ÿWPCš ²™r·P%µê)¬ì²>óúiâëy,N]ú…ýæ1ìÂK‡L&ðA"{?6²w]9á!ë°»ÓØø¥y¡ šzMMé?Ñú^ÊÿÀ6kÓØŸ vÏ×À=鵆N{:^F™7Ã>?a‡f+’yöù*ÃÙšQjábcð¬´ß‰‚Ò 5¨&Dâ@µÛBÏ1–LG]¦„Û¿–€wy«§a!=¦øÞû:ý Æa²ˆíã²S¸ägÖnƒ ¡Ð³´9Kû|'I¸ š>Ç„xò®ówÖh”öÚisÆ+ºI‘†ŽÙT;¨´r„…®ŒÔѯ³œ2n¶:ª è<è/ÌÅîx¥{¦‡ y}öb}“Øè±ÿU?ÕP ØXñ) €­C¡@¤»sí# >~?¬Öÿ»:±!èݺº˜Êv_3¡“q8ÄxvkvÇÕú~qn†üL•Æœ‰ì¯¢3ÔÞ-'B5™%v€&$L=GÐ|%ia–XÐß5D7tˆÁ_¾tÏWË`t>êDiY^áx¼ëP**“&–ÃCß}Â6$¬Æ“§CÌu«“Öm}肉^Ä/'Yæw„7Ľ¬$EE³np6] ‡}3ýÖ‘1¸b#Á\^  %) 0ˆ/ w· 4» UNÏ z Ò— i x mz ‘ Æ™ Æ_ Æ% Æë ì±N 0DŸyãE\\Û^´999999¢íííííííííííííííb 0ë———— B‚‚ 0¤Ÿ D3C D-v 0K££ ASîÆA 0¤ 0D« A«ï˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 6ÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0`†Û,s »(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó9‚±,|ë©(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 âÝ ƒR¬$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôc5ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔOur€review€of€the€motives€behind€Interrogatory€Number€Fourteen€is€borne€out€by€Preston€Skahanððs€case€at€trial.€Ð ° ÐIts€president€failed€to€introduce€any€cancelled€checks€or€other€business€records.€€In€fact,€he€conceded€that€the€companyÐ tÄ Ðdid€not€have€all€its€checks€or€the€invoices€it€had€received€from€Kuehne€&€Nagel.(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó oÝ ƒR¬$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôc5ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔMotions€to€compel€have€been€called€both€ð ðthe€usual€remedyðð€and€a€ð ðpredicateðð€to€seeking€stiffer€penalties€forÐ ° Ðnon„production.€€òòóó1€Laurence€A.€Ô_ÔPivnickÔ_Ô,€òòTennessee€Circuit€Court€Practiceóó€ðð€18„12€(2002).€€Motions€to€compel€shouldÐ tÄ Ðbe€made€in€the€court€where€the€action€is€pending€and€can€be€used€to€obtain€relief€against€a€recalcitrant€litigant€who€failsÐ 8ˆ Ðto€answer€an€interrogatory€question€or€refuses€to€produce€a€requested€document.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€37.01(2).€€DecisionsÐ üL Ðto€grant€a€motion€to€compel€rest€in€the€trial€courtððs€reasonable€discretion.€€òòState€v.€Ô_ÔVanderfordÔ_Ôóó,€980€S.W.2d€390,€397Ð À Ð(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€1997).€€Where€such€a€motion€is€granted,€the€courts€may€require€the€party€who€necessitated€the€motionÐ „Ô Ðto€pay€the€prevailing€sideððs€reasonable€expenses€in€pursuing€the€motion.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€37.01(4);€òòAmerican€Ô_ÔSteinwinterÔ_ÔÐ H ˜ ÐInvestor€Group€v.€American€Ô_ÔSteinwinterÔ_Ô,€Inc.óó,€964€S.W.2d€569,€573„74€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€ ÑÝ ƒR¬$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôc5ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€parties,€of€course,€had€not€been€doing€business€with€each€other€for€five€years. ªÝ ƒR¬$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôc5ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔA€motion€to€compel€was€not€the€only€relief€available€to€Preston€Skahan.€€When€confronted€at€trial€withÐ ° Ðinformation€it€supposedly€had€never€seen€before,€Preston€Skahan€could€have€moved€for€a€continuance€to€marshalÐ tÄ Ðinformation€to€refute€the€invoices.€€òòLyle€v.€Exxon€Corp.óó,€746€S.W.2d€at€698„99€(involving€a€courtððs€offer€of€a€continuanceÐ 8ˆ Ðduring€trial€to€permit€a€party€to€deal€with€previously€undisclosed€evidence).€€However,€Preston€Skahan€did€not€requestÐ üL Ðthis€relief. ˜Ý ƒR¬$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôc5ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€37.02(B).- ù-(|G2¬$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ê»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôc5ò»»Ô d(|3™w$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ê»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3™w$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ê»»dXXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Ê»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑH°ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼Ê»»»ÔÑ8€Ÿ‘XXdì»»d8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îÞ,ÊÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼Ê»îîÞ,#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓAssigned€on€Briefs€September€1,€1999Ð üL ÐÔ‡XŸ‘X»¼ÊÔÌò òÔ#†¼Ê»XXŸ‘#ÔÔ_ÔKUEHNEÔ_Ô€&€NAGEL,€INC.