ÿWPC@! 9# .UN9 %‡ 0 (w@µ4õ  0l  0DŒ 0JÐ 0T 0^n 0hÌ 0r4 0|¦ 0†" 0¨ 1u8 0d­ 0@ D3Q B„ U>¡ B)ß DC AMK AQ˜ Æé 0D¯ 0Dó D/7 Bf U*ƒ ­ 8´]ìÄI  Å-ýòv~ïvÓm˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ÒVÓVÔVÕDÖD×DØEÙÓ€åêB\J#3|xê((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò""""'ÿÿdxd d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd* 'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Arial ýÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔÔ€/ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€/XÔÌÌò òNovember€25,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€/ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó .Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝPruett€also€submitted€the€affidavit€of€Patricia€Dotson,€who€stated€that€her€physicianÏrecommended€that€she€not€work€in€a€job€that€required€a€lot€of€standing.€€On€June€17,€1994,€DotsonÏsaid€that€she€asked€Hollis€about€a€job€she€could€do€while€sitting.€€She€said€that€Hillis€told€her€thatÏthe€only€such€job€was€the€telephone€position,€and€that€he€already€had€Pruett,€Mary€Morphis€andÏPeggy€West€scheduled€for€it.€€Ì SÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝPruett€asserts€that€Pittman€sought€an€accommodation€from€Wal„Mart,€to€transfer€òòfromóó€theÏtelephone€position€to€a€òòlessóó€sedentary€position,€and€that€Wal„Mart€failed€to€accommodate€her.Ì ºÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ýð ð€The€term€ððqualified€individual€with€a€disabilityðð€means€an€individual€with€a€disabilityÓ  ÓÏwho,€with€or€without€reasonable€accommodation,€can€perform€the€essential€functions€of€theÏemployment€position€that€such€individual€holds€or€desires.ðð€42€U.S.C.A.€ðð€12111(8)€(1995).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ýð ð[U]ndue€hardship,ðð€means€an€action€requiring€significant€difficulty€or€expense€.€.€.€.ðð€42ÏU.S.C.A.€ðð€12111(10)€(1995).Ì »Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝPruett€testified€in€her€deposition€that€she€is€only€disabled€ð ðto€stand€or€walk.ðð€€She€assertedÏthat€she€could€perform€a€sedentary€job,€and€that€she€informed€the€Social€Security€Administration€ofÏthis.€€Under€these€circumstances,€her€prior€statement€would€not€contradict€her€assertions€here.€Ì óÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„50„103(a)€provides€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓ  ÓÌà8 àThere€shall€be€no€discrimination€in€the€hiring,€firing€and€other€terms€and€conditionsÏof€employment€of€the€state€of€Tennessee€or€any€department,€agency,€institution€orÏpolitical€subdivision€of€the€state,€or€of€any€private€employer,€against€any€applicantÏfor€employment€based€solely€upon€any€physical,€mental€or€visual€handicap€of€theÏapplicant,€unless€such€handicap€to€some€degree€prevents€the€applicant€fromÏperforming€the€duties€required€by€the€employment€sought€or€impairs€theÏperformance€of€the€work€involved.à8 àÌÌ€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›Ñ7€ìXXdðdÈ7Ñò òœ›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óÌà@ àò òWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSON€€€ÌÙ€*ÙœßR€(0'A1-j|Ž-` Å `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌóóÌÌELLA€FRANCES€PRUETT,€€€€à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant,ò òà àà àà à)à àó óMadison€Chancery€No.€50067€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌWAL„MART€STORES,€INC.,€€€€€€€à à€€à à)à àó óAppeal€No.