ÿWPCö 6# U D %S 0(Y 0”4)8w@@ 0D€ 0JÄ 0T 0^b 0hÀ 0r( 0|š 0† 0œ 1u, 0d¡ 0@ D3E Bx B)• AQ¾ Æ 0DÕ 0D D/] BŒ DC© AMì U*9 c U>gv~¥vÓ#˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ8§ÖhZŠ,Century-WP RegularX($¡¡(D(2´¤$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóóäzz!3|xÏ  » D¼ ½ D¾ ¿ À DÁ   à Ó€Ï (#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò&&&&'ÿÿdxd d% Line 7 d*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd((((7Border 1dd* /Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial úÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€1ÔÔ€1ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€1XÔÌÌò òApril€10,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€1ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó< Œ 9p`(&Times New RomanPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  Ý›Ò  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑœÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€Ô›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌ______________________________________________________________________________ÌÌWILLIAM€P.€NIXON,€JR.,à àà àà àShelby€Law€No.€144305„9€R.D.̜ـ*ÙßR€02/A1-j|ðÉ` Å `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€02A01„9512„CV„00287Ìà àà àPlaintiff,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHon.€Robert€L.€Childers,€JudgeÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌMARTHA€SUE€NIXON,ÌÌà àà àDefendant.ÌÌSTEVAN€L.€BLACK€and€KIMBERLY€HARRIS€JORDAN,€Black,€Bobango€&€Morgan,ÏMemphis,€Attorneys€for€Plaintiff.ÌÌMARTI€L.€KAUFMAN,€Monroe,€Shankman€&€Kaufman,€Memphis,€Attorney€forÏDefendant.ÌÌò òòòREVERSED€IN€PART€AND€AFFIRMED€IN€PARTó óóóÌÌOpinion€filed:Ì______________________________________________________________________________ÌÌò òTOMLIN,€Sr.€J.ó óà@ àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÓÓÔ€Ôà àWilliam€P.€Nixon,€Jr.€(ð ðHusbandðð)€filed€suit€for€divorce€againstÏMartha€Sue€Nixon€(ð ðWifeðð)€in€the€Circuit€Court€of€Shelby€County€on€theÏgrounds€of€irreconcilable€differences€and€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€ÏWife€also€filed€a€counter„complaint€against€Husband€seeking€a€divorce.€ÏFollowing€a€bench€trial,€the€court€awarded€a€divorce€to€both€parties.€€InÍaddition€the€court€set€aside€certain€real€estate€to€Husband€as€separateÏproperty,€and€found€that€the€appreciation€in€value€during€marriage€of€thatÏproperty€to€be€marital€property,€awarding€Wife€40%€of€the€appreciatedÏvalue.€€The€trial€court€also€found€that€while€the€parties€had€entered€into€aÏprenuptial€agreement€that€contained€a€provision€expressly€prohibiting€theÏpayment€of€alimony,€œthis›€provision€was€void€as€against€public€policy€andÏawarded€Wife€rehabilitative€alimony.€Ìà àOn€appeal,€Husband€presents€three€issues€for€our€consideration:€ÌÓÓÌà8 àI.à à(a)€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€calculating€theÏappreciation€in€value€of€Husbandððs€separate€property?€(b)ÏWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€classifying€the€appreciation€inÏvalue€of€Husbandððs€separate€property€as€marital€property€andÏin€awarding€forty€percent€(40%)€to€Wife€in€light€of€(1)€terms€ofÏthe€partiesðð€prenuptial€agreement€or,€alternatively,€(2)€WifeððsÏfailure€to€prove€that€she€made€a€substantial€contribution€to€itsÏpreservation€and€appreciation.ÌÌà8 àII.à à(a)€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€anyÏappreciation€in€the€value€of€the€Husbandððs€life€insuranceÏpolicies?€(b)€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€classifying€saidÏð ðappreciationðð€as€marital€property€and€in€awarding€a€twenty„five€percent€(25%)€to€Wife€in€light€of€(1)€the€partiesððÏprenuptial€agreement,€or,€alternatively,€(2)€Wifeððs€failure€toÏprove€that€she€made€a€substantial€contribution€to€theÏappreciation?ÌÌà8 àIII.à àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€rehabilitativeÏalimony€to€Wife€in€light€of€the€terms€of€the€partiesðð€prenuptialÏagreement?ÌÌÌÓÓFor€the€reasons€hereinafter€stated,€we€reverse€in€part€and€affirm€in€part.Ìà àThe€essential€facts€are€not€controverted.€€Husband€met€Wife€in€1978.€ÏThe€parties€were€married€in€1982.€€Husband€was€43€years€of€age€at€theÏtime€of€marriage€and€Wife€was€33.€€Both€Husband€and€Wife€had€beenÏmarried€previously.€€Wife€had€two€children€from€her€Ñ7€fXXdðXXdð7Ñformer€marriage,€agesÏsixteen€and€seven€at€the€time€of€the€marriage.€€€No€children€were€born€ofÏthe€marriage€which€is€the€basis€of€this€litigation.€€The€marriage€lastedÏthirteen€years.€€Ìà àSome€two€weeks€prior€to€marriage,€Husband€and€Wife€executed€aÏPrenuptial€Agreement€(hereafter€ð ðAgreementðð),€which€set€forth€in€detailÏthe€disposition€of€their€respective€properties€in€the€event€of€death€orÏdivorce,€providing€among€other€things€that€each€party€would€retain€asÏtheir€separate€property€all€property€which€each€currently€owned€at€theÏtime€of€the€marriage,€or€thereafter€acquired€during€marriage.€€In€addition,Ïthe€Agreement€contained€a€provision€whereby€neither€party€would€beÏobligated€to€pay€to€the€other€party€alimony€of€any€sort,€irrespective€ofÏfault.€[We€shall€have€occasion€to€examine€these€two€provisions€hereafter.]Ìà àThe€Agreement€provided€that€prior€to€its€execution€by€Husband€andÏWife,€each€party€was€to€seek€the€advice€and€counsel€of€a€licensed€attorneyÏin€Tennessee€to€counsel€them€regarding€their€rights€under€the€Agreement.€ÏIn€addition,€it€stated€that€each€attorney€so€employed€was€to€execute€anÍoath€stating€that€he€had€counseled€his€client€regarding€the€effects€andÏramifications€of€this€Agreement,€that€his€client€fully€understood€theÏcontents€thereof€and€had€willingly€entered€into€same.€€Ô€ÔThese€provisionsÏwere€carried€out€as€reflected€by€the€affidavits€of€counsel€attached€to€theÏAgreement.Ìà àIn€addition,€both€Husband€and€Wife€executed€affidavits€of€theirÏrespective€net€worth€that€were€attached€to€the€Agreement€as€exhibits.€ÏHusbandððs€net€worth€was€stated€at€$1,859,300.00€and€Wifeððs€net€worthÏwas€œstated€at›€approximately€$38,000.00.€€€ÌÓÓÌà@ àòòI.€Appreciation€in€Value€of€Husbandððs€Real€Estate.óóÌÌÌÓÓà àHusband€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€that€theÏappreciation€in€value€of€Husbandððs€separate€real€estate€during€marriageÏconstituted€marital€property€and€that€Wife€was€entitled€to€share€in€thisÏappreciation€if€she€showed€she€had€contributed€to€it.€€Husband€states€thatÏit€was€likewise€error€for€the€court€to€award€Wife€40%€of€the€calculatedÏappreciation.Ìà àThe€Agreement€contains€the€following€provision,€in€part:ÌÓÓÌà8 à3.€The€Wife€at€no€time€during€the€marriage€hereinÏcontemplated,€or€following€its€dissolution€by€reason€byÍannulment€or€divorce,€shall€have€any€interest€whatsoeverÏoccasioned€by€the€marriage,€or€otherwise,€in€the€propertyÏpresently€owned€or€hereafter€acquired,€both€real€and€personal,Ïof€Husband,€and€he€shall€have€the€right€at€all€times€to€sell,Ïexchange,€mortgage,€and€dispose€of€said€property€during€hisÏlife€by€gift€or€otherwise.€.€.€.ÌÌÌÓÓà àParagraph€2€of€the€Agreement€provides€the€same€waivers€insofar€asÏHusband€having€an€interest€in€the€Wifeððs€property€is€concerned.€€HusbandÏasserts€that€by€virtue€of€the€language€quoted€above,€Wife€knowinglyÏwaived€her€rights€created€by€the€marriage.€€He€further€states€that€underÏcase€law€in€this€state,€in€prenuptial€agreements€such€as€this,€the€partiesÏcan€readily€contract€regarding€the€disposition€of€any€appreciation€in€valueÏof€their€sole€property.€€In€support€of€this€contention,€Husband€cites€theÏcase€of€òòPerkinson€v.€Perkinsonóó,€802€S.W.2d€600€(Tenn.€1990).€€Upon€closeÏanalysis€of€òòPerkinsonóó€we€are€of€the€opinion€that€under€the€facts€thereinÏstated,€òòPerkinsonóó€supports€what€the€trial€court€did€in€the€instant€case.€€Ìà àIt€is€appropriate€to€examine€the€facts€and€the€holding€in€òòPerkinsonóó.€ÏThe€principal€asset€of€wife€coming€into€the€marriage€was€stock€in€anÏAnheuser„Busch€distributorship,€a€family€business€in€which€wife€and€someÏof€her€children€were€active,€which€involved€agreements€with€Anheuser„Busch€that€could€be€jeopardized€by€the€potential€of€the€business€passing€toÏhusband.€€The€recitals€in€the€ð ðBackground€Factsðð€portion€of€the€prenuptialÍagreement€set€forth€the€following€as€circumstances€that€encouraged€itsÏexecution:ÌÓÓÌà8 à.€.€.€[u]nder€Tennessee€law€interest€in€separate€property€mayÏbecome€marital€property€for€the€purpose€of€division€in€aÏdivorce€suit;€application€of€that€law€to€the€partiesððÏcircumstances€could€result€in€the€husbandððs€acquiring€anÏinterest€in€the€income€and€appreciation€in€value€of€the€wifeððsÏseparate€property.€.€.€.€ÌÌÌà àThe€heart€of€the€agreement€is€paragraph€1,€which€reads€in€pertinentÏpart€as€follows:ÌÌÌà8 à1.€òòAgreed€Distribution€on€Divorceóó.€€If€the€parties€wereÏdivorced,€Perkinson€[Husband]€agrees€to€accept€$150,000.00€inÏfull€satisfactory€[sic]€of€his€right€to€any€interest€in€theÏseparate€property€which€Tarver€brought€to€the€marriage.€ÏTarver€agreed€she€wants€none€of€Perkinsonððs€separate€propertyÏbrought€to€the€marriage.ÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€reversing€both€the€trial€court€and€the€Court€of€Appeals,€ChiefÏJustice€Reid,€writing€for€the€court,€stated€in€part:ÌÓÓÌà8 àThe€purpose€of€the€agreement€clearly€was€to€eliminate€theÏpossibility€that€a€court€might€find€that€during€the€marriage€theÏhusband€ð ðsubstantially€contributed€to€the€preservation€andÏappreciationðð€of€the€wifeððs€separate€property€within€theÏmeaning€of€T.C.A.€ðþÿð€36„4„121(b)(1)€and€declare€the€incomeÏand€appreciation€in€value€to€be€marital€property€subject€toÏdivision.€.€.€.€ÌÌà@ à*€*€*€*€ÌÌà8 àThe€record€shows€that€the€contract,€in€the€case€before€theÏcourt,€was€intended€to€apply€to€the€appreciation€in€value€of€theÏwifeððs€separate€property.ÌÌÌÓÓà àAn€examination€of€the€Agreement€in€the€instant€case€reveals€thatÏthere€is€no€specific€provision€pertaining€to€the€issue€of€appreciation€inÏvalue€of€separate€property€during€marriage.€€òòPerkinsonóó€stands€for€theÏproposition€that€by€appropriate€language€in€a€prenuptial€agreement,€theÏmatter€of€appreciation€in€value€of€separate€property€owned€by€a€spouseÏmay€become€marital€property€under€certain€circumstances,€subject€toÏdivision€among€the€parties,€while€the€non„owning€spouse€has€no€realÏproperty€interest€in€the€separate€property.Ìà àIt€is€a€well„settled€rule€of€law€in€this€state€that€ambiguities€in€aÏcontract€are€to€be€construed€against€the€party€drafting€it.€€òòFrank€RudyÏAyers€œAssociates›€v.€Moore€œ&›€Associates,€Inc.óó€919€S.W.2d€609,€613€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1995).€€A€contract€is€found€to€be€ambiguous€when€its€meaning€isÏuncertain€and€can€be€understood€in€more€ways€than€one.€òòId.óó€€It€isÏuncontradicted€that€in€the€instant€case€the€Agreement€was€the€brain€childÏand€product€of€Husband.€€As€stated€in€òòPerkinsonóó,€under€circumstances€suchÏas€these€appreciation€in€value€of€separate€property€can€be€dealt€with€asÍother€property€interests,€but€in€attempting€to€do€so€the€language€usedÏshould€be€abundantly€clear.€€In€this€case,€the€Agreement,€fails€to€do€so.€ÏAccordingly,€we€find€that€this€portion€of€the€issue€to€be€without€merit,Ïand€hold€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€in€classifying€the€appreciation€inÏvalue€of€Husbandððs€separate€property€as€marital€property,€subject€to€beÏshared€with€Wife€under€appropriate€circumstances.€€Ìà àWe€now€examine€the€amount€of€appreciation€in€value€as€determinedÏby€the€trial€court€as€well€as€taking€a€look€at€the€method€the€trial€courtÏemployed€in€determining€this€figure.€€It€appears€to€this€court€from€theÏrecord€that€what€the€trial€court€did€was€this:€based€upon€evidence€offeredÏon€behalf€of€Husband,€as€pertains€to€the€seven€parcels€of€real€estateð"ðtheÏproperty€used€as€the€marital€residence€and€six€parcels€of€rentalÏpropertyð"ðthe€trial€court€subtracted€the€balance€of€the€existing€mortgageÏon€each€piece€of€property€from€the€fair€market€value€thereof,€resulting€inÏa€figure€which€the€court€labeled€ð ðequityðð,€added€these€seven€individualÏamounts€together,€subtracted€from€it€Husbandððs€mortgage€debt€to€NixonÏLumber€Company€of€$339,057.00,€which€resulted€in€what€we€shall€call€theÏð ðnet€equityðð,€which€amounted€to€$153,767.00.€€The€trial€court€labeled€thisÏas€ð ðappreciation€in€valueðð€and€proceeded€to€divide€it€between€Husband€andÏWife.€€This€method€of€evaluation€constituted€error.€€ÌÔ€3Ôà àÔ€ÔThe€principal€error€in€the€courtððs€process€of€determining€the€amountÏof€appreciation€in€value€of€Husbandððs€separate€property€was€its€utilizingÏthe€propertiesðð€equity,€determined€by€subtracting€the€amount€of€theÏmortgage€from€the€fair€market€value,€as€an€indicia€of€appreciation.€€ForÏexample,€there€might€be€two€identical€houses€constructed€side€by€side€onÏtwo€identical€lots€in€the€same€neighborhood,€that€cost€the€same€to€build.€ÏOne€might€be€encumbered€with€a€mortgage€of€$50,000.00,€while€the€otherÏmight€be€encumbered€with€a€mortgage€of€$250,000.00.€€Letððs€considerÏfurther€that€the€cost€of€each€house€and€lot€was€$400,000.00.€€Under€thisÏscenario,€while€the€ð ðequityðð€of€the€owner€(the€amount€of€cash€he€wouldÏreceive€upon€sale)€would€be€different,€nonetheless,€fair€market€valueÏwould€be€the€same.€€Ìà àOrdinarily,€to€prove€an€appreciation€in€value€of€a€spouseððs€separateÏproperty€during€marriage€there€must€be€presented€evidence€thatÏestablishes€the€value€of€the€asset€prior€to€marriage€as€well€as€value€ofÏthe€asset€at€the€time€of€divorce€in€order€to€ascertain€what€theÏappreciation€of€value€is,€if€any.€€This€case€is€complicated€by€the€fact€thatÏthe€parcels€of€rental€property€and€the€marital€residence€were€acquired€byÏHusband€during€the€course€of€the€marriage.€€It€is€also€readily€apparentÏfrom€the€record€that€both€Husband€and€Wife€treated€these€properties€asÍHusbandððs€separate€property.€€Since€these€properties€were€not€owned€byÏHusband€òòprioróó€to€marriage,€if€possible,€some€other€date€must€be€used€toÏascertain€these€propertiesðð€initial€value€and€thereafter€to€compare€thisÏvalue€to€the€proven€market€value€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.Ìà àWhile€Wife€did€not€offer€any€such€evidence€herself,€we€are€of€theÏopinion€that€the€void€in€this€record€is€filled€by€evidence€offered€on€behalfÏof€Husband€through€his€accountant,€who€produced€an€exhibit€showing€theÏð ðOriginal€Cost€Basisðð€and€the€ð ðMarket€Value€5/7/95"€of€each€parcel€ofÏproperty.€€This€evidence€reveals€that€the€original€cost€basis,€or€value€atÏinception€during€the€partiesðð€marriage,€totaled€$717,514.00,€and€that€theÏmarket€value€at€time€of€divorce€was€$985,000.00,€presenting€a€totalÏappreciation€in€value€of€$267,486.00.Ìà àIn€ruling€on€the€contribution€of€the€parties,€the€trial€court€stated€inÏpart€as€follows:ÌÓÓÌà8 àThe€Court€has€considered€the€contribution€of€each€party€to€theÏacquisition,€preservation,€appreciation,€or€dissipation€of€theÏmarital€or€separate€property€including€the€contribution€of€theÏparties€to€the€marriage€as€homemaker€or€wage€earner€andÏparent.ÌÌà8 àThe€œstatute›€setting€œÔ€Ô[sic]Ô€Ô€out›€that€contributions€of€a€party€asÏhomemaker€or€wage€earner€are€to€be€given€the€same€weight€ifÏeach€party€has€fulfilled€his€or€her€role.€€The€Court€finds,€and€IÏthink€the€proof€is€clear€in€this€case,€that€Mrs.€Nixon€worked€inÍthe€home.€€She€worked€particularly€on€the€real€property,€theÏrental€property.€€Apparently,€Mr.€Nixon€still€relies€on€her€toÏhelp€with€that€rental€property,€and€she,€of€course,€has€workedÏwith€St.€Nick€farms€and€the€animals€out€there.ÌÌÌÓÓThe€record€reflects€that€the€testimony€of€Husband€and€Wife€contradictedÏeach€other€on€more€than€one€occasion€concerning€Wifeððs€role€in€theÏconstruction,€decoration,€and€operation€of€the€various€pieces€of€rentalÏproperties.€Findings€of€fact€of€the€trial€court€that€are€dependant€upon€theÏconsideration€of€the€credibility€of€witnesses€testifying€before€him€areÏentitled€to€great€weight.€€Where€an€issue€hinges€on€the€credibility€of€theÏwitnesses,€the€trial€court€will€not€be€overturned€in€this€regard,€unlessÏthere€is€in€the€record€clear,€concrete€and€convincing€evidence,€other€thanÏoral€testimony€of€witnesses€that€contradicts€these€findings.€€òòGalbreath€v.ÏHarrisóó,€811€S.W.2d€88€(Tenn.€App.€1990).€€Ìà àWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€trial€court€correctly€determined€thatÏWife€made€significant€contributions€to€the€appreciation€in€value€ofÏHusbandððs€separate€property,€such€as€her€work€on€the€rental€properties,Ïthe€time€spent€maintaining€the€marital€residence€and€her€generalÏhomemaking€activities.Ìà àThe€trial€court€divided€what€it€considered€to€be€the€appreciation€ofÏthe€Husbandððs€separate€property€60%€to€Husband€and€40%€to€Wife.€€We€areÍof€the€opinion€that€this€was€a€proper€and€appropriate€division,€and€holdÏthat€Wife€is€entitled€to€40%€of€appreciation,€amounting€to€$106,994.00,Ïwhile€Husband€is€entitled€to€$160,492.00.€€This€award€should€be€made€toÏWife€as€a€division€of€marital€property,€rather€than€alimony€òòin€solidoóó.ÌÓÓÌà@ àò òòòII.€€Husbandððs€Life€Insurance€Policies.óóó óÌÌÌÓÓà àNext,€Husband€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€that€theÏappreciation€in€value€of€two€life€insurance€polices€owned€by€Husband€andÏNixon€Lumber€Company€amounted€to€$40,000.00€and€that€as€maritalÏproperty€this€appreciation€was€subject€to€division€between€the€parties.€ÏWe€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€that€there€wasÏproven€to€exist€an€appreciation€in€value€of€$40,000.00,€25%€of€which€wasÏawarded€to€Wife.€€The€only€proof€in€this€record€was€to€the€effect€that€atÏthe€time€of€the€divorce€the€policies€had€a€value€of€$40,000.00.€€There€wasÏno€proof€as€to€what€the€value€of€the€policies€were€at€the€time€of€theÏmarriage€of€the€parties.€€Accordingly,€there€was€no€basis€on€which€theÏcourt€could€calculate€any€increase€in€value.€€We€resolve€this€aspect€of€thisÏissue€in€favor€of€Husband.ÌòòÓÓà@ àÌà@ àIII.€The€Prenuptial€Agreement€and€Rehabilitative€Alimonyóó.à àÌ€ÌÌÓÓà àIt€is€Husbandððs€contention€that€the€trial€court€committed€error€inÏawarding€Wife€rehabilitative€alimony€in€light€of€a€specific€provision€inÏthe€Agreement,€that€read€in€part€as€follows:ÌÓÓÌà8 à4.€That€if€the€marriage€of€the€parties€to€each€other€beÏdissolved€by€divorce,€or€any€other€legal€process,€irrespectiveÏof€fault,€ò òneither€party€shall€pay€to€the€other€partyÏalimony,€temporary€or€permanent,€periodic€or€in€lumpÏsumó ó,€attorneyððs€fees,€court€costs,€or€otherwise.€(EmphasisÏAdded).ÌÌÌÓÓà àFor€years€it€was€well€settled€in€this€state€that€prenuptialÏagreements€that€limited€a€spouseððs€right€to€alimony€were€void€as€beingÏagainst€public€policy.€€òòSeeóó€òòCrouch€v.€Crouchóó,€756€S.W.2d€288€(Tenn.€1964);ÏòòKahn€v.€Kahnóó,€756€S.W.2d€685€(Tenn.€1988).€€The€law€in€this€regard€has€beenÏchanged.€€In€òòCary€v.€Caryóó,€937€S.W.2d€777€(Tenn.€1996)€our€supreme€courtÏheld€that€a€waiver€of€alimony€in€a€prenuptial€agreement,€entered€intoÏvoluntarily€and€knowingly,€is€no€longer€void€and€unenforceable€as€beingÏcontrary€to€public€policy.€€In€so€holding,€the€òòCaryóó€court€stated:ÌÓÓÌà8 àWe,€therefore,€exercise€our€duty€to€abolish€obsolete€common„law€doctrines€and€conclude€that€antenuptial€agreementsÏcontaining€a€provision€limiting€or€waiving€alimony€are€not€voidÏas€contrary€to€public€policy.€€So€long€as€the€antenuptialÏagreement€was€entered€into€freely€and€knowledgeably,€withÏadequate€disclosure,€and€without€undue€influence€orÍoverreaching,€the€provision€limiting€or€waiving€alimony€will€beÏenforced,€with€one€exception.Ìà8 àà àWe€agree€that€the€Stateððs€interest€in€providing€adequateÏsupport€for€its€citizens€precludes€specific€enforcement€ofÏsuch€a€contract€provision€if€enforcement€deprives€one€spouseÏof€support€that€he€or€she€cannot€otherwise€obtain€and€resultsÏin€that€spouse€becoming€a€public€charge.€€The€trial€court€mustÏexamine€the€terms€of€the€antenuptial€agreement€at€the€time€ofÏthe€divorce€to€insure€that€its€enforcement€will€not€result€inÏthe€spouse€being€deprived€of€alimony,€becoming€a€publicÏcharge.€€If€a€spouse€would€be€rendered€a€public€charge€byÏspecific€enforcement,€the€trial€court€must€void€the€provisionÏand€award€alimony€in€accordance€with€the€factors€set€out€inÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101€(1991€Repl.€&€Supp.€1995).€€òòòòId.óóóó€atÏPage€7826.ÌÌÌÓÓà àIn€the€light€of€òòCaryóó,€we€now€look€at€the€circumstances€surroundingÏthe€execution€of€the€Agreement€by€Husband€and€Wife€and€the€ensuingÏresults€thereof.€€While€the€trial€court€did€not€make€a€specific€finding€thatÏthe€Agreement€was€ð ðwillingly€and€knowinglyðð€entered€into€by€Wife,€fromÏour€reading€of€the€record,€it€is€clear€to€this€court€that€it€was.€€HusbandÏtestified€that€Wife€willingly€signed€the€Agreement€and€expressed€noÏhesitation€at€the€time€it€was€signed.€€Wife€also€readily€admitted€that€sheÏwillingly€signed€the€Agreement.€€Furthermore,€there€is€nothing€in€theÏrecord€to€indicate€undue€influence€or€overreaching€on€the€part€of€Husband.€ÏThe€Agreement€had€some€built„in€safeguards,€by€providing€that€each€partyÏwas€to€receive€separate€legal€advice€regarding€the€Agreement,€and€thatÍtheir€respective€counsel€were€to€make€oath€through€affidavits€that€theÏparties€had€been€duly€and€properly€advised.€€In€the€instant€case,€theÏattorney€who€counseled€Wife€prior€to€her€signing€the€Agreement€testifiedÏthat€she€was€competent€to€sign€it€and€understood€what€she€was€signing.€€Ìà àThe€last€question€remaining€to€be€disposed€of€is€whether€or€not€byÏvirtue€of€executing€this€Agreement,€Wife€was€rendered€a€ð ðpublic€chargeððÏif€the€Agreement€was€specifically€enforced.€€We€have€found€no€case€in€thisÏstate€that€defines€the€term€ð ðpublic€chargeðð€in€the€context€of€a€prenuptialÏagreement.€€However,€in€òòTennessee€Department€of€Human€Services€v.ÏHintonóó,€660€S.W.2d€506€(Tenn.€App.€1983),€this€court€implied€that€in€orderÏto€be€considered€a€ð ðpublic€chargeðð€one€would€have€to€receive€some€form€ofÏpublic€welfare€or€other€financial€assistance.€€Subsequently,€in€òòState€ofÏTennessee,€Department€of€Human€Services€for€Martin€v.€Neilsonóó,€771ÏS.W.2d€128€(Tenn.€App.€1989),€this€court€made€a€reference€to€ð ðpublicÏchargeðð€as€it€pertained€to€T.C.A.€ðð€36„2„103(a)(1),€that€provides€that€aÏpetition€to€establish€paternity€œmay›€be€brought€by€the€State€Department€ofÏHuman€Services€if€the€child€has€become€a€public€charge€or€is€likely€toÏbecome€a€public€charge.€Ìà àLooking€at€the€financial€circumstances€that€Wife€was€placed€in€atÏthe€time€of€divorce€as€a€result€of€signing€the€Agreement,€we€cannot€sayÍthat€she€will€become€a€ð ðpublic€charge.ðð€€While€the€conclusion€we€haveÏreached€will€prevent€Wife€from€receiving€rehabilitative€alimony€totalingÏ$72,000.00€over€a€three€year€period,€she€does€stand€to€receive€a€sizeableÏsum€of€money€representing€her€share€of€the€distribution€of€appreciation€inÏvalue€of€Husbandððs€separate€property,€which€was€correctly€found€to€beÏmarital€property.€€The€record€also€reflects€that€she€is€otherwise€employedÏand€has€sufficient€experience€and€training€to€be€employable€in€the€future.€ÏIn€sum,€in€light€of€òòCaryóó,€we€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€award€ofÏrehabilitative€alimony€to€Wife.€Ìà àWe€hold€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€in€classifying€theÏappreciation€in€value€during€marriage€of€Husbandððs€separate€property€asÏmarital€property,€nor€did€the€court€err€in€awarding€€40%€of€the€valueÏthereof€to€Wife,€in€the€form€of€cash,€on€the€ground€that€Wife€had€made€aÏsubstantial€contribution€to€its€preservation€and€appreciation.€€We€are€ofÏthe€opinion€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€determining€the€amount€ofÏappreciation€in€the€value€of€Husbandððs€separate€property.€€We€further€holdÏthat€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€any€appreciation€in€the€value€ofÏHusbandððs€two€life€insurance€policies€and€the€awarding€Wife€25%€of€thisÏð ðvalue.ðð€€€Lastly,€as€heretofore€stated,€the€trial€court€erred€in€awardingÏrehabilitative€alimony€to€Wife€in€light€of€the€provisions€of€the€partiesððÍprenuptial€agreement.€€ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€therefore€affirmed€in€part€andÏreversed€in€part.€€Costs€in€this€cause€on€appeal€are€taxed€one/half€toÏHusband€and€one/half€to€Wife,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àTOMLIN,€Sr.€J.ÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àCRAWFORD,€P.€J.€W.S.à à€€€€€€(CONCURS)ÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àHIGHERS,€J.à àà à€€€€€€(CONCURS)Ì