ÿWPCµ5 …# VUNa %¯ 0 4µ 0 ³ébœ w@¤ ä 4ì  j Ny ^ { ‡ m‰ 0D  0Jä 0T. 1‡‚ 1m  0^v 0hÔ 0c< 0rŸ 0| 0† 0 1u£ 0d D3| 0@¯U'>ïB)-DCV AM™U*æ.ñ>"/JQg›v¬xá$!È$ïÍ%v~¼'vÓ:) B / 0w*/ 0Š¡/ 0 +0 0´Ë0 0Ç1 0ÛF2 0ï!3 AO4Æ_4 0D%5 D/i5 B˜5˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ'í€"  Z 6Times New Roman Regular¼( ¤U$¡¡Ó  Ó(c(2‰•$¤¤Ý ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€XΤX¼¼Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù- DU// U!Ó€+¥Hœ$-3|x+kinard v. kinard - opinion Î # '  0 .   Nhý$ˆÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(5hCEKQW]cioAutoList1IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII tuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(;s˜$´´Ô2,ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô#$%& ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓVVVV'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d33337Border 1dd€-4Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial $Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€6ÔÔ€6ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€6XÔÌÌAugust€5,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó çÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€2XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€Const.€art.€6,€ðð€11€provides,€in€part:ÌÌà8 àà àNo€Judge€of€the€Supreme€or€Inferior€Courts€shall€preside€on€the€trial€of€anyÏcause€in€the€event€of€which€he€[or€she]€may€be€interested,€or€where€either€of€theÏparties€shall€be€connected€with€him€[or€her]€by€affinity€of€consanguinity,€withinÏsuch€degrees€as€may€be€prescribed€by€law,€or€in€which€he€[or€she]€may€have€beenÏof€counsel,€or€in€which€he€[or€she]€may€have€presided€in€any€inferior€Court,€exceptÏby€consent€of€all€the€parties.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€2XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€10,€Canon€2(A).Ì @Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€2XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Ô_ÔAlvaradoÔ_Ô€Morales€v.€Digital€Equip.€Corp.óó,€699€F.€Supp.€16,€18€(Ô_ÔD.P.R.Ô_Ô€1988);ÏòòDolphin€v.€Wilsonóó,€942€S.W.2d€815,€817„18€(Ark.€1997);òò€Ô_ÔFerrenÔ_Ô€v.€City€of€Sea€Isle€Cityóó,€580ÏA.2d€737,€739„40€(N.J.€Super.€Ct.€App.€Div.€1990).Ì ]Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€2XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€National€City€Bank€v.€Ô_ÔShortridgeÔ_Ôóó,€691€N.E.2d€1210,€1211€(Ind.€1998).Ì lÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€2XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Ô_ÔBonelliÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBonelliÔ_Ô,óó€570€A.2d€189,€192€(Conn.€1990).Ì ¢Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€2XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€trial€judge€would€have€been€required€to€recuse€himself€if€he€had€still€had€an€officeÏsharing€arrangement€with€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€lawyer€when€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€filed€for€divorce.€€See€Tenn.€S.ÏCt.€R.€10,€Canon€3(E)(1)(b)€requiring€disqualification€if€ð ða€lawyer€with€whom€the€judgeÏpreviously€practiced€law€served€during€such€association€as€a€lawyer€concerning€the€matter.ððÌ ×Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€2XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThis€property€includes€(1)€real€property€in€Ô_ÔStarkvilleÔ_Ô,€Mississippi,€(2)€the€Dean€Ô_ÔWitterÔ_ÔÏstocks,€(3)€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€jewelry,€(4)€the€partiesðð€crystal,€sliver,€and€china,€and€(5)€the€10„year„oldÏMercedes.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€asserted€that€this€property€was€worth€$146,435;€while€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€placed€aÏvalue€of€$146,500€on€the€property.Ì ¾Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€2XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€the€preceding€section,€we€concluded€that€the€evidence€preponderates€in€favor€ofÏconcluding€that€the€Mercedes€was€a€gift€to€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€and,€therefore,€her€separate€property.Ì åÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€2XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€total€value€of€the€marital€estate€was€decreased€by€$146,500€when€we€reclassified€theÏitems€of€property€previously€classified€as€marital€property.€€However,€it€was€increased€by€$47,952Ïrepresenting€the€increased€value€of€the€Drug€Centers€note.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò d(OÞ{$µµà0  àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0` (#(#à(b²D$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xÓñ$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒÆ‚$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿù…$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2,Ô(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³¶4$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Ǫ»$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2,ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€2ÔÔ€2¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ „ ÑÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›Ô_ÔÑ€ÑÑ7€f…¼¼ddÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€2„Ôò òÞ ÞÌÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÙ€€ÙœßR€574A1-j|Îÿâ` ç `€€@ÿRß›à@ àAT€NASHVILLEó óÌÔ€2¼ÔÌœÌÌÌ›ÌÌÌJOHN€ANDERSON€Ô_ÔKINARDÔ_Ô,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà à)à àRutherford€ChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€94DR„318ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.ÌLINDA€Ô_ÔKINARDÔ_Ô,à àà àà à)à à01A01„9606„CH„00265Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellant.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌÔ€2îÔà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURTÌà@ àFOR€RUTHERFORD€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€MURFREESBORO,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€E.€Ô_ÔCORLEWÔ_Ô,€III,€CHANCELLORÔ€2¼ÔÌÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Plaintiff/Appelleeóó:à àà àà àà àà àòòFor€Defendant/Appellantóó:ÌÌDicken€E.€KÔ_ÔidwellÔ_Ôà àà àà àà àà àÔ_ÔJ.€RusÔ_ÔsellÔ_Ô€HeldmanÔ_ÔÌMurfreesboro,€Tennesseeà àà àà àà àFranklin,€TennesseeÌÌÌÔ€2„Ôò òÌÌÌà@ àAFFIRMED€AS€MODIFIEDÌà@ àAND€REMANDEDó óÌÔ€2¼ÔÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÇÑ X ÑÓ€ÓÔ€2„Ôò òòòÑ  Ñà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÔ€2¼Ôà àThis€appeal€involves€a€divorce€ending€a€long„term€marriage.€€The€husbandÏfiled€suit€to€divorce€his€wife€of€thirty€years€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€RutherfordÏCounty,€and€the€wife€counterclaimed€for€a€divorce€from€bed€and€board.€€TheÏtrial€judge,€sitting€without€a€jury,€declared€the€parties€divorced,€divided€theÏmarital€property,€and€awarded€the€wife€rehabilitative€alimony€for€three€years.€ÏThe€wife€takes€issue€on€this€appeal€with€the€decision€to€declare€the€partiesÏdivorced,€the€division€of€marital€property,€and€the€failure€to€award€her€long„termÏspousal€support€and€attorneyððs€fees.€€She€also€insists€that€the€trial€judge€shouldÏhave€Ô_ÔrecusedÔ_Ô€himself€because€of€his€prior€professional€association€with€theÏhusbandððs€lawyer.€€We€conclude€that€the€trial€judge€was€not€disqualified€fromÏhearing€this€case.