ÿWPC·2 X# àUNë %9 0N? 0 ÍbZw@b4¢¶Å†áNg 0Di ­ m¯ 0JÆ 0T 0^d 0h 0r* 0|œ 0† 0ž 1u. 0d£U2>B)EDCn AM± AQþÆO 0D 0@Y 0D™ D/Ý B  D3)U*\K†^щ/U¸Æ ªÓÍ}J K"Ma$&®&uÔ(v~I+vÓÇ, Bš2˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ'í€"  Z 6Times New Roman Regular¼(&öy$¡¡Ó  ÓÙñÓ Ù(}(20î$¤¤Ý ƒöy!ÝÓ  ÓÙñÓ ÙÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€X~ûX¼¼Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù- °±Qe²³´µ¶ U· U¸Ó€Âê‚_#3|xÂLaidlawLaidlaw opinion Í 02 ' IB011C20IB011C2 .   (#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d,,,,7Border 1dd02-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ01234Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó55'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdWWWW'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial AÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ1"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€9ÔÔ€9ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€9XÔÌÌNovember€14,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó TÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔFly€ash€consists€of€suspended€particles,€Ô_ÔÔ_Ôcharred€paper,€dust,€soot,€and€other€partiallyÏoxidized€matter€carried€out€of€a€furnaceððs€chimney€by€the€waste€gas€stream.€€òòSeeóó€40€Ô_ÔC.F.R.Ô_Ô€ððððÏ240.101(h),€423.11(e)€(1997);€òòWebsterððs€Third€New€International€Dictionaryóó€879€(1971).€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€weight€of€the€fly€ash€could€vary€depending€on€the€output€of€the€plant€and€the€amountÏof€water€needed€to€weigh€down€the€ash€for€dust€control.Ì KÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔLaidlawððs€exact€quote€was€ð ð15„25€tons/day€„€Fly€Ash€(15€ton/min.€ld.)€$205.60/ton.ððÌ ¼Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€contract€documents€included€the€contract€itself,€the€invitation€to€bid,€LaidlawððsÏresponse€to€the€invitation€to€bid,€Laidlawððs€certificate€of€insurance,€and€Laidlawððs€addendum€to€theÏcontract.Ì  Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔMetropolitan€Ô_ÔGovððtÔ_Ô€of€Nashville€and€Davidson€County,€Tennessee,€Code€ðð€4.24.020Ï(1992)€(ð ðMetropolitan€Codeðð)€requires€that€modifications€to€written€city€contracts€must€beÏapproved€by€the€purchasing€agent,€the€Legal€Department,€and€the€Mayor.€€If€the€contractualÏmodification€requires€the€expenditure€of€additional€city€funds,€this€section€also€requires€approvalÏby€the€Director€of€Finance.Ì ÃÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Metropolitan€Governmentððs€motion€does€not€ð ðstate€with€particularity€the€groundsÏthereforðð€as€required€by€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€7.02(1).€€We€assume€that€the€grounds€were€set€out€in€theÏmemorandum€of€law€accompanying€the€motion;€however,€as€provided€in€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€24(a),Ïthis€memorandum€has€not€been€included€in€the€appellate€record.€€The€record€likewise€does€notÏcontain€any€of€the€evidentiary€materials€that€might€have€been€attached€to€the€memorandum.€€€Ì ÷Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSince€the€trial€courtððs€February€26,€1996€order€recites€that€it€considered€the€ð ðentire€recordÏherein,ðð€we€presume€that€the€trial€court€did€consider€Laidlawððs€original€evidentiary€materials€filedÏin€opposition€to€the€Metropolitan€Governmentððs€motion.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€exercise€of€the€trial€courtððs€discretion€should€be€guided€by€considering€whetherÏconverting€the€motion€will€likely€facilitate€the€disposition€of€the€case.€€òòSeeóó€5A€Charles€Alan€WrightÏ&€Arthur€R.€Miller,€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€1366,€at€493€(2d€ed.€1990).Ì CÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€a€case€involving€a€contract€for€the€sale€of€a€load€of€barley,€a€New€York€court€found€thatÏthe€term€ð ðloadðð€referred€to€the€carrying€capacity€of€the€conveyance€usually€used€to€transport€grain.€ÏòòSee€Ô_ÔFlanaganÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔDemarestÔ_Ôóó,€26€N.Y.€Super.€(3€Rob.)€173,€180„81€(1865).