ÿWPC‰ 1# ¾UNÉ % 0(4EYhw@p 0D° 0lô 0D` 0J¤ 0Tî 0^B 0h  0r 0|z 0†ö 0| 1u 0d AQå Æ6 Bü 0@ 0DY D/ U>Ì B D3' B)Z DCƒ AMÆ U* û= v~8vÓ¶˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ'Ör Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ê‚_#3|xÉ ·D¸D¹Dº»D¼U½D¾¿Ó€É(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ! #$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New RomanüÿP Pd""""'ÿÿdxd% Line 7 d****7Border 1dd!#+Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial ñÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ "ÝÝ  ÝÔ€-ÔÔ€-ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€-XÔÌÌAugust€19,€1998ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€'ÔÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\Ñò òÑ7€ñ&XXdìdÈ7Ñ›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óÌà@ àò òAT€NASHVILLEÌà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌóóÌÌMICHAEL€MEYERS,€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant,ò òà àà àà à)à àó óDavidson€Chancery€No.€95„2518„IÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ÌÙ€!ÙœßR€,.+A1-j|pôÂ` ç `€€@ÿRß›vs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌMARK€A.€COLE,€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà à)à àó óAppeal€No.€€01A01„9710„CH„00543Ìò òà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àà àDefendant/Appellee.à àà àò òà à)à àÌó óòòÌóóò òÌ€€€ÌÌÌà@ àó óAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTY€Ìà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€IRVIN€H.€KILCREASE,€JR.€€€€ÌòòÌÌÌFor€the€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:òòà àà àà àFor€the€Defendant€/Appelleeóó:òòÌóóÌStephen€M.€Miller€€€€à àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€George€E.€Copple,€Jr.ÌNashville,€Tennessee€€€€€€à àà àà àNashville,€TennesseeÌÌà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌò ò€€à àà àà àà àà àà àREMANDEDÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àó óHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòòÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.€€€€€€€€€€ÌÇØØÙ  ÙÓÓÑ7€ñ&XXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  Ñà@ àò òOPINIONó óÌà àThis€case€involves€the€dissolution€of€a€partnership€formed€to€create€and€sell€music.€€TheÏtrial€court€determined€the€partnersðð€respective€rights€in€some€properties€and€ordered€some€itemsÏsold.€€We€remand.Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant€Michael€Meyers€("Meyers")€and€Defendant/Appellee€Mark€Cole€("Cole")Ïformed€an€oral€partnership€in€late€1992€named€MusicArts.€€The€partnership€initially€produced€andÏsold€musical€"jingles"€for€use€in€advertising.€€Meyers€wrote€the€jingles€to€meet€the€advertisingÏneeds€of€clients€solicited€by€Cole.€€After€some€time,€Cole€tried€to€expand€the€focus€of€theÏpartnership€to€include€the€creation€of€video€footage€to€correspond€with€the€jingles.€€This€led€to€a€riftÏbetween€the€partners.Ìà àThe€dispute€intensified€in€early€February€1995€and€culminated€in€a€series€of€faxes€andÏtelephone€conversations€between€the€parties.€€On€February€13,€1995,€Meyers€advised€Cole€thatÏ"[a]s€of€today,€you€don't€represent€me€in€a€business€capacity.€.€.€.€€I€think€a€clean€break€isÏnecessary€at€this€time."€€Meyers€and€Cole€subsequently€divided€the€partnership's€businessÏequipment€between€them.€€They€did€not€attempt€to€dispose€of€the€name€MusicArts,€the€customerÏlist,€or€the€audio€and€video€tapes€containing€edited€music/commercials€(ð ðthe€DAT€tapesðð).