ÿWPC‰î Ö# Ä UNÏ % 0e4# 0c³W b w@4Rf^ u mƒ 0Dš 0JÞ 0T( 0^| 0hÚ 0rB´ 0|¼ 0†8 0¾ 1uN 0dÃ('U0>OÎV[u±©&"Ï Bñ 1! 1m›! 0c"uk"}à#v]%sÓ&uF(s»)^ .+:+ m<+NS+[U+‹°/å;1 3ª55†ß8âe:„G<²Ë>j}@NçBæéB³ÏE3‚GûµJ„°L&4N 0wZQ)ÑQ;úS:5UªoV¶XÏZáÑ\L²^<þ_I:aIƒbJÌcÔfðêjÚoÓëtœ¾v"Zx7|{³|1C~6t€-ªÎׂ0¥„ÛÕ†&°ˆ ÖöjýVg’E½“b•¼d–h ˜˜ˆšW ž¤w¡8£gS¤º¥;º§õ¨8«2G¬áy­TZ¯v®°×$´ÊûµéÅ·9®¹’çº2y¼Ü«ÀS‡Â´ÚÃŽÅ´“ÇGʈNÎŽÖÏ›dÓÿԵ׫ÈÚ¡sÜTß1hád™â·ýã„´åv~8çvÓ¶è˜HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0nLlÎ'í€"  Z 6Times New Roman Regular¼( ¤U$¡¡Ó  Ó(c(2~õ$¤¤Ý ƒ¤U!ÝÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€X~ïX¼¼Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù- [=P\=]=D^= P_=`=a=Pb=Ec=d=Pû~%ñðññïñoe3|xd=G–¬$ˆHÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô 2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô%'( ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓprocreational< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman ÄÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee,€e.g.,€Thornburgh€v.€American€College€of€Obstetricians€and€Gynecologistsóó,€476€U.S.Ï747,€764,€106€S.€Ct.€2169,€2180€(1986)€(invalidating€a€requirement€of€mandatory€pre„abortionÏcounseling€by€a€physician€using€state„prescribed€materials€discouraging€abortion);€òòCity€of€Akron€v.ÏAkron€Ctr.€for€Reproductive€Healthóó,€462€U.S.€416,€437„39,€449„51,€103€S.€Ct.€2481,€2496„97,€Ï2502„03€(1983)€(invalidating€24„hour€waiting€periods€and€requirements€that€abortions€beÏperformed€in€hospitals€after€the€first€trimester);€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Danforthóó,€428€U.S.€52,€69„71,€74„75,€96€S.€Ct.€2831,€2841„42,€2843„44€(1976)€(invalidating€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€consent€requirementsÏand€parental€vetoes).Ì LÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee,€e.g.,€Webster€v.€Reproductive€Health€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.óó,€492€U.S.€490,€507„11,€109€S.€Ct.Ï3040,€3050„53€(1989);€òòÔ_ÔPoelkerÔ_Ô€v.€Doeóó,€432€U.S.€519,€521,€97€S.€Ct.€2391,€2392€(1977);€òòÔ_ÔMaherÔ_ÔÏv.€Roeóó,€432€U.S.€464,€474,€97€S.€Ct.€2376,€2382„83€(1977).€€Ì kÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€€Act€of€Mar.€23,€1883,€ch.€140,€1883€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€188€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„301€(amended€1973)).Ì ŸÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€óóAct€of€May€14,€1973,€ch.€235,€1973€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€901€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„301€(Supp.€1973)).€€This€statute€permitted€abortions€performed€during€the€first€threeÏmonths€of€pregnancy€with€the€womanððs€consent€and€pursuant€to€the€medical€judgment€of€herÏattending€physician.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„301(e)(1).€€It€also€permitted€abortions€after€threeÏmonths€but€before€viability€if€they€were€performed€in€a€hospital€with€the€womanððs€consent€andÏpursuant€to€the€medical€judgment€of€the€womanððs€physician.€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„301(e)(2).€ÏFinally,€the€statute€permitted€abortion€during€viability€if€the€requirements€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„301(e)(2)€were€met€and€if€the€womanððs€physician€certified€in€writing€to€the€hospital€and€theÏdistrict€attorney€general€that€the€abortion€was€necessary€to€preserve€the€life€or€health€of€the€mother.€ÏòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„301(e)(3).€€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„301(f).Ì d ¦åCEMU]emu}AutoList1(1)(a)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)d‹#§%37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(;3è$´´Ô2§%ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à kÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€€Act€of€Mar.€1,€1974,€ch.€471,€1974€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€156€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„301(c)€(Supp.€1974)).Ì sÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€€Act€of€Mar.€20,€1978,€ch.€811,€1978€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€925€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðððð€39„306,€„307€(Supp.€1978)).Ì lÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€óóAct€of€Mar.€23,€1978,€ch.€847,€1978€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€1078€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„302(d)€(Supp.€1978)).Ì iÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€€Act€of€Apr.€30,€1979,€ch.€287,€1979€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€590€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„302€(Supp.€1979)).Ì kÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€€Act€of€May€10,€1979,€ch.€334,€1979€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€762€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„302(f)€(Supp.€1979)).Ì iÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€Apr.€19,€1979,€ch.€183,€1979€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€317,€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„308€(Supp.€1979)).ÌÔn×$ ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ QÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€Apr.€28,€1988,€ch.€929,€1988€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts.€868€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðððð€37„10„301,€„307€(Supp.€1988)).€€The€United€States€District€Court€for€the€Middle€DistrictÏof€Tennessee€held€that€this€statute€was€unconstitutional.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô€ofÏNashville,€Inc.€v.€Ô_ÔMcWherterÔ_Ôóó,€716€F.€Supp.€1064€(M.D.€Tenn.€1989).€€However,€the€UnitedÏStates€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€Sixth€Circuit€later€vacated€this€decision€after€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€held€that€the€1988€parental€notification€statutes€had€been€repealed€by€implication.€ÏòòSee€Planned€Parenthood€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô€€of€Nashville,€Inc.€v.€Ô_ÔMcWherterÔ_Ôóó,€945€F.2d€405,€1991€WL€193471Ï(6th€Cir.€1991)€(Sept.€30,€1991)€(unpublished€table€decision).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€May€24,€1989,€ch.€412,€1989€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€697€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€37„10„304(g)€(Supp.€1989));€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€24.Ì ÛÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€May€24,€1989,€ch.€591,€1989€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€1169€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„208€(Supp.€1989)).€€Compare€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f)€(Supp.Ï1989)€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„4„202(f)€(1982).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThis€suit€was€later€transferred€to€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€County€where€it€wasÏstayed€and€held€in€abeyance€pending€the€outcome€of€this€litigation.€€òòSee€Emancipation€v.ÏÔ_ÔMcWherterÔ_Ôóó,€No.€92„2221„II€(Davidson€Chan.€Order€filed€April€21,€1993).Ì  Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSpecifically,€the€plaintiffs€challenged€the€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€that€abortions€ð ðafter€three€(3)€months,€but€before€viability€of€the€fetusðð€be€performed€inÏð ða€hospital€as€defined€in€ðð€68„11„201ðð;€the€prohibition€against€attempting€to€procure€a€miscarriageÏin€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(b)(2);€the€residency€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(d);€the€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b),€(c)€that€a€physician€provide€state„mandated€pre„abortion€information;€the€waiting€period€required€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d);€and€the€parental€notification€procedure€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f)€(Supp.€1989).€€Ì |Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€May€26,€1995,€ch.€458,€1995€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€799€(codified€at€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðððð€€37„10„301,€„307€(1996€&€Supp.€1997)).Ì ØÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€a€memorandum€elaborating€on€its€first€opinion,€the€trial€court€observed€that€ð ðeachÏprovision€of€the€statute€which€was€salvaged€by€the€Court€is€obviously€enforceable€only€asÏinterpreted€by€the€Court€in€the€preceding€opinion.ððÌ zÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€trial€court€designated€four€physicians€as€court„appointed€experts€in€accordance€withÏTenn.€R.€Ô_ÔEvidÔ_Ô.€706.€€The€two€physicians€who€testified€in€support€of€the€statutesðð€constitutionalityÏhad€tried€unsuccessfully€to€intervene€as€parties€before€the€trial.€€The€two€physicians€who€opposedÏthe€statutes€were€experts€retained€by€the€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs.Ì ¨Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€American€College€of€Obstetricians€&€Gynecologists,€òòStandards€for€Obstetric„ÏGynecologic€Servicesóó€(7th€ed.€1989)€(ð ðÔ_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standardsðð).Ìplanned parenthood - opinion Î 3 '  0 .    ÜÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSpecifically,€the€trial€court€recommended€that€the€General€Assembly€(1)€amend€theÏdefinition€of€ð ðhospitalðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€to€include€ambulatory€surgicalÏcenters€and€(2)€amend€the€judicial€bypass€provision€in€the€parental€notification€statute€to€require€aÏsecond€physicianððs€opinion.€€The€trial€court€was€also€prepared€to€appoint€one€of€the€Stateððs€expertÏwitnesses€to€prepare€a€ð ðmodel€code€relating€to€informed€consent€for€abortions€in€Tennessee.ðð€€€Ì ©Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€(Supp.€1989)€is€currently€codified€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€39„15„202(g)€(1997)€as€a€result€of€the€repeal€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f)€in€1995.€€Ì )Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWe€need€not€consider€the€trial€courtððs€construction€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f)(1)€or€„202(f)(2)(B)€because€these€provisions€were€repealed€by€implication€in€1989.€€òòSeeÏPlanned€Parenthood€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô€of€Nashville,€Inc.€v.€Ô_ÔMcWherterÔ_Ôóó,€817€S.W.2d€at€16.€€The€trial€courtððsÏconstruction€of€these€two€provisions€has€no€bearing€on€the€interpretation€or€enforcement€of€theÏparental€consent€provisions€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€37„10„301,€„307€which€were€revived€by€theÏGeneral€Assembly€in€1995.Ì ñÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€term€ð ðphysicianðð€includes€only€persons€licensed€to€practice€medicine€or€surgery€inÏaccordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€63„6„201(1997)€and€persons€licensed€as€osteopathicÏphysicians€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€63„9„101,€„114€(1997).Ì zÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThese€two€dates€are€different€since€conception€can€occur€approximately€two€weeks€afterÏthe€first€day€of€a€womanððs€last€menstrual€period.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€states€that€a€woman€must€be€informed€of€ð ðtheÏfollowing€factsðð€and€then€lists€the€six€ð ðfactsðð€that€must€be€provided.€€This€construction€means€thatÏthe€woman€must€be€informed€of€each€of€the€listed€facts.€€However,€the€conjunction€ð ðorðð€may€haveÏeither€an€inclusive€or€an€exclusive€sense.€€òòSeeóó€Bryan€A.€Garner,€òòA€Dictionary€of€Modern€LegalÏUsageóó€624€(2d€ed.€1995).€€If€ð ðorðð€is€interpreted€in€its€exclusive€sense,€it€would€be€inconsistentÏwith€the€provisionððs€apparent€inclusive€meaning.€€Ì(O.<$µµà0  àÔ2§%ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0` (#(#à Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€May€4,€1973,€ch.€235,€ðð€1(e)(2),€1973€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€901,€903,€allowingÏabortions€ð ð[Ô_Ôa]fterÔ_Ô€three€(3)€months,€but€before€viability€of€the€fetus,€if€the€abortion€.€.€.€isÏperformed€.€.€.€in€a€hospital€as€defined€in€Section€53„1301€of€this€Code.ðð€€Ì 1Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€Feb.€25,€1976,€ch.€471,€1976€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€185.Ì 0Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€Mar.€15,€1979,€ch.€77,€1979€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€123.Ì  Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„11„201(3)€states€that€patients€at€an€ambulatory€surgical€treatmentÏcenter€must€be€either€discharged€in€ambulatory€condition€or€transferred€to€a€hospital.Ì ¬Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Ô_ÔRegsÔ_Ô.€r.€0720„2„.01(2)€(1994)€defines€an€ambulatory€surgicalÏtreatment€center€as€ð ðany€institution,€place€or€building€devoted€primarily€to€the€performance€ofÏsurgical€procedures€on€an€outpatient€basis.ðð€€The€definition€of€ð ðhospitalðð€in€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&ÏÔ_ÔRegsÔ_Ô.€r.€0720„2„.01(9)€(1995)€simply€refers€to€the€definition€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„11„201(21).Ì øÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€(Supp.€1989)€is€currently€codified€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€39„15„202(g)€(1997).€€Since€the€statuteððs€substance€has€remained€unchanged,€we€will€continue€toÏrefer€to€it€as€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h),€as€did€the€trial€court.Ì ×Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Court€explained€in€a€companion€case€to€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€that€the€term€ð ðhealthððÏencompasses€a€womanððs€psychological€as€well€as€physical€well„being.€€òòSee€Doe€v.€Boltonóó,€410ÏU.S.€179,€192,€93€S.€Ct.€739,€747€(1973).Ì BÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€May€4,€1973,€ch.€235,€ðð€1(e)(3),€1973€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€901,€903.Ì 2Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€Mar.€23,€1978,€ch.€847,€1978€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€1078.Ì ?Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€April€30,€1979,€ch.€287,€ðð€3,€1979€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€590,€591.Ì ?Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Act€of€April€30,€1979,€ch.€287,€ðð€4,€1979€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€590,€591.Ì @Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWomen€under€the€age€of€eighteen€years€of€age€may€circumvent€the€parental€consentÏrequirements€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€37„10„303€if€their€physician€determines€in€his€or€her€bestÏmedical€judgment€that€ð ða€medical€emergency€exists€that€so€complicates€the€pregnancy€as€to€requireÏan€immediate€abortion.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€37„10„305.Ì ÊÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Congress€enacted€H.R.€1833,€the€ð ðPartial„Birth€Abortion€Ban€Act€of€1995"€whichÏwould€have€limited€partial„birth€abortions€to€circumstances€where€they€were€necessary€to€save€theÏlife€of€the€mother.€€During€the€United€States€Senateððs€debate€over€an€amendment€proposed€byÏSenator€Boxer€that€would€have€permitted€partial„birth€abortions€to€protect€the€motherððs€health,ÏSenator€Smith€pointed€out€that€the€amendment€would€be€to€permit€partial„birth€abortions€onÏdemand.€€òòSeeóó€141€Cong.€Rec.€S18,074€(daily€ed.€Dec.€6,€1995)€(statement€of€Senator€Smith).€ÏThe€amendment€failed,€and€the€President€vetoed€H.R.€1833€on€April€10,€1996.€€The€PresidentÏstated€in€his€veto€message€that€he€would€sign€the€bill€if€it€contained€an€exception€for€€ð ðseriousÏhealth€consequences.ðð€€Message€to€the€House€of€Representatives€Returning€Without€ApprovalÏPartial€Birth€Abortion€Legislation,€1€Pub.€Papers€567,€568€(April€10,€1996);€òòsee€alsoóó€142€Cong.ÏRec.€H3338„01€(April€15,€1996).€€Ì æÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€specifically€held€that€several€provisions€of€theÏConstitution€of€Tennessee€provide€broader€protection€than€their€federal€counterparts.€€òòSee,€e.g.,ÏState€v.€Marshallóó,€859€S.W.2d€289,€290„91,€294„95€(Tenn.€1993)€(holding€that€the€stateÏconstitution€provides€broader€protection€for€speech€than€the€First€and€Fourteenth€Amendments);ÏòòState€v.€Blackóó,€815€S.W.2d€166,€189,€192„93€(Tenn.€1991)€(holding€that€the€state€constitutionÏprovides€different€standards€for€determining€what€constitutes€cruel€and€unusual€punishment);€òòStateÏv.€Ô_ÔJacuminÔ_Ôóó,€778€S.W.2d€430,€435„36€(Tenn.€1989)€(holding€that€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€7€requiresÏdifferent€standards€for€obtaining€a€search€warrant€than€does€the€Fourth€Amendment);€òòMiller€v.ÏStateóó,€584€S.W.2d€758,€759„61€(Tenn.€1979)€(holding€that€the€Ex€Post€Facto€Clause€of€Tenn.ÏConst.€art.€I,€ðð€11€provides€greater€protection€than€the€Ex€Post€Facto€Clause€in€U.S.€Const.€art.€I,Ïðð€10,€cl.€1).€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSome€commentators€have€suggested€that€these€decisions€represent€efforts€by€state€judgesÏto€circumvent€the€perceived€conservatism€of€the€Burger€and€Rehnquist€Courts.€€òòSeeóó€Paul€M.€Bator,ÏòòThe€State€Court€and€Federal€Constitutional€Libertiesóó,€22€Ô_ÔWmÔ_Ô.€&€Mary€L.€Rev.€605,€606€n.1Ï(1981);€Otis€H.€Stephens,€Jr.,òò€The€Tennessee€Constitution€and€the€Dynamics€of€AmericanÏFederalismóó,€61€Tenn.€L.€Rev.€707,€708€(1994);€Alan€Ô_ÔTarrÔ_Ô,€òòConstitutional€Theory€and€StateÏConstitutional€Interpretationóó,€22€Rutgers€Ô_ÔL.J.Ô_Ô€841,€845„47€(1991).€€On€the€other€hand,€defendersÏof€these€decisions€restore€state€constitutions€to€their€proper€place€in€the€continuing€constitutionalÏdialogue.€€òòSee€óóKahn,€106€Ô_ÔHarvÔ_Ô.€L.€Rev.€at€1154;€Frederic€S.€Le€Ô_ÔClercqÔ_Ô,€òòThe€Process€of€SelectingÏConstitutional€Standards:€€Some€Incongruities€of€Tennessee€Practiceóó,€61€Tenn.€L.€Rev.€573,€586„92€(1994).€€Ì ÉÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€€James€A.€Gardner,€òòThe€Failed€Discourse€of€State€Constitutionalismóó,€90€Mich.€L.ÏRev.€761,€763€(1992);€David€Schuman,€òòA€Failed€Critique€of€State€Constitutionalismóó,€91€Mich.€L.ÏRev.€274,€276€(1992).Ì ’Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Ô_ÔNeelyÔ_Ô€v.€Stateóó,€63€Tenn.€174,€185€(1874);€òòÔ_ÔEasonÔ_Ô€v.€Stateóó,€65€Tenn.€466,€477Ï(1873).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Metropolitan€Ô_ÔGovððtÔ_Ô€v.€Tennessee€State€Bd.€of€Equalizationóó,€817€S.W.2d€953,€955Ï(Tenn.€1991);€òòÔ_ÔLuehrmanÔ_Ô€v.€Taxing€Dist.óó,€70€Tenn.€425,€438€(1879)€(stating€that€the€courtððs€searchÏfor€meaning€of€constitutional€provisions€should€not€be€guided€by€the€judgeððs€own€subjectiveÏnotions€of€unexpressed€constitutional€intent);€òòState€ex€rel.€Ô_ÔWitcherÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔBilbreyÔ_Ôóó,€878€S.W.2d€567,Ï573€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994).€€Ì -Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€heard€oral€argument€in€this€case€on€April€2,€1998.Ì †Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Gaskin€v.€Collinsóó,€661€S.W.2d€865,€867€(Tenn.€1983);€òòÔ_ÔHatcherÔ_Ô€v.€Bellóó,€521ÏS.W.2d€799,€803€(Tenn.€1974).Ì 'Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Ô_ÔAsheÔ_Ô€v.€Leechóó,€653€S.W.2d€398,€401€(Tenn.€1983);€òòÔ_ÔPeayÔ_Ô€v.€Nolanóó,€157€Tenn.€222,Ï230,€7€S.W.2d€815,€817€(1928);€òòPope€v.€Ô_ÔPhiferÔ_Ôóó,€50€Tenn.€(3€Ô_ÔHeiskÔ_Ô.)€682,€687€(1871).Ì ,Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Williams€v.€Taxing€Dist.óó,€84€Tenn.€531,€535€(1886).Ì #Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€State€v.€Wilsonóó,€80€Tenn.€246,€265€(1883).Ì ÄÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€State€ex€rel.€Cohen€v.€Ô_ÔDarnellÔ_Ôóó,€885€S.W.2d€61,€63€(Tenn.€1994);€òòThe€JudgesððÏCasesóó,€102€Tenn.€509,€519„20,€53€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€134,€136€(1899).Ì &Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€State€v.€Marshallóó,€859€S.W.2d€at€303€(Reid,€C.J.,€concurring€and€dissenting);€òòÔ_ÔPatyÔ_ÔÏv.€Ô_ÔMcDanielÔ_Ôóó,€547€S.W.2d€897,€902€(Tenn.€1977),€òòÔ_ÔrevððdÔ_Ô€on€other€groundsóó,€435€U.S.€618,€98€S.ÏCt.€1322€(1978).Ì ÑÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€State€v.€Marshallóó,€859€S.W.2d€at€292„94;€òòCumberland€Capital€Corp.€v.€Pattyóó,€556ÏS.W.2d€516,€519€(Tenn.€1977);€òòÔ_ÔStootsÔ_Ô€v.€Stateóó,€205€Tenn.€59,€69,€325€S.W.2d€532,€536€(1959).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€courtððs€discussion€of€the€liberty€clauses€centered€on€Tenn.€Const.€art.€ðððð€1,€2,€3,€7,Ï19,€and€27.€€Referring€to€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðððð€1€and€2,€the€court€observed€that€the€ConstitutionÏof€Tennessee€is€the€only€state€constitution€that€gives€the€people€the€right€to€resist€governmentalÏoppression€even€to€the€extent€of€overthrowing€the€government.€€òòSee€Davis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2dÏat€599.€€In€fact,€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðððð€1€and€2€were€derived€from€Md.€Dec.€of€Rights€of€1776,Ïart.€IV€and€N.H.€Const.€of€1784,€pt.€I,€art.€X€and€are€not€unique.€€Currently,€the€constitutions€ofÏthirty„one€states€contain€provisions€securing€the€political€rights€of€the€people.òò€€See,€e.g.,óó€Ala.ÏConst.,€art.€I,€ðð€2;€Ga.€Const.,€art.€I,€ðð€2,€ðð€2;€Ky.€Const.,€Bill€of€Rights€ðð€4;€Mass.€Const.,€Dec.Ïof€Rights,€art.€VII;€N.C.€Const.,€art.€I,€ðð€2;€Va.€Const.,€art.€I,€ðð€3.€€Two€other€state€constitutionsÏcontain€provisions€similar€to€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€2.€€òòSeeóó€Md.€Const.,€Dec.€of€Rights,€art.€6;ÏN.H.€Const.,€pt.€I,€art.€10.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Stein€v.€Davidson€Hotel€Co.óó,€945€S.W.2d€714,€717„18€(Tenn.€1997);€òòIn€reÏAdoption€of€Female€Childóó,€896€S.W.2d€546,€547„48€(Tenn.€1995);€òòÔ_ÔNaleÔ_Ô€v.€Robertsonóó,€871ÏS.W.2d€674,€680€(Tenn.€1994);€òòHawk€v.€Hawkóó,€855€S.W.2d€573,€577€(Tenn.€1993).Ì ýÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSeeóó€òòsupraóó€note€53.Ì `Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Thornburgh€v.€American€College€of€Obstetricians€and€Gynecologistsóó,€476€U.S.€atÏ764,€106€S.€Ct.€at€2180.Ì LÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Danforthóó,€428€U.S.€52,€69„71,€96€S.€Ct.€2831,€2841„42Ï(1976).Ì ;Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Danforthóó,€428€U.S.€at€74,€96€S.€Ct.€at€2843.Ì XÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€City€of€Akron€v.€Akron€Ctr.€for€Reproductive€Healthóó,€462€U.S.€at€449„51,€103€S.ÏCt.€at€2502„03.Ì ²Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Ashcroftóó,€462€U.S.€476,€481„82,€103€S.€Ct.€2517,€2520Ï(1983);€òòCity€of€Akron€v.€Akron€Ctr.€for€Reproductive€Healthóó,€462€U.S.€at€437„39,€103€S.€Ct.€atÏ2496„97.Ì ^Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€joint€opinion€is€the€controlling€opinion€in€the€case€because€it€embodies€the€position€ofÏthe€members€of€the€Court€who€concurred€on€the€narrowest€grounds.€€òòSee€Marks€v.€United€Statesóó,Ï430€U.S.€188,€193,€97€S.€Ct.€990,€993€(1977);€òòGregg€v.€Georgiaóó,€428€U.S.€153,€169€n.15,€96ÏS.€Ct.€2909,€2923€n.15€(1976)€(opinion€of€Stewart,€Powell,€and€Stevens,€JJ.).Ì ŽÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAccording€to€the€joint€opinion,€the€three€essential€holdings€of€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€were:€(1)€theÏrecognition€of€a€womanððs€right€to€choose€to€have€an€abortion€before€viability€and€to€obtain€itÏwithout€undue€interference€from€the€state,€(2)€confirmation€of€the€stateððs€power€to€restrict€abortionsÏafter€fetal€viability€if€the€law€contains€emergency€medical€exceptions€to€protect€the€life€and€health€ofÏthe€woman,€and€(3)€recognition€that€the€state€has€legitimate€interests€from€the€onset€of€pregnancy€inÏprotecting€the€health€of€the€woman€and€the€life€of€the€fetus€that€may€become€a€child.òò€€See€PlannedÏParenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€846,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2804.€€Ì MÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThree€justices€continue€to€insist€that€facial€challenges€to€abortion€statutes€must€fail€unlessÏthere€exists€no€set€of€circumstances€in€which€the€statute€can€be€constitutionally€applied.€€òòSeeÏÔ_ÔJanklowÔ_Ô€v.€Planned€Parenthoodóó,€517€U.S.€1174,€___,€116€S.€Ct.€1582,€1584„85€(1996)€(Scalia,ÏJ.,€dissenting€from€the€denial€of€certiorari);€òòAda€v.€Guam€Ô_ÔSocððyÔ_Ô€of€Ô_ÔObstetriciansÔ_Ô€andÏGynecologistsóó,€506€U.S.€1011,€1011„12,€113€S.€Ct.€633,€633„34€(1992)€(Scalia,€J.,€dissentingÏfrom€the€denial€of€certiorari).€€Ì šÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Division€of€Information€Resources,€Tennessee€Ô_ÔDepððtÔ_Ô€of€Health,€òòReport€of€InducedÏAbortions€in€Tennessee€1990óó€(June€1992).Ì .Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔChattanooga,€Knoxville,€Nashville,€Memphis,€and€the€Tri„Cities.Ì ]Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Planned€Parenthood€clinics€in€Memphis€and€Nashville€are€licensed€as€ambulatoryÏsurgical€treatment€centers.Ì öÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€City€of€Akron€v.€Akron€Ctr.€for€Reproductive€Healthóó,€462€U.S.€at€434„439,€103€S.ÏCt.€at€2495„97;€òòPlanned€Parenthood€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô€of€Kansas€City,€Mo.,€Inc.€v.€Ashcroftóó,€462€U.S.€476,Ï481„82,€103€S.€Ct.€2517,€2520€(1983).Ì 1Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Ô_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards€at€65„66.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Ô_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards€at€68.€€The€medical€community€has€also€concluded€that€abortionsÏcan€be€provided€even€later€in€ambulatory€surgical€facilities€attached€to€hospitals€because€of€theÏavailability€of€surgical,€recovery,€and€emergency€response€facilities.Ì .Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Ô_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards€at€66.Ì (Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSee€Ô_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards€at€74.Ì ×Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAs€an€illustration,€one€physician€who€performs€abortions€at€the€Planned€ParenthoodÏclinic€in€Nashville€recounted€an€occasion€when€he€was€forced€to€complete€a€procedure€using€aÏflashlight€when€the€clinicððs€electrical€power€failed.Ì JÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSee€Evans€v.€Steelmanóó,€No.€01S01„9701„JV„00019,€1998€WL€325224€(Tenn.€Mar.€30,Ï1998).Ì lÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThis€comparison€is€based€on€the€cost€of€abortions€performed€during€the€first€fourteenÏweeks€of€pregnancy.€€We€have€no€similar€comparison€of€costs€for€abortions€performed€after€theÏfirst€fourteen€weeks€because€outpatient€clinics€are€not€presently€performing€these€procedures.€€ForÏthe€purpose€of€our€analysis,€we€will€presume€that€there€are€similar€differences€in€the€cost€of€post„fourteen€week€abortions.€€The€cost€difference€is€most€likely€not€as€great€because€the€clinics€wouldÏpass€on€to€their€patients€most,€if€not€all,€of€the€increased€operating€expenses€incurred€to€complyÏwith€the€Ô_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards.€€Ì ÍÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAmerican€Medical€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô,€Council€on€Scientific€Affairs,€ð ðInduced€Termination€ofÏPregnancy€Before€and€After€Roe€v.€Wade:€Trends€in€Mortality€and€Morbidity€in€Women,ðð€at€16Ï(May€1992).Ì ÀÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€State€has€not€appealed€from€the€trial€courtððs€decision€that€the€information€required€byÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(4)€is€misleading.€€Accordingly,€the€validity€of€this€provision€isÏnot€before€us.Ì ßÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAmerican€Pub.€Health€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔòòAPHAÔ_Ô€Recommended€Program€Ô_ÔGuideÔ_Ô€for€AbortionÏServices€(Revised€1979)óó,€70€Am.€J.€Pub.€Health€652,€654€(1980).Ì /Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Ô_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards,€at€68.Ì ˆÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔCouncil€on€Ethical€&€Judicial€Affairs,€American€Medical€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô,€òòCode€of€Medical€Ethics,ÏCourt€Opinionsóó€xi€(1992).Ì (Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Ô_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards€state:ÌÌà8 àà àIn€the€event€of€an€unwanted€pregnancy,€the€physician€should€counsel€theÏpatient€about€her€options:€1)€continuing€the€pregnancy€to€term€and€keeping€theÏinfant,€2)€continuing€the€pregnancy€to€term€and€offering€the€infant€for€legalÏadoption,€or€3)€aborting€the€pregnancy.€€When€feasible,€and€with€the€patientððsÏapproval,€the€physician€should€offer€this€counseling€to€the€patientððs€relatives€and€toÏher€parents€(if€she€is€an€adolescent)€before€this€difficult€decision€is€made.€€If€theÏpatient€elects€abortion,€information€about€contraception€should€be€offered.€€WhenÏthe€physician€recommends€pregnancy€termination€for€medical€or€psychologicalÏindications,€consultation€may€be€appropriate.ÌÌÔ_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards,€at€62.Ì ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWe€need€not€decide€in€this€case€whether€providing€truthful€yet€irrelevant€informationÏplaces€an€undue€burden€on€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€choice€because€the€parties€have€neither€raised€nor€briefedÏthe€issue.Ì IÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔReport€of€Committee€to€Study€Aid€to€Families€with€Dependent€Children,€at€p.€7€(Oct.Ï1992).Ì ªÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€Tennessee€Ô_ÔCommððnÔ_Ô€on€Children€&€Youth,€òòKids€Count,€The€State€of€the€Child€inÏTennessee€1996óó,€at€10€(May€1997)€(ð ðòòKids€Countóóðð).Ì ûÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔOver€97%€of€the€abortions€performed€in€Tennessee€employ€the€suction€curettageÏprocedure.€€òòSeeóó€Division€of€Information€Resources,€Tennessee€Ô_ÔDepððtÔ_Ô€of€Health,€òòReport€of€InducedÏAbortions€in€Tennessee€1990óó,€at€15€(Jan.€1992).Ì ªÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThis€emergency€medical€exception€is€similar€to€the€general€emergency€medical€exceptionÏfound€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h).€€We€need€not€address€in€this€case€whether€having€twoÏpotentially€overlapping€emergency€medical€exceptions€introduces€unconstitutional€ambiguity€intoÏthe€statute.€€However,€as€we€concluded€in€Section€V(F)€of€this€opinion,€the€scope€of€thisÏexception,€like€that€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h),€is€too€narrow.Ì ýÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€first€of€the€two€studies€involved€women€seeking€abortions€from€Planned€ParenthoodÏclinics€in€Knoxville€and€Memphis€between€October€1979€and€January€1980.€€The€second€studyÏinvolved€women€in€Memphis€but€excluded€women€who€expressed€an€uncertainty€about€obtainingÏan€abortion.€€See€Michael€Ô_ÔLupferÔ_Ô€&€Ô_ÔBohneÔ_Ô€G.€Ô_ÔSilberÔ_Ô,€òòHow€Patients€View€Mandatory€WaitingÏPeriods€for€Abortions,€13€Fam.€Planning€Perspectivesóó€75,€76€(March/April€1981)€(ð ðÔ_ÔLupferÔ_Ô€&ÏÔ_ÔSilberÔ_Ôðð).€€The€State€has€not€challenged€the€methodology€of€these€studies,€and€we€express€noÏindependent€opinion€concerning€the€studiesðð€methodology€or€conclusions.Ì ~Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€record€contains€other€evidence€that€women€decide€whether€they€will€obtain€anÏabortion€within€one€week€after€missing€their€menstrual€period.Ì „Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAt€one€point€late€in€the€proceeding,€the€trial€court€referred€to€but€did€not€appear€to€rely€onÏdata€obtained€by€The€Alan€Ô_ÔGuttmacherÔ_Ô€Institute€that€was€introduced€through€its€Deputy€Director€ofÏResearch.€€Other€courts,€citing€what€they€believed€to€be€serious€methodological€shortcomings,Ïhave€declined€to€give€credence€to€other€Institute€studies.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔKarlinÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔFoustÔ_Ôóó,€975€F.€Supp.€atÏ1215„18€(declining€to€accredit€the€deputy€directorððs€conclusion€that€Wisconsinððs€24„hour€waitingÏperiod€operates€as€a€substantial€obstacle€in€a€large€number€of€cases).€€Ì ‘Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€clinicsðð€records€do€not€indicate€how€many€of€the€women€who€missed€their€firstÏappointment€obtained€another€appointment€and€eventually€obtained€an€abortion.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€medical€director€of€the€Planned€Parenthood€clinic€in€Nashville€could€not€recall€anyÏincidents€of€harassment€or€of€breach€of€confidentiality.€€The€clinicððs€clinical€director€recalled€onlyÏone€incident€where€the€privacy€of€a€woman€choosing€the€two„step€procedure€was€breached.€€Ì «Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWe€have€found€no€decisions€handed€down€since€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€CaseyóóÏconstruing€the€constitutionality€of€a€waiting€period€longer€than€twenty„four€hours.€€Prior€to€1992,Ïat€least€four€courts€struck€down€48„hour€waiting€periods.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔWomensÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.,€P.C.€Ô_Ôv.€ThoneÔ_Ôóó,Ï636€F.2d€206,€210€(8th€Cir.€1980);€òòWynn€v.€Careyóó,€599€F.2d€193,€196€(7th€Cir.€1979);€òòPlannedÏParenthood€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô€of€Kansas€City,€Mo.,€Inc.€v.€Ashcroftóó,€483€F.€Supp.€679,€696€(W.D.€Mo.Ï1980);€òòWomenððs€Community€Health€Ctr.,€Inc.€v.€Cohenóó,€477€F.€Supp.€542,€551€(D.€Me.€1979).Ì ¡Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€record€contains€evidence€that€the€Planned€Parenthood€clinic€in€Nashville€employsÏseveral€physicians€who€provide€abortion€services€at€the€clinic€only€one€day€every€other€week.Ì —Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔUnemancipatedÔ_Ô€women€living€at€home€face€additional€problems€with€regard€to€(a)Ïobtaining€the€funds€necessary€to€pay€for€the€procedure,€(b)€discussing€their€pregnancy€with€theirÏparents€or€seeking€a€judicial€bypass€of€this€requirement,€(c)€discussing€their€pregnancy€with€theirÏsexual€partner,€and€(d)€finding€the€opportunity€to€be€absent€from€school€to€obtain€the€counselingÏand€the€abortion.Ì JÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWhile€evenhanded,€the€trial€courtððs€decision€seems€to€be€somewhat€inconsistent€with€theÏpurpose€of€court„appointed€experts€which€is€to€provide€the€trial€court€with€neutral,€unbiasedÏexperts€who€will€provide€more€reliable€expert€opinions.€€òòSeeóó€29€Charles€A.€Wright€&€Victor€J.ÏGold,€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€6302€(1997).€€Ì 'Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€State€has€not€taken€issue€with€these€fees€on€appeal.Ì ZÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€State€has€not€appealed€from€the€trial€courtððs€determination€that€this€provision€isÏunconstitutional.Ì ­Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€have€not€appealed€from€the€trial€courtððs€determinationÏthat€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(1),€(2)€are€Ô_Ôconstitutional.Ô_ÔÌ zÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€FXÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€State€has€not€appealed€from€the€trial€courtððs€determination€that€this€provision€isÏÔ_Ôunconstitutional.Ô_ÔÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€FÔÔ€F¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ X ÑÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›Ô_ÔÑ€ÑÑ7€ö„¼¼d¼¼d7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€F„Ôò òÑ  ÑÞ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEó óÌÔ€F¼ÔÌÔ€FŠÔPLANNED€PARENTHOOD€OFà àà à)ÌMIDDLE€TENNESSEE,€et€al.à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€CircuitÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€92C„1672Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌDON€Ô_ÔSUNDQUISTÔ_Ô,€GOVERNORà à)ÌOF€THE€STATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à)à àAppeal€No.Ìet€al.,à àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01A01„9601„CV„00052Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€HAMILTON€Ô_ÔGAYDENÔ_Ô,€JUDGEÌÌÓšÙÓòòFor€Plaintiffs/Appellantsóó:à àà àà àà àà àòòFor€Defendants/Appelleesóó:ÌÌBarry€Friedmanà àà àà àà àà àà àJohn€Knox€Ô_ÔWalkupÔ_ÔÌVanderbilt€Universityà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌNashville,€TennesseeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAndy€D.€BennettÌIrwin€Ô_ÔVenickÔ_Ôà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssociate€Chief€DeputyÌDobbins€&€Ô_ÔVenickÔ_ÔÌNashville,€Tennesseeà àà àà àà àà àMichael€W.€Ô_ÔCatalanoÔ_ÔÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssociate€Solicitor€GeneralÌElizabeth€B.€ThompsonÌÔ_ÔHowreyÔ_Ô€&€SimonÌWashington,€œDCà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œòòFor€Dr.€Anthony€Trabue€andóó›Ìœà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œòòDr.€Betty€Neffóó:›ÌBarbara€E.€Ô_ÔOttenÔ_ÔÌÔ_ÔDaraÔ_Ô€œÔ_ÔKlasselà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJ.€Russell€HeldmanÔ_Ô›ÌRoger€K.€œEvansà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œà à›œFranklin,€Tennessee›ÌPlanned€Parenthood€Federation€of€America,€Inc.ÌNew€York,€NYÌÌLouise€Ô_ÔMellingÔ_ÔÌCatherine€WeissÌAmerican€Civil€Liberties€FoundationÌNew€York,€NYÌÌòòFor€American€College€of€Obstetricians€and€Gynecologistsóó:ÌÌAnn€E.€AllenÌAmerican€College€of€Obstetricians€and€GynecologistsÌWashington,€DCÌÌAbby€R.€Ô_ÔRubenfeldÔ_ÔÌÔ_ÔRubenfeldÔ_Ô€&€AssociatesÌNashville,€TennesseeÌÓÓÔ€F¼ÔÌÔ€F„Ôò òà@ àAFFIRMED€IN€PART;€REVERSED€IN€PART;Ìà@ àAND€REMANDEDó óÌÔ€F¼ÔÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÇÑ „ ÑÓ€ÓÔ€F„Ôò òòòà@ àO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÔ€F¼ÔÌà àThis€appeal€presents€a€multifaceted€challenge€to€the€constitutionality€ofÏTennesseeððs€abortion€statutes.€After€a€physician€and€a€clinic€in€Knoxville€wereÏcharged€with€violating€these€statutes,€two€other€clinics€in€Memphis€and€Nashville,Ïjoined€by€three€physicians,€filed€suit€in€the€Circuit€Court€for€Davidson€CountyÏseeking€declaratory€and€injunctive€relief€under€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee.€ÏThe€trial€court€struck€down€the€residency€requirement,€the€waiting€period,€andÏthe€requirement€that€physicians€inform€their€patients€that€an€abortion€is€a€majorÏsurgical€procedure.€€After€making€its€own€substantive€revisions€in€the€statutoryÏtext,€the€trial€court€upheld€the€mandatory€hospitalization€requirement,€theÏremaining€informed€consent€requirements,€and€the€newly€enacted€parentalÏconsent€requirement.€€We€have€determined€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€revisingÏthe€text€of€several€provisions.€€We€have€also€determined€that€the€emergencyÏmedical€exception€enacted€by€the€General€Assembly€is€unconstitutionally€narrow,Ïthat€the€combined€effect€of€the€waiting€period€and€the€physician„only€counselingÏrequirement€places€an€undue€burden€on€womenððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€choice,€and€thatÏthe€remaining€challenged€provisions€as€construed€herein€pass€constitutionalÏmuster.€€€ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àTennesseeððs€statutes€regulating€abortions€have€not€developed€in€a€vacuumÏduring€the€past€twenty„five€years.€€They€have€been€inextricably€caught€up€in€theÏcontinuing€national€debate€over€the€scope€of€a€womanððs€freedom€to€makeÏprofoundly€personal€decisions€concerning€whether€or€not€to€terminate€herÏpregnancy€free€from€unwarranted€governmental€intrusion.€€The€United€StatesÏSupreme€Courtððs€abortion€jurisprudence€has€influenced€the€direction€of€thisÍdebate,€and€thus,€Tennesseeððs€abortion€statutes€must€be€considered€against€aÏnational€backdrop€that€takes€into€account€the€federal€constitutional€principlesÏformulated€and€applied€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court.ÌÌà àIn€1973,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€women€possess€aÏfundamental€right€to€decide€whether€to€terminate€a€pregnancy.€€This€right€springsÏfrom€their€constitutionally€protected€right€of€privacy€and€their€liberty€interestsÏarising€under€Ô_ÔtheÔ_Ô€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€€òòSee€Roe€v.ÏWadeóó,€410€U.S.€113,€152„55,€93€S.€Ct.€705,€726„728€(1973).€€But€as€fundamentalÏas€these€rights€are,€the€Court€also€held€that€they€are€not€absolute€or€unqualifiedÏand€that€they€must€be€measured€against€the€Stateððs€important€interests€inÏsafeguarding€health,€in€maintaining€medical€standards,€and€in€protecting€potentialÏlife.€€òòSee€Roe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€at€154,€93€S.€Ct.€at€727.€ÌÌà àThe€Court€reconciled€womenððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€rights€with€the€StateððsÏinterests€in€two€ways.€€First,€the€Court€announced€that€statutes€affecting€aÏwomanððs€right€to€decide€whether€to€terminate€a€pregnancy€must€be€subjected€toÏheightened€scrutiny€and€should€be€upheld€only€when€they€are€narrowly€drawn€toÏfurther€a€compelling€state€interest.€€òòSee€Roe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€at€155„156,€93€S.ÏCt.€at€728.€€Second,€the€Court€established€the€trimester€framework€to€governÏabortion€regulations.€€During€the€first€trimester,€almost€no€interference€with€aÏwomanððs€right€to€decide€whether€to€terminate€a€pregnancy€was€permitted.€ÏDuring€the€second€trimester,€the€framework€allowed€regulations€to€protect€theÏwomanððs€health€but€not€to€further€the€Stateððs€interest€in€protecting€potential€life.€ÏDuring€the€third€trimester,€when€the€fetus€was€viable,€the€framework€permittedÏthe€states€to€prohibit€abortions€unless€the€life€or€health€of€the€mother€was€at€stake.€ÏòòSee€Roe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€at€163„66,€93€S.€Ct.€at€731„33.ÌÌà àRather€than€ending€the€abortion€controversy,€the€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€decisionÏcaused€abortion€to€become€one€of€the€most€divisive€domestic€legal€issues€of€ourÏtime.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€833,€995,€112€S.€Ct.€2791,Ï2882€(1992)€(Scalia,€J.,€concurring€in€the€judgment€in€part€and€dissenting€inÏpart);€òòWebster€v.€Reproductive€Health€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ôóó.,€492€U.S.€490,€559,€109€S.€Ct.Ï3040,€3079€(1989)€(Blackmun,€J.,€concurring€in€part€and€dissenting€in€part);€EarlÏM.€Ô_ÔMaltzÔ_Ô,€òòAbortion,€Precedent,€and€the€Constitution:€A€Comment€on€PlannedÏParenthood€of€Southeast€Pennsylvania€v.€Casey,óó€68€Notre€Dame€L.€Rev.€11,€27Ï(1992).€€State€legislatures€began€to€test€the€limits€of€the€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€decision€byÏenacting€various€restrictions€on€a€womanððs€right€to€decide€whether€to€terminateÏher€pregnancy.€€For€its€part,€the€Court€used€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóóððs€strict€scrutiny€test€toÏstrike€down€a€number€of€these€restrictions.Ô_Ô× ƒG ××  ×Ô_Ô€€But€even€while€it€was€invalidatingÏstate€statutes€restricting€a€womanððs€right€to€terminate€her€pregnancy,€the€CourtÏalso€held€repeatedly€that€the€states€could€favor€childbirth€over€abortion€byÏdeclining€to€use€public€funds€or€facilities€to€perform€abortions.Ô_Ô× ƒH ××  ×Ô_ÔÌÌà àTennessee€was€not€unaffected€by€the€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€decision.€€It€too€had€aÏstatute€on€the€books,€like€the€Texas€statute€struck€down€in€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó,€thatÏcriminalized€abortions€except€to€preserve€the€life€of€the€mother.× ƒJ ××  ×€€Realizing€thatÍthe€statute€could€not€pass€constitutional€muster,€the€General€Assembly€enacted€aÏnew€statute€intended€to€comply€with€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóóððs€trimester€framework.× ƒM ××  ×€ÏHowever,€the€General€Assembly€limited€the€right€to€obtain€an€abortion€under€theÏnew€statute€to€women€who€could€demonstrate€that€they€were€bona€fide€residentsÏof€Tennessee.× ƒN ××  ×€€ÌÌà àDuring€the€next€five€years,€the€General€Assembly€increased€the€punishmentÏfor€performing€criminal€abortions× ƒe ××  ×€and€provided€for€the€medical€care€andÏcustody€of€infants€Ô_ÔbornÔ_Ô€live€during€an€abortion€procedure.× ƒh ××  ×€€It€also€established€anÏinformed€consent€procedure€and€imposed€a€waiting€period€before€abortions€couldÏbe€performed.× ƒi ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€first€judicial€challenge€to€Tennesseeððs€abortion€statutes€was€filed€in€theÏUnited€States€District€Court€for€the€Western€District€of€Tennessee€when€PlannedÏParenthood€of€Memphis€attacked€the€residency€requirement€enacted€in€1973€andÍthe€informed€consent€and€waiting€period€requirements€enacted€in€1978.€€TheÏUnited€States€District€Court€permanently€enjoined€the€enforcement€of€theÏresidency€requirement€and€continued€the€temporary€injunction€against€enforcingÏthe€waiting€period.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€of€Memphis€v.€Ô_ÔBlantonÔ_Ôóó,€No.€78„2310Ï(W.D.€Tenn.€July€14,€1978).€€€In€1979,€the€General€Assembly€enacted€newÏinformed€consent€and€waiting€period€requirements€designed€to€respond€to€theÏconstitutional€challenges€involved€in€the€pending€federal€litigation.× ƒj ××  ×€€It€alsoÏestablished€€a€parental€notification€procedure€for€minors€seeking€an€abortion× ƒm ××  ×Ïand€placed€restrictions€on€research€and€experimentation€on€aborted€fetuses.× ƒn ××  ×ÌÌà àWithin€months€after€the€enactment€of€the€1979€amendments€to€the€abortionÏstatutes,€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€County€temporarily€enjoined€theÏenforcement€of€the€informed€consent€and€waiting€period€requirements.€€After€theÏAttorney€General€declined€to€defend€the€parental€notification€procedure,€theÏchancery€court€also€found€that€it€was€unconstitutional.€€òòSeeóó€òòPlanned€ParenthoodÏof€Nashville,€Inc.€v.€Alexanderóó,€No.€79„843„II€(Davidson€Chan.€Oct.€19€&€24,Ï1979)€(no€appeal€filed).€€Approximately€one€and€one„half€years€later,€the€federalÏdistrict€court€in€Memphis€permanently€enjoined€the€enforcement€of€the€1978Ïwaiting€period€statute.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€of€Memphis€v.€Alexanderóó,€No.Ï78„2310€(W.D.€Tenn.€Mar.€23,€1981).ÌÌà àIn€1982€the€General€Assembly€Ô_ÔrecodifiedÔ_Ô€the€abortion€statutes€withoutÏsubstantive€change.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€€39„4„201,€„208€(1982).€€Six€yearsÏlater,€it€established€a€new€parental€consent€procedure.Ô_Ô× ƒs ××  ×Ô_Ô€€In€1989,€the€GeneralÏAssembly€provided€for€expedited€appellate€review€of€judicial€decisions€to€foregoÏparental€consent.× ƒt ××  ×€€During€the€same€session,€the€General€Assembly€againÏÔ_ÔrecodifiedÔ_Ô€the€abortion€statutes€but€this€time€made€substantive€changes€in€the€law.€ÏIt€replaced€the€1988€parental€consent€procedures€with€the€parental€notificationÏprocedures€originally€enacted€in€1979€that€had€been€invalidated€by€the€DavidsonÏCounty€Chancery€Court€ten€years€earlier.× ƒw ××  ×€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€laterÏdetermined€that€the€General€Assemblyððs€Ô_ÔrecodificationÔ_Ô€of€the€1979€parentalÏnotification€procedures€repealed€the€1988€parental€consent€procedures€byÏimplication.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô€of€Nashville,€Inc.€v.€Ô_ÔMcWherterÔ_Ôóó,€817ÏS.W.2d€13,€16€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Courtððs€adherence€to€the€trimester€frameworkÏin€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€began€to€waver€as€the€years€passed.€€In€1989,€three€justicesÏconcluded€that€it€was€unsound€in€principle€and€unworkable€in€practice,€òòseeÏWebster€v.€Reproductive€Health€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.óó,€492€U.S.€490,€518,€109€S.€Ct.€3040,€3056Ï(1989);€one€justice€advocated€overruling€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€outright,€òòsee€Webster€v.ÍReproductive€Health€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.óó,€492€U.S.€at€532,€109€S.€Ct.€at€3064€(Scalia,€J.,Ïconcurring€in€part€and€concurring€in€the€judgment);€while€another€justice€impliedÏthat€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€should€be€reexamined€at€a€proper€time.€€òòSee€Webster€v.ÏReproductive€Health€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.óó,€492€U.S.€at€525„26,€109€S.€Ct.€at€3060„61Ï(OððConnor,€J.,€concurring€in€part€and€concurring€in€the€judgment).€€ThisÏmovement€away€from€the€trimester€framework€prompted€the€author€of€theÏmajority€opinion€in€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€to€declare€that€a€womanððs€right€to€terminate€aÏpregnancy€was€not€ð ðsecure.ðð€€òòSee€Webster€v.€Reproductive€Health€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.óó,€492ÏU.S.€at€537,€109€S.€Ct.€at€3067€(Blackmun,€J.,€concurring€in€part€and€dissentingÏin€part).€ÌÌà àThe€occasion€for€re„examining€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€arrived€in€1992€in€a€caseÏchallenging€the€Pennsylvania€Abortion€Control€Act.€€In€a€splintered€decision€inÏwhich€the€justices€issued€five€separate€opinions,€seven€members€of€the€court€choseÏto€abandon€òòRoe€v.óó€òòWadeóóððs€trimester€framework€and€strict€scrutiny€standard.€€TheÏsame€four€justices€who€had€earlier€signaled€their€dissatisfaction€with€the€òòRoe€v.ÏWadeóó€decision€concluded€that€a€womanððs€decision€to€terminate€her€pregnancy€wasÏnot€ð ða€ððfundamental€rightðð€that€could€be€abridged€only€in€a€manner€whichÏwithstood€ððstrict€scrutinyðð.ðð€€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€833,€953,Ï112€S.€Ct.€2791,€2860€(1992)€(Rehnquist,€C.J.,€concurring€in€the€judgment€andÏdissenting€in€part).€€Three€other€justices€rendered€a€rare€joint€opinion€in€whichÏthey€reaffirmed€the€ð ðessential€holdingðð€of€òòRoe€v.€Wade,€see€Planned€ParenthoodÏv.€Casey,óó€505€U.S.€at€846,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2804€(OððConnor,€Kennedy,€&€Ô_ÔSouterÔ_Ô,ÏJJ.),€but€also€replaced€the€trimester€framework€with€an€undue€burden€standard€inÏwhich€the€viability€of€the€unborn€child€plays€a€prominent€role.€€òòSee€PlannedÏParenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€876„77,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2820„21€(OððConnor,ÏKennedy,€&€Ô_ÔSouterÔ_Ô,€JJ.).€ÌÌà àBased€on€the€facts€before€it,€the€Court€unanimously€upheld€theÏPennsylvania€statuteððs€definition€of€ð ðmedical€emergency.ðð€€However,€retreatingÏfrom€its€earlier€decisions€in€òòThornburgh€v.€American€College€of€ObstetriciansÏand€Gynecologistsóó,€476€U.S.€747,€106€S.€Ct.€2169€(1986)€and€òòCity€of€Akron€v.ÏAkron€Ctr.€for€Reproductive€Healthóó,€462€U.S.€416,€103€S.€Ct.€2481€(1983),€theÏCourt€upheld€(1)€an€informed€consent€procedure€that€required€giving€womenÏtruthful,€Ô_ÔnonmisleadingÔ_Ô€information€about€the€nature€of€the€procedure,€theÏattendant€health€risks€as€well€as€those€of€childbirth,€and€the€gestational€age€of€theÏfetus,€(2)€a€requirement€that€physicians€provide€pre„abortion€counseling,€and€(3)Ïa€requirement€of€a€24„hour€waiting€period€before€an€abortion€could€beÏperformed.€€The€Court€also€upheld€a€one„parent€consent€requirement€Ô_ÔforÔ_Ô€minorsÏthat€included€an€adequate€judicial€bypass€procedure.€€The€only€provision€that€theÏCourt€struck€down,€by€a€narrow€majority€of€a€single€vote,€was€PennsylvaniaððsÏÔ_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€notification€requirement.ÌÌà àIn€the€meantime,€the€controversy€over€Tennesseeððs€abortion€statutes€beganÏto€take€concrete€form€in€1992.€€After€a€grand€jury€in€Knoxville€indicted€a€clinicÏand€a€physician€for€performing€an€abortion€on€a€minor€who€was€more€than€threeÏmonths€pregnant,€the€statutesðð€opponents€filed€suit€in€the€Chancery€Court€forÏKnox€County€challenging€the€statutesðð€constitutionality.Ô_Ô× ƒx ××  ×Ô_Ô€€Less€than€three€weeksÏafter€the€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó€decision,€Planned€Parenthood€AssociationÏof€Nashville,€Inc.€and€Memphis€Planned€Parenthood,€Inc.€filed€suit€in€the€CircuitÏCourt€for€Davidson€County€seeking€a€declaration€that€six€provisions€of€theÏabortion€laws€were€unconstitutional€and€requesting€an€injunction€against€theirÍenforcement.× ƒ{ ××  ×€€Later,€they€filed€an€amended€complaint€adding€three€physiciansÏas€plaintiffs€who€were€seeking€to€represent€themselves€and€their€patients.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€conducted€a€five„day€bench€trial€in€October€and€NovemberÏ1992.€€During€the€course€of€the€next€sixteen€months,€the€trial€court€issued€threeÏopinions€containing€its€findings€with€regard€to€the€constitutionality€of€theÏchallenged€statutes.€€Specifically,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€following€fourÏprovisions€were€unconstitutional:€the€residency€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€39„15„201(d),€the€waiting€period€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d),€theÏwaiting€period€for€minors€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f),€and€theÏrequirement€€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„15„202(b)(4)€that€women€be€informed€thatÏan€abortion€is€a€ð ðmajor€surgical€procedure.ðð€€The€trial€court€also€determined€thatÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(a)€and€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(b)(2)€wereÏnot€unconstitutionally€vague.€€Finally€the€trial€court€Ô_ÔupheldÔ_Ô€the€remainingÏchallenged€provisions€after€ð ðbroadly€construingðð€or€ð ðsalvagingðð€them€byÏimporting€terms€into€the€statutory€text€that€had€not€been€included€by€the€GeneralÏAssembly.ÌÌà àIn€November€1994,€this€court€dismissed€the€first€appeal€in€this€case€for€lackÏof€a€final€order€and€remanded€the€case€for€further€proceedings.€€While€the€caseÏwas€pending€in€the€trial€court,€the€General€Assembly€revived€the€parental€consentÏrequirement€originally€enacted€in€1988€and€codified€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€37„10„301,€„307€and€repealed€the€parental€notification€requirement€in€Tenn.€CodeÍAnn.€ðð€39„15„202(f).× ƒ| ××  ×€€Upon€being€notified€of€this€legislative€development,€theÏtrial€court€initially€observed€that€the€revival€of€the€parental€consent€statutes€mightÏrender€moot€its€decision€concerning€the€constitutionality€of€the€parentalÏnotification€procedure€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f).€€Even€though€theÏplaintiffs€specifically€declined€to€amend€their€complaint€to€challenge€the€parentalÏconsent€statutes€and€requested€a€ruling€on€the€constitutionality€of€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„202(f),€the€trial€court€entered€another€order€in€July€1995€upholdingÏthe€constitutionality€of€the€new€parental€consent€procedure€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðððð€37„10„301,€„307.€€The€trial€court€entered€an€amended€final€order€andÏjudgment€in€August€1995.ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌÌà àWe€will€first€address€a€threshold€matter€concerning€the€plaintiffsðð€standingÏto€challenge€the€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€thatÏabortions€performed€after€the€first€three€months€of€pregnancy€must€be€performedÏin€a€hospital.€€The€State€asserts€that€the€plaintiffs€do€not€have€standing€becauseÏneither€Planned€Parenthood€clinic€currently€offers€second€trimester€abortions.€ÏThe€plaintiffs€respond€in€two€ways.€€First,€they€assert€that€the€plaintiff€physiciansÏhave€standing€to€challenge€the€hospitalization€requirement€on€behalf€of€themselvesÏand€their€patients.€€Second,€they€point€out€that€the€Nashville€Planned€ParenthoodÏclinic€has€been€considering€offering€second€trimester€abortions€because€of€ð ðtheÏpaucity€of€those€services€available€in€Middle€Tennessee.ððÌÌÌÌà àStanding€is€a€judge„made€doctrine€used€to€determine€whether€a€party€isÏentitled€to€judicial€relief.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔKnierimÔ_Ô€v.€Leatherwoodóó,€542€S.W.2d€806,€808Ï(Tenn.€1976);€òòMetropolitan€Air€Research€Testing€Auth.,€Inc.€v.€MetropolitanÏÔ_ÔGovððtÔ_Ôóó,€842€S.W.2d€611,€615€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).€€It€requires€the€court€toÏdetermine€whether€the€party€seeking€relief€has€a€sufficiently€personal€stake€in€theÏoutcome€to€warrant€the€exercise€of€the€courtððs€power.€€òòSee€Browning„FerrisÏIndus.,€Inc.€v.€City€of€Oak€Ridgeóó,€644€S.W.2d€400,€402€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1982).€ÏThe€primary€focus€of€a€standing€inquiry€is€on€the€party,€òòsee€Valley€ForgeÏChristian€College€v.€Americans€United€for€Separation€of€Church€and€Stateóó,€454ÏU.S.€464,€484,€102€S.€Ct.€752,€765€(1982),€not€the€likelihood€of€success€of€theÏpartyððs€claim.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔWarthÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔSeldinÔ_Ôóó,€422€U.S.€490,€500,€95€S.€Ct.€2197,€2206Ï(1975);€òòÔ_ÔFlastÔ_Ô€v.€Cohenóó,€392€U.S.€83,€99,€88€S.€Ct.€1942,€1952€(1968).ÌÌà àAs€a€general€rule,€parties€must€assert€their€own€rights€and€interests€and€notÏthe€rights€and€interests€of€third€parties€in€order€to€have€standing.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔWarthÔ_Ô€v.ÏÔ_ÔSeldinÔ_Ôóó,€422€U.S.€at€499,€95€S.€Ct.€at€2205.€€Thus,€litigants€ordinarily€establishÏtheir€standing€by€demonstrating€that€they€have€sustained€some€actual€orÏthreatened€injury,€that€the€injury€was€caused€by€the€challenged€conduct,€and€thatÏthe€injury€is€one€for€which€a€judicial€remedy€is€available.€€òòSee€In€re€Petition€ofÏÔ_ÔYoungbloodÔ_Ôóó,€895€S.W.2d€322,€326€(Tenn.€1995);€òòTennessee€Ô_ÔEnvtlÔ_Ô.€Council€v.ÏSolid€Waste€Disposal€Control€Bd.óó,€852€S.W.2d€893,€896€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);òòÏMetropolitan€Air€Research€Testing€Auth.,€Inc.€v.€Metropolitan€Ô_ÔGovððtÔ_Ôóó,€842ÏS.W.2d€at€615.€€However,€the€courts€may€also€grant€a€litigant€standing€to€assertÏthe€rights€of€third€parties€(Ô_ÔjusÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔtertiiÔ_Ô)€when€the€litigant€has€suffered€its€own€directÏinjury„in„fact€and€when€the€concomitant€rights€of€third€parties€would€be€dilutedÏor€adversely€affected€by€the€proceeding.€€òòSee€Craig€v.€Borenóó,€429€U.S.€190,€195,Ï97€S.€Ct.€451,€455„56€(1976).ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€specifically€accorded€physiciansÏstanding€to€challenge€the€constitutionality€of€abortion€statutes€on€behalf€of€theirÏpatients.€€Recognizing€the€closeness€of€the€physician„patient€relationship,€the€factÏthat€a€woman€cannot€safely€procure€an€abortion€except€from€a€physician,€and€theÏdifficulties€facing€women€who€wish€to€assert€their€own€claims,€the€CourtÏconcluded€that€a€ð ðphysician€is€uniquely€qualified€to€litigate€the€constitutionality€ofÏthe€Stateððs€interference€with,€or€Ô_ÔdiscriminationÔ_Ô€against,€[a€womanððs€decision€toÏterminate€her€pregnancy].ððòò€€Singleton€v.€Ô_ÔWulffÔ_Ôóó,€428€U.S.€106,€117,€96€S.€Ct.Ï2868,€2875€(1976).ÌÌà àThe€ability€of€a€physician€to€perform€an€abortion€in€a€clinic€rather€than€aÏhospital€affects€a€womanððs€exercise€of€her€right€to€decide€whether€to€terminateÏher€pregnancy.€In€this€case,€both€the€physicians€and€the€clinics€have€demonstratedÏa€concrete€legal€interest€in€the€enforcement€of€the€restriction€because€(1)€they€riskÏcriminal€prosecution€if€they€ignore€it€and€(2)€the€medical€director€of€the€PlannedÏParenthood€clinic€in€Nashville€intends€€to€begin€providing€abortions€at€the€clinicÏafter€the€first€three€months€of€pregnancy€if€the€current€restriction€is€invalidated.€ÏòòSee€Akron€Ctr.€for€Reproductive€Health€v.€City€of€Akronóó,€479€F.€Supp.€1172,Ï1214„15€(N.D.€Ohio€1979),€òòÔ_ÔaffððdÔ_Ô€in€part€and€Ô_ÔrevððdÔ_Ô€in€part€on€other€grounds,óó€462ÏU.S.€416,€103€S.€Ct.€2481€(1983)€(finding€standing€when€a€clinic€directorÏexpressed€a€desire€to€perform€abortions€after€the€first€trimester).€€Based€on€thisÏrecord,€we€find€that€both€the€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€and€the€physicianÏplaintiffs€have€standing€to€challenge€the€hospitalization€requirement€in€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2).€€ÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌÌà àWe€turn€next€to€the€role€that€courts€should€play€in€litigation€challenging€theÏconstitutionality€of€a€state€statute.€€In€this€case,€the€trial€court€undertook€toÏð ðsalvageðð× ƒ} ××  ×€the€statute€by€broadly€interpreting€several€of€its€challengedÏprovisions.€€By€doing€so,€the€trial€court€exceeded€its€proper€role€in€at€least€threeÏinstances€and€thereby€usurped€prerogatives€exclusively€within€the€province€of€theÏGeneral€Assembly.ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àThe€trial€court€manifested€a€keen€interest€throughout€the€proceedings€inÏreconciling€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„202€with€current€medical€practice.€ÏIt€appointed€experts€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€R.€Ô_ÔEvidÔ_Ô.€706Ô_Ô× ƒ~ ××  ×Ô_Ô€and€aggressivelyÏquestioned€the€witnesses€concerning€their€understanding€of€proper€medicalÏpractice.€€The€trial€court€frequently€signaled€its€intention€to€propose€revisions€toÏthe€abortion€statutes€to€conform€them€to€the€standards€of€the€American€College€ofÏObstetricians€and€GynecologistsÔ_Ô× ƒ ××  ×Ô_Ô€and€to€reconcile€them€with€the€advances€inÏmedical€science€occurring€since€the€statutes€were€first€enacted.× ƒ‚ ××  ×ÌÌà àIn€its€opinions,€memoranda,€and€orders,€the€trial€court€eventually€alteredÏthe€wording€and€meaning€of€two€portions€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201€andÏsix€portions€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202.€€It€construed€the€phrase€ð ðfirst€threeÏ(3)€months€of€pregnancyðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(1)€to€mean€ð ðfirstÏtrimesterðð€or€ð ðfourteen€(14)€weeks€from€the€first€day€of€a€womanððs€last€menstrualÏperiod€or€twelve€(12)€weeks€from€conception.ðð€€The€trial€court€also€construed€theÏword€ð ðhospitalðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€to€include€ð ðambulatoryÏsurgical€centerðð€for€abortions€performed€up€to€eighteen€weeks€from€a€womanððsÏlast€menstrual€period.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€construed€the€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€that€the€woman€be€ð ðorally€informed€by€her€attending€physicianðð€of€certainÏstatutorily€required€information€to€permit€physicians€to€ð ðpersonally€provide€theÏmandated€information€or€personally€confirm€with€the€patient€that€she€has€beenÏgiven€the€information.ðð€€The€trial€court€also€interpreted€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€to€require€physicians€to€respond€to€a€patientððs€request€forÏinformation€by€providing€a€list€of€services€and€agencies€ð ðreasonably€knownðð€toÏthem.€€In€addition,€the€trial€court€removed€the€word€ð ðorðð€between€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€and€„202(b)(6),€construed€the€phrase€ð ðparents€or€legalÏguardiansðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f)(1)€to€mean€ð ðparent€or€legalÏguardian,ðð€and€construed€the€word€ð ðhealthðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f)(2)(B)€to€include€ð ðpsychologicalðð€health.€€Finally,€the€trial€courtÏinterpreted€the€word€ð ðlifeðð€in€the€medical€emergency€exception€in€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€(Supp.€1989)× ƒƒ ××  ×€to€mean€ð ðlife€and€health.ðð€€ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àThe€constitutional€doctrine€of€separation€of€powers€shapes€the€courtsððÏpower€to€construe€statutes€that€have€come€under€constitutional€attack.€€òòSeeóó€òòÔ_ÔAsheÔ_ÔÏv.€Leechóó,€653€S.W.2d€398,€401€(Tenn.€1983);€òòÔ_ÔPeayÔ_Ô€v.€Nolanóó,€157€Tenn.€222,Ï234,€7€S.W.2d€815,€818€(1928).€€Tenn.€Const.€art.€II,€ðð€3€vests€all€legislativeÏauthority€in€the€General€Assembly,€and€Tenn.€Const.€art.€II,€ðð€2€prohibits€theÏother€two€departments€of€government€from€exercising€legislative€power.€€TheÏGeneral€Assemblyððs€legislative€power€is€limited€only€by€the€federal€and€stateÏconstitutions.€€òòSee€Williams€v.€Carróó,€218€Tenn.€564,€578,€404€S.W.2d€522,€529Ï(1966);€òòÔ_ÔSmiddyÔ_Ô€v.€City€of€Memphis,óó€140€Tenn.€97,€104„05,€203€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€512,€514Ï(1918).ÌÌà àThe€General€Assembly,€not€the€courts,€is€responsible€for€the€formulation€ofÏthe€stateððs€public€policy€that€is€not€already€embodied€in€the€state€and€federalÏconstitutions.€€òòSee€Stein€v.€Davidson€Hotel€Co.óó,€945€S.W.2d€714,€717€(Tenn.Ï1997);€òòCary€v.€Caryóó,€937€S.W.2d€777,€781€(Tenn.€1996);€òòCooper€v.€Nolanóó,€159ÏTenn.€379,€386,€19€S.W.2d€274,€276€(1929);€òòÔ_ÔCavenderÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔHewittÔ_Ôóó,€145€Tenn.€471,Ï475,€239€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€767,€768€(1922).€€Thus,€when€the€constitutionality€of€a€statute€hasÏbeen€called€into€question,€the€courts€must€first€ascertain€the€purpose€and€effect€ofÏthe€statute€and€then€must€determine€whether€the€statute€conforms€to€the€applicableÏconstitutional€requirements.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔPeayÔ_Ô€v.€Nolanóó,€157€Tenn.€at€235,€7€S.W.2d€atÏ818.€€The€€courts€will€invalidate€a€statute€only€when€it€clearly€contravenes€eitherÏthe€state€or€the€federal€constitution.€€òòSee€Holly€v.€City€of€Ô_ÔElizabethtonÔ_Ôóó,€193€Tenn.Ï46,€53,€241€S.W.2d€1001,€1004„05€(1951);€òòÔ_ÔSoukupÔ_Ô€v.€Sellóó,€171€Tenn.€437,€441,Ï104€S.W.2d€830,€831€(1937).€€ÌÌÔ_ÔÔ_Ôà àA€constitutional€challenge€does€not€give€the€courts€license€to€second„guessÏthe€General€Assemblyððs€policy€judgments€or€to€import€their€own€views€into€theÏstatutory€text.€€òòSee€National€Broiler€Marketing€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô€v.€United€Statesóó,€436€U.S.Ï816,€827,€98€S.€Ct.€2122,€2130€(1978).€€Nor€may€the€courts€review€the€statuteððsÏwisdom,€necessity,€expediency,€or€desirability.€€òòSee€Nashville€Ô_ÔMobilephoneÔ_Ô€Co.€v.ÏAtkinsóó,€536€S.W.2d€335,€340€(Tenn.€1976);òò€Dennis€v.€Sears,€Roebuck€&€Co.óó,€223ÏTenn.€415,€426,€446€S.W.2d€260,€266€(1969);€òòÔ_ÔEstepÔ_Ô€v.€Stateóó,€183€Tenn.€325,€335,Ï192€S.W.2d€706,€710€(1946).€€The€remedies€for€these€ills€are€entrusted€to€theÏpublic,€not€the€courts.€€òòSee€State€v.€Lindsayóó,€103€Tenn.€625,€640,€53€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€950,Ï954€(1899);€òòHenley€v.€Stateóó,€98€Tenn.€665,€679,€41€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€352,€354€(1897);€òòStateÏex€rel.€Coleman€v.€Campbellóó,€3€Tenn.€Ô_ÔCasÔ_Ô.€(Shannon)€355,€366€(1875).€€ÌÌà àThe€traditional€canons€of€statutory€construction€guide€the€inquiry€into€aÏstatuteððs€purpose€and€effect.€€The€courts€ascertain€a€statuteððs€purpose€from€theÏplain€and€ordinary€meaning€of€its€language.€€€òòSee€Westland€West€CommunityÏÔ_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô€v.€Knox€Countyóó,€948€S.W.2d€281,€283€(Tenn.€1997);€òòRiggs€v.€Ô_ÔBursonÔ_Ôóó,€941ÏS.W.2d€44,€54€(Tenn.€1997).€€Because€the€courts€must€give€effect€to€unambiguousÏstatutes,€òòsee€Spencer€v.€Towson€Moving€&€Storage,€Inc.óó,€922€S.W.2d€508,€510Ï(Tenn.€1996),€there€is€no€room€for€applying€the€rules€of€construction€when€theÏlanguage€is€plain€and€clear.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔPursellÔ_Ô€v.€First€Am.€Ô_ÔNatððlÔ_Ô€Bankóó,€937€S.W.2dÏ838,€842€(Tenn.€1996);€òòAnderson€v.€Outlandóó,€210€Tenn.€526,€532,€360€S.W.2dÏ44,€47€(1962).€€Thus,€when€the€words€of€a€statute€clearly€mean€one€thing,€theÏcourts€cannot€give€them€another€meaning€under€the€guise€of€construing€them.€ÏòòSee€Henry€v.€Whiteóó,€194€Tenn.€192,€198,€250€S.W.2d€70,€72€(1952);€òòState€ex€rel.ÏÔ_ÔBarksdaleÔ_Ô€v.€Wilsonóó,€194€Tenn.€140,€144„45,€250€S.W.2d€49,€51€(1952);€òòÔ_ÔMathesÔ_ÔÏv.€Stateóó,€173€Tenn.€511,€516,€121€S.W.2d€548,€550€(1938).ÌÌà àThe€courts€also€have€a€duty€to€use€the€canons€of€construction€to€make€senseÏrather€than€nonsense€out€of€statutes.€€òòSee€West€Virginia€Univ.€Hospitals,€Inc.€v.ÏCaseyóó,€499€U.S.€83,€101,€111€S.€Ct.€1138,€1148€(1991);€òòMcClellan€v.€Board€ofÏRegentsóó,€921€S.W.2d€684,€689€(Tenn.€1996);€òòMercy€v.€Olsenóó,€672€S.W.2d€196,Ï200€(Tenn.€1984).€€Whenever€possible,€we€must€employ€the€canons€to€saveÏstatutes,€not€to€destroy€them.€€òòSee€Scales€v.€Stateóó,€181€Tenn.€440,€443,€181ÏS.W.2d€621,€622€(1944).€€Accordingly,€we€begin€by€presuming€that€theÏchallenged€statute€is€constitutional.€€òòSee€Vogel€v.€Wells€Fargo€Guard€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.óó,€937ÏS.W.2d€856,€858€(Tenn.€1996);€òòIn€re€Ô_ÔBursonÔ_Ôóó,€909€S.W.2d€768,€775€(Tenn.€1995).€ÏWhen€faced€with€a€choice€between€two€plausible€constructions€of€a€statute,€theÏcourts€should€adopt€the€construction€that€avoids€undermining€the€statuteððsÏconstitutionality.€€òòSee€Davis„Ô_ÔKiddÔ_Ô€Booksellers,€Inc.€v.€Ô_ÔMcWherterÔ_Ôóó,€866€S.W.2dÏ520,€529„30€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.€Lyonsóó,€802€S.W.2d€590,€592€(Tenn.€1990);ÏòòRailroad€v.€Ô_ÔCriderÔ_Ôóó,€91€Tenn.€489,€506,€19€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€618,€622€(1892).€€But,€as€helpfulÏas€this€canon€may€be€in€close€cases,€it€does€not€authorize€the€courts€to€rewriteÏstatutes€enacted€by€the€General€Assembly.€€òòSee€Chapman€v.€United€Statesóó,€500ÏU.S.€453,€464,€111€S.€Ct.€1919,€1927€(1991);€òòHeckler€v.€Mathewsóó,€465€U.S.€728,Ï741„42,€104€S.€Ct.€1387,€1396€(1984).€€€€ÌÌà àIn€the€final€analysis,€altering€or€amending€statutes€is€a€uniquely€legislativeÏprerogative.€€òòSee€United€States€v.€National€Treasury€Employees€Unionóó,€513€U.S.Ï454,€479€n.26,€115€S.€Ct.€1003,€1019€n.26€(1995);€òòRichardson€v.€Tennessee€Bd.Ïof€Dentistryóó,€913€S.W.2d€446,€453€(Tenn.€1995);€òòÔ_ÔManahanÔ_Ô€v.€Stateóó,€188€Tenn.Ï394,€397,€219€S.W.2d€900,€901€(1949).€€The€courts€cannot€use€the€canons€ofÏconstruction€to€amend€statutory€language.€€òòSee€Shelby€County€Election€Ô_ÔCommððnÔ_ÔÏv.€Turneróó,€755€S.W.2d€774,€777„78€(Tenn.€1988);€òòTown€of€Mount€Carmel€v.ÏCity€of€Kingsportóó,€217€Tenn.€298,€306,€397€S.W.2d€379,€382€(1965);€òòÔ_ÔMcBrayerÔ_ÔÏv.€Dixie€Mercerizing€Co.óó,€176€Tenn.€560,€569,€144€S.W.2d€764,€768€(1940).€ÍThe€far€better€practice€is€to€leave€necessary€amendments€to€the€General€AssemblyÏ„„€the€governmental€body€constitutionally€empowered€to€make€them.€€òòSeeóó€2AÏNorman€J.€Singer,òò€Statutes€and€Statutory€Constructionóó€ðð€47.38€(5th€ed.€1992).ÌÌà àEven€though€the€courts€should€strive€to€avoid€tampering€with€the€text€of€aÏstatute,€òòsee€United€States€v.€National€Treasury€Employees€Unionóó,€513€U.S.€at€478,Ï115€S.€Ct.€at€1019,€they€are€not€entirely€without€authority€to€modify€statutoryÏtext.€€The€courts€should€exercise€their€authority€with€unusual€caution€and€only€inÏnarrowly€defined€circumstances€because€judicial€rewriting€of€statutes€provides€aÏdisincentive€for€careful€legislative€drafting€in€the€first€instance,€òòsee€Reno€v.ÏACLUóó,€___€U.S.€___,€___€n.50,€117€S.€Ct.€2329,€2351€n.50€(1997);€òòOsborne€v.ÏOhioóó,€495€U.S.€103,€121,€110€S.€Ct.€1691,€1702€(1990),€and€also€creates€the€riskÏof€inadvertent€judicial€infringement€on€a€legislative€prerogative.€€ÌÌà àCourts€may€supply€missing€words€to€render€a€statute€intelligible€when€theÏcontext€clearly€demonstrates€that€the€words€were€omitted€inadvertently€orÏmistakenly.òò€€See€Metropolitan€Ô_ÔGovððtÔ_Ô€v.€Poeóó,€215€Tenn.€53,€74,€383€S.W.2d€265,Ï274€(1964);€òòScales€v.€Stateóó,€181€Tenn.€at€443,€181€S.W.2d€at€622;€òòÔ_ÔRigginsÔ_Ô€v.ÏTyleróó,€134€Tenn.€577,€581„82,€184€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€860,€861€(1916).€€The€court€mayÏlikewise€remove€words€from€a€statute€in€order€to€avoid€absurdity€as€long€as€theÏreal€purpose€of€the€statute€is€clear.€€òòSee€City€of€Bristol€v.€Bank€of€Bristolóó,€159ÏTenn.€647,€649,€21€S.W.2d€620,€621€(1929).€€The€courts€cannot,€however,Ïrewrite€statutes€in€order€to€conform€them€to€constitutional€requirements,€òòseeÏReno€v.€ACLUóó,€___€U.S.€at€___,€117€S.€Ct.€at€2351;€òòVirginia€v.€AmericanÏBooksellers€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ôóó,€484€U.S.€383,€397,€108€S.€Ct.€636,€645€(1988),€or€to€moldÏthem€to€conform€them€to€their€own€views€of€prudent€public€policy.€€òòSee€UnitedÏStates€v.€Rutherfordóó,€442€U.S.€544,€555,€99€S.€Ct.€2470,€2477€(1979);€òòNashvilleÏÔ_ÔMobilephoneÔ_Ô€Co.€v.€Atkinsóó,€536€S.W.2d€at€340.ÌÌà@ àò òC.Ìó óÌà àWe€now€apply€these€principles€to€six€of€the€eight€provisions€ð ðsalvagedðð€byÏthe€trial€court.Ô_Ô× ƒ„ ××  ×Ô_Ô€€We€find€that€the€trial€court€construed€three€provisions€correctlyÏbut€exceeded€its€authority€by€essentially€rewriting€the€remaining€three€provisions.€€ÌÌà@ àò ò1.ó óÌà@ àò òòòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ððóó€39„15„201(c)(1)ó óÌÌà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(1)€states€that€abortion€procedures€may€beÏlegally€performed€ð ð[Ô_Ôd]uringÔ_Ô€the€first€three€(3)€months€of€pregnancyðð€as€long€asÏthe€woman€has€consented€and€the€procedure€is€performed€by€an€attendingÏphysician.× ƒ‡ ××  ×€€The€phrase€ð ðfirst€three€(3)€months€of€pregnancyðð€may€reasonably€beÏinterpreted€in€more€than€one€way€because€of€ambiguities€concerning€when€theÏperiod€begins€and€the€duration€of€the€word€ð ðmonth.ðð€€Thus,€the€trial€courtÏproperly€undertook€to€construe€this€phrase€in€a€way€that€gives€the€fullest€possibleÏeffect€to€the€General€Assemblyððs€purpose€and€at€the€same€time€avoidsÏundermining€the€statuteððs€constitutionality.ÌÌà àThe€medical€testimony€concerning€the€physiology€of€human€reproductionÏwas€remarkably€consistent.€€Both€the€physicians€who€opposed€the€statutes€andÍthose€who€favored€them€agreed€that€the€duration€of€a€typical€human€pregnancy€isÏ265€days€and,€therefore,€that€pregnancy€cannot€be€neatly€subdivided€into€threeÏninety„day€periods.€€They€also€agreed€that€the€length€of€a€pregnancy€could€beÏmeasured€either€from€the€date€of€conception€or€from€the€first€day€of€a€womanððsÏlast€menstrual€period× ƒ‰ ××  ×€and€that€obstetricians€and€gynecologists€customarilyÏcalculated€a€fetusððs€gestational€age€beginning€with€the€first€day€of€a€womanððs€lastÏmenstrual€period.ÌÌà àThe€physicians€also€agreed€that€the€term€ð ðmonthðð€was€not€medically€helpfulÏbecause€the€pace€of€fetal€development€required€shorter€measurement€intervals€andÏbecause€it€could€refer€to€calendar€months,€thirty„day€months,€or€even€four„weekÏmonths.€€Accordingly,€the€physicians€testified€that€obstetricians€and€gynecologistsÏmeasured€pregnancies€in€terms€of€weeks€rather€than€months€or€trimesters.€€TheyÏalso€agreed€that€the€term€ð ðfirst€trimesterðð€refers€to€the€first€fourteen€weeks€ofÏpregnancy€measured€from€the€first€day€of€a€womanððs€last€menstrual€period,€thatÏthe€term€ð ðsecond€trimesterðð€refers€to€the€fifteenth€through€the€twenty„seventhÏweek€of€pregnancy,€and€that€the€term€ð ðthird€trimesterðð€is€commonly€understoodÏby€physicians€to€include€the€time€of€pregnancy€remaining€after€the€twenty„seventhÏweek€of€pregnancy.ÌÌà àThe€phrase€ð ðfirst€three€(3)€months€of€pregnancyðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(1)€requires€judicial€construction€because€it€can€reasonably€beÏinterpreted€more€than€one€way.€€Our€examination€of€the€context€in€which€theÏphrase€appears,€as€well€as€its€legislative€history,€leads€us€to€conclude€that€theÏGeneral€Assembly€employed€the€phrase€in€order€to€square€Tennesseeððs€abortionÏstatutes€with€the€trimester€framework€first€established€in€the€òòRoe€v.€WadeóóÍdecision.€€We€find€no€definitive€indication€in€the€statuteððs€legislative€history€of€€aÏclear€legislative€purpose€concerning€when€this€period€should€begin€or€preciselyÏwhether€it€should€consist€of€eighty„four€days€(three€four„week€months),€ninetyÏdays€(three€thirty„day€months),€or€ninety„two€days€(three€calendar€months,Ïincluding€two€thirty„one€day€months).ÌÌà àDefining€this€phrase€in€a€way€that€will€be€understood€both€by€laypersonsÏand€the€medical€profession€is€necessary€for€two€reasons.€€First,€the€phrase€is€anÏintegral€part€of€a€statutory€scheme€that€imposes€criminal€liability€on€persons€whoÏperform€abortions€inconsistent€with€its€requirements.€€Second,€the€differenceÏbetween€eighty„four€and€ninety„two€days€can€have€a€profound€effect€on€aÏwomanððs€decision€whether€or€not€to€terminate€her€pregnancy.€€Accordingly,€weÏfind€that€the€trial€court,€following€the€weight€of€the€medical€evidence€presented,Ïcould€properly€define€the€term€ð ðfirst€three€(3)€months€of€pregnancyðð€to€meanÏð ðthe€first€fourteen€weeks€of€pregnancy€measured€from€the€first€day€of€a€womanððsÏlast€menstrual€period.ððÌÌà@ àò ò2.ó óÌà@ àò òòòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€óó39„15„202(b)(5)ó óÌÌà àThe€informed€consent€provision€enacted€in€1978€required€that€a€womanÏreceive€certain€statutorily€defined€information€before€obtaining€an€abortion.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€requires€that€a€woman€be€informed€that€ifÏshe€chooses€not€to€have€an€abortion€that€ð ðnumerous€public€and€private€agenciesÏand€services€are€available€to€assist€her€during€her€pregnancy€and€after€the€birth€ofÏher€child€.€.€.€whether€she€wishes€to€keep€her€child€or€place€him€[or€her]€forÏadoption.ðð€€It€also€requires€that€a€woman€be€informed€that€ð ðher€physician€willÍprovide€her€with€a€list€of€such€agencies€and€the€services€available€if€she€soÏrequests.ðð€€ÌÌà àThe€physicians€opposing€the€abortion€statutes€argued€that€this€provisionÏrequires€physicians€to€provide€women€with€a€list€of€every€available€agency€andÏservice€providing€prenatal,€delivery,€and€post„delivery€services€to€pregnantÏmothers€whether€the€physician€was€aware€of€the€agency€or€not.€€They€complainedÏthat€physicians€who€performed€abortions€could€be€subjected€to€criminal€liabilityÏif€they€did€not€know€about€every€single€public€or€private€agency€that€might€helpÏpregnant€women€decide€whether€to€keep€their€child€instead€of€having€an€abortion.€ÏIn€response€to€these€concerns,€the€trial€court€interpreted€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€to€require€physicians€to€inform€their€patients€of€the€agencies€andÏservices€ð ðreasonably€known€to€the€physician.ðð€€ÌÌà àThe€legislative€debates€concerning€this€provision€do€not€substantiate€theÏclaim€that€the€General€Assembly€enacted€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€toÏrequire€physicians€to€inform€themselves€of€every€single€public€or€private€agencyÏthat€could€possibly€provide€services€to€pregnant€women.€€Likewise,€they€provideÏno€support€for€the€notion€that€the€General€Assembly€desired€to€subject€physiciansÏto€criminal€prosecution€if€they€did€not€provide€their€patients,€on€request,€with€aÏlist€containing€each€and€every€one€of€these€agencies.€€Rather,€the€GeneralÏAssemblyððs€purpose€was€to€make€sure€that€women€considering€a€voluntaryÏtermination€of€their€pregnancy€knew€that€they€would€be€able€to€obtain€assistanceÏif€they€decided€to€continue€their€pregnancy.ÌÌà àWhile€the€phrasing€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€is€awkward,€itÏcannot€reasonably€be€interpreted€to€require€physicians,€under€penalty€of€criminalÏprosecution,€to€be€aware€of€every€single€agency€that€might€possibly€provideÍservices€to€pregnant€women€who€desire€assistance.€€The€phrase€ð ðlist€of€suchÏagencies€and€the€services€availableðð€does€not€connote€a€list€of€all€agencies€andÏservices€but€rather€a€representative€list€of€such€agencies€and€services.€€EveryÏphysician€and€clinical€employee€testified€that€they€were€aware€of€agenciesÏproviding€services€to€women€who€decide€to€continue€their€pregnancy,€and€mostÏtestified€that€they€already€maintained€a€list€of€these€agencies€or€that€they€hadÏreferred€women€to€these€agencies€in€the€past.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€courtÏproperly€construed€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€to€require€physicians€toÏprovide€a€representative€list€of€agencies€reasonably€known€to€them.ÌÌà@ àò ò3.ó óÌà@ àò òòòThe€ð ðOrðð€Following€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððóó€39„15„202(b)(5)ó óÌÌà àThe€physicians€opposing€the€abortion€statutes€also€complain€that€theÏinclusion€of€the€word€ð ðorðð€between€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€andÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(6)€renders€the€entire€informed€consentÏprovision€incomprehensible.€€In€response,€the€Attorney€General€introducedÏevidence€that€the€original€legislation€enacted€by€the€General€Assembly€did€notÏcontain€the€word€ð ðorðð€and€that€it€first€appeared€in€the€1982€replacement€ofÏVolume€7€of€the€Code€because€of€an€ð ðeditorial€error.ðð€€Accordingly,€the€trialÏcourt€ð ðstruckðð€the€word€from€the€statute.ÌÌà àThe€original€version€of€the€informed€consent€provision€enacted€in€1978€didÏnot€contain€the€word€ð ðor.ðð€€òòSeeóó€Act€of€March€23,€1978,€ch.€847,€1978€Tenn.€Pub.ÏActs€1078,€1079.€€Nor€did€the€original€codified€version€of€the€legislation.€€òòSeeóóÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„302€(Supp.€1978).€€As€reflected€in€the€affidavit€of€theÏExecutive€Secretary€of€the€Tennessee€Code€Commission,€the€ð ðorðð€first€appearedÍin€1982€after€the€Code€Commission€replaced€Volume€7€of€the€Code.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„4„202(b)€(1982€replacement€volume).ÌÌà àThese€facts€illustrate€a€classic€circumstance€in€which€the€courts€mayÏproperly€elide€a€word€from€a€statute.€€The€word€was€mistakenly€included€in€theÏcodified€versions€of€the€statute€appearing€after€1982€even€though€it€had€not€beenÏin€the€legislation€enacted€by€the€General€Assembly.€€Including€the€conjunctionÏð ðorðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€causes€the€provision€to€becomeÏinternally€inconsistent€and€contrary€to€the€General€Assemblyððs€purpose.× ƒŠ ××  ×€ÏBecause€the€General€Assembly€clearly€intended€that€a€woman€must€receive€all€theÏinformation€specified€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€before€terminating€herÏpregnancy,€the€trial€court€properly€elided€the€ð ðorðð€between€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„15„202(b)(5)€and€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(6)€from€the€statute.ÌÌà@ àò ò4.ó óÌà@ àò òòòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ððóó€39„15„201(c)(2)ó óÌÌà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€requires€that€ð ð[Ô_Ôa]fterÔ_Ô€three€(3)€months,Ïbut€before€viability€of€the€fetus,ðð€abortions€must€be€performed€in€a€ð ðhospital€asÏdefined€in€ðð€68„11„201,€licensed€by€the€state€department€of€health,€or€a€hospitalÏoperated€by€the€state€of€Tennessee€or€a€branch€of€the€federal€government.ðð€€InÏresponse€to€the€testimony€that€abortions€between€fourteen€and€eighteen€weeksÏafter€the€first€day€of€a€womanððs€last€menstrual€period€could€be€performed€safelyÏin€ambulatory€surgical€centers,€the€trial€court€construed€the€word€ð ðhospitalðð€inÍTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€to€include€ambulatory€surgical€centers€ð ðforÏabortions€performed€up€to€eighteen€weeks€measured€from€the€first€day€of€aÏwomanððs€last€menstrual€period.ðð€€We€have€determined€that€the€plain€meaning€ofÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€does€not€permit€this€construction.ÌÌà àThe€hospitalization€for€ð ðsecond€trimesterðð€abortions€originated€with€theÏ1973€legislation€that€rewrote€Tennesseeððs€abortion€statutes€in€response€to€the€òòRoeÏv.€Wadeóó€decision.Ô_Ô× ƒŒ ××  ×Ô_Ô€€At€the€time€the€General€Assembly€enacted€this€statute,€theÏbroad€definition€of€ð ðhospitalðð€included€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àany€institution€.€.€.€represented€and€held€out€to€theÏgeneral€public€as€ready,€willing€and€able€to€furnish€care,Ïaccommodations,€facilities€and€equipment€for€the€use,€inÏconnection€with€the€services€of€a€physician€of€one€(1)€orÏmore€Ô_ÔnonrelatedÔ_Ô€persons€who€may€be€suffering€fromÏdeformity,€injury,€or€disease€or€from€any€otherÏcondition€for€which€nursing,€medical€or€surgicalÏservices€would€be€appropriate€for€care,€diagnosis€orÏtreatment.ÌÓ€ÓÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€53„1301(a)€(Supp.€1973).€€The€statutes€regulating€health€careÏfacilities€did€not€distinguish€between€hospital€and€ambulatory€surgical€centers,Ïand€the€definition€of€ð ðhospitalðð€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€53„1301(a)€was€broadÏenough€to€include€ambulatory€surgical€centers.ÌÌà àIn€1976,€the€General€Assembly€amended€the€statutes€regulating€health€careÏfacilities€to€recognize€a€new€type€of€facility€called€an€ð ðambulatory€surgicalÏtreatment€center.ðð× ƒ ××  ×€€These€facilities€were€defined€as:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[Ô_ÔA]nyÔ_Ô€institution,€place€or€building€devoted€primarily€toÏthe€maintenance€and€operation€of€a€facility€for€theÏperformance€of€surgical€procedures€or€any€facility€inÏwhich€a€medical€or€surgical€procedure€is€utilized€toÏterminate€a€pregnancy.€€Such€facilities€shall€not€provideÏbeds€or€other€accommodations€for€the€overnight€stay€ofÏpatients.€€Individual€patients€shall€be€discharged€in€anÏambulatory€condition€without€danger€to€the€continuedÏwell€being€of€the€patients€or€shall€be€transferred€to€aÏhospital.ÌÌÓ€ÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€53„1301(o)€(Supp.€1976).€€Three€years€later,€the€GeneralÏAssembly€amended€the€definition€of€ð ðambulatory€surgical€treatment€centersðð€toÏmake€clear€that€patients€receiving€abortions€at€these€facilities€would€not€beÏpermitted€to€stay€in€one€of€these€facilities€for€more€than€twelve€hours.× ƒŽ ××  ×€€ThisÏcurrent€definition€of€ð ðambulatory€surgical€treatment€centerðð€is€codified€at€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€68„11„201(3).ÌÌà àBy€its€own€terms,€the€definition€of€ð ðambulatory€surgical€treatment€centerððÏrecognizes€that€ambulatory€surgical€treatment€centers€are€not€hospitals.× ƒ ××  ×€€ThisÏdifferentiation€is€also€reflected€in€the€Tennessee€Health€Planning€and€ResourceÏDevelopment€Act€of€1987,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„11„102(4)(A)€(1996)Ï(definition€of€ð ðhealth€care€institutionðð€that€differentiates€between€a€ð ðhospitalðð€andÏan€ð ðambulatory€surgical€treatment€centerðð),€and€in€the€regulations€of€theÏTennessee€Health€Facilities€Commission.Ô_Ô× ƒ ××  ×Ô_Ô€€Accordingly,€under€the€law€existingÍsince€1976,€hospitals€and€ambulatory€surgical€treatment€centers€are€entirelyÏdifferent€entities.ÌÌà àWhen€called€upon€to€construe€statutes,€the€courts€must€presume€that€theÏGeneral€Assembly€is€aware€of€its€prior€enactments,€òòsee€Hicks€v.€Stateóó,€945ÏS.W.2d€706,€707€(Tenn.€1997);€òòWilson€v.€Johnson€Countyóó,€879€S.W.2d€807,€810Ï(Tenn.€1994),€and€of€the€state€of€the€law€at€the€time€it€enacts€new€legislation.€€òòSeeÏRiggs€v.€Ô_ÔBursonÔ_Ôóó,€941€S.W.2d€44,€54€(Tenn.€1997);€òòStill€v.€First€Tenn.€Bank,ÏN.A.óó,€900€S.W.2d€282,€285€(Tenn.€1995).€€Thus,€when€the€General€AssemblyÏdifferentiated€between€ambulatory€surgical€treatment€centers€and€hospitals€inÏ1976,€we€must€presume€that€it€was€aware€of€the€existing€hospitalizationÏrequirement€for€second€trimester€abortions€and,€therefore,€that€it€did€not€intendÏfor€second€trimester€abortions€to€be€performed€in€ambulatory€surgical€treatmentÏcenters.€€The€General€Assembly€has€revisited€the€abortion€statutes€on€nineÏseparate€occasions€since€1976,€and€on€none€of€these€occasions€has€it€altered€theÏhospitalization€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2).€€Accordingly,Ïthe€trial€court€erroneously€undertook€to€amend€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€when€it€construed€it€to€permit€abortions€between€the€fourteenth€andÏeighteenth€weeks€following€a€womanððs€last€menstrual€period€to€be€performed€inÏambulatory€surgical€treatment€centers.€ÌÌà@ àò ò5.Ìà@ àòòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202óó(b)ó óÌÌà àWhen€the€General€Assembly€enacted€the€informed€consent€requirement€inÏ1978,€it€required€that€a€woman€obtaining€an€abortion€must€be€ð ðorally€informedÏby€her€attending€physicianðð€of€certain€ð ðfacts.ðð€€Following€the€testimony€of€severalÏphysicians€and€counselors€employed€by€Planned€Parenthood€that€the€pre„abortionÍcounseling€€and€informed€consent€discussions€were€performed€by€persons€otherÏthan€the€physician€performing€the€abortion,€the€trial€court€construed€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€to€require€the€attending€physician€either€to€ð ðpersonallyÏprovide€the€mandated€informationðð€or€to€ð ðpersonally€confirm€with€the€patientÏthat€she€has€been€given€the€information.ðð€€Neither€the€plain€meaning€of€the€wordsÏin€the€statute€nor€the€statuteððs€legislative€history€supports€this€construction.ÌÌà àThe€language€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€is€clear€andÏunambiguous.€€It€requires€that€a€womanððs€ð ðattending€physicianðð€must€be€theÏperson€who€provides€the€required€information.€€On€its€face,€the€statute€does€notÏpermit€the€physician€to€delegate€his€or€her€statutory€counseling€and€informedÏconsent€obligation€to€any€other€person.€€The€certainty€of€the€language€isÏreinforced€by€the€substance€of€the€legislatorsðð€discussions€about€this€provision€onÏthird€and€final€reading.€€The€House€sponsor€was€asked€repeatedly,€ð ðWho€is€goingÏto€have€the€authority€to€do€this€explaining?ðð.€€On€every€occasion,€the€HouseÏsponsor€responded€that€ð ðthis€will€be€her€attending€physician.€€It€will€be€her€doctorÏthat€[sic]€does€this.ðð€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court€erred€by€importing€languageÏinto€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€that€is€not€warranted€by€the€text€and€thatÏwas€not€desired€by€the€General€Assembly.ÌÌÌà@ àò ò6.Ìà@ àòòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ððóó€39„15„202(h)€(Supp.€1989)× ƒ‘ ××  ×ó óÌÌà àThe€trial€courtððs€final€construction€of€the€abortion€statutes€relates€to€theÏmedical€emergency€provision€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€that€empowersÍphysicians€to€bypass€the€informed€consent,€waiting€period,€and€parentalÏnotification€provisions€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202€when€the€physicianÏcertifies€that€ð ðan€abortion€.€.€.€[is]€necessary€to€preserve€the€life€of€the€pregnantÏwoman.ðð€€The€trial€court€construed€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€to€provideÏan€exception€not€only€to€the€requirements€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202€butÏalso€to€those€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201.€€It€also€construed€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€to€apply€to€circumstances€where€the€ð ðhealth€of€a€woman€isÏthreatened.ðð€€The€trial€court€again€exceeded€its€authority.€€Its€construction€ofÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€is€not€supported€by€the€plain€meaning€of€theÏstatutory€text€or€by€the€legislative€history€of€the€abortion€statutes.ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€in€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€that€the€states€haveÏð ðan€important€and€legitimate€interest€in€preserving€and€protecting€the€health€ofÏthe€pregnant€woman.ðð€€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€at€162,€93€S.€Ct.€at€731.€ÏAccordingly,€the€Court€held€that€the€states€could€enact€regulations€of€secondÏtrimester€abortions€that€reasonably€relate€to€the€preservation€and€protection€ofÏmaternal€health.€€òòSee€Roe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€at€163,€93€S.€Ct.€at€732.€€The€CourtÏalso€held€that€states€may€prohibit€abortions€after€a€fetus€becomes€viable€ð ðexceptÏwhen€it€is€necessary€to€preserve€the€life€or€health× ƒ’ ××  ×€of€the€mother.ðð€€òòRoe€v.ÏWadeóó,€410€U.S.€at€163„164,€93€S.€Ct.€at€732.ÌÌà àWhen€the€General€Assembly€rewrote€Tennesseeððs€abortion€statutes€in€1973,Ïit€endeavored€to€comply€strictly€with€the€medical€emergency€requirement€in€theÏòòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€decision.€€The€only€restrictions€placed€on€abortions€prior€toÏviability€were€(1)€that€the€procedure€must€be€performed€by€a€licensed€physician,Ï(2)€that€the€woman€must€consent€to€the€procedure,€and€(3)€that€the€procedureÍmust€be€performed€in€a€hospital€if€it€occurs€after€three€months€but€beforeÏviability.€€The€General€Assembly€also€prohibited€abortions€after€the€fetus€becameÏviable€unless€the€womanððs€attending€physician€certified€in€writing€that€theÏabortion€is€ð ðnecessary€to€preserve€the€life€or€health€of€the€mother.ðð€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(3).× ƒ“ ××  ×ÌÌà àWhen€the€General€Assembly€began€placing€additional€restrictions€on€aÏwomanððs€right€to€decide€whether€to€terminate€her€pregnancy,€it€declined€toÏinclude€medical€emergency€exceptions€as€broad€as€the€one€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„15„201(c)(3).€€When€it€first€enacted€the€informed€consent€and€waiting€periodÏrequirements€in€1978,€the€General€Assembly€did€not€include€a€medical€emergencyÏexception.× ƒ” ××  ×€€During€the€next€legislative€session,€however,€the€General€AssemblyÏadded€two€medical€emergency€exceptions€applicable€to€the€informed€consent€andÏwaiting€period€requirements.€€First,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(3)Ïpermitted€a€physician€to€bypass€the€waiting€period€if€he€or€she€determined€thatÏwaiting€two€days€ð ðwould€endanger€the€life€of€the€pregnant€woman.ðð× ƒ• ××  ×€€Second,ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€provided€a€medical€emergency€exception€for€allÏrequirements€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202€ð ðin€those€situations€where€anÏabortion€is€certified€.€.€.€as€necessary€to€preserve€the€life€of€the€pregnantÏwoman.ðð× ƒ– ××  ×€€ÌÌà àUnder€the€statutes€as€enacted€by€the€General€Assembly,€women€may€obtainÏabortions€after€their€fetus€is€viable€if€their€attending€physician€certifies€that€theÍabortion€is€necessary€to€preserve€their€life€or€health.€€However,€women€cannotÏreceive€an€abortion€until€they€comply€with€the€informed€consent€and€waitingÏperiod€requirements€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202€unless€their€attendingÏphysician€certifies€that€either€the€informed€consent€requirement€or€the€waitingÏperiod€or€both€would€endanger€their€lives.× ƒ— ××  ×€ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€made€it€clear€that€states€cannotÏinterfere€with€a€womanððs€decision€to€have€an€abortion€if€continuing€the€womanððsÏpregnancy€would€constitute€a€threat€to€her€health.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.ÏCaseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€880,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2822;€òòHarris€v.€Ô_ÔMcRaeÔ_Ôóó,€448€U.S.€297,€316,Ï100€S.€Ct.€2671,€2687„88€(1980);€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€at€164„65,€93€S.€Ct.€atÏ732.€€Thus,€the€trial€courtððs€construction€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)Ïclearly€stemmed€from€its€desire€to€save€the€constitutionality€of€the€abortionÏstatutes.€€While€courts€should,€when€possible,€construe€statutes€to€avoid€theÏdanger€of€unconstitutionality,òò€see€Ohio€v.€Akron€Ctr.€for€Reproductive€Healthóó,Ï497€U.S.€502,€514,€110€S.€Ct.€2972,€2980€(1990),€they€cannot€adopt€aÏconstruction€that€is€not€fairly€supported€by€the€plain€meaning€of€the€statuteððsÏlanguage€or€that€is€either€inconsistent€with€or€not€clearly€supported€by€theÏpurpose€of€the€statute.ÌÌà àMedical€emergency€exceptions€to€protect€the€motherððs€health€have€been€theÏsubject€of€intense€public€and€legislative€debate€ever€since€the€òòRoe€v.€WadeóóÏdecision€was€issued.€€Because€of€the€United€States€Supreme€Courtððs€broadÏconstruction€of€the€term€ð ðhealthðð€in€òòDoe€v.€Boltonóó,€410€U.S.€at€192,€93€S.€Ct.€atÏ747,€many€have€argued€that€to€construe€medical€emergency€exceptions€to€protectÍa€motherððs€health€was€to€permit€ð ðabortion€on€demand.ðð€€Even€the€justicesÏthemselves€have€been€divided€on€this€issue.€€òòCompare€Planned€Parenthood€v.ÏCaseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€887,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2826€(stating€that€even€the€broadest€readingÏof€òòRoeóó€has€not€suggested€there€is€a€constitutional€right€to€abortion€on€demand)Ïòòwith€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€995,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2882€(Scalia,€J.,Ïconcurring€in€the€judgment€and€dissenting€in€part)€(characterizing€òòRoe€v.€WadeóóÏas€a€mandate€for€abortion€on€demand);€òòThornburgh€v.€American€College€ofÏObstetricians€&€Gynecologistsóó,€476€U.S.€at€782„83,€106€S.€Ct.€at€2190€(Burger,ÏC.J.,€dissenting)€(stating€that€the€Courtððs€opinion€plainly€undermines€its€earlierÏrejection€of€the€idea€of€abortion€on€demand).ÌÌà àThe€legislative€concern€over€the€potential€expansive€interpretation€ofÏprovisions€that€permit€abortions€to€protect€the€health€of€the€mother€hasÏmanifested€itself€in€the€context€of€debates€concerning€public€funding€for€abortionsÏand,€more€recently,€with€regard€to€legislation€proscribing€ð ðpartial„birthððÏabortions.€€In€order€to€avoid€the€expansive€interpretation€of€the€term€ð ðhealth,ððÏboth€federal€and€state€legislators€have€limited€the€medically€necessary€abortionsÏthat€must€be€funded€under€the€Medicaid€Program,€Title€XIX€of€the€SocialÏSecurity€Act,€to€those€where€physical€disorders,€injuries,€or€illnesses€would€placeÏthe€woman€in€danger€of€death€unless€an€abortion€is€performed.€€òòSee€PlannedÏParenthood€Affiliates€of€Michigan€v.€Ô_ÔEnglerÔ_Ôóó,€73€F.€3d€634,€638€(6th€Cir.€1996)Ï(quoting€139€Cong.€Rec.€S12,581€(daily€ed.€Sept.€28,€1993)€(statement€of€SenatorÏHatch));€Act€of€April€28,€1992,€ch.€1018,€ðð€10,€Item€4,€1992€Tenn.€Pub.€ActsÏ1059,€1090„91€(containing€limitations€on€the€use€of€state€funds€for€abortions);ÏHouse€Bill€3309€/€Senate€Bill€3307,€100th€General€Assembly€(1998),€ðð€10,€Item€4Ï(limiting€the€use€of€state€funds€to€abortions€ð ðwhere€an€abortion€is€necessary€toÏsave€the€life€of€the€mother€or€where€the€pregnancy€is€the€result€of€an€act€of€rapeÏor€incestðð).€€Likewise,€the€General€Assembly€has€permitted€ð ðpartial„birthððÍabortions€only€when€they€are€ð ðnecessary€to€save€the€Ô_ÔlifeÔ_Ô€of€the€mother€whose€lifeÏis€endangered€by€a€physical€disorder,€illness€or€injury.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„209(c)€(1997).× ƒ˜ ××  ×ÌÌà àDespite€the€testimony€of€the€physicians€who€supported€the€statutes€beingÏchallenged€in€this€case,€the€terms€ð ðlifeðð€and€ð ðhealthðð€in€the€context€of€emergencyÏmedical€exceptions€do€not€mean€the€same€thing€as€they€are€commonly€understoodÏto€mean.€€While€there€is€consensus€that€abortions€should€be€permitted€to€save€theÏlife€of€the€mother€when€she€is€in€immediate€danger,€there€is€no€consensusÏconcerning€whether€an€emergency€medical€exception€to€save€a€motherððs€life€alsoÏincludes€procedures€to€protect€the€mother€from€physical€impairment€orÏpsychological€impairment€that€is€not€life„threatening€or€procedures€to€end€aÏpregnancy€when€childbirth€would€severely€cripple€a€womanððs€chance€for€aÏsuccessful€life€herself.€€ÌÌà àThe€only€reasonable€interpretation€of€the€plain€meaning€of€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€is€that€it€permits€bypassing€the€requirements€of€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„202€only€when€ð ðnecessary€to€preserve€the€life€of€the€pregnantÏwoman.ðð€€A€review€of€the€other€statutes€pertaining€to€abortions€clearlyÏdemonstrates€that€the€General€Assembly€knows€how€to€provide€broader€medicalÏemergency€exceptions€when€it€chooses€to€do€so.€€It€defined€the€medicalÍemergency€exception€in€general€terms€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(3)Ïwith€regard€to€third€trimester€abortions€and€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€37„10„305Ïwith€regard€to€the€parental€consent€requirement.€€Thus,€we€must€conclude€that€theÏGeneral€Assembly€purposely€decided€to€limit€the€scope€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€to€circumstances€where€bypassing€the€procedures€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€39„15„202€became€necessary€to€preserve€the€motherððs€life.€€Accordingly,€theÏtrial€court€erred€by€interpreting€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€to€apply€inÏcircumstances€where€the€health€of€a€woman€is€threatened.ÌÌà@ àò òIV.ó óÌÌà àA€pivotal€issue€in€this€case€concerns€the€appropriate€standard€forÏdetermining€the€constitutionality€of€the€challenged€provisions€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðððð€39„15„201,€„202.€€Even€though€the€constitutional€challenges€are€based€on€theÏConstitution€of€Tennessee,€both€parties€draw€legal€support€for€their€positionsÏlargely€from€federal€precedents€construing€the€United€States€Constitution.€€TheÏPlanned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€assert€that€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€requiresÏnothing€less€than€the€strict€standard€of€Ô_ÔreviewÔ_Ô€employed€by€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€in€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó.€€The€State€responds€that€a€womanððs€fundamentalÏright€to€refrain€from€procreating€is€adequately€protected€using€the€ð ðundueÏburdenðð€standard€employed€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€in€òòPlannedÏParenthood€v.€Caseyóó.€ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àThe€architects€of€our€federal€form€of€government€looked€to€stateÏconstitutions€to€provide€the€primary€protection€of€individual€liberties.€ÏAccordingly,€neither€the€Articles€of€Confederation€nor€the€United€StatesÍConstitution,€as€originally€adopted,€contained€a€€declaration€of€rights.€€òòSeeóó€RobertÏAllen€Ô_ÔRutlandÔ_Ô,€òòThe€Birth€of€the€Bill€of€Rights,€1776„1791óó,€at€78,€100,€106€(1955)Ï(ð ðÔ_ÔRutlandÔ_Ôðð).€€When€the€First€Congress€approved€the€Bill€of€Rights€in€1789,€itsÏprovisions€were€drawn€largely€from€state€constitutions€and€bills€of€rights.€€òòSeeóóÏEdward€Ô_ÔDumbauldÔ_Ô,€òòThe€Bill€of€Rights€and€What€It€Means€Todayóó€160„65€(1957);ÏEugene€W.€Ô_ÔHickockÔ_Ô,€Jr.,€òòIntroduction€of€the€Bill€of€Rights:€Original€Meaning€andÏCurrent€Understandingóó€17€(Eugene€W.€Ô_ÔHickockÔ_Ô,€Jr.,€ed.€1991);€Craig€R.€Smith,ÏòòTo€Form€a€More€Perfect€Union,€The€Ratification€of€the€Constitution€and€the€BillÏof€Rights€1787„1791óó,€at€128€(1993).€€Thus,€most€of€the€provisions€in€the€state€andÏfederal€declarations€of€rights€share€a€common€ancestry.€òò€Seeóó€Paul€W.€Kahn,ÏòòInterpretation€and€Authority€in€State€Constitutionalismóó,€106€Ô_ÔHarvÔ_Ô.€L.€Rev.€1147,Ï1159„61€(1993)€(ð ðKahnðð);€Ô_ÔRutlandÔ_Ô,€at€13,€74.€€Although€their€words€differ,€theseÏprovisions€embody€restatements€of€fundamental€principles€commonly€accepted€atÏthe€time.€€òòSee€State€v.€Statenóó,€46€Tenn.€(6€Cold.)€233,€264€(1869);€WallaceÏÔ_ÔMcClureÔ_Ô,€òòState€Constitution„Making€With€Especial€Reference€to€Tennesseeóó€211Ï(1916);€Edward€T.€Sanford,€òòThe€Constitutional€Convention€of€1796óó,€ProceedingsÏof€the€Fifteenth€Annual€Meeting€of€the€Bar€Association€of€Tennessee€92,€108Ï(Nashville,€Marshall€&€Bruce€Co.€1896).€ÌÌà àThe€primacy€of€state€declarations€of€rights€continued€until€the€ratificationÏof€the€post„Civil€War€amendments€which,€over€time,€altered€the€originalÏstructure€of€federalism€to€allow€federal€protection€for€individual€rights€throughÏthe€Due€Process€and€Equal€Protection€Clauses€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€ÏToday€many€of€our€personal€liberties€are€protected€by€both€the€state€and€theÏfederal€constitutions.€€€€€ÌÌà àThe€relationship€between€the€protections€of€the€state€and€federalÏconstitutions€is€well€understood.€€The€federal€Bill€of€Rights€provides€a€basic€levelÍof€protection€for€individual€liberties,€which€state€laws€and€constitutionalÏprovisions€may€not€violate.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔMcDanielÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔPatyÔ_Ôóó,€435€U.S.€618,€628„29,€98€S.ÏCt.€1322,€1328„29€(1978);€òòÔ_ÔGirdnerÔ_Ô€v.€Stephensóó,€48€Tenn.€(1€Ô_ÔHeiskÔ_Ô.)€280,€283„84Ï(1870);€òòUnion€Bank€v.€Stateóó,€17€Tenn.€(9€Ô_ÔYerÔ_Ô.)€489,€494„95€(1836).€€However,Ïstate€constitutions€may€provide€greater€protection€or€may€even€protect€rights€thatÏare€not€protected€by€the€United€States€Constitution.€€òòSee€State€v.€Barnettóó,€909ÏS.W.2d€423,€430€n.6€(Tenn.€1995);€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2d€204,€207Ï(Tenn.€1992);€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€588,€600€(Tenn.€1992).Ô_Ô× ƒ™ ××  ×Ô_Ô€€As€a€resultÏof€the€overlapping€protections€in€the€state€and€federal€constitutions,€many€stateÏcourts€became€accustomed€to€following€the€United€States€Supreme€Courtððs€lead€inÏarticulating€constitutional€principles.€€They€conformed€their€interpretations€ofÏstate€constitutional€provisions€to€the€United€States€Supreme€Courtððs€interpretationÏof€analogous€federal€constitutional€provisions.€€ÌÌà àIn€recent€decades,€state€appellate€courts€began€to€place€new€emphasis€onÏstate€constitutions€as€independent€sources€of€protections€of€personal€liberties.€€TheÏsoundness€of€many€of€these€modern€interpretations€has€been€clouded€by€anÏongoing€debate€concerning€the€motivations€for€these€decisionsÔ_Ô× ƒš ××  ×Ô_Ô€and€by€wide„spread€academic€criticism€of€the€quality€of€the€scholarship€and€reasoning.× ƒ› ××  ×€€TheÏmost€widespread€concern€is€that€state€constitutions€have€become€convenientÏvehicles€for€state€judges€who€disagree€with€the€holdings€of€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€to€transform€their€personal€beliefs€and€opinions€into€stateÏconstitutional€doctrine.€€ÌÌà àIn€this€climate,€the€courts€should€provide€thorough€explanations€of€theirÏinterpretations€of€state€constitutional€provisions.€€òòSee€Summers€v.€Thompsonóó,€764ÏS.W.2d€182,€188€(Tenn.€1988)€(Ô_ÔDrowotaÔ_Ô,€J.,€concurring).€€Our€understanding€ofÏthe€provisions€of€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€should€be€guided€by€the€text€of€theÏprovision,€the€history€of€its€adoption,€our€stateððs€unique€history€and€tradition,€theÏfundamental€values€reflected€in€the€provision,€and€the€United€States€SupremeÏCourtððs€construction€of€similar€provisions€in€the€United€States€Constitution.€€òòSeeóóÏA.€E.€Dick€Howard,€òòState€Courts€and€Constitutional€Rights€in€the€Day€of€theÏBurger€Courtóó,€62€Va.€L.€Rev.€873,€935„44€(1976).€€If€we€are€to€be€theÏConstitutionððs€guardiansÔ_Ô× ƒœ ××  ×Ô_Ô€and€the€chief€protectors€of€the€fundamental€principlesÏit€contains,Ô_Ô× ƒ ××  ×Ô_Ô€we€should€not€allow€constitutional€principles€to€be€shaped€byÍjudicial€ingenuity€or€by€individual€€judgesðð€personal€preferences.€€òòSee€City€ofÏWhite€House€Ô_Ôv.€WhitleyÔ_Ôóó,€No.€01A01„9612„CH„00571,€1997€WL€331743,€at€*10Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€June€18,€1997)€(Koch,€J.,€dissenting),€òòperm.€app.€grantedóó€(Tenn.ÏNov.€24,€1997).× ƒž ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€interpretation€of€a€constitutional€provision€should€begin€with€its€text.€ÏòòSee€Shelby€County€v.€Haleóó,€200€Tenn.€503,€510,€292€S.W.2d€745,€748€(1956);ÏòòPrescott€v.€Duncanóó,€126€Tenn.€106,€128,€148€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€229,€234€(1912);€òòBank€v.ÏCooperóó,€10€Tenn.€(2€Ô_ÔYerÔ_Ô.)€599,€621„22€(1831)€(Kennedy,€J.,€concurring).€€TheÏcourts€may€illuminate€the€meaning€of€the€text€by€examining€the€reasonableÏunderstanding€of€the€text€when€the€provision€was€adopted,Ô_Ô× ƒŸ ××  ×Ô_Ô€the€practices€andÏusages€in€existence€when€the€provision€was€adopted,Ô_Ô× ƒ  ××  ×Ô_Ô€the€common€law,× ƒ¡ ××  ×€and€theÏcontemporary€legislative€and€judicial€construction€of€the€provision.× ƒ¢ ××  ×€€We€mayÏalso€consider€pertinent€historical€documents€including€journals€of€constitutionalÍconventions,Ô_Ô× ƒ£ ××  ×Ô_Ô€prior€draft€constitutions,Ô_Ô× ƒ¤ ××  ×Ô_Ô€and€other€jurisdictionsðð€constructionsÏof€similar€constitutional€provisions.Ô_Ô× ƒ¥ ××  ×Ô_Ô€€ÌÌà àEarlier€judicial€decisions€can€also€elucidate€the€meaning€of€a€constitutionalÏprovision.€€These€precedents€provide€stability€and€continuity€in€our€understandingÏof€the€constitutionððs€meaning.€€òòSee€Monday€v.€Ô_ÔMillsapsÔ_Ôóó,€197€Tenn.€295,€298,€271ÏS.W.2d€857,€858€(1954);€òòState€ex€rel.€Ô_ÔPittsÔ_Ô€v.€Nashville€Baseball€Clubóó,€127€Tenn.Ï292,€303,€154€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€1151,€1154€(1913).€€They€should€not,€however,€be€used€toÏperpetuate€error,€òòsee€Board€of€Educ.€v.€Shelby€Countyóó,€207€Tenn.€330,€365,€339ÏS.W.2d€569,€584€(1960);€òòArnold€v.€Mayor€of€Knoxvilleóó,€115€Tenn.€195,€202,€90ÏÔ_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€469,€470€(1905),€or€principles€that€no€longer€work.€€òòSee€State€v.€Ô_ÔKendricksÔ_Ôóó,Ï891€S.W.2d€597,€603€(Tenn.€1994).€€The€doctrine€of€stare€Ô_ÔdecisisÔ_Ô€is€notÏinflexible,€òòsee€City€of€Memphis€v.€Ô_ÔOvertonÔ_Ôóó,€216€Tenn.€293,€298,€392€S.W.2d€98,Ï100€(1965),€and€should€be€used€to€enable€the€law€to€adapt€to€changing€conditions.€ÏòòSee€Metropolitan€Ô_ÔGovððtÔ_Ô€v.€Poeóó,€215€Tenn.€53,€80,€383€S.W.2d€265,€277€(1964);ÏòòÔ_ÔShoushaÔ_Ô€v.€Matthews€Ô_ÔDrivurself€Serv.Ô_Ô,€Inc.óó,€210€Tenn.€384,€389,€358€S.W.2dÏ471,€473€(1962).€ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€alluded€to€a€womanððs€federally€protectedÏright€to€terminate€her€pregnancy€several€times€prior€to€1992.òò€€See€Smith€v.€Goreóó,Í728€S.W.2d€738,€751„52€(Tenn.€1987);€òòOlson€v.€Ô_ÔMolzenÔ_Ôóó,€558€S.W.2d€429,€431Ï(Tenn.€1977).€€In€1992,€the€court€recognized€for€the€first€time€that€theÏConstitution€of€Tennessee€protects€a€womanððs€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomyÏwhich€includes€both€the€right€to€procreate€and€the€right€to€avoid€procreation.€€òòSeeÏDavis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€601.€€As€fashioned€by€the€court,€the€right€ofÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€is€not€absolute€but€is€tempered€by€the€Stateððs€interest€inÏprotecting€life€after€the€end€of€the€first€trimester€of€pregnancy.€€òòSee€Davis€v.ÏDavisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€602.ÌÌà àThe€lineage€of€the€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€protected€by€theÏConstitution€of€Tennessee€parallels€that€of€a€womanððs€right€to€decide€whether€toÏterminate€her€pregnancy€recognized€in€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó.€€The€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_ÔÏautonomy€derives€from€an€individualððs€right€of€privacy,€òòsee€Davis€v.€Davisóó,€842ÏS.W.2d€at€600,€which€is€inherent€in€the€concept€of€liberty€embedded€in€theÏConstitution€of€Tennessee.€€òòSee€Davis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€598„99.€€TheÏconcept€of€liberty€is€not€confined€to€a€specific€provision€but€rather€is€implicit€inÏTenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€8€and€the€ð ðliberty€clausesðð€in€the€Declaration€of€Rights.€€òòSeeÏDavis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€599„600.× ƒ¦ ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€never€held€in€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó€that€the€scopeÏof€the€right€of€privacy€protected€by€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€was€broaderÍthan€the€right€of€privacy€protected€by€the€United€States€Constitution.€€While€theÏcourt€observed€that€there€is€no€reason€to€assume€complete€congruity€between€theÏtwo€rights,€òòsee€Davis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€600,€it€did€not€conclude€that€theÏboundaries€between€the€two€rights€are,€in€fact,€different.€€In€fact,€the€courtÏintimated€that€the€state€and€federal€rights€are€similar€when€it€noted€that€ð ðthe€rightÏof€procreation€is€a€vital€part€of€an€individualððs€right€to€privacy.€€Federal€law€is€toÏthe€same€effect.ðð€€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€600.€€The€court€also€reliedÏexclusively€on€decisions€of€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€construing€theÏUnited€States€Constitution€to€describe€the€nature€and€scope€of€the€right€ofÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy.€€òòSee€Davis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€600„02.ÌÌà àWhile€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€invoked€the€right€of€privacy€sinceÏdeciding€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó,Ô_Ô× ƒ§ ××  ×Ô_Ô€it€has€not€again€addressed€the€scope€of€either€the€rightÏof€privacy€or€the€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy.€€The€only€reported€caseÏaddressing€the€scope€of€the€right€of€privacy€involved€a€challenge€to€theÏHomosexual€Practices€Act,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„510€(1991).€€In€that€case,€aÏpanel€of€this€court€held€that€the€statute€was€unconstitutional€because€it€was€notÏnarrowly€tailored€to€advance€the€Stateððs€interest€in€preventing€the€spread€ofÏinfectious€diseases.€€òòSee€Campbell€v.€Ô_ÔSundquistÔ_Ôóó,€926€S.W.2d€250,€263„64€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€1996).€€The€panel€also€observed€that€ð ðthe€right€to€privacy€provided€toÏTennesseans€under€our€Constitution€is€in€fact€more€extensive€than€theÏcorresponding€right€to€privacy€provided€by€the€Federal€Constitution.ðð€€òòCampbellÏv.€Ô_ÔSundquistÔ_Ôóó,€926€S.W.2d€at€261.ÌÌà àWe€do€not€on€this€occasion€take€issue€with€our€colleaguesðð€conclusion€inÏòòCampbell€v.€Ô_ÔSundquistÔ_Ôóó.€€However,€we€do€not€view€their€observation€concerningÍthe€scope€of€Tennesseeððs€right€of€privacy€to€be€controlling€in€this€case€for€fourÏreasons.€€First,€their€reliance€on€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó€for€the€proposition€that€the€scopeÏof€the€state€right€of€privacy€is€broader€than€the€scope€of€the€federal€right€ofÏprivacy€is€misplaced.€€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó€never€held€that€the€contours€of€the€twoÏrights€differ,€and€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Courtððs€analysis€based€on€the€uniquenessÏof€the€liberty€clauses€in€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€is€historically€inaccurate.× ƒ¨ ××  ×€ÏSecond,€other€than€its€reliance€on€the€historically€incorrect€language€inòò€Davis€v.ÏDavisóó,€the€Court€of€Appeals€cited€no€other€law€to€support€its€understanding€of€theÏscope€of€the€right€of€privacy.€€Third,€the€òòCampbell€v.€Ô_ÔSundquistÔ_Ôóó€decision€did€notÏdeal€specifically€with€the€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy.€€Finally,€the€fact€thatÏthe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€denied€permission€to€appeal€in€òòCampbell€v.ÏÔ_ÔSundquistÔ_Ôóó€is€not€a€reliable€indication€that€the€court€concurs€with€the€conclusionÏwith€regard€to€the€scope€of€Tennesseeððs€right€of€privacy.€€òòSee€Meadows€v.€Stateóó,Ï849€S.W.2d€748,€752€(Tenn.€1993);€òòSwift€v.€Kirbyóó,€737€S.W.2d€271,€277€(Tenn.Ï1987);€òòStreet€v.€Ô_ÔCalvertÔ_Ôóó,€541€S.W.2d€576,€587€(Tenn.€1976).ÌÌà àAccordingly,€we€must€determine€whether€the€scope€of€the€right€ofÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€is€broader€than€the€analogous€right€of€reproductiveÏfreedom€protected€by€the€United€States€Constitution.€€The€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€has€already€noted€that€these€rights€spring€from€common€constitutionalÏroots€„„€the€concept€of€liberty€reflected€in€the€state€and€federal€constitutions.€€òòSeeÏDavis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€598.€€In€order€to€conclude€that€Tennesseeððs€right€toÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€is€broader€than€its€federal€counterpart,€we€must€point€toÏmaterial€differences€in€the€applicable€constitutional€language€or€to€other€historicalÏor€precedential€matters€that€warrant€this€conclusion.òò€€See€City€of€White€House€v.ÏWhitleyóó,€1997€WL€331743,€at€*13€(Koch,€J.,€dissenting).€€ÌÌà àThe€parties€challenging€the€constitutionality€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„202€have€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€the€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_ÔÏautonomy€differs€in€scope€and€application€from€the€constitutionally€protectedÏliberty€interests€recognized€in€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó.€€They€have€failed€to€carry€theirÏburden€because€even€the€most€expansive€reading€of€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó€does€notÏsubstantiate€their€claim.€€Both€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€and€the€United€StatesÏConstitution€embody€ancient€principles€that€shield€private€rights€from€arbitraryÏgovernmental€interference.€€òòSee€State€v.€Statenóó,€46€Tenn.€(6€Cold.)€233,€245Ï(1869).€€In€light€of€the€common€constitutional€lineage€of€these€two€rights,€and€inÏthe€absence€of€any€demonstrable€basis€for€a€contrary€conclusion,€we€decline€toÏhold€that€the€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€recognized€in€òòDavis€v.€DavisóóÏdiffers€in€any€material€way€from€the€fundamental€right€of€a€woman€to€decideÏwhether€to€terminate€her€pregnancy€first€recognized€in€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó.€ÌÌà@ àò òC.ó óÌÌà àHaving€determined€that€the€state€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€does€notÏdiffer€materially€from€the€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€right€recognized€in€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó,€weÏmust€now€identify€the€standards€to€be€used€to€test€the€validity€of€the€statutoryÏprovisions€challenged€in€this€case.€€The€formulation€of€clear€legal€standards€inÏcases€of€this€sort€is€essential€because€standards€minimize€judicial€subjectivity€asÏwell€as€the€risk€that€the€height€of€the€bar€will€be€determined€by€the€apparentÏexigencies€of€the€day.€€òòSee€Denver€Area€Educ.€Telecommunications€Consortium,ÏInc.€v.€FCCóó,€518€U.S.€727,€785,€116€S.€Ct.€2374,€2406€(1996)€(Kennedy,€J.,Ïconcurring€in€part,€concurring€in€the€judgment€in€part,€and€dissenting€in€part).ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€not€provided€us€with€standards€forÏdeciding€whether€a€statute€adequately€balances€the€Stateððs€interest€in€protectingÍmaternal€health€and€potential€human€life€with€a€womanððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy.€ÏIt€has,€however,€pointed€to€several€important€similarities€between€the€state€andÏfederal€rights€that€point€to€a€workable€standard.€€Like€the€United€States€SupremeÏCourt,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€recognized€that€women€have€aÏconstitutionally€protected€liberty€interest€in€determining€whether€to€bear€or€begetÏa€child.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€846,€859,€112€S.€Ct.€atÏ2804,€2816;€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€at€153,€93€S.€Ct.€at€727;€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó,€842ÏS.W.2d€at€600„01.€€But,€like€the€United€States€Supreme€Court,€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€has€also€recognized€that€the€womanððs€right€is€not€absolute€and€thatÏthe€Stateððs€interest€in€protecting€maternal€health€and€potential€life€may€justifyÏimposing€reasonable€limitations€on€a€womanððs€exercise€of€her€right.€€òòSee€PlannedÏParenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€878„79,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2821;€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó,€410ÏU.S.€at€162„64,€93€S.€Ct.€at€731„32;€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€602.€ÌÌà àIn€an€early€effort€to€strike€the€appropriate€balance€between€these€interests,Ïthe€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€in€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€and€in€several€later€casesÏthat€state€regulations€touching€on€a€womanððs€abortion€decision€should€be€subjectedÏto€strict€scrutiny€and€should€be€upheld€only€if€they€were€drawn€in€narrow€termsÏto€further€a€compelling€state€interest.€€òòSee€Roe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€at€155„56,€93ÏS.€Ct.€at€728.€€Using€the€strict€scrutiny€test,€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÏinvalidated€statutes€requiring€mandatory€pre„abortion€counseling,× ƒ© ××  ×€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_ÔÍconsent,× ƒª ××  ×€parental€consent€for€minors,× ƒ« ××  ×€waiting€periods,× ƒ¬ ××  ×€and€hospitalizationÏrequirements€for€abortions€occurring€after€the€first€trimester.× ƒ­ ××  ×ÌÌà àIn€1989€the€Court€signaled€its€disenchantment€with€its€post„òòRoe€v.€WadeóóÏstandards€when€it€upheld€a€statutory€restriction€against€using€public€employees€orÏfacilities€to€perform€non„therapeutic€abortions.€€òòSee€Webster€v.€ReproductiveÏHealth€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.óó,€492€U.S.€at€509„11,€109€S.€Ct.€at€3052„53.€€€Four€members€of€theÏCourt,€including€Chief€Justice€Rehnquist€and€Justices€White,€Scalia,€and€Kennedy,Ïnoted€that€òòRoe€v.€Wadeððs€óóstrict€scrutiny€standard€based€on€the€trimesterÏframework€had€proved€to€be€unsound€in€principle€and€unworkable€in€practice.òò€ÏSee€Webster€v.€Reproductive€Health€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.óó,€492€U.S.€at€518,€109€S.€Ct.€3056;ÏòòWebster€v.€Reproductive€Health€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.óó,€492€U.S.€at€532,€109€S.€Ct.€at€3064Ï(Scalia,€J.,€concurring€in€part€and€concurring€in€the€judgment).€€Justice€OððConnorÏstated€that€she€was€not€prepared€to€address€the€continuing€viability€of€òòRoe€v.ÏWadeóó€in€this€case.€€òòSee€Webster€v.€Reproductive€Health€Ô_ÔServsÔ_Ô.óó,€492€U.S.€at€525„26,€109€S.€Ct.€at€3060„61€(OððConnor.€J.,€concurring€in€part€and€concurring€in€theÏjudgment).ÌÌà àThe€occasion€for€reconsidering€the€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€standards€presented€itselfÏin€1992€in€a€multifaceted€challenge€to€Pennsylvania€statutes€pertaining€to€medicalÍemergencies,€informed€consent,€waiting€periods,€parental€consent,€reporting€andÏrecord€keeping€requirements,€and€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€notification.€€The€Court€upheld€allÏchallenged€provisions€except€the€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€notification€requirement,€but€the€justicesÏprepared€five€opinions€reflecting€their€lack€of€consensus€concerning€theÏappropriate€standards.€€Four€justices,€including€three€of€the€justices€who€hadÏearlier€departed€from€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó€in€òòWebster€v.€Reproductive€Health€Servs.óó,Ïsustained€all€the€challenged€provisions€on€the€basis€that€they€were€rationallyÏrelated€to€a€legitimate€state€interest.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.Ïat€966,€979,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2867,€2873€(Rehnquist,€C.J.,€concurring€in€theÏjudgment€in€part€and€dissenting€in€part).€€ÌÌà àThe€pivotal€opinion€was€prepared€jointly€by€Justices€Oðð€Connor,€Kennedy,Ïand€Ô_ÔSouterÔ_Ô.× ƒ® ××  ×€€While€retaining€the€ð ðessential€holdingsðð€of€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó,× ƒ¯ ××  ×€theÏthree€justices€rejected€òòRoe€v.€Wadeððs€óórigid€trimester€framework,€òòsee€PlannedÏParenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€873,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2818,€and€also€rejected€theÏstrict€scrutiny€standard€because€it€did€not€give€proper€weight€to€the€StateððsÏinterest€in€maternal€health€and€in€potential€life.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.ÏCaseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€875„76,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2819„20.€€In€the€place€of€the€strictÏscrutiny€standard,€the€joint€opinion€employed€an€ð ðundue€burdenðð€standard€that€itÏexplained€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àOnly€where€state€regulation€imposes€an€undue€burden€onÏa€womanððs€ability€to€make€this€decision€does€the€powerÏof€the€State€reach€into€the€heart€of€the€liberty€protectedÏby€the€Due€Process€Clause.ÌÌÓ€ÓòòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€874,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2819.€€The€Ô_ÔjointÔ_ÔÏopinion€elaborated€on€the€meaning€of€an€undue€burden€by€pointing€out€that€ð ð[a]Ïfinding€of€an€undue€burden€is€a€shorthand€for€the€conclusion€that€a€stateÏregulation€has€the€purpose€or€effect€of€placing€a€substantial€obstacle€in€the€path€ofÏa€woman€seeking€an€abortion€of€a€Ô_ÔnonviableÔ_Ô€fetus.ðð€€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.ÏCaseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€877,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2820.€€ÌÌà àThe€joint€opinion€drew€a€clear€distinction€between€regulations€that€placedÏan€undue€burden€on€a€womanððs€ability€to€decide€whether€to€terminate€herÏpregnancy€and€those€that€had€the€incidental€effect€of€increasing€the€cost€orÏdecreasing€the€availability€of€abortions.€€The€justices€pointed€out€that€ð ðthe€factÏthat€a€law€which€serves€a€valid€purpose,€one€not€designed€to€strike€at€the€rightÏitself,€has€the€incidental€effect€of€making€it€more€difficult€or€more€expensive€toÏprocure€an€abortion€cannot€be€enough€to€invalidate€it.ððòò€€Planned€Parenthood€v.ÏCaseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€874,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2819.€€They€also€emphasized€thatÌÓÓà8 àà8 àWhat€is€at€stake€is€the€womanððs€right€to€make€theÏultimate€decision,€not€a€right€to€be€insulated€from€allÏothers€in€doing€so.€€Regulations€which€do€no€more€thanÏcreate€a€structural€mechanism€by€which€the€State,€or€theÏparent€or€guardian€of€a€minor,€may€express€profoundÏrespect€for€the€life€of€the€unborn€are€permitted,€if€theyÏare€not€a€substantial€obstacle€to€the€womanððs€exercise€ofÏthe€right€to€choose.€.€.€.€Unless€it€has€that€effect€on€herÏright€of€choice,€a€state€measure€designed€to€persuade€herÏto€choose€childbirth€over€abortion€will€be€upheld€ifÏreasonably€related€to€that€goal.€€Regulations€designed€toÏfoster€the€health€of€a€woman€seeking€an€abortion€areÏvalid€if€they€do€not€constitute€an€undue€burden.ÌÌÓ€ÓòòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€877„78,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2821.ÌÌà àAs€employed€in€the€joint€opinion,€the€undue€burden€standard€requires€theÏcourt€to€analyze€the€factual€record€to€determine€whether€the€challengedÏregulation,€in€a€large€fractionÔ_Ô× ƒ° ××  ×Ô_Ô€of€the€cases€in€which€it€is€relevant,€will€operateÏas€a€substantial€obstacle€to€a€womanððs€choice€to€undergo€an€abortion.€€òòSee€PlannedÏParenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€895,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2830;€òòsee€also€Womenððs€Med.ÏÔ_ÔProfððlÔ_Ô€Corp.€v.€Ô_ÔVoinovichÔ_Ôóó,€130€F.3d€187,€194€(6th€Cir.€1997);€òòPlannedÏParenthood€v.€Milleróó,€63€F.3d€1452,€1457€(8th€Cir.€1995);€òòSummit€Med.€Ô_ÔAssocsÔ_Ô.,ÏP.C.€v.€Jamesóó,€984€F.€Supp.€1404,€1449€(M.D.€Ala.€1998).€€Thus,€the€undueÏburden€standard€requires€a€fact„intensive€inquiry€based€on€the€record€developedÏin€the€trial€court.òò€€See€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€510€U.S.€1309,€1310,€114€S.ÏCt.€909,€910„11€(1994)€(Ô_ÔSouterÔ_Ô,€J.,€denying€application€for€stay);€òòFargo€WomenððsÏHealth€Org.€v.€Ô_ÔSchaferÔ_Ôóó,€507€U.S.€1013,€1014,€113€S.€Ct.€1668,€1669€(1993)Ï(OððConnor,€J.,€concurring€in€denial€of€stay).ÌÌà àAccordingly,€the€three€justices€employing€the€undue€burden€standard€andÏthe€four€justices€employing€the€rational€basis€standard€departed€from€òòAkron€v.ÏAkron€Ctr.€for€Reproductive€Health,€Inc.óó€and€upheld€Pennsylvaniaððs€24„hourÏwaiting€period.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€885„87,€112€S.€Ct.Ïat€2825„26.€€They€also€departed€from€òòAkron€v.€Akron€Ctr.€for€ReproductiveÏHealth,€Inc.óó€and€òòThornburgh€v.€American€College€of€Obstetricians€andÏGynecologistsóó€to€uphold€Pennsylvaniaððs€informed€consent€procedure€requiringÏphysicians€to€provide€their€patients€with€state„prescribed€Ô_ÔinformationÔ_Ô,€some€ofÍwhich€was€intended€to€influence€the€womanððs€choice€between€abortion€andÏchildbirth.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€881„85,€112€S.€Ct.€atÏ2822„25.€ÌÌà àThe€Court€also€upheld€Pennsylvaniaððs€one„parent€consent€requirement€forÏminors€seeking€abortions€because€it€had€an€adequate€judicial€bypass€procedure.€ÏòòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Casey,óó€505€U.S.€at€899„900,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2832.€€InÏaddition,€the€Court€upheld€Pennsylvaniaððs€medical€emergency€exception,€òòseeÏPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€879„80,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2822,€as€well€asÏthe€reporting€and€record€keeping€requirement.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,Ï505€U.S.€at€900„01,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2832„33.€€In€a€closely€divided€vote,€the€CourtÏfound€that€the€Ô_ÔspousalÔ_Ô€notification€requirement€unduly€burdened€married€womenÏseeking€abortions€who€do€not€wish€to€notify€their€husbands€and€who€do€notÏqualify€for€one€of€the€statutory€exemptions€to€the€notice€requirement.€€òòSeeÏPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€887„98,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2826„31.ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Courtððs€ð ðreproductive€rightsðð€decisions€are€notÏbinding€on€this€court€in€this€case€because€the€challenge€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„202€is€based€on€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee.€€They€can,€however,Ïprovide€helpful€guidance€for€our€decision.€€òòSee€Wright€v.€Cunninghamóó,€115ÏTenn.€445,€463„64,€91€Ô_ÔS.W.Ô_Ô€293,€297€(1905).€€In€the€absence€of€a€demonstrableÏbasis€for€holding€otherwise,€we€should€favor€a€construction€of€the€Constitution€ofÏTennessee€that€is€harmonious€with€analogous€provisions€in€the€United€StatesÏConstitution.€€òòSee€State€v.€Jonesóó,€598€S.W.2d€209,€219€(Tenn.€1980)€òòoverruled€onÏother€grounds€by€State€v.€Shropshireóó,€874€S.W.2d€634,€638€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1993);€òòMiller€v.€Stateóó,€584€S.W.2d€758,€763€(Tenn.€1979)€(Ô_ÔHarbisonÔ_Ô,€J.,Ïdissenting).ÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€have€failed€to€present€Ô_ÔcolorableÔ_ÔÏarguments€that€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyððsóó€undue€burden€standard€isÏinconsistent€with€the€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€privacy€recognized€in€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó.€ÏThey€have€not€pointed€to€textual€differences€or€historical€or€precedential€factorsÏthat€require€the€continued€use€of€òòRoe€v.€Wadeððsóó€strict€scrutiny€standard.€€We€haveÏconsidered€this€issue€in€light€of€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó€and€the€historical€backgroundÏsurrounding€the€drafting€and€adoption€of€Tennesseeððs€Bill€of€Rights,€and€we€findÏthat€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóóððs€undue€burden€standard€appropriately€balancesÏa€womanððs€right€to€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€with€the€Stateððs€significant€interest€inÏprotecting€maternal€health€and€potential€human€life.€€Accordingly,€we€will€use€theÏundue€burden€standard€to€determine€whether€the€provisions€challenged€in€thisÏcase€pass€muster€under€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee.ÌÌà àExcept€for€certain€circumstances€not€applicable€here,€the€personsÏchallenging€a€statute€have€the€burden€of€demonstrating€its€unconstitutionality.€€òòSeeÏHart€v.€City€of€Johnson€Cityóó,€801€S.W.2d€512,€516€(Tenn.€1990);€òòÔ_ÔFrittsÔ_Ô€v.ÏWallaceóó,€723€S.W.2d€948,€950€(Tenn.€1987).€€This€principle€applies€toÏconstitutional€challenges€to€abortion€statutes.€€òòSeeóó€Katherine€Ô_ÔKolbertÔ_Ô€&€David€H.ÏÔ_ÔGansÔ_Ô,€òòResponding€to€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Casey:€Establishing€NeutralityÏPrinciples€in€State€Constitutional€Lawóó,€66€Temple€L.€Rev.€1151,€1155€(1993).€ÏThus,€in€order€to€prevail,€those€challenging€the€statutory€regulations€of€aÏwomanððs€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€must€prove€either€that€the€GeneralÏAssemblyððs€purpose€in€enacting€the€regulation€was€to€interfere€substantially€withÏa€womanððs€choice€or€that€the€regulation€has€interposed€a€substantial€obstacle€in€theÏpath€of€a€woman€seeking€an€abortion€before€the€fetus€attains€viability.€€òòSeeÏPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€878,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2821.€ÌÌà@ àò òV.ó óÌÌà àWe€will€now€consider€the€constitutionality€of€the€separate€statutoryÏprovisions€at€issue€in€this€case.€€The€relative€sparsity€of€probative€evidenceÏconcerning€the€effect€of€these€provisions€has€not€escaped€our€notice.€€We€find€theÏlack€of€evidence€somewhat€discomfiting€in€light€of€both€the€profound€importanceÏof€the€issues€presented€and€the€United€States€Supreme€Courtððs€unmistakably€clearÏdirection€in€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó€that€the€undue€burden€standard€requiresÏa€thoughtful,€fact„intensive€analysis€of€the€effect€of€the€challenged€provisions€onÏwomenððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy.ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌÌà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„202€have€state„wide€application.€ÏAccording€to€the€most€current€data€in€the€record,× ƒ± ××  ×€abortions€are€currently€beingÏperformed€in€nine€of€Tennesseeððs€ninety„five€counties.€€Over€90%€of€theseÏabortions€are€performed€in€the€Stateððs€five€most€populous€areas.× ƒ² ××  ×€€Despite€thisÏgeographic€concentration,€virtually€all€of€the€evidence€presented€to€the€trial€courtÏrelates€to€abortions€performed€in€Nashville€and€the€operation€of€the€PlannedÏParenthood€clinic€in€Nashville.€€While€there€is€some€evidence€about€the€operationÏof€the€Planned€Parenthood€clinic€in€Memphis,€the€record€contains€little€evidenceÏconcerning€the€availability€of€abortions€in€Memphis€and€no€current€evidence€ofÏany€sort€concerning€the€circumstances€in€Chattanooga,€Knoxville,€or€the€Tri„Cities.ÌÌà àTo€the€extent€that€the€statewide€statistical€data€for€1990€remains€reliable,Ï90%€of€the€abortions€performed€in€Tennessee€are€performed€during€the€firstÏtwelve€weeks€of€pregnancy.€€Approximately€6%€are€performed€during€theÏthirteenth€and€fourteenth€weeks€of€pregnancy,€and€only€3.9%€of€the€abortions€areÏperformed€after€the€fourteenth€week€of€pregnancy.€€The€statewide€data€alsoÏindicates€that€87%€of€the€abortions€obtained€by€Tennessee€residents€areÏperformed€either€in€a€physicianððs€office€or€in€a€licensed€ambulatory€surgicalÏtreatment€center.× ƒ³ ××  ×€€Only€2.2%€of€all€abortions€are€performed€in€hospitals;Ïhowever,€over€81%€of€all€abortions€performed€during€or€after€the€seventeenth€ofÏpregnancy€are€performed€in€hospitals.ÌÌà àThe€data€also€reveals€that€a€majority€of€the€women€who€obtain€abortionsÏ(63.3%)€are€Ô_ÔCaucasianÔ_Ô.€€Approximately€80%€of€the€women€are€unmarried,€andÏapproximately€36%€have€had€a€previous€abortion.€€The€median€age€of€womenÏobtaining€an€abortion€is€twenty„three€years€old.€€Approximately€25%€of€theÏwomen€are€nineteen€years€old€or€younger,€while€33.9%€are€between€the€ages€ofÏtwenty€and€twenty„four.ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€first€assert€that€the€abortion€regulationsÏin€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€€39„15„201,€„202€violate€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€8€andÏTenn.€Const.€art.€XI,€ðð€8€because€they€subject€women€seeking€abortions€toÏburdens€and€obstacles€not€faced€by€women€seeking€other€types€of€medicalÏtreatment.€€Since€the€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€is€a€fundamental€right,€theyÏargue€that€the€challenged€regulations€must€be€strictly€scrutinized€and€that€theyÍshould€be€upheld€only€if€they€are€precisely€tailored€to€serve€a€compellingÏgovernmental€interest.€€The€State€responds€that€heightened€scrutiny€is€notÏrequired€and€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„202€will€withstand€an€equalÏprotection€challenge€if€there€is€any€reasonably€conceivable€set€of€facts€that€couldÏprovide€a€rational€basis€for€the€restriction.ÌÌà àThe€Equal€Protection€Clauses€of€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€require€thatÏall€persons€or€entities€be€treated€the€same€under€like€circumstances€andÏconditions.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔGenescoÔ_Ô,€Inc.€v.€Woodsóó,€578€S.W.2d€639,€641€(Tenn.€1979);ÏòòÔ_ÔMascariÔ_Ô€v.€International€Brotherhood€of€Teamstersóó,€187€Tenn.€345,€350,€215ÏS.W.2d€779,€781€(1948).€€They€do€not€require€persons€or€things€that€are,€in€fact,Ïdifferent€to€be€treated€the€same.€€òòSee€Riggs€v.€Ô_ÔBursonÔ_Ôóó,€941€S.W.2d€at€52.€€TheÏinitial€burden€of€determining€what€is€ð ðdifferentðð€and€what€is€ð ðthe€sameðð€withÏregard€to€statutory€classifications€resides€with€the€General€Assembly.€€òòSee€State€v.ÏSmoky€Mountain€Secrets,€Inc.óó,€937€S.W.2d€905,€912€(Tenn.€1996).€€AnyÏclassification€that€is€constitutionally€suspect€or€that€interferes€with€a€fundamentalÏconstitutional€right€will€be€subjected€to€strict€scrutiny,€òòsee€State€v.€Testeróó,€879ÏS.W.2d€823,€828€(Tenn.€1994);€òòHarrison€v.€Ô_ÔSchraderÔ_Ôóó,€569€S.W.2d€822,€825Ï(Tenn.€1978),€and€will€be€upheld€only€if€it€is€precisely€tailored€to€serve€aÏcompelling€governmental€interest.€€òòSee€Doe€v.€Norrisóó,€751€S.W.2d€834,€842Ï(Tenn.€1988).ÌÌà àPregnancy,€as€a€medical€condition,€provides€a€natural,€appropriate€basis€forÏclassifying€women€with€regard€to€the€provision€of€medical€services.€€PregnantÏwomen€are€distinctly€different€from€other€women€seeking€reproductive€or€anyÏother€type€of€healthcare.€€Their€pregnancy€places€additional€demands€on€theirÏbodies,€and€treatment€decisions€can€affect€not€only€their€life€and€health€but€alsoÏthe€life€and€health€of€the€fetus.€€Because€of€the€dual€effect€of€decisions€regardingÍthe€treatment€of€pregnant€women,€the€State€has€a€constitutionally€significantÏinterest€not€only€in€protecting€the€motherððs€life€and€health€but€also€in€the€fetusððsÏpotential€human€life.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€846,€112€S.ÏCt.€at€2804;€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€914„15,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2840Ï(Stevens,€J.,€concurring€in€part€and€dissenting€in€part);€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.ÏCaseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€929„30,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2847€(Blackmun,€J.,€concurring€in€part,Ïconcurring€in€the€judgment€in€part,€and€dissenting€in€part);€òòPlanned€ParenthoodÏv.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€945„46,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2856€(Rehnquist,€C.J.,€concurring€inÏthe€judgment€in€part€and€dissenting€in€part);€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€at€162,€93€S.ÏCt.€at€731;€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€601„02.ÌÌà àThus,€even€if€a€womanððs€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€is€fundamentalÏfor€the€purposes€of€an€equal€protection€analysis,€the€Stateððs€interest€in€maternalÏhealth€and€potential€life€justifies€appropriate€state€intervention.€€In€equalÏprotection€parlance,€this€intervention€must€be€precisely€tailored.€€In€the€context€ofÏstatutory€regulations€of€abortions,€the€courts€should€determine€whether€aÏparticular€regulation€is€precisely€tailored€using€the€undue€burden€standard€set€outÏin€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó.€€Thus,€a€statutory€regulation€of€abortion€willÏwithstand€equal€protection€analysis€if€it€does€not€impose€a€substantial€obstacle€inÏthe€path€of€a€woman€seeking€an€abortion€before€the€fetus€attains€viability.ÌÌà@ àò òC.ó óÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€assert€that€the€hospitalizationÏrequirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€burdens€a€womanððs€right€ofÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€without€serving€a€compelling€or€even€legitimate€stateÏinterest.€€They€insist€that€elective€abortions€can€be€performed€safely€outside€aÏhospital€through€the€eighteenth€week€of€pregnancy€and€that€the€cost€of€obtainingÍan€abortion€in€a€hospital€is€significantly€higher€that€the€cost€of€similar€proceduresÏin€an€outpatient€clinic€or€free„standing€facility.€€They€also€insist€that€theÏhospitalization€requirement€is€inconvenient€and€that€hospitals€pose€additionalÏhealth€risks€for€women€because€of€the€possibility€of€Ô_ÔnosocomialÔ_Ô€infection.ÌÌà àOur€determination€of€these€issues€rests€on€the€language€of€the€statute€asÏenacted€by€the€General€Assembly,€not€as€embellished€by€the€trial€court.€€Thus,€theÏregulation€we€are€construing€at€this€juncture€permits€abortions€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àAfter€three€(3)€months,€but€before€viability€of€theÏfetus,€if€the€abortion€.€.€.€is€performed€.€.€.€in€a€hospitalÏas€defined€in€ðð€68„11„201,€licensed€by€the€stateÏdepartment€of€health,€or€a€hospital€operated€by€the€StateÏof€Tennessee€or€a€branch€of€the€federal€government.ÌÌÌÓ€Óà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€argue€that€we€should€review€thisÏrequirement€using€the€same€strict€scrutiny€standard€used€by€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€to€overturn€€similar€requirements€in€the€past.Ô_Ô× ƒ´ ××  ×Ô_Ô€€They€insist€thatÏthe€undue€burden€standard€is€inapplicable€because€the€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€did€not€specifically€depart€from€its€earlier€decisions€concerningÏhospitalization€requirements€when€it€decided€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó.€€TheÏòòCaseyóó€Court€did€not€address€its€prior€decisions€concerning€hospitalizationÏrequirements€because€this€question€was€not€before€it.€€However,€the€authors€of€theÏjoint€opinion€in€òòCaseyóó€clearly€envisioned€that€the€undue€burden€standard€shouldÏbe€used€to€evaluate€the€constitutionality€of€any€state€regulation€affecting€aÏwomanððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy.€€We€have€already€determined€that€the€undueÏburden€standard€strikes€the€proper€balance€between€a€womanððs€right€ofÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€and€the€Stateððs€important€and€legitimate€interest€inÍprotecting€maternal€health€and€potential€human€life.€€Accordingly,€our€task€is€toÏreview€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€to€determine€whether€itsÏhospitalization€requirement€places€a€substantial€obstacle€in€the€path€of€womenÏseeking€an€abortion€before€fetal€viability.ÌÌà àThe€undue€burden€standard€requires€us€to€consider€both€the€purpose€andÏthe€effects€of€the€hospitalization€requirement.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,Ï505€U.S.€at€877,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2820.€€The€purpose€prong€of€the€standard€does€notÏrequire€us€to€consider€the€number€of€women€affected€by€the€provision.€€Instead,Ïit€requires€us€to€invalidate€the€requirement€if€the€persons€challenging€the€statuteÏprove€that€the€General€Assembly€intended€to€hinder€a€womanððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_ÔÏautonomy€when€it€enacted€the€requirement.€€If,€however,€the€requirement€servesÏa€valid€purpose€not€designed€to€strike€at€the€heart€of€the€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_ÔÏautonomy,€the€requirement€should€be€overturned€only€if€its€effect€is€to€place€aÏsubstantial€obstacle€in€the€path€of€a€significant€number€of€women€seeking€anÏabortion€before€fetal€viability.ÌÌà àThe€record€contains€no€direct€evidence€that€the€General€Assembly€enactedÏthe€hospitalization€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€toÏfrustrate€a€womanððs€exercise€of€her€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€choice.€€To€the€contrary,€theÏevidence€illustrates€the€General€Assemblyððs€genuine€desire€to€protect€the€health€ofÏwomen€who€seek€abortions.€€Since€protecting€maternal€health€is€a€legitimate€andÏimportant€state€interest,€òòseeóó€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€877„78,Ï112€S.€Ct.€at€2821,€we€find€that€the€evidence€does€not€support€a€finding€ofÏimproper€legislative€motivation.ÌÌà àIn€the€absence€of€direct€evidence€of€improper€legislative€motive,€theÏPlanned€Ô_ÔParenthoodÔ_Ô€plaintiffs€argue€that€an€improper€motive€may€be€deducedÍfrom€the€facts€that€few€Tennessee€hospitals€provide€elective€abortions€after€theÏfirst€fourteen€weeks€of€pregnancy€and€that€the€medical€community€believes€thatÏabortions€through€the€first€eighteen€weeks€of€pregnancy€can€be€performed€safelyÏoutside€of€hospitals.€€The€evidence€with€regard€to€the€availability€issue€is€meager.€ÏWhat€evidence€there€is€relates€only€to€the€practice€of€hospitals€in€Nashville.€ÏThere€is€no€evidence€concerning€hospital€policies€with€regard€to€post„fourteenÏweek€abortions€in€Memphis,€Chattanooga,€Knoxville,€the€Tri„Cities,€Ô_ÔCookevilleÔ_Ô,Ïor€Jackson.€€With€regard€to€Nashville,€the€evidence€shows€that€between€two€andÏfour€hospitals€permit€elective€post„fourteen€week€abortions.€€The€evidence€alsoÏshows€that€hospital€policies€regarding€post„fourteen€week€abortions€are€driven€byÏthe€risk€of€complications€of€these€procedures€and€the€shortage€of€trainedÏphysicians€willing€to€perform€them,€not€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„202.ÌÌà àIn€light€of€the€improvements€in€medical€equipment€and€procedures€duringÏthe€past€twenty„five€years,€the€medical€community€has€reached€a€consensus€thatÏabortions€can€be€performed€safely€in€physiciansðð€offices€and€outpatient€clinicsÏthrough€the€fourteenth€week€of€pregnancy.× ƒµ ××  ×€€Physicians€have€also€agreed€thatÏabortions€through€the€eighteenth€week€of€pregnancy€may€be€performed€safely€inÏa€free„standing€surgical€facility.Ô_Ô× ƒ¶ ××  ×Ô_Ô€€The€procedures€performed€in€these€facilitiesÏmay€be€under€general€or€regional€block€anesthetic,€but€the€recovery€period€mustÏbe€short€because€patients€must€be€able€to€be€discharged€on€the€same€day€theÏprocedure€is€performed.Ô_Ô× ƒ· ××  ×Ô_Ô€€These€facilities€must€maintain€the€same€surgical,Ïanesthetic,€and€personnel€standards€that€are€required€of€hospitals,€including:€(a)Ícontrol€of€the€sources€and€transmission€of€infection,€(b)€infection€surveillance,€(c)Ïfunctional€oxygen€and€suction,€(d)€resuscitation€and€Ô_ÔdefibrillationÔ_Ô€(e)€emergencyÏlighting,€(f)€sterilization,€and€(g)€emergency€intercommunication.× ƒ¸ ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€evidence€concerning€the€adequacy€of€the€facilities€in€Tennessee€whereÏoutpatient€abortions€are€performed€is€sketchy.€€Outside€of€the€evidence€withÏregard€to€the€Planned€Parenthood€clinics€in€Memphis€and€Nashville,€it€isÏnonexistent.€€The€Planned€Parenthood€clinics€in€Memphis€and€Nashville€areÏlicensed€as€ambulatory€surgical€treatment€centers€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€68„11„102(4)(A),€but€neither€facility€meets€the€Ô_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards€for€performingÏpost„fourteen€week€abortions.× ƒ¹ ××  ×ÌÌà àBecause€ambulatory€surgical€centers€are€of€relatively€recent€vintage,€theÏPlanned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€do€not€seriously€argue€that€the€General€AssemblyÏerred€in€1973€when€it€decided€that€post„fourteen€week€abortions€must€beÏperformed€in€hospitals.€€They€argue€instead€that€the€hospitalization€requirementÏhas€become€outdated.€€Since€it€is€no€longer€medically€necessary€to€performÏabortions€through€the€eighteenth€week€of€pregnancy€in€a€hospital,€they€ascribeÏimproper€motives€to€the€General€Assembly€for€failing€to€update€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€to€make€it€consistent€with€current€medical€thinking.ÌÌà àCourts€must€be€cautious€about€reading€too€much€into€legislative€inaction.€ÏòòSee€Johnson€v.€Ô_ÔTransportationÔ_Ô€Agencyóó,€480€U.S.€616,€671„72,€107€S.€Ct.€1442,Ï1472€(1987)€(Scalia,€J.,€dissenting);€òòEvans€v.€Steelmanóó,€No.€01A01„9511„JV„00508,€1996€WL€557844€at€*10€n.14€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Oct.€2,€1996)€(Koch,€J.,Ïdissenting),€òòaffððd€on€other€groundsóó,€___€S.W.2d€___€(Tenn.€1998).œ× ƒº ××  ×›€€The€recordÏcontains€no€indication€that€the€General€Assembly€has€declined€or€even€has€beenÏrequested€to€reconcile€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€with€the€currentÏÔ_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards.€€Accordingly,€we€decline€to€read€any€sort€of€improper€motiveÏinto€the€General€Assemblyððs€actions€or€inactions€regarding€the€hospitalizationÏrequirement.€€Under€the€facts€of€this€case,€the€arguments€concerning€updating€theÏhospitalization€requirement€do€not€raise€a€constitutional€issue€but€rather€a€policyÏissue€that€should€be€addressed€to€the€General€Assembly.€€Based€on€the€evidenceÏbefore€us,€we€decline€to€find€improper€legislative€motivation€for€theÏhospitalization€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2).ÌÌà àThe€lack€of€evidence€of€improper€legislative€purpose€does€not€end€theÏinquiry.€The€hospitalization€requirement€must€be€invalidated€if€it€has€the€effect€ofÏplacing€a€substantial€burden€in€the€path€of€a€woman€seeking€an€abortion€beforeÏfetal€viability.€€The€effect€prong€of€the€undue€burden€analysis€requires€us€to€focusÏon€only€those€women€for€whom€the€requirement€is€actually€a€restriction.€€òòSeeÏPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€894,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2829.€€The€group€ofÏwomen€in€Tennessee€affected€by€the€hospitalization€requirement€is€quite€limited.ÌÌà àSince€96%€of€all€abortions€performed€in€Tennessee€are€performed€beforeÏor€during€the€fourteenth€week€of€pregnancy,€the€hospitalization€requirementÏaffects€only€4%€of€the€abortions€performed€in€Tennessee.€€Of€these€abortions,€theÏrequirement€does€not€impose€an€undue€burden€on€women€(a)€who€are€more€thanÏeighteen€weeks€pregnant,€(b)€who€elect€to€obtain€their€abortions€outside€ofÏTennessee€for€reasons€of€confidentiality€or€other€similar€reasons,€and€(c)€whoseÍmedical€condition€otherwise€requires€hospitalization.€€While€the€evidence€on€theseÏmatters€is€sketchy,€it€appears€that,€at€most,€the€hospitalization€requirement€couldÏbecome€a€substantial€obstacle€for€approximately€2%€of€the€women€seekingÏabortions€in€Tennessee€„€that€is€those€women€who€are€between€fourteen€andÏeighteen€weeks€pregnant€who€seek€elective€abortions€and€who,€either€by€choice€orÏnecessity,€decide€to€obtain€their€abortion€in€Tennessee.ÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€assert€that€the€hospitalizationÏrequirement€substantially€burdens€these€womenððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€in€threeÏways:€€(1)€significantly€increased€cost,€(2)€additional€delay€and€inconvenience,Ïand€(3)€increased€risk€of€complications.€€The€fact€that€a€regulation€makes€it€moreÏdifficult€or€expensive€for€a€woman€to€obtain€an€abortion€is€not€enough€toÏinvalidate€the€regulation.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€874,€112ÏS.€Ct.€at€2819.€€Thus,€inconvenience,€even€significant€inconvenience,€is€not€aÏsubstantial€obstacle€under€the€undue€burden€analysis.€€In€order€to€constitute€anÏundue€burden,€the€Ô_ÔregulationÔ_Ô€must€be€likely€to€prevent€women€from€obtainingÏabortions.€€òòSee€Ô_ÔKarlinÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔFoustÔ_Ôóó,€975€F.€Supp.€1177,€1205€(W.D.€Wis.€1997).€ÏUnder€the€facts€before€us,€we€decline€to€find€that€the€hospitalization€requirementÏwill€likely€prevent€women€desiring€an€elective€abortion€from€obtaining€one.ÌÌà àThe€record€contains€clear€evidence€that€the€average€cost€of€abortionsÏperformed€in€hospitals€is€substantially€higher€than€the€cost€of€abortionsÏperformed€in€a€physicianððs€office€or€outpatient€clinic.Ô_Ô× ƒ» ××  ×Ô_Ô€€Increased€cost€alone,Íhowever,€is€not€an€undue€burden.€€Women€can€avoid€these€costs€by€obtainingÏtheir€elective€abortions€during€or€prior€to€their€fourteenth€week€of€pregnancy.€€IfÏthey€do€so,€they€avoid€the€hospitalization€requirement€completely€because€theyÏwill€be€able€to€obtain€the€procedure€at€a€physicianððs€office€or€clinic.ÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€also€argue€that€the€hospitalizationÏrequirement€imposes€an€undue€burden€because€it€increases€inconvenience€andÏcauses€delay.€€The€record€contains€little€probative€evidence€on€this€point.€€ThereÏis€some€evidence€that€women€in€Tennessee€are€presently€traveling€an€average€ofÏfifty€miles€to€obtain€an€elective€abortion,€and€there€is€no€evidence€that€they€willÏbe€required€to€travel€any€further€if€they€must€obtain€their€elective€abortion€in€aÏhospital.€€As€with€the€cost€issue,€women€can€avoid€this€additional€delay€andÏinconvenience€by€obtaining€their€abortion€during€or€before€their€fourteenth€weekÏof€pregnancy.ÌÌà àIn€their€final€assault€on€the€hospitalization€requirement,€the€PlannedÏParenthood€plaintiffs€argue€that€hospitals€may€be€less€appropriate€than€physicianððsÏoffices€or€outpatient€clinics€for€performing€abortions€because€(a)€hospital€staffsÏmight€be€less€supportive€of€women€seeking€elective€abortions,€(b)€hospitals€have€aÏhigher€risk€of€Ô_ÔnosocomialÔ_Ô€infection,€and€(c)€hospitals€present€a€greater€risk€forÏbreaches€of€confidentiality.€€Again,€the€record€contains€little,€if€any,€evidence€toÏsupport€these€assertions€other€than€the€fears€of€the€persons€challenging€theÏhospitalization€requirement.€€The€record€before€us€does€not€contain€sufficientÏevidence€for€us€to€conclude€that€hospital€personnel€will€provide€substandard€careÏto€women€seeking€elective€abortions€or€that€they€will€violate€the€strictÏconfidentiality€standards€imposed€on€hospitals€by€state€and€federal€law.€€Likewise,Ïthere€is€no€objective€evidence€supporting€the€claim€that€women€run€a€greater€riskÏof€Ô_ÔnosocomialÔ_Ô€infection€if€they€obtain€an€abortion€in€a€hospital€as€opposed€to€aÍphysicianððs€office€or€outpatient€clinic.€€In€light€of€the€present€record,€we€find€thatÏthe€infection€control€standards€imposed€on€hospitals€by€governmental€regulationsÏand€accrediting€agencies€are€sufficient€to€protect€the€health€of€women€who€areÏhospitalized€when€they€obtain€their€abortions.ÌÌà àThe€American€Medical€Association€has€concluded€that€abortions€are€safestÏwhen€they€are€performed€early€in€a€pregnancy€by€a€well„trained€physicianÏworking€in€a€facility€equipped€to€manage€any€complications€that€might€arise.× ƒ¼ ××  ×€ÏBecause€of€the€absence€of€evidence€that€the€hospitalization€requirement€in€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€has€the€purpose€or€effect€of€placing€a€substantialÏobstacle€in€the€path€of€women€seeking€an€elective€abortion,€we€conclude€that€theÏhospitalization€requirement€does€not€place€an€undue€burden€on€womenððsÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy.ÌÌà@ àò òD.ó óÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€have€also€mounted€a€multifaceted€attackÏon€the€informed€consent€requirements€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b),€(c).€ÏFirst,€they€take€issue€with€the€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)Ïthat€a€woman€be€ð ðorally€informed€[of€the€required€information]€by€her€attendingÏphysician.ðð€€Second,€they€assert€that€the€information€required€to€be€provided€byÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(3),€„202(b)(5),€and€„202(b)(6)€and€„202(c)€isÏbiased,€inaccurate,€and€misleading× ƒ½ ××  ×€and€that€requiring€that€this€information€beÍprovided€unduly€burdens€womenððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy.€€As€with€ourÏconsideration€of€the€hospitalization€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2),€we€will€construe€the€challenged€provisions€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b),€„202(c)€as€they€were€enacted€by€the€General€Assembly€and€as€weÏconstrued€them€in€Section€III(C)€of€this€opinion.ÌÌœÌÌÌÌ›à@ àò ò1.ó óÌà@ àò òòòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201óó(b)ó óÌÌà àWe€turn€first€to€the€requirement€that€physicians€must€personally€provideÏtheir€patients€with€the€information€required€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b),Ï„202(c).€€Despite€the€United€States€Supreme€Courtððs€approval€of€this€procedure,Ïòòsee€Ô_ÔMazurekÔ_Ô€v.€Armstrongóó,€œ520›€U.S.€œ968,›€___,€117€S.€Ct.€1865,€1866€(1997);ÏòòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€883„885,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2824„25,€theÏPlanned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€assert€that€it€places€an€undue€burden€onÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€and€that€it€infringes€on€a€Ô_ÔphysicianÔ_Ôððs€freedoms€ofÏconscience€and€speech€protected€by€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€ðð€3€and€19.€€We€willÏconsider€the€physicianððs€rights€first.ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€recognized€that€similar€requirementsÏimplicate€a€physicianððs€First€Amendment€rights€but€has€found€that€they€are€alsoÏpart€of€a€Stateððs€legitimate€prerogative€to€regulate€the€practice€of€medicine.€€òòSeeÏPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€884,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2824.€€ThisÏreasoning€is€equally€applicable€to€a€physicianððs€free€speech€rights€protected€byÍTenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€19.€€In€some€circumstances€the€protection€afforded€byÏTenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€19€may€be€broader€than€those€of€the€First€Amendment,€òòseeÏLeech€v.€American€Booksellers€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô,€Inc.óó,€582€S.W.2d€738,€745€(Tenn.€1979)Ï(holding€that€the€scope€of€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€19's€protection€of€speech€is€atÏleast€as€broad€as€that€afforded€by€the€First€Amendment).€€However,€the€partiesÏchallenging€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€have€failed€to€point€out€anyÏdifference€in€the€wording€of€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€19€or€in€its€history€ofÏconstruction€that€might€support€a€broader€construction€in€cases€of€this€sort€thanÏthe€United€States€Supreme€Court€gave€the€First€Amendment€in€òòPlannedÏParenthood€v.€Caseyóó.€€ÌÌà àThe€connection€between€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b),€(c)€and€aÏphysicianððs€freedom€of€conscience€protected€by€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€3€is€tenuousÏat€best.€€The€Constitution€of€Tennessee€insulates€from€governmental€control€anÏindividualððs€freedom€to€believe€whatever€he€or€she€wishes,€but€it€does€notÏsimilarly€insulate€actions€or€conduct€based€on€those€beliefs.€€òòSee€State€ex€rel.ÏÔ_ÔSwannÔ_Ô€v.€Packóó,€527€S.W.2d€99,€111€(Tenn.€1975);€òòHarden€v.€Stateóó,€188€Tenn.€17,Ï25,€216€S.W.2d€708,€711€(1948);€òòWolf€v.€Ô_ÔSundquistÔ_Ôóó,€955€S.W.2d€626,€630„31Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€While€states€should€tread€lightly€when€imposing€practiceÏstandards€on€licensed€professionals,€they€have€the€unquestioned€authority€underÏtheir€police€power€to€regulate€the€conduct€of€licensees.€€Requiring€physicians€toÏconform€their€conduct€to€prescribed€standards€does€not€thereby€requireÏphysicians€to€alter€their€beliefs€about€the€propriety€or€efficacy€of€abortions,€norÏdoes€it€require€them€to€subscribe€to€ideas€inconsistent€with€their€own€beliefs€orÏstandards.€€Accordingly,€a€requirement€such€as€the€one€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€will€not€violate€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€3,€as€long€as€it€involves€truthful,Ïnon„misleading€information€that€is€not€likely€to€prevent€women€from€obtain€anÏabortion.€€ÌÌà àAll€parties€agreed€that€women€seeking€an€abortion€should€receive€properÏcounseling€before€the€procedure.€€They€also€agreed€that€this€counseling€shouldÏinclude€appropriate€information€concerning€the€procedure€itself€and€the€possibleÏrisks€and€complications,€as€well€as€information€necessary€to€enable€the€woman€toÏunderstand€the€consequences€of€the€procedure€on€herself€and€the€fetus.€€TheÏparties€differed€sharply€over€who€should€provide€this€information€to€the€woman.ÌÌà àThe€opponents€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€insist€that€the€requiredÏcounseling€may€be€provided€by€persons€other€than€the€physician€who€willÏperform€the€procedure.€€In€fact,€they€assert€that€trained€counselors€may€provideÏmore€effective€counseling€than€physicians€because€physicians€do€not€receiveÏtraining€as€counselors€€and€may€not€be€as€empathetic€listeners€as€counselors.€ÏThey€also€point€to€the€policy€statements€of€both€the€American€College€ofÏObstetrics€and€Gynecology€and€the€American€Public€Health€Association€thatÏwomen€may€receive€pre„abortion€counseling€from€ð ðtrained,€sympatheticÏindividuals€working€under€appropriate€supervisionðð× ƒ¾ ××  ×€and€that€physiciansÏperforming€abortions€ð ðshould€verify€that€the€counseling€has€taken€placeðð€if€theyÏdo€not€perform€the€counseling€themselves.Ô_Ô× ƒ¿ ××  ×Ô_Ô€€ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€the€physicians€supporting€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€insist€that€the€physicians€performing€the€procedure€should€personallyÏprovide€their€patients€with€the€counseling€and€informed€consent€information.€ÏThey€assert€that€persons€who€are€not€medically€trained€should€not€be€permitted€toÏcounsel€with€patients€and€that€the€physician€who€will€actually€perform€theÍprocedure€is€best€suited€to€explain€the€benefits€and€risks€of€the€procedure€and€theÏalternative€treatments.€€In€support€of€their€position,€these€physicians€cite€the€CodeÏof€Ethics€of€the€American€Medical€Association,€which€states€that€one€of€theÏfundamental€elements€of€the€relationship€between€a€patient€and€a€physician€is€thatÏð ð[Ô_Ôp]atientsÔ_Ô€should€receive€guidance€from€the€physicians€as€to€the€optimal€course€ofÏaction.ððÔ_Ô× ƒÀ ××  ×Ô_ÔÌÌà àThe€opposing€views€of€physicians€who€testified€in€this€case€mirror€theÏobservation€of€Dr.€Terrence€Ackerman,€the€Chairman€of€the€Department€ofÏHuman€Values€and€Ethics€of€the€University€of€Tennessee€College€of€Medicine.€ÏCiting€the€Ô_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards,× ƒÁ ××  ×€Dr.€Ackerman€stated€that€physicians€have€anÏethical€obligation€to€obtain€informed€consent€prior€to€surgery.€€He€pointed€outÏthat€the€medical€profession,€as€a€general€matter,€assigns€the€role€of€obtainingÏproper€informed€consent€to€physicians€and€that€physicians€have€a€duty€toÏdetermine€whether€they€and€their€patients€are€in€agreement€with€the€proposedÏprocedure.€€While€Dr.€Ackerman€stated€that€the€physician€is€the€person€whoÏshould€obtain€the€informed€consent,€he€did€not€rule€out€the€possibility€thatÏcircumstances€could€arise€in€which€the€physician€could€appropriately€delegate€thisÍresponsibility.€€He€added,€however,€that€delegation€is€not€the€accepted€norm€andÏthat€it€should€be€permitted€only€when€the€treating€physician€receives€anÏappropriate€and€relatively€full€report€in€order€to€assure€himself€or€herself€thatÏthe€patient€has€been€given€the€opportunity€to€make€an€autonomous€decision.ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€upheld€Pennsylvaniaððs€requirementÏthat€physicians,€not€their€assistants,€must€provide€their€patients€with€the€requiredÏinformation.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€884„85,€112€S.€Ct.€atÏ2824„25.€€With€the€medical€opinions€concerning€the€delegation€of€thisÏresponsibility€so€evenly€divided,€we€are€not€prepared€to€hold€that€the€GeneralÏAssembly€established€this€requirement€to€interfere€with€a€womanððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_ÔÏautonomy.ÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€also€argue€that€the€physician€counselingÏrequirement€will€have€the€effect€of€unduly€burdening€a€womanððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_ÔÏchoice€because€it€will€force€physicians€to€spend€more€time€with€each€patientÏthereby€reducing€the€time€available€to€them€to€perform€abortions.€€They€view€thisÏas€a€substantial€obstacle€because€of€the€limited€number€of€physicians€who€areÏwilling€to€perform€abortions.€€However,€the€evidence€does€not€provide€a€directÏcausal€link€between€the€Planned€Parenthood€clinicsðð€recruiting€difficulties€andÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„202.€€To€the€contrary,€the€evidence€indicatesÏthat€the€shortage€of€physicians€willing€to€perform€abortions€is€caused€by€(a)€theÏdecrease€in€the€number€of€medical€schools€providing€training€in€the€procedure,Ï(b)€physiciansðð€personal€decisions€not€to€perform€abortions,€(c)€physiciansððÏreluctance€to€take€time€away€from€their€regular€practice,€and€(d)€physiciansððÏconcern€about€their€relationship€with€both€their€regular€patients€and€their€peers.ÌÌà àEnforcing€the€physician€counseling€requirement€will€require€physiciansÏproviding€abortions€in€a€Planned€Parenthood€clinic€to€spend€more€time€with€theirÏpatients.€€Clinic€representatives€testified€that€physicians€at€their€facilities€spend,Ïon€average,€only€ten€minutes€with€each€patient,€including€the€two€to€five€minutesÏrequired€to€perform€the€procedure€itself.€€By€contrast,€other€physicians€testifiedÏthat€they€spend€from€fifteen€to€thirty€minutes€counseling€their€patients€beforeÏperforming€the€procedure.€€In€recognition€of€the€importance€of€proper€pre„abortion€counseling€and€the€profound€significance€of€the€womanððs€decision,€weÏdecline€to€find,€on€these€facts,€that€the€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€that€physicians€personally€provide€the€counseling€to€their€patients€places€aÏsubstantial€obstacle€in€the€path€of€a€woman€seeking€an€elective€abortion.ÌÌÌà@ àò ò2.Ìà@ àòòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202óó(b)€&€(c)ó óÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€also€take€issue€with€the€substance€ofÏseveral€of€the€statutory€informed€consent€requirements.€€They€argue€thatÏmandatory€informed€consent€unduly€burdens€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€choice€because€(a)€it€isÏbiased€in€favor€of€€continuing€pregnancies€to€term,€(b)€it€creates€unnecessaryÏstress€because€most€women€have€already€decided€to€have€an€abortion€by€the€timeÏthey€contact€Planned€Parenthood,€and€(c)€providing€this€information€in€casesÏwhere€the€abortion€is€therapeutic€rather€than€elective€is€inappropriate€and€cruel.€€ÌÌà àWe€need€not€tarry€long€with€the€bias€claim.€€The€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€has€already€rejected€this€argument€when€it€held€that€States€couldÏconstitutionally€adopt€measures€designed€to€persuade€women€to€choose€childbirthÏover€abortion.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at,€877„78€112€S.€Ct.Íat€2821.€€Decisions€concerning€whether€to€have€an€abortion€have€profound€andÏlasting€meaning.€€Accordingly,€the€State€may€take€steps€to€ensure€that€a€womanððsÏdecision€is€thoughtful€and€informed€and€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àmay€erect€rules€and€regulations€designed€to€encourageÏher€to€know€that€there€are€philosophic€and€socialÏarguments€of€great€weight€that€can€be€brought€to€bear€inÏfavor€of€continuing€her€pregnancy€to€full€term€and€thatÏthere€are€procedures€and€institutions€to€allow€adoptionÏof€unwanted€children€as€well€as€a€certain€degree€of€stateÏassistance€if€the€mother€chooses€to€raise€the€childÏherself.ÌÌÓ€ÓòòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€872,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2818.€ÌÌà àThe€claim€that€state„mandated€counseling€increases€stress€for€women€whoÏhave€already€decided€to€have€an€abortion€is€equally€without€merit€because€theÏState€has€a€significant€interest€in€making€sure€that€a€womanððs€decision€to€have€anÏabortion€is€autonomous,€informed,€and€well„considered.€€The€Planned€ParenthoodÏplaintiffs€assert€that€virtually€all€women€have€already€decided€to€obtain€anÏabortion€before€they€contact€one€of€their€clinics.€€However,€they€also€concede€thatÏonly€43%€of€their€patients€are€referred€to€them€by€a€private€physician.€€Thus,€it€isÏreasonable€to€conclude€that€approximately€one„half€of€Planned€ParenthoodððsÏpatients€have€made€their€decision€to€have€an€abortion€without€appropriate€medicalÏcounseling€or€advice.ÌÌà àThe€State€has€a€legitimate€interest€in€establishing€a€framework€to€ensureÏthat€a€womanððs€consideration€of€her€options€is€commensurate€with€the€importanceÏof€her€decision.€€Thus,€as€Dr.€Ackerman€stated,€the€fact€that€a€woman€might€haveÏmade€up€her€mind€to€have€an€abortion€is€irrelevant€insofar€as€proper€counselingÏand€informed€consent€are€concerned.€€The€State€may€take€steps€to€see€to€it€that€aÏwoman€makes€an€informed,€autonomous€choice€and€that€she€understands€not€onlyÍthe€nature€and€the€risks€of€the€procedure€but€also€the€other€alternatives€availableÏto€her.ÌÌà àThe€final€challenge€to€the€mandatory€counseling€is€that€it€is€cruel€andÏunnecessary€to€provide€this€information€to€women€who€must€undergo€therapeuticÏabortions€to€protect€their€health€or€life.€€Requiring€women€facing€a€medicallyÏnecessary€abortion€to€participate€in€the€mandatory€counseling€required€by€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€&€(c)€is€undoubtedly€inappropriate.€€However,€thisÏargument€overlooks€the€mandatory€constitutional€requirement€that€regulationsÏsuch€as€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€&€(c)€must€be€subject€to€an€emergencyÏmedical€exception€that€will€enable€physicians€to€bypass€any€or€all€of€theseÏcounseling€requirements€when€medically€necessary.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.ÏCaseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€880,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2822.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)Ïcurrently€contains€such€an€emergency€medical€exception,€even€though€it€isÏconstitutionally€deficient€in€its€current€form€because€it€fails€to€includeÏcircumstances€and€conditions€that€seriously€endanger€a€womanððs€health.€ÏHowever,€once€brought€into€compliance€with€constitutional€standards,€thisÏprovision€will€obviate€the€mandatory€counseling€requirement€when€womenÏrequire€a€therapeutic€abortion.ÌÌà@ àò ò3.ó óÌà@ àò òòòTenn.€Code€Ann.óó€ðð€39„15„202(b)(3)ó óÌÌà àIn€their€first€of€three€challenges€to€specific€statutorily€requiredÏinformation,€the€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€take€issue€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„15„202(b)(3)€that€requires€physicians€to€inform€their€patientsÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àThat€if€more€than€twenty„four€(24)€weeks€haveÏelapsed€from€the€time€of€conception,€her€child€may€beÏviable,€that€is,€capable€of€surviving€outside€the€womb,Íand€that€if€such€child€is€prematurely€born€alive€in€theÏcourse€of€the€abortion,€her€attending€physician€has€aÏlegal€obligation€to€take€steps€to€preserve€the€life€andÏhealth€of€the€child.ÌÌÓ€ÓWhile€they€do€not€take€issue€with€the€truthfulness€of€this€information,€they€assertÏthat€it€is€irrelevant€to€the€vast€majority€of€women€seeking€an€abortion€becauseÏthese€women€obtain€their€abortions€long€before€the€twenty„fourth€week€ofÏpregnancy.€€On€the€assumption€that€providing€truthful€yet€irrelevant€informationÏcan€unduly€burden€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy,× ƒ ××  ×€we€find€that€the€informationÏmandated€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(3)€is€relevant€to€all€womenÏconsidering€whether€to€have€an€elective€abortion.ÌÌà àNinety€percent€of€the€abortions€performed€in€Tennessee€are€performedÏduring€the€first€twelve€weeks€of€pregnancy.€€However,€the€Planned€ParenthoodÏplaintiffs€presented€evidence€that€younger€women€tend€to€put€off€making€theirÏdecision€and€thus€generally€obtain€abortions€later€in€their€pregnancy.€€EvenÏthough€the€physicians€differed€about€the€relevance€of€this€information,€they€didÏnot€disagree€that€abortions€become€more€risky€as€a€pregnancy€advances€and€thatÏelective€abortions€cannot€be€performed€once€a€fetus€becomes€viable.ÌÌà àAs€we€interpret€the€information€required€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(3),€it€is€intended€to€impress€on€a€woman€the€consequences€of€waiting€tooÏlong€before€deciding€to€obtain€an€abortion.€€The€information€is€quite€relevant€toÏall€women€seeking€elective€abortions€because€it€assists€them€in€making€informed,Ïautonomous€decisions.€€Accordingly,€like€the€trial€court,€we€find€that€providingÍwomen€with€the€information€required€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(3)Ïdoes€not€unduly€burden€their€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€choice.ÌÌà@ àò ò4.ó óÌà@ àò òòòTenn.€Code€Ann.€óóðð€39„15„202(b)(5)ó óÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€also€take€issue€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„15„202(b)(5)€that€requires€physicians€to€inform€their€patientsÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àThat€numerous€public€and€private€agencies€andÏservices€are€available€to€assist€her€during€her€pregnancyÏand€after€the€birth€of€her€child,€if€she€chooses€not€toÏhave€an€abortion,€whether€she€wishes€to€keep€the€childÏor€place€him€[or€her]€for€adoption,€and€that€herÏphysician€will€provide€her€with€a€list€of€such€agenciesÏand€services€available€if€she€so€requests.ÌÌÓ€ÓEarlier€in€Section€III(C)(2)€of€this€opinion,€we€held€that€this€statute€does€notÏrequire€physicians€to€know€about€every€public€and€private€organization€that€couldÏpossibly€help€a€pregnant€woman€with€either€medical€care€or€adoption€services.€ÏRather,€we€construed€the€statute€to€require€physicians€to€provide€their€patientsÏwith€information€reasonably€known€to€them.Ìà€ àÌà àEven€though€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€explicitly€approvedÏproviding€women€with€this€sort€of€information,€òòseeóó€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,Ï505€U.S.€at€872,€S.€Ct.€at€2818,€the€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€insist€that€it€isÏinaccurate€and€misleading€because€the€public€and€private€agencies€in€TennesseeÏthat€provide€medical€services,€financial€support,€and€adoption€services€are€neitherÏnumerous€nor€reasonably€available€to€most€women.€€They€also€insist€thatÏproviding€this€information€to€women€requiring€therapeutic€abortions€would€beÏcruel€and€Ô_ÔtraumatizingÔ_Ô,€especially€if€the€fetus€has€profound€abnormalities€or€if€theÏpregnancy€was€the€result€of€rape€or€incest.ÌÌà àIn€order€to€determine€whether€providing€women€with€the€informationÏrequired€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€burdens€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€choice,Ïwe€must€first€identify€the€class€of€women€to€which€this€provision€is€relevant.€€It€isÏnot€relevant€to€women€who€have€the€financial€means€to€obtain€adequate€medicalÏcare€for€themselves€and€their€child.€€It€is€likewise€not€relevant€to€women€whoÏqualify€under€the€emergency€medical€exception€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h).€€Thus,€this€provision€is€most€relevant€to€low€income€women€seekingÏelective€abortions.€€We€must€decide€whether€this€information€is€inaccurate€andÏwhether€it€will€most€likely€have€the€effect€of€preventing€these€women€fromÏobtaining€elective€abortions.ÌÌà àThe€parties€challenging€the€accuracy€of€the€information€required€by€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€point€to€the€October€1992€final€report€of€theÏCommittee€to€Study€Aid€To€Families€With€Dependent€Children€as€proof€thatÏTennessee€does€not€have€numerous€public€and€private€agencies€that€provideÏmedical€and€adoption€services€to€financially€disadvantaged€pregnant€women€andÏnew€mothers.€€This€report€demonstrates€in€convincing€terms€that€TennesseeððsÏpoorest€families€must€Ô_ÔstruggleÔ_Ô€for€many€of€lifeððs€basic€necessities€and€that€theÏStateððs€AFDC€program€falls€short€of€meeting€these€basic€needs.€€It€does€not,Ïhowever,€support€the€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffsðð€arguments€in€this€case€forÏtwo€reasons.€€First,€the€fact€that€gaps€in€AFDC€coverage€exist€does€not€necessarilyÏmean€that€there€are€not€many€public€and€private€agencies€in€Tennessee€providingÏmedical€and€adoption€services€to€women€seeking€them.€€Second,€the€report€doesÏnot€reflect€the€improvements€in€the€availability€of€medical€care€brought€about€byÏthe€Ô_ÔTennCareÔ_Ô€program.ÌÌà àThe€opponents€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€point€to€the€findingÏin€the€AFDC€report€that€thirty„five€of€Tennesseeððs€ninety„five€counties€have€noÏobstetrician€willing€to€accept€Medicaid.× ƒà ××  ×€€While€this€may€very€well€be€true,€theÏDirector€of€Womenððs€Health€of€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Health€testified€thatÏall€county€health€departments€provide€basic€prenatal€services€with€no€eligibilityÏrequirements.€€She€also€stated€that€comprehensive€prenatal€care€is€available€inÏtwenty„five€counties€and€that€the€Department€has€contracted€with€privateÏphysicians€for€similar€services€in€other€areas.€€Women€residing€in€counties€whereÏno€prenatal€care€is€available€may€obtain€the€care€in€other€counties,€and€accordingÏto€the€Director,€it€is€quite€common€for€women€to€gravitate€toward€service€areasÏwhere€specialty€care€is€available.ÌÌà àThe€implementation€of€the€Ô_ÔTennCareÔ_Ô€program€has€also€improved€theÏavailability€of€prenatal€care€and€medical€care€for€young€children.€€As€a€result€ofÏÔ_ÔTennCareÔ_Ô,€tens€of€thousands€of€children€who€did€not€have€healthcare€coverage€inÏthe€past€are€now€insured.× ƒÄ ××  ×€€In€addition,ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à242,264€girls€and€women€ages€14€to€44€„€roughlyÏchildbearing€age€„€are€now€covered€and€have€greaterÏaccess€to€prenatal€care.Ìà8 àà8 àà àMany€of€those€now€covered€by€Ô_ÔTennCareÔ_Ô,€butÏwho€were€not€covered€by€Medicaid,€are€lower„incomeÏworking€people€who€previously€had€to€self„ration€healthÏcare€because€of€their€limited€financial€resources.€€ThisÏcould€have€lead€[sic]€to€a€pregnant€woman€having€littleÏprenatal€care€or€preventative€medical€care€for€theÏfamily.ÌÌÓ€ÓòòKids€Countóó,€at€10.€€As€a€result,€Tennesseeððs€prenatal€care€indicator€has€improvedÏfrom€1990€when€32.3%€of€all€births€lacked€adequate€Ô_ÔprenatalÔ_Ô€care€to€1995€whenÏ27.3%€of€births€lacked€adequate€prenatal€care.€€òòSeeóó€òòKids€Countóó,€at€11.€€ThisÏimprovement€should€continue€as€a€result€of€another€Ô_ÔTennCareÔ_Ô€initiative€beginningÏin€April€1997€enabling€uninsured€children€under€18€years€of€age€to€apply€forÏÔ_ÔTennCareÔ_Ô€coverage.€€òòSeeóó€òòKids€Countóó,€at€11.ÌÌà àIn€addition€to€the€public€services€available€to€pregnant€women,€the€recordÏcontains€evidence€of€a€number€of€private€and€not„for„profit€service€providers.€ÏThe€physicians€testifying€concerning€the€availability€of€services€in€NashvilleÏidentified€four€agencies€providing€these€services.€One€physician€observed€that€twoÏof€these€agencies€have€never€failed€to€provide€assistance€to€patients€he€hasÏreferred€to€them.€€Planned€Parenthood€of€Nashvilleððs€own€clinical€policies€andÏprocedures€manual€contains€numerous€references€to€both€public€and€privateÏproviders€who€offer€basic€medical€care,€obstetric€and€gynecologic€care,€andÏadoption€services.ÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€personnel€who€testified€at€trial€stated€that€theyÏcollect€this€referral€information€because€they€believe€that€part€of€the€informedÏconsent€process€is€making€sure€that€a€woman€is€informed€of€her€alternatives€andÏbecause€they€desire€to€provide€comprehensive€services€to€their€patients.€€Thus,Ïfor€women€who€decide€to€continue€their€pregnancy€to€term,€the€PlannedÏParenthood€of€Nashville€manual€stresses€that€women€who€are€concerned€aboutÏmonetary€needs€should€be€provided€ð ðreferrals€for€subsidized€food€programs,Ïprenatal€care,€or€even€housing€and€Medicaid€referrals.ðð€€For€a€womanÏconsidering€adoption,€the€manual€directs€that€she€be€given€ð ðcounseling€andÏadoption€referrals.ðð€€The€manual€also€recommends€that€a€woman€consideringÏadoption€should€be€informed€that€ð ðsome€couples€might€reimburse€her€for€theÍmedical€and€food€billsðð€and€that€she€should€be€provided€assistance€in€seekingÏð ðsupport€systems€such€as€parents,€relatives,€and€her€church.ðð€€ÌÌà àThose€testifying€both€in€favor€of€and€in€opposition€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„15„202(b)(5)€agreed€that€pregnant€women€considering€elective€abortionsÏshould€be€counseled€concerning€their€alternatives.€€This€particular€section€reflectsÏthis€consensus.€€It€does€not€require€physicians€to€provide€their€patients€with€everyÏpossible€public€or€private€agency€that€might€help€them.€€Of€equal€importance,€itÏdoes€not€require€physicians€to€inform€their€patients€that€deciding€to€continue€theirÏpregnancy€to€term€will€be€easy€or€without€risk.€€Nor€does€it€require€physicians€toÏleave€their€patients€with€the€erroneous€impression€that€the€care€and€services€thatÏthey€and€their€babies€will€require€are€convenient€or€readily€available€simply€forÏthe€asking.€€All€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(5)€requires€physicians€to€doÏis€to€provide€their€patients,€if€requested,€with€truthful,€accurate€informationÏconcerning€public€and€private€agencies€that€might€be€able€to€provide€them€withÏassistance€should€they€decided€to€carry€their€pregnancy€to€term.€€While€severalÏphysicians€viewed€this€requirement€as€inconvenient,€it€does€not€place€an€undueÏburden€on€a€womanððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€choice.ÌÌà@ àò ò5.Ìà@ àòòTenn.€Code€Ann.€óóðð€39„15„202(b)(6)€&€„202(c)ó óà àÌÌà àThe€final€challenged€informed€consent€provisions€require€that€womenÏconsidering€an€abortion€should€be€told€that€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àNumerous€benefits€and€risks€are€attendant€eitherÏto€continued€pregnancy€and€childbirth€or€to€abortionÏdepending€upon€the€circumstances€in€which€the€patientÏmight€find€herself.€€The€physician€shall€explain€theseÏbenefits€and€risks€to€the€best€of€his€[or€her]€ability€andÏknowledge€of€the€circumstances€involved.ÌÌÓ€ÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(6)€and€thatÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àAt€the€same€time€the€attending€physician€providesÏthe€information€required€by€subsection€(b),€he€[or€she]Ïshall€inform€the€pregnant€woman€of€the€particular€risksÏassociated€with€her€pregnancy€and€childbirth€and€theÏabortion€or€child€delivery€technique€to€be€employed,Ïincluding€providing€her€with€at€least€a€generalÏdescription€of€the€medical€instructions€to€be€followedÏsubsequent€to€the€abortion€or€childbirth€in€order€toÏensure€her€safe€recovery.ÌÌÓ€ÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(c).€€The€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€take€issueÏwith€these€provisions€because€(a)€it€is€not€clear€what€additional€information€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(c)€requires€that€is€not€already€required€by€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(6),€(b)€physicians€are€not€able€to€predict€at€the€early€stagesÏof€a€pregnancy€which€childbirth€technique€might€eventually€be€employed,€(c)€theÏinformation€concerning€delivery€techniques€and€postpartum€care€is€irrelevant€toÏwomen€seeking€an€abortion,€and€(d)€it€is€impossible€to€know€in€advance€whatÏspecific€benefits€a€woman€will€derive€from€carrying€her€pregnancy€to€term.ÌÌà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(6)€&€„202(c)€are€not€models€of€clearÏlegislative€drafting.€€In€this€circumstance,€our€task€is€to€make€sense€rather€thanÏnonsense€out€of€their€terms.€€òòSee€McCellan€v.€Board€of€Regentsóó,€921€S.W.2d€atÏ689.€€We€must€discover€and€give€the€fullest€possible€effect€to€the€GeneralÏAssemblyððs€purpose,€òòsee€Ganzevoort€v.€Russellóó,€949€S.W.2d€293,€296€(Tenn.Ï1997),€without€unduly€restricting€the€statute€or€expanding€it€beyond€its€intendedÏscope.€€òòSee€Hicks€v.€Stateóó,€945€S.W.2d€at€707;€òòRiggs€v.€Bursonóó,€941€S.W.2d€at€54.€ÏIn€doing€so,€we€must€ascribe€the€words€in€the€statute€their€natural€and€ordinaryÏmeaning,€òòsee€Davis€v.€Reaganóó,€951€S.W.2d€766,€768€(Tenn.€1997),€and€we€mustÏalso€consider€the€words€in€the€context€of€the€entire€statute.€òòSee€Kultura,€Inc.€v.ÏSouthern€Leasing€Corp.óó,€923€S.W.2d€536,€539€(Tenn.€1996).€ÌÌà àThese€two€provisions€overlap€significantly.€€When€read€together€in€light€ofÏthe€General€Assemblyððs€purpose€to€ensure€that€women€make€fully€informed,Ïautonomous€decisions€about€whether€to€obtain€an€abortion,€we€find€that€theyÏrequire€physicians€to€provide€their€patients€the€following€information:Ìœà0 à(1)›ÓÓà0 àthat€there€are€numerous€risks€and€benefits€attendant€to€having€anÏabortion€or€carrying€a€pregnancy€to€term;ÌÌà0 àœ(2)à0 àthe›€specific€risks€associated€with€either€abortion€or€childbirth€that€theÏparticular€patient€herself€might€face€in€light€of€the€physicianððsÏreasonable€understanding€and€knowledge€of€the€patientððs€condition;ÌÌà0 àœ(3)à0 àa›€general€discussion€of€the€risks€and€benefits€of€both€childbirth€andÏabortion;€and€ÌÌà0 àœ(4)à0 àa›€general€explanation€of€the€expected€course€of€a€routine€pregnancyÏwithout€complications€and€the€expected€recovery€from€both€a€routineÏdelivery€and€a€routine€abortion.ÌÌÓ€ÓThis€information€is€relevant€to€women€faced€with€a€choice€between€having€anÏabortion€and€carrying€the€pregnancy€to€term.€€It€enables€them€to€make€anÏinformed,€autonomous€decision.ÌÌà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(6)€&€„202(c)€do€not€require€physicians€toÏdescribe€the€specific€benefits€that€each€particular€patient€might€gain€fromÏcarrying€her€pregnancy€to€term€or€by€deciding€to€have€an€abortion.€€PhysiciansÏwill€satisfy€these€requirements€by€explaining€in€general€terms€how€abortions€mayÏbenefit€women€by€permitting€them€to€continue€with€their€lives€without€beingÏrequired€to€deal€with€an€unwanted€pregnancy.€€Likewise,€it€will€be€sufficient€forÏphysicians€to€explain€to€their€patients€in€general€terms€the€benefits€of€carryingÏtheir€pregnancy€to€term.€€For€women€who€decide€to€keep€their€child,€theseÏbenefits€may€include€the€joys€of€parenthood.€€For€women€who€decide€to€give€upÍtheir€child€for€adoption,€the€benefits€may€include€knowing€that€they€have€enabledÏanother€couple€to€enjoy€parenthood€and€that€their€child€will€be€provided€for.ÌÌà àFinally,€we€turn€to€the€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffsðð€assertion€that€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(c)€requires€physicians€to€inform€their€patients€of€theÏspecific€delivery€technique€that€will€be€used€if€they€decide€to€carry€theirÏpregnancy€to€term.€€They€point€out€that€it€is€difficult€to€predict€early€in€aÏpregnancy€which€delivery€technique€will€be€used,€especially€if€the€prediction€isÏbeing€made€by€a€physician€who€will€not€deliver€the€child.€€Thus,€they€assert€thatÏrequiring€this€information€prompts€conjecture€that€could€very€well€prove€to€beÏwrong€depending€on€the€course€of€a€womanððs€pregnancy.ÌÌà àWe€would€agree€with€the€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffsðð€concerns€if€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(c)€required€physicians€to€guess€which€delivery€techniqueÏwill€be€used€for€a€particular€patient.€€However,€we€do€not€construe€the€statute€toÏrequire€this€information.€€In€the€context€of€the€entire€provision,€the€statutoryÏterms€at€issue€require€physicians€to€inform€their€patients€of€ð ðthe€particular€risksÏassociated€with€.€.€.€the€.€.€.€child€delivery€technique€to€be€employed€.€.€.ðð€ÏReasonably€understood,€this€language€requires€only€that€physicians€provide€theirÏpatients€with€a€general€description€of€the€risks€associated€with€commonlyÏemployed€child€delivery€techniques.€€This€information€is€certainly€relevant€toÏpregnant€women€who€are€considering€whether€to€have€an€abortion€or€to€carryÏtheir€pregnancy€to€term,€and€physicians,€even€ones€who€do€not€expect€to€deliverÏthe€child,€are€certainly€capable€of€providing€it.ÌÌà àWhile€the€evidence€demonstrates€that€physicians€are€unable€to€guess€in€theÏearly€weeks€of€a€womanððs€pregnancy€which€delivery€technique€will€be€used,€theÏsame€cannot€be€said€for€abortion€techniques.€€The€evidence€containsÍoverwhelming€proof€that€physicians€know€which€abortion€procedure€they€willÏemploy€if€their€patient€decides€to€have€an€abortion€during€the€first€fourteen€weeksÏof€pregnancy.× ƒÅ ××  ×€€€In€addition,€the€basic€requirements€of€informed€consent€requireÏphysicians€to€provide€their€patients€with€specific€information€concerning€the€risksÏattendant€to€the€procedure€they€propose€to€perform.€€Thus,€the€requirement€inÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(c)€that€physicians€inform€their€patients€of€ð ðtheÏparticular€risks€associated€with€.€.€.€the€abortion€.€.€.€technique€to€be€employedððÏplaces€no€more€burden€on€physicians€than€the€law€presently€imposes.€ÌÌà@ àò ò6.Ìà@ àòòTenn.€Code€Ann.óó€ðð€39„15„202(d)ó óÌÌà àThe€mandatory€waiting€period€is€the€final€challenged€feature€of€theÏinformed€consent€process.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(1)€requires€that€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àThere€shall€be€a€two€(2)€day€waiting€period€afterÏthe€physician€provides€the€required€information,Ïexcluding€the€day€on€which€such€information€was€given.€ÏOn€the€third€day€following€the€day€such€information€wasÏgiven,€the€patient€may€return€to€the€physician€and€sign€aÏconsent€form.ÌÌÓ€ÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(3)€contains€an€emergency€medical€exceptionÏspecifically€applicable€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(1)€that€permitsÏforegoing€the€waiting€period€when€delaying€the€procedure€could€endanger€the€lifeÏof€the€mother.× ƒÆ ××  ×€€The€trial€court€determined€that€any€inflexible€waiting€periodÍunduly€burdened€a€womanððs€right€to€terminate€her€pregnancy€under€both€theÏfederal€and€state€constitutions.€€The€trial€courtððs€decision,€to€the€extent€it€rests€onÏthe€effect€of€the€waiting€period€on€the€physician„patient€relationship,€isÏinconsistent€with€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó.€€It€also€devalues€the€StateððsÏlegitimate€interest€in€maternal€health€and€the€Stateððs€constitutionally„recognizedÏprerogative€to€establish€a€decision„making€framework€to€ensure€that€a€womanððsÏdecision€is€considered€and€autonomous.ÌÌà àDeciding€whether€to€have€an€abortion€is€one€of€the€most€difficult€choicesÏthat€a€woman€can€make.€There€is€no€psychologically€painless€way€to€make€thisÏdecision,€and€in€fact,€most€women€perceive€it€as€a€choice€of€the€lesser€of€twoÏunfortunate€options.€€All€parties€agree€that€a€woman€in€this€predicament€shouldÏmake€a€deliberate,€informed€choice.€€They€do€not€agree,€however,€on€whether€aÏmandatory€waiting€period€should€be€part€of€the€decision„making€process.ÌÌà àThe€opponents€of€statutorily€mandated€informed€consent€procedures€insistÏthat€decisions€concerning€an€abortion€are€not€easily€made€and€are€not€easilyÏchanged€once€made.€€They€assert€that€statutory€waiting€periods€are€unnecessaryÏbecause€a€vast€majority€of€women€have€already€decided€to€have€an€abortion€byÏthe€time€they€consult€an€abortion€provider.€€In€addition,€they€argue€that€womenÏdo€not€favor€waiting€periods€and€that€requiring€a€woman€to€wait€for€any€pre„ordained€amount€of€time€increases€her€anxiety€and€stress€and€adds€to€theÏinconvenience€and€cost€of€the€procedure.€€They€also€express€concern€that€delayÏcould€cause€medical€complications€and€could€even€push€a€woman€past€the€timeÏwhen€she€will€be€able€to€obtain€an€abortion€in€her€physicianððs€office€or€in€anÏoutpatient€clinic.€ÌÌà àThe€advocates€of€a€waiting€period€respond€that€a€womanððs€interests€are€notÏwell€served€by€making€a€snap€decision€about€an€abortion€and€that€a€waiting€periodÏactually€helps€women€to€regain€a€sense€of€control€and€to€increase€their€self„esteem.€€They€point€out€that€unwanted€pregnancies€cause€highly€stressfulÏsituations€which€promote€reactive€thinking€and€that€the€waiting€period€promptsÏwomen€to€discuss€their€pregnancy€with€the€other€important€persons€in€their€livesÏand€to€reflect€on€their€choice.€€They€also€point€out€that€a€waiting€period€does€notÏgenerally€entail€a€health€risk€and€that€any€delay€caused€by€a€waiting€period€is€notÏdisproportionate€to€delays€normally€attendant€to€other€kinds€of€elective€surgery.ÌÌà àThere€is€a€consensus€among€the€medical€community€that€a€woman€ð ðshouldÏbe€allowed€sufficient€time€for€reflection€before€she€makes€an€informed€decisionððÏconcerning€an€abortion.€€òòSeeóó€Ô_ÔACOGÔ_Ô€Standards,€at€68.€€Some€physicians€assert€thatÏcounseling€and€informed€consent€ð ðmay€be€best€performed€a€day€or€so€precedingÏthe€operation€to€ensure€that€the€patient€is€emotionally€committed€to€undergoingÏthe€abortion.ðð€€Warren€C.€Ô_ÔPlauchÔ_Ô,€et€al.,€òòSurgical€Obstetricsóó€122€(1992).€€In€theÏfinal€analysis,€all€testifying€physicians€agreed€that€the€attending€physician€shouldÏperform€an€abortion€only€when€satisfied€that€the€patient€has€made€an€informed,Ïautonomous€choice.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€acknowledged€the€need€for€a€ð ðsufficient€time€forÏreflection,ðð€but€determined€that€deciding€how€much€time€is€sufficient€was€aÏmatter€to€be€decided€solely€by€the€woman€and€her€physician,€not€the€GeneralÏAssembly.€€The€trial€court€concluded€that€ð ða€sufficient€amount€of€time€varies€withÏeach€individual€woman,€and€the€Ô_ÔinflexibilityÔ_Ô€of€a€two„day€waiting€period€as€itÏapplies€to€every€woman€except€in€a€medical€emergency€situation€requires€itsÏinvalidation.ðð€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€waiting€period€in€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)€infringed€upon€a€womanððs€ð ðflexible€patient„physicianÍautonomous€relationshipðð€and€that€this€relationship€was€an€integral€part€of€theÏright€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€protected€by€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee.ÌÌà àWe€turn€first€to€the€trial€courtððs€conclusion€that€the€waiting€period€in€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(1)€is€unconstitutional€simply€because€it€is€at€least€twiceÏas€long€as€the€waiting€period€upheld€in€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó.€€We€haveÏdiscovered€no€precedent€for€the€notion€that€a€waiting€periodððs€constitutionality€Ïsomehow€hinges€on€its€length€alone.€While€a€waiting€periodððs€length€has€someÏbearing€on€whether€it€unconstitutionally€burdens€procreative€choice,€it€is€notÏevidence,€in€and€of€itself,€that€the€General€Assembly€intended€to€place€aÏsubstantial€obstacle€in€the€path€of€women€seeking€an€abortion.€€Accordingly,€theÏtrial€court€erred€by€holding€that€the€length€of€the€waiting€period€alone€rendersÏthe€statute€unconstitutional.ÌÌà àLikewise,€the€trial€court€erred€by€holding€that€the€waiting€period€isÏunconstitutional€because€it€interferes€with€the€physician„patient€relationship.€€TheÏUnited€States€Supreme€Court€rejected€a€similar€argument€in€òòPlanned€ParenthoodÏv.€Caseyóó€when€it€upheld€Pennsylvaniaððs€waiting€period€even€though€it€interferedÏwith€the€physicianððs€discretion.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€atÏ886,€112€S.€Ct.€at€€2825.€€In€doing€so,€the€Court€held€that€waiting€periods€enhanceÏthe€informed€consent€process€as€long€as€they€do€not€create€an€appreciable€healthÏrisk€and€do€not€place€a€substantial€obstacle€in€the€path€of€women€seeking€anÏabortion.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€885„86,€112€S.€Ct.€atÏ2825.ÌÌà àA€waiting€period€may€still€be€found€unconstitutional€under€the€state€andÏfederal€constitutions€if€it€cannot€withstand€scrutiny€under€the€effects€prong€ofÏòòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyððsóó€undue€burden€test.€€Using€this€test,€an€abortionÍregulation€should€be€found€unconstitutional€if€it€will€likely€prevent€a€significantÏnumber€of€women€for€whom€the€restriction€is€relevant€from€obtaining€anÏabortion.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€894„95,€112€S.€Ct.€atÏ2829„30.€Waiting€periods€are€relevant€to€women€seeking€an€abortion€of€aÏÔ_ÔnonviableÔ_Ô€fetus€who€do€not€meet€the€requirements€for€an€emergency€medicalÏexception€under€either€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(3)€or€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„15„202(h).€€An€analysis€under€the€effects€prong€on€the€undue€burden€standardÏis€fact„intensive.€€Accordingly,€we€return€to€the€record€to€analyze€the€evidenceÏconcerning€the€effect€that€the€waiting€period€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(1)€has€had€or€will€have€on€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€choice.€€The€record€containsÏsome€evidence€concerning€the€operation€of€Tennesseeððs€mandatory€waitingÏperiod,€although€this€evidence€is€relatively€old€and€geographically€limited.ÌÌà àIn€the€context€of€the€federal€litigation€challenging€Tennesseeððs€residencyÏrequirement€and€mandatory€waiting€period,€Memphis€Planned€ParenthoodÏcommissioned€two€studies€concerning€the€attitudes€of€women€seeking€electiveÏabortions€to€the€waiting€period€now€found€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d).× ƒÇ ××  ×€ÏWhile€77%€of€the€women€surveyed€said€that€they€gained€no€benefit€from€theÏwaiting€period,€23%€identified€benefits€such€as€(a)€providing€more€time€toÏconsider€the€decision,€(b)€providing€additional€time€to€adjust€psychologically,€andÏ(c)€providing€additional€time€to€learn€about€the€medical€aspects€of€the€procedure.€ÏòòSeeóó€Ô_ÔLupferÔ_Ô€&€Ô_ÔSilberÔ_Ô,€at€76.€€In€addition,€41%€of€the€women€stated€that€theÏwaiting€period€was€not€burdensome€while€59%€percent€identified€problems€suchÍas€(a)€additional€stress,€(b)€additional€nausea,€(3)€additional€expense€for€travel€andÏchildcare,€(d)€missing€work€and€school,€and€(e)€requiring€them€to€make€upÏadditional€excuses.€€òòSeeóó€Ô_ÔLupferÔ_Ô€&€Ô_ÔSilberÔ_Ô,€at€76„77.€€The€women€also€reported€anÏincrease€in€their€expenses€of€approximately€$24.€€òòSeeóó€Ô_ÔLupferÔ_Ô€&€Ô_ÔSilberÔ_Ô,€at€75.€€ÌÌà àThese€surveys€also€shed€some€light€into€the€womenððs€decision„makingÏprocess.€€Of€the€women€surveyed,€59%€stated€that€they€decided€to€obtain€anÏabortion€within€twenty„four€hours€of€learning€that€they€were€pregnant.€€òòSeeóóÏÔ_ÔLupferÔ_Ô€&€Ô_ÔSilberÔ_Ô,€at€76.× ƒÈ ××  ×€€While€88%€of€the€women€stated€that€they€talked€aboutÏtheir€pregnancy€to€someone€else€before€seeing€a€counselor€at€a€PlannedÏParenthood€clinic,€only€7%€of€the€women€had€discussed€their€pregnancy€with€aÏphysician€or€a€nurse.€€òòSeeóó€Ô_ÔLupferÔ_Ô€&€Ô_ÔSilberÔ_Ô,€at€76.€€Most€often,€the€women€hadÏdiscussed€their€pregnancy€with€their€partner€or€with€a€close€friend.€€Only€17%Ïhad€talked€with€their€mothers,€and€only€2%€had€talked€with€a€counselor€orÏminister.€€The€women€surveyed€stated€that€they€obtained€the€abortion€withinÏfourteen€to€twenty„one€days€after€making€their€decision.ÌÌà àIn€July€1978,€the€United€States€District€Court€for€the€Western€District€ofÏTennessee€temporarily€enjoined€the€enforcement€of€the€waiting€period.€òòSeeÏPlanned€Parenthood€of€Memphis€v.€Ô_ÔBlantonÔ_Ôóó,€No.€78„2310€(W.D.€Tenn.€Jul.€14,Ï1978).€€In€March€1981,€following€an€evidentiary€hearing€that€included€theÏintroduction€of€the€two€Planned€Parenthood€studies,€the€United€States€DistrictÏCourt€ð ðwith€considerable€trepidation€under€these€circumstancesðð€permanentlyÏenjoined€the€enforcement€of€the€waiting€period.€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€ofÏMemphis€v.€Alexanderóó,€No.€78„2310€(W.D.€Tenn.€Mar.€23,€1981).€€In€doing€so,Ïthe€court€noted€that€it€was€ð ðnot€persuaded€that€there€has€been€an€ððundue€burdenððÍcast€by€the€requirement€of€a€waiting€periodðð€but€that€it€was€constrained€to€grantÏthe€injunction€because€of€ð ðthe€almost€universal€holding€of€courts€of€appeal€.€.€.Ïsetting€aside€the€waiting€period€(even€a€24„hour€period).ðð€€òòPlanned€Parenthood€ofÏMemphis€v.€Alexanderóó,€òòsupraóó,€at€17.€ÌÌà àAs€a€result€of€the€injunction€that€has€been€in€place€since€1981,€the€record€inÏthis€case€contains€no€current€data€concerning€Tennesseeððs€waiting€period.€€ThereÏis€little€other€reliable€evidence€on€this€issue.× ƒÉ ××  ×€€Prior€to€1991,€the€PlannedÏParenthood€clinics€in€Memphis€and€Nashville€provided€only€one„day€abortionÏservices€in€which€the€counseling€and€the€procedure€took€place€on€the€same€day.€ÏSometime€in€early€1991,€both€clinics€began€to€offer€two„step€procedures€in€whichÏthe€counseling€and€necessary€medical€tests€are€performed€on€one€day€and€then€theÏpatient€returns€on€another€day€for€the€procedure.€€While€the€two„step€procedureÏwas€offered€for€the€patientððs€convenience,€the€Memphis€clinic€discontinued€it€afterÏseveral€weeks€because€of€lack€of€demand.€€The€Nashville€clinic€continues€to€offerÏthe€two„step€procedure,€and€it€is€now€requested€by€59%€of€the€clinicððs€patients.€ÏPrior€to€offering€the€two„step€procedure,€approximately€30%€of€the€NashvilleÏclinicððs€patients€and€40%€of€the€Memphis€clinicððs€did€not€keep€their€appointmentÏfor€the€one„day€procedure.× ƒÊ ××  ×€€In€contrast,€of€the€women€who€opt€for€the€two„stepÏprocedure€at€the€Nashville€clinic,€only€7%€do€not€return€for€their€secondÏappointment€when€the€procedure€is€performed.€€Ìà àMuch€of€the€force€of€the€argument€that€any€sort€of€waiting€period€willÏprevent€a€significant€number€of€women€from€obtaining€an€abortion€isÏundermined€by€the€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffsðð€own€evidence.€€Forty„oneÏpercent€of€the€women€surveyed€in€1979€and€1980€did€not€perceive€that€theÏwaiting€period€burdened€their€decision€to€obtain€an€abortion.€€The€difficultiesÏidentified€by€the€remaining€women€are€virtually€the€same€problems€that€theÏUnited€States€Supreme€Court€has€declined€to€classify€as€substantial€burdens.€€òòSeeÏPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€885„87,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2825„26€(holdingÏthat€requiring€two€visits€to€the€physician€and€the€accompanying€costs€and€delayÏdid€not€unduly€burden€a€womanððs€decision€to€obtain€an€abortion).€€Similarly,€theÏevidence€that€59%€of€the€Nashville€clinicððs€patients€voluntarily€opt€for€the€two„step€procedure€indicates€that€a€majority€of€the€women€currently€seeking€anÏabortion€do€not€view€a€delay€between€their€initial€and€second€appointment€as€aÏsubstantial€obstacle.€€The€record€contains€no€evidence€that€a€very€large€number€ofÏTennessee€women€have€been€or€are€being€subjected€to€additional€harassment€orÏthat€they€have€had€their€confidentiality€breached€by€choosing€the€two„stepÏprocedure.× ƒË ××  ×€€Likewise,€the€record€contains€no€evidence€that€a€large€number€ofÏwomen€either€in€1979,€1980,€or€at€the€present€time,€have€experienced€significantÏhealth€problems€or€have€been€forced€to€forego€obtaining€an€abortion€in€anÏoutpatient€clinic€or€physicianððs€office€solely€because€of€the€delay€between€theirÏfirst€and€second€clinic€appointments.€€Taken€in€its€entirety,€the€evidence€fails€toÏdemonstrate€that€women€in€Tennessee€are€being€or€will€be€burdened€anymore€byÏa€waiting€period€than€were€the€women€in€Pennsylvania€whose€waiting€period€wasÏupheld€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court.ÌÌà àGiven€the€importance€of€the€decision,€there€is€virtual€unanimity€among€theÏwitnesses€that€a€womanððs€choice€should€be€informed€and€autonomous.€€In€orderÏfor€a€decision€to€be€truly€informed,€a€women€should€understand€the€nature€of€theÏprocedure,€the€risks€associated€with€the€procedure€and€with€pregnancy,€the€costsÏof€the€options€available€to€her,€the€alternatives€to€abortion,€and€the€effects€of€theÏdecision€on€her€unique€personal€circumstances.€€After€receiving€this€information,Ïshe€should€also€be€allowed€sufficient€time€for€reflection€in€order€to€make€sureÏthat€she€understands€the€decision€and€is€comfortable€with€her€choice,€whatever€itÏmight€be.€€In€contrast€to€the€lack€of€evidence€concerning€the€burdensome€effectsÏof€a€waiting€period,€the€record€contains€evidence€that€a€statutorily€mandatedÏinformed€consent€process€that€includes€a€waiting€period€promotes€deliberate,Ïautonomous€decisions€concerning€the€termination€of€a€pregnancy.ÌÌà àThe€evidence€indicates€that€women€in€Tennessee€are€quick€to€make€up€theirÏminds€about€having€an€abortion.€€Sometimes€they€make€a€decision€when€they€onlyÏsuspect€they€might€be€pregnant,€but€most€often€they€make€their€decision€shortlyÏafter€their€pregnancy€is€confirmed.€€According€to€the€Planned€ParenthoodÏplaintiffsðð€evidence,€few€women€have€consulted€a€medical€professional€of€any€sortÏwhen€they€first€make€their€decision.€€Most€of€the€women€who€have€shared€the€factÏthat€they€are€pregnant€with€anyone€have€shared€it€with€their€partner€or€a€closeÏfriend.€€Thus,€many€women€appear€not€to€have€received€the€very€information€thatÏonly€health€professionals€can€provide€about€abortion€when€they€make€their€initialÏdecision.ÌÌà àIn€light€of€this€evidence,€health€professionals€have€insufficient€basis€toÏassume€that€most€women€seeking€abortions€have€already€been€fully€andÏappropriately€counseled€when€they€first€come€to€a€clinic€to€obtain€an€abortion.€€ItÏthus€becomes€the€physicianððs€responsibility€to€see€to€it€that€his€or€her€patientÍmakes€an€informed€and€autonomous€choice€that€best€accommodates€her€personalÏcircumstances.€€The€informed€consent€requirements€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b),€„202(c)€and€the€waiting€period€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)Ïrepresent€an€appropriate€legislative€effort€to€establish€a€decision„makingÏframework€that€reflects€a€profound€respect€for€the€potential€life€of€the€unborn,Ïensures€that€each€womanððs€choice€is€informed€and€autonomous,€and€does€notÏunduly€burden€a€womanððs€ability€to€obtain€an€abortion€once€she€has€made€up€herÏmind€to€obtain€one.ÌÌà àAs€a€final€matter,€the€duration€of€the€waiting€period€requires€someÏcomment.€€The€waiting€period€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)€is€at€leastÏtwice€as€long€as€the€24„hour€waiting€period€approved€in€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.ÏCaseyóó.€€While€the€length€of€the€waiting€period€gives€us€some€concern,€we€areÏreluctant€to€hold€that€the€constitutionality€of€a€waiting€period€depends€solely€onÏits€length.€€We€have€been€unable€to€find€any€case,€either€before€or€after€theÏòòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó€decision,€upholding€a€waiting€period€longer€thanÏtwenty„four€hours.× ƒÌ ××  ×€€But€the€lack€of€precedent€supporting€a€48„hour€waitingÏperiod€does€not€preclude€us€from€upholding€such€a€waiting€period.€€UnderÏòòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€we€should€not€disturb€the€General€AssemblyððsÏdecision€to€establish€this€requirement€unless€it€has€the€practical€effect€ofÏpreventing€a€significant€number€of€women€from€obtaining€an€abortion.€€ÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffsðð€strategy€in€this€litigation€was€to€placeÏthe€burden€on€the€State€to€prove€that€the€challenged€provisions€in€TennesseeððsÍabortion€statutes€serve€a€compelling€governmental€interest€and€are€preciselyÏtailored€to€further€that€interest€alone.€€They€anticipated€that€this€court€would€findÏa€broader€right€of€procreational€privacy€in€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€than€isÏfound€in€the€United€States€Constitution.€€The€evidence€they€presented€at€trialÏreflected€this€strategy,€and€it€was€only€after€the€trial€court€indicated€that€it€wouldÏnot€employ€òòRoe€v.€Wadeóóððs€strict€scrutiny€standard€that€the€plaintiffs€asserted€thatÏtheir€proof€was€sufficient€to€carry€their€burden€of€proving€that€the€challengedÏprovisions€unduly€burdened€womenððs€procreational€autonomy.€€While€theÏplaintiffs€introduced€some€evidence€of€the€burdens€and€inconveniences€that€aÏwaiting€period€could€cause€women€seeking€an€abortion,€they€have€failed€to€proveÏthat€waiting€periods,€as€a€general€matter,€place€an€undue€burden€on€procreationalÏchoice.Ì€Ìà àIn€their€assault€on€waiting€periods€in€general,€the€Planned€ParenthoodÏplaintiffs€presented€little,€if€any,€proof€concerning€how€the€48„hour€waitingÏperiod€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)€placed€a€greater€burden€on€womenÏseeking€an€abortion€than€the€24„hour€waiting€period€upheld€in€òòPlannedÏParenthood€v.€Caseyóó.€€In€fact,€several€of€their€witnesses€testified€that€a€24„hourÏwaiting€period€would€Ô_ÔessentiallyÔ_Ô€cause€the€same€burden€to€women€seeking€anÏabortion€as€the€waiting€period€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d).€€Accordingly,Ïbased€on€the€evidence€in€this€record,€we€have€no€factual€basis€for€concluding€thatÏthe€waiting€period€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)€unduly€burdens€a€womanððsÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy.€€This€is€the€same€factual€conclusion€reached€by€theÏUnited€States€District€Court€in€1981.€€Of€course,€our€conclusion€based€on€theÏfacts€in€this€record€does€not€prevent€another€court€from€reaching€a€differentÏconclusion€in€another€case€based€on€different€evidence.ÌÌà@ àò òE.ó óÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€have€also€challenged€the€parentalÏnotification€procedures€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f).€€The€trial€courtÏinvalidated€these€procedures€in€its€initial€ruling,€but€before€the€trial€court€enteredÏa€final€order,€the€General€Assembly€repealed€the€parental€notification€proceduresÏin€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f)€and€replaced€them€with€the€parental€consentÏprocedures€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€€37„10„301,€„307.€€The€parties€properlyÏinformed€the€trial€court€of€this€development,€but€no€party€sought€to€amend€itsÏpleadings€to€raise€the€issue€of€the€constitutionality€of€the€parental€consentÏprocedures€in€these€proceedings.€€Nonetheless,€the€trial€court,€on€its€ownÏinitiative,€declared€that€the€parental€consent€procedures€were€constitutionalÏwithout€first€giving€the€parties€the€opportunity€to€present€evidence€or€legalÏarguments€concerning€this€provision.ÌÌà àThe€doctrine€of€Ô_ÔjusticiabilityÔ_Ô€prompts€the€courts€to€stay€their€hand€in€casesÏthat€do€not€involve€a€genuine,€existing€controversy.€€òòSee€State€ex€rel.€Lewis€v.ÏStateóó,€208€Tenn.€534,€537,€347€S.W.2d€47,€48€(1961);€òòMcIntyre€v.€Ô_ÔTraughberÔ_Ôóó,Ï884€S.W.2d€134,€137€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994).€€Courts€should€decline€to€renderÏadvisory€opinions,€òòsee€Super€Flea€Market€of€Chattanooga,€Inc.€v.€Olsenóó,€677ÏS.W.2d€449,€451€(Tenn.€1984);€òòParks€v.€Alexanderóó,€608€S.W.2d€881,€892€(Tenn.ÏCt.€App.€1980),€or€to€decide€abstract€legal€questions.€€òòSee€State€ex€rel.€Lewis€v.ÏStateóó,€208€Tenn.€at€538,€347€S.W.2d€at€48„49;€òòÔ_ÔEyringÔ_Ô€v.€East€Tenn.€BaptistÏHosp.óó,€950€S.W.2d€354,€359€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997).€€Thus,€courts€should€refrainÏfrom€deciding€constitutional€issues€in€the€absence€of€an€actual€controversyÏrequiring€them€to€address€the€question.€€òòSee€West€v.€Carróó,€212€Tenn.€367,€382,Ï370€S.W.2d€469,€475€(1963).€€ÌÌà àThe€parties€in€this€case€never€joined€issue€with€regard€to€theÏconstitutionality€of€the€newly€enacted€parental€consent€procedures.€€Accordingly,Ïneither€party€had€the€opportunity€to€present€evidence€or€legal€argumentsÏconcerning€this€issue.€€Addressing€the€constitutionality€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€Ï37„10„301,€„307€was€not€necessary€to€deciding€this€case,€and€thus€the€trial€courtÏerred€by€reaching€out€to€address€the€constitutionality€of€these€provisions.ÌÌà@ àò òF.ó óÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€also€take€issue€with€the€emergencyÏmedical€exceptions€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€and€„202(d)(3).€€TheyÏpoint€to€two€defects€in€these€provisions.€€First,€they€point€to€the€ambiguity€createdÏby€the€overlapping€of€the€two€provisions.€€Second,€they€take€issue€with€theÏnarrowness€of€their€application.€€We€have€already€determined€that€the€trial€courtÏexceeded€its€authority€by€effectively€amending€these€provisions€and,€therefore,Ïthat€we€must€construe€them€as€they€were€enacted€by€the€General€Assembly.ÌÌà àThe€wording€of€the€emergency€medical€exceptions€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„15„202(d)(3)€and€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€differ€slightly.€€TheÏformer€provides€an€exception€for€circumstances€that€ð ðwould€endanger€the€life€ofÏthe€pregnant€woman;ðð€while€the€latter€permits€exceptions€when€ð ðnecessary€toÏpreserve€the€life€of€the€pregnant€woman.ðð€€Despite€these€differences,€we€find€thatÏboth€provisions€cover€circumstances€where€a€womanððs€pregnancy€is€endangeringÏher€life.€€The€legislative€history€contains€no€explanation€for€these€redundantÏprovisions,€and€we€perceive€no€apparent€need€for€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(3)€because€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h)€applies€to€all€provisions€inÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202,€including€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d).€ÏRedundancy€in€statutory€language€is€not€necessarily€unconstitutional,€and€ourÍconstruction€removes€any€ambiguity€concerning€the€operation€or€scope€of€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(h).€€ÌÌà àEmergency€medical€exceptions€are€essential€to€the€operation€of€abortionÏstatutes.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€879,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2822.€ÏAccordingly,€any€regulation€that€will€delay€a€womanððs€opportunity€to€obtain€anÏabortion€must€contain€a€valid€emergency€medical€exception.€€òòSeeóó€òòWomenððs€Med.ÏÔ_ÔProfððlÔ_Ô€Corp.€v.€Ô_ÔVoinovichÔ_Ôóó,€130€F.3d€187,€203€(6th€Cir.€1997).€€In€order€to€beÏvalid,€the€exception€must€not€only€cover€immediately€life€threatening€conditionsÏbut€also€conditions€that€constitute€a€serious€threat€to€a€womanððs€health.€€òòSeeÏPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€880,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2822.€€Thus,€theÏUnited€States€Supreme€Court€approved€an€emergency€medical€exception€whenÏpregnancy€so€complicated€a€womanððs€medical€condition€that€a€delay€in€obtainingÏan€abortion€would€create€a€serious€risk€of€substantial€and€irreversible€impairmentÏof€a€major€bodily€function.€€òòSee€Planned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€505€U.S.€at€879„80,€112€S.€Ct.€at€2822.€€Ìà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„202(h),€„202(d)(3)€cover€only€circumstancesÏthat€threaten€a€womanððs€life;€they€do€not€cover€medical€conditions€Ô_ÔthreateningÔ_Ô€aÏserious€risk€of€substantial€and€irreversible€impairment€of€a€major€bodilyÏfunction.€Thus,€on€their€face,€these€emergency€medical€exceptions€are€too€narrowÏto€pass€constitutional€muster.€€Accordingly,€we€find€that€these€provisions€undulyÏburden€a€womanððs€constitutional€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€because€they€doÏnot€contain€adequate€provisions€that€will€permit€immediate€abortions€necessary€toÏprotect€the€womanððs€health.ÌÌà@ àò òVI.ó óÌÌà àIn€the€previous€section€we€reviewed€separately€each€of€the€challengedÏprovisions€in€the€statutes€regulating€a€womanððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€choice.€€ApplyingÏthe€undue€burden€standard€formulated€in€òòPlanned€Parenthood€v.€Caseyóó,€weÏconcluded€that,€with€the€exception€of€the€emergency€medical€exceptions,€theÏPlanned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€have€not€carried€their€burden€of€proving€that€eachÏprovision,€standing€alone,€imposes€an€undue€burden€on€a€womanððs€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_ÔÏautonomy.€€Even€though€not€directly€raised€by€the€parties,€we€have€concludedÏthat€our€review€of€the€constitutionality€of€the€challenged€provisions€cannot€endÏwith€a€review€of€each€individual€provision€in€isolation.€€Even€though€a€particularÏprovision,€standing€on€its€own,€may€pass€constitutional€muster,€a€combination€ofÏtwo€or€more€of€these€provisions€may€unduly€burden€a€womanððs€right€to€terminateÏher€pregnancy€when€the€effects€of€the€provisions€are€considered€together.ÌÌà àThe€evidence€in€this€record€demonstrates€that€the€combined€effects€of€theÏphysician„only€counseling€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€andÏthe€waiting€period€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)€will€place€a€substantialÏobstacle€in€the€path€of€a€large€number€of€women€seeking€an€abortion€inÏTennessee.€€The€representatives€of€the€Planned€Parenthood€clinics€in€NashvilleÏand€Memphis€testified€concerning€the€difficulty€of€recruiting€physicians€willing€toÏperform€abortions€at€their€clinics.€€Neither€clinic€employs€full€time€physicians,Ïand€accordingly,€they€must€contract€with€individual€physicians€or€physicianÏgroups.€€These€physicians€have€other€practices,€and€their€work€at€the€clinics€isÏclearly€secondary.ÌÌà àThe€Planned€Parenthood€clinic€in€Nashville€provides€abortion€services€onÏTuesday,€Wednesday,€alternate€Thursdays,€Friday,€and€alternate€Saturdays.€€TheÏclinic€in€Memphis€provides€abortion€services€on€Tuesday€and€ThursdayÏafternoons€from€3:00€to€6:00€p.m.€and€on€Saturdays€from€9:00€a.m.€to€2:00€p.m.€ÍIn€order€to€provide€the€necessary€coverage,€the€clinics€must€contract€with€enoughÏphysicians€who€will€be€available€to€work€during€these€times.€€Since€mostÏphysicians€maintain€other€practices,€they€are€available€to€work€at€the€clinicÏirregularly€or€infrequently.€€In€addition,€for€reasons€unrelated€to€the€statutes,Ïmany€physicians€do€not€want€the€additional€work€and€are€concerned€about€theÏeffects€that€working€at€the€clinics€might€have€on€their€own€practices€and€withÏtheir€relations€with€their€patients€and€other€physicians.€€Thus,€it€is€quite€commonÏfor€physicians€to€agree€to€work€at€the€clinics€only€one€day€every€other€week€orÏon€similar€irregular€intervals.ÌÌà àThe€medical€staffing€problems€facing€Planned€Parenthood€clinics€would€notÏappreciably€increase€the€burden€or€inconvenience€caused€by€either€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€or€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)€considered€alone.€ÏHowever,€the€staffing€problems€will€exacerbate€the€burdens€caused€by€theÏcombined€operation€of€these€two€provisions.€€If€the€clinics€employed€full€timeÏphysicians,€the€expected€delay€in€obtaining€the€procedure€attributable€to€theÏstatutes€would€be€the€length€of€the€waiting€period€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d).€€Ô_ÔConceivablyÔ_Ô,€a€particular€womanððs€scheduling€conflicts€could€cause€someÏadditional€delay.€€These€sorts€of€delays,€however,€are€not€substantively€differentÏfrom€the€delay€involved€with€other€elective€surgical€procedures,€and€they€shouldÏnot€prevent€a€large€number€of€women€from€obtaining€an€abortion€during€the€firstÏfourteen€weeks€of€pregnancy.€€ÌÌà àThe€reality€of€employing€part€time€physicians€changes€this€pictureÏsignificantly.€€When€physicians€work€irregularly,€the€delay€between€theÏmandatory€counseling€and€the€procedure€could€very€well€be€substantially€longerÏthan€the€minimum€waiting€period.€€If,€for€example,€a€physician€works€only€everyÍother€week,× ƒÍ ××  ×€a€woman€seeking€an€abortion€would€be€delayed€at€least€two€weeksÏbecause€she€would€be€required€to€wait€for€the€same€doctor€who€provided€her€withÏthe€pre„abortion€counseling€to€perform€her€abortion.€€This€two„week€delay€couldÏbecome€extremely€significant€in€light€of€the€relatively€short€interval€between€theÏtime€a€woman€discovers€she€is€pregnant€and€the€end€of€her€fourteenth€week€ofÏpregnancy,€after€which€she€will€no€longer€be€able€to€obtain€an€abortion€in€aÏphysicianððs€office€or€outpatient€clinic.€€This€interval€could€be€even€shorter€in€theÏcase€of€younger€women€who,€according€to€the€proof,€tend€to€discover€or€confirmÏtheir€pregnancies€later€than€their€older€counterparts€and€who€face€additionalÏobstacles€to€obtaining€an€abortion.Ô_Ô× ƒÎ ××  ×Ô_Ô€€Ìà àPhysician€scheduling€would€not€have€the€same€impact€if€there€were€noÏmandatory€waiting€period.€€Women€would€be€able€to€consult€with€a€physician€andÏhave€their€abortion€on€the€same€day€without€being€required€to€delay€theirÏabortion€until€the€same€physician€was€working.€€Similarly,€if€there€were€noÏrequirement€that€the€physician€performing€the€abortion€provide€the€requiredÏcounseling,€women€would€be€able€to€obtain€their€counseling€from€any€physicianÏand€then€schedule€their€procedure€with€another€physician€as€soon€as€the€waitingÏperiod€expired.€€The€physiciansðð€schedules€would€not€be€relevant€in€thoseÏcircumstances€because€any€qualified€physician€could€perform€the€procedure€evenÏthough€he€or€she€had€not€counseled€the€patient.ÌÌà àNationwide,€approximately€91%€of€abortions€are€performed€within€theÏfirst€twelve€weeks€of€pregnancy.€€In€Memphis,€however,€20%€of€all€abortions€areÍperformed€in€the€thirteenth€or€fourteenth€weeks€of€pregnancy,€as€compared€withÏ5%€of€the€abortions€performed€in€Nashville.€€The€passage€of€time€becomesÏimportant€as€a€pregnancy€progresses€because€the€medical€risks€attendant€to€theÏprocedure€increase€and€because€the€opportunity€to€obtain€a€less€expensiveÏabortion€in€a€physicianððs€office€or€clinic€rather€than€in€a€hospital€may€slip€away.€ÏThus,€the€possibility€of€introducing€a€delay€of€two€weeks€or€more€after€the€tenthÏweek€of€pregnancy€would€amount€to€a€substantial€obstacle€for€a€large€number€ofÏwomen,€especially€younger€women.ÌÌà àHaving€determined€that€the€combined€effect€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€and€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)€causes€an€undue€burden€because€ofÏthe€staffing€problems€of€the€Planned€Parenthood€Clinics,€we€must€decide€whetherÏwe€have€any€factual€or€legal€basis€for€striking€down€either€provision.€€The€recordÏprovides€no€factual€basis€to€do€so€because€the€Planned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€haveÏfailed€to€prove€that€either€requirement,€standing€alone,€unduly€burdensÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy.€€Likewise,€because€we€have€no€reason€to€invalidateÏeither€provision€on€its€face,€we€have€no€legal€basis€to€strike€down€eitherÏprovision.€€The€resolution€of€this€dilemma€must€be€found€in€the€Constitution€ofÏTennessee€itself.ÌÌà àNeither€the€state€nor€the€federal€constitution€prevent€the€states€fromÏconditioning€a€womanððs€exercise€of€her€right€of€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€either€onÏphysician„only€counseling€or€on€a€mandatory€waiting€period.€€It€follows€thatÏdeciding€whether€to€establish€either€or€both€requirements€is€a€public€policyÏjudgment€for€the€General€Assembly,€not€the€courts,€to€make.€€Thus,€Tenn.€Const.Ïart.€II,€ðððð€1€&€2€require€us€to€leave€the€choice€between€the€two€policies€to€theÏGeneral€Assembly€rather€than€arrogating€the€General€Assemblyððs€powers€forÏourselves.€€ÌÌà àOur€task€as€judges€is€to€measure€the€product€of€legislative€action€against€theÏrequirements€of€the€state€and€federal€constitutions.€€We€have€performed€our€taskÏin€this€case€by€determining€that€the€combined€effect€of€the€physician„onlyÏcounseling€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€and€the€mandatory€waiting€periodÏin€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)€unconstitutionally€burdens€womenððsÏÔ_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€autonomy€by€unduly€delaying€their€ability€to€obtain€an€abortion.€ÏThe€General€Assembly€must€decide€which€of€these€two€policies€is€most€important.€ÏHowever,€until€the€General€Assembly€makes€this€choice,€neither€the€waitingÏperiod€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)€nor€the€requirement€in€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€that€only€physicians€may€provide€the€required€pre„abortionÏcounseling€may€be€enforced.ÌÌà@ àò òVII.ó óÌÌà àThe€State€takes€issue€with€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€award€two€court„appointed€expert€witnesses€$27,600€in€attorneyððs€fees€on€the€Ô_ÔgroundÔ_Ô€that€the€trialÏcourt€lacked€the€authority€to€award€these€fees.€€We€agree€that€the€trial€court€doesÏnot€have€the€authority€to€require€the€State€to€pay€the€legal€expenses€of€theseÏcourt„appointed€experts€and,€accordingly,€vacate€the€award€of€these€fees.ÌÌà àThe€trial€courtððs€perception€of€the€role€of€Drs.€Anthony€Ô_ÔTrabueÔ_Ô€and€BettyÏÔ_ÔNeffÔ_Ô€can€best€be€described€as€novel.€€Shortly€after€this€case€began,€these€twoÏphysicians€retained€their€own€lawyer€and€sought€to€intervene€in€the€case€as€partiesÏto€defend€the€constitutionality€of€the€abortion€statutes,€especially€the€parentalÏnotification€procedures€that€the€Attorney€General€and€Reporter€was€unpreparedÏto€defend.€€In€September€1992,€the€trial€court€denied€the€physiciansðð€motion€toÏintervene€but,€relying€on€Tenn.€R.€Ô_ÔEvidÔ_Ô.€614€and€706,€named€them€court„appointed€experts€for€the€defendants.€€At€the€same€time,€the€trial€court€announcedÏthat€it€would€appoint€two€court„appointed€experts€for€the€plaintiffs€and€requestedÏthe€plaintiffs€to€designate€the€experts€to€be€appointed.× ƒÏ ××  ×€€In€addition,€the€trialÏcourt€stated€that€the€lawyer€retained€by€Drs.€Ô_ÔTrabueÔ_Ô€and€Ô_ÔNeffÔ_Ô€could€continue€toÏparticipate€in€pretrial€discovery,€examine€all€court„appointed€experts€andÏwitnesses,€file€briefs,€and€participate€in€oral€arguments.ÌÌà àEven€though€their€lawyer€appears€to€have€focused€much€of€his€efforts€onÏthe€parental€notice€provision€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f),€both€Drs.ÏÔ_ÔTrabueÔ_Ô€and€Ô_ÔNeffÔ_Ô€testified€in€detail€in€support€of€all€the€challenged€provisions€inÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„202.€€In€its€initial€opinion€filed€on€NovemberÏ19,€1992,€the€trial€court€struck€down€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f)€andÏpermitted€Drs.€Ô_ÔTrabueÔ_Ô€and€Ô_ÔNeffÔ_Ô€to€intervene€as€ð ðlimited€partiesðð€to€defend€theÏconstitutionality€of€this€procedure€on€appeal.€€Four€months€later,€the€physiciansÏrequested€fees€for€their€services€as€well€as€an€additional€$19,062.50€for€theirÏlegal€expenses.€€In€April,€1993,€the€trial€court€awarded€Dr.€Ô_ÔTrabueÔ_Ô€$7,725€andÏDr.€Ô_ÔNeffÔ_Ô€$5,525€for€their€services.× ƒÐ ××  ×€€It€also€awarded€the€physicians€an€additionalÏ$25,000€for€their€legal€expenses.€€ÌÌà àThereafter,€Drs.€Ô_ÔTrabueÔ_Ô€and€Ô_ÔNeffÔ_Ô,€through€their€counsel,€undertook€to€fileÏa€cross„claim€requesting€a€declaration€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f)€wasÏconstitutional€even€though€the€trial€court€had€already€struck€down€the€provision.ÏThe€trial€court€permitted€them€to€file€this€cross„claim€over€the€objections€of€theÏPlanned€Parenthood€plaintiffs€and€the€State€and€even€allowed€them€to€presentÍevidence€on€this€issue.€€The€trial€courtððs€belated€decision€to€accept€proof€on€thisÏissue€created€a€procedural€quagmire€for€the€parties.€€Eventually,€Drs.€Ô_ÔTrabueÔ_Ô€andÏÔ_ÔNeffÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔnonsuitedÔ_Ô€their€cross„claim€without€offering€evidence€of€any€sort.€€The€trialÏcourt€permitted€them€to€dismiss€their€cross„claim€but€not€before€awarding€themÏanother€$2,600€for€their€legal€expenses.ÌÌà àAll€parties€had€numerous€expert€witnesses€available€to€testify€both€in€favorÏof€and€in€opposition€to€the€constitutionality€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„202.€€Accordingly,€we€question€whether€this€case€called€for€court„appointedÏexperts,€especially€ones€that€had€already€allied€themselves€with€the€parties€in€theÏcase.€€However,€on€the€assumption€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretionÏby€appointing€these€experts,€we€find€no€basis€in€the€rules,€the€statutes,€or€theÏcommon€law€for€reimbursing€these€witnesses€for€their€own€voluntarily€assumedÏlegal€expenses.€€It€was€not€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€designate€them€as€court„appointed€experts€that€prompted€them€to€retain€counsel.€€The€physicians€hadÏalready€retained€counsel€by€the€time€they€were€designated€court„appointedÏexperts,€and€they€could€have€discharged€their€responsibilities€as€court„appointedÏexperts€without€counsel.ÌÌà àTenn.€R.€Ô_ÔEvidÔ_Ô.€706(b)€permits€the€trial€court€to€set€reasonableÏcompensation€for€court„appointed€experts.€€This€compensation€is€for€theirÏservices€as€experts€and€does€not€include€the€collateral,€voluntarily€incurred€legalÏexpenses.€€The€trial€courtððs€decision€to€designate€them€as€court„appointed€expertsÏdid€not€require€them€to€retain€counsel,€and€the€record€contains€no€evidence€thatÏthey€ever€requested€permission€to€seek€legal€advice€or€that€they€would€have€beenÏunable€to€provide€expert€testimony€without€the€assistance€of€counsel.€ÏAccordingly,€Tenn.€R.€Ô_ÔEvidÔ_Ô.€706(b)€provides€no€basis€for€the€trial€courtððsÏdecision€to€require€the€State€to€pay€Drs.€Ô_ÔTrabueÔ_Ôððs€and€Ô_ÔNeffÔ_Ôððs€legal€expenses.ÌÌà àAttorneyððs€fees€are€not€recoverable€in€the€absence€of€a€statute€or€contractÏproviding€for€their€recovery€or€some€other€recognized€equitable€ground.€€òòSeeÏÔ_ÔKulturaÔ_Ô,€Inc.€v.€Southern€Leasing€Corp.óó,€923€S.W.2d€at€540;€òòPullman€Standard,ÏInc.€v.€Ô_ÔAbexÔ_Ô€Corp.óó,€693€S.W.2d€336,€338€(Tenn.€1985);€òòState€ex€rel.€Orr€v.ÏThomasóó,€585€S.W.2d€606,€607€(Tenn.€1979).€€When€attorneyððs€fees€are€awarded,Ïthey€are€awarded€as€additional€damages€unless€the€statute€or€rule€permitting€themÏprovides€otherwise.€€In€the€absence€of€a€statute€or€rule€to€the€contrary,€attorneyððsÏfees€or€other€legal€expenses€are€not€costs.€€Accordingly,€neither€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€20„12„119€(1994)€nor€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„14„111€(1980)€empower€the€trialÏcourt€to€order€the€State€to€pay€the€voluntarily€incurred€legal€expenses€of€itsÏcourt„appointed€experts.ÌÌà@ àò òVIII.ó óÌÌà àThe€trial€court€has€broad€discretion€to€award€attorneys€fees€to€prevailingÏparties€in€cases€such€as€this€one.€€When€attorneys€fees€are€sought,€the€trial€courtÏmust€first€determine€whether€the€party€requesting€the€fees€is€a€prevailing€partyÔ_ÔÔ_ÔÏand€then€must€determine€what€fee€would€be€reasonable€under€the€facts€of€the€case.€ÏPrevailing€parties€must€obtain€more€than€a€technical,€de€Ô_ÔminimisÔ_Ô€victory.€€òòSeeÏTexas€State€Teachers€Ô_ÔAssððnÔ_Ô€v.€Garland€Ô_ÔIndepÔ_Ô.€Sch.€Dist.óó,€489€U.S.€782,€792„93,Ï109€S.€Ct.€1486,€1493„94€(1989).€€They€must€succeed€on€a€significant€issue€in€theÏlitigation€and€obtain€relief€that€materially€alters€the€legal€relationship€between€theÏparties€by€obtaining€some€benefit€the€party€sought€in€bringing€suit.€€òòSee€Farrar€v.ÏHobbyóó,€506€U.S.€103,€111„12,€113€S.€Ct.€566,€573€(1992);€òòÔ_ÔHensleyÔ_Ô€v.€Ô_ÔEckerhartÔ_Ôóó,Ï461€U.S.€424,€433,€103€S.€Ct.€1933,€1939€(1983);€òòMcIntyre€v.€Ô_ÔTraughberÔ_Ôóó,€884ÏS.W.2d€134,€138€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994).€€The€reasonableness€of€a€requested€feeÏdepends€on€the€facts€of€each€case,€òòsee€Hail€v.€Nashville€Trust€Co.óó,€31€Tenn.€App.Í39,€51,€212€S.W.2d€51,€56€(1948),€and€must€be€carefully€analyzed€using€theÏfactors€in€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€Ô_ÔDRÔ_Ô€2„106(B).€€òòSee€Connors€v.€Connorsóó,€594€S.W.2dÏ672,€676„77€(Tenn.€1980);€òòAlexander€v.€Ô_ÔInmanÔ_Ôóó,€903€S.W.2d€686,€695€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1995).ÌÌà àThe€question€of€the€amount€of€attorneyððs€fees€to€which€the€PlannedÏParenthood€plaintiffs€may€be€entitled€should€be€revisited€in€light€of€the€substantialÏmodifications€we€have€made€in€the€trial€courtððs€disposition€of€this€case.€ÏAccordingly,€we€direct€the€trial€court€to€reopen€the€question€of€attorneyððs€feesÏonce€this€case€is€remanded.€€At€that€time,€the€trial€court€should€permit€the€partiesÏto€present€any€evidence€they€have€with€regard€to€the€plaintiffsðð€right€to€an€awardÏfor€their€legal€expenses€and€the€amount€of€the€award.€€The€trial€court€shouldÏspecifically€consider€the€reasonableness€of€the€requested€fees€with€regard€toÏpossible€duplication€of€services€and€the€services€relating€to€the€challenge€to€theÏconstitutionality€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f).€€ÌœÌÌ›Ìà@ àò òIX.ó óÌÌà àIn€summary,€the€combined€results€of€our€decision€and€the€trial€courtððsÏdecisions€either€affirmed€by€or€not€appealed€to€this€court€are:ÌÌÓÓà0 à(1)à0 àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„15„201,€„202€do€not€violate€the€EqualÏProtection€Clauses€of€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€8€and€Tenn.€Const.€art.ÏXI,€ðð€8€[see€Section€V(B)];ÌÌà0 à(2)à0 àthe€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(c)(2)€thatÏabortions€performed€after€the€fourteenth€week€of€pregnancy€beÏperformed€in€a€hospital€is€constitutional€[see€Section€V(C)];ÌÌà0 à(3)à0 àthe€residency€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„201(d)€isÏunconstitutional;× ƒÑ ××  ×€ÌÌà0 à(4)à0 àthe€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€that€a€womanððsÏattending€physician€must€provide€his€or€her€patient€with€theÏinformation€required€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b),€„202(c)€isÏconstitutional€[see€Section€V(D)(1)];ÌÌà0 à(5)à0 àthe€information€required€to€be€provided€to€women€seeking€anÏabortion€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(1),€(2),€(3),€(5),€andÏ(6)€and€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(c)€is€constitutional€[see€SectionÏV(D)(2)„(5)];× ƒÒ ××  ×ÌÌà0 à(6)à0 àthe€information€required€to€be€provided€to€women€seeking€anÏabortion€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)(4)€isÏunconstitutional;× ƒÓ ××  ×ÌÌà0 à(7)à0 àthe€mandatory€waiting€period€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(1)Ïis€constitutional€based€on€the€facts€in€this€record€[see€SectionÏV(D)(6)];ÌÌà0 à(8)à0 àthe€parental€notification€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(f)€has€been€repealed€by€implication,€and€we€express€no€opinionÏconcerning€the€constitutionality€of€the€parental€consent€requirementÏin€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€37„10„301,€„307€[see€Section€V(E)];ÌÌà0 à(9)à0 àthe€medical€emergency€exceptions€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(3),€„202(h)€are€unconstitutionally€narrow€[see€Section€V(F)];ÏandÌÌà0 à(10)à0 àunder€the€facts€of€this€case,€the€combined€effect€of€the€physician„onlyÏcounseling€requirement€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(b)€and€theÍmandatory€waiting€period€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„15„202(d)(1)Ïunduly€burdens€a€womanððs€exercise€of€her€Ô_ÔprocreationalÔ_Ô€rights€[seeÏSection€VI].€€ÌÌÓ€ÓWe€remand€the€case€for€whatever€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinionÏmay€be€required,€and€we€tax€the€costs€of€this€appeal€to€the€State€of€Tennessee.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€PRESIDING€JUDGE€ÌMIDDLE€SECTION€ÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€œJUDGE›