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Vermont€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€the€term€ð ðloadðð€refers€to€the€weight€of€theÏmaterial€placed€on€the€conveyance,€not€including€the€weight€of€the€conveyance€itself.€€òòSee€Howe€v.ÏTown€of€Ô_ÔCastletonÔ_Ôóó,€25€Ô_ÔVtÔ_Ô.€162,€167€(1853).Ì kÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔOf€course,€Laidlaw€would€be€entitled€to€payment€for€the€actual€amount€of€fly€ash€loadedÏon€a€truck€when€the€truck€is€carrying€more€then€fifteen€tons€of€fly€ash.€€Since€the€costs€ofÏtransporting€the€fly€ash€are€relatively€fixed,€the€purpose€of€the€fifteen€ton€per€load€minimum€is€toÏenable€Laidlaw€to€at€least€recapture€its€transportation€costs€when€the€loads€of€fly€ash€are€light.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò dÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€+ÔÔ€+¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ Ü ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€È¼¼ddÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñ›Þ ÞÌÌà@ àÔ€+„Ôò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE̜ـ0ÙßR€.:-A1-j|&ÿM` ç `€€@ÿRß›à@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÔ€+¼ÔÌó óLAIDLAW€ENVIRONMENTALà àà à)ÌSERVICES€OF€SOUTH€CAROLINA,à à)ÌINC.,à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€ChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€95„2114„IÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01A01„9610„CH„00479ÌTHE€METROPOLITAN€GOVERNMENTà à)ÌOF€NASHVILLE€AND€DAVIDSONà àà à)ÌCOUNTY,à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà àà à)ÌÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€FOR€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€IRVIN€H.€Ô_ÔKILCREASEÔ_Ô,€JR.,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌòòFor€the€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:à àà àà àòòFor€the€Defendant/Appelleeóó:ÌÌThomas€V.€Whiteà àà àà àà àà àStephen€O.€NunnÌJohn€P.€Williamsà àà àà àà àà àMetropolitan€AttorneyÌTune,€Ô_ÔEntrekinÔ_Ô€&€WhiteÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€+„Ôò òAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDó óÌÌÔ€+¼ÔÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,ÏJUDGEÇÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ ° ÑÑ „ ÑÓ€ÓÔ€+„Ôà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÔ€+¼ÔÌÌà àThis€appeal€involves€a€dispute€arising€out€of€the€performance€of€a€contractÏto€dispose€of€fly€ash€generated€by€the€Nashville€Thermal€Transfer€plant.€€AfterÏagreeing€to€increase€the€amount€of€ash€it€removed€from€the€plant€each€day,€theÏdisposal€company€filed€a€breach€of€contract€action€against€the€MetropolitanÏGovernment€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€County.€€It€alleged€that€it€wasÏentitled€to€be€compensated€based€on€a€minimum€charge€per€container€rather€thanÏon€the€weight€of€the€ash€actually€removed.€€The€trial€court€granted€theÏMetropolitan€Governmentððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€after€determining€thatÏthe€partiesðð€original€contract€did€not€specify€a€minimum€payment€for€eachÏcontainer€removed€and€that€the€parties€had€not€amended€their€contract€to€permitÏthese€charges.€€The€disposal€company€asserts€on€this€appeal€that€the€trial€courtÏshould€not€have€granted€the€summary€judgment€because€of€material€factualÏdisputes€concerning€the€meaning€of€certain€contract€terms.€€We€have€determinedÏthat€the€trial€court€correctly€interpreted€the€contract€as€a€matter€of€law€and,Ïtherefore,€affirm.ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àIn€July€1994,€the€Metropolitan€Government€of€Nashville€and€DavidsonÏCounty€solicited€bids€for€the€removal€of€the€fly€ash€generated€by€the€NashvilleÏThermal€Transfer€plant.Ô_Ô× ƒ; ××  ×Ô_Ô€€The€invitation€stated€that€the€contractor€would€beÏrequired€to€provide€for€the€continuous€collection€and€removal€of€approximatelyÏtwenty€tons€of€fly€ash€each€day,€although€the€daily€amount€could€vary€betweenÍfifteen€and€twenty„five€tons.€€It€also€stated€that€the€contractor€would€be€requiredÏto€provide€twenty„cubic„yard€containers€to€remove€the€fly€ash.× ƒ< ××  ×€€The€invitationÏrequested€bids€based€on€the€cost€per€ton€for€removing€approximately€twenty€tonsÏof€fly€ash€each€day€and€stated€that€the€compensation€would€be€determined€by€theÏweight€of€the€fly€ash,€measured€by€the€thermal€plantððs€scales.Ìà àLaidlaw€Environmental€Services€of€South€Carolina,€Inc.€submitted€a€bid€toÏremove€the€fly€ash.€€It€proposed€to€remove€fifteen€to€twenty„five€tons€of€fly€ashÏeach€day€at€a€cost€of€$205.60€per€ton.€€Because€it€was€unclear€how€much€fly€ashÏwould€be€removed€each€day€and€how€much€fly€ash€could€be€placed€in€a€twenty„cubic„yard€container,€Laidlaw€included€a€provision€in€its€bid€that€it€would€be€paidÏfor€at€least€fifteen€tons€per€load,€even€when€the€load€weighed€less€than€fifteenÏtons.× ƒ= ××  ×€ÌÌà àOn€July€28,€1994,€the€Metropolitan€Government€and€Laidlaw€signed€aÏcontract€Ìfor€the€removal€of€fly€ash€from€the€thermal€plant.× ƒ> ××  ×€€The€initial€term€of€theÏcontract€was€six€months;€however,€the€contract€permitted€the€MetropolitanÏGovernment€to€obtain€two€six„month€extensions.€€The€contract€obligated€LaidlawÏto€remove€fifteen€to€twenty„five€tons€of€fly€ash€each€day.€€It€also€requiredÏLaidlaw€to€keep€at€least€two€spare€containers€at€the€plant€at€all€times.€€In€return,Ïthe€Metropolitan€Government€agreed€to€be€billed€for€each€load€and€to€payÏLaidlaw€$205.60€per€ton.€€The€Metropolitan€Government€also€agreed€toÍcompensate€Laidlaw€for€at€least€fifteen€tons€per€load.€€The€contract€documentsÏcontained€standard€provisions€stating€that€changes€or€modifications€to€the€contractÏmust€be€in€writing€and€must€comply€with€ð ðsection€4.24.020€of€the€MetropolitanÏCode€of€Laws.ððÔ_Ô× ƒ? ××  ×Ô_ÔÌÌà àThe€parties€soon€discovered€that€the€twenty„cubic„yard€containers€could€notÏphysically€hold€fifteen€tons€of€fly€ash€and€that€the€plant€was€generating€enoughÏash€each€day€to€fill€between€two€and€four€containers.€€Since€Laidlaw€had€beenÏremoving€only€one€container€each€day,€a€large€number€of€containers€of€fly€ashÏbegan€to€accumulate€at€the€plant.€€In€order€to€resolve€the€problem,€Jack€Tucker,Ïrepresenting€the€Metropolitan€Government,€and€Tom€Ô_ÔMastalerz,Ô_Ô€representingÏLaidlaw,€agreed€in€August€1994€that€Laidlaw€would€begin€removing€more€thanÏone€container€each€day€as€long€as€the€weight€of€the€truck€did€not€exceed€40,000Ïpounds.Ìà àSoon€after€the€conversation€between€Mr.€Ô_ÔMastalerzÔ_Ô€and€Mr.€Tucker,ÏLaidlaw€began€using€one€truck€to€remove€two€containers€of€fly€ash€each€day.€€ItÏalso€began€submitting€bills€to€the€Metropolitan€Government€treating€eachÏcontainer€as€a€separate€load€and€seeking€the€minimum€fifteen„ton€fee€for€eachÏcontainer.€€While€the€Metropolitan€Government€was€willing€to€pay€Laidlaw€forÏthe€actual€number€of€tons€of€fly€ash€removed,€it€refused€to€pay€the€doubleÏminimum€Laidlaw€demanded.ÌÌà àIn€July€1995,€Laidlaw€sued€the€Metropolitan€Government€in€the€ChanceryÏCourt€for€Davidson€County€seeking€$169,620€in€allegedly€unpaid€fees€for€the€flyÏash€removed€from€the€thermal€plant.€€The€Metropolitan€Government€then€filed€aÍð ðmotion€to€dismiss€or€in€the€alternative€for€summary€judgment.ðð× ƒ@ ××  ×€€LaidlawÏresponded€to€the€motion€by€filing€Mr.€Ô_ÔMastalerzÔ_Ôððs€affidavit€detailing€hisÏconversations€and€agreement€with€Mr.€Tucker€concerning€the€removal€ofÏadditional€containers.€€The€Metropolitan€Government€countered€by€submitting€aÏcopy€of€Metro€Code€ðð€4.24.020€which€requires€modifications€in€written€contractsÏto€be€approved€by€various€city€purchasing,€legal,€and€accounting€officials.€€OnÏFebruary€26,€1996,€the€trial€court€granted€the€Metropolitan€Governmentððs€motionÏand€dismissed€Laidlawððs€complaint.ÌÌà àLaidlaw€filed€a€timely€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€59.04€motion€to€alter€or€amend€theÏorder€dismissing€its€complaint.€It€supported€its€motion€with€the€affidavit€of€L.€E.ÏWilson,€an€environmental€engineer€and€solid€waste€management€consultant.€€Mr.ÏWilson€opined€that€the€term€ð ðloadðð€used€in€Laidlawððs€contract€with€theÏMetropolitan€Government€referred€to€a€single€container€and€that€ð ðLaidlaw€isÏentitled€to€be€paid€on€the€basis€of€loaded€roll„off€containers€received€at€theÏlandfill€regardless€how€they€were€transported.