ÿWPC 7# U: %W 0(]b …w@‘4Ñå 0cô 0‹WU:â 0@$ 0Jd 0T® 0^ 0h` 0rÈ 0|: 0†¶ 0< 1uÌ 0dA AQ¥ Æö 0D¼ B 0D D/a B D3­ U*à B) DC3 AMv à  ØvxÔîv~ÂvÓ@˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - EED Ó€zƒ=#3|x("_‡$Ô‡XÁáXXXÔòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(;(2Å$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X¶XXXÔà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó@"Arial Regular("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ!"$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý d($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd####'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d....7Border 1dd!/Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€-ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€-ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€-XÔÌÌOctober€29,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó –Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€-ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÓ  ÓÔ€-ôÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€Code€provision€concerning€declaratory€judgments,€formerly€found€in€ðð€4„5„224,€wasÏtransferred€to€ðð€4„5„225€pursuant€to€Acts€1997,€ch.€162,€ðð€1.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„224Ï(Supp.€1997)€compilerððs€notes.Ì lÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€-ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€-ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóWe€note€that€this€court€recently€held€that€a€regular€employee€who€has€acquired€a€propertyÏinterest€in€his€position€has€a€right€to€procedural€due€process€when€that€position€is€reclassified€fromÏcareer€to€executive€service€as€this€reclassification€is€an€"action€which€deprives€a€regular€employee€ofÏsuch€employee's€'property€right'"€under€Tennessee€Code€ðð€8„30„331.€€òòArmstrong€v.€TennesseeÏDep't€of€Veterans€Affairsóó,€€No.€01„A„01„9610„CH00476,€1997€WL€367463€(Tenn.€App.€1997).€€ThisÏopinion€was€based€upon€the€nature€of€constitutional€due€process€which€will€not€permit€a€propertyÏinterest,€once€bestowed,€to€be€arbitrarily€taken€away.òò€€Logan€v.€Zimmerman€Brush€Co.óó,€455€U.S.Ï422,€432€(1982)€(quoting€òòVitek€v.›€Jonesóó,€445€U.S.€480,€490„91€(1980)€(quoting€òòœArnett›€v.€Kennedyóó,Ï416€U.S.€134,€167€(1974))).€€However,€subsequent€to€òòArmstrongóó,€the€legislature€seems€to€haveÏeliminated€the€constitutional€ramifications€of€reclassification€by€providing€that€a€career€serviceÏemployee,€upon€reclassification€to€the€executive€œservice,›€ð ðshall€maintain€the€position€with€anÏincumbentððs€rights€in€the€career€service.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„208(g)(1)€(œSupp›.€1997).à à€œÌ ÊÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€-ÔÝ  ÝÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€-ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóòòSee€supraóó€note€1.€€ÌÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€-ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€¶XXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñ›Þ ÞÌWAYNE€MORRIS,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9612„CH„00543ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€ChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€96„705„I̜ـ!ÙßR€01/A1-j|tÿª` ç `€€@ÿRß›CORRECTIONAL€ENTERPRISES€à à)ÌOF€TENNESSEE,€TENNESSEEà àà à)ÌCIVIL€SERVICE€COMMISSION,€andà à)ÌSUSAN€R.€WILLIAMS,€in€Herà àà à)ÌOfficial€Capacity€as€Commissioner€ofà à)Ìthe€Tennessee€Department€ofà àà à)ÌPersonnel,à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€IRVIN€H.€KILCREASE,€JR.,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌÌLARRY€D.€WOODSÌP.€O.€Box€24727ÌNashville,€Tennessee€37202„4727Ìà àAttorney€for€Plaintiff/AppellantÌÌJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌÌJAMES€C.€FLOYDÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌ450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌNashville,€Tennessee€37243„0490Ìà àAttorney€for€Defendants/AppelleesÌÌÌÌà@ àREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌLEWIS,€J.ÌKOCH,€J.ÇÓÓÓ  Óà@ àò òòòÔ€-„ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÔ€-XÔÌÑ7€ ¬È XXdðXXdæ7Ñà àà àThe€primary€question€in€this€appeal,€from€which€all€other€issues€flow,Ïis€what€is€the€procedure€for€determining€whether€a€state€employee€was€in€theÏcareer€service,€and€thus€entitled€to€œcivil›€œservice›€protection,€or€in€the€executiveÏservice€serving€at€the€pleasure€of€his€employer.€€We€vacate€the€judgment€of€theÏchancery€court€and€give€the€appellant€employee€thirty€days€to€act€in€accordanceÏwith€the€proper€procedure€€as€outlined€in€the€following€opinion.̛̜à@ àò òI.Ìœà@ àProcedural›€Historyó ớ̜à àà àThe€Tennessee€Civil€Service€Commission€(CSC)€and€CorrectionalÏEnterprises€of€Tennessee€(CET)€denied€the€appellant€an€administrative€hearingÏafter€he€was€terminated€from€his€job€with€Tennessee€State€Industries,€a€division€ofÏthe€Department€of€Correction.€€Appellant€then€petitioned€the€Chancery€Court€ofÏDavidson€County€for€review€of€the€denial€pursuant€to€the€Uniform€AdministrativeÏProcedures€Act€(UAPA)€adding€a€claim€for€the€infringement€on€his€rights€inÏviolation€of€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983.€€Finding€that€it€lacked€jurisdiction€to€hear€the€ðð€1983Ïclaim,€the€trial€court€dismissed€this€portion€of€œAppellant's›€petition.€€The€court€thenÏfound€that€Appellees'€decision€not€to€grant€œAppellant›€a€hearing€was€not€subject€toÏreview€in€the€chancery€court€because€there€was€no€"contested€case"€in€this€matterÍand€because€the€law€provides€that€"[t]he€final€step€of€th[e]€grievance€procedure€forÏregular€employees€shall€be€a€request€for€review€to€the€[CSC],€and€all€decisions€byÏthe€[CSC]€upon€such€requests€for€review€shall€be€final."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„328(a)(7)€(1993).€ÌœÌÌÌ›à@ àò òII.Ìà@ àFactsó óÌÌÓ  Óà àà àÓ  Óà àà àWayne€Morris€had€been€employed€by€the€State€ofÏTennessee€for€twenty„seven€years€when€he€was€terminated€œfrom€his€job€in›ÏDecember€of€1995.€€He€began€his€career€with€the€state€as€a€correctional€officer.€ÏIn€1984,€he€was€transferred€to€Tennessee€State€Industries,€a€division€of€theÏDepartment€of€Correction,€where€he€worked€as€a€Correctional€IndustriesÏSupervisor€II.€€From€1984€to€1989,€Mr.€Morris€received€merit€pay€increases€andÏpromotions€becoming€first€a€Correctional€Industries€Supervisor€III€and,€later,€aÏCorrectional€Industries€Supervisor€V.€€In€the€latter€position,€Mr.€Morris€was€PlantÏManager€of€the€metal€plant€at€Turney€Center€„„€a€state€prison€industry€facilityÏcontaining€a€metal€plant,€a€paint€plant€and€a€wood€furniture€plant.€€At€TurneyÏCenter,€there€is€an€Industries€Operations€Manager€(IOM),€a€position€which€Mr.ÏMorris€claims€was€filled€by€Ken€Brown€during€Mr.€Morris'€entire€tenure€as€PlantÍManager.€€It€is€Appellees'€view€that€Mr.€Morris'€promotion€in€January€of€1995€wasÏto€the€position€of€IOM.€€Contrarily,€Mr.€Morris€asserts€that€CET€and€the€CSCÏtransferred€him€from€his€position€as€Plant€Manager€of€the€metal€plant€to€PlantÏManager€of€the€wood€furniture€plant€at€which€time€Mr.€Morris€was€promised€a€stepÏraise.€€ÌÌà àà àAlmost€a€year€after€the€change€in€Mr.€Morris'€job,€the€ActingÏExecutive€Director€of€CET€notified€Mr.€œMorris›€in€a€letter€dated€December€5,€œ1995›Ïœthat,›€"[d]ue€to€continuing€quality€control€problems€and€the€inadequate€oversight€ofÏplant€operations,"€he€was€being€terminated€from€employment.€€When€heÏattempted€to€utilize€the€grievance€procedures€set€up€by€statute€for€stateÏemployees,€the€Director€for€Human€Resource€Management€for€CET€told€him€thatÏhe€was€not€entitled€to€a€hearing€because€he€had€been€in€an€executive€serviceÏposition€since€January€16,€1995.€€The€Director€asserted€in€a€letter€that€the€fact€thatÏMr.€Morris€accepted€the€raise€which€he€received€in€January€of€1995€indicates€thatÏhe€knowingly€accepted€this€executive€service€position.€€When€Mr.€MorrisÏrequested€a€Level€V€hearing€before€the€CSC,€his€request€was€again€denied€in€aÏletter€stating€that€his€personnel€records€indicated€that€he€has€been€in€theÏexecutive€service€since€January€16,€1995€and€thus€CSC€has€no€authority€to€hearÏhis€appeal.€€ÌÌò òÓ  ÓIII.€ÌÓ  Óà@ àThe€Status€of€the€Employeeó óÌÌà àà àThe€scope€of€Mr.€Morris'€rights€with€regard€to€his€former€employmentÏis€defined€by€whether€he€was€Plant€Manager€or€IOM„„€each€position€occupying€aÏdifferent€status€under€the€Civil€Service€Code€which€divides€all€positions€in€theÏstate€service€between€career€service€and€executive€service.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ8„30„208€(1993).€€The€Tennessee€Code€provides€that€a€plant€manager€in€a€prisonÏindustry€"shall€be€a€career€service€employee."€€òòId.óó€ðð€41„22„407(d)€œ(1997).›€€TheÏstatute€further€provides€that€the€Tennessee€œRehabilitative›€œInitiative›€œin€Correction›ÏœBoard€(TRICOR),€with€the€approval€of€the€commissioner€of€personnnel,€"shall›Ïhave€the€option€of€declaring€certain€management€positions,€unique€to€theÏoperations€under€the€control€of€the€board,€a€part€of€the€executive€service€andÏunder€the€exclusive€control€of€the€board."€€òòIdóó.€€Mr.€Morris€does€not€dispute€that€theÏposition€of€IOM€is€such€an€executive€service€job.€€ÌÌà àà àSignificantly,€if,€at€the€time€of€his€termination,€Mr.€Morris€was€a€careerÏservice€employee€who€had€completed€his€initial€working€test€period,€or€a€"regularÏemployee,"€he€should€have€been€given€certain€procedural€protections€under€theÏCivil€Service€Code.€€òòSee€id.óó€ðð€8„30„101(a)(20)€(Supp.€œ1997)›€(defining€"regularÏemployee").€€For€example,€while€ðð€8„30„328€sets€up€€grievance€procedures€forÏboth€permanent€and€regular€employees€in€the€state€service,€only€regularÏemployees€are€permitted€a€contested€case€hearing€before€the€CSC€as€the€finalÍstep€of€these€grievance€procedures.€€òòIdóó.€ðð€œ8„30„328(7)(1993);›€€Tenn.€œComp.€R.€&ÏReg.€R.€1120„11„.05(5)(b).€€Moreover,€a€regular€employee€in€the€career€serviceÏacquires€a€property€right€in€his€position.€€òòId.óó€ðð€8„30„331(a)€(1993).€€With€such€aÏright,€"no€suspension,€demotion,€dismissal€or€any€other€action€which€deprives€aÏregular€employee€of€such€employee's€'property€right'€will€become€effective€untilÏminimum€due€process€is€provided."€€òòId.óó€€The€statute€provides€that€minimum€dueÏprocess€includes€written€notice€of€the€charges€and€the€opportunity€to€respond€toÏthese€charges€before€any€action€is€taken.€€òòId.óó€ðð€8„30„331(b)(1)„(2).€€An€executiveÏservice€employee,€on€the€other€hand,€€serves€at€the€pleasure€of€his€employer.€ÏTenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Reg.€R.€1120„10„.02.€€While€the€grievance€procedures€of€ðð€8„30„328€are€available€to€executive€employees,€for€them€the€final€step€of€theseÏprocedures€is€before€the€agency€appointing€authority€and€is€not€a€contested€caseÏhearing.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„328(a)(7);›€œTenn.›€œComp.€R.€&€Reg.€R.€1120„11„.05(4).€€ÌÌà àà àIn€support€of€his€position€that€he€was€a€Plant€Manager,€and€hence€aÏcareer€service€employee,€Mr.€Morris€presented€his€own€testimony€as€well€as€thatÏof€a€man€who€was€present€at€a€meeting€in€January€of€1995€where€Mr.€Morris€wasÏoffered€the€job€of€managing€the€wood€plant.€€Appellees€have€presented€noÏevidence€to€establish€that€Mr.€Morris€was€the€IOM.€€Rather,€they€rely€on€the€bareÏassertion€that€the€grievance€procedures€do€not€apply€to€his€termination€becauseÏhe€was€an€executive€service€employee.€€In€addition,€they€maintain€that€theÍgrievance€procedures€are€not€available€to€adjudicate€the€issue€of€whether€Mr.ÏMorris€was€a€Plant€Manager€or€an€IOM€at€the€time€of€his€termination.€€As€stated,Ïthe€chancery€court€found€that€it€did€not€have€jurisdiction€to€hear€Mr.€Morris'€caseÏunder€the€UAPA€since€there€had€been€no€contested€case€hearing.€€Finally,€theÏcourt€found€that€even€if€Mr.€Morris€were€a€civil€service€employee,€the€right€toÏappeal€a€grievance€to€the€CSC€is€a€determination€expressly€within€the€exclusiveÏauthority€of€the€CSC.€ÌÌà àà àMr.›€Morris€is€confronted€with€an€interesting€procedural€dilemma:€heÏdesires€a€contested€case€hearing€to€resolve€the€question€of€his€status€as€a€stateÏemployee,€the€resolution€of€which€would€determine€his€right€to€a€contested€caseÏhearing€in€the€first€place.€€While€Mr.€Morris€does€not€dispute€that€he€has€no€right€toÏa€hearing€if€he€was€an€executive€employee€at€the€time€of€his€termination,€heÏargues€that€his€claim€and€uncontroverted€proof€that€he€was€in€the€career€serviceÏentitles€him€to€a€hearing€before€the€CSC€on€this€issue.€€We€must€settle€this€issueÏin€a€manner€which,€while€consistent€with€the€œcivil›€œservice›€statute,€rules,€andÏregulations,€does€not€permit€the€state€to€deny€an€employee€civil€service€protectionÏby€merely€declaring€that€the€employee€was€in€an€executive€position.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓIV.ÌJudicial€Review€Under€the€UAPAÌÓ  Óó óÌœà à›à à"Title€4,€Chapter€5€of€the€Tennessee€Code€establishes€theÏprocedures€for€State€agencies€under€the€aegis€of€the€Uniform€AdministrativeÏProcedures€Act."€€òòGonsalves€v.€Robertsóó,€905€S.W.2d€931,€932€(Tenn.€1995).€€ThisÏstatute€was€"designed€to€clarify€and€bring€uniformity€to€the€procedure€of€stateÏadministrative€agencies€and€judicial€review€of€their€determination."€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€œ4„5„103€(1991).›€€As€for€the€judicial€review€of€agency€decisions,€the€courtsÏhave€recognized€that€the€UAPA€provides€two€methods€by€which€such€decisionsÏcan€be€reviewed.€€òòSee€Richardson€v.€Tennessee€Bd.€of€Dentistryóó,€913€S.W.2dÏ446,€œ455„56›€(Tenn.€1995);€€òòMcKissack€&€McKissack€&€Thompson€Architects€&ÏEng'rs,€Inc.€v.€State€Bd.€of€Exam'rs€œfor›€Architects€&€Eng'rsóó,€No.€86„361„II,€1987€WLÏ10331,€at€*2€(Tenn.€App.€1987).€€The€first€is€through€a€declaratory€judgmentÏproceeding€œwhich›€is€outlined€in€œð𛀜4„5„225× ƒ2 ××  ×›€œof€the€Tennessee€Code€and›€theÏsecond€is€through€judicial€review€of€contested€cases€pursuant€to€œTennessee›ÏCode€œAnnotated€section›€4„5„322.€ÌÌœà à›à àTennessee€Code€Annotated€œsection›€œ4„5„225›€provides€a€procedureÏby€which€the€Davidson€County€Chancery€Court€can€issue€a€declaratory€judgmentÏto€determine€"[t]he€legal€validity€or€applicability€of€a€statute,€rule€or€order€of€anÏagency€to€specified€circumstances€.€.€.€if€the€court€finds€that€the€statute,€rule€orÍorder,€or€its€threatened€application,€interferes€with€or€impairs,€or€threatens€toÏinterfere€with€or€impair,€the€legal€rights€or€privileges€of€the€complainant."€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€œ4„5„225(a)›€œ(Supp.1997).›€€A€complainant€can€petition€the€chanceryÏcourt€for€a€declaratory€judgment€if€he€"has€petitioned€the€agency€for€a€declaratoryÏorder€and€the€agency€has€refused€to€issue€a€declaratory€order."€€òòId.óó€ðð€œ4„5„225(b);›Ïòòsee€Richardsonóó,€913€S.W.2d€at€456.€€The€œdeclaratory›€œorder›€œstatute,›€found€in€œðð›Ïœ4„5„223€of€the€Code,›€provides€that€"[a]ny€affected€person€may€petition€an€agencyÏfor€a€declaratory€order€as€to€the€validity€or€applicability€of€a€statute,€rule€or€orderÏwithin€the€primary€jurisdiction€of€the€agency"€at€which€time€the€agency€shallÏ"[c]onvene€a€contested€case€hearing€pursuant€to€the€provisions€of€this€chapterÏand€issue€a€declaratory€order€which€shall€be€subject€to€review€in€the€chanceryÏcourt€of€Davidson€County."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ4„5„223(a)(1)(1991).›€€ÌÌœà à›à àThe€second€method€by€which€an€agency€decision€can€be€reviewedÏin€the€chancery€court€is€found€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€œsection›Ï4„5„322(a)(1).€€This€statute€provides€that€"[a]€person€who€is€aggrieved€by€a€finalÏdecision€in€a€contested€case€is€entitled€to€judicial€review€under€this€chapter,€whichÏshall€be€the€only€available€method€of€judicial€review."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ4„5„322(a)(1)€(Supp.€œ1997).›€€A€"contested€case"€is€statutorily€defined€as€"aÏproceeding,€including€a€declaratory€proceeding,€in€which€the€legal€rights,€dutiesÏor€privileges€of€a€party€are€required€by€any€statute€or€constitutional€provision€to€beÏdetermined€by€an€agency€after€an€opportunity€for€a€hearing."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÍ4„5„102(3)€(1991).€€An€example€is€the€contested€case€hearing€to€which€a€regularÏemployee€is€statutorily€entitled€as€the€final€step€in€the€grievance€procedures€underÏðð€8„30„328.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„328(a)(7)€&€(d)€(1993);€òòò ò€ó ósee€alsoóó€Tenn.ÏœComp.€R.€&€Reg.€R.€1120„11„.05(5)(b).€ÌÌà àà àIt›€is€the€latter€statute,€œTennessee›€Code€œAnnotated›€œsection›€4„5„322,Ïthrough€which€Mr.€Morris€sought€chancery€court€review.€€Finding€that€the€CSC€didÏnot€conduct€a€hearing€in€this€matter€and€that€neither€statute€nor€constitutionalÏprovision€required€a€hearing€to€determine€Mr.€Morris'€legal€rights,€duties€andÏprivileges,€the€trial€court€concluded€that€Mr.€Morris'€case€was€not€a€"contestedÏcase"€and€thus€that€it€had€no€jurisdiction€under€the€UAPA.€€In€drawing€itsÏconclusion,€the€lower€court€cited€òòMid„South€Indoor€Horse€Racing,€Inc.€v.ÏTennessee€State€Racing€Comm'nóó,€798€S.W.2d€531€(Tenn.€App.€1990),€whichÏinvolved€the€issue€of€the€UAPA's€applicability€to€the€review€of€licensingÏproceedings€that€had€resulted€in€the€plaintiff's€being€denied€a€license€to€conductÏhorse€racing.€€œIn›€òòMid„Southóó,€this€court€did€state€that€such€proceedings€"will€beÏtreated€as€'contested€cases'€only€if€they€contain€three€essential€elements.€€TheyÏmust€be€a€'proceeding'€conducted€by€an€'agency'€after€the€opportunity€for€aÏ'hearing.'€.€.€.€Proceedings€lacking€any€of€these€ingredients€are€not€contestedÏcases."€€òòId.óó€at€537.€€In€the€case€before€œus,›€œappellees›€œassert›€that€since€theÏCommission€did€not€conduct€a€proceeding€after€the€opportunity€for€a€hearing€butÏrather€simply€advised€Mr.€Morris€that€his€dismissal€from€an€executive€serviceÍposition€was€not€grievable,€there€was€no€"contested€case"€as€is€required€by€theÏlaw€for€judicial€review.ÌÌà àà àThe€problem€with€œappellee's›€argument€is€that€the€òòMid„Southóó€caseÏdid€not€turn€on€the€fact€that€there€was€no€hearing€before€the€agency,€but€rather€onÏthe€fact€that€no€hearing€was€required.€€The€court€stated€"the€licensing€proceedingÏinvolved€in€this€case€was€not€a€contested€case€because€the€commission€òòwas€notÏrequiredò ò€ó óóóto€afford€Mid„South€a€hearing€before€acting€on€its€application."€òò€Id.óóÏ(emphasis€added).€€As€stated,€the€UAPA€defines€"contested€case"€as€"aÏproceeding,€including€a€declaratory€proceeding,€in€which€the€legal€rights,€dutiesÏor€privileges€of€a€party€òòare€required€by€any€statute€or€constitutional€provision€óóto€beÏdetermined€by€an€agency€after€an€opportunity€for€a€hearing."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ4„5„102(3)€(1991)€(emphasis€added).€€The€court€in€òòMid„South€óófound€that€state€lawÏdid€not€contain€a€contested€case€hearing€requirement€nor€was€there€one€arisingÏfrom€a€constitutionally€protected€property€interest€in€a€racing€license.€€òòMid„Southóó,Ï798€S.W.2d€at€539„40.€€In€the€case€at€œbar,›€we€must€determine€whether€œa€statute›€orÏœthe€constitution›€requires€that€an€employee€who€claims€to€have€been€terminatedÏfrom€a€career€services€position€be€given€the€opportunity€to€be€heard€before€theÏCSC€on€this€matter.€ÌÌò òÓ  ÓV.ÌClassification€of€State€Employees€Under€Civil€Service€Lawó óÌÓ  ÓÌœà à›à àAn€examination€of€the€civil€service€statutes€and€regulations€revealsÏthat€it€is€the€Commissioner€of€Personnel€who€has€the€authority€to€determine€anÏemployee's€status€within€the€state€service.€€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€œsection›Ï8„30„208(d)€œ(Supp.€1997)›€states€that€"[t]he€commissioner€shall€determineÏequivalent€levels€for€the€purpose€of€assigning€positions€not€specifically€addressedÏin€subsection€(b)€to€the€career€or€executive€service.€€Such€determination€shall€beÏbased€solely€on€duties,€responsibilities€and€reporting€relationships€and€shall€notÏbe€subject€to€review€through€any€procedure."€€òòSee€alsoóó€Tenn.€œComp.€R.€&€Reg.€R.Ï1120„3„.03.€€In€addition,€the€Commissioner€is€charged€with€maintaining€the€officialÏroster€of€all€state€service€employees€which€must€€show,€among€other€information,Ïthe€employee's€name,€title€of€position,€class€and€any€changes€in€classification.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„202(a)(2)€(1993);€€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Reg.€R.€1120„2„.16.€ÏThe€CSC,€on€the€other€hand,€has€no€role€in€the€classification€of€state€employees.€ÏIts€duties€are€limited€to€those€€"expressly€imposed€upon"€it€in€the€code€whichÏinclude›€exercising€jurisdiction€over€"civil€service€appeals€brought€pursuant€toÏstatute€and€regulations€promulgated€pursuant€thereto"€and€acting€as€"the€finalÏstep€in€the€grievance€procedure€provided€for€regular€employees."€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€œ8„30„108€(1993).›ÌÌœà à›à àNothing€in€the€statutes€or€rules€requires€the€Commissioner€toÏprovide€the€employee€a€contested€case€hearing€before€making€a€classificationÍdecision.œ× ƒ3 ××  ×›€€Moreover,€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Personnel€Rules€explicitlyÏprovide€that€the€"classification€of€a€position"€is€a€non„grievable€matter.€€Tenn.ÏœComp.€R.€&€Reg.€R.€1120„11.08(12)€(in€€section€entitled€"Grievances").€€As€forÏdisputes€over€grievability€itself,€the€rules€provide€as€follows:€"Disputes€overÏgrievability€may€be€resolved€by€an€agency's€appointing€authority€or€by€theÏCommissioner.€€The€[CSC]€may€review€such€determinations€and,€at€its€discretion,Ïtake€whatever€action€it€deems€appropriate."€€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Reg.€R.€1120„11„.09(3).ÌÌà àà àIn›€light€of€the€foregoing,€it€appears€that€a€state€employee€œcannot›Ïobtain€a€hearing€before€the€CSC€regarding€his€classification.€€The€law€is€clear€thatÏclassification€decisions€are€solely€within€the€jurisdiction€of€the€Commissioner€ofÏPersonnel€and€that€they€are€not€grievable€or€contestable€matters.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€œBecauseÏneither€statute€nor€constitution€requires€the€state€to€provide€a€hearing€forÍemployees€who€claim€to€have€been€terminated€from€career€services€positions,€theÏchancery€court€was€correct€in€its€determination€that€it€lacked€jurisdiction€under€ððÏ4„5„322€of€the€UAPA.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„102(3)(1991);€òòMid„SouthÏIndoor€Horse€Racing,€Inc.€v.€Tennessee€State€Racing€Commððnóó,€798€S.W.2d€531,Ï537€(Tenn.€App.€1990).€€However,›€as€we€pointed€œout,›€the€UAPA€provides€œanother›Ïœmethod›€for€employees€in€the€state€service€to€€seek€review€of€the€decisions€whichÏaffect€their€œemployment€and€it€is€to€this€other€method€Mr.€Morris€ought€haveÏturned.›€ÌÌœà à›à àTo€avail€himself€of€chancery€court€review,€Mr.€Morris€should€haveÏfiled€a€petition€for€a€declaratory€order€with€the€Commissioner€of€PersonnelÏpursuant€to€ðð€4„5„223.€€In€his€petition,€Mr.€Morris€could€have€requested€theÏCommissioner€to€declare€whether,€at€the€time€of€his€termination,€he€was€a€careerÏemployee€who€was€entitled€to€invoke€the€grievance€procedure€or€whether€he€wasÏan€executive€service€employee€with€no€such€right.€€As€stated€above,€theÏœdeclaratory›€œorder›€statue€provides€that€"[a]ny€affected€person€may€petition€anÏagency€for€a€declaratory€order€as€to€the€validity€or€applicability€of€a€statute,€rule€orÏorder€within€the€primary€jurisdiction€of€the€agency."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„223(a)(1)€(1991).€€€The€rules€and€statutes€are€clear€that€both€the€classification€andÏthe€grievability€issues€are€within€the€Commissioner€of€Personnel's€primaryÏjurisdiction.€ÌÌà àœà àHad›€Mr.€Morris€requested€a€declaratory€order,€the€CommissionerÏcould€have€convened€a€contested€case€œhearing€under›€ðð€4„5„223(a)(1)€and€issuedÏa€declaratory€order€which€would€have€been€subject€to€review€in€the€DavidsonÏCounty€œChancery›€œCourt›€€under€ðð€4„5„322(a)(1).€€If€the€Commissioner€œhad€refused›Ïto€issue€a€declaratory€order,€Mr.€Morris€could€have€filed€a€petition€for€a€declaratoryÏjudgment€in€the€œchancery›€œcourt›€of€Davidson€County€under€ðð€œ4„5„225.›€€Finally,€inÏeither€case,€a€final€judgment€of€the€chancery€court€would€have€been€appealableÏto€the€Tennessee€Court€of€Appeals.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„223€(1991);€òòseeÏRichardson€v.€Tennessee€Bd.€of€Dentistryóó,€913€S.W.2d€446,€458€(Tenn.€1995)Ï(summarizing€the€avenues€by€which€a€state€service€employee€can€obtain€judicialÏreview).€€ÌÌœà à›à àBecause€no€Tennessee€court€has€previously€set€out€the€properÏprocedure€for€a€state€service€employee€to€obtain€an€authoritative€answer€to€theÏquestion€of€his€classification,€we€give€Mr.€Morris€thirty€days€to€file€a€petition€for€aÏdeclaratory€order€with€the€Commissioner€of€Personnel.€€The€judgment€of€the€courtÏbelow€is€vacated€and€Mr.€Morris€is€authorized€to€proceed€in€accordance€with€theÏprocedure€as€outlined€above€œshould›€he€so€œdesire.›Ìò òÓ  ÓÌVI.ÌThe€ðð€1983€Claimó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àà àLastly,€we€turn€to€the€lower€court's€dismissal€of€œthe€appellant's›€42ÏU.S.C.€ðð€1983€claim.€€In€Mr.€Morris'€original€œpetition,›€he€argued,€in€the€alternative,Ïthat€Appellees'€actions€constituted€a€deprivation€and€infringement€upon€hisÏprotected€rights€in€violation€of€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983.€€In€his€prayer€for€relief,€Mr.€MorrisÏrequested€that€he€be€granted,€in€addition€to€a€hearing€and€subsequentÏreinstatement,€"such€other€relief€as€is€just€and€proper€including€an€award€of€costsÏand€reasonable€attorney's€fees."€€òòSeeóó€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1988(b)€(governing€the€awardÏof€attorney's€fees€in€a€ðð€1983€action€by€providing€that€"the€court,€in€its€discretion,Ïmay€allow€the€prevailing€party€other€than€the€United€States,€a€reasonableÏattorneys'€fees€as€part€of€the€costs").€€Finding€that€it€lacked€jurisdiction€over€theÏthis€claim,€the€trial€court€dismissed€that€portion€of€Mr.€Morris'€complaint€involving€ððÏ1983.€ÌÌœà à›à àIn€its€order,€the€court€stated€that€it€was€dismissing€œthe€appellantððs›Ïcomplaint€under€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983€"for€good€cause€shown,€as€reflected€in€œ[theÏappellees']›€Memorandum€in€Support€of€Their€Motion€for€Partial€Dismissal."€€While€ÏœAppellees'›€œmemorandum›€in€œsupport›€of€the€dismissal€motion€was€not€made€a€partÏof€the€record,€the€parties'€briefs€indicate€that€the€jurisdictional€basis€for€dismissalÏinvolved€the€joinder€of€an€original€action€with€an€administrative€appeal.€€BeforeÏaddressing€this€jurisdictional€question,€we€must€determine€whether€Mr.€Morris€œhas›Ïa€federally€protected€right€which€would€give€rise€to€a€ðð€1983€action€before€thereÏhas€been€a€decision€that€he€was€a€career€service€employee.€€ÌÌœà à›à àSection€1983€of€Title€42€of€the€United€States€Code€establishes€aÏcause€of€action€against€"[e]very€person€who,€under€color€of€any€statute,€ordinance,Ïregulation,€custom,€or€usage,€of€any€State€or€Territory€or€the€District€of€Columbia,Ïsubjects,€or€causes€to€be€subjected,€any€citizen€of€the€United€States€œ.€.€.›€to€theÏdeprivation€of€any€rights,€privileges,€or€immunities€secured€by€the€ConstitutionÏand€laws."€€Procedural€due€process€is€a€right€secured€by€federal€law.€€òòSee€LoganÏv.€Zimmerman€Brush€Co.óó,€455€U.S.€422,€432€(1982)€(quoting€òòVitek€v.€Jonesóó,€445ÏU.S.€480,€491€(1980))€(in€addressing€the€nature€of€constitutional€due€process,€theÏCourt€noted€that€"'minimum€[procedural]€requirements€[are]€a€matter€of€federalÏlaw'").€€As€stated,€Tennessee€law€only€gives€employees€who€are€in€the€careerÏservice€property€rights€to€their€positions.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„331€(1993);€òòseeÏidóó.ðð€8„30„331(b)€(providing€that€œminimum›€due€process€ensures€career€employeesÏnotification€of€charges€against€them€and€a€right€to€a€pre„decision€discussion€withÏtheir€manager).€€€Since€it€has€not€even€been€determined€that€Mr.€Morris€was€in€theÏcareer€service,€we€think€it€premature€for€him€to€raise€a€ðð€1983€claim.€ÌÌœà à›à àShould€it€be€determined€by€the€Commissioner€of€Personnel€that€Mr.ÏMorris€was€indeed€a€career€service€employee€at€the€time€of€his€termination,€heÏmay€desire€to€join€a€ðð€1983€claim€with€the€claim€that€he€œwas›€denied€the€minimumÏdue€process€to€which€he€œwas›€entitled.€€Because€we€find€that€there€is€noÏjurisdictional€basis€for€œcategorically€denying›€the€joinder€of€an€original€action€withÍan€œappeal€as€the€court€below€seemed€to€do,›€we€œwill€discuss›€this€issue€which€hasÏœalready›€been€thoroughly€addressed€by€Tennessee€courts.€€œÌÌà àà àIn›€òòGoodwin€v.€Metropolitan€Bd.€of€Healthóó,€656€S.W.2d€383,€386Ï(Tenn.€App.€1983),€the€plaintiff€appealed€from€an€administrative€hearing€rulingÏwhich€upheld€her€termination€of€employment€from€the€Metropolitan€Board€ofÏHealth.€€In€the€same€action,€the€plaintiff€sought€additional€relief€by€requesting€aÏœdeclaratory›€œjudgment›€to€have€certain€regulations€of€the€Board€of€Health€declaredÏunconstitutional.€€This€court€condemned€the€joinder€of€these€two€claims€holdingÏthat€the€original€action€should€have€been€dismissed€at€the€"very€outset."€€òòId.óó€atÏ387.€€The€court€reasoned€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThis€Court€is€of€the€firm€opinion€that€such€procedure€isÏinimical€to€a€proper€review€in€the€lower€certiorari€CourtÏand€creates€even€greater€difficulties€in€the€Court€ofÏAppeals.€€€The€necessity€of€a€separation€of€appellateÏreview€of€a€matter€and€trial€of€another€matter€ought€toÏbe€self€evident.€€€In€the€lower€Court€one€is€reviewedÏunder€appropriate€Appellate€rules€and€the€other€is€triedÏunder€trial€rules.€€€In€this€Court€our€scope€of€review€isÏdependent€upon€the€nature€of€a€proceeding.€€€In€thisÏcase€one€matter€would€be€limited€by€rules€of€certiorariÏreview€and€the€other€would€be€reviewed€under€13(d),ÏTennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure.€€€Like€waterÏand€oil,€the€two€will€not€mix.ÌÓÓÌòòId.óó€at€386.€€ÌÌà àà àCiting€òòGoodwinóó,€the€Court€of€Appeals€again€reiterated€its€view€thatÏan€appeal€from€an€action€from€a€board€should€not€be€joined€with€an€originalÏaction€in€the€trial€court.€òò€State€ex€rel.€Byram€v.€City€of€Brentwoodóó,€833€S.W.2d€500Ï(Tenn.€App.€1991).€€In€òòByramóó,€the€plaintiffs€were€seeking€plat€approval€from€theÏcity€planning€commission€in€order€to€develop€a€tract€of€land€which€the€commissionÏdenied.€€On€appeal,€the€plaintiffs€"sought€to€have€the€trial€court€mandate€theÏissuance€of€a€certified€plat€or,€in€the€alternative,€to€find€that€theÏdefendants/appellees€acted€arbitrarily,€capriciously€and€unreasonably€inÏwithholding€approval€of€a€plat€for€a€subdivision€to€be€built€on€property€owned€byÏthe€Byrams€in€Williamson€County,€Tennessee.€€The€Byrams€also€sought€an€awardÏof€damages€they€alleged€they€sustained€as€a€result€of€the€defendants'€actions."€ÏòòId.óó€at€501.€€The€court€held€that€plaintiffs'€mandamus€action€and€their€action€forÏdamages€should€have€been€dismissed€at€the€outset€and€that€it€was€"unnecessaryÏto€discuss€any€issue€having€to€do€with€damages€and€claims€invoking€the€originalÏjurisdiction€of€the€trial€court."€€òòId.óó€at€502.à à€ÌÌà àà àMost€recently,€in€òòWimley€v.€Rudolphóó,€931€S.W.2d€513€(Tenn.€1996),Ïthe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€addressed€the€issue€of€"whether€[a]€plaintiff€canÏcombine€an€original€action€under€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983€with€a€petition€for€judicialÏreview€under€the€[UAPA]€when€the€sole€relief€requested€under€the€ðð€1983€claim€isÏan€award€of€attorney€fees."€€There,€the€plaintiff€exhausted€her€administrativeÏremedies€after€the€state€terminated€her€Aid€for€Dependent€Children€(AFDC)Íbenefits.€€When€she€sought€chancery€court€review€of€the€decision€that€she€wasÏineligible€for€continued€benefits,€she€also€"requested€that€the€court€'[a]ssess€costs,Ïincluding€a€reasonable€attorney's€fee€as€provided€by€42€U.S.C.€ðð€œ1988.€.€€.€.'"›€€òòId.óóÏat€514.€€Holding€that€the€plaintiff€was€permitted€to€join€these€two€claims,€the€œcourt›Ïnoted€that€the€plaintiff€was€not€seeking€remedies€under€ðð€1983€which€wereÏinconsistent€with€the€remedies€in€her€petition€for€review.€€òòId.óó€at€515.€€The€courtÏstated€that€"[h]ad€[the€p]laintiff€sought€to€join€a€claim€for€any€of€those€types€of€reliefÏunder€[ðð]€1983€which€were€inconsistent€to€remedies€available€in€a€petition€forÏjudicial€review€under€the€Uniform€Administrative€Procedures€Act,€the€state'sÏestoppel€claim€would€have€had€merit."€€òòId.óó€ÌÌà àà àThe€court€distinguished€òòGoodwinóó€and€òòByramóó€characterizing€themÏboth€as€cases€in€which€the€"plaintiffs,€pursuing€administrative€appeals,€attemptedÏto€join€original€actions€for€inconsistent€relief€with€the€judicial€review€provided€inÏthe€[UAPA]."€€òòId.óó€at€516.€€Significantly,€the€court€articulated€"the€crucial€distinctionÏbetween€the€issues€in€those€cases€and€the€one€at€bar"€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àHere,€the€basis€for€plaintiff's€petition€for€judicial€reviewÏwas€her€allegation€that€DHS€had€denied€her€rightsÏafforded€under€federal€law,€specifically€rights€to€AFDCÏbenefits.€€Upon€prevailing€upon€that€claim,€plaintiff€had,Ïby€definition,€established€a€deprivation€of€rights€underÏcolor€of€state€law,€the€very€basis€for€recovery€under€ððÏ1983.€€Furthermore,€that€success€entitled€her€toÏattorney€fees€under€€ðð€1983€even€had€she€not€pleadÏthat€entitlement.€€ÌÓÓòòÌId.óó€€(citing€òòBloomingdale's€by€Mail€Ltd.€v.€Huddlestonóó,€848€S.W.2d€52,€56€(Tenn.Ï1992)).€€òòGoodwinóó€and€òòByramóó,€on€the€other€hand,€did€not€involve€allegations€of€theÏdeprivation€of€federal€rights€under€color€of€law.€€òòWimleyóó,€931€S.W.2d€at€516.€€€ÌÌà àà àMr.€Morris€œmight,›€subsequent€to€the€remand€of€this€œcase,›€petition€forÏjudicial€review€on€the€basis€that€he€was€denied€his€right€to€procedural€dueÏprocess€which,€like€the€right€at€issue€in€òòWimleyóó,€is€a€right€afforded€under€federalÏlaw.€€œBy€prevailing€on€a€claim€brought€under€the€UAPA,€Mr.€Morris€may›€show€thatÏhe€is€also€entitled€to€recover€under€42€U.S.C.€ðð€œ1983€as€the€plaintiff€in€òòWimleyóó€did.›€ÏBecause€the€case€law€has€emphasized€that€the€relief€sought€in€the€original€ððÏ1983€action€can€not€be€inconsistent€with€the€judicial€review€under€the€UAPA,€it€isÏsignificant€that€Mr.€Morris€œspecifically›€sought€only€attorney's€fees€under€ðð€1983€inÏhis€complaint.€€The€œcourt›€in€òòWimleyóó€explicitly€held€that€there€was€no€inconsistencyÏwhen€a€plaintiff€joined€a€claim€for€attorney's€fees€under€ðð€1983€with€her€appealÏunder€the€UAPA€.€€We€therefore€œclarify›€that€the€trial€court€œwas€in€error€when€itÏbased€its€dismissal€of€the€ðð€1983€claim€on€its€lack€of€jurisdiction€over€an€originalÏaction€joined€with€an€administrative€appeal.Ô€-ôÔ›€€Ìò òÓ  ÓÔ€-XÔVII.ÌConclusionó óÌÓ  Óà à€Ìà àà àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€decision€of€the€chancery€court€isÏvacated.€€We€hold€that€the€proper€procedure€for€a€state€employee€to€obtain€anÍauthoritative€answer€to€the€question€of€his€status€is€the€filing€of€a€œdeclaratory›€œorder›Ïwith€the€Commissioner€of€Personnel€pursuant€to€œTennessee›€Code€œAnnotated›Ïœsection›€4„5„223.€€We€direct€that€Mr.€Morris€be€given€œthirty›€days€to€act€inÏaccordance€with€this€procedure.€œ€Finally,›€we€œconclude€that€there€is€no€basis€for€a€ððÏ1983€action€until€there€has€been€a€determination€that€Mr.€Morris€was€a€careerÏservice€employee€with€a€federally€secured€property€interest€in€his€position.€ÏHowever,€once€the€declaratory€order€action€before€the€Commissioner€is€final,€Mr.ÏMorris€may€couple€a€ðð€1983€claim€for€attorneyððs€fees€with€his€petition€for€chanceryÏcourt€review€of€the€issue€that€he,€as€a€career€service€employee,€was€denied€dueÏprocess.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€state.›ÌœÌÌ›ÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€œJUDGEÇÑ ° ÑÑ X ÑÑ  Ñ›œ›