€€While€we€also€find€that€declaring€the€parties€divorced€wasÏproper,€we€have€determined€that€the€division€of€marital€property€and€the€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_ÔÏsupport€award€should€be€modified€but€that€the€wife€should€not€receive€anÏadditional€award€for€her€legal€expenses.ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àLinda€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€and€John€A.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€were€married€in€August€1964.€€Mr.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€is€a€licensed€pharmacist.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€was€a€school€teacher€when€theÏparties€married€but,€at€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€request,€she€left€teaching€after€the€first€yearÏof€the€marriage€when€she€became€pregnant€with€the€first€of€their€two€children.€ÏThe€couple€bought€their€first€pharmacy€several€years€later.€€Today,€the€business,ÏDrug€Centers,€Inc.,€has€grown€into€a€chain€of€nine€drugstores.ÌÌà àMarital€difficulties€began€to€surface€in€1992€when€the€partiesðð€last€child€leftÏhome€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€reduced€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€role€in€the€business.€€In€March€1994,Íafter€thirty€years€of€marriage,€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€filed€suit€in€the€Chancery€Court€forÏRutherford€County€seeking€a€divorce€from€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€based€on€irreconcilableÏdifferences€and€inappropriate€marital€conduct€consisting€of€interfering€with€hisÏbusiness€and€making€unfounded€accusations€about€his€fidelity.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_ÔÏcounterclaimed€for€a€divorce€from€bed€and€board.€€Following€a€bench€trial,€theÏtrial€judge€declared€the€parties€divorced€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ36„4„129(b)€(1996),€divided€the€marital€estate,€awarded€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€rehabilitativeÏÔ_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€of€$1,000€per€month€for€thirty„six€months,€and€denied€Ms.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€request€for€an€additional€award€for€her€attorneyððs€fees.€€ÌÌà àMs.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€retained€a€new€lawyer€after€the€trial€judge€announced€hisÏdecision.€€Within€thirty€days€after€the€entry€of€the€final€divorce€decree,€Ms.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€new€lawyer€filed€motions€requesting€the€trial€judge€to€alter€or€amendÏthe€divorce€decree,€to€grant€a€new€trial,€and€to€recuse€himself€because€of€hisÏprior€professional€relationship€with€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€lawyer.€€Following€a€hearing,Ïthe€trial€judge€denied€the€recusal€motion€as€well€as€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€request€for€anÏinterlocutory€appeal.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€has€now€perfected€this€appeal€as€of€right€inÏwhich€she€raises€numerous€objections€relating€to€the€manner€in€which€the€divorceÏwas€granted,€the€division€of€the€marital€property,€the€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€award,€andÏthe€trial€judgeððs€refusal€to€order€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€to€pay€her€legal€expenses.ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌà@ àòòò òSupplementation€of€the€Recordó óóóÌÌà àBefore€proceeding€further,€we€turn€our€attention€to€the€evidentiary€record.€ÏFollowing€the€entry€of€the€final€divorce€decree€and€the€denial€of€the€Tenn.€R.ÏCiv.€P.€59€motions,€the€trial€judge€permitted€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€to€reopen€the€record€toÏpresent€additional€testimony€that€she€would€have€given€at€trial€had€she€beenÏrepresented€by€her€present€lawyer.€€We€must€determine€whether€this€novelÍprocess€is€contemplated€or€permitted€by€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€ProcedureÏbecause€the€answer€to€this€question€will€dictate€the€facts€that€we€will€consider€inÏrendering€this€decision.ÌÌà àAfter€the€trial€judge€denied€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€post„trial€motions€and€her€motionÏfor€an€interlocutory€appeal,€her€present€lawyer€requested€permission€to€make€anÏð ðoffer€of€proofðð€because€the€denial€of€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€motion€for€a€new€trial€meantÏthat€she€would€not€be€ð ðback€at€square€oneðð€and€would€not€be€given€anÏð ðopportunity€to€start€over.ðð€€As€best€as€we€can€understand€her€lawyerððs€reasoning,Ïhe€wished€to€take€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€deposition€in€order€to€preserve€for€appellateÏreview€the€substance€of€additional€testimony€that€she€would€have€given€at€aÏsecond€trial€had€the€trial€judge€Ô_ÔrecusedÔ_Ô€himself€and€granted€a€new€trial.€€TheÏlawyer€believed€that€this€testimony€would€somehow€become€relevant€if€this€courtÏlater€determined€that€the€trial€judge€should€have€Ô_ÔrecusedÔ_Ô€himself.€€The€trial€judgeÏagreed€to€allow€this€ð ðoffer€of€proofðð€over€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€objection.€€In€May€1996,Ïfully€ten€months€after€the€original€divorce€trial€and€four€months€after€the€denialÏof€the€post„trial€motions,€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€gave€a€deposition€answering€questions€fromÏher€present€lawyer€that€her€former€lawyer€had€not€asked€her€in€the€originalÏproceeding.€€This€deposition€is€now€a€part€of€the€appellate€record€even€though€itÏwas€never€presented€to€or€considered€by€the€trial€judge.ÌÌà àWe€can€find€no€precedent€for€this€novel€post„trial€fact€gathering.€€RatherÏthan€being€an€offer€of€proof€in€the€traditional€sense,€it€is€more€accurately€anÏattempt€to€include€testimony€in€the€appellate€record€that€was€not€considered€byÏthe€trial€judge€in€the€first€instance.€€The€reasons€for€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€failure€toÏpresent€this€testimony€at€trial€are€not€altogether€clear.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€does€not,€andÏbased€on€the€nature€of€the€testimony€cannot,€claim€that€her€after„the„factÏtestimony€concerned€newly€discovered€information.€€We€can€only€conclude€thatÏMs.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€present€lawyer€decided€that€her€former€lawyer€should€have€askedÍher€these€questions€at€trial€and€that€he€decided€to€ask€the€questions€himself€evenÏthough€the€case€had€already€been€concluded.ÌÌà àWe€have€determined€that€the€substance€of€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€May€1,€1996Ïdeposition€should€not€be€considered€on€this€appeal.€€Our€jurisdiction€is€appellateÏonly.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€16„4„108(a)(1)€(1994);€òòDuncan€v.€Duncanóó,€672ÏS.W.2d€765,€767€(Tenn.€1984);€òòÔ_ÔMallicoatÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔPoynterÔ_Ôóó,€722€S.W.2d€681,€682Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1986);€òòFoley€v.€Dayton€Bank€&€Trustóó,€696€S.W.2d€356,€359Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1985).€€While€we€review€factual€findings€by€a€trial€judge€sittingÏwithout€a€jury€de€novo€with€a€presumption€of€correctness€in€accordance€withÏTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d),€we€do€not€customarily€consider€evidence€that€has€neitherÏbeen€presented€to€nor€considered€by€the€trial€judge€unless€it€has€been€made€partÏof€the€record€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€14.€€Because€the€trial€judgeÏnever€considered€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€May€1,€1996€deposition,€we€decline€to€consider€itÏnow.