ÿWPCÓ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 UP@ 0l 0Dü 0J@ 0TŠ 0^Þ 0h< 0r¤ 0| 0†’ 0 ¨ B° 1uÍ 0dBU>¦U 6ä D3B)MDCv 0@¹ AMùU*Fpr€Üòbέ0v~ÝvÓ[ AO.Æ} 0DC D/‡ B¶˜HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,ð,,,,,ð0nLdÒ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ Ž D E V‘ D’ “ ” D• D– U— Ó€Úƒç"3|x¢ &@FÐZ ‹8CaslonOpnface BT Regular((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô d ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New'ÿÿdxd% Line 7 d++++7Border 1dd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-,Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔÔ€/ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€/XÔÌÌò òNovember€18,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€/ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó hÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔIn€addition€to€Pratt,€Travis€Maxson€was€originally€named€as€aÏrepresentative€plaintiff.€€However,€an€order€of€voluntary€dismissal€wasÏentered€as€to€him€on€February€1,€1996.Ì ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔO.C.G.A.€ðð€13„1„13.Ì XÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔGiven€this€conclusion,€we€find€it€unnecessary€to€address€PrattððsÏargument€that€her€attorneyððs€payment€of€Smartððs€invoice€was€not€ð ðvoluntary.ððÌ £Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔThe€attorney€would€not€be€entitled€to€the€records€in€the€absence€of€aÏwritten€authorization€from€Pratt.€€Thus,€Smart€knew€that€it€was€dealing€withÏan€agent€for€a€disclosed€principal.€€This€was€a€transaction€between€Pratt€andÏSmart.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÑ P ÑÑ7€ÌÈXXdðdÈ7ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€)ÔÑ  ÑÙ€€ÙßR€.0,A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌÌÌBRENDA€PRATT,à àà àà àà à€€€)€C/A€NO.€03A01„9701„CV„00024Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìà àPlaintiff„Appellant,à à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)€APPEAL€AS€OF€RIGHT€FROM€THEÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)€KNOX€COUNTY€CIRCUIT€COURTÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)ÌSMART€CORPORATION,à àà àà à€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€)€HONORABLE€HAROLD€WIMBERLY,Ìà àDefendant„Appellee.à àà à€€€)€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌFor€Appellantà àà àà àà àà àFor€AppelleeÌÌDONALD€K.€VOWELLà àà àà àà àDAN€D.€RHEAÌROBERT€R.€œCARL›€IIà àà àœà à›à àArnett,€Draper€&€HagoodÌVowell€&€Carlà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€TennesseeÌKnoxville,€TennesseeÌÌœJAMES€H.€HICKMAN€IIIÌKnoxville,€TennesseeÌÌTHOMAS€A.€SNAPPÌAyres€&€ParkeyÌKnoxville,€Tennessee›ÌÌÌœ›ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€ ÔÔ€  ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€ XÔÔ€)ÔÌœÌÌ›ÌÌœ›ÌVACATED€AND€REMANDEDà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSusano,€J.ÌÓÓà àà àThe€plaintiff,€Brenda€Pratt€(ð ðPrattðð),€filed€suit€toÏrecover€œa€portion€of›€œthe›€payment€made€by€her€to€the€defendant,ÏSmart€Corporation€(ð ðSmartðð),€for€copies€of€her€medical€records.€ÏœThe›€trial€court€granted€Smartððs€motion€for€summary€œjudgment,Ïconcluding€that€the€relevant€statute€does€not€permit€a€ð ðrecoveryÏfor€this€plaintiff€against€this€defendant.ð𛀀Pratt€appealed,Ïraising€several€issues€which€in€essence€present€the€followingÏquestions€for€our€review:ÌÌÓÓà àà8 à1.€€Does€the€record€contain€evidence€fromÏwhich€a€jury€could€conclude€that€a€charge€by€aÏhospitalððs€œagent,€i.e.,€Smart,€of›€$28.58€forÏœcopies›€of€œfour€pages€of€medical›€œrecords›€was€inÏexcess€of€ð ðthe€reasonable€costs€of€copying€andÏmailing€the€patientððs€records,ðð€according€toÏthe€œMedical›€Records€œAct€of€1974,›€T.C.A.€ðð€68„11„304(a)(2)(A),€thus€rendering€theÏtransaction€voidable?ÌÌà àà8 à2.€€Does€the€record€contain€evidence€fromÏwhich€a€jury€could€conclude€that€PrattððsÏpayment€of€Smartððs€invoice€constitutes€aÏvoidable€contract€of€adhesion?ÌÌÓÓÌSmart,€on€the€other€hand,€frames€the€issue€before€us€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà àà8 àMay€a€personal€injury€claimant€who€hasÏvoluntarily€paid€the€invoice€of€a€hospitalÏrecord€copying€service€for€copies€of€herÏhospital€chart€later€sue€the€copying€serviceÏfor€a€partial€refund€of€her€payment€on€theÏground€that€the€payment€violated€theÏhospitalððs€statutory€right€to€recoupÏð ðreasonable€costs€of€copying€and€mailingðð?ÌÌÓÓÌà@ àI.€€òòFactsóóÌÌà àà àThe€events€that€precipitated€this€litigation€began€whenÏPratt€was€injured€in€an€automobile€accident.€€She€receivedÏtreatment€for€her€injuries€at€Fort€Sanders€œHospital›€(ð ðtheÏhospitalðð)€in€Knoxville.€€Wishing€to€pursue€a€claim€against€theÏdriver€of€the€other€vehicle,€Pratt€subsequently€requested,€throughÏher€attorney,€œcopies›€of€her€hospital€records.€€The€hospitalÏreferred€the€request€to€Smart,€a€ð ðcopy€companyðð€that€it€hadÏretained€to€handle€œwritten›€œrequests€for€copies.›€€Smart€furnishedÏcopies€of€the€four„page€medical€record€to€Prattððs€attorney,€alongÍwith€an€invoice€for€$28.58.€€Prattððs€attorney€then€paid€theÏinvoice.ÌÌà àà àOn€June€16,€1995,€Pratt€filed,€as€the€representativeÏplaintiff× ƒ1 ××  ×,€a€class€action€complaint€against€Smart,€pursuant€to€theÏprovisions€of€the€œMedical›€Records€œAct€of€1974,›€T.C.A.€ðð€68„11„301,Ïòòet€seqóó.€(ð ðthe€Actðð).€€Smart€subsequently€moved€for€summaryÏjudgment.€€The€trial€court€declined€to€certify€the€class€pendingÏresolution€of€œSmartððs›€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€The€trialÏcourt€ultimately€granted€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€Smart,Ïstating€thatÌÌÓÓà àà8 àthere€is€no€factual€dispute€about€anythingÏhappening€in€this€case.€€And€it€is€further€theÏopinion€œ[of€the€court]€that›€the€statute€inÏquestion€which€is,€as€I€said,€the€basis€of€theÏplaintiffððs€claim,€does€not€allow€recovery€forÏthis€plaintiff€against€this€defendant.ÌÌÓÓÌThe€trial€court€œdid€not€otherwise€state€its€rationale€for€grantingÏsummary€judgment.›Ì̜Ǜà@ àII.€€òòStandard€of€ReviewóóÌÌà àà àWe€measure€the€propriety€of€the€trial€courtððs€grant€ofÏsummary€judgment€against€the€standard€of€Rule€œ56.04,›ÏTenn.R.Civ.P.,€which€provides€that€summary€judgment€is€appropriateÏwhereÌÌÓÓà àà8 àthe€pleadings,€depositions,€answers€toÏinterrogatories,€and€admissions€on€file,Ïtogether€with€the€affidavits,€if€any,€showÏthat€there€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€anyÏmaterial€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€isÏentitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.ÓÓœ›ÌÌWhen€reviewing€a€grant€of€summary€judgment,€an€appellate€courtÏmust€decide€anew€if€judgment€in€œsummary›€fashion€is€appropriate.€Ïò òòòCowden€v.€Sovran€Bank/Central€Southó óóó,€816€S.W.2d€741,€744Ï(Tenn.€1991);€ò òòòGonzalez€v.€Alman€Constr.€Co.ó óóó,€857€S.W.2d€42,Ïœ44„45›€(Tenn.App.€1993).€€Since€this€determination€involves€aÏquestion€of€law,€there€is€no€presumption€of€correctness€as€to€theÏtrial€courtððs€judgment.€€òòò òId.óóó óÌÌà@ àIII.€€œòòThe€Partiesðð€Contentionsóó›ÌÌà àà àPratt€contends€that€there€is€evidence€from€which€a€juryÏcould€conclude€that€Smart€violated€the€Act€by€charging€$28.58€forÏœcopies›€of€œfour€pages€of›€hospital€œrecords.›€€The€Act€provides,€inÏpertinent€part,€that̜ǛÓÓà àà8 à...a€hospital€shall€furnish€to€a€patient€or€aÏpatientððs€authorized€representative€such€partÏor€parts€of€such€patientððs€hospital€recordsÏwithout€unreasonable€delay€upon€request€inÏwriting€by€the€patient€or€such€representative.ÌÌà àà8 àThe€party€requesting€the€patientððs€recordsÏshall€be€responsible€to€the€hospital€for€theÏreasonable€costs€of€copying€and€mailing€theÏpatientððs€records.ÌÌÓÓÌT.C.A.€ðð€68„11„304(a)(1),€(a)(2)(A).€€The€Act€provides€that€aÏwillful€violation€of€its€terms€constitutes€a€Class€C€œmisdemeanor.€ÏT.C.A.€ðð€68„11„311(a).€€It›€also€limits€an€offending€partyððs€civilÏliability€to€ð ðactual€damages...€for€willful€or€reckless€or€wantonððÏviolations.€€T.C.A.€ðð€œ68„11„311(b).›ÌÌà àà àPratt€argues€that€the€Act€was€intended€to€protectÏpatients€from€incurring€excessive€charges€in€obtaining€copies€ofÏtheir€medical€records.€€She€contends€that€Smart€falls€within€theÏambit€of€the€Act€and€that€there€is€evidence€from€which€a€juryÏcould€conclude€that€Smart€willfully,€intentionally,€or€wantonlyÏviolated€its€provisions€in€the€following€ways:€by€charging€her€aÏgrossly€excessive,€unreasonable€amount;€by€using€such€excessiveÏcharges€to€ð ðsubsidizeðð€free€copies€provided€to€doctors€andÏhospitals;€and€by€abusing€its€ð ðmonopoly€powerðð€over€her€medicalÏrecords.ÌÌà àà àPratt€contends€that€Smartððs€violation€of€the€Act€rendersÏher€attorneyððs€payment€of€the€invoice€a€voidable€transaction,€inÏaccordance€with€the€doctrine€of€òòò òNewton€v.€Coxó óóó,€878€S.W.2d€105Ï(Tenn.€1994).€€In€ò òòòNewtonó óóó,€the€Supreme€Court€found€that€a€50%Ïcontingency€fee€agreement€between€an€attorney€and€client€in€aÏmedical€malpractice€case€was€in€violation€of€T.C.A.€ðð€29„26„120,Ïwhich€sets€the€maximum€contingency€fee€arrangement€in€such€casesÏat€one„third.€€The€Court€found€that€the€contract€in€questionÏviolated€the€public€policy€embodied€in€the€statute,€and€that€as€aÏresult,€the€contract€was€voidable€by€the€client.€€The€Court€statedÏas€follows:ÌÌÓÓà àà8 àThe€prevailing€view€which€has€also€beenÏapplied€in€Tennessee€is€that€contracts€areÏvoidable€and€not€void€when€they€violateÏstatutes€enacted€for€the€protection€of€theÏpublic€interests€or€for€the€protection€of€theÏclass€of€persons€of€which€the€party€seeking€toÏavoid€the€contract€is€a€member.ÌÌÓÓÌò òòòNewtonó óóó,€878€S.W.2d€at€108€(citations€omitted).€€In€the€instantÏcase,€Pratt€argues€that€the€Act€incorporates€a€public€policy€ofÏprotecting€medical€patients€from€excessive€charges€for€copies€ofÏtheir€records,€and€that€the€legislative€history€of€the€ActÍsupports€this€conclusion.€€Pratt€contends€that€Smartððs€actionsÏconstitute€a€violation€of€the€Act€and€that€the€subject€transactionÏtherefore€is€voidable€under€the€principle€set€forth€in€ò òòòNewtonó óóó.ÌÌà àà àAs€a€second€theory€of€recovery,€Pratt€argues€that€theÏrecord€contains€evidence€from€which€a€jury€could€conclude€that€herÏattorneyððs€payment€of€Smartððs€invoice€constitutes€a€voidableÏcontract€of€adhesion.ÌÌà àà àSmart,€on€the€other€hand,€advances€a€variety€of€theoriesÏto€support€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment€in€itsÏfavor.€€As€œpreviously€indicated,›€the€trial€court€did€not€œgive€aÏdetailed›€explanation€œfor€its€decision›€that€ð ðthe€statute€inÏœquestion...does›€not€allow€recovery€for€this€plaintiff€against€thisÏdefendant.ðð€€We€will€not€attempt€to€discern€the€reasons€for€theÏtrial€courtððs€decision€but€instead€will€review€the€record€òòde€œnovoóóÏwithout€a€presumption€of€correctness,€ò òòòGonzalesó óóó,€857€S.W.2d€at€44,Ïto€determine€if€summary€judgment€for€Smart€is€appropriate.›ÌÌà àà àSmartððs€primary€defense€to€Prattððs€claim,€and€itsÏprincipal€argument€for€sustaining€the€trial€courtððs€decision,€isÏbased€upon€the€voluntary€payment€rule.€€That€doctrine€œprovides›Íthat€where€one€makes€a€voluntary€payment€with€knowledge€of€allÏrelevant€facts,€and€then€sues€to€recover€that€payment,€thereÏgenerally€can€be€no€recovery,€even€if€there€was€no€legal€liabilityÏto€pay€in€the€first€place.€€ò òòòRoach€v.€Underwoodóóó ó,€241€S.W.2d€498,Ï499€(Tenn.€1951).€€In€accordance€with€this€principle,€SmartÏcontends€that€Pratt€is€barred€from€recovery,€due€to€the€fact€thatÏher€attorney€voluntarily€paid€the€invoice€with€knowledge€of€allÏrelevant€facts.ÌÌà àà àSmart€relies€upon€œthe€case€of€ò òòòCotton›€v.€Med„CorÏHealth€Information€Solutions,€Inc.óóó ó,€472€S.E.2d€92,€221€Ga.App.Ï609€œ(1996),€a€decision€of€the€Georgia€Court€of€Appeals.›€€In€thatÏcase,€the€court€held€that€the€plaintiffs€„„€former€hospitalÏpatients€who€alleged€that€they€had€been€overcharged€for€copies€ofÏtheir€medical€records€„„€were€barred€from€recovery,€due€to€theirÏvoluntary€payment€of€the€invoices€for€such€copies,€regardless€ofÏthe€fact€that€the€charges€were€in€violation€of€a€œstatute,€which€is›Ïsimilar€to€the€one€in€the€œinstant€case.›€€ò òòòIdó óóó.€at€96.€€Smart€arguesÏthat€the€same€reasoning€is€applicable€to€the€œcase€now€before€us.›ÌÌà àà àIn€addition,€Smart€offers€various€arguments€regardingÏthe€scope€and€purpose€of€the€Act.€€Specifically,€it€contends€thatÍthe€Act€does€not€authorize€a€lawsuit€of€this€kind€or€provide€aÏcause€of€action€against€an€independent€copying€service.€€PrattÏthen€insists€that€the€Actððs€ð ðreasonable€costsðð€provision€imposes€aÏduty€upon€requestors€of€medical€records,€rather€than€uponÏhospitals,€which€Smart€maintains€are€the€intended€beneficiaries€ofÏthat€provision.€€Smart€also€contends€that€any€resort€to€the€ActððsÏlegislative€history€is€unwarranted,€since€an€ordinary€constructionÏof€the€statute€shows€that€the€Act€is€an€ð ðaccessðð€statute,Ïbenefitting€patients€who€require€access€to€their€records.€ÏAccording€to€Smart,€Pratt€was€not€in€the€class€of€personsÏprotected€by€the€Act,€since€she€had€already€obtained€access€to€herÏrecords€at€the€time€she€filed€suit.€€Smart€further€argues€that€theÏAct€merely€provides€a€recipient€of€copies€with€a€defense€toÏunreasonable€charges,€and€that€such€defense€may€be€œwaived,€e.g.,›Ïunder€the€voluntary€payment€rule.€€In€addition,€Smart€contendsÏthat€since€the€Act€fails€to€set€forth€any€maximum€charge€forÏcopies€of€medical€records,€the€only€standard€by€which€such€chargesÏare€measured€is€that€of€reasonableness;€thus,€according€to€Smart,Ïthe€definition€of€what€constitutes€a€ð ðreasonableðð€cost€is€leftÏentirely€to€the€parties€to€a€given€œtransaction:€if€an€invoice€isÏrendered€and€paid,€the€parties€to€the€transaction€have€agreed€thatÏthe€cost€is€reasonable,€regardless€of€the€amount.›ÌÌà àà àAs€further€support€for€the€trial€courtððs€decision,€SmartÏargues€that€the€charge€of€$28.58€was€not€unreasonable.€€ItÏmaintains€that€shifting€copying€costs€away€from€health€careÏproviders,€at€the€expense€of€individual€patients,€is€notÏunreasonable.€€As€an€additional€theory,€Smart€argues€that€theÏparties€were€in€òòpari€delictoóó,€thus€precluding€either€party€fromÏseeking€relief€on€the€basis€of€any€illegality€in€the€contract.€ÏFinally,€Smart€contends€that€the€subject€transaction€cannot€beÏconsidered€a€contract€of€adhesion,€since€Prattððs€attorney€paid€theÏinvoice€after€his€receipt€of€the€copies.ÌÌà àà àIn€response€to€Smartððs€contentions,€Pratt€submits€theÏfollowing€arguments:€that€the€jury€could€conclude€that€œthe€payment›Ïof€the€invoice€œby€Prattððs€attorney€was›€not€voluntary,€givenÏSmartððs€monopoly€over€her€hospital€records;€that€the€Act€doesÏprovide€a€private€cause€of€action€to€remedy€violations€of€itsÏterms;€that€the€Actððs€failure€to€establish€a€maximum€amount€forÏcopy€charges€is€irrelevant,€since€the€paramount€question€isÏwhether€the€contract€violates€the€public€policy€embodied€in€theÏAct;€that€the€Act€speaks€in€terms€of€reasonable€òòcostsóó,€rather€thanÏcharges,€and€a€jury€could€conclude€that€$28.58€exceeded€theÍreasonable€costs€of€copying€and€mailing€Prattððs€records;€that€anÏagent€may€not€accomplish€for€its€principal€an€act€which€theÏprincipal€is€forbidden€to€accomplish€itself,€and€that€thereforeÏSmart€is€liable€despite€the€Actððs€failure€to€specifically€addressÏindependent€copying€companies;€and€finally,€that€Pratt€was€not€inÏòòpari€delictoóó€with€Smart.ÌÌà@ àIV.€€òòApplication€of€the€Voluntary€Payment€RuleóóÌÌà àà àWe€shall€first€address€Smartððs€œprimary€contention›€œ„„Ïthat›€Prattððs€claim€is€barred€by€virtue€of€her€attorneyððs€voluntaryÏpayment€of€the€invoice.€€Our€review€of€the€record€and€the€relevantÏcase€law€persuades€us€that€the€voluntary€payment€rule€is€notÏapplicable€œto€bar€this€action.›ÌÌà àà àWe€recognize€that€Smartððs€position€is€in€accord€with€theÏGeorgia€case€of€òòò òCotton€v.€Med„Cor€Health€InformationÏSolutions,€Inc.óóó ó,€472€S.E.2d€92,€221€Ga.App.€609€(1996).€€ThatÏdecision€is€based€upon€a€specific€Georgia€statute× ƒ2 ××  ×€that€sets€forthÏthat€stateððs€version€of€the€voluntary€payment€rule.€€In€Tennessee,Ïhowever,€the€voluntary€payment€rule€œfinds€its€genesis€in€theÍcommon›€law.€€òòSee,€e.g.,€ò òRoach€v.€Underwoodó óóó,€241€S.W.2d€498Ï(Tenn.€1951).€€Other€authority€in€this€jurisdiction€indicates€thatÏthis€common€law€doctrine€is€not€universally€applicable€to€allÏtransactions.€€Specifically,€the€case€of€ò òòòNewton€v.€Coxóóó ó,€878ÏS.W.2d€105€(Tenn.€1994),€illustrates€that€the€voluntary€paymentÏrule€does€not€come€into€play€in€situations€involving€a€transactionÏœthat€violates›€œpublic›€policy.€€In€that€decision,€the€Supreme€CourtÏheld€that€a€medical€malpractice€client€could€recover€an€excessiveÏfee€that€he€had€already€remitted€but€which€was€in€derogation€ofÏthe€public€policy€behind€a€specific€statute.€€òòò òIdó óóó.€€òòò òNewtonó óóó€thusÏrecognizes€that,€where€public€policy€has€been€established€by€œaÏlegislative€enactment,›€œa›€transaction€that€is€violative€of€thatÏpolicy€is€subject€to€inquiry€even€though€it€may€be€fullyÏconsummated.€€òòSeeóó€ò òòòIdóóó ó.€€In€other€words,€the€œState›€has€an€interestÏin€transactions€that€involve€violations€of€statutorily„definedÏpublic€policy,€œand,€generally€speaking,›€in€such€situations,€theÏvoluntary€payment€rule€will€not€be€œapplicable.›€€œRelying€on€ò òòòNewtonó óóóÏand€its€analysis,€we›€find€that€œthe€voluntary€payment€rule›€presentsÏno€impediment€to€Prattððs€cause€of€action,€and€thus€does€notÍprovide€an€adequate€basis€for€sustaining€the€trial€courtððs€grantÏof€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€Smart.× ƒ3 ××  ×ÌÌà@ àV.€€òòAnalysis€of€Smartððs€Other€ArgumentsóóÌÌà àà àWe€turn€now€to€Smartððs€other€justifications€for€theÏtrial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment.€€Initially,€we€disagreeÏwith€Smart€to€the€extent€that€it€argues€that€the€Act€does€notÏauthorize€a€cause€of€action€such€as€the€one€in€this€case.€€The€ActÏclearly€contemplates€private€actions€to€remedy€violations€of€itsÏterms,€as€evidenced€by€its€provision€for€the€recovery€of€ð ðactualÏœdamages€in€a€civil€action›€for€œwillful€or›€reckless€or€œwantonðð›Ïviolations.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€68„11„311.ÌÌà àà àSecondly,€we€disagree€with€Smartððs€contention€that€byÏits€terms,€the€Act€does€not€apply€to€independent€copying€services.€ÏIt€is€true€that€the€Act€does€not€specifically€mention€suchÏentities;€nevertheless,€it€is€clear€in€this€case€that€Smart€actedÏas€the€hospitalððs€authorized€agent,€and,€as€such,€could€notÏperform€acts€which€the€hospital€was€forbidden€by€law€to€performÍitself.€€Furthermore,€in€the€ò òòòCottonó óóó€case,€upon€which€Smart€relies,Ïthe€Georgia€Court€of€Appeals€specifically€held€that€a€statuteÏsubstantially€similar€to€the€Act€œwas›€applicable€to€independentÏcopying€services.€€ò òòòCottonó óóó,€472€S.E.2d€at€95.€€The€œcourt›€œin€ò òòòCottonó óóóÏstated›€that€the€legislatureððs€objective€of€ensuring€that€patientsÏhave€access€to€medical€records€at€a€reasonable€costÌÌÓÓà àà8 àwould€be€completely€defeated€through€aÏconstruction€of€the€Act€that€would€allowÏpatients€to€be€charged€more€than€theÏreasonable€copying€and€mailing€costs€if€theÏproviders€hire€others€to€perform€the€task€ofÏsupplying€the€records.ÌÌÓÓÌò òòòIdóóó ó.€€We€agree€with€this€reasoning,€and€we€therefore€find€that€theÏAct€applies€to€independent€entities€that€are€retained€to€provideÏcopying€services€œfor›€hospitals.ÌÌà àà àAs€set€forth€earlier€in€this€opinion,€Smart€presentsÏseveral€arguments€pertaining€to€the€proper€construction€andÏapplication€of€the€Act.€€We€agree€with€Smart€that,€in€the€absenceÏof€any€ambiguity,€the€Act€need€only€be€enforced€as€written,Ïwithout€reference€to€its€legislative€history.€€òòSee€ò òIn€reÏConservatorship€of€Claytonó óóó,€914€S.W.2d€84,€90€(Tenn.App.€1995).€ÏWe€take€issue,€however,€with€several€aspects€of€Smartððs€analysisÍof€the€Act€and€its€application€to€the€facts€before€us.€€WeÏdisagree€that€the€Actððs€ð ðreasonable€costsðð€provision€was€intendedÏto€benefit€only€the€hospital€by€imposing€a€duty€of€payment€upon€aÏrequestor€of€medical€records.€€On€the€contrary,€that€provision€wasÏclearly€intended€to€protect€a€requestor€of€records€from€excessiveÏcharges.€€We€also€disagree€with€Smartððs€contention€that€the€ActÏonly€confers€upon€a€patient€a€defense€to€unreasonable€charges,€andÏthat€such€defense€can€be€waived€by€a€voluntary€payment€of€theÏamount€charged.€€As€stated€earlier,€the€Act€benefits€the€patientÏby€providing€the€remedy€of€actual€damages,€and€the€voluntaryÏpayment€rule€will€not€be€implicated€where€a€transaction€is€inÏviolation€of€its€terms.€€ÌÌà àà àBy€the€same€token,€we€disagree€with€Smartððs€positionÏthat€the€Actððs€failure€to€establish€a€definite€maximum€chargeÏallows€the€parties€to€define€ð ðreasonableðð€costs€in€any€way€thatÏthey€choose.€€An€excessive€amount,€although€œtacitly€agreed›€to€byÏthe€parties,€will€nevertheless€violate€the€provisions€of,€andÏpolicy€behind,€the€Act.€€We€also€find€no€merit€in€the€argumentÏthat€because€she€had€already€received€copies€of€her€medicalÏrecords€at€the€time€she€filed€suit,€Pratt€was€not€in€the€class€ofÏpersons€protected€by€the€Act,€i.e.,€individuals€seeking€òòaccessóó€toÍtheir€medical€records.€€We€agree€that€the€Act€serves€to€provideÏpatients€with€access€to€their€records;€however,€as€previouslyÏdiscussed,€the€Act€also€is€intended€to€protect€such€individualsÏfrom€excessive€charges.€€This€latter€protection€is€availableÏwhether€or€not€the€records€have€been€received.€€Pratt€thus€fallsÏsquarely€within€the€œprotective›€ambit€of€the€Act.€€Likewise,€theÏfact€that€it€was€Prattððs€attorney,€rather€than€Pratt€herself,€whoÏreceived€the€records€and€paid€the€invoice€presents€no€obstacle€toÏPrattððs€claim,€since€her€attorney€clearly€acted€on€her€behalf€inÏobtaining€the€records.œ× ƒ4 ××  ×›ÌÌà àà àWe€also€find€Smartððs€theory€that€the€parties€were€inÏòòpari€delictoóó€to€be€without€merit.€€This€is€not€a€situation€inÏwhich€both€parties€to€a€transaction€were€involved€in€improperÏconduct.€€Neither€Pratt€nor€her€attorney€were€involved€in€settingÏthe€price€of€the€copies,€and€the€mere€fact€that€her€attorney€hadÏpreviously€engaged€in€similar€transactions€with€Smart€isÏinsufficient€to€establish€such€a€defense.ÌÌà àà àFinally,€Smart€argues€that€the€charge€of€$28.58€forÏcopying€and€mailing€Prattððs€medical€records€was€reasonable.€€WeÏbelieve€that€this€represents€a€disputed€question€of€fact€that€isÏproperly€left€for€the€œtrier€of€fact.›ÌÌà@ àVI.€€òòConclusionóóÌÌà àà àœFinding€no€basis€for€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summaryÏjudgment€in€this€case,€we€conclude€that€the€judgment€now€before€usÏis€erroneous.€€Given›€this€determination,€we€œdo€not€find€it›Ïœnecessary›€œto€address›€the€question€of€whether€the€subjectÏtransaction€œconstitutes›€a€voidable€contract€of€adhesion.ÌÌà àà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€hereby€vacated.€ÏCosts€on€appeal€are€assessed€to€the€appellee.€€This€case€isÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€for€such€further€proceedings€as€areÏnecessary,€consistent€with€this€opinion.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à__________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€J.ÌÌÌÌœÇCONCUR:›ÌÌÌÌ_________________________ÌHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.ÌÌÌÌ_________________________ÌWilliam€H.€Inman,€œSr.J.›