that€he€will€not€discover€what€isÏobvious,€or€will€forget€what€he€hasÏdiscovered,€or€fail€to€protect€himself€against€it.€ÏSuch€reason€may€also€arise€where€theÏpossessor€has€reason€to€expect€that€the€inviteeÏwill€proceed€to€encounter€the€known€orÏobvious€danger€because€to€a€reasonable€manÏin€his€position€the€advantages€of€doing€soÏwould€outweigh€the€apparent€risk.ÌÒÌ'ÒÒ„¸ Ú'ÒÓè'ÓÒ¸ N5ÒÒ` `5„ÒÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ}*Óòòò òÓ  ÓTENNESSEE€LAWó óóóÐ t%l! ÐÓ§*ÓÓ6ÓÌà  àWe€agree€with€the€rationale€of€the€majority€of€courtsÏwhich€have€limited€or€restricted€the€traditional€ð ðopen€andÏobviousðð€rule€in€favor€of€the€Restatement€approach.€€We€alsoÏagree€that€attempting€to€analyze€the€duty€issue€simply€byÏlabeling€some€conditions€ð ðopen€and€obvious,ðð€withoutÏconsideration€of€any€surrounding€circumstances,€promotesÏarbitrary€and€inconsistent€results.€€Moreover,€the€open€andÏobvious€rule€is€inconsistent€with€our€cases€which€analyze€dutyÏby€balancing€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€harm€withÏfeasibility€and€availability€of€alternatives€that€would€haveÏavoided€the€harm.à À àÐ „0|)- ÐÌà  àWe€deem€the€Restatement€approach€to€be€the€betterÏreasoned€and€more€persuasive€analysis.ÌÓë*ÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓÿ-ÓÓ9Óà  àWe€find€that€the€City€owned€a€duty€of€care€under€theÏfacts€of€this€case.€€The€deviation€between€the€surface€of€theÏbrick€pavers€and€concrete€sidewalk€created€a€foreseeableÏprobability€of€harm.€€Although€the€deviation€was€open€andÏnoticeable€to€a€degree,€it€is€significant€that€the€deviation€wasÏin€an€area€that€had€to€be€navigated€in€order€to€gain€access€toÐ ¼9´27 Ðthe€City€Hall€building.€€It€is€also€significant€that€the€City€hadÏactual€knowledge€of€the€deviation€when€the€pavers€wereÏinstalled€and€was€aware€of€the€availability€of€correctiveÏaction.ðð€€Despite€such€knowledge€and€the€foreseeable€risk€ofÏharm€to€persons€who€entered€the€City€Hall€building,€the€CityÏtook€no€steps€to€remove€or€warn€against€the€danger.€€In€ourÏview,€the€risk€of€harm€was€unreasonable€despite€its€open€andÏobvious€nature€and€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€harm,Ïtherefore,€outweighed€the€burden€imposed€in€protectingÏagainst€that€harm.€€òòSee€McCall€v.€Wilderóó,€913€S.W.2d€at€153.Ð TL  ÐÓ#.ÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓ;2ÓÓ>Óà  àThe€evidence€in€this€record,€reviewed€with€theÏpresumption€of€correctness,€supports€the€trial€courtððs€findingÏthat€the€sidewalk€was€defective,€unsafe€or€dangerous,€as€wellÏas€the€finding€that€the€City€had€actual€notice€of€the€condition.€ÏTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d).€€Moreover,€because€we€have€held€thatÏcomparative€fault€applies€to€conduct€that€is€broader€thanÏnegligence,€such€as€strict€liability€in€tort,€òòsee,€e.g.,€WhiteheadÐ ´¬ Ðv.€Toyota€Motor€Corpóó.,€897€S.W.2d€684€(Tenn.€1995).€€WeÐ  ˜ Ðobserve€that€the€trial€courtððs€application€of€comparative€fault€Ïprinciples€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„20„203€was€entirelyÏconsistent€with€òòMcIntyre€v.€Balentine,€supra.€€See€Bradford€v.Ð d\ ÐCity€of€Clarksvilleóó,€885€S.W.2d€78€(Tenn.€App.€1994).Ð PH ÐÓ_2ÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„ÌÓÀ5ÓÓBÓà  àSummary€judgment€is€appropriate€only€if€the€movingÏparty€shows€that€no€genuine€and€material€factual€issue€existsÏand€he€or€she€is€entitled€to€relief€as€a€matter€of€law.€€In€rulingÏon€such€a€motion,€the€court€must€consider€the€evidence€in€aÏlight€most€favorable€to€the€non„moving€party€and€must€allowÏall€reasonable€inferences€in€his€or€her€favor.€€A€summaryÏjudgment€may€be€appropriate,€therefore,€ð ðwhen€there€is€noÏdispute€over€the€evidence€establishing€the€facts€that€controlÏthe€application€of€a€rule€of€law.