̛̜à àThere€is€a€second€reason€for€declining€to€consider€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€May€1,Ï1996€deposition.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€lawyer€believed€that€the€deposition€would€beÏneeded€only€if€an€appellate€court€were€to€determine€that€the€trial€judge€shouldÏhave€granted€a€new€trial€and€then€Ô_ÔrecusedÔ_Ô€himself.€€As€we€discuss€more€fully€inÏSection€III,€we€have€determined€Ô_Ôthat€the€trial€judge€did€not€err€by€declining€toÏrecuse€himself€from€the€case.€€Accordingly,€there€is€no€need€to€consider€Ms.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€answers€to€questions€that€her€former€lawyer€failed€to€ask€her€at€trial.ÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌà@ àòòò òThe€Trial€Judgeððs€Disqualificationó óóóÌÌà àWe€turn€now€to€the€question€of€the€trial€judgeððs€qualification€to€hear€thisÏcase.€€After€the€trial€judge€had€entered€the€final€divorce€decree,€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_ÔððsÍpresent€lawyer€insisted€that€he€should€have€granted€a€new€trial€and€then€steppedÏaside€because€of€his€prior€professional€relationship€with€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€lawyer.€ÏWe€have€determined€that€the€evidence€does€not€provide€a€reasonable€basis€forÏquestioning€the€trial€judgeððs€impartiality.ÌÌà@ àò òA.€ó óÌÌà àLitigants,€as€the€courts€have€often€said,€are€entitled€to€the€ð ðcold€neutralityÏof€an€impartial€court.ðð€€òòSee€Ô_ÔLeightonÔ_Ô€v.€Hendersonóó,€220€Tenn.€91,€98,€414ÏS.W.2d€419,€421€(1967);€òòÔ_ÔChumbleyÔ_Ô€v.€Peoples€Bank€&€Trust€Co.óó,€165€Tenn.€655,Ï659,€57€S.W.2d€787,€788€(1933).€€The€principle€of€judicial€neutrality€is€embodiedÏin€both€Tenn.€Const.€art.€6,€ðð€11× ƒ8 ××  ×€and€in€the€Code€of€Judicial€Conduct.× ƒ9 ××  ×€€Thus,Ïone€of€the€central€tenets€of€our€jurisprudence€is€that€all€litigants€have€a€right€toÏhave€their€cases€heard€by€fair€and€impartial€judges.̛̜à àThe€courts€have€also€recognized,€however,€that€the€preservation€of€theÏpublicððs€confidence€in€judicial€neutrality€requires€not€only€that€the€judge€beÏimpartial€in€fact,€but€also€that€the€judge€be€perceived€to€be€impartial.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔOffuttÔ_ÔÏv.€United€Statesóó,€348€U.S.€11,€14,€75€S.€Ct.€11,€13€(1954)€(holding€that€ð ðjusticeÏmust€satisfy€the€appearance€of€justiceðð);€òòIn€re€Cameronóó,€126€Tenn.€614,€658,€151ÏS.W.€64,€76€(1912).€€Thus,€even€when€a€judge€believes€that€he€or€she€can€hear€aÏcase€fairly€and€impartially,€the€judge€should€recuse€himself€or€herself€if€ð ðtheÍjudgeððs€impartiality€might€reasonably€be€questioned.ðð€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€10,ÏCanon€3(E)(1);€òòÔ_ÔChumbleyÔ_Ô€v.€Peoples€Bank€&€Trust€Co.óó,€165€Tenn.€at€659,€57ÏS.W.2d€at€788.€ÌÌà àThe€decision€of€whether€recusal€is€warranted€must€in€the€first€instance€beÏmade€by€the€judge€himself€or€herself.€€Unless€the€grounds€for€recusal€fall€withinÏthose€enumerated€in€Tenn.€Const.€art.€6,€ðð€11€or€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€17„2„101(1994),€these€decisions€are€discretionary.€€òòSee€State€v.€Raspberryóó,€875€S.W.2dÏ678,€681€(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€1993);€òòMemphis€Bd.€of€Realtors€v.€Cohenóó,€786ÏS.W.2d€951,€953€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989);€òòÔ_ÔWisemanÔ_Ô€v.€Spauldingóó,€573€S.W.2d€490,Ï493€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1978).€€However,€instead€of€making€this€decision€based€onÏsubjective€notions€of€his€or€her€impartiality,€a€judge€must€be€more€objective€andÏmust€ask€what€a€reasonable,€disinterested€person€knowing€all€the€relevant€factsÏwould€think€about€his€or€her€impartiality.€€òòSee€Alley€v.€Stateóó,€882€S.W.2d€810,Ï821€(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€1994).ÌÌà àA€party€may€lose€the€right€to€challenge€a€judgeððs€impartiality€by€engagingÏin€strategic€conduct.€€Courts€frown€upon€the€manipulation€of€the€impartialityÏissue€to€gain€procedural€advantage€and€will€not€permit€litigants€to€refrain€fromÏasserting€known€grounds€for€disqualification€in€order€ð ðto€experiment€with€theÏcourt€.€.€.€and€raise€the€objection€later€when€the€result€of€the€trial€is€unfavorable.ðð€ÏòòHolmes€v.€Ô_ÔEasonÔ_Ôóó,€76€Tenn.€(8€Lea)€754,€757€(1882);€òòsee€also€Ô_ÔGotwaldÔ_Ô€v.ÏÔ_ÔGotwaldÔ_Ôóó,€768€S.W.2d€689,€694€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€Thus,€recusal€motionsÏmust€be€filed€promptly€after€the€facts€forming€the€basis€for€the€motion€becomeÏknown,€òòsee€United€States€v.€Bakeróó,€441€F.€Supp.€612,€616€(M.D.€Tenn.€1977);ÏòòÔ_ÔHunnicuttÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔHunnicuttÔ_Ôóó,€283€S.E.2d€891,€893€(Ga.€1981),€and€the€failure€to€assertÏthem€in€a€timely€manner€results€in€a€waiver€of€a€partyððs€right€to€question€aÏjudgeððs€impartiality.€€òòSee€In€re€Cameronóó,€126€Tenn.€at€663,€151€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€at€78;ÍòòÔ_ÔRadfordÔ_Ô€Trust€Co.€v.€Lumber€Co.óó,€92€Tenn.€126,€136„37,€21€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€329,€331Ï(1893);€òòHolmes€v.€Ô_ÔEasonÔ_Ôóó,€76€Tenn.€(8€Lea)€at€761.€ÌÌÔ_Ôà@ àò òB.Ìó óÌà àThe€fact€that€a€judge€was€once€professionally€associated€with€a€lawyer€forÏone€of€the€parties€in€a€case€is€not,€without€more,€grounds€for€disqualification.€ÏòòSeeóó€ABA€Comm.€on€Ethics€and€Professional€Responsibility,€Informal€Op.€87„1524€(1987).€€Thus,€in€the€absence€of€other€disqualifying€circumstances,€courtsÏhave€consistently€concluded€that€a€judge€is€not€disqualified€when€the€lawyer€forÏone€of€the€parties€is€a€former€law€partner,œ× ƒ: ××  ×›€associate,× ƒ; ××  ×€or€co„counsel.× ƒ< ××  ×€€A€judge€isÏlikewise€not€disqualified€solely€because€he€or€she€may€at€one€time€have€had€anÏoffice€sharing€arrangement€with€a€lawyer€for€one€of€the€parties.€€òòSee€Savani€v.ÏSavanióó,€403€S.E.2d€900,€903€(N.C.€App.€1991).€€When€a€motion€forÏdisqualification€based€on€a€judgeððs€former€association€with€a€partyððs€lawyer€isÏfiled,€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€should€be€examined,€including€theÏfollowing€factors:€(1)€the€nature€and€extent€of€the€prior€association,€(2)€the€lengthÏof€time€since€the€association€was€terminated,€(3)€the€possibility€that€the€judgeÏmight€continue€to€benefit€from€the€relationship,€and€(4)€the€existence€of€personalÏor€social€relationships€springing€from€the€professional€relationship.€€òòSee€BonelliÏv.€Bonellióó,€570€A.2d€at€192;€òòJames€v.€Jamesóó,€656€N.E.2d€399,€404„05€(Ohio€Ct.ÏApp.€1995).ÌÌà àThe€trial€judge€and€the€lawyer€representing€Mr.€Kinard€had€an€officeÏsharing€arrangement€lasting€two€years€that€ended€eight€years€before€Mr.€KinardÏsought€a€divorce€from€Ms.€Kinard.€€The€trial€judge€had€severed€all€financial€tiesÏwith€Mr.€Kinardððs€lawyer€two€years€before€the€divorce€suit€was€filed€when€heÏsold€the€lawyer€his€interest€in€the€building€that€housed€their€offices.€€There€is€noÏsuggestion€in€the€record€that€the€trial€judge€stands€to€benefit€in€any€way€from€Mr.ÏKinardððs€lawyerððs€practice€or€that€he€was€ever€involved€in€the€present€case€or€anyÏother€matter€related€to€the€present€case.€€Mr.€Kinardððs€lawyer€did€not€undertakeÏto€represent€him€in€this€divorce€proceeding€until€long€after€his€professionalÏrelationship€with€the€trial€judge€Ô_Ôhad€ended.