ÿWPC¯ Ù“º‚ºåÍÌyû®éåãÍý’²Ì ùàiãI¯o:ð³r;Á”+ã~¢¢AÅÀÒËo÷ÙgLŽÞ3Ú+&æ¼M‘•Ù=H F­øD³fÏNjçÏkîoè(hSÊ:úôÕ•±`<é"×ÁÏ|“¹‹Àq´TÜJTÃÎë@‹¯óŠ÷„ÒE8ËʇÈðÚN y1½ª`IŠ}]ɲ]ÁA|´åpu"áŽéYü,¿×ÌÊðÖ¤¦ÿÃsÝHwúÿ¼á—Š-)·eQunbÀK6¤G‚b¡«¦Ô*´-íe,ÁmŒ„; üÖÁf"’4Å&»4ç^fî/Š(D A‹íä‡Í¼úÕŠ£læ= r5š[ÄNú‰òè¶ð –”i¶ÀaŽV@Múçß ²ÓMz»#¡T$µxºïµT R×¢¾7€HùÎ Ž€¨Æ xézWlÄûþsäÝxeF„wtg¦L®º•+SâìPRùvä5ýu†Öï£ ëæ,!äàw×î©Pl<ôTå‚§Ë´QƒÙžnÕ¬leõ‡Gm–jaºák¦ìç] ’j¬Hx&I ú9µßƒ#; e]û2Ž:姪88ã¹4I°ŽÞÎ)Þ =/nb#Á\ % U@# 0ˆc U Në ^ 9 wE zI Òà 4• © ¸ mº ÆÑ Æ— Æ] Æ#n­éN–N˜šE¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢b¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤¤ 0묬¬¬ B—— 0¤´ D3X D-‹ 0K¸¸ ASÆV 0¤ 0DÀ A«˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0»(ÆúI Z‹(Times New Roman (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regularew)  ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptõ}|)¨ÉŸ3|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5«<þ6X9`("Courier NewTTXXxþ6X@ÉDQX@ - ù-(|G27*$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€L»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôç…ò»»Ô d(|3Ç„$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€L»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Ç„$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€L»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€L»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼L»»»ÔÑ8€XXdì»»d8ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼L»»¼LÔà@ü ü ìàÔ‡î™î»¼LÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼L»îî™+#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓNovember€6,€2000€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XX»¼LÔÌò òÔ#†¼L»XX#ÔVIRGINIA€RUTH€MOOREòòóó€v.€DWIGHT€STEVEN€MOOREòòóóÔ‡XX»¼LÔó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò ò€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Warren€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€10081€€€€€€Charles€Ô_ÔHastonÔ_Ô,€JudgeÐ æ 6 ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M1999„02301„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€December€13,€Ô_Ô2000Ô_ÔÐ ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓIn€this€divorce€case,€the€husband€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€the€way€it€classified€andÐ xÈ  Ðdistributed€the€partiesðð€marital€property.€€We€agree€that€the€trial€courtððs€implied€classification€of€theÐ d´ Ðpartiesðð€home€on€Pleasant€Cove€Road€was€erroneous€as€a€matter€of€law,€but€we€find€that€itsÐ P  Ðdisposition€of€the€property€was€nonetheless€within€the€courtððs€authority€and€discretion.€€WeÐ <Œ Ðaccordingly€modify€the€final€decree€to€reflect€our€view€of€its€correct€classification,€but€otherwiseÐ (x Ðaffirm€the€trial€court.Ô#†¼L»XX#ÔÔ‡XX»¼LÔÐ d ÐÓíÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€CourtÐ ì< ÐAffirmed€as€Modified€and€Remandedó óÐ Ø( ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼L»àX‹#ÔÔ‡XX.¼LÔBen€H.€Cantrell,€P.J.,€M.S.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòWilliam€B.€Cainóó€andÐ ° ÐòòPatricia€J.€Cottrell,€JJ.óó,€joined.Ð œì ÐÌThomas€F.€Bloom,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Dwight€Steven€Moore.Ð tÄ ÐÌSam€Wallace,€Sr.,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Virginia€Ruth€Moore.Ð L œ ÐÓiÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼L»XX˜#ÔÔ‡XX»¼LÔÐ $"t! ÐÌÔ#†¼L»XXx #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€XX»¼LÔòòò òó óóóà@¬¬)ìàò òI.ˆÐ ü#L# Ðà@à à ìàòò€A€Long„Term€Relationship,€a€Marriage€and€a€Divorceóóó óˆÐ è$8 $ ÐÌà  àIn€April€of€1976,€ò òó óDwight€Moore€and€Virginia€Ruth€Greene€Ô_ÔVanattaÔ_Ô€started€living€together.Ð À&"& ÐThey€bought€and€exchanged€wedding€bands€and€held€themselves€out€as€man€and€wife,€but€did€notÐ ¬'ü"' Ðactually€marry€until€January€14,€1986.€€The€record€contains€joint€income€tax€returns€in€the€names€ofÐ ˜(è#( ÐDwight€S.€Moore€and€spouse€Virginia€R.€Moore,€dating€from€1979€until€1986.Ð „)Ô$) ÐÌà  àIn€1977,€Mr.€Moore€bought€a€6.5€acre€tract€of€land€on€Pleasant€Cove€Road€in€Warren€County,Ð \+¬&+ Ðfinancing€the€property€through€a€six„month€note,€and€taking€the€deed€in€his€name€only.€€Ms.€MooreÐ H,˜', Ðtestified€that€she€helped€make€the€payments€on€the€note.€€The€parties€subsequently€had€a€one„halfÐ 4-„(-ý Ðacre€portion€of€the€property€surveyed,€and€borrowed€money€to€build€a€house€on€that€parcel.€€A€DeedÐ ° Ðof€Trust,€executed€on€the€one„half€acre€containing€the€house,€was€signed€ð ðDwight€S.€Moore€and€wifeÐ œì ÐVirginia€R.€Moore.ðð€€Several€more€loans€were€taken€on€the€property,€with€both€parties€signing€theÐ ˆØ Ðnotes,€and€contributing€to€the€payments.€€The€purpose€of€each€of€the€loans€was€to€produce€funds€forÐ tÄ Ðbusiness€ventures,€all€of€which€eventually€failed.Ð `° ÐÌà  àAside€from€the€marital€home,€another€piece€of€property€at€issue€is€a€48€acre€farm€located€onÐ 8 ˆ ÐRandall€Hitchcock€Road.€€That€property€was€owned€by€Ms.€Mooreððs€mother,€Ellen€Gibbs,€who€livedÐ $ t Ðin€a€mobile€home€on€the€property.€€Another€mobile€home€on€the€land€was€occupied€by€VirginiaÐ  ` ÐMooreððs€former€daughter„in„law.€€In€September€of€1995,€Ms.€Gibbs€conveyed€the€property€to€her€sonÐ ü L  ÐJames€Greene,€by€warranty€deed,€expressly€reserving€a€life€estate€for€herself.€€No€considerationÐ è 8  Ðpassed€for€the€conveyance.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àMr.€Greene€testified€that€he€was€worried€that€the€property€might€pass€outside€his€family€ifÐ ¬ü  Ðsomething€happened€to€him,€so€shortly€thereafter,€he€asked€a€friend€to€draft€a€deed€to€convey€a€oneÐ ˜è  Ðhalf„interest€in€the€property€to€his€sister.€€The€resulting€deed€conveyed€the€interest€to€ð ðRuth€MooreÐ „Ô  Ðet€Ô_ÔvirÔ_Ô€Steve€Moore,ðð€and€contained€no€mention€of€the€life€estate.€€Mr.€Greene€did€not€object€whenÐ pÀ Ðhe€saw€Mr.€Mooreððs€name€on€the€deed,€but€he€testified€that€the€conveyance€was€ð ðfor€love€andÐ \¬ Ðaffection,ðð€and€that€he€intended€the€property€to€go€only€to€Ms.€Moore.€€€Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àOn€November€8,€1998,€Virginia€Moore€filed€a€Complaint€for€Divorce€on€the€grounds€ofÐ  p Ðirreconcilable€differences,€or€in€the€alternative,€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€Her€complaint€statedÐ  \ Ðthat€she€and€her€husband€had€been€separated€since€October€3,€1998,€but€that€he€was€still€staying€inÐ øH Ðtheir€home.€€Dwight€Mooreððs€answer€denied€the€allegations€of€the€complaint,€and€asked€that€it€beÐ ä4 Ðdismissed.€€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àOn€February€2,€1999,€the€court€granted€Ms.€Mooreððs€motion€for€temporary€alimony,€andÐ ¨ø Ðordered€her€husband€to€pay€Ô_ÔpendenteÔ_Ô€lite€alimony€of€$1,000€per€month,€with€Ms.€Moore€to€make€theÐ ”ä Ðfirst€and€second€mortgage€payments€on€the€marital€home€from€those€funds.€Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àOn€March€19,€1999,€the€court€gave€its€approval€to€an€Agreed€Order€declaring€the€partiesÐ X ¨ Ðdivorced,€and€scheduling€a€hearing€for€the€purpose€of€determining€the€division€of€the€marital€assetsÐ D!” Ðand€debts.€€A€hearing€was€conducted€before€a€Special€Master€on€May€11,€1999,€so€he€could€makeÐ 0"€  Ðrecommendations€on€property€division.€€The€Masterððs€recommendations€were€filed€with€the€trialÐ #l! Ðcourt€three€days€later.Ð $X" ÐÌà  àAmong€other€things,€the€Master€recommended€that€the€Pleasant€Cove€Road€property€be€sold,Ð à%0!$ Ðand€the€proceeds€be€split€between€the€parties€after€the€indebtedness€was€paid€off,€and€that€VirginiaÐ Ì&"% ÐMoore€retain€ownership€of€the€Randall€Hitchcock€Road€farm.€€Although€both€parties€filed€exceptionsÐ ¸'#& Ðto€the€Masterððs€recommendations,€the€trial€court€confirmed€his€findings€on€October€22,€1999,Ð ¤(ô#' Ðreserving€the€issue€of€alimony€for€a€later€hearing.€€€Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðà  àThe€hearing€on€the€issue€of€alimony€was€conducted€on€November€9,€1999.€€In€the€FinalÐ ° Ðâ âDecree€of€Divorce,€filed€November€24,€1999,€the€trial€court€ordered€Dwight€Moore€to€pay€his€wifeÐ œì Ð$1,000€per€month€in€alimony,€for€a€period€of€two€years.€€The€trial€court€granted€Ms.€MooreððsÐ ˆØ Ðsubsequent€motion€to€amend€the€final€decree€to€require€the€husband€to€pay€an€additional€$250€perÐ tÄ Ðmonth€in€alimony€until€the€sale€of€the€marital€home,€to€help€defray€the€cost€of€the€monthly€mortgageÐ `° Ðpayments.€€This€appeal€followed.Ð L œ ÐÌà@ll(ìàò òII.€ˆÐ $ t Ðà@ll"ìàòòThe€Marital€Homeóóó óˆÐ  ` ÐÌà  àTenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121€defines€the€power€of€the€trial€court€to€distribute€maritalÐ è 8  Ðproperty€pursuant€to€divorce.€€The€statute€authorizes€the€trial€court€to€ð ðequitably€divide,€distributeÐ Ô$  Ðor€assign€the€marital€property€between€the€parties€without€regard€to€marital€fault€in€proportions€asÐ À  Ðthe€court€deems€just.ðð€€To€accomplish€this€purpose,€the€court€may€divest€and€reinvest€title€to€theÐ ¬ü  Ðproperty,€and/or€to€order€the€sale€of€the€property€so€that€the€proceeds€may€be€divided€between€theÐ ˜è  Ðparties.€€Although€marital€property€is€subject€to€division,€separate€property€is€not.Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àSection€(b)(1)(A)€of€the€same€statute€defines€marital€property€as€follows:Ð \¬ ÐÒ°ÒÒ°ÒÓ  ÓÌÓ  Óð ðall€real€and€personal€property,€both€tangible€and€intangible,€acquired€by€either€orÐ 4„ Ðboth€spouses€during€the€course€of€the€marriage€up€to€the€date€of€the€final€divorceÐ  p Ðhearing€and€owned€by€either€or€both€spouses€as€of€the€date€of€filing€of€a€complaintÐ  \ Ðfor€divorce,€.€.€€.€.Ð øH ÐÓ’$ÓÌÒ°ÒÒ°Òà  àSeparate€property€is€defined€as€ð ð[Ô_Ôa]llÔ_Ô€real€and€personal€property€owned€by€a€spouse€beforeÐ Ð  Ðmarriage.ðð€€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(2)(A).€à  àÐ ¼  ÐÌÓ  Óà  àAlthough€neither€the€Special€Master€nor€the€trial€court€specifically€stated€that€they€found€theÐ ”ä Ðhome€on€Pleasant€Cove€Road€to€be€jointly€owned€by€the€parties,€such€a€classification€is€implicit€inÐ €Ð Ðthe€Special€Masterððs€decision€to€include€it€in€his€recommended€distribution€of€marital€property.€€TheÐ l¼ Ðappellant€argues,€however,€that€the€marital€home€is€not€marital€property,€but€rather€his€own€separateÐ X ¨ Ðproperty,€because€he€acquired€it€in€his€own€name€before€he€and€his€wife€formalized€their€relationship.Ð D!” ÐÌà  àThe€appellee€for€her€part€argues€that€Mr.€Moore€should€be€Ô_ÔestoppedÔ_Ô€from€denying€that€theÐ #l! Ðproperty€was€marital,€because€the€parties€were€holding€themselves€out€as€married€when€the€propertyÐ $X" Ðwas€acquired.€€Alternatively,€she€asserts€that€she€and€her€husband€were€implied€partners€in€theÐ ô$D # Ðbusiness€of€buying€and€selling€property,€and€that€she€therefore€had€an€interest€in€the€property€thatÐ à%0!$ Ðrendered€it€subject€to€equitable€division.€€€€€€Ð Ì&"% Ðà  àÌà  àThese€same€arguments€were€recently€considered€by€our€Supreme€Court€in€òòMartin€v.€Colemanóó,Ð ¤(ô#' Ð19€S.W.2d€757€(Tenn.€2000),€another€case€in€which€the€Court€was€asked€to€divide€property€that€oneÐ )à$( Ðparty€acquired€during€an€extensive€period€of€unmarried€cohabitation€with€the€other.Ð |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àRobert€and€Dolores€Coleman€had€been€married€to€each€other€once,€and€divorced.€€TheyÐ ° Ðreunited,€but€never€remarried,€living€together€and€holding€themselves€out€as€husband€and€wife€forÐ œì Ðsixteen€years.€€During€that€period,€Mr.€Coleman€purchased€a€used€car€business,€using€the€coupleððsÐ ˆØ Ðjointly€owned€house€as€collateral€to€finance€the€purchase.€€Mr.€Coleman€later€bought€the€lot€on€whichÐ tÄ Ðthe€business€was€located.€€The€purchase€was€made€in€his€name€only,€though€Ms.€Coleman€signed€theÐ `° Ðloan€documents.€Ð L œ ÐÌà  àWhen€the€parties€separated,€Ms.€Coleman€filed€a€complaint€for€divorce,€alleging€a€marriageÐ $ t Ðby€estoppel€and€asking€for€division€of€the€marital€assets,€including€Mr.€Colemanððs€business,€and€hisÐ  ` Ð401(k)€from€a€former€job.€€The€trial€court€stated€that€ð ðequity€ought€to€require€this€relationship€to€beÐ ü L  Ðconsidered€marriage€by€estoppel,ðð€but€declined€to€make€such€a€ruling€because€it€recognized€thatÐ è 8  Ðwould€be€contrary€to€case€law.€€In€affirming€this€portion€of€the€trial€courtððs€judgment,€the€SupremeÐ Ô$  ÐCourt€stated,€Ð À  ÐÌÒ°ÒÒ°Òà ` àð ðIn€Tennessee,€marriage€is€controlled€by€statute,€and€common„law€marriagesÐ ˜è  Ðare€not€recognized.€€Our€courts€have€recognized€marriage€by€estoppel€when€partiesÐ „Ô  Ðhave€believed€in€the€validity€of€their€marriage€and€have€evidenced€that€belief€byÐ pÀ Ðcohabitation.€€The€doctrine€of€marriage€by€estoppel€is€applied€in€exceptional€cases.Ð \¬ ÐIt€does€not€apply€in€cases€where€the€parties€knowingly€live€together€in€an€unmarriedÐ H˜ Ðstate€and€are€privileged€to€discontinue€that€relationship€at€will.ðð€(Citations€omitted)€Ð 4„ ÐÌÒ°ÒÒ°ÒÓÓ19€S.W.3d€at€760.€Ð  \ ÐÓÓà  àThe€trial€court€intended€to€divide€the€property€equally,€however,€and€it€found€a€rationale€toÐ ä4 Ðdo€so€in€the€theory€that€an€implied€partnership€existed€between€the€parties€during€the€duration€of€theirÐ Ð  Ðcohabitation.€€The€Supreme€Court€rejected€this€theory€and€reversed€the€trial€court,€finding€that€anÐ ¼  Ðimplied€partnership€could€not€be€inferred€from€the€act€of€cohabitation€alone,€but€that€it€only€arisesÐ ¨ø Ðð ðwhen€it€appears€that€the€parties€have€entered€into€a€business€relationship€for€profit,€combining€theirÐ ”ä Ðproperty,€labor,€skill,€experience€or€money.ðð€19€S.W.3d€at€761.€€An€example€of€such€a€relationshipÐ €Ð Ðwithin€the€context€of€cohabitation€may€be€found€in€òòBass€v.€Bassóó,€814€S.W.2d€38€(Tenn.€1991).€Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àThe€proof€showed€that€Ms.€Colemanððs€participation€in€the€used€car€business€was€minimal€atÐ D!” Ðbest,€and€that€she€made€no€contribution€to€the€401(k)€except€for€her€role€as€a€homemaker.€€While€Ms.Ð 0"€  ÐColemanððs€contribution€as€a€homemaker€could€be€considered€in€dividing€marital€property,€òòseeóó€Tenn.Ð #l! ÐCode.€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(B),€it€was€not€sufficient€to€establish€an€implied€partnership.Ð $X" ÐÌà  àIn€the€present€case,€the€evidence€showed€that€in€1978,€the€parties€sold€one€piece€of€propertyÐ à%0!$ Ðthat€Virginia€Moore€had€owned€before€meeting€Dwight€Moore,€and€that€they€bought€another€pieceÐ Ì&"% Ðof€property€in€1984,€and€sold€it€a€year€later.€€This€does€not€even€come€close€to€establishing€anÐ ¸'#& Ðimplied€partnership€to€buy€and€sell€properties€as€a€business.€€€€Ð ¤(ô#' Ðâ âÐ )à$( Ðà  àEven€if€the€home€at€Pleasant€Cove€Road€was€Mr.€Mooreððs€separate€property,€however,€Ms.Ð ° ÐMoore€insists€that€she€is€entitled€to€a€share€of€it€under€the€provisions€of€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€36„4„Ð œì Ð121(b)(1)(B)€and€(C),€which€state:€Ð ˆØ Ðâ âÒ°ÒÒ°ÒÌ(B)€ð ðMarital€propertyðð€includes€income€from,€and€any€increase€in€value€during€theÐ `° Ðmarriage€of,€property€determined€to€be€separate€property€in€accordance€withÐ L œ Ðsubdivision€(b)(2)€if€each€party€substantially€contributed€to€its€preservation€andÐ 8 ˆ Ðappreciation€and€the€value€of€vested€pension,€retirement€or€other€fringe€benefit€rightsÐ $ t Ðaccrued€during€the€period€of€the€marriage.Ð  ` ÐÌ(C)€As€used€in€this€subsection,€"substantial€contribution"€may€include,€but€not€beÐ è 8  Ðlimited€to,€the€direct€or€indirect€contribution€of€a€spouse€as€homemaker,€wage€earner,Ð Ô$  Ðparent€or€family€financial€manager,€together€with€such€other€factors€as€the€courtÐ À  Ðhaving€jurisdiction€thereof€may€determine.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌÒ°ÒÒ°Òà  àThe€problem€with€this€theory€is€the€paucity€of€proof€as€to€Ms.€Mooreððs€contribution€to€theÐ „Ô  Ðpreservation€and€appreciation€of€the€property.€€She€testified€that€she€helped€to€make€the€mortgageÐ pÀ Ðpayments€on€the€property,€but€provided€no€details€as€to€the€magnitude€of€her€contribution.€€Mr.Ð \¬ ÐMoore€maintains€that€the€gross€amount€was€minimal,€and€that€it€was€offset€by€the€financial€drainÐ H˜ Ðresulting€from€the€extended€stay€in€the€home€of€Ms.€Mooreððs€two€sons€from€a€previous€marriage,Ð 4„ Ðtheir€wives€and€their€children.€€Further,€while€we€may€find€it€plausible€that€Ms.€Moore€made€aÐ  p Ðsubstantial€contribution€to€the€preservation€of€the€home€in€her€role€as€homemaker,€there€is€no€proofÐ  \ Ðin€the€record€as€to€any€such€contribution.€Ð øH Ðà  à€€Ð ä4 Ðà  àIt€thus€appears€to€us€that€under€the€statutes€governing€the€distribution€of€marital€property,€theÐ Ð  Ðappellee€has€not€overcome€the€presumption€that€the€Pleasant€Cove€Road€property€is€the€husbandððsÐ ¼  Ðseparate€property,€and€we€cannot€fully€approve€any€ruling€that€implies€otherwise.€€This€does€not€endÐ ¨ø Ðthe€story,€however,€and€we€will€continue€our€discussion€of€the€marital€home€in€the€section€of€thisÐ ”ä Ðopinion€that€deals€with€alimony.Ð €Ð ÐÌà@EE(ìàò òIII.€ˆÐ X ¨ Ðà@ ìàòòThe€Randall€Hitchcock€Road€Farm€and€the€401(k)ó ó€óóˆÐ D!” ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€awarded€the€farm€on€Randall€Hitchcock€Road€to€the€wife,€and€ordered€anyÐ  #p! Ðinterest€the€husband€may€have€had€in€the€property€divested€out€of€him€and€vested€in€her.€€TheÐ  $\" Ðhusband€argues€that€since€it€was€acquired€in€both€their€names€during€the€course€of€the€marriage,€theÐ ø$H # Ðfarm€should€be€considered€joint€property,€and€it€should€be€divided€equally€between€the€parties.Ð ä%4!$ ÐÌà  àMr.€Moore€points€out€that€under€Tennessee€law,€unless€a€deed€is€ambiguous,€the€intentionÐ ¼' #& Ðof€the€grantor€is€to€be€determined€from€its€four€corners.€€òòÔ_ÔHardinÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔHardinÔ_Ôóó,€979€S.W.2d€314€(Tenn.Ð ¨(ø#' ÐCt.€App.€1998);€òòBennett€v.€Langhamóó€383€S.W.2d€16€(Tenn.1964).€€Thus,€he€contends,€JamesÐ ”)ä$( ÐGreeneððs€testimony€as€to€his€intention€to€convey€the€property€only€to€his€sister€is€irrelevant,€becauseÐ €*Ð%) Ðthe€deed€unambiguously€grants€the€property€to€both€parties.€€He€also€argues€that€even€if€we€disagreedÐ l+¼&* Ðwith€his€analysis,€he€would€still€be€entitled€to€a€share€in€the€property€because€he€contributed€to€itsÐ ° Ðpreservation€and€appreciation,€by€building€fences€and€corrals€on€it,€fertilizing€it,€and€maintainingÐ œì Ðcattle€on€it.€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(B).Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€did€not€characterize€the€property€as€either€marital€property€or€as€the€wifeððsÐ `° Ðseparate€property,€but€simply€awarded€it€to€her.€€We€believe€that€the€husbandððs€argument€that€theÐ L œ Ðproperty€has€to€considered€marital€property€is€correct.€€However,€it€is€well€established€that€anÐ 8 ˆ Ðequitable€division€of€martial€property€is€not€necessarily€an€equal€division,€whether€the€court€isÐ $ t Ðdealing€with€a€single€piece€of€property€or€with€the€entire€marital€estate.€òò€Ô_ÔBarnhillÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBarnhillÔ_Ôóó,€826Ð  ` ÐS.W.2d€443€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991);€òòEllis€v.€Ellisóó,€748€S.W.2d€424€(Tenn.€1988).€Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àTrial€courts€have€been€granted€great€discretion€when€dividing€marital€property.€òò€Ô_ÔLoydÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔLoydÔ_Ô,óóÐ Ô$  Ð860€S.W.2d€409,€411€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993);€òòHarrington€v.€Harringtonóó,€798€S.W.2d€244,€245€(Tenn.Ð À  ÐCt.€App.1990).€€Accordingly,€their€decisions€are€entitled€to€great€weight€on€appeal,€òòEdwards€v.Ð ¬ü  ÐEdwardsóó,€501€S.W.2d€283,€288€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.1973),€and€are€presumed€to€be€correct€unless€theÐ ˜è  Ðevidence€preponderates€otherwise.€òò€Ô_ÔMondelliÔ_Ô€v.€Howardóó,€780€S.W.2d€769,€772€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.1989).Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àIn€the€present€case,€both€parties€were€awarded€a€substantial€portion€of€the€marital€estate.Ð \¬ ÐAccording€to€the€Rule€15€Table€appended€to€both€partiesðð€briefs,€much€of€the€Ô_ÔpropertyÔ_Ô€was€evenlyÐ H˜ Ðsplit€between€the€husband€and€wife,€including€cattle,€farm€equipment,€and€a€piece€of€real€propertyÐ 4„ Ðin€Ô_ÔMcMinnvilleÔ_Ô€with€a€value€of€$15,000.€€The€husband€was€awarded€the€full€value€of€his€401(k)Ð  p Ðretirement€account€($18,000„$20,000),€his€guns€(worth€at€least€$4,500€according€to€his€ownÐ  \ Ðestimates),€his€tools€($2,500„$7,500)€and€his€coin€collection€(no€value€given).€€Aside€from€theÐ øH ÐRandall€Hitchcock€Road€farm,€the€wife€was€awarded€a€Certificate€of€Deposit€worth€$2,300,€personalÐ ä4 Ðproperty€worth€$3,000,€and€a€telephone€company€refund€credit€worth€$250.€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€record€shows€that€the€48€acre€farm€was€mostly€very€poor€land,€but€Mr.€Moore€testifiedÐ ¨ø Ðthat€similar€land€in€the€same€area€sold€for€between€$1,800€and€$2,000€per€acre.€€If€true,€that€wouldÐ ”ä Ðgive€Ms.€Mooreððs€share€of€the€property€a€value€between€$43,200€and€$48,000.€€In€light€of€the€overallÐ €Ð Ðdistribution€of€the€marital€property,€and€of€her€familyððs€connection€to€the€land,€we€do€not€believe€thatÐ l¼ Ðthe€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€by€granting€the€farm€property€solely€to€Ms.€Moore,€and€we€affirmÐ X ¨ Ðthe€award.€Ð D!” ÐÌà  àAnother€piece€of€property€in€dispute€was€Mr.€Mooreððs€401(k)€retirement€account.€€The€proofÐ #l! Ðshowed€that€this€account€was€entirely€acquired€during€the€marriage€of€the€parties,€indisputablyÐ $X" Ðmaking€it€marital€property.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(B),€supra,€and€òòÔ_ÔBatsonÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBatsonÔ_Ôóó,Ð ô$D # Ð769€S.W.2d€849,€857€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€Ms.€Moore€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€awardingÐ à%0!$ Ðit€to€her€husband,€and€contends€that€she€should€be€entitled€to€half€of€it.€€We€believe,€however,€thatÐ Ì&"% Ðin€light€of€the€award€to€the€wife€of€the€Randall€Hitchcock€Road€farm,€it€is€equitable€to€award€theÐ ¸'#& Ðhusband€the€entire€amount€of€his€401(k).Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌÌÐ h+¸&* Ðà@KK(ìàò òIV.€ˆÐ ° Ðà@>>&ìàòòAlimonyó ó€óóˆÐ œì ÐÌà  àTenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101€sets€out€the€factors€for€the€courts€to€consider€in€awardingÐ xÈ Ðalimony€as€follows:Ð d´ ÐÒ°ÒÒ°ÒÌà ` à(A)€The€relative€earning€capacity,€obligations,€needs,€and€financial€resourcesÐ < Œ Ðof€each€party,€including€income€from€pension,€profit€sharing€or€retirement€plans€andÐ ( x Ðall€other€sources;Ð  d Ðà ` à(B)€The€relative€education€and€training€of€each€party,€the€ability€andÐ  P  Ðopportunity€of€each€party€to€secure€such€education€and€training,€and€the€necessity€ofÐ ì <  Ða€party€to€secure€further€education€and€training€to€improve€such€party's€earningÐ Ø(  Ðcapacity€to€a€reasonable€level;Ð Ä  Ðà ` à(C)€The€duration€of€the€marriage;Ð °  Ðà ` à(D)€The€age€and€mental€condition€of€each€party;Ð œì  Ðà ` à(E)€The€physical€condition€of€each€party,€including,€but€not€limited€to,Ð ˆØ  Ðphysical€disability€or€incapacity€due€to€a€chronic€debilitating€disease;Ð tÄ Ðà ` à(F)€The€extent€to€which€it€would€be€undesirable€for€a€party€to€seekÐ `° Ðemployment€outside€the€home€because€such€party€will€be€custodian€of€a€minor€childÐ Lœ Ðof€the€marriage;Ð 8ˆ Ðà ` à(G)€The€separate€assets€of€each€party,€both€real€and€personal,€tangible€andÐ $t Ðintangible;Ð ` Ðà ` à(H)€The€provisions€made€with€regard€to€the€marital€property€as€defined€in€ððÐ üL Ð36-4-121;Ð è8 Ðà ` à(I)€The€standard€of€living€of€the€parties€established€during€the€marriage;Ð Ô$ Ðà ` à(J)€The€extent€to€which€each€party€has€made€such€tangible€and€intangibleÐ À Ðcontributions€to€the€marriage€as€monetary€and€homemaker€contributions,€and€tangibleÐ ¬ü Ðand€intangible€contributions€by€a€party€to€the€education,€training€or€increased€earningÐ ˜è Ðpower€of€the€other€party;Ð „Ô Ðà ` à(K)€The€relative€fault€of€the€parties€in€cases€where€the€court,€in€its€discretion,Ð pÀ Ðdeems€it€appropriate€to€do€so;€€andÐ \ ¬ Ðà ` à(L)€Such€other€factors,€including€the€tax€consequences€to€each€party,€as€areÐ H!˜ Ðnecessary€to€consider€the€equities€between€the€parties.Ð 4"„  ÐÌÒ°ÒÒ°Òà  àElsewhere,€this€court€has€stated€that€the€most€important€factors€for€the€courts€to€consider€areÐ  $\" Ðthe€need€of€the€Ô_ÔobligeeÔ_Ô€spouse,€and€the€ability€of€the€Ô_ÔobligorÔ_Ô€to€pay.€òò€Ô_ÔLoydÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔLoydÔ_Ôóó,€860€S.W.2d€409Ð ø$H # Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).Ð ä%4!$ ÐÌà  àUnder€either€formulation,€it€is€clear€that€Virginia€Moore€is€entitled€to€alimony€from€DwightÐ ¼' #& ÐMoore.€€The€proof€showed€that€Ms.€Moore€was€sixty„two€years€of€age€at€the€time€of€divorce€and€onlyÐ ¨(ø#' Ðhad€an€eighth€grade€education.€€She€is€unemployed,€and€her€only€regular€income€is€$399€per€monthÐ ”)ä$( Ðâ âin€Social€Security€retirement€benefits.€€Her€monthly€living€expenses,€including€mortgage€paymentsÐ €*Ð%) Ðamount€to€$1,680.€€Ms.€Moore€has€serious€health€problems,€and€it€is€uncertain€to€what€extent€she€willÐ ° Ðbe€able€to€work€to€supplement€her€Social€Security.Ð œì Ðâ âà  à€As€we€stated€above,€the€parties€married€on€January€14,€1986.€€In€that€same€year,€Mr.€MooreÐ ˆØ Ðbegan€working€as€a€superintendent€in€the€construction€of€new€gas€station/convenience€stores.€ThisÐ tÄ Ðproved€to€be€a€demanding€but€lucrative€job,€and€by€the€time€of€divorce,€he€was€earning€aboutÐ `° Ð$68,000€a€year.€€However,€the€forty„eight€year€old€Mr.€Moore€also€suffers€from€health€problems,€andÐ L œ Ðif€they€worsen,€he€may€not€be€able€to€continue€in€his€job.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€awarded€Ms.€Moore€$1,000€per€month€in€alimony,€to€be€paid€for€twenty„fourÐ  ` Ðmonths,€or€until€her€death€or€remarriage,€whichever€comes€sooner.€€Though€the€trial€court€did€notÐ ü L  Ðspecifically€say€so,€this€award€of€temporary€support€appears€to€fall€under€the€category€ofÐ è 8  Ðrehabilitative€alimony.€€The€Legislature€established€rehabilitative€alimony€as€a€separate€class€ofÐ Ô$  ÐÔ_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€support,€distinct€from€alimony€in€Ô_ÔsolidoÔ_Ô€or€periodic€alimony,€and€has€specifically€stated€thatÐ À  Ðit€should€be€awarded€where€there€is€any€possibility€of€an€economically€disadvantaged€spouseÐ ¬ü  Ðbecoming€financially€independent€of€a€former€spouse.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àIn€view€of€her€age,€health,€and€lack€of€skills,€it€appears€unlikely€that€Ms.€Moore€will€be€ableÐ pÀ Ðto€fully€rehabilitate€herself,€but€she€should€be€encouraged€to€make€the€attempt.€€If€she€does€notÐ \¬ Ðsucceed,€then€she€will€be€able€to€apply€to€the€court€for€a€more€permanent€arrangement,€because€anÐ H˜ Ðaward€of€rehabilitative€alimony€ð ðÔ_Ôremain[sÔ_Ô]€within€the€courtððs€control€for€the€duration€of€such€award,Ð 4„ Ðand€may€be€increased,€decreased,€terminated,€or€otherwise€modified,€upon€a€showing€of€substantialÐ  p Ðand€material€change€in€circumstances.ðð€€Tenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(2).€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòÔ_ÔCrabtreeÔ_Ô€v.Ð  \ ÐÔ_ÔCrabtreeÔ_Ôóó,€16€S.W.3d€356€(Tenn.€2000).€Ð øH ÐÌà  àWe€accordingly€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€alimony€award.€€It€appears€to€us,€however,€that€evenÐ Ð  Ðwith€that€alimony,€Ms.€Moore€remains€in€need€of€further€financial€assistance.€€The€most€equitableÐ ¼  Ðway€to€provide€such€assistance€is€through€an€award€of€alimony€in€Ô_ÔsolidoÔ_Ô.€€€Such€alimony€is€generallyÐ ¨ø Ðawarded€out€of€a€spouseððs€estate.€òò€Ô_ÔHoughlandÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔHoughlandÔ_Ôóó,€844€S.W.2d€619,€622€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð ”ä ÐÔ_ÔApp.1992),Ô_Ô€rather€than€out€of€an€expectation€of€future€earnings.€òò€Ô_ÔAleshireÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔAleshireÔ_Ôóó,€642€S.W.2dÐ €Ð Ð729,€733€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.1981).Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àAs€the€trial€court€no€doubt€recognized,€the€most€readily€available€source€of€additional€fundsÐ D!” Ðfor€both€parties€would€be€through€the€sale€of€the€marital€home€on€Pleasant€Cove€Road.€€The€proofÐ 0"€  Ðshowed€that€the€home€had€a€value€of€$95,000,€encumbered€by€€mortgage€debts€of€about€$26,000.Ð #l! ÐTherefore€if€it€were€sold,€with€the€proceeds€divided€equally€between€the€parties,€each€would€receiveÐ $X" Ðover€$30,000.€€We€accordingly€affirm€the€courtððs€order€for€the€sale€of€the€home,€and€for€the€divisionÐ ô$D # Ðof€the€proceeds,€but€we€declare€the€award€to€the€wife€to€be€alimony€in€Ô_ÔsolidoÔ_Ô€rather€than€division€ofÐ à%0!$ Ðmarital€property.€€Though€this€might€appear€to€be€a€distinction€without€a€difference,€we€do€not€thinkÐ Ì&"% Ðso.€€It€appears€to€us€that€the€trial€court€reached€the€most€equitable€result,€and€we€only€modify€itsÐ ¸'#& Ðdecree€for€the€purpose€of€making€certain€that€it€arrives€at€that€result€by€a€legally€correct€route.€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌÌÐ h+¸&* ЇÌà@‹‹)ìàò òV.ó óˆÐ œì Ðò òó óà  àÌà  àThe€order€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€as€modified.€€Remand€this€cause€to€the€Circuit€CourtÐ tÄ Ðof€Warren€County€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€toÐ `° Ðthe€appellant,€Dwight€Steven€Moore.Ð L œ ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à_________________________________________€Ð Ô$  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.