Ìà àMeyers€filed€suit€on€August€15,€1995,€seeking€a€declaratory€judgment€as€to€the€partiesððÏrespective€rights.€€Cole€filed€an€answer€and€counterclaim€seeking€a€complete€accounting€of€theÏrevenues€and€expenses€of€the€partnership.€€The€trial€court€referred€the€matter€to€the€Clerk€andÏMaster€for€a€full€hearing.€€The€trial€court€adopted€the€Clerk€and€Master's€findings€as€the€judgmentÏof€the€court.€€à àÌà àThe€trial€court€found€that€the€parties€had€been€acting€under€an€oral€partnership€agreement.€ÏThe€partnership€dissolved€on€February€13,€1995€when€Meyers€withdrew,€but€did€not€terminate€onÏthat€date.€€Eight€months€after€dissolution,€while€this€suit€was€pending,€Cole€created€advertisingÏusing€works€developed€during€the€partnership€for€two€former€clients€of€the€partnership.€€The€trialÏcourt€did€not€require€Cole€to€account€to€Meyers€or€to€the€partnership€for€the€income€from€theseÏprojects.€€The€trial€court€found,€however,€that€Meyers€had€breached€his€fiduciary€duty€toward€ColeÍby€not€sharing€profits€from€jobs€begun€before€the€dissolution,€but€completed€afterwards.€€TheÏcourt€further€found€that€the€DAT€tapes€should€not€be€divided€or€copied€and€ordered€them€to€be€soldÏand€the€proceeds€divided€equally€between€the€parties.€€At€the€sale€for€the€DAT€tapes,€Cole€bidÏ$100.€€Meyers€objected€to€the€sale€because€the€court€had€not€determined€the€rights€of€the€respectiveÏparties€in€the€tapes.€€He€also€refused€to€bid€at€the€sale€because€he€claimed€the€sale€was€notÏð ðcommercially€reasonable.ðð€€Meyers€moved€for€a€stay€of€the€sale€of€the€tapes€pending€appeal,€andÏthis€motion€was€granted.Ìà à€On€appeal,€Meyers€argues€that€the€trial€courtððs€findings€are€incomplete.€€€Meyers€contendsÏthat€the€trial€court€failed€to€require€Cole€to€account€for€transactions€which€occurred€after€thisÏlitigation€began,€involving€works€developed€during€the€partnership.€€Meyers€notes€that€ColeððsÏtransactions€with€former€MusicArts€clients€involved€music€that€Meyers€created€during€the€partiesððÏpartnership.€€Meyers€argues€that,€consequently,€Cole€is€accountable€to€Meyers€or€to€the€partnershipÏfor€the€profits€from€these€projects.€€Meyers€also€claims€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€ordering€the€saleÏof€the€DAT€tapes€without€first€determining€who€owned€the€copyrights€to€the€creative€works€on€theÏtapes.Ìà àCole€initially€argues€that€Meyers€is€prohibited€from€raising€the€issue€of€Coleððs€post„dissolution€projects€because€the€order€of€reference€to€the€Master€did€not€include€that€issue.€€WhileÏthe€order€of€reference€did€not€list€Coleððs€projects€as€an€issue€to€be€determined,€the€issue€was€in€factÏconsidered€by€the€Master€and€the€trial€court.€€The€Masterððs€report€œindicates€that›€it€considered€ð ðtheÏamount€of€funds€owing€either€party€after€winding€up€of€partnership€affairs.ðð€€Moreover,€MeyersÏnoted€this€issue€in€his€objections€to€the€Masterððs€report.€€Thus,€we€find€the€issue€of€what€funds,€ifÏany,€Cole€owed€to€Meyers€for€use€of€the€music€created€during€the€partnership€was€presented€to€theÏtrial€court€and€may€be€raised€on€appeal.Ìà àCole€argues€that€the€money€collected€from€Meyersðð€jobs€was€partnership€property€becauseÏthose€projects€were€ð ðin€the€pipeline,ðð€or€in€progress,€as€of€the€date€he€alleges€the€partnershipÏterminated,€February€13,€1995.€€Cole€asserts€that€he€did€not€solicit€or€perform€any€work€for€formerÍMusicArts€clients€until€approximately€two€months€after€this€lawsuit€was€filed€and€at€least€eightÏmonths€after€the€alleged€termination.€€Consequently,€Cole€argues€that€profits€from€these€projectsÏdid€not€have€to€be€accounted€for€during€the€winding€up€of€the€partnership.ÌÓ  Óà àà àà àà àà àÓ  Ó€à àIn€this€appeal,€Meyers€asks€this€Court€to€review€theÏtrial€courtððs€decision€regarding€profits€Cole€received€on€projects€begun€after€dissolution€andÏfinished€before€termination€of€the€partnership.€€ð ðA€concurrent€finding€of€fact€by€a€Master€and€a€trialÏcourt€is€conclusive€on€appeal,€except€where€the€finding€.€.€.€is€based€on€an€error€of€law€or€a€mixedÏquestion€of€fact€and€law,€or€where€the€factual€finding€is€not€based€on€material€evidence.ððòòò òÏAussenberg€v.€Krameró óóó,€944€S.W.2d€367,€370€(Tenn.€App.€1996)€(citing€òòò òArcher€v.ÏArcheró óóó,€907€S.W.2d€412,€415€(Tenn.€App.€1995)).€The€issues€raised€by€Meyers€in€this€appealÏare€mixed€questions€of€fact€and€law,€subject€to€review.€òòò òId.ó óóó€(citing€òòò òBubis€v.€Blackmanó óóó,€58ÏTenn.€App.€619,€632,€435€S.W.2d€492,€498€(1968));€òòò òsee€Aaron€v.€Aaronó óóó,€909€S.W.2d€408,Ï410€(Tenn.€1995).€€In€this€case,€no€presumption€of€correctness€attaches€to€the€trial€courtððsÏfindings,€and€ð ðthis€Court€has€great€latitude€to€determine€whether€findings€as€to€mixed€questions€ofÏfact€and€law€made€by€the€trial€court€are€sustained€by€probative€evidence€on€appeal.ðð€òòò òAaron€v.ÏAaronó óóó,€909€S.W.2d€408,€410€(Tenn.€1995).€Ìà àThe€rules€governing€dissolution€and€winding€up€of€partnerships€are€well€settled€inÏTennessee:ÌÓÓà8 àUpon€dissolution,€a€withdrawing€partner€who€has€not€wrongfully€dissolved€theÏpartnership€may€require€a€winding€up€of€the€partnership€affairs,€and€shareÏproportionately€in€both€profits€and€losses€until€termination,€when€all€partnershipÏaffairs€are€settled.€€In€this€event,€the€respective€interests€of€the€partners€in€theÏpartnership,€including€profits€and€losses,€do€not€change€until€final€settlementÏ(termination).€€ÌÌÓÓòòò òShepherd€v.€Griffinó óóó,€929€S.W.2d€336,€343€(Tenn.€App.€1995)€(citation€omitted)€(citingÏòòò òShepherd€v.€Griffinó óóó,€776€S.W.2d€119,€122€(Tenn.€App.€1989)).€€ð ðDissolution€is€caused:€.€.€.Ï[b]y€the€express€will€of€any€partnerðð€when€the€partnership€is€indefinite€in€term.€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ61„1„130(1)(B)€(1989).€€In€this€case,€the€partnership€dissolved€on€February€13,€1995,€the€date€onÍwhich€Meyers€told€Cole€that€Cole€no€longer€represented€Meyers€in€the€business.€€However,Ïdissolution€does€not€terminate€the€partnership.€€òòò òSee€Shepherd€v.€Griffinó óóó,€776€S.W.2d€119,Ï121€(Tenn.€App.€1989).€€In€this€case,€there€was€no€partnership€agreement€controlling€theÏdissolution,€distribution€of€assets€or€accounting€upon€dissolution€of€the€partnership.€ÏConsequently,€the€Uniform€Partnership€Act€governs.€òòò òHoppen€v.€Powelló óóó,€600€S.W.2d€736,Ï738€(Tenn.€App.€1980).€€Ìà àUnder€the€Tennessee€Uniform€Partnership€act,€the€partnership€continues€until€the€windingÏup€of€the€partnership€is€completed,€and€the€partnership€is€terminated.€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€61„1„129Ï(1989).€€The€process€of€winding€up€includes€an€accounting€and€distribution€of€the€partnershipÏassets.€€ð ðUntil€termination€of€the€partnership€the€interests€of€the€partners€in€partnership€assets,Ïprofits,€liabilities€and€losses€do€not€change,€even€though€they€exist€at€or€occur€after€dissolution.ððÏòòò òShepardó óóó,€776€S.W.2d€at€122€€(citing€òòò òYoung€v.€Cooperó óóó,€30€Tenn.€App.€55,€203€S.W.2d€376,Ï386€(1947);€€20€Tenn.Jur.€Sec.€43).€€The€partnersðð€interests€ð ðremain€unchanged€until€theÏpartnership€is€terminated.ððòòò ò€Id.ó óóó€(citing€59A€Am.Jur.2d€Partnerships,€ðð€809€(1987)).à à€ÌœÇ›à àTherefore,€the€partnership€did€not€terminate€in€February€of€1995.€€Termination€does€notÏoccur€until€the€assets€are€equitably€distributed.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€61„1„129€(1989).€€In€this€case,Ïtermination€has€not€yet€occurred,€in€part€due€to€the€ongoing€litigation.€€An€unresolved€issue€of€lawÏand€fact€remains€as€to€Coleððs€use€of€the€works€created€by€Meyers€during€the€term€of€the€œpartnership›Ïin€two€projects€undertaken€on€Coleððs€behalf,€the€Burford€project€and€the€Cunningham€project.€€InÏthe€Burford€project,€Cole€used€a€jingle€and/or€music€created€during€the€partnership€which€had€beenÏpreviously€used€in€another€television€commercial€for€that€client.€€The€new€advertisementÏincorporated€elements€of€the€earlier€project€and€carried€the€same€theme.€€In€the€CunninghamÏproject,€Cole€made€minor€changes€to€a€prior€MusicArts€television€ad€for€the€same€client.€€TheÏCunningham€project€also€utilized€works€created€during€the€partnership.€€In€addition,€ColeÏacknowledged€that€he€had€assumed€that€he€could€continue€to€use€the€DAT€tapes€for€solicitation€ofÏbusiness€independent€of€the€partnership.€Ìà àThe€resolution€of€the€issue€involving€Coleððs€use€of€works€created€by€Meyers€during€theÏpartnership€depends€in€part€on€another€issue:€the€rights€of€the€parties€in€the€copyrights€to€theÏcopyrightable€works€developed€during€the€partnership.€€Meyers€contends€that€the€trial€court€did€notÏdetermine€what€rights€the€parties€or€the€partnership€acquired€in€the€copyrights€to€the€music€orÏcommercials€recorded€on€the€DAT€tapes.€Ìà àMeyers€raised€the€issue€after€the€report€of€the€Clerk€and€Master€was€issued.€€The€trial€courtÏconsidered€the€DAT€tapes€to€be€a€partnership€asset€because€it€ordered€the€tapes€sold€and€theÏproceeds€divided€evenly.€€By€implication,€then,€the€trial€court€must€have€considered€the€partnershipÏto€be€the€owner€of€the€copyrights€to€the€tapes.€€This,€too,€is€a€mixed€issue€of€law€and€fact,€properlyÏreviewable€by€this€court.€ò òòòSee€Aussenberg€v.€Krameróóó ó,€944€S.W.2d€at€369.Ìà àCopyrights€are€governed€by€federal€copyright€law,€and€any€provision€of€the€Copyright€ActÏof€1976€(ð ðthe€Actðð),€17€U.S.C.S.€ðð€101,€òòet€seq.óó€(1994),€which€deals€with€the€issue€at€hand€wouldÏpreempt€state€law.€ðð€301(a).€€The€provisions€of€the€Act€which€deal€most€closely€with€the€issue€inÏthis€case€concern€the€doctrines€of€(1)€a€ð ðwork€made€for€hireðð€in€ðð€101€and€ðð€201(b),€and€(2)Ítransfer€of€ownership€in€a€copyright€in€ðð€201(d)€and€ðð€204(a).€€Creative€works€developed€duringÏthe€partnership€could€be€deemed€partnership€property€under€one€of€these€two€doctrines.Ìà àSection€101€reads€in€pertinent€part€that€ð ð[a]€ððwork€made€for€hireðð€is„„(1)€a€work€prepared€byÏan€employee€within€the€scope€of€his€or€her€employment.ðð€ðð€101.€€In€the€absence€of€an€expressÏwritten€agreement,€a€ð ðwork€made€for€hireðð€is€owned€by€the€employer.€17€U.S.C.S.€ðð€201(b).€€InÏòòò òCommunity€for€Creative€Non„Violence€v.€Reidó óóó,€490€U.S.€730,€109€S.Ct.€2166,€104ÏL.Ed.2d€811€(1989),€the€Court€indicated€that€the€phrase€ð ðscope€of€employmentðð€should€beÏinterpreted€according€to€the€ð ðgeneral€common€law€of€agency,€rather€than€on€the€law€of€anyÏparticular€State.ðð€ò òòòIdóó.ó ó€at€740.€€The€Court€listed€factors€relevant€to€the€issue€of€whether€a€hired€partyÏis€an€employee€under€agency€law.€ò òòòSee€id.óóó ó€at€751„52.€€These€factors€include€the€skill€required€toÏcreate€the€work,€the€source€of€the€instrumentalities€and€tools€used€to€create€the€work,€the€locationÏof€the€work,€the€duration€of€the€relationship€between€the€parties,€whether€the€hiring€party€has€theÏright€to€assign€additional€projects€to€the€hired€party,€the€extent€of€the€hired€partyððs€discretion€overÏwhen€and€how€long€to€work,€the€method€of€payment,€the€hired€partyððs€role€in€hiring€out€andÏpaying€assistants,€whether€the€work€is€part€of€the€regular€business€of€the€hiring€party,€whether€theÏhiring€party€is€in€business,€the€provision€of€employee€benefits,€and€the€tax€treatment€of€the€hiredÏparty.€ò òòòId.€€Communityó óóó€did€not€involve€a€partnership,€and€it€is€unclear€whether€these€factorsÏwould€be€pertinent€in€the€œcontext›€of€a€partnership.Ìà àWe€found€no€cases€determining€whether€the€ð ðworks€made€for€hireðð€doctrine€applies€toÏworks€created€by€a€partner€during€the€partnership.€€Consequently,€we€look€to€caselaw€in€analogousÏsituations.€€For€example,€ò òòòWheeler€v.€Hurdmanóóó ó,€825€F.2d€257€(10th€Cir.€1987),€involved€theÏissue€of€whether€federal€anti„discrimination€laws€(Title€VII,€ADEA,€and€FLSA),€which€protectÏð ðemployees,ðð€should€apply€to€a€partner€within€the€context€of€a€general€partnership.€€Ìà àThe€court€in€ò òòòWheeleró óóó€reviewed€the€many€ways€in€which€the€characteristics€of€a€partnerÏdiffer€from€those€of€an€employee,€such€as€the€right€to€share€in€profits€and€participate€inÏmanagement€decisions,€the€right€to€act€as€agent€for€the€other€partner,€and€unlimited€personalÍliability€for€partnership€losses.€€It€noted€that€the€partnerððs€ð ðparticipation€in€profits€and€losses,Ïexposure€to€liability,€investment€in€the€firm,€partial€ownership€of€firm€assets,€and€her€voting€rights„„plus€her€position€under€the€partnership€agreement€and€partnership€laws„„clearly€placed€her€in€aÏdifferent€economic€and€legal€category.ðð€ò òòòIdóó.ó ó€at€276.€€It€ultimately€determined€that€CongressÏintentionally€used€the€term€ð ðemployeeðð€in€these€statutes€to€exclude€partners€in€a€general€partnership.Ïò òòòIdóó.ó ó€at€276.Ìà àThis€case€involves€an€analogous€situation.€€An€employee€who€creates€works€for€anÏemployer€functions€in€a€more€protected€position€than€a€partner;€he€is€shielded€from€€unlimitedÏpersonal€liability€for€the€organizationððs€obligations.€€As€in€ò òòòWheeleró óóó,€this€fact€is€significant,€as€areÏthe€other€characteristics€that€distinguish€an€employee€from€a€partner.€€The€Copyright€Act€includesÏno€indication€that€Congress€intended€the€ð ðworks€made€for€hireðð€doctrine€to€apply€to€works€createdÏby€a€partner€during€the€course€of€the€partnership,€and€we€decline€to€do€so.€Therefore,€we€hold€thatÏthe€works€created€solely€by€Meyers€are€not€ð ðworks€made€for€hireðð€as€defined€in€17€U.S.C.S.€ððÏ101,€and€that€the€partnership€does€not€own€the€copyrights€by€virtue€of€this€doctrine.Ìà àIn€the€absence€of€application€of€the€ð ðworks€for€hireðð€doctrine,€the€copyright€to€an€originalÏwork€such€as€the€music€in€this€case€ð ðvests€initially€in€the€author€or€authors€of€the€work.ðð€€17ÏU.S.C.S.€ðð€201(a).€€However,€the€copyright€to€the€music€created€by€Meyers€could€be€owned€byÏthe€partnership€if€ownership€was€transferred€to€the€partnership€by€agreement€of€the€partners.€ÏUnder€the€Copyright€Act,€such€a€transfer€would€be€valid€only€if€the€ð ðinstrument€of€conveyance,€orÏa€note€or€memorandum€of€the€transfer,€is€in€writing€and€signed€by€the€owner€of€the€rights.ðð€€17ÏU.S.C.S.€ðð204(a).Ìà àThere€is€little€œcaselaw›€dealing€with€the€ownership€of€the€copyright€on€original€works€in€theÏcontext€of€a€partnership.€€In€ò òòòOddo€v.€Riesóóó ó,€743€F.2d€630€(9th€Cir.€1984),€two€parties€enteredÏinto€a€written€partnership€agreement€to€write€a€book.€€One€partner€agreed€to€provide€the€capital€andÏsupervise€the€business€end€of€the€venture€and€the€other€agreed€to€write€the€book.€€Because€of€theÏwritten€partnership€agreement,€the€ò òòòOddoó óóó€court€held€that€the€partners€were€co„owners€of€theÍpartnershipððs€assets,€including€the€copyright€in€the€book.€€Ìà àIn€òòò òKonigsberg€Intððl€Inc.€v.€Riceó óóó,€16€F.3d€355€(9th€Cir.€1994),€the€court€discussed€atÏlength€€the€law€regarding€copyrights.€€In€ò òòòKonigsbergóóó ó,€two€movie€producers€met€over€lunch€withÏa€popular€novelist.€€During€the€lunch€meeting,€they€orally€agreed€that€the€novelist€would€create€aÏmanuscript€which€could€be€developed€further€within€several€media.€€€No€written€agreement€wasÏever€signed.€€Later,€a€dispute€arose€concerning€the€copyright€to€the€manuscript€and€a€lawsuit€wasÏfiled.€€The€ò òòòKonigsbergó óóó€court€distinguished€this€situation€from€ò òòòOddoóóó ó,€in€which€there€was€aÏwritten€partnership€agreement.€€The€òòò òKonigsbergóóó ó€court€construed€ðð€204(a)€of€the€Act€as€requiringÏa€òòwrittenóó€agreement€which€clearly€divests€the€creator€of€a€work€of€his€copyright.€ò òòòIdóó.ó ó€at€357„58.ÏTherefore,€òòò òKonigsbergóóó ó€€held€that€the€oral€partnership€agreement€was€not€sufficient€to€transferÏownership€of€a€copyright€to€the€partnership.€ò òòòAccordó ó€ò òEffects€Assocs.,€Inc.€v.€Cohenóóó ó,€908ÏF.2d€555,€557€(9th€Cir.€1990).Ìà àUnder€the€Copyright€Act€and€the€reasoning€in€òòò òKonigsbergóóó ó,€in€the€absence€of€anyÏevidence€that€Meyers€transferred€in€writing€ownership€of€the€copyright€to€the€partnership,€MeyersððÏrights€in€the€works€created€solely€by€him€during€the€partnership€were€not€transferred€to€theÏpartnership€and€remain€€vested€in€Meyers.€€If€both€partners€significantly€contributed€to€creation€ofÏthe€music€or€commercials,€œunder›€copyright€law,€they€may€be€construed€as€co„owners€of€theÏcopyrights€to€those€works.€ò òòòSee€óóó ó17€U.S.C.S.€ðð€101€(definition€of€ð ðjoint€workðð);ò ò€òòOddo€v.€Riesóóó ó,Ï743€F.2d€at€633.€€€à àÌà àIn€this€case,€the€record€is€insufficient€for€this€Court€to€determine€ownership€of€theÏcopyright€to€the€works€at€issue.€€Consequently,€we€remand€the€case€for€the€trial€court€to€determineÏthe€respective€contributions€of€each€partner€to€the€creation€of€the€copyrightable€works€during€theÏterm€of€the€partnership,€whether€there€is€written€evidence€of€a€transfer€of€the€copyrights€from€eitherÏparty€to€the€partnership,€and€any€other€issues€pertinent€to€ownership€of€the€copyrights.€€OnceÏownership€of€the€copyrights€is€determined,€the€trial€court€must€determine€the€proper€accounting€ofÏeach€partner€for€the€use€of€the€music€or€commercials€during€the€winding€up€of€the€partnership.Ìà àThe€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€thisÏOpinion.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€assessed€equally€against€Appellant€and€Appellee,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àò òóóHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ìó óà àò òÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.€J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌòòœÌ›€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ó óÌ