Ô_Ô× ƒ= ××  ×Ô_Ô€€There€is€likewise€no€indication€inÏthe€record€that€any€social€or€personal€relationship€that€might€exist€between€theÏtrial€judge€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€lawyer€prevented€the€trial€judge€from€beingÏimpartial.ÌÌà àThus,€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€is€left€with€only€one€circumstance€to€substantiate€herÏclaim€that€the€trial€judge€should€have€disqualified€himself€from€hearing€this€case.€ÏShe€asserts€that€a€reasonable€person€would€conclude€that€the€trial€judge€could€notÏbe€impartial€because€he€had€an€office€sharing€arrangement€with€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_ÔððsÏlawyer€during€a€portion€of€the€time€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€lawyer€was€representingÏMr.€Kinard€in€a€lawsuit€entirely€unrelated€to€this€divorce€case.€€This€relationshipÏis€simply€too€attenuated€to€draw€such€a€conclusion.€€There€is€no€evidence€in€theÏrecord€that€the€trial€judge€played€any€role€in€or€received€any€benefit€from€theÏearlier€litigation€on€behalf€of€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô.€€Considering€the€totality€of€theÏcircumstances,€we€find€that€a€reasonable€person,€knowing€all€the€relevant€facts,Ïwould€not€conclude€that€the€trial€judge€could€not€be€impartial.€€Accordingly,€theÍtrial€judge€did€not€abuse€his€discretion€by€denying€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€recusal€motionÏafter€the€final€divorce€decree€had€been€entered.ÌÌà@ àò òIV.ó óÓ  Óòòò òThe€Award€of€the€Divorce€to€Both€Partiesó óóóÌÌÓ  Óà àMs.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€also€takes€issue€with€the€trial€judgeððs€decision€to€grant€bothÏparties€a€divorce€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„129(b)€instead€of€assigningÏfault€to€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô.€€She€argues€that€the€record€contains€ample€evidence€of€Mr.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€fault,€including€his€emotional€and€verbal€abuse.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€does€notÏdeny€that€his€conduct€contributed€to€the€dissolution€of€the€marriage€but€points€toÏthe€evidence€of€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€inappropriate€conduct€occurring€primarily€afterÏtheir€son€left€home.̛̜à àLittle€can€be€gained€from€reciting€the€details€of€these€parties'€complaintsÏabout€the€otherððs€conduct€during€the€waning€years€of€the€marriage.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_ÔÏtestified€to€two€incidents€in€which€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€was€physically,€verbally,€andÏemotionally€abusive.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€explained€how€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€suspicions€andÏjealousy€prompted€her€to€disrupt€his€business€by€calling€his€employees€to€questionÏthem€about€his€whereabouts€and€his€conduct€with€his€female€employees.€€AfterÏreviewing€the€evidence€de€novo€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d),€weÏcannot€say€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€judgeððs€conclusion€thatÏboth€parties€contributed€to€the€breakup€of€the€marriage€and,€therefore,€that€theyÏshould€simply€be€declared€divorced€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„129(b).ÌÌà@ àò òV.Ìà@ àòòThe€Division€of€the€Marital€Estateó óóóÌÌà àWe€turn€now€to€the€division€of€the€partiesðð€not€insubstantial€marital€estate.€ÏMs.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€asserts€that€the€overall€division€of€the€estate€is€inequitable€and€that€theÏtrial€judge€incorrectly€valued€the€Drug€Centers,€Inc.€note.€€Our€review€of€thisÏissue€has€been€hampered€by€the€trial€judgeððs€failure€to€properly€classify€theÏproperty€and€to€place€a€value€on€the€property€whose€value€was€disputed.€€WeÏhave€determined€that€the€division€of€the€marital€estate€must€be€modified€toÏcorrect€the€valuation€and€classification€errors€and€to€provide€a€more€equitableÏdistribution€of€the€marital€property€and€debts.ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àThe€Ô_ÔKinardsÔ_Ôðð€marital€estate€was€worth€between€$600,000€(according€to€Ms.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô)€and€$850,000€(according€to€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô).€€While€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€tended€toÏvalue€marital€property€lower€than€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô,€the€œprincipal›€reason€for€theÏdifference€in€their€valuation€evidence€is€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€included€approximatelyÏ$146,500€worth€of€property€in€the€marital€estate€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€asserts€shouldÏhave€been€classified€as€her€separate€property.Ô_Ô× ƒ> ××  ×Ô_Ô€€The€œprincipal›€assets€in€the€estateÏwere€the€Ô_ÔKinardsÔ_Ôðð€house,€a€note€payable€to€the€Ô_ÔKinardsÔ_Ô€from€Drug€Centers,€Inc.,Ïthe€stock€in€Drug€Centers,€Inc.,€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€Drug€Centers,€Inc.€retirementÏaccount.€€The€parties€disputed€the€value€of€the€Ô_Ôhouse,€the€Drug€Centers€note,€andÏthe€Drug€Centers€stock,€but€the€trial€judge€did€not€undertake€to€resolve€thisÏconflicting€evidence.ÌÌà àThe€trial€judge€adopted€Mr.€Kinardððs€proposed€division€of€the€maritalÏestate€with€one€exception.€€Instead€of€awarding€Mr.€Kinard€all€of€his€DrugÏCenters€pension,€the€trial€judge€decided€that€Ms.€Kinard€should€receive€thirtyÍpercent€of€the€value€of€this€asset.€€Recognizing€that€Mr.€Kinard€did€not€desire€Ms.ÏKinard€to€share€in€his€pension,€the€trial€judge€gave€him€the€option€of€paying€Ms.ÏKinard€$500€for€sixty€months€instead.€€Under€this€arrangement,€and€using€Mr.ÏKinardððs€valuations€of€the€property,€Ms.€Kinard€received€property€worthÏapproximately€$448,150,€while€Mr.€Kinard€received€property€worthÏapproximately€$412,850.ÌÌà àIn€addition€to€the€$146,500€in€property€that€Ms.€Kinard€asserts€should€haveÏbeen€classified€as€her€separate€property,€Ms.€Kinard€received€the€maritalÏresidence,€the€household€goods€and€furnishings,€the€Drug€Centers€note€at€aÏreduced€face€value,€thirty€percent€of€Mr.€Kinardððs€Drug€Centers€retirement,€andÏseveral€other€pieces€of€property.€€Mr.€Kinard€received€all€the€Drug€CentersÏstock,€Florida€real€estate,€a€Gatlinburg€timeshare,€the€remaining€seventy€percentÏof€his€Drug€Centers€retirement,€and€his€gun€and€coin€collections.€€He€alsoÏreceived€his€interest€in€his€motherððs€home€on€Kay€Street.ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àDividing€a€marital€estate€necessarily€begins€with€the€classification€of€theÏproperty€as€either€separate€or€marital€property.€€òòSee€McClellan€v.€McClellan,óó€873ÏS.W.2d€350,€351€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€The€definitions€of€ð ðseparate€propertyððÏand€ð ðmarital€propertyðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b)€(1996)€provide€theÏground€rules€for€the€task.€€Once€the€property€has€been€classified,€the€trial€judgeððsÏgoal€is€to€divide€the€marital€property€in€an€essentially€equitable€manner.€€AÏdivision€is€not€rendered€inequitable€simply€because€it€is€not€precisely€equal,€òòseeÏCohen€v.€Cohenóó,€937€S.W.2d€823,€832€(Tenn.€1996);€òòEllis€v.€Ellis,óó€748€S.W.2dÏ424,€427€(Tenn.€1988),€or€because€each€party€did€not€receive€a€share€of€everyÏpiece€of€marital€property.€€òòSee€Brown€v.€Brown,óó€913€S.W.2d€163,€168€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1994).ÌœÔ_ÔÌ›à àDividing€a€marital€estate€is€not€a€mechanical€process€but€rather€is€guided€byÏconsidering€the€factors€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(c).