€02A01„9610„CH„00266Ìò òà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àDefendant/Appellee.€à àà àò òà à)à àÌó óòòÌóóò òÌ€€€ÌÌÌà@ àó óAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€MADISON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€JACKSON,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€JOE€C.€MORRIS,€CHANCELLOR€òòÌÌÌFor€the€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:òòà àà àà àFor€the€Defendant/Appelleeóó:òòÌóóÌHite€McLean,€Jr.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àCharles€H.€Barnett,€III€€€ÌMemphis,€Tennessee€œ€›€à àà àà àJustin€S.€Gilbert€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€Jackson,€TennesseeÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌò òÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAFFIRMED€IN€PART,€REVERSED€INÏPART,€€à àà àà àà àà àà àAND€REMANDEDÌà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àó óHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòòÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌØØÙ  ÙÓÓÑ7€ìXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ќ̛à@ àò òOPINIONó ớ̜à àThis€is€an€employment€discrimination€case.€€The€plaintiff,€an€employee€of€a€departmentÏstore,€developed€problems€with€her€feet€and€was€unable€to€stand€or€walk€for€long€periods.€€SheÏcontends€that€the€defendant€store€refused€to€assign€her€to€a€position€answering€the€telephone,Ïalleging€discrimination€on€the€basis€of€age€and€disability,€as€well€as€an€intent€to€take€away€herÏmedical€insurance€benefits.€€The€trial€court€granted€summary€judgment€to€the€employer.€€We€affirmÏin€part,€reverse€in€part,€and€remand.Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant€Ella€Frances€Pruett€(ð ðPruettðð)€was€hired€by€Defendant/Appellee€Wal„Mart€Stores,€Inc.€€(ð ðWal„Martðð)€in€1985,€at€the€age€of€52.€€She€was€hired€to€work€as€a€cashier.€ÏFor€several€years€she€worked€as€either€a€cashier€or€a€sales€clerk.€€During€some€of€this€time€period,Ïshe€worked€in€the€domestics€department.€€In€1988,€Pruett€injured€her€foot.€€For€several€weeks€sheÏwas€assigned€the€job€of€answering€the€telephones.€€When€she€had€recuperated€she€returned€to€herÏprevious€duties.€Ìà àAfter€Pruett€returned€to€her€regular€duties,€when€Pruett€worked€in€domestics,€she€workedÏunder€the€supervision€of€George€Hobson.€€Hobson€felt€Pruett€was€a€very€good€employee.€€DuringÏœthis›€same€time€period,€the€department€manager€over€domestics,€Shirley€Flake,€complainedÏrepeatedly€about€Pruett€to€the€store€manager,€John€Hillis.€€During€March,€1993,€Hobson€was€outÏon€an€extended€sick€leave.€€His€replacement€during€that€time€filed€two€written€reprimands,€termedÏð ðcoaching€records,ðð€regarding€Pruettððs€negative€attitude€and€other€work€problems.€€In€late€March,Ï1993,€because€of€these€problems,€Pruett€was€transferred€from€domestics€to€the€checkout€area.Ìà àMeanwhile,€Pruett€once€again€developed€foot€problems.€€Eventually,€in€œSeptember€1993,›ÏPruett€underwent€surgery€to€treat€degenerative€bone€and€joint€disease€in€her€foot.€€She€was€againÍassigned€to€answer€the€phones€at€the€store€during€her€recovery.€€After€three€weeks€of€answeringÏthe€phones,€€Wal„Mart€reassigned€Pruett€to€her€original€position€as€cashier,€which€required€her€toÏstand€for€long€periods.€€This€exacerbated€her€foot€problems,€and€Pruett€left€work€for€severalÏmonths.€€In€February,€1994,€Pruett€underwent€another€foot€surgery.€€While€recuperating€from€herÏsecond€surgery,€Pruett€learned€of€Wal„Martððs€plans€to€open€a€new€store€in€the€area€in€August€ofÏ1994.€€In€May€1994,€while€still€off€work€recuperating,€she€applied€for€a€job€answering€phones€atÏthe€new€store.€€Pruett€alleges€that€the€store€manager,€John€Hillis,€promised€her€the€job.€Ìà àPruett€returned€to€work€on€June€27,€1994,€and€was€assigned€to€answer€the€telephones.€ÏPruettððs€job€performance€in€this€position€is€in€dispute.€€On€July€1,€1994,€Hillis€made€the€decisionÏto€transfer€Pruett€from€the€telephone€position.€€Ìà àPruett€was€then€assigned€to€a€position€hanging€apparel€in€the€stock€room.€€Because€of€theÏstress€to€her€feet,€Pruett€could€only€work€in€the€stock€room€for€four€hours€a€day.€€In€late€July,ÏPruett€obtained€a€doctorððs€note€specifying€she€could€only€work€while€sitting,€and€Hillis€informedÏher€there€were€no€such€jobs€available.€€In€August,€Pruett€learned€that€she€did€not€receive€theÏtelephone€operator€position€in€the€new€store.€€From€August€1,€1994,€until€August€28,€1995,€PruettÏdid€not€work.€€She€collected€social€security€disability€payments€during€this€time.€€After€PruettÏtendered€Wal„Mart€a€letter€of€resignation,€Wal„Mart€offered€Pruett€a€job€at€the€new€Supercenter€atÏthe€cosmetics€counter€where€she€could€use€a€stool€to€relieve€the€stress€on€her€feet.€€This€job€did€notÏexist€at€the€old€Wal„Mart€store.€€The€record€indicates€that€Pruett€has€since€continued€herÏemployment€at€Wal„Mart,€though€not€in€a€position€answering€telephones.€Ìà àPruett€filed€this€lawsuit€on€January€25,€1995,€alleging€violations€of€the€federal€AmericansÏwith€Disabilities€Act€(ð ðADAðð),€the€federal€Age€Discrimination€in€Employment€Act€(ð ðADEAðð),€theÏfederal€Employee€Retirement€Income€and€Security€Act€(ð ðERISAðð),€and€the€Tennessee€HumanÏRights€Act€(ð ðTHRAðð).€€Pruett€alleged€that€Wal„Mart€did€not€award€her€the€job€answering€phones€inÏthe€new€store€because€of€her€age€and/or€her€disability.€€Pruett€claimed€that€Wal„Mart€failed€toÏaccommodate€her€disability€because€it€did€not€reassign€her€to€the€telephone€position,€a€job€thatÍallowed€her€to€sit€while€working.€€Pruett€also€asserted€a€third€claim€under€ERISA:€she€maintainedÏthat€Wal„Mart€removed€her€from€the€job€answering€the€phone,€which€she€could€perform€eightÏhours€a€day,€and€put€her€in€a€job€she€could€work€only€four€hours€a€day,€so€that€she€would€noÏlonger€be€eligible€for€coverage€under€Wal„Martððs€medical€insurance€plan.€€She€asserted€that€Wal„Mart€did€this€to€avoid€paying€her€future€medical€benefits.€Ìà àWal„Mart€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€asserting€that€it€had€a€legitimate,€non„discriminatory€reason€for€not€assigning€Pruett€to€a€position€answering€telephones.€€In€an€affidavitÏsubmitted€by€Wal„Mart€in€support€of€its€motion,€store€manager€Hillis€asserted€that,€in€PruettððsÏemployment€history€since€1985,€some€employees€had€difficulty€getting€along€with€her.€€RegardingÏPruettððs€job€performance€answering€telephones,€Hillis€stated€that€he€had€received€complaints€fromÏothers€about€Pruett€ð ðcutting€them€off.ðð€€Hillis€also€stated€that€he€had€heard€Pruett€relay€messages€on€Ïthe€storeððs€public€address€(PA)€system,€and€asserted€that:ÌÓÓà8 à.€.€.€she€was€not€tactful,€she€was€impatient,€and€she€was€callous.€€For€example,€if€aÏWal„Mart€associate€did€not€answer€her€first€call,€Pruett€would€call€again€with€aÏpiercing€tone€that€I€believe€did€not€project€favorably€on€Wal„Martððs€public€image.€€IÏpersonally€counseled€Pruett€several€times€about€her€tone€and€her€brashness.€ÌÌÓÓHillis€also€indicated€that€Pruettððs€duties€on€the€telephone€included€reference€checks,€and€that€PruettÏasked€inappropriate€questions.€Hillis€noted€that€the€telephone€system€at€the€new€Supercenter€wasÏmuch€more€complex€than€that€at€the€old€store.€€He€stated€that,€considering€Pruettððs€problems€on€theÏsmaller€telephone€system€and€his€ð ðperception€of€her€inability€to€maintain€an€appropriate€publicÏdemeanor,ðð€he€did€not€assign€Pruett€to€a€telephone€position€at€the€new€Supercenter.€€€Hillis€deniedÏany€€discrimination.Ìà àIn€response€to€Wal„Martððs€motion,€Pruett€filed€several€affidavits.€Pruett€filed€the€affidavitÏof€Karen€Crook,€who€stated€that€she€had€worked€for€approximately€three€years€in€the€late€1980's€inÏdomestics€as€the€department€manager,€and€that€Pruett€had€worked€under€her€supervision.€€CrookÏstated€that€Pruett€ð ðwas€a€good€worker€and€had€a€good€attitude.€.€.€.ðð€€In€addition,€Pruett€filed€anÏaffidavit€from€Sarah€Scott,€a€Wal„Mart€manager€from€approximately€1986„1988.€€She€stated€thatÍPruett€always€tried€ð ðto€do€her€best,ðð€and€was€ð ðnice€and€helpful€and€friendlyðð€to€customers.€€PruettÏalso€filed€an€affidavit€from€George€Hobson,€assistant€manager€of€the€store€until€June€1993.€ÏHobson€stated€that€Pruett€ð ðwas€a€very€good€employee.ðð€€He€acknowledged€that€the€departmentÏmanager€over€domestics,€Shirley€Flake,€œhad›€complained€to€Hillis€repeatedly€about€Pruett.€€HobsonÏnoted€that€he€did€not€agree€with€Flakeððs€complaints.€€Hobson€disputed€Hillisðð€assertions€in€HillisððÏdeposition€that€Hobson€had€complained€about€Pruett.€€Hobson€noted€the€ð ðcoaching€recordsðð€issuedÏto€Pruett€about€her€negative€attitude€and€job€performance€by€Hobsonððs€replacement€during€anÏextended€sick€leave€in€March,€1993.€€Hobson€indicated€he€did€not€agree€with€the€coaching€records.Ìà àFinally,€Pruett€submitted€her€own€affidavit.€€In€it,€Pruett€stated€that,€in€May€1994,€HillisÏtold€her€that€she€would€be€assigned€a€telephone€position,× ƒ1 ××  ×€first€at€the€old€store€and€then€at€the€newÏSupercenter€when€it€opened.€€She€recounted€returning€to€work€on€June€27,€1994,€and€beingÏassigned€to€answer€the€telephones.€€A€few€days€later,€on€July€1,€1994,€Hillis€transferred€PruettÏaway€from€the€telephone€position.€€Pruett€stated€that€Hillis€did€not€tell€her€at€that€time€that€herÏperformance€had€been€unsatisfactory.€€In€August,€when€she€was€told€she€would€not€be€assigned€aÏtelephone€position€at€the€new€Supercenter,€Pruett€stated€that€Hillis€told€her€for€the€first€time€that€heÏhad€ð ðreceived€complaintsðð€about€her€performance€in€the€telephone€position€at€the€old€store.€€SheÏdenied€receiving€any€counseling€or€warnings€about€her€performance€prior€to€then.€€She€stated€thatÏother€employees€also€had€problems€cutting€people€off€on€the€telephone,€and€that€any€problems€withÏthat€were€not€her€fault.€€She€stated€that,€only€once€several€years€earlier,€she€was€counseled€that€herÏvoice€was€too€loud€on€the€PA€system.€€Pruett€denied€being€rude€or€abrupt€with€anyone€on€theÏtelephone,€and€asserted€that€she€had€never€been€told€that€her€questions€on€reference€checks€wereÏinappropriate.Ìà àAfter€reviewing€Wal„Martððs€motion€and€Pruettððs€response,€the€trial€court€granted€summaryÏjudgment€in€favor€of€Wal„Mart.€€It€explained€its€reasoning:ÌÓÓà8 àà àThe€Plaintiff,€Ella€Frances€Pruett,€has€filed€this€lawsuit€claimingÏdiscrimination€and€damages€because€she€was€not€placed€in€a€job€at€the€new€Wal„Mart€Super€Center€in€Jackson,€Tennessee,€answering€the€telephone.€€In€order€toÏprevail€in€this€litigation,€the€Plaintiff€must€prove€that€she€was€not€given€the€job€thatÏshe€desired€because€of€her€age,€which€is€over€fifty€(50),€her€medical€expensesÏassociated€with€her€feet,€which€is€over€$9,000,€or€because€of€the€problem€with€herÏfeet.ÌÌà8 àà àThe€Plaintiff€was€not€fired€from€her€job,€but€is,€in€fact,€still€working€at€theÏWal„Mart€Super€Center€in€a€job€other€than€answering€the€telephone.€€Her€insuranceÏbenefits€have€not€been€terminated€and€are€also€in€full€effect.€€ÌÌà8 àà àThe€reason€given€by€Wal„Mart€offices€in€their€affidavits€is€that€the€decisionÏto€not€place€the€plaintiff€in€the€telephone€answering€position€was€a€business€one,Ïand€had€nothing€to€do€with€age,€disability,€or€medical€bills.€€In€her€opposingÏaffidavits,€various€employees€have€sworn€that€Ms.€Pruett€was€a€good€employee,Ïetc.€€Ms.€Pruett,€in€her€affidavit€and€deposition,€theorizes€that€she€thought€it€wasÏbecause€of€age€and€her€feet,€but€she€had€no€proof€that€would€corroborate€herÏtheory.ÌÌà8 àà àThe€Court€is€of€the€opinion€that€there€are€no€issues€of€material€fact.€€TheÏreason€that€she€was€not€placed€on€the€job€was€a€business€decision€made€by€Wal„Mart€that€she€was€not€the€right€person€for€that€particular€job,€and€not€because€sheÏwas€œprejudiced›€or€discriminated€against€because€of€age€or€feet.ÌÌÓÓFrom€this€decision,€Pruett€now€appeals.€€Ìà àOn€appeal,€Pruett€argues€that€summary€judgment€was€improper€in€this€case€because€sheÏproduced€sufficient€evidence€to€rebut€the€Defendantððs€alleged€nondiscriminatory€reason€œfor€its›Ïdecision€not€to€assign€her€to€the€telephone€position.€€ÌœÇ›à àA€motion€for€summary€judgment€should€be€granted€when€the€movant€demonstrates€thatÏthere€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€judgment€as€aÏmatter€of€law.€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.03.€€The€party€requesting€summary€judgment€bears€the€burdenÏof€demonstrating€that€no€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€exists.€ò òòòByrd€v.€Hallóóó ó,€847€S.W.2d€208,Ï211€(Tenn.€1993).€€On€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€court€must€take€the€strongestÏlegitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€inÏfavor€of€that€party,€and€discard€all€countervailing€evidence.€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€210„11.€€Summary€judgment€isÏonly€appropriate€when€the€facts€and€the€legal€conclusions€drawn€from€the€facts€reasonably€permitÏonly€one€conclusion.€€òòò òCarvell€v.€Bottomsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26.€(Tenn.€1995).€€Since€onlyÏquestions€of€law€are€involved,€on€appeal€there€is€no€presumption€of€correctness€regarding€a€trialÏcourtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment.€ò òòòId.óóó ó€€Ìà àThe€core€allegation€for€Pruettððs€discrimination€claims€is€that€Wal„Mart€discriminated€againstÏher€by€refusing€to€assign€her€to€the€telephone€position.€€Pruett€does€not€allege€that€she€was€fired;Ïindeed,€the€record€indicates€that€she€continues€to€work€for€Wal„Mart.€€Therefore,€her€overall€jobÏperformance€in€other€positions,€while€relevant€background,€is€not€the€core€factual€issue€in€thisÏcase.€€Rather,€her€qualifications€for,€and€performance€in,€the€telephone€position€must€be€the€focusÏof€the€factual€analysis.Ìà àIn€Hillisðð€affidavit€in€support€of€Wal„Martððs€motion€for€summary€judgment,€Hillis€assertsÏthat€Pruettððs€manner€on€