ðð€€On€May€21,€1996,€the€trial€courtÏfiled€a€memorandum€and€order€denying€Laidlawððs€motion€to€alter€or€amend.€€TheÏtrial€court€reasoned€that€Laidlaw€was€not€entitled€to€recover,€even€if€Mr.ÏWilsonððs€interpretation€of€the€word€ð ðloadðð€was€correct,€because€the€purportedÏcontract€modification€was€not€in€writing€and€had€not€been€approved€by€theÏappropriate€city€officials.̛̜à@ àò òII.ó óÌÌà àAmbiguities€in€the€procedural€posture€of€this€case€in€the€trial€court€requireÏus€to€first€identify€the€appropriate€standard€of€appellate€review.€€TheÏMetropolitan€Governmentððs€opening€motion€requested€relief€under€either€Tenn.ÏR.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6)€or€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.€€While€Laidlawððs€response€relied€onÏevidentiary€materials€outside€the€pleadings,€the€February€26,€1996€order€did€notÏstate€whether€the€trial€court€had€considered€Laidlawððs€evidentiary€materials× ƒA ××  ×€orÏwhether€it€was€treating€the€Metropolitan€Governmentððs€motion€as€a€motion€toÏdismiss€or€a€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€Both€Laidlaw€and€the€MetropolitanÏGovernment€filed€additional€evidentiary€materials€in€support€of€and€in€oppositionÏto€Laidlawððs€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€59.04€motion.€€While€the€trial€courtððs€May€21,Ï1996€memorandum€and€order€specifically€refers€to€these€evidentiary€materials,€itÏdoes€not€specifically€address€whether€the€Metropolitan€Governmentððs€motion€is€aÏmotion€to€dismiss€or€a€motion€for€summary€judgment.ÌÌà àThe€differences€between€a€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6)€dismissal€and€a€Tenn.ÏR.€Civ.€P.€56€dismissal€are€not€merely€academic.€€Motions€to€dismiss€pursuant€toÏTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6)€are€rarely€granted.€€òòSee€Dobbs.€v.€Ô_ÔGuentherÔ_Ô,óó€846ÏS.W.2d€270,€273€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€They€challenge€the€sufficiency€of€theÏcomplaint,€òòsee€Cook€v.€Spinnakerððs€of€Ô_ÔRivergateÔ_Ô,€Inc.óó,€878€S.W.2d€934,€938Ï(Tenn.€1994),€and€should€be€granted€only€when€the€complaint€states€no€facts€thatÏwould€entitle€the€claimant€to€relief.€€òòSee€Fletcher€v.€Board€of€ProfððlÏResponsibilityóó,€915€S.W.2d€448,€450€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€Courts€consideringÏthese€motions€must€take€all€the€well„pleaded€factual€allegations€in€the€complaint€asÏtrue€and€must€construe€the€complaint€liberally€in€the€plaintiffððs€favor.€€òòSee€CookÏv.€Spinnakerððs€of€Ô_ÔRivergateÔ_Ô,€Inc.óó,€878€S.W.2d€at€938;€òòÔ_ÔRampyÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔICIÔ_Ô€Acrylics,ÏInc.óó,€898€S.W.2d€196,€198€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994).ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€motions€for€summary€judgment€provide€an€expeditiousÏand€inexpensive€means€for€concluding€litigation€when€there€are€no€materialÏfactual€disputes€and€when€the€Ô_ÔdispositiveÔ_Ô€issues€involve€questions€of€law.€€òòSeeÏAlexander€v.€Memphis€Individual€Practice€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ôóó,€870€S.W.2d€278,€280€(Tenn.Ï1993).€€When€reviewing€a€summary€judgment€motion,€the€courts€view€theÏevidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€non„moving€party€and€must€deny€theÏmotion€if€there€is€any€dispute€as€to€the€material€facts€or€if€there€is€any€doubt€as€toÏthe€conclusions€to€be€drawn€from€the€facts.€€òòSee€Byrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,Ï210„11€(Tenn.€1993).€€Appellate€courts€reviewing€an€order€granting€a€summaryÏjudgment€do€not€presume€that€the€trial€courtððs€decision€was€correct,€òòsee€City€ofÏÔ_ÔTullahomaÔ_Ô€v.€Bedford€Countyóó,€938€S.W.2d€408,€412€(Tenn.€1997),€but€ratherÏmake€a€fresh€determination€of€whether€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56€has€been€satisfied.€ÏòòSee€Ô_ÔHembreeÔ_Ô€v.€Stateóó,€925€S.W.2d€513,€515€(Tenn.€1996);€òòÔ_ÔCowdenÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔSovranÔ_ÔÏBank/Central€Southóó,€816€S.W.2d€741,€744€(Tenn.€1991).