€€Trial€judges€haveÏwide€latitude€in€fashioning€an€equitable€division€of€marital€property,€òòsee€Fisher€v.ÏFisher,óó€648€S.W.2d€244,€246€(Tenn.€1983);€òòBrown€v.€Brown,óó€913€S.W.2d€at€168,Ïand€appellate€courts€accord€great€weight€to€a€trial€judgeððs€division€of€maritalÏproperty.€€òòSee€Wilson€v.€Moore,óó€929€S.W.2d€367,€372€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996);ÏòòEdwards€v.€Edwards,óó€501€S.W.2d€283,€288€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1973).€€Thus,€weÏwill€ordinarily€defer€to€the€trial€judgeððs€decision€unless€it€is€inconsistent€with€theÏfactors€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(c)€or€is€not€supported€by€a€preponderanceÏof€the€evidence.€€òòSee€Brown€v.€Brown,óó€913€S.W.2d€at€168;€òòÔ_ÔMahaffeyÔ_Ô€v.ÏÔ_ÔMahaffeyÔ_Ô,óó€775€S.W.2d€618,€622€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989);€òòÔ_ÔHardinÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔHardinÔ_Ô,óó€689ÏS.W.2d€152,€154€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983).€€ÌÌà@ àò òC.ó óÌà@ àò òòòThe€Valuation€of€the€Drug€Centers€Noteóóó óÌÌà àBoth€parties€listed€a€$145,952€note€by€Drug€Centers€on€their€pretrialÏstatements€of€marital€property.€€At€trial,€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€stated€that€the€value€of€theÏnote€remained€at€$145,952.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€asserted,€however,€that€the€amount€ofÏthe€note€should€be€reduced€to€$98,000€to€reflect€a€$35,000€debt€he€owed€to€DrugÏCenters€and€$12,000€advance€of€corporate€funds€used€to€purchase€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_ÔððsÏMercedes.€€The€trial€judge€accepted€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€testimony€concerning€the€valueÏof€the€note.ÌÌà àThe€valuation€of€a€marital€asset€is€a€question€of€fact.€€It€is€determined€byÏconsidering€all€relevant€evidence,€and€each€party€bears€the€burden€of€bringingÏforth€competent€evidence.€€òòSee€Wallace€v.€Wallaceóó,€733€S.W.2d€102,€107€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€1987).€€If€the€evidence€of€value€is€conflicting,€the€trial€judge€may€assignÍa€value€that€is€within€the€range€of€values€supported€by€the€evidence.€€òòSee€Ray€v.ÏRayóó,€916€S.W.2d€469,€470€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995);€òòWallace€v.€Wallaceóó,€733ÏS.W.2d€at€107.€€On€appeal,€we€presume€the€trial€judgeððs€factual€determinationsÏare€correct€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€them.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔJahnÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔJahnÔ_Ôóó,€932ÏS.W.2d€939,€941€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).ÌÌà àThe€exact€status€of€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€debt€to€Drug€Centers€was€never€fullyÏdeveloped€at€trial.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€admitted€that€he€could€not€produce€a€noteÏevidencing€the€$35,000€debt.€€Drug€Centersððs€December€31,€1993€balance€sheetÏlisted€a€$25,000€receivable€from€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô,€but€this€indebtedness€had€beenÏreduced€to€approximately€$4,200€by€the€time€the€company€prepared€itsÏSeptember€30,€1994€balance€sheet.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€own€sworn€financial€statementÏdated€October€17,€1994€did€not€list€any€personal€debt€to€Drug€Centers.€€ThisÏevidence€strongly€indicates€that€if€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€ever€owed€Drug€Centers€$35,000,Ïhe€had€repaid€this€debt€prior€to€the€divorce€trial.€€Accordingly,€after€reviewingÏthe€record€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d),€we€have€determined€thatÏthe€Ô_ÔevidenceÔ_Ô€preponderates€against€the€trial€judgeððs€conclusion€that€the€value€ofÏthe€Drug€Centers€note€awarded€to€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€should€be€reduced€by€$35,000.ÌÌà àWe€have€also€determined€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trialÏjudgeððs€conclusion€that€the€value€of€the€Drug€Centers€note€should€be€furtherÏreduced€by€$12,000.€€At€trial,€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€asserted€that€Drug€Centers€owned€theÏMercedes€and€that€the€company€should€be€paid€$12,000€before€transferring€theÏtitle€of€the€car€to€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô.€€For€her€part,€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€testified€that€theÏMercedes€had€been€a€Christmas€gift€from€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€and€even€produced€a€noteÏwritten€by€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€stating,€ð ðMerry€Christmas.€€A€new€Mercedes.ðð€€Based€onÏthis€evidence,€we€find€that€the€evidence€preponderates€in€favor€of€concluding€thatÏthe€Mercedes€was€a€gift€to€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô,€and€thus€that€it€was€her€separate€property.€ÏBy€the€same€token,€any€indebtedness€to€Drug€Centers€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€incurred€inÍorder€to€purchase€this€present€for€his€wife€should,€in€the€final€analysis,€be€borneÏby€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô.€€Thus,€the€$12,000€is€a€matter€between€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€and€DrugÏCenters,€and€the€trial€judge€erred€by€reducing€the€amount€of€the€Drug€CentersÏnote€by€that€amount.ÌÌà àThe€trial€judge€should€not€have€reduced€the€value€of€the€Drug€Centers€noteÏawarded€to€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€by€$47,000.€€Accordingly,€we€amend€the€propertyÏsettlement€to€provide€that€the€Drug€Center€note€awarded€to€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€as€part€ofÏthe€division€of€the€marital€estate€should€be€valued€at€its€face€amount€ð!ð€$145,952.ÌœÌÌ›Ìà@ àò òD.Ìà@ àòòThe€Classification€of€the€Separate€Propertyóóó óÌÌà àWe€turn€next€to€the€four€remaining€items€of€property€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_ÔÏasserts€were€her€separate€property€even€though€the€trial€judge€classified€them€asÏmarital€property.Ô_Ô× ƒ? ××  ×Ô_Ô€€Because€the€trial€judge€adopted€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€proposedÏproperty€division,€it€necessarily€adopted€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€assertion€that€this€propertyÏshould€be€classified€as€marital€property.€€We€have€determined€that€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€this€conclusion.€ÌÌà àAn€integral€part€of€the€process€of€dividing€the€property€interests€ofÏdivorcing€parties€is€identification€and€distribution€of€the€partiesðð€separateÏproperty.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔBatsonÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôóó,€769€S.W.2d€849,€856€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€ÏProperty€should€not€be€included€in€the€marital€estate€unless€a€party€can€prove€thatÏit€is€marital€property€as€defined€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(A).€€òòSeeÍÔ_ÔCutsingerÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔCutsingerÔ_Ôóó,€917€S.W.2d€238,€241€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€SeparateÏproperty€cannot,€by€definition,€be€included€in€the€marital€estate,€and€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(2)(D)€provides€that€property€acquired€by€a€spouse€during€aÏmarriage€by€ð ðgift,€bequest,€devise€or€descentðð€is€separate€property.€€Thus,€giftsÏby€one€spouse€to€another€that€might€otherwise€be€considered€marital€propertyÏshould€be€classified€as€the€recipient€spouseððs€separate€property.€€òòSee€Hanover€v.ÏHanoveróó,€775€S.W.2d€612,€617€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989);€òòÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôóó,€769ÏS.W.2d€at€859.€€€ÌÌà àThe€evidence€does€not€support€the€trial€judgeððs€conclusion€that€these€fourÏitems€of€property€were€marital€property.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€testified€withoutÏcontradiction€that€she€received€the€crystal,€china,€and€silver€valued€at€$20,800€asÏwedding€gifts€and€then€throughout€the€marriage€on€special€occasions€such€as€herÏbirthday€or€anniversary€or€at€Christmas.€€Both€parties€testified€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_ÔÏopened€the€brokerage€accounts€at€Dean€Ô_ÔWitterÔ_Ô€and€J.€C.€Bradford€valued€betweenÏ$45,635€and€$51,500€for€his€wife€during€the€marriage.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€stated€that€heÏplaced€these€accounts€in€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€name€because€she€had€complained€that€sheÏhad€no€assets€in€her€own€name.€€He€wrote€the€following€note€to€Ô_ÔMs.€KinardÔ_Ô€whenÏhe€set€up€the€Dean€Ô_ÔWitterÔ_Ô€account:€ð ðI€have€told€Edgar€to€put€this€account€in€òòyourÏnameóó€ð!ð€not€joint.€€I€can€still€speak€with€him€ð!ð€but€it€will€be€òòyouróó€money€andÏdecision.ðð€(emphasis€in€the€original).€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€personal€jewelry,€valued€atÏ$38,000,€were€likewise€gifts€to€her€during€the€marriage.€€Ìà àThe€final€item€of€property€is€the€property€in€Ô_ÔStarkvilleÔ_Ô,€Mississippi€whereÏthe€partiesðð€son€lives.€€The€parties€purchased€this€property€during€the€marriageÏand€placed€the€title€in€the€name€of€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€and€their€son.€€Thus,€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€isÏthe€owner€of€record€of€an€undivided€one„half€interest€of€this€property.€€EvenÏthough€the€property€was€acquired€with€marital€funds,€the€fact€that€it€was€placed€inÏthe€name€of€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€and€her€son€is€strong€evidence€that€the€parties€intendedÍfor€this€property€to€be€controlled€by€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€and€her€son€rather€than€by€theÏparties€themselves.ÌÌà àHaving€reviewed€the€evidence€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d),Ïwe€have€determined€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€judgeððsÏclassification€of€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€jewelry,€the€crystal,€silver,€and€china,€theÏÔ_ÔbrokerageÔ_Ô€accounts,€and€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€interest€in€the€Ô_ÔœStarkvilleÔ_Ô€property€asÏmarital€property.€€While€we€agree€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€should€have€received€thisÏproperty,€it€should€not€have€been€as€part€of€the€division€of€the€marital€estate€butÏrather€as€a€distribution€of€her€separate€property.€€The€gross€value€of€the€partiesððÏmarital€estate€should€be€reduced€by€the€total€value€of€this€property.ÌÌà@ àò òE.Ìà@ àòòThe€Debt€to€Union€Planters€Bankóóó óÌÌà àThe€final€matter€relating€to€the€division€of€the€marital€estate€involves€theÏallocation€of€the€responsibility€for€paying€the€$100,000€home€equity€loan€withÏUnion€Planters€Bank.€€The€trial€judge€determined€that€this€debt€should€be€Ms.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€responsibility,€ostensibly€because€she€received€the€house€that€secured€theÏdebt.€€The€evidence€does€not€support€this€conclusion.ÌÌà àMarital€debt,€like€marital€property,€should€be€divided€equitably€inÏaccordance€with€the€factors€in€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(c)€and€in€light€of€(1)Ïwhich€party€incurred€the€debt,€(2)€the€purpose€of€the€debt,€(3)€which€partyÏbenefitted€from€incurring€the€debt,€and€(4)€which€party€is€better€able€to€repay€theÏdebt.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔCutsingerÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔCutsingerÔ_Ôóó,€917€S.W.2d€at€243;€òòÔ_ÔMahaffeyÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔMahaffeyÔ_Ôóó,€775ÏS.W.2d€at€623„24.€€Marital€debts€need€not€be€divided€in€precisely€the€sameÏmanner€as€the€marital€assets,€although€they€frequently€follow€their€related€assets.€ÏòòSee€Ô_ÔMondelliÔ_Ô€v.€Howardóó,€780€S.W.2d€769,€773€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989);€òòMansfieldÍv.€Mansfieldóó,€No.€01A01„9412„CH„0058,€1995€WL€643329,€at€*9€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€Nov.€3,€1995)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed).€€ÌÌà àMost€of€the€home€equity€loan€was€used€for€speculative€investments.€€Ms.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€testified€that€$45,000€was€used€to€purchase€stock€and€that€$30,000€wasÏused€to€make€some€oil€investments.€€She€also€testified€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€tookÏ$4,000€of€the€proceeds€for€his€personal€use€shortly€after€the€separation.€€Ms.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€is€fifty„five€years€old.€€She€is€currently€unemployed,€and€her€monthlyÏexpenses€are€approximately€$5,500.€€Although€qualified€to€teach€at€the€secondaryÏlevel,€she€had,€by€the€time€of€the€trial,€applied€and€been€rejected€for€at€least€tenÏjobs.€€On€the€other€hand,€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€earns€more€than€$80,000€a€year€and,€as€theÏmajor€stockholder€of€Drug€Centers,€has€a€far€better€chance€at€accumulatingÏcapital€assets€and€generating€the€income€required€to€repay€this€indebtedness.€ÏAfter€considering€the€factors€applicable€to€the€apportionment€of€marital€debt,€weÏhave€determined€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€should€be€responsible€for€repaying€this€homeÏequity€loan.ÌÌà@ àò òF.ó ó€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€judgeððs€distribution€of€the€marital€estate€left€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€withÏmarital€property€valued€at€$448,150€(52%€of€the€net€marital€estate)€and€left€Mr.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€with€property€valued€at€$412,850€(48%€of€the€net€marital€estate).€€As€aÏresult€of€the€adjustments€in€the€preceding€sections,€this€apportionment€changes.€ÏThe€value€of€the€entire€marital€estate€is€decreased€by€$99,548€as€a€result€of€theÏadjustments€for€the€increased€value€of€the€Drug€Centers€note€and€reclassificationÏof€the€separate€property€that€had€been€classified€erroneously€as€marital€property.× ƒ@ ××  ×€ÍIn€addition,€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€share€of€the€marital€estate€has€been€increased€byÏ$47,952€representing€the€adjustment€in€the€value€of€the€Drug€Centers€note€and€byÏ$100,000€representing€the€transfer€of€responsibility€for€paying€the€home€equityÏloan€from€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€to€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€share€of€the€estate€isÏcorrespondingly€decreased€by€$100,000€which€represents€the€home€equity€loanÏthat€he€is€now€responsible€for€repaying.ÌÌà àAs€a€result€of€these€adjustments,€the€net€value€of€the€partiesðð€estate€isÏapproximately€$762,452.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€will€receive€$449,602€(59%),€and€Mr.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€will€receive€$312,850€(41%).€€Under€this€division,€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€willÏreceive€well€over€half€of€the€marital€estate,€including€the€marital€home€and€allÏhousehold€goods€and€furnishings,€the€$145,952€Drug€Centers€note,€twoÏautomobiles,€$80,000€of€stocks€and€oil€shares,€and€thirty€percent€of€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_ÔððsÏretirement€fund.ÌÌà àRetirement€benefits,€as€marital€property,€are€subject€to€the€sameÏconsiderations€as€other€property€during€the€equitable€division.€€The€division€needÏnot€be€mathematically€precise€but€must€reflect€essential€fairness€in€light€of€theÏfacts.€€òòSee€Cohen€v.€Cohenóó,€937€S.W.2d€at€832;€òòÔ_ÔKendrickÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔKendrickÔ_Ôóó,€902ÏS.W.2d€918,€929€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994).€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€has€failed€to€point€to€anyÏfacts€that€show€the€division€of€the€retirement€benefits,€in€light€of€the€overallÏproperty€division,€is€inequitable.€€However,€we€do€find€that€the€judge€should€notÏhave€allowed€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€to€pay€the€benefits€in€monthly€installment€payments€ofÏ$500€over€sixty€months.€€This€distribution€would€require€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€to€payÏfederal€income€tax€on€the€retirement€benefits,€which€would€ordinarily€not€beÏtaxed€at€retirement.€€We€order€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€portion€of€the€retirementÏaccount€be€transferred€to€her€by€a€Qualified€Domestic€Relations€Order.ÌÌà@ àò òVI.Ìà@ àòòThe€Ô_ÔSpousalÔ_Ô€Support€Awardóóó óÌÌà àMs.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€also€takes€issue€with€the€trial€judgeððs€decision€to€award€herÏ$1,000€in€rehabilitative€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€for€thirty„six€months.€€She€insists€that€sheÏis€entitled€to€permanent€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€and€that€the€amount€of€monthly€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_ÔÏsupport€ordered€by€the€trial€judge€is€far€less€than€her€monthly€needs.€€We€haveÏdetermined€that€the€amount€of€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€should€be€increasedÏand€that€the€duration€of€this€support€should€be€lengthened.ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àThere€are€no€hard€and€fast€rules€for€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€decisions.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔCrainÔ_ÔÏv.€Ô_ÔCrainÔ_Ôóó,€925€S.W.2d€232,€233€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996);€òòStone€v.€Stoneóó,€56€Tenn.ÏApp.€607,€615„16,€409€S.W.2d€388,€392„93€(1966).€€Trial€judges€have€broadÏdiscretion€to€determine€whether€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€is€needed€and,€if€so,€its€nature,Ïamount,€and€duration.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔGarfinkelÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔGarfinkelÔ_Ôóó,€945€S.W.2d€744,€748€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€1996);€òòJones€v.€Jonesóó,€784€S.W.2d€349,€351€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€ÏAppellate€courts€are€generally€disinclined€to€second„guess€a€trial€judgeððs€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_ÔÏsupport€decision€unless€it€is€not€supported€by€the€evidence€or€is€contrary€to€theÏpublic€policies€reflected€in€the€applicable€statutes.òò€€See€Brown€v.€Brownóó,€913ÏS.W.2d€at€169;€òòÔ_ÔIngramÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔIngramÔ_Ôóó,€721€S.W.2d€262,€264€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1986).ÌÌà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)€reflects€a€preference€for€temporary,Ïrehabilitative€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support,€as€opposed€to€long„term€support.òò€€See€Ô_ÔHerreraÔ_Ô€v.ÏÔ_ÔHerreraÔ_Ôóó,€944€S.W.2d€379,€387€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996);€òòWilson€v.€Mooreóó,€929ÏS.W.2d€367,€375€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€The€purpose€of€rehabilitative€support€isÏto€enable€the€disadvantaged€spouse€to€acquire€additional€job€skills,€education,€orÏtraining€that€will€enable€him€or€her€to€be€more€self„sufficient.€€òòSee€Smith€v.ÏSmithóó,€912€S.W.2d€155,€160€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995);€òòÔ_ÔCranfordÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔCranfordÔ_Ôóó,€772ÍS.W.2d€48,€51€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€€The€purpose€of€long„term€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_ÔÏsupport,€on€the€other€hand,€is€to€provide€support€to€a€disadvantaged€spouse€who€isÏunable€to€achieve€some€degree€of€self„sufficiency.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔLoriaÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔLoriaÔ_Ôóó,€952ÏS.W.2d€836,€838€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€ÌÌà àThe€statutory€preference€for€rehabilitative€support€does€not€entirelyÏdisplace€other€forms€of€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€when€the€facts€warrant€long„term€orÏmore€open„ended€support.€€òòSee€Aaron€v.€Aaronóó,€909€S.W.2d€408,€410€(Tenn.Ï1995);€òòÔ_ÔIsbellÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔIsbellÔ_Ôóó,€816€S.W.2d€735,€739€(Tenn.€1991).€€Trial€judges€have€theÏprerogative€to€determine€the€type€of€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€that€best€fits€theÏcircumstances€of€the€case,€and€thus€trial€judges€may€award€several€different€typesÏof€support€in€the€same€case€when€the€facts€warrant€it.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔCheathamÔ_Ô€v.ÏÔ_ÔCheathamÔ_Ôóó,€No.€01A01„9508„CH„00380,€1997€WL€731784,€at€*7€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.ÏNov.€25,€1997)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed).ÌÌà àEven€though€fault€is€a€relevant€consideration€when€setting€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support,Ïòòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)(K),€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€decisions€are€notÏintended€to€be€punitive.€€òòSee€Duncan€v.€Duncanóó,€686€S.W.2d€568,€571€(Tenn.Ï1984);€òòÔ_ÔMcClungÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔMcClungÔ_Ôóó,€29€Tenn.€App.€580,€584,€198€S.W.2d€820,€822Ï(1946).€€The€purpose€of€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€is€to€aid€the€disadvantaged€spouse€toÏbecome€and€remain€self„sufficient€and,€when€economic€rehabilitation€is€notÏfeasible,€to€mitigate€the€harsh€economic€realities€of€divorce.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔShacklefordÔ_Ô€v.ÏÔ_ÔShacklefordÔ_Ôóó,€611€S.W.2d€598,€601€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1980).€€Two€persons€livingÏseparately€incur€more€expenses€than€two€persons€living€together.€€Thus,€in€mostÏdivorce€cases€it€is€unlikely€that€both€parties€will€be€able€to€maintain€their€pre„divorce€lifestyle€once€the€proceedings€are€concluded.€€€òòSeeóó€òòBrown€v.€Brownóó,€913ÏS.W.2d€at€169.€€While€enabling€the€economically€disadvantaged€to€maintain€theÏpre„divorce€lifestyle€is€a€laudable€goal,€we€have€realistically€recognized€that€inÏmost€divorce€cases,€the€courts€must€be€satisfied€with€awarding€ð ðclosing€in€moneyððÍð!ð€that€is€awarding€the€spouse€sufficient€funds€to€return€as€closely€as€isÏeconomically€possible€to€the€pre„divorce€lifestyle.€€òòSeeóó€òòAaron€v.€Aaronóó,€909ÏS.W.2d€at€411.ÌÌà àÔ_ÔSpousalÔ_Ô€support€decisions€hinge€on€the€unique€facts€of€the€case€and€requireÏa€careful€balancing€of€the€factors€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)€(Supp.Ï1997).€€òòSee€Hawkins€v.€Hawkinsóó,€883€S.W.2d€622,€625€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994);ÏòòÔ_ÔLoydÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔLoydÔ_Ôóó,€860€S.W.2d€409,€412€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€In€virtually€everyÏcase,€the€two€most€important€factors€are€the€demonstrated€need€of€theÏdisadvantaged€spouse€and€the€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ô€spouseððs€ability€to€pay.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔVarleyÔ_Ô€v.ÏÔ_ÔVarleyÔ_Ôóó,€934€S.W.2d€659,€618€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996);€òòÔ_ÔCrainÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔCrainÔ_Ôóó,€925€S.W.2dÏat€234.ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àMs.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€is€presently€fifty„five€years€old€and€in€good€health.€€She€has€aÏB.S.€degree€from€Middle€Tennessee€State€University€and€is€certified€to€teach.€ÏHowever,€she€has€been€out€of€the€workforce€for€thirty€years€as€a€result€of€theÏpartiesðð€decision€that€she€should€remain€at€home€to€raise€their€children.€€WhileÏMs.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€is€capable€of€working,€the€realities€of€the€labor€market€narrow€herÏoptions.€€It€is€unlikely€that€she€will€be€able€to€match€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€earningÏcapacity€or€that€she€will€be€able€to€make€up€the€economic€ground€she€has€lostÏover€the€past€thirty€years.ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô,€who€is€now€sixty€years€old,€is€a€licensedÏpharmacist€and€is€the€chief€executive€office€and€a€major€stockholder€in€aÏcorporation€that€owns€a€chain€of€nine€drugstores.€€Despite€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€directÏand€indirect€contributions€to€this€business,€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€has€received€the€businessÏas€part€of€the€division€of€the€marital€estate.€€His€income€exceeds€$80,000€per€yearÍand€he€also€receives€a€generous€fringe€benefit€package€that€provides€profitÏsharing€and€pays€for€his€automobile,€insurance,€and€other€daily€needs.ÌÌà àMs.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€has€demonstrated€a€need€for€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support,€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€isÏable€to€pay€support.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€asserts€that€she€needs€at€least€$3,500€per€monthÏin€order€to€maintain€a€lifestyle€comparable€to€her€pre„divorce€lifestyle.€€ThisÏrecord€does€not€support€a€conclusion€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€can€pay€that€much€support.€ÏHowever,€in€light€of€the€long€duration€of€the€marriage,€Ms€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€contributionsÏto€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€business,€€the€disparity€between€the€partiesðð€ability€to€earnÏincome€and€to€accumulate€assets,€and€the€manner€in€which€the€marital€estate€hasÏbeen€divided,€we€have€determined€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€should€be€ordered€to€pay€Ms.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€$2,000€per€month€in€long„term€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€until€she€is€sixty„fiveÏyears€old.€€This€award€for€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support€will€remain€in€the€trial€judgeððsÏjurisdiction,€and€the€trial€judge€may€alter€either€the€amount€or€duration€of€theÏaward€upon€a€proper€showing€by€either€party.€€This€increased€spousal€supportÏaward€shall€take€effect€sixty€days€after€this€opinion€is€filed.€€However,€it€shall€beÏsuspended€if€either€party€files€a€timely€application€for€permission€to€appeal.€ÏShould€either€party€file€an€application€for€permission€to€appeal,€Mr.€Kinard€shallÏcontinue€to€pay€Ms.€Kinard€$1,000€per€month€while€the€appeal€is€pending€and€thisÏobligation€shall€continue€for€as€long€as€the€appeal€is€pending€and€shall€not€expire.€ÏIf€Mr.€Kinard€files€an€application€for€permission€to€appeal€that€is€later€denied,€heÏshall€pay€Ms.€Kinard€the€difference€between€the€spousal€support€he€actually€paidÏwhile€the€application€for€permission€to€appeal€was€pending€and€the€spousalÏsupport€he€would€have€paid€had€no€application€for€permission€to€appeal€beenÏfiled.ÌÌà@ àò òVII.ó óÌà@ àòòò òMs.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ôððs€Requests€for€Legal€Expensesó óóóÌÌà àAs€a€final€matter,€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€asserts€that€the€trial€judge€should€haveÏrequired€Mr.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€to€pay€for€her€legal€expenses€at€trial€and€that€she€is€entitledÏto€an€additional€award€for€the€legal€expenses€incurred€on€this€appeal.€€The€trialÏjudge€gave€no€reason€for€its€denial€of€her€request.€€Based€on€the€division€of€theÏmarital€property€as€modified€by€this€opinion,€we€have€determined€that€Ms.ÏÔ_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€has€not€demonstrated€that€she€should€receive€additional€funds€to€defrayÏher€legal€expenses.ÌÌà àIn€a€divorce€action,€an€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€is€treated€as€alimony.€€òòSeeÏSmith€v.€Smithóó,€912€S.W.2d€at€161;€òòÔ_ÔGilliamÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔGilliamÔ_Ôóó,€776€S.W.2d€81,€96Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€The€decision€to€award€attorneyððs€fees€lies€within€theÏsound€discretion€of€the€trial€judge,€sòòee€Aaron€v.€Aaronóó,€909€S.W.2d€at€411;ÏòòBrown€v.€Brownóó,€913€S.W.2d€at€170,€and€we€will€not€interfere€with€the€trialÏjudgeððs€decision€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€it.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔBatsonÔ_Ô€v.ÏÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôóó,€769€S.W.2d€at€862.€€A€party€is€entitled€to€attorneyððs€fees€when€he€or€sheÏlacks€sufficient€funds€to€pay€his€or€her€legal€expenses€or€would€be€required€toÏdeplete€other€assets€to€do€so.€€òòSee€Brown€v.€Brownóó,€913€S.W.2d€at€170;€òòÔ_ÔKincaidÔ_ÔÏv.€Ô_ÔKincaidÔ_Ôóó,€912€S.W.2d€140,€144€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).ÌÌà àUnder€the€facts€of€this€case,€we€have€concluded€that€Ms.€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€should€beÏresponsible€for€her€own€legal€expenses.€€She€has€received€sufficient€funds€in€theÏrevised€division€of€the€marital€estate€to€enable€her€to€pay€her€lawyers.€€TheseÏfunds€could€easily€come€from€the€increase€in€the€amount€of€the€Drug€CentersÏnote.€€Even€after€she€pays€these€expenses,€she€still€has€sufficient€assets€that,€ifÏproperly€managed,€will€provide€her€with€additional€income€over€the€long€term.ÌÌà@ àò òVIII.ó óÌÌà àWe€affirm€the€final€divorce€decree€as€modified€by€this€opinion€and€remandÏthe€case€to€the€trial€judge€for€whatever€further€proceedings€may€be€required.€€WeÏtax€the€costs€of€this€appeal€in€equal€proportions€to€John€Anderson€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€and€toÏLinda€Ô_ÔKinardÔ_Ô€and€her€surety€for€which€execution,€if€necessary,€may€issue.ÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ__________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGE€ÌMIDDLE€SECTION€ÌÌÌÌ__________________________________ÌBEN€H.€Ô_ÔCANTRELLÔ_Ô,€JUDGE