€v.€PRESTON,€Ô_ÔSKAHANÔ_Ô€&€SMITHÐ úJ ÐINTERNATIONAL,€INC.Ô‡XŸ‘X»¼ÊÔó óÐ  ^ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Davidson€CountyÐ  ^ Ðà@@øøìàNo.€97C„3786€€€€€€Walter€C.€Kurtz,€JudgeÐ ú J ÐÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<Ñ` AßÐ Ò"  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M1998„00983„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€Ô_Ô„€Filed€June€27,€Ô_Ô2002Ô_ÔÔ_ÔÐ Í  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<¤` AßÐ ¥õ  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€appeal€involves€a€contract€dispute€between€a€customs€broker€and€an€importer€of€Russian€vodka.€Ð  ð  ÐThe€customs€broker€sued€the€importer€in€the€Davidson€County€General€Sessions€Court€seeking€toÐ ŒÜ Ðrecover€$4,781.16,€and€the€importer€counterclaimed€alleging€fraud,€breach€of€fiduciary€duty,€andÐ xÈ Ðusury.€€After€the€general€sessions€court€dismissed€both€cases,€the€parties€appealed€to€the€CircuitÐ d´ ÐCourt€for€Davidson€County.€€On€the€day€of€trial,€the€trial€court€denied€the€importerððs€motion€toÐ P  Ðexclude€nine€invoices€that€the€customs€broker€had€failed€to€produce€during€discovery.€€Thereafter,Ð <Œ Ðthe€trial€court,€sitting€without€a€jury,€awarded€the€customs€broker€a€$4,623.16€judgment€andÐ (x Ðdismissed€the€importerððs€countersuit.€€On€this€appeal,€the€importer€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erredÐ d Ðby€refusing€to€exclude€the€nine€invoices€and€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€judgment.€Ð P ÐWe€have€determined€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€by€denying€the€importerððs€motionÐ ì< Ðin€Ô_ÔlimineÔ_Ô€and€that€the€evidence€supports€the€judgment€for€the€customs€broker.€€Accordingly,€weÐ Ø( Ðaffirm€the€judgment.€Ð Ä ÐÌÓJÓò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Affirmedó óÐ œì ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼Ê»àXŸ‘ì#ÔÔ‡XŸ‘X.¼ÊÔWilliam€C.€Koch,€Jr.,óó€J.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòWilliam€B.€Cainóó€andÐ t Ä ÐòòPatricia€J.€Cottrell,€JJ.óó,€joined.Ð `!°  ÐÌPaul€J.€Bruno,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Preston,€Ô_ÔSkahanÔ_Ô€&€Smith€International,€Inc.Ð 8#ˆ" ÐÌJohn€E.€Ô_ÔBuffaloeÔ_Ô,€Jr.€and€Joel€A.€Vallejo,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Ô_ÔKuehneÔ_Ô€&€Nagel,Ð %` $ ÐInc.Ð ü%L!% ÐÓ9 ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼Ê»XXŸ‘h #ÔÔ‡XŸ‘X»¼ÊÔÐ Ô'$#' ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼Ê»XXŸ‘ç #ÔÔ‡XŸ‘X»¼ÊÔÓ  Óà@¬¬)ìàò òI.ó óÔ#†¼Ê»XXŸ‘E#ÔÔ€XŸ‘X»¼ÊԈР¬)ü$) ÐÌà  àPreston,€Ô_ÔSkahanÔ_Ô€&€Smith€International,€Inc.€(ð ðPreston€Ô_ÔSkahanÔ_Ôðð)€is€a€Nashville€company€thatÐ „+Ô&+ Ðimports€and€distributes€Russian€vodka.€€Sometime€in€1995,€it€retained€the€services€of€Ô_ÔKuehneÔ_Ô€&Ð p,À', ÐNagel,€Inc.€(ð ðÔ_ÔKuehneÔ_Ô€&€Nagelðð),€an€international€freight€broker€with€over€five€hundred€officesÐ \-¬(- Ðworldwide,€including€one€in€Nashville,€to€assist€with€completion€of€the€customs€paperwork,€theÐ H.˜). Ðpayment€of€customs€duties€and€taxes,€and€the€shipment€of€the€vodka€in€the€United€States.€€Under€theÐ 4/„*/ý ÐÔ_Ôarrangement,€Kuehne€&€Nagel€received€and€held€the€vodka€in€its€bonded€warehouse€in€NashvilleððsÐ ° Ðforeign€trade€zone€and€then€shipped€it€to€Preston€Skahanððs€customers€at€Preston€Skahanððs€direction.€Ð œì ÐIn€addition€to€charging€a€fee€for€these€services,€Kuehne€&€Nagel€also€advanced€its€own€funds€for€theÐ ˆØ Ðpayment€of€customs€duties,€taxes,€and€freight€charges€and€then€sought€reimbursement€from€PrestonÐ tÄ ÐSkahan.€€Ð `° ÐÌà  àIn€mid„1996,€Preston€Skahan€became€concerned€that€Kuehne€&€Nagel€was€double€billingÐ 8 ˆ Ðsome€of€its€charges€and€was€making€other€mistakes€in€the€shipment€of€the€vodka.€€Ultimately,Ð $ t ÐPreston€Skahan€refused€to€pay€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€invoices.