€ÌÌà àTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€12.02(6)€requires€that€a€motion€to€dismiss€must€be€treatedÏas€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€if€ð ðmatters€outside€the€pleading€are€presentedÏto€and€not€excluded€by€the€[trial]€court.ðð€€Trial€courts€have€discretion€to€decideÏwhether€or€not€to€consider€evidentiary€materials€beyond€the€pleadings,× ƒB ××  ×€but€ifÏthey€decide€to€consider€these€materials,€they€must€treat€the€motion€as€one€forÏsummary€judgment.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔHixsonÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔStickleyÔ_Ôóó,€493€S.W.2d€471,€473€(Tenn.€1973);ÏòòPacific€Eastern€Corp.€v.€Gulf€Life€Holding€Co.óó,€902€S.W.2d€946,€952€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1995).€€Once€conversion€occurs,€all€subsequent€consideration€of€the€motionÏmust€comply€with€the€procedural€requirements€applicable€to€motions€forÏsummary€judgment.ÌÌà àBecause€of€the€significant€procedural€and€substantive€differences€betweenÏmotions€to€dismiss€and€motions€for€summary€judgment,€the€trial€courts€shouldÏgive€the€parties€fair€notice€of€the€changed€status€of€the€motion€and€a€reasonableÏopportunity€to€present€evidence€either€in€support€of€or€in€opposition€to€theÏsummary€judgment€motion.€€òòSeeóó€2A€James€W.€Moore€et€al.,€òòMooreððs€FederalÏPractice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€12.09[3]€(2d€ed.€1995);€5A€òòFederal€Practice€andÏProcedureóó,€ðð€1366,€at€501.€€This€notice€eliminates€the€possibility€of€confusion€andÏmisunderstanding€concerning€the€posture€of€the€proceedings.€However,€failure€toÏgive€this€notice€is€not€reversible€error€if€the€parties€had€actual€notice€of€theÏconversion€of€the€motion€and€were€not€otherwise€prejudiced€by€the€lack€ofÏformal€notice.€€òòSee€Nuclear€Transp.€&€Storage€v.€United€Statesóó,€890€F.2d€1348,Ï1351€(6th€Cir.€1989);€2A€òòMooreððs€Federal€Practice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€12.09[3];€5AÏòòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€1366,€at€506.€€ÌÌà àWhen€the€trial€court€does€not€state€whether€it€is€converting€a€motion€toÏdismiss€to€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€we€must€examine€the€trial€courtððsÏdecision€and€the€record€to€determine€whether€it€considered€factual€materialsÏbeyond€the€partiesðð€pleadings.€€If€we€determine€that€the€trial€court€consideredÏthese€materials,€then€we€must€review€the€order€dismissing€the€complaint€as€if€itÏwere€a€summary€judgment.€€òòSee€Sutton€v.€Davisóó,€916€S.W.2d€937,€938€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1995);€òòPacific€Eastern€Corp.€v.€Gulf€Life€Holding€Co.óó,€902€S.W.2d€at€952.€ÌÌà àBoth€parties€supported€their€arguments€with€evidentiary€materials€beyondÏtheir€pleadings.€€While€the€order€dismissing€the€complaint€does€not€state€explicitlyÏthat€the€trial€court€considered€Laidlawððs€evidentiary€materials€and€converted€theÏmotion€to€one€seeking€a€summary€judgment,€it€recites€in€general€terms€that€theÏtrial€courtððs€decision€was€based€on€the€ð ðentire€record€herein.ðð€€Additionally,€theÍlater€memorandum€and€order€denying€Laidlawððs€motion€to€alter€or€amendÏanalyzes€the€new€evidentiary€materials€Laidlaw€submitted€after€the€original€orderÏof€dismissal.€€Accordingly,€we€have€concluded€that€the€trial€court€considered€theÏevidentiary€materials€submitted€by€the€parties€and,€therefore,€that€the€order€ofÏdismissal€should€be€viewed€as€one€granting€a€summary€judgment.ÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌÌà àLaidlawððs€principle€argument€is€that€the€trial€court€should€not€have€grantedÏthe€Metropolitan€Governmentððs€summary€judgment€motion€because€of€theÏgenuine€factual€disputes€concerning€the€meaning€of€the€word€ð ðloadðð€as€it€was€usedÏin€the€contract.€€It€asserts€that€the€term€ð ðloadðð€is€ambiguous€and,€therefore,€thatÏthe€fact„finder€must€go€beyond€the€four€corners€of€the€contract€to€discern€theÏpartiesðð€intended€meaning.€€Since€we€have€determined€that€the€contracting€partiesððÏintentions€can€be€gleaned€from€the€four€corners€of€their€agreement,€the€paroleÏevidence€concerning€the€partiesðð€respective€understanding€of€the€meaning€of€theÏterm€ð ðloadðð€was€immaterial.ÌÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àWhen€called€upon€to€construe€a€written€contract,€the€courtððs€task€is€toÏascertain€and€give€effect€to€the€contracting€partiesðð€intentions€by€fairly€construingÏthe€terms€of€their€written€agreement.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔPenskeÔ_Ô€Truck€Leasing€Co.€v.ÏHuddlestonóó,€795€S.W.2d€669,€671€(Tenn.€1990);€òòBob€Pearsall€Motors,€Inc.€v.ÏRegal€Chrysler„Plymouth,€Inc.óó,€521€S.W.2d€578,€580€(Tenn.€1975).€€The€courtÏmust€construe€a€contract€as€written€and€is€not€at€liberty€to€make€a€new€contractÏfor€parties€who€have€spoken€for€themselves.€€òòSee€Petty€v.€Sloanóó,€197€Tenn.€630,Í640,€277€S.W.2d€355,€359€(1955);€òòHillsboro€Plaza€Enters.€v.€Moonóó,€860€S.W.2dÏ45,€47€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€It€is€the€courtððs€responsibility€to€enforce€contractsÏaccording€to€their€plain€terms€without€favoring€either€contracting€party.€€òòSeeÏÔ_ÔCockeÔ_Ô€County€Bd.€of€Highway€Ô_ÔCommððrsÔ_Ô€v.€Newport€Ô_ÔUtilsÔ_Ô.€Bd.óó,€690€S.W.2d€231,Ï237€(Tenn.€1985);€òòHeyer„Jordan€Ô_Ô&€AssocsÔ_Ô.,€Inc.€v.€Jordanóó,€801€S.W.2d€814,€821Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).€€ÌÌà àIf€a€contractððs€language€is€unambiguous,€the€courts€must€enforce€theÏcontract€according€to€its€terms.€€òòSee€Cummings€v.€Vaughnóó,€911€S.W.2d€739,€742Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).€€Determining€whether€a€contractual€provision€isÏambiguous€is€a€question€of€law.€€òòSee€Anderson€v.€Ô_ÔDTBÔ_Ô€Corp.óó,€App.€No.€89„172„II,€1990€WL€33380,€at€*2€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Mar.€28,€1990)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ï11€application€filed).€€It€requires€the€court€to€construe€the€provision€at€issue€inÏlight€of€the€entire€agreement,€òòsee€Ô_ÔCockeÔ_Ô€County€Bd.€of€Highway€Ô_ÔCommððrsÔ_Ô€v.ÏNewport€Ô_ÔUtilsÔ_Ô.€Bd.óó,€690€S.W.2d€at€237,€and€to€give€the€words€their€common,Ïordinary€meaning.€€òòSee€Moore€v.€Life€&€Ô_ÔCasÔ_Ô.€Ins.€Co.óó,€162€Tenn.€682,€686,€40ÏS.W.2d€403,€404€(1931);€òòWilson€v.€Mooreóó,€929€S.W.2d€367,€373€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1996).€€A€contract€should€be€found€to€be€ambiguous€only€when€its€meaning€isÏuncertain€or€when€it€can€fairly€be€construed€in€more€ways€than€one.€€òòSeeÏFarmers„Peoples€Bank€v.€Ô_ÔClemmerÔ_Ôóó,€519€S.W.2d€801,€805€(Tenn.€1975);€òòÔ_ÔGredigÔ_ÔÏv.€Tennessee€Farmers€Mut.€Ins.€Co.óó,€891€S.W.2d€909,€912€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1994).ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àAfter€the€trial€court€granted€the€Metropolitan€Governmentððs€motion€forÏsummary€judgment,€Laidlaw€requested€that€the€trial€court€revisit€its€decisionÏbased€on€Mr.€Wilsonððs€affidavit€concerning€the€meaning€of€the€word€ð ðload.ðð€€OneÍapparent€purpose€of€this€affidavit€was€to€convince€the€trial€court€that€the€wordÏð ðloadðð€was€a€term€of€art€in€the€waste€management€business€with€a€meaningÏdifferent€than€its€common,€ordinary€meaning.€€Since€Mr.€Wilsonððs€affidavit€doesÏnot€indicate€that€he€played€a€role€in€the€formation€of€the€contract€betweenÏLaidlaw€and€the€Metropolitan€Government,€the€affidavit€does€not€affirmativelyÏshow€that€Mr.€Wilson€is€competent€to€testify€about€either€partyððs€intentions€andÏunderstandings€when€they€used€the€word€ð ðloadðð€in€their€agreement.ÌÌà àAnother€apparent€purpose€of€introducing€Mr.€Wilsonððs€affidavit€was€toÏcreate€a€material€factual€dispute€that€would€provide€a€sufficient€basis€for€denyingÏthe€summary€judgment.€€This€tactic,€while€clever,€avails€Laidlaw€little€because€weÏhave€determined€that€the€contract€is€clear€and,€that€we€can€ascertain€the€partiesððÏagreement€from€the€contract€documents€themselves.€€Neither€the€parties€nor€theÏcourt€may€create€contractual€ambiguity€when€none€exists.€€òòSee€Edwards€v.ÏTravelers€Ô_ÔIndemÔ_Ô.€Co.óó,€201€Tenn.€435,€441,€300€S.W.2d€615,€617„18€(1957);ÏòòÔ_ÔCookevilleÔ_Ô€Gynecology€&€Ô_ÔObstetricsÔ_Ô,€P.C.€v.€Southeastern€Data€Ô_ÔSysÔ_Ô.,€Inc.óó,€884ÏS.W.2d€458,€462€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994).€€€ÌÌà@ àò òC.ó óÌÌà àWe€see€no€need€to€go€beyond€the€four€corners€of€the€contract€documents€inÏthis€case€because€the€payment€provisions€are€unambiguous.€€Considering€theseÏprovisions€in€light€of€the€entire€agreement,€the€contract€provides€that€LaidlawððsÏcompensation€will€be€based€on€the€weight€of€the€fly€ash,€not€the€number€ofÏcontainers€removed€from€the€plant.€€The€word€ð ðloadðð€in€this€context€refers€to€theÏfly€ash€and€not€the€containers€in€which€the€fly€ash€is€placed€for€disposal.€€ÌÌà àThis€construction€is€consistent€with€the€common€meaning€of€the€wordÏð ðloadðð€and€is€harmonious€with€the€three€provisions€in€the€contract€where€theÏword€ð ðloadðð€appears.€€In€its€most€common€usage,€ð ðloadðð€connotes€ð ðwhatever€isÏput€in€a€.€.€.€vehicle€.€.€.€for€conveyance,ðð€òòWebsterððs€Third€New€InternationalÏDictionaryóó€1325€(1971),€or€ð ð[t]hat€which€is€laid€upon€a€.€.€.€vehicle€to€be€carried.ðð€Ï8€òòThe€Oxford€English€Dictionaryóó€1062€(2d€ed.€1989).× ƒC ××  ×€€Thus,€the€requirementÏthat€ð ðall€loads€must€be€weighed€on€Ownerððs€scalesðð€means€that€each€truck€leavingÏthe€plant€will€be€weighed€to€determine€the€weight€of€the€fly€ash€being€removed.Ô_Ô× ƒD ××  ×Ô_Ô€€€ÏThe€provision€in€the€addenda€entitling€Laidlaw€to€be€billed€on€a€ð ðper€load€basisððÏmeans€that€Laidlaw€will€bill€the€Metropolitan€Government€based€on€the€amountÏof€fly€ash€loaded€on€each€truck€leaving€the€plant.€€Finally,€the€provision€grantingÏLaidlaw€a€fifteen€ton€per€load€minimum€payment€means€that€Laidlaw€is€entitledÏto€receive€payment€for€a€fifteen„ton€load€even€when€one€of€its€trucks€is€loadedÏwith€less€than€fifteen€tons€of€fly€ash.× ƒE ××  ×€€€ÌÌà@ àò òIV.ó óÌÌà àLaidlawððs€alternative€argument€is€that€the€Metropolitan€Government€shouldÏbe€Ô_ÔestoppedÔ_Ô€from€denying€that€Laidlaw€is€entitled€to€collect€the€minimumÏpayment€for€each€container€of€fly€ash€because€a€city€employee€agreed€toÍð ðinterpretðð€the€contract€to€require€compensation€on€this€basis.€€While€thisÏargument€gives€us€some€pause,€we€have€determined€that€it€must€fail€for€twoÏreasons.€€First,€interpreting€the€contract€is€unnecessary€because€the€contractððsÏprovisions€are€clear.€€Second,€the€ð ðinterpretationðð€relied€on€by€Laidlaw€is€actuallyÏa€modification€of€the€contract,€and€the€purported€oral€modification€of€theÏcontract€is€legally€ineffective€because€it€does€not€meet€the€requirements€ofÏMetropolitan€Code€ðð€4.24.020.ÌÌà àWe€have€already€concluded€that€the€payment€provisions€in€the€contractÏbetween€Laidlaw€and€the€Metropolitan€Government€are€unambiguous.€ÏTherefore,€the€parties€were€not€required€to€resort€to€interpreting€vagueÏcontractual€terms€but€rather€were€required€to€perform€in€accordance€with€theÏcontractððs€plain€requirements.€€As€we€read€the€contract,€it€clearly€provides€thatÏLaidlaw€is€entitled€to€be€paid€based€on€the€weight€of€the€fly€ash€removed€and€thatÏLaidlaw€is€not€entitled€to€collect€the€minimum€charge€for€each€container€filledÏwith€fly€ash.€€Thus,€Laidlawððs€assertion€that€Mr.€Tucker€agreed€to€pay€Laidlaw€aÏdouble€minimum€if€it€would€haul€away€two€containers€of€ash€on€each€truck€is€notÏa€contract€interpretation€claim€but€rather€a€contract€modification€claim.ÌÌà àIt€is€well€established€that€the€terms€of€a€written€contract€may€be€modifiedÏby€an€oral€amendment.òò€€See€Co„Operative€Stores€Co.€v.€United€States€FidelityÏGuar.€Co.óó,€137€Tenn.€609,€622,€195€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€177,€180€(1917);€òòÔ_ÔGalbreathÔ_Ô€v.€Harrisóó,Ï811€S.W.2d€88,€91€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).€€Thus,€contracting€parties€may,€byÏtheir€conduct,€waive€a€requirement€that€contractual€modifications€must€be€inÏwriting€in€order€to€be€effective.€€òòSee€Moore€Constr.€Co.€v.€Clarksville€Depððt€ofÏElectricityóó,€707€S.W.2d€1,€12€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1985).€€These€principles€apply€toÏcontracts€with€government€entities€but€with€two€significant€limitations.€€First,Ïpersons€dealing€with€governmental€officials€are€presumed€to€know€the€limitationsÍof€the€officialððs€authority.€€òòSee€City€of€Lebanon€v.€Bairdóó,€756€S.W.2d€236,€245Ï(Tenn.€1988).€€Second,€the€governmental€entity€must€have€acted€affirmatively€toÏinduce€the€contracting€party€to€perform€more€than€it€was€originally€obligated€toÏperform.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔPaduchÔ_Ô€v.€City€of€Johnson€Cityóó,€896€S.W.2d€767,€772„73€(Tenn.Ï1995)€(quoting€òòBledsoe€County€v.€McReynoldsóó,€703€S.W.2d€123,€125„26€(Tenn.Ï1985));€òòCity€of€Lebanon€v.€Bairdóó,€756€S.W.2d€at€244.Ì€Ìà àEach€of€these€limitations€undermines€the€vitality€of€Laidlawððs€estoppelÏclaim.€€The€reference€to€Metropolitan€Code€ðð€4.24.020€in€the€contractððsÏmodification€clause€put€Laidlaw€on€notice€that€Mr.€Tucker€did€not€have€theÏauthority€to€modify€the€terms€of€the€contract.€€This€provision€clearly€conditionsÏthe€effectiveness€of€a€modification€to€the€contract€on€the€approval€of€theÏpurchasing€agent,€the€Legal€Department,€the€Director€of€Finance,€and€the€Mayor.€ÏSecond,€the€purported€ð ðinterpretationðð€of€the€contract€agreed€to€by€Mr.€TuckerÏand€Mr.€Ô_ÔMastalerzÔ_Ô€did€not€require€Laidlaw€to€undertake€to€perform€the€workÏrequired€by€the€contract€for€less€compensation€than€it€was€already€entitled€toÏreceive.€€Under€the€contract,€Laidlaw€was€entitled€to€be€paid€$205.60€for€each€tonÏof€fly€ash€removed€from€the€plant€and€was€entitled€to€be€paid€for€at€least€fifteenÏtons€for€every€truck€loaded€with€fly€ash€that€left€the€plant.€€After€Laidlaw€agreedÏto€place€two€containers€on€each€truck€leaving€the€plant€rather€than€one,€it€was€stillÏreceiving€$205.60€for€each€ton€of€fly€ash€and€was€still€entitled€to€be€paid€theÏfifteen„ton€minimum€when€a€truck€was€loaded€with€less€than€fifteen€tons€of€flyÏash.ÌÌà@ àò òV.ó óÌÌà àWe€affirm€the€summary€judgment€dismissing€Laidlawððs€complaint€againstÏthe€Metropolitan€Government€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€for€whateverÍfurther€proceedings€may€be€required.€€We€tax€the€costs€of€this€appeal€to€LaidlawÏEnvironmental€Services,€Inc.€and€its€surety€for€which€execution,€if€necessary,Ïmay€issue.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ__________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€Ô_ÔPRESIDING€JUDGEÌMIDDLE€SECTIONÌÌÌ__________________________________ÌBEN€H.€Ô_ÔCANTRELLÔ_Ô,€JUDGE€ÇÑ ð ÑÑ7€6€¼¼d¼¼d7ÑÔ€+ Ôà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÔ€+ŠÔÌÌÌó óLAIDLAW€ENVIRONMENTALà àà àà à)ÌSERVICES€OF€SOUTH€CAROLINA,à àà à)ÌINC.,à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€ChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€95„2114„IÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01A01„9610„CH„00479ÌTHE€METROPOLITAN€GOVERNMENTà à)ÌOF€NASHVILLE€AND€DAVIDSONà àà à)ÌCOUNTY,à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà àà à)ÌÌÔ€+¼ÔÌÔ€+„Ôà@ àòòò òÔ€+ ÔJ€U€D€G€M€E€N€TÔ€+¼Ôóóó óÌÌÓ€ÓÌÔ€+ŠÔà àThis€cause€came€on€to€be€heard€upon€the€record€on€appeal€from€the€DavidsonÏCounty€Chancery€Court,€the€briefs€of€the€parties,€and€the€arguments€of€counsel.€€UponÏconsideration€of€the€entire€record,€this€court€finds€and€concludes€that€the€trial€courtððsÏjudgment€should€be€affirmed.ÌÌà àIn€accordance€with€the€opinion€filed€contemporaneously€with€this€judgment,€it€is,Ïtherefore,€ordered,€adjudged,€and€decreed€that€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€be€and€isÏhereby€affirmed,€that€the€cause€be€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedingsÏconsistent€with€this€courtððs€opinion,€and€that€the€costs€be€taxed€in€the€manner€providedÏin€this€judgment.ÌÌà àIt€is€further€ordered€that€the€costs€of€this€appeal€be€taxed€against€LaidlawÏEnvironmental€Services,€Inc.,€principal,€and€Thomas€V.€White,€surety,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌà àENTER,€________________.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœ_________________________________›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHENRY€F.€TODD,€œÔ_ÔPRESÔ_ÔIDING€JUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMIDDLE€SECTION›ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœ_________________________________›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€Ô_ÔCANTRELLÔ_Ô,€JUDGE€ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœ_________________________________›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE