ÿWPC¬ «aþœÝ¢¯:ÞSMÀ"­lyÃèÿÒW-Qr ú¨H¸ø;"Ö1BêäÓKÓós)ÓóVëGŸÉú.J:\SÒ¦íî°=U¦_Q²3s -eöŽ÷W,hßMSוkƒ/¾f¹ŽÌd/ø"O©w³TÇ ‚±ÕËBÁPÖ6ÚIüÂåNŠË€º<}ÀVõø,º¬°3;(¾`ÙZ îÍJ%¬h¬Ð†ÿBð)d<šø¤%rn×õtÕ½væ¯#ƒ _ޚΨªéDPÿh(u;Ÿ=îÙ=TŒòñ…b¾Îƒˆ GNy&qö²ïúÉ~!^”¹O ö`^Ã;¤¸ ÕºÜ6Ý)Ük1ÖÈõ{¡k.¦BGÖÃä»yõRõ«[©TL2PŒð>´ûuA¢®6~MÓ‡hœœSÚMÇoŠÇûý>²m…´öɈ*ç³IË:(¨µÈ°± ï™Pm`ޱ8û•+(ÎF^HX.tüSÅv_1ä\’ž³¾~gþj-;Û'a½ÏÙÀ—rÇÊ»Vky!V˜éÁ´Äópv,¸“fÄЀ½HÄ’ÉAóÁì1bO´ã SSCÆí¹ÀÉ€Búëzê‡r"É&K¡ÓëÆÅ~XŽ–BJÞ7ie6b %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÁÐ Z‘ Æë ƱÆwÆ= 0DNGIUNQEŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸŸb¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡ 0ë©©©© B”” 0¤± D3U D-ˆ 0Kµµ ASÆS 0¤ 0D½ A«»êjV+â (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularòK+bk2$ħ3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 8000 Series PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0 PÝ ƒRH¸$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô°ù ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€€The€original€Order€contained€a€sentence€that€was€stricken€from€the€Order€after€Defendant€filed€a€motion€toÐ ° Ðalter€or€amend€the€judgment.€€That€sentence€read:€ð ðThe€turning€around€of€a€vehicle€by€the€use€of€the€driveway€isÐ tÄ Ðpermissible,€so€long€as€that€can€be€reasonably€done€in€the€space€of€the€current€driveway€and€without€requiring€theÐ 8ˆ ÐDefendant/Counter„plaintiff€or€her€tenants€to€move€their€cars.ððLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó (ÆúI Z‹6Times New Roman Regular- ù-(|G2H¸$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€4»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôw¸ò»»Ô d(|3Eä$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€4»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Eä$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€4»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€d»»d dÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼ ñ»»»ÔÑ8€aXXdê»»d 8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îh ñÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼ ñ»îîh #ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓAugust€28,€2001€SessionÔ‡XLuX»¼ ñÔÐ üL ÐÌÌò òÔ#†¼ ñ»XXLuß#ÔJAMES€C.€R.€LANEY€v.€EVELYN€B.€OLDHAMó óÐ æ 6 ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òÔ€XLuX»¼ ñÔAppeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Hamilton€CountyÐ  \ Ðà@@øøìàNo.€71888€€€€€€W.€Frank€Brown,€III,€ChancellorÐ ø H ÐÌFILED€OCTOBER€19,€2001Ð Ð  Ðà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<»` AßÐ ¼  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2000„02710„COA„R3„CVÐ ·  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<Ž` Aßó óÐ ß  ÐÌÌÓ  ÓEvelyn€B.€Oldham€(ð ðDefendantðð)€sold€to€James€C.€R.€Laney€(ð ðPlaintiffðð)€a€house€and€lot€located€nextÐ vÆ Ðto€a€Chalet€owned€by€Defendant.€€Defendant€granted€Plaintiff€an€easement€for€use€of€a€driveway.€Ð b² ÐPlaintiff€later€converted€his€residence€into€a€business.€€In€1993,€the€Trial€Court€entered€an€OrderÐ Nž Ðinterpreting€the€easement€to€allow€Plaintiffððs€use€of€the€driveway€for€a€ð ðnormal€amount€of€delivery.ðð€Ð :Š ÐNo€appeal€was€taken€from€this€Order.€€In€2000,€the€Trial€Court,€but€a€different€trial€judge,€enteredÐ &v Ðanother€Order€interpreting€the€1993€Order€to€allow€for€a€normal€amount€of€business€deliveries€usingÐ b Ðthe€driveway.€€We€conclude€that€the€1993€Order€permits€only€a€normal€amount€of€deliveriesÐ þN Ðconsistent€with€a€residential€use.€€We€reverse€the€decision€of€the€Trial€Court,€and€remand€for€furtherÐ ê: Ðproceedings.Ð Ö& ÐÌÌÓzÓò òÓ  Óà@µ µ ìàTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€theˆÐ šê Ðà@ ìàChancery€Court€Reversed;€Case€Remanded.ó óˆÐ †Ö ÐÌòòÌD.€Michael€Swiney,€J.,€óódelivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.,óó€andÐ J"š! ÐòòCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€J.óó,€joinedÐ 6#†" ÐÌPamela€R.€OððDwyer€and€Randall€D.€Larramore,€Chattanooga,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellant€EvelynÐ %^ $ ÐB.€Oldham.Ð ú%J!% ÐÌPhillip€E.€Fleenor€and€Jane€M.€Stahl,€Chattanooga,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellee€James€C.€R.€Laney.Ð Ò'"#' ÐÌÐ  ª)ú$)ý Ðà@66'ìàò òOPINIONˆÐ ° ÐÌà@ÛÛ%ìàòòBackgroundóóó óˆÐ ˆØ ÐÌà  àà ` àPlaintiff€sued€Defendant€some€years€after€Plaintiff€purchased€from€Defendant€a€houseÐ `° Ðand€lot€located€next€door€to€a€Chalet€owned€by€Defendant.€€At€the€time€of€the€purchase,€the€partiesÐ L œ Ðentered€into€a€contract€titled€Adjoining€Property€Ownersðð€Agreement€Regarding€Water€Lines,€SepticÐ 8 ˆ ÐTanks,€and€Driveway€(ð ðAgreementðð),€which€was€signed€on€May€2,€1974.€€The€Agreement€conveyedÐ $ t Ðto€Plaintiff€a€ð ðperpetual€easement€in€the€driveway€located€on€Lot€2",€Defendantððs€property,€andÐ  ` Ðfurther€provided€that€the€parties€would€split€equally€the€cost€of€any€repairs.€€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àà ` àWhen€this€lawsuit€began€in€1992,€Plaintiff€was€seeking€to€install€a€separate€septic€tankÐ Ô$  Ðsystem€and€have€Defendant€pay€a€portion€of€the€cost€pursuant€to€the€terms€of€the€Agreement.€Ð À  ÐDefendant€filed€an€answer€and€a€counter„claim.€€Defendant€asserted€in€the€counter„claim€that€whenÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€Agreement€was€entered€into,€the€property€purchased€by€Plaintiff€was€zoned€for€residential€use.€Ð ˜è  ÐThereafter,€Plaintiff€had€the€property€re„zoned€for€commercial€use.€€Defendant€claimed€that€afterÐ „Ô  Ðhaving€the€property€re„zoned,€Plaintiff€began€using€the€driveway€as€a€parking€lot€and€a€businessÐ pÀ Ðentry.€€Defendant€claimed€this€was€a€higher€use€than€was€granted€in€the€easement€created€by€theÐ \¬ ÐAgreement.€€In€June€of€1993,€the€Trial€Court€entered€an€Order€after€a€two€day€trial.€€The€portion€ofÐ H˜ Ðthe€1993€Order€pertinent€to€this€appeal€is€as€follows:Ð 4„ ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à[T]he€original€driveway€easement€granted€to€the€Plaintiff/Counter„Ð  \ Ðdefendant€by€the€Adjoining€Property€Ownerððs€Agreement€was€to€beÐ øH Ðfor€the€use€of€the€driveway€as€a€residence.€€Now,€the€Plaintiff€hasÐ ä4 Ðchanged€the€uses€of€the€premises€to€a€business,€and€certainly€Mr.Ð Ð  ÐLaney€or€his€wife€going€to€their€business€would€not€be€any€increaseÐ ¼  Ðupon€the€burden€to€Lot€No.€2€for€that€use.€€Likewise,€a€normal€amountÐ ¨ø Ðof€delivery€by€the€driveway€would€not€be€an€additional€burden€uponÐ ”ä ÐLot€No.€2.€€The€clients€or€customers€of€the€Plaintiff/Counter„Ð €Ð Ðdefendant€would€be€a€burden€upon€the€easement€and€one€notÐ l¼ Ðcontemplated€at€the€time€of€the€Adjoining€Property€OwnerððsÐ X ¨ ÐAgreement.€€However,€the€Plaintiff/Counter„defendant€will€beÐ D!” Ðallowed€to€park€on€his€own€property€and€the€Court€interprets€theÐ 0"€  Ðeasement€across€the€driveway€upon€Lot€No.€2€to€be€one€of€allowingÐ #l! Ðthe€Plaintiff/Counter„defendant€to€cross€the€property€on€Lot€No.€2,€butÐ $X" Ðnot€to€park€on€Lot€No.€2.€€€The€Defendant/Counter„plaintiff€and€herÐ ô$D # Ðtenants€shall€provide€ample€unobstructed€driveway€ingress€and€egressÐ à%0!$ Ðto€the€owners€or€tenants€of€Lot€No.€1.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€ÐÌ&"%` x` x ЇAfter€this€Order€was€entered,€Defendant€timely€filed€an€appeal€which€she€voluntarily€dismissedÐ ° Ðapproximately€three€months€later.Ð œì ÐÌà  àà ` àIn€November€of€1997,€Plaintiff€filed€a€petition€for€contempt€and€to€enforce€theÐ tÄ Ðprevious€Order€of€the€court.€€Plaintiff€claimed€that€Defendant€was€ð ðinterfering€with€deliveries€toÐ `° ÐPlaintiffððs€property€by€U.P.S.€and€with€garbage€and€recycling€pickup.ðð€€Defendant€filed€a€responseÐ L œ Ðand€counter„petition,€claiming€that€when€this€matter€was€originally€heard€in€1993,€Plaintiff€had€notÐ 8 ˆ Ðyet€requested€annexation€of€the€property€by€the€City€of€Chattanooga.€€Defendant€claimed€thatÐ $ t Ðsubsequent€to€the€previous€Order,€and€as€a€result€of€annexation€of€the€property€by€the€City,€thereÐ  ` Ðwere€additional€burdens€on€the€subservient€tenement€which€did€not€exist€when€the€case€was€heardÐ ü L  Ðin€1993.€€Defendant€sought€to€have€the€additional€burdens€stopped.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àà ` àA€hearing€was€held€on€the€various€claims€raised€in€the€petition€and€counter„petition.€Ð À  ÐIn€September€of€2000,€the€Trial€Court€issued€an€Order€which€stated,€in€relevant€part,€as€follows:Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€partied€have€returned€to€this€Court€ð8ð€for€further€interpretationÐ „Ô  Ðof€the€Adjoining€Property€Ownerððs€Agreement€and€clarification€ofÐ pÀ Ðquestions€surrounding€the€driveway€easement,€particularly€whetherÐ \¬ Ðthe€use€of€the€shared€driveway€by€delivery€trucks€and€garbage€trucksÐ H˜ Ðconstitutes€a€material€increase€in€the€burden€upon€the€subservientÐ 4„ Ðestate.ð8ð[I]t€is€clear€that€at€the€time€the€parties€previously€cameÐ  p Ðbefore€this€Court€in€1993,€the€Plaintiff,€Mr.€Laney,€had€alreadyÐ  \ Ðchanged€the€use€of€the€property€at€806€South€Scenic€Highway€to€thatÐ øH Ðof€a€business.€€Therefore,€the€Court€previously€took€into€account€thisÐ ä4 Ðbusiness€usage€when€stating€that€a€ð ðnormal€amount€of€delivery€by€theÐ Ð  Ðdriveway€would€not€be€an€additional€burden.ðð€€Since€1993,€Mr.€LaneyÐ ¼  Ðpetitioned€the€City€of€Chattanooga€to€place€806€South€ScenicÐ ¨ø ÐHighway€into€the€corporate€city€limits€of€Chattanooga€to€obtain€theÐ ”ä Ðservices€offered€by€the€City,€including€but€not€limited€to€garbageÐ €Ð Ðpick„up.€€Two€types€of€ð ðdeliveriesðð€are€in€question€here€ð!ð€the€deliveryÐ l¼ Ðand€pickup€of€packages€by€services€such€as€UPS,€Federal€Express,Ð X ¨ Ðand€perhaps€others,€and€the€collection€of€garbage€by€the€City€ofÐ D!” ÐChattanooga.€€While€it€is€understood€that€usage€of€any€paved€surfaceÐ 0"€  Ðby€trucks€will€cause€some€damage€over€a€period€of€time,€there€areÐ #l! Ðseveral€safety€factors€to€be€taken€into€account,€namely€safety€of€theÐ $X" Ðother€residents€on€Shingle€Road,€as€well€as€that€of€the€delivery€menÐ ô$D # Ðand€garbage€men€who€cannot€perform€their€duties€in€a€safe€manner€onÐ à%0!$ ÐScenic€Highway€due€to€the€volume€of€traffic.€€ÐÌ&"%` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àà ¸ àAfter€reviewing€the€previous€Order€of€this€Court,€as€well€asÐ ¤(ô#' Ðthe€Adjoining€Property€Ownerððs€Agreement,€it€is€the€determinationÐ )à$( Ðof€this€Court€that€this€matter€is€controlled€by€the€doctrine€of€resÐ |*Ì%) Ðjudicata,€in€that€the€previous€Order€controls€the€issues€at€hand.€€ThatÐ h+¸&* Ðprevious€Order€held€that€the€Plaintiff€had€the€right€to€have€a€normalÐ ° Ðamount€of€deliveries,€and€the€proof€at€this€time€has€not€establishedÐ œì Ðthat€the€Plaintiff€is€receiving€an€abnormal€amount€of€deliveries.ЈØ` x` x ÐÌThe€Trial€Court€then€held€that€Plaintiff€was€allowed€to€use€the€driveway€for€delivery€trucks€andÐ `° Ðgarbage€trucks€in€a€normal€manner€as€this€did€not€materially€increase€the€burden€on€the€estate.€€TheÐ L œ Ðproof€at€the€hearing€showed€UPS€either€made€a€delivery€or€stopped€by€Plaintiffððs€business€to€see€ifÐ 8 ˆ Ðthere€were€any€packages€to€be€picked€up€five€days€per€week.€€There€was€no€proof€introduced€as€toÐ $ t Ðhow€many€other€deliveries€were€being€made€(i.e.€deliveries€by€Federal€Express,€etc.).€€The€garbageÐ  ` Ðtrucks€used€the€driveway€twice€per€week.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àà ` à€Chancellor€R.€Vann€Owens€entered€the€original€Order€in€1993.€€Chancellor€FrankÐ Ô$  ÐW.€Brown,€III,€entered€the€September€2000€Order€which€is€the€subject€of€this€appeal.€€Ð À  ÐÌà@))%ìàò òòòDiscussionóóó óˆÐ ˜è  ÐÌà  àà ` àAlthough€Plaintiff€raises€several€issues€in€this€appeal,€we€believe€all€of€these€potentialÐ pÀ Ðissues€can€be€addressed€by€the€resolution€of€one€primary€issue.€€Chancellor€Brown€interpreted€theÐ \¬ Ðphrase€ð ðnormal€deliveryðð€contained€within€Chancellor€Owensðð€1993€Order€to€mean€normal€businessÐ H˜ Ðdelivery.€€The€issue€on€appeal€thus€becomes:€€whether€the€Trial€Court€erred€when€it€concluded€thatÐ 4„ Ðthe€1993€Order€permitted€the€driveway€to€be€used€by€delivery€trucks€and€garbage€trucks€in€a€normalÐ  p Ðbusiness€manner€because€this€did€not€materially€increase€the€burden€on€the€subservient€estate.€€Ð  \ ÐÌà  àà ` àOur€standard€of€review€with€regard€to€matters€decided€by€the€Trial€Court€is€wellÐ ä4 Ðsettled.€€A€review€of€findings€of€fact€by€a€trial€court€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€of€the€trial€court,Ð Ð  Ðaccompanied€by€a€presumption€of€correctness,€unless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.€Ð ¼  ÐTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d);€òòBrooks€v.€Brooksóó,€992€S.W.2d€403,€404€(Tenn.€1999).€€Review€of€questionsÐ ¨ø Ðof€law€is€òòde€novoóó,€without€a€presumption€of€correctness.€€òòSee€Nelson€v.€Wal„Mart€Stores,€Inc.óó,€8Ð ”ä ÐS.W.3d€625,€628€(Tenn.€1999).€Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€Order€entered€by€the€Trial€Court€in€1993€was€not€appealed€to€this€Court.€€ThatÐ X ¨ ÐOrder,€therefore,€became€final€and€binding€on€the€parties.€€òòDupuis€v.€Dupuisóó,€811€S.W.2d€538,€539Ð D!” Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991)€(The€plaintiff€did€not€take€issue€on€the€first€appeal€with€the€trial€courtððs€rulingÐ 0"€  Ðon€a€particular€issue,€and€ð ðthus€its€decision€in€this€regard€became€the€law€of€the€case€at€theÐ #l! Ðconclusion€of€the€first€appeal.ðð);€òòJones€v.€Jonesóó,€784€S.W.2d€349,€351€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989)Ð $X" Ð(ð ðBecause€the€1986€order€was€not€appealed€from€within€the€time€allowed€by€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€4(a),Ð ô$D # Ðthe€holding€of€the€trial€court€ð8ð€is€ððthe€law€of€the€case.ðððð).Ð à%0!$ ÐÌà  àà ` àAt€issue€in€1993€was€the€purported€increased€use€of€the€subservient€tenement€by€theÐ ¸'#& ÐPlaintiff.€€In€its€Order,€the€Trial€Court€stated:€ð ð[T]he€original€driveway€easement€granted€to€theÐ ¤(ô#' ÐPlaintiff/Counter„defendant€by€the€Adjoining€Property€Ownerððs€Agreement€was€to€be€for€the€use€ofÐ )à$( Ðthe€driveway€as€a€residence.€€Now,€the€Plaintiff€has€changed€the€uses€of€the€premises€to€a€business,Ð |*Ì%) Ðand€certainly€Mr.€Laney€or€his€wife€going€to€their€business€would€not€be€any€increase€upon€theÐ h+¸&* Ðburden€to€Lot€No.€2€for€that€use.€€Likewise,€a€normal€amount€of€delivery€by€the€driveway€would€notÐ ° Ðbe€an€additional€burden€upon€Lot€No.€2.ðð€€The€Order€entered€in€2000€essentially€involved€ChancellorÐ œì ÐBrownððs€attempt€to€interpret€and€clarify€what€was€meant€by€Chancellor€Owens€in€the€1993€Order.€Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àà ` àIn€1993,€Chancellor€Owens€correctly€noted€that€the€original€easement€addressed€theÐ `° Ðuse€of€the€subject€driveway€for€residential€purposes.€€€Chancellor€Owens€further€concluded€that€aÐ L œ Ðð ðnormal€amountðð€of€delivery€was€permissible.€€Although€Plaintiff€was€using€the€property€as€aÐ 8 ˆ Ðbusiness€in€1993,€we€interpret€Chancellor€Owensðð€Order€to€mean€that€a€normal€amount€of€deliveriesÐ $ t Ðconsistent€with€a€òòresidentialóó€use€was€permissible€under€the€easement.€€This€interpretation€isÐ  ` Ðsupported€by€Chancellor€Owensðð€statement€that€ð ð[t]he€clients€or€customers€of€the€Plaintiff/Counter„Ð ü L  Ðdefendant€would€be€a€burden€upon€the€easement€and€one€not€contemplated€at€the€time€of€theÐ è 8  ÐAdjoining€Property€Ownerððs€Agreement.ðð€€To€interpret€the€1993€Order€in€the€way€the€Trial€CourtÐ Ô$  Ðdid€results€in€an€internal€inconsistency€in€the€1993€Order.€€Under€the€Trial€Courtððs€interpretation€inÐ À  Ð2000,€Chancellor€Owens€held€that€Plaintiffððs€clients€or€customers€could€not€use€the€easement€as€thatÐ ¬ü  Ðwould€be€a€burden€upon€the€easement€not€contemplated€at€the€time€of€the€Agreement,€but€somehowÐ ˜è  Ðdeliveries€consistent€with€a€business€use€would€not€be€an€additional€burden€on€the€easement€and€wasÐ „Ô  Ðcontemplated€at€the€time€of€the€Agreement.€€This€interpretation€would€mean€that€Chancellor€OwensÐ pÀ Ðfound€that€the€parties€both€did€and€did€not€contemplate€a€business€use€of€the€easement€when€theÐ \¬ ÐAgreement€was€signed.€€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€partiesðð€intent€when€the€Agreement€was€entered€into€was€the€central€focus€ofÐ  p ÐChancellor€Owensðð€determination.€€Chancellor€Owensðð€1993€Order€specifically€held€that€ð ð[t]heÐ  \ Ðclients€or€customers€of€the€Plaintiff/Counter„defendant€would€be€a€burden€upon€the€easement€andÐ øH Ðone€not€contemplated€at€the€time€of€the€Adjoining€Property€Ownerððs€Agreement.ðð€€We€believe€thisÐ ä4 Ðstatement€clearly€shows€Chancellor€Owensðð€intention€that€the€burden€on€the€easement€was€not€to€beÐ Ð  Ðincreased€beyond€the€use€of€the€driveway€in€an€amount€and€manner€consistent€with€PlaintiffððsÐ ¼  Ðresidential€use€of€the€property.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àà ` àOur€reading€of€Chancellor€Brownððs€Order€is€that€he€broadened€the€permissible€useÐ €Ð Ðof€the€driveway€to€allow€for€normal€òòbusinessóó€use€of€the€driveway€for€deliveries.€€We€believe€this€wasÐ l¼ Ðreversible€error.€€The€range€of€what€might€be€normal€business€use€is€virtually€unlimited.€€ForÐ X ¨ Ðexample,€a€normal€business€use€might€result€in€ten€deliveries€a€day,€or€one€delivery€a€month€toÐ D!” ÐPlaintiffððs€business.€€We€do€not€read€the€1993€Order€to€be€so€open„ended.€€We€conclude€that€theÐ 0"€  Ð1993€Order€permits€Plaintiff€to€use€the€driveway€for€deliveries€and€garbage€pick„up,€etc.,€but€onlyÐ #l! Ðto€the€extent€that€such€would€be€consistent€with€a€normal€residential€(as€opposed€to€business)€use€ofÐ $X" Ðthe€driveway.€€We€interpret€the€1993€Order€to€allow€Plaintiff€the€use€of€the€driveway€only€in€aÐ ô$D # Ðmanner€that€ð ðwould€not€be€an€additional€burden€upon€Lot€No.€2"€beyond€that€which€would€beÐ à%0!$ Ðconsistent€with€ð ðthe€use€of€the€driveway€as€a€residence.ðð€€Accordingly,€we€remand€this€matter€to€theÐ Ì&"% ÐTrial€Court€for€a€determination€as€to€what€use€by€Plaintiff€of€the€driveway€is€consistent€with€aÐ ¸'#& Ðresidential€use€by€Plaintiff€so€as€not€to€result€in€any€additional€burden€upon€Lot€No.€2.Ð ¤(ô#' Ðâ âÐ )à$( ÐÔ& ˆ Ôâ âà@  %ìàò òòòConclusionóóó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àà ` àThe€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€reversed.€€This€case€is€remanded€to€the€Trial€CourtÐ ˆØ Ðfor€further€proceedings€as€required,€consistent€with€this€Opinion,€and€for€collection€of€costs€below.€Ð tÄ ÐCosts€of€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€Appellee,€James€C.€R.€Laney.€€Ð `° ÐÔ'ˆ°9HÔÌÌÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à____________________________________Ð è 8  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àD.€MICHAEL€SWINEYÐ Ô$  Ð