€€In€April€1997,€Kuehne€and€Nagel€suedÐ  ` ÐPreston€Skahan€in€the€Davidson€County€General€Sessions€Court€seeking€to€recover€$4,781.16€ð!ðÐ ü L  Ðeighty€percent€of€which€represented€money€that€Kuehne€&€Nagel€had€advanced€to€Preston€Skahan.€Ð è 8  ÐFor€its€part,€Preston€Skahan€countersued,€alleging€that€Kuehne€&€Nagel€was€guilty€of€fraud,€breachÐ Ô$  Ðof€fiduciary€duty,€and€usury.Ð À  ÐÌà  àAfter€Kuehne€&€Nagel€presented€its€evidence€in€the€general€sessions€proceeding,€the€courtÐ ˜è  Ðsuggested€that€the€parties€should€take€more€time€to€do€more€discovery€and€indicated€that€it€intendedÐ „Ô  Ðto€stop€the€trial€to€attend€a€previously€scheduled€meeting.€€Rather€than€continue€the€general€sessionsÐ pÀ Ðproceeding,€the€lawyer€for€Kuehne€&€Nagel€suggested€that€the€court€dismiss€the€case€and€that€theÐ \¬ Ðparties€would€thereafter€perfect€de€novo€appeals€to€the€Circuit€Court€for€Davidson€County.€€The€courtÐ H˜ Ðagreed,€and€after€the€case€was€dismissed,€both€parties€perfected€de€novo€appeals€to€the€circuit€court.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àPreston€Skahan€decided€to€take€some€formal€discovery€once€the€case€reached€the€circuitÐ  \ Ðcourt.€€It€sent€Kuehne€&€Nagel€written€interrogatories€and€a€request€for€production€of€documents.€Ð øH ÐTwo€of€these€interrogatories€and€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€responses€form€the€basis€for€part€of€this€appeal.€Ð ä4 ÐInterrogatory€Number€Two€stated:Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àDescribe€each€and€every€transaction€between€the€Plaintiff€andÐ ¨ø ÐDefendant€in€the€past€five€(5)€years.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€For€each,€provide€the€date€of€theÐ ”ä Ðtransaction,€the€subject€matter€of€the€transaction,€the€purpose€of€theÐ €Ð Ðtransaction,€the€services€rendered€by€KUEHNE€&€NAGEL,€INC.€andÐ l¼ Ðwhat€prices,€if€any,€were€charged€for€the€services.€€Produce€any€andÐ X ¨ Ðall€documentation€supporting,€or€referred€to,€in€answering€thisÐ D!” Ðinterrogatory.Ð0"€ ` x` x ÐÌKuehne€&€Nagelððs€response€to€this€interrogatory€was:Ð $X" ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àNot€Applicable.€€The€issue€at€hand€can€be€determined€by€reviewingÐ à%0!$ Ðthe€invoices€in€question€which€have€been€provided€to€the€defendant.ÐÌ&"%` x` x ÐÌÌÌÐ |*Ì%) ÐPreston€Skahanððs€Interrogatory€Number€Fourteen€stated:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àPlease€provide€a€list€of€all€payments€made€to€the€Plaintiff€by€theÐ ˆØ ÐDefendant€and€state€the€check€number€for€each€payment,€the€amountÐ tÄ Ðof€each€payment,€to€whom€the€payment€was€made,€for€what€invoice,Ð `° Ðand€when€the€payment€was€made.€€Please€produce€copies€of€each€ofÐ L œ Ðthe€checks€made€as€payment.Ð8 ˆ` x` x ÐÌKuehne€&€Nagelððs€response€to€this€interrogatory€was:Ð  ` ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àRegarding€the€issue€at€hand€no€monies€have€been€received€from€theÐ è 8  ÐDefendant.ÐÔ$ ` x` x ÐÌà  àDissatisfied€with€these€responses,€Preston€Skahanððs€lawyer€sent€a€follow„up€letter€to€theÐ ¬ü  Ðlawyer€representing€Kuehne€&€Nagel€explaining€why€he€believed€the€requested€information€wasÐ ˜è  Ðrelevant.€€The€letter€achieved€nothing;€Kuehne€&€Nagel€produced€no€documents.€€Preston€SkahanÐ „Ô  Ðdid€not€pursue€the€matter€by€filing€a€motion€to€compel€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€37.01.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àOn€the€morning€of€trial,€Preston€Skahanððs€lawyer€filed€a€motion€in€limine€to€exclude€ð ðanyÐ H˜ Ðevidence,€or€the€testimony€of€any€witnesses,€which€was€not€disclosed€or€providedðð€in€response€to€itsÐ 4„ Ðinterrogatories€or€request€for€production€of€documents.€€Specifically,€Preston€Skahan€argued€thatÐ  p ÐKuehne€&€Nagel€should€not€be€permitted€to€introduce€nine€invoices€and€an€accompanying€summaryÐ  \ Ðsubstantiating€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€claim€for€$4,781.16.€€The€trial€court€overruled€the€motion,€andÐ øH Ðthese€documents€were€introduced€during€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€case„in„chief€over€Preston€SkahanððsÐ ä4 Ðrenewed€objection.€€Based€on€these€invoices,€and€after€allowing€some€small€offsets,€the€trial€courtÐ Ð  Ðawarded€Kuehne€&€Nagel€and€a€$4,623.16€judgment€against€Preston€Skahan.€€On€this€appeal,Ð ¼  ÐPreston€Skahan€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€denying€its€motion€in€limine€and€that€the€evidenceÐ ¨ø Ðpreponderates€against€the€judgment.Ð ”ä ÐÌà@……)ìàò òII.ó óˆÐ l¼ Ðà@ýý ìàòòò òThe€Motion€in€Limineó óóóˆÐ X ¨ ÐÌà  àPreston€Skahan€first€asserts€that€the€trial€court€should€have€excluded€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€nineÐ 0"€  Ðinvoices€because€Kuehne€&€Nagel€had€refused€to€produce€these€invoices€during€pretrial€discovery.Ð #l! ÐThe€control€over€pretrial€discovery€and€the€imposition€of€sanctions€for€the€abuse€of€discovery€or€theÐ $X" Ðrefusal€to€comply€with€appropriate€discovery€requests€is€largely€within€the€trial€courtððs€discretion.€Ð ô$D # ÐòòBenton€v.€Snyderóó,€825€S.W.2d€409,€416€(Tenn.€1992);€òòLyle€v.€Exxon€Corp.óó,€746€S.W.2d€694,€699Ð à%0!$ Ð(Tenn.€1988);€òòBuckner€v.€Hassellóó,€44€S.W.3d€78,€83€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000);€òòVythoulkas€v.€VanderbiltÐ Ì&"% ÐUniv.€Hosp.óó,€693€S.W.2d€350,€356€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1985).€€Accordingly,€we€will€review€the€trialÐ ¸'#& Ðcourtððs€decision€using€the€more„relaxed€ð ðabuse€of€discretionðð€standard.Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà@‹‹)ìàò òA.ó óˆÐ |*Ì%) ÐÌà  àWhen€Professor€Abraham€Caruthers€wrote€òòHistory€of€a€Lawsuitóó€in€the€mid„nineteenthÐ T,¤'+ Ðcentury,€he€devoted€little€space€to€the€subject€of€ð ðPreparation€For€Trial.ðð€€The€law€as€former€judgeÐ @-(, ÐCaruthers€knew€it€depended€almost€entirely€on€the€pleadings€to€provide€advance€notice€of€the€partiesððÐ ° Ðclaims€and€defenses.€€A€caseððs€specifics€usually€emerged€at€trial.€€All€that€changed€dramatically€withÐ œì Ðthe€adoption€of€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.€€Today,€pre„trial€discovery€unquestionablyÐ ˆØ Ðovershadows€pleadings€as€the€way€parties€actually€prepare€for€trial.€€It€is€through€discovery€thatÐ tÄ Ðparties€openly€mine€ð ðto€find€the€truth€and€to€prepare€for€the€disposition€of€the€case€in€favor€of€theÐ `° Ðparty€who€is€justly€deserving€of€a€judgment.ðð€€Irving€Kaufman,€òòJudicial€Control€Over€Discoveryóó,€28Ð L œ ÐF.R.D.€111,€125€(1962).Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àA€party€seeking€pre„trial€discovery€is€entitled€to€obtain€information€from€other€parties€aboutÐ  ` Ðð ðany€matter,€not€privileged,€which€is€relevant€to€the€subject€matter€involved€in€the€pending€action,Ð ü L  Ðwhether€it€relates€to€the€claim€or€defense€of€the€party€seeking€discovery€or€to€the€claim€or€defenseÐ è 8  Ðof€any€other€party.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€26.02(1);€òòReid€v.€Stateóó,€9€S.W.3d€788,€792€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð Ô$  Ð1999).€€The€relevancy€requirement€has€been€construed€broadly€to€encompass€any€matter€that€bearsÐ À  Ðon,€or€that€reasonably€could€lead€to€other€matters€that€could€bear€on€any€of€the€caseððs€issues.€€òòPriceÐ ¬ü  Ðv.€Mercury€Supply€Co.óó,€682€S.W.2d€924,€935€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€Of€course,€the€ability€to€obtainÐ ˜è  Ðrelevant€information€presumes€a€proper€inquiry.€€Discovery€requests€require€some€tailoring.€€IfÐ „Ô  Ðparties€go€too€far,€the€courts€may€whittle€down€their€discovery€requests€when€the€discovery€soughtÐ pÀ Ðð ðis€unduly€burdensome€or€expensive,€taking€into€account€the€needs€of€the€case,€the€amount€inÐ \¬ Ðcontroversy,€limitations€on€the€partiesðð€resources,€and€the€importance€of€the€issues€at€stake€in€theÐ H˜ Ðlitigation.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€26.02(1);€òòReid€v.€Stateóó,€9€S.W.3d€at€793.€€Parties€who€desire€relief€fromÐ 4„ Ðimproper€or€overburdensome€discovery€are€expected€to€request€a€protective€order€under€Tenn.€R.Ð  p ÐCiv.€P.€26.03.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àA€neutral€application€of€these€principles€casts€both€parties€in€a€bad€light.€€Preston€SkahanððsÐ ä4 Ðtwo€disputed€interrogatories€were€entirely€too€broad.€€Read€literally,€Interrogatory€Number€TwoÐ Ð  Ðsought€a€description€of€every€transaction€between€the€parties€for€the€past€five€years€even€though€theirÐ ¼  Ðentire€business€relationship€lasted€approximately€one€year.€€It€would€have€required€Kuehne€&€NagelÐ ¨ø Ðto€compile€a€detailed€tabulation,€together€with€supporting€documents,€of€all€the€services€it€hadÐ ”ä Ðprovided€Preston€Skahan€even€though€the€dispute€centered€on€a€relatively€small€number€ofÐ €Ð Ðidentifiable€invoices.€€Interrogatory€Number€Fourteen€required€Kuehne€&€Nagel€to€audit€PrestonÐ l¼ ÐSkahanððs€entire€payment€history€and€to€provide€Preston€Skahan€with€copies€of€its€own€checks.€€It€hadÐ X ¨ Ðthe€practical€effect€of€shifting€the€burden€of€preparing€Preston€Skahanððs€case€for€trial€from€PrestonÐ D!” ÐSkahanððs€lawyer€to€Kuehne€&€Nagel.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àHad€Preston€Skahan€sought€to€compel€Kuehne€&€Nagel€to€answer€these€interrogatories,€theÐ $X" Ðtrial€court€would€have€been€justified€in€scaling€them€back.€€Kuehne€&€Nagel€did€not€have€theÐ ô$D # Ðresponsibility€to€recreate€the€workaday€business€records€that€Preston€Skahan€had€itself€failed€to€keepÐ à%0!$ Ðand€then€supply€these€records€to€Preston€Skahan€so€it€could€defend€itself.€€The€courts€understand€thatÐ Ì&"% Ðð ðthere€is€a€far€greater€cost€in€complying€with€a€discovery€request€than€in€making€the€discoveryÐ ¸'#& Ðrequest.€€As€a€result€there€[can€be]€a€strong€temptation€to€inflict€harm€on€oneððs€adversary€by€seekingÐ ¤(ô#' Ðadditional€information€for€which€the€adversary€will€have€to€incur€the€cost.ðð€€Samuel€Issacharoff€&Ð )à$( ÐGeorge€Loewenstein,€òòUnintended€Consequences€of€Mandatory€Disclosureóó,€73€Tex.€L.€Rev.€753,€755Ð ° Ðn.€8€(1995).€€Accordingly,€the€courts€can€and€should€actively€discourage€overburdensome€discoveryÐ œì Ðsuch€as€these€two€interrogatories.€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àConcluding€that€Preston€Skahanððs€interrogatories€were€unduly€broad€does€not€end€the€inquiry.€Ð `° ÐAlthough€Preston€Skahanððs€two€unanswered€interrogatories€were€objectionable€in€light€of€the€issuesÐ L œ Ðactually€involved€in€this€case,€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€self„help€ð ðstonewallingðð€responses€were€notÐ 8 ˆ Ðentirely€appropriate.€€The€party€on€whom€a€request€for€discovery€has€been€served€must€serve€aÐ $ t Ðwritten€response,€usually€within€thirty€days,€from€the€request.€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€34.02.€€If€that€partyÐ  ` Ðobjects€to€any€request,€the€reasons€for€objection€must€be€stated.€€As€a€general€matter,€the€rules€favorÐ ü L  Ðthe€production€of€requested€information€in€all€cases€where€the€request€is€reasonable.€€Therefore,Ð è 8  Ðrelief€from€overbroad€or€unduly€burdensome€discovery€should€be€sought€through€a€motion€for€aÐ Ô$  Ðprotective€order.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€26.03.€€The€party€opposing€discovery€has€the€burden€toÐ À  Ðestablish€good€cause€justifying€issuance€of€a€protective€order.€€òòLoveall€v.€American€Honda€MotorÐ ¬ü  ÐCo.óó,€694€S.W.2d€937,€939€(Tenn.€1985).€€Kuehne€&€Nagel€did€not€follow€that€procedure€in€this€case.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà@)ìàò òB.ó óˆÐ pÀ ÐÌà  àTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€37.02€places€a€broad€array€of€discovery€sanctions€at€a€trial€courtððs€fingertips,Ð H˜ Ðincluding€the€sanction€of€preventing€a€party€from€introducing€certain€matters€in€evidence.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€WhileÐ 4„ Ðtrial€courts€have€considerable€discretion€in€fashioning€appropriate€sanctions,€the€nature€of€theÐ  p Ðsanctions€depends€upon€(1)€the€partyððs€reasons€for€not€providing€the€requested€discovery,€(2)€theÐ  \ Ðimportance€of€the€information€sought,€and€(3)€the€time€needed€to€respond€effectively€to€theÐ øH Ðinformation.€€òòLyle€v.€Exxon€Corp.óó,€746€S.W.2d€at€699;€òòEstate€of€Brock€v.€Ristóó,€63€S.W.3d€729,€732Ð ä4 Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2001);€òòPettus€v.€Hurstóó,€882€S.W.2d€783,€787€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€Preston€Skahan€insists€that€the€only€appropriate€sanction€for€Kuehne€&€NagelððsÐ ¨ø Ðrefusal€to€answer€its€interrogatories€was€to€prevent€Kuehne€&€Nagel€from€introducing€the€nineÐ ”ä Ðdisputed€invoices€that€it€did€not€produce€during€discovery.€€This€sanction,€had€it€been€imposed,€Ð €Ð Ðwould€have€effectively€prevented€Kuehne€&€Nagel€from€presenting€its€case€in€chief.€€That€wouldÐ l¼ Ðhave€been€an€extreme€sanction€indeed,€given€that€neither€party€is€completely€blameless€in€thisÐ X ¨ Ðdiscovery€dispute.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àThe€purpose€of€having€trials€is€to€get€at€the€truth€and€then€to€arrive€at€a€just€adjudication€ofÐ #l! Ðthe€partiesðð€rights.€€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€632€S.W.2d€542,€546€(Tenn.€1982);€òòBoone€v.€Citizen€Bank€&Ð $X" ÐTrust€Co.óó,€154€Tenn.€241,€245,€290€S.W.€39,€40€(1927).€€Questions€regarding€the€admissibility€ofÐ ô$D # Ðevidence€touch€on€the€courtððs€ability€to€reconstruct€past€events€in€its€effort€to€arrive€at€the€truth.€Ð à%0!$ ÐCategorically€excluding€relevant€evidence€obviously€hampers€the€judicial€systemððs€truth„seekingÐ Ì&"% Ðpurposes.€€òòState€v.€Brileyóó,€619€S.W.2d€149,€152€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1981).€€For€that€reason,€excludingÐ ¸'#& Ðrelevant€evidence€is€an€extraordinary€step€that€should€be€sparingly€employed.€€òòRichardson€v.€Milleróó,Ð ¤(ô#' Ð44€S.W.3d€1,€21€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000);€òòState€v.€Hamptonóó,€No.€W1999„00983„CCA„R3„CD,€2000Ð )à$( ÐWL€1840071,€at€*6€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Dec.€6,€2000)€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€May€14,€2001).€€AsÐ |*Ì%) Ðlong„time€Harvard€law€professor€John€Maguire€noted,€exclusion€of€evidence€not€shown€to€beÐ ° Ðunreliable€can€give€a€party€ð ða€perfectly€undeserved€windfall.ðð€€John€M.€Maguire,€òòEvidence:€€CommonÐ œì ÐSense€and€Common€Lawóó,€123€(1947).Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€opted€to€admit€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€nine€invoices€which€wereÐ `° Ðunquestionably€relevant€to€matters€at€issue€in€the€case.€€We€are€not€inclined€to€second„guess€the€trialÐ L œ Ðcourtððs€decision€to€admit€them€for€three€reasons.€€First,€Preston€Skahanððs€interrogatories€were€overlyÐ 8 ˆ Ðbroad€and€would€have€been€unduly€burdensome€to€answer.€€Second,€Preston€Skahan€did€not€moveÐ $ t Ðunder€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€37€to€compel€Kuehne€&€Nagel€to€answer€these€interrogatories.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Third,Ð  ` Ðgranting€the€requested€sanctions€would€have€cut€the€heart€out€of€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€ability€to€makeÐ ü L  Ðits€case„in„chief€and€would€have€reduced€the€whole€trial€to€little€more€than€a€vague,€inconclusive,Ð è 8  Ðundetailed€swearing€contest€between€the€partisan€witnesses€who€appeared€for€each€side.€€To€let€theÐ Ô$  Ðdispute€degenerate€to€that€level€might€have€served€Preston€Skahanððs€trial€strategy,€but€it€would€hardlyÐ À  Ðhave€served€justice.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àWe€share€the€trial€courtððs€impression€that€had€Preston€Skahan€really€wanted€to€find€out€theÐ „Ô  Ðdocumentary€basis€for€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€claim,€it€could€have€simply€asked€specifically€for€all€theÐ pÀ Ðinvoices€on€which€the€broker€based€its€claim€and€the€related€payment€records.€€Had€theseÐ \¬ Ðappropriately€tailored€requests€been€denied,€Preston€Skahan€could€then€have€filed€a€motion€to€compelÐ H˜ Ðdiscovery€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€37.01€which€would€undoubtedly€have€been€granted.׃°×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€HadÐ 4„ ÐKuehne€&€Nagel€still€refused€to€produce€the€invoices,€exclusion€of€the€invoices€under€Tenn.€R.€Civ.Ð  p ÐP.€37.02(B)€would€have€been€warranted.Ð  \ ÐÌà@^^(ìàò òIII.ó óˆÐ ä4 Ðà@Ô Ô ìàòòò òThe€Evidentiary€Support€for€the€Judgment€ó óóóˆÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àPreston€Skahan€also€attacks€the€judgment€by€arguing€that€the€evidence€preponderates€againstÐ ¨ø Ðit.€€We€review€decisions€in€bench€trials€using€the€settled€standard€contained€in€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ð ”ä Ð13(d).€€With€regard€to€a€trial€court's€findings€of€fact,€we€will€review€the€record€de€novo€and€willÐ €Ð Ðpresume€that€the€findings€of€fact€are€correct€ð ðunless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.ðð€Ð l¼ ÐWe€will€also€give€great€weight€to€a€trial€court's€factual€findings€that€rest€on€determinations€ofÐ X ¨ Ðcredibility.€€òòIn€re€Estate€of€Waltonóó,€950€S.W.2d€956,€959€(Tenn.€1997);€òòB€&€G€Constr.,€Inc.€v.€Polkóó,Ð D!” Ð37€S.W.3d€462,€465€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000).€€However,€if€the€trial€judge€has€not€made€a€specificÐ ° Ðfinding€of€fact€on€a€particular€matter,€we€will€review€the€record€to€determine€where€theÐ œì Ðpreponderance€of€the€evidence€lies€without€employing€a€presumption€of€correctness.€€òòGanzevoortÐ ˆØ Ðv.€Russellóó,€949€S.W.2d€293,€296€(Tenn.€1997).Ð tÄ ÐÌà  àReviewing€findings€of€fact€under€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d)€requires€an€appellate€court€to€weighÐ L œ Ðthe€evidence€to€determine€in€which€party's€favor€the€weight€of€the€aggregated€evidence€falls.€€òòColesÐ 8 ˆ Ðv.€Wreckeróó,€2€Tenn.€Cas.€(Shannon)€341,€342€(1877);€òòHohenberg€Bros.€Co.€v.€Missouri€Pac.€R.R.óó,Ð $ t Ð586€S.W.2d€117,€119€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1979).€€There€is€a€ð ðreasonable€probabilityðð€that€a€propositionÐ  ` Ðis€true€when€there€is€more€evidence€in€its€favor€than€there€is€against€it.€€òòChapman€v.€McAdamsóó,€69Ð ü L  ÐTenn.€500,€506€(1878);€€2€McCormick€on€Evidence€ðð€339,€at€439€(John€W.€Strong€ed.,€4thÐ è 8  ÐPractitioner's€ed.€1992)€(stating€that€ð ðthe€existence€of€a€contested€fact€is€more€probable€than€itsÐ Ô$  Ðnonexistenceðð).€€Thus,€the€prevailing€party€is€the€one€in€whose€favor€the€evidentiary€scale€tips,€noÐ À  Ðmatter€how€slightly.€€òòBryan€v.€Aetna€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€174€Tenn.€602,€611,€130€S.W.2d€85,€88€(1939);Ð ¬ü  ÐòòMcBee€v.€Bowmanóó,€89€Tenn.€132,€140,€14€S.W.€481,€483€(1890);€òòChapman€v.€McAdamsóó,€69€Tenn.Ð ˜è  Ðat€503;€òòRealty€Shop,€Inc.€v.€RR€Westminster€Holding,€Inc.óó,€7€S.W.3d€581,€596€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d)'s€presumption€of€correctness€requires€appellate€courts€to€defer€to€aÐ \¬ Ðtrial€court's€findings€of€fact.€€òòFell€v.€Ramboóó,€36€S.W.3d€837,€846€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€2000);€òòTaylor€v.Ð H˜ ÐTrans€Aero€Corp.óó,€924€S.W.2d€109,€112€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€Because€of€the€presumption,€anÐ 4„ Ðappellate€court€is€bound€to€leave€a€trial€court's€finding€of€fact€undisturbed€unless€it€determines€thatÐ  p Ðthe€aggregate€weight€of€the€evidence€demonstrates€that€a€finding€of€fact€other€than€the€one€found€byÐ  \ Ðthe€trial€court€is€more€probably€true.€€òòEstate€of€Haynes€v.€Bradenóó,€835€S.W.2d€19,€20€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð øH Ð1992)€(holding€that€an€appellate€court€is€bound€to€respect€a€trial€court's€findings€if€it€cannotÐ ä4 Ðdetermine€that€the€evidence€preponderates€otherwise).€€Thus,€for€the€evidence€to€preponderate€againstÐ Ð  Ða€trial€court's€finding€of€fact,€it€must€support€another€finding€of€fact€with€greater€convincing€effect.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€Kuehne€&€Nagel€had€the€burden€to€prove€that€it€had€performed€services€andÐ ”ä Ðadvanced€monies€on€Preston€Skahanððs€behalf€for€which€it€was€entitled€to€payment.€€Its€case€consistedÐ €Ð Ðof€business€records€and€the€testimony€of€the€branch€manager€of€its€Nashville€office.€€Together,€thisÐ l¼ Ðevidence€showed€that€the€parties€had€a€contractual€relationship€entitling€Kuehne€&€Nagel€to€paymentÐ X ¨ Ðfor€its€work€and€that€the€company€had€$4,781.16€in€outstanding€invoices€against€Preston€Skahan€forÐ D!” Ðwork€performed,€for€which€it€was€owed€money.€€It€is€obvious€that€the€trial€judge€believed€thisÐ 0"€  Ðevidence.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àAgainst€that,€Preston€Skahanððs€president€testified€that€he€wrote€all€his€companyððs€checks€andÐ ô$D # Ðthat,€on€the€basis€of€some€of€these€records,€ð ðI€know€that€we€have€paid€within€[a]€yearððs€timeÐ à%0!$ Ð$25,886.76.ðð€€That€testimony,€while€unrefuted,€sheds€no€real€light€on€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€claim.€Ð Ì&"% ÐPreston€Skahan€introduced€no€evidence€matching€up€its€payments€with€Kuehne€&€Nagelððs€invoices,Ð ¸'#& Ðand€it€made€no€comparison€of€total€billings€and€total€payments€between€the€parties€over€any€timeÐ ¤(ô#' Ðperiod.€€Preston€Skahan€could€very€well€have€paid€over€$25,000€corresponding€to€some€period€ofÐ )à$( Ðtime€and€still€not€have€paid€all€it€owed.€€That,€indeed,€would€be€consistent€with€Kuehne€&€NagelððsÐ |*Ì%) Ðclaim.€€Kuehne€&€Nagel€at€no€time€said€that€Preston€Skahan€never€paid€anything.€€The€dispute€wasÐ h+¸&* Ðover€whether€it€had€paid€everything.Ð T,¤'+ ÐÐ @-(, Ðà  àAfter€hearing€the€partiesðð€evidence,€the€trial€court€expressly€found€that,€ð ðgiven€the€burden€ofÐ ° Ðproof€and€the€lack€of€specifics€on€[Preston€Skahanððs]€part€related€to€these€bills,€I€really€donððt€haveÐ œì Ðany€choice€.€.€.€but€to€[award€Kuehne€&€Nagel€judgment].ðð€€Specifically,€the€trial€court€saidÐ ˆØ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àHere,€I€think€that€[Kuehne€&€Nagel]€has€shown€by€the€testimony€andÐ `° Ðthe€records€that€the€amount€is€owed.€€I€could€„€„€I€guess€I€could€raiseÐ L œ Ða€question€about€why€[it]€didnððt€prove€the€total€amount€billed€againstÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€total€amount€paid,€but€that€really€goes€to€the€weight€of€it.€€And€IÐ $ t Ðthink€thereððs€sufficient€proof€there€to€say€that€[Kuehne€&€Nagel]€hasÐ  ` Ðat€least€carried€their€initial€burden€of€proof.€.€.€.€[As€for€PrestonÐ ü L  ÐSkahan,€it]€ha[d]€the€tools€at€hand€to€produce€records€of€[its]€checksÐ è 8  Ð.€.€.€[and]€the€tools€at€hand€to€even€get€the€invoices€from€[Kuehne€&Ð Ô$  ÐNagel],€but€[it€did€not]€do€so.€€I€find€that€to€be€a€little€odd.€€And€IÐ À  Ðdonððt€think€that€I€can€rule€in€[Preston€Skahanððs]€favor€based€on€theseÐ ¬ü  Ðsort€of€vague€feelings€about€the€account€not€[being]€backed€up€byÐ ˜è  Ðnumbers,€checks,€and€invoices.Ð„Ô ` x` x ÐÌà  àBoth€sides€could€have€done€more€at€trial€to€prove€their€positions.€€At€the€same€time€weÐ \¬ Ðrecognize€that€in€terms€of€what€was€at€stake,€this€case€was€not€the€federal€governmentððs€antitrustÐ H˜ Ðprosecution€of€Microsoft.€€Although€it€obviously€would€have€preferred€more€evidence,€especiallyÐ 4„ Ðfrom€Preston€Skahan,€the€trial€court€conscientiously€weighed€what€evidence€the€parties€provided€it.Ð  p ÐApplying€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d)ððs€prescribed€standard€of€review,€we€cannot€say,€taking€all€theÐ  \ Ðevidence€as€a€whole,€that€it€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€decision.Ð øH ÐÌà@dd)ìàò òIV.ó óˆÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àWe€affirm€the€$4,623.16€judgment€against€Preston€Skahan€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trialÐ ¨ø Ðcourt€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€We€tax€the€costs€of€this€appeal€to€Preston,Ð ”ä ÐSkahan€&€Smith€International,€Inc.€and€its€surety€for€which€execution,€if€necessary,€may€issue.Ð €Ð ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à_____________________________€Ð 0"€  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE