ÿWPC° 6oî9ç¢et]Ý“6ƒÅ'aã+Üÿõ]y˰Fò¸9{)ø×Õ{¨mK̦±_ ö$$úèòbl…ª]:(uB·q «¡`v}&Ç9°‘ºÙ`ߘ¤ žÊš®¼H«i,M ç‚6h)±ýigª͹~®w¹¼© Š ”_¶­ô3 ªOSD£Èê œˆõx€?0%Å‚Zæø>7EË™X k"þ Éëݺë€ RÏØÒæÄÓöûÉNÑÜuczKµPgœá»p)7¤ð)gÝ‹ ÌØ›þ‡þŒEbå ´È:[L 0}ÒS£³ó¢[”ˆ U]4m+NÒ9}Y]—¼€,‹õ§ fçœÀßøj<˜?!ðÌ Éo/9Òú€«HbˆÑ˜V]4°V GAÿùX¨šÿ¼'5ÇÊb#Á\ % ^ # 0ˆ/ UN· w 4 z Ò— i x mz æ‘ Æw Æ=ÆÆÉ 0DNÓÕÖÝE³¢µUNWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWb¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥ 0ë­­­­ B˜˜ 0¤µ D3Y D-Œ 0K¹¹ ASÆW 0¤ 0DÁ A«˜HP LaserJet 8000 Series PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0»—}+s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularÝ^p+Üð T¡ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ ÜÝ ƒRQ:$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôæ" ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€court€further€decreed€that€the€remaining€assets€of€the€drugstore€ð!ð€specifically,€its€name€and€goodwill,€metalÐ ° Ðshelves,€rubber€mats,€two€computers,€a€safe,€a€telephone,€and€a€fax€machine€ð!ð€passed€to€Wife€under€the€terms€of€theÐ tÄ ÐMDA.€€This€finding€has€not€been€challenged€by€the€children€on€this€appeal.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó  ÌÝ ƒRQ:$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôæ" ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€other€co„executor€is€Husbandððs€son,€the€defendant,€Mark€Powers€Terry.€€ ˜Ý ƒRQ:$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôæ" ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€a€similarly„worded€provision,€the€MDA€awards€the€partiesðð€residence€to€Wife:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€marital€home€of€the€parties...shall€be€the€property€of€the€WIFE€for€life,€and€sheÐ 8ˆ Ðis€given€the€right€to€sell€same€and€retain€all€proceeds.€€If€WIFE€should€die€prior€toÐ üL Ðselling€the€property,€said€property€shall€revert€to€the€HUSBAND.ÐÀ` x` x ÐÌ(Capitalization€in€original).€€Wife€sold€the€residence€prior€to€her€former€husbandððs€death.(ÆúI Z‹6Times New Roman Regular- ù-(|G2Q:$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ND»»d XXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô<ò»»Ô d(|3QU$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ND»»d XXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3QU$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€ND»»d XXdì8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€W »»d dÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÔ€¼R‚»»»ÔÑ8€1ŒXXdê»»d 8ÑÑ  Ñà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îGCR‚ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEÔ#†¼R‚»îîGC#ԈРÖ& ÐÓ  ÓOctober€17,€2001€SessionÐ üL ÐÔ‡XnX»¼R‚ÔÌò òÔ#†¼R‚»XXn#ÔFRANCES€POWERSòòóó€v.€MARK€POWERS€TERRY,€òòet€alóó.Ô‡XnX»¼R‚Ôó óÐ úJ ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Chancery€Court€for€Ô_ÔRoaneÔ_Ô€CountyÐ ú J Ðà@@øøìàNo.€13,724€€€€€€Frank€V.€Williams,€III,€ChancellorÐ æ 6 ÐÌFILED€NOVEMBER€29,€2001Ð ¾   Ðà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<©` AßÐ ªú  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€E2001„00108„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€Ð ¥õ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<|` AßÐ }Í  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓThis€litigation€focuses€on€a€dispute€between€the€former€wife€of€the€late€James€Spencer€Terry€ð!ð€aÐ xÈ  Ðpharmacist€ð!ð€and€the€partiesðð€children.€€Following€Mr.€Terryððs€death,€his€former€spouse€sued€theÐ d´ Ðchildren,€claiming€that€she€was€the€beneficial€owner€of€Union€Drug€Co.,€a€drugstore€in€Harriman.€Ð P  ÐShe€based€her€claim€on€the€language€of€the€partiesðð€marital€dissolution€agreement€(ð ðMDAðð).€Ð <Œ ÐFollowing€a€bench€trial,€the€court€below€found€that,€prior€to€his€death,€Mr.€Terry€had€sold€theÐ (x Ðdrugstore€and€that€the€children,€as€his€heirs€at€law,€were€entitled€to€the€proceeds€from€the€sale.€€TheÐ d Ðtrial€court€also€found€the€plaintiff€did€not€have€a€legal€interest€in€the€drugstoreððs€bank€account€andÐ P Ðcertificates€of€deposit.€€We€affirm.Ô#†¼R‚»XXn‚#ÔÔ‡XnX»¼R‚ÔÐ ì< ÐÓÞÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Chancery€CourtÐ Ä ÐAffirmed;€Case€Remandedó óÐ ° ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼R‚»àXn„#ÔÔ‡XnX.¼R‚ÔCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòHouston€M.€Ô_ÔGoddardÔ_Ô,Ð ˆØ ÐÔ_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,óó€and€òòD.€Michael€Ô_ÔSwineyÔ_Ô,€J.óó,€joined.Ð tÄ ÐÌM.€Robin€Ô_ÔRepassÔ_Ô,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Frances€Powers.Ð L œ ÐÌRobert€H.€Green,€Knoxville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellees,€Mark€Powers€Terry€and€Elizabeth€T.Ð $"t! ÐSmith,€individually€and€as€the€co„executors€of€the€Estate€of€James€Spencer€Terry,€Ô_ÔD.PhÔ_Ô.,€Estate€ofÐ #`" ÐJames€Spencer€Terry,€Ô_ÔD.PhÔ_Ô.,€Union€Drug€Store€of€Harriman,€Inc.,€and€Union€Drug€Company.Ð ü#L# ÐÓY ÓÌò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼R‚»XXnˆ #ÔÔ‡XnX»¼R‚ÔÐ Ô%$!% ÐòòóóÔ#†¼R‚»XXn #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€XnX»¼R‚ÔÌÓ  ÓI.Ð ¬'ü"' ÐÓ¢ ÓÌà  àThe€plaintiff,€Frances€Powers€(ð ðWifeðð),€and€the€decedent,€James€Spencer€Terry€(ð ðHusbandðð),Ð „)Ô$) Ðwere€divorced€in€1989€after€32€years€of€marriage.€€During€the€course€of€their€marriage,€they€operatedÐ p*À%* ÐUnion€Drug€Store€in€Harriman.€€The€business€was€incorporated€in€1969.€€While€the€business€wasÐ \+¬&+ Ðoperated€under€various€names€ð!ð€Union€Drug€Store€of€Harriman,€Inc.,€Union€Drug€Store,€Inc.,€UnionÐ H,˜', ÐDrug,€Inc.,€Union€Drug€Company,€Inc.,€Union€Drug€Company,€and€Union€Drug€Store€ð!ð€all€agreeÐ 4-„(-ý ÐÔ_Ôthere€was€only€one€business€entity,€which€the€parties€simply€referred€to€as€ð ðthe€drugstore.ðð€€Wife€andÐ ° ÐHusband€were€the€sole€shareholders€and€officers€of€the€corporation.€€In€1987,€the€corporation€wasÐ œì Ðadministratively€dissolved€by€the€Secretary€of€State.€€Despite€the€dissolution,€the€parties€continuedÐ ˆØ Ðto€operate€the€drugstore.€€While€no€longer€a€corporation,€the€drugstore€continued€to€file€corporateÐ tÄ Ðtax€returns,€in€which€Husband€represented€himself€to€be€the€sole€shareholder€of€the€ð ðcorporation.ððÐ `° ÐÌà  àThe€partiesðð€MDA,€which€was€incorporated€by€reference€into€their€1989€judgment€of€divorce,Ð 8 ˆ Ðprovides,€in€pertinent€part,€as€follows:Ð $ t ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€drugstore€jointly€owned€by€the€parties,€Union€Drug€Co.,€locatedÐ ü L  Ðat€520€Devonia€in€Harriman,€Tennessee,€shall€be€the€property€of€theÐ è 8  ÐHUSBAND€for€life,€and€he€is€given€the€right€sell€same€and€retain€allÐ Ô$  Ðproceeds.€€òòIf€HUSBAND€should€die€prior€to€selling€the€drugstore,Ð À  Ðsaid€drugstore€shall€revert€to€the€WIFE.óó׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ьü ` x` x ÐÌ(Capitalization€in€original)€(Emphasis€added).Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àOn€September€17,€1999,€Husband€executed€an€Asset€Purchase€and€Sale€Agreement€(ð ðtheÐ \¬ ÐAgreementðð),€by€which€he€agreed€to€sell€the€merchandise€inventory€and€prescription€records€ofÐ H˜ ÐUnion€Drug€Co.€to€Revco€Discount€Drug€Centers,€Inc.€(ð ðRevcoðð).€€The€Agreement€provides€that€theÐ 4„ Ðpurchase€price€of€the€merchandise€inventory€would€be€determined€by€a€physical€inventory€onÐ  p ÐSeptember€23,€1999,€and€that€delivery€of€the€bill€of€sale€and€payment€of€the€purchase€price€wouldÐ  \ Ðtake€place€no€later€than€seven€days€following€the€taking€of€the€inventory.Ð øH ÐÌà  àOn€the€same€day€Husband€executed€the€Agreement,€he€transferred€the€drugstoreððs€telephoneÐ Ð  Ðnumber€to€Revco,€as€required€by€the€Agreement,€and€sent€a€letter€to€the€United€States€DrugÐ ¼  ÐEnforcement€Administration€(ð ðDEAðð)€requesting€permission€to€transfer€all€controlled€substances€toÐ ¨ø ÐRevco.€€In€the€letter,€he€declared€his€intention€to€relinquish€his€license€to€dispense€controlledÐ ”ä Ðsubstances.€€Husband€ceased€to€operate€Union€Drug€Co.€as€a€going€concern€on€September€22,€1999.€Ð €Ð ÐThe€following€day,€only€hours€before€the€commencement€of€the€inventory,€Husband€died.€€RevcoÐ l¼ Ðproceeded€with€the€physical€inventory€as€planned.€€In€October,€1999,€the€defendant,€Elizabeth€T.Ð X ¨ ÐSmith,€Husbandððs€daughter€and€co„executor׃ì×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€of€his€estate,€signed€the€bill€of€sale€and€Revco€tenderedÐ D!” Ða€check€for€$218,475.34,€which€was€deposited€in€a€Union€Planters€bank€account€in€the€name€ofÐ 0"€  ÐUnion€Drug€Company,€Inc.€€Ð #l! Їà  àWife€brought€this€action,€claiming€she€was€entitled,€pursuant€to€the€MDA,€to€all€of€theÐ ° Ðdrugstoreððs€assets,€including€the€Union€Planters€bank€account€and€two€certificates€of€deposit€in€theÐ œì Ðname€of€Union€Drug€Company,€Inc.,€as€well€as€the€proceeds€from€the€sale€to€Revco.€€The€defendantsÐ ˆØ Ðfiled€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€alleging€that€Husband€had€sold€the€drugstore€prior€to€his€deathÐ tÄ Ðand€therefore€the€proceeds€passed€to€his€estate.€€Wife€opposed€the€motion,€arguing€that€no€sale€wasÐ `° Ðconsummated€prior€to€Husbandððs€death.€€The€trial€court€granted€the€defendants€partial€summaryÐ L œ Ðjudgment,€holding€that€the€proceeds€from€the€sale€to€Revco€belonged€to€Husbandððs€estate.€€The€trialÐ 8 ˆ Ðcourt€set€the€case€for€trial€as€to€the€remaining€issue€of€the€disposition€of€the€other€drugstore€assets.€Ð $ t ÐThe€case€proceeded€to€a€bench€trial,€following€which€the€court€held€that€the€Union€Planters€bankÐ  ` Ðaccount€and€the€certificates€of€deposit€were€Husbandððs€property€at€the€time€of€his€death€and,€as€aÐ ü L  Ðconsequence,€had€passed€to€his€estate.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€This€appeal€followed.Ð è 8  ÐÌÓÓII.Ð À  ÐÓ|"ÓÓ  ÓÌà  àWe€first€address€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€partial€summary€judgment€to€the€defendantsÐ ˜è  Ðregarding€the€disposition€of€the€proceeds€from€the€sale€to€Revco.€€Summary€judgment€is€appropriateÐ „Ô  Ðð ðif€the€pleadings,€depositions,€answers€to€interrogatories,€and€admissions€on€file,€together€with€theÐ pÀ Ðaffidavits,€if€any,€show€that€there€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€partyÐ \¬ Ðis€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.04.€€In€considering€a€motion€forÐ H˜ Ðsummary€judgment,€courts€ð ðmust€take€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€theÐ 4„ Ðnonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€that€party,€and€discard€all€countervailingÐ  p Ðevidence.ðð€€òòò òByrd€v.€Hall,ó óóó€847€S.W.2d€208,€210-11€(Tenn.1993).€€Since€our€review€of€the€trial€courtððsÐ  \ Ðgrant€of€partial€summary€judgment€involves€only€a€question€of€law,€no€presumption€of€correctnessÐ øH Ðattaches€to€the€trial€court's€judgment.€€òòSee€ò òGonzales€v.€Alman€Constr.€Co.,ó óóó€857€S.W.2d€42,€44€(Tenn.Ð ä4 ÐCt.€App.€1993).Ð Ð  ÐÌ€à  àWife€argues€that€partial€summary€judgment€was€not€appropriate€because,€so€the€argumentÐ ¨ø Ðgoes,€the€transaction€between€Husband€and€Revco€was€not€òòcompletedóó€during€Husbandððs€lifetime.€Ð ”ä ÐTherefore,€she€argues,€Husband€ð ðdie[d]€prior€to€selling€the€drugstoreðð€and,€under€the€terms€of€theÐ €Ð ÐMDA,€ð ðthe€drugstoreðð€reverted€to€her.€€Wife€does€not€attempt€to€set€aside€the€transfer€of€assets€toÐ l¼ ÐRevco,€even€though€it€is€her€contention€that€the€transfer€occurred€after€Husbandððs€death.€€Rather,€sheÐ X ¨ Ðargues€that€the€proceeds€from€the€sale€are€the€ð ðproperty€of€the€drugstore€and,€therefore,€should€beÐ D!” Ðawarded€to€her.ððÐ 0"€  ÐÌà  àWife€first€argues€that€the€sale€did€not€occur€prior€to€Husbandððs€death€because,€according€toÐ $X" Ðher,€the€Agreement€between€Husband€and€Revco€was€merely€an€option€contract.€€In€support€of€thisÐ ô$D # Ðargument,€she€cites€section€20€of€the€Agreement,€pursuant€to€which€Husband€agreed€that€he€wouldÐ à%0!$ Ðnot€sell€or€lease€ð ðthe€Storeðð€to€any€entity€for€a€period€of€six€months€from€the€date€of€inventory.€€Wife,Ð Ì&"% Ðhowever,€misconstrues€this€section.€€Reading€the€Agreement€as€a€whole,€a€clear€distinction€is€madeÐ ¸'#& Ðbetween€òòcontentsóó€of€the€drugstore€ð!ð€òòi.e.óó,€files,€records,€and€inventory€ð!ð€and€ð ðthe€Storeðð€itself,€òòi.e.óó,€theÐ ° Ðphysical€òòpremisesóó€of€the€business.€€The€purpose€of€the€Agreement€was€to€sell€most€of€the€òòcontentsóóÐ œì Ðof€the€drugstore€to€Revco.€€Section€20€is€merely€collateral€to€the€sale.€€In€it,€Husband€agreed€not€toÐ ˆØ Ðsell€or€lease€the€òòpremisesóó€for€six€months,€for€which,€incidentally,€he€received€additionalÐ tÄ Ðconsideration.€€This€provision€does€not€render€the€sale€of€the€contents€of€the€store€an€option€contract.€Ð `° ÐWifeððs€first€argument€is€without€merit.Ð L œ ЀÌà  àNext,€Wife€contends€that€the€sale€to€Revco€did€not€occur€prior€to€Husbandððs€death€because,Ð $ t Ðso€the€argument€goes,€the€time€of€sale€and€conveyance€was€set€in€the€Agreement€as€the€date€of€theÐ  ` Ðinventory.€€Wife€relies€upon€the€following€provision€of€the€Agreement:Ð ü L  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àSubject€to€the€terms€and€conditions€of€this€Agreement,€on€the€Date€ofÐ Ô$  ÐInventory€(hereinafter€defined),€Seller€shall€sell,€transfer,€assign€andÐ À  Ðconvey€to€Buyer,€free€and€clear€of€all€liens€and€security€interests,€theÐ ¬ü  Ðfollowing€described€assets€(ð ðAssetsðð).Иè ` x` x ÐÌThe€Agreement€was€dated€and€signed€on€September€17,€1999,€five€days€before€Husband€died.€€AsÐ pÀ Ðof€the€earlier€date,€both€parties€were€bound€to€the€sale.€€The€fact€that€the€sale€was€not€carried€intoÐ \¬ Ðeffect€until€a€later€date€does€not€change€the€fact€that€Husband€was€legally€bound€to€go€forward€withÐ H˜ Ðthe€sale€òòas€of€September€17,€1999óó.€€We€find€that€the€sale€occurred€on€September€17,€1999.€€Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àWife€insists€that€the€Agreement€does€not€amount€to€a€sale€of€Union€Drug€Co.€as€such€aÐ  \ Ðtransaction€was€contemplated€by€the€MDA.€€We€disagree.€Ð øH ÐÌà  àWe€begin€with€the€language€of€the€MDA.€€What€did€the€parties€mean€by€the€language€ð ðifÐ Ð  ÐHusband€should€die€prior€to€òòselling€the€drugstoreððóó?€€(Emphasis€added).€€The€answer€to€this€questionÐ ¼  Ðwill€resolve€this€particular€issue.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àA€marital€dissolution€agreement€is€interpreted€like€any€other€contract.€€òòSee€ò òGray€v.€Estate€ofÐ €Ð ÐGray,ó óóó€993€S.W.2d€59,€63€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).€€Our€goal€is€to€ascertain€the€intent€of€the€partiesÐ l¼ Ðaccording€to€the€usual,€natural,€and€ordinary€meaning€of€the€words€used€by€the€parties.€€ò òòòGuiliano€v.Ð X ¨ ÐCleo,€Inc.,ó óóó€995€S.W.2d€88,€95€(Tenn.€1999).€€In€determining€the€partiesðð€intent,€a€court€ð ðdoes€notÐ D!” Ðattempt€to€ascertain€the€partiesðð€state€of€mind€at€the€time€the€contract€was€executed,€but€rather€theirÐ 0"€  Ðintentions€as€actually€embodied€and€expressed€in€the€contract€as€written.ðð€€ò òòòRainey€v.€Stansell,ó óóó€836Ð #l! ÐS.W.2d€117,€119€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).Ð $X" ÐÌà  àOur€inquiry,€however,€is€complicated€by€the€peculiar€facts€of€this€case.€€Although€at€firstÐ à%0!$ Ðblush€the€phrase€ð ðselling€the€drugstoreðð€appears€unambiguous,€a€latent€ambiguity€arises€when€weÐ Ì&"% Ðattempt€to€apply€that€language€to€the€facts€before€us.€€As€stated€by€the€Supreme€Court:Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àA€latent€ambiguity€is€where€the€equivocality€of€expression€orÐ )à$( Ðobscurity€of€intention€does€not€arise€from€the€words€themselves,€butÐ |*Ì%) Ðfrom€the€ambiguous€state€of€extrinsic€circumstances€to€which€theÐ h+¸&* Ðwords€of€the€instrument€refer,€and€which€is€susceptible€of€explanationÐ ° Ðby€the€mere€development€of€extraneous€facts,€without€altering€orÐ œì Ðadding€to€the€written€language,€or€requiring€more€to€be€understoodÐ ˆØ Ðthereby€then€will€fairly€comport€with€the€ordinary€or€legal€sense€of€theÐ tÄ Ðwords€and€phrases€made€use€of.Ð`°` x` x ÐÌò òòòTeague€v.€Sowder,ó óóó€121€Tenn.€132,€148,€114€S.W.€484,€488€(1908).€€A€latent€ambiguity€in€a€contractÐ 8 ˆ Ðmay€be€removed€by€the€use€of€parol€evidence.€€ò òòòWard€v.€Berry€&€Associates,€Inc.,ó óóó€614€S.W.2d€372,Ð $ t Ð374€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1981).€€Ð  ` ÐÌà  àð ðThe€drugstore,ðð€as€it€was€commonly€referred€to€by€the€parties,€was€for€most€of€the€partiesððÐ è 8  Ðmarriage€a€corporate€entity,€with€Husband€and€Wife€as€shareholders.€€In€1987,€however,€theÐ Ô$  Ðcorporation€was€administratively€dissolved€by€the€State,€the€result€of€which€was€that€the€propertyÐ À  Ðwhich€had€formerly€belonged€to€the€corporation€passed€to€its€shareholders.€€òòSee€ò òJesse€A.€Bland€Co.Ð ¬ü  Ðv.€Knox€Concrete€Products,€Inc.,ó óóó€207€Tenn.€206,€211,€212,€338€S.W.2d€605,€607,€608€(1960).€€Thus,Ð ˜è  Ðwhile€the€parties€continued€to€treat€the€business€as€if€it€were€a€corporation,€it€was,€in€fact,€aÐ „Ô  Ðpartnership.€òòò òó óóó€The€business€underwent€another€fundamental€change€in€1989€when€the€parties€divorced,Ð pÀ Ðand€Husband€was€awarded€the€drugstore,€leaving€Wife€no€interest€in€the€business,€at€least€duringÐ \¬ ÐHusbandððs€lifetime.€€Husband€became€the€sole€proprietor€of€the€business.€€Thereafter,€ð ðthe€drugstoreððÐ H˜ Ðwas€simply€James€Spencer€Terry,€a€proprietorship,€doing€business€as€Union€Drug€Co.Ð 4„ ÐÌà  àThe€significance€of€these€changes€in€the€structure€of€the€business€ð!ð€from€corporation€toÐ  \ Ðpartnership€to€proprietorship€ð!ð€becomes€evident€when€we€attempt€to€interpret€what€the€parties€meantÐ øH Ðby€ð ðselling€the€drugstore.ðð€€If€ð ðthe€drugstoreðð€were€a€corporation,€the€meaning€of€the€phrase€ð ðsellingÐ ä4 Ðthe€drugstoreðð€is€relatively€clear:€generally€speaking,€one€sells€a€corporation€by€selling€its€stock.€Ð Ð  ÐHowever,€as€we€have€just€discussed,€the€business€entity€at€issue€was€òònotóó€a€corporation€at€the€time€theÐ ¼  ÐMDA€was€executed;€it€was€a€partnership,€and€after€the€MDA,€it€was€a€sole€proprietorship€andÐ ¨ø Ðcontinued€to€be€so€right€up€to€the€time€of€the€sale€to€Revco.Ð ”ä Ѐ€Ð €Ð Ðà  àThus,€the€question€is€simply€this:€What€qualifies€as€a€sale€of€a€business€when€it€is€a€soleÐ l¼ Ðproprietorship?€€In€the€instant€case,€there€were€numerous€components€to€Husbandððs€business:€theÐ X ¨ Ðname,€the€goodwill,€the€equipment,€the€bank€account,€the€certificates€of€deposit,€the€pharmacyÐ D!” Ðrecords,€and€the€inventory,€pharmaceutical€and€otherwise.€€As€we€have€already€held,€Husband€soldÐ 0"€  Ðthe€pharmacy€records€and€the€inventory€of€the€drugstore€prior€to€his€death.€€While€these€assets€wereÐ #l! Ðonly€part€of€what€made€up€Husbandððs€business,€the€facts€demonstrate€that€their€sale,€especially€whenÐ $X" Ðconsidered€in€the€context€of€the€Agreement,€resulted€in€the€termination€of€the€functioning€businessÐ ô$D # Ðentity€of€James€Spencer€Terry€doing€business€as€Union€Drug€Co.€€These€assets€represented€theÐ à%0!$ Ðessence€of€Husbandððs€business;€they€are€assets€without€which€the€drugstore€could€not€have€continuedÐ Ì&"% Ðto€operate€as€a€retail€business.€€In€addition€to€selling€the€drugstoreððs€inventory€and€records,€HusbandÐ ¸'#& Ðnotified€the€DEA€that€he€was€transferring€the€drugstoreððs€controlled€substances€to€Revco€and€thatÐ ¤(ô#' Ðhe€was€surrendering€his€license€to€deal€in€such€substances.€€He€also€transferred€to€Revco€theÐ )à$( Ðdrugstoreððs€phone€number.€€Finally,€on€September€22,€1999,€he€closed€the€drugstoreððs€doors€for€theÐ |*Ì%) Ðlast€time.€€When€he€died€on€September€23,€1999,€the€Union€Drug€Store€was€simply€gone;€òòthere€wasÐ h+¸&* Ðno€ongoing€drugstore€businessóó.€€He€had€done€everything€required€of€him€under€the€Agreement€toÐ ° Ðtransfer€the€core€assets€of€the€drugstore€to€Revco.€€All€that€remained€to€be€accomplished€was€theÐ œì Ðphysical€inventory€of€the€merchandise€so€that€the€purchase€price€could€be€calculated€and€a€bill€of€saleÐ ˆØ Ðexchanged.€€Based€upon€these€circumstances,€we€find€that€Husband€ð ð[sold]€the€drugstoreðð€prior€toÐ tÄ Ðhis€death€within€the€meaning€of€the€MDA.€€Therefore,€the€proceeds€of€the€sale€would€have€belongedÐ `° Ðto€Husband€had€he€lived,€and€they€belong€to€his€estate€ð!ð€and€hence€his€heirs€ð!ð€by€virtue€of€his€death.Ð L œ ÐÌà  àOur€determination€that€Husband€sold€the€drugstore€during€his€life€also€resolves€the€issue€ofÐ $ t Ðthe€disposition€of€the€bank€account€and€certificates€of€deposit€that€were€held€in€the€drugstoreððs€name.€Ð  ` ÐBecause€Husband€ð ð[sold]€the€drugstoreðð€before€his€death,€the€reversionary€language€of€the€subjectÐ ü L  Ðprovision€of€the€Agreement€is€not€implicated.€€Therefore,€Wife€is€not€entitled€to€the€other€assets€atÐ è 8  Ðissue,€òòi.e.óó,€the€bank€account€and€certificates€of€deposit.€€These€assets€and€the€proceeds€from€the€saleÐ Ô$  Ðpassed€to€Husbandððs€estate.Ð À  ÐÌÓ  ÓIII.Ð ˜è  ÐÓwSÓÌà  àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€This€case€is€remanded€for€collection€of€costsÐ pÀ Ðassessed€below.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€appellant,€Frances€Powers.Ð \¬ ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à_______________________________Ð  \ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àCHARLES€D.€SUSANO,€JR.,€JUDGE