ðð€€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€atÐ ˆ$€  Ð214„215,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.ÌÓä5ÓÓ  Ó„€„€„€„Ìòòò òCONCLUSIONó óóóÐ L'D # ÐÓl8ÓÓFÓÌà  àWe€conclude€that€an€open€and€obvious€danger€thatÏcauses€an€injury€to€a€plaintiff€does€not€automatically€result€inÏa€finding€of€no€duty€and€no€landowner€liability.€€As€in€anyÏnegligence€action,€a€risk€is€unreasonable€and€gives€rise€to€aÏduty€if€the€foreseeability€and€gravity€of€harm€posed€by€aÏdefendantððs€conduct,€even€if€open€and€obvious,€outweigh€theÏburden€upon€the€defendant€to€engage€in€conduct€that€wouldÏhave€prevented€the€harm.ÌÌÌÒ¸ Y*ÒÒ„` k*ÒÓœÓà ` àIn€the€present€case,€the€Trial€Court€made€no€finding€of€fact,€but€the€motion€of€defendantsÏfor€summary€judgment€stated:ÌÒ` „ÒÒ¸ ÒÓÓà  àComes€now€Defendant,€JAH,€Inc.€(HereinafterÏð ðJAHðð),€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rule€of€Civil€Procedure€56,Ïand€œmoves›€this€Court€for€an€order€granting€summaryÏjudgment€in€its€favor.€€JAH€owed€no€duty€to€Plaintiff€KeownÏbecause€the€hazard€she€complains€of€was€open€and€obvious.€Ð ¼9´27 ÐFurther,€the€Court€should€find€Keownððs€negligence€was€fiftyÏpercent€or€more€as€a€matter€of€law€under€the€circumstances€ofÏthis€case.ÌÒ¸ ^;ÒÒ„` P;ÒÓl;ÓÌà ` àThe€affidavit€of€the€hotel€manager€stated:ÌÒ` „ÒÒ¸ ÒÓÓà  à5.à h àI€was€in€an€office€off€the€lobby€area€of€theÐ | t Ðhotel€when€Doris€Keown€fell.€€I€heard€a€crash€and€wentÏquickly€to€the€entrance.€€I€saw€her€head€resting€against€theÏdoor€and€she€was€lying€on€the€sidewalk.€€The€entrance€whereÏshe€fell€is€located€on€the€east€side€of€the€hotel€and€there€areÏbenches€adjacent€to€it.ÌÌà  à6.à h àThe€sidewalk€in€front€of€the€entrance€isÐ ðè  Ðcomposed€of€a€brown€aggregate€known€as€Futura€StoneÏOutdoor€Surface€Covering.ÌÌà  à7.à h àI€have€measured€the€height€of€the€sidewalk€inÐ  ˜ Ðfront€of€this€particular€entrance.€€It€is€approximately€three€andÏone„half€inches€high.ÌÒ¸ ¾=ÒÒ„` °=ÒÓÌ=ÓÌà ` àPlaintiff€relied€upon€a€deposition€of€a€consulting€engineer€that€the€paving€of€the€parkingÏlot€was€a€different€color€from€that€of€the€sidewalk€and€that€the€ð ðstep€upðð€of€approximate€3„1/2Ïinches€was€readily€discernable€at€some€distance,€but€that€it€was€not€discernable€from€a€shortÏdistance€because€the€color€of€the€vertical€face€of€the€sidewalk€was€the€same€as€the€horizontal€faceÏof€the€sidewalk.€œÌ›Ìà ` àœPlaintiffððs›€œother€expert›€œtestified€of€€various›€ð ðstandardsðð€and€ð ðcodesðð€œwhich›€were€notÏshown€to€be€locally€applicable€or€applicable€to€the€facts€of€the€present€case.ÌÌà ` àNevertheless,€the€decision€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€òòColn€v.€City€of€Savannahóó,€quotedÐ Ô,Ì%) Ðabove,€requires€a€re„evaluation€of€the€summary€judgment€in€the€light€of€the€law€declared€in€ColnÏand€its€applicability€to€the€facts€of€the€present€case.ÌœÌà ` àWhere€reasonable€minds€might€differ€as€to€degree€of€fault,€summary€judgment€on€thisÏissue€is€not€in€order.Ìâ â›Ð ä7Ü05 Ðà ` àThe€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€defendants€is€œreversed,›€and€the€cause€is€remanded€toÏâ âthe€Trial€Court€for€further€proceedings€and€final€disposition.€€œCosts›€of€this€appeal€are€assessedÏagainst€the€œdefendantñîCñs›€and›€their›€suretyñîCññïCñsñïCñ.›ÌÓ»8ÓÓ  Óò òÌœREVERSED›€AND€REMANDED.ó óÐ h` ÐÓÓÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p à_________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àHENRY€F.€œTODD,€JUDGE›ÌÓJFÓÓZFÓÓÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ____________________________ÌœBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGE›ÌÌÌ____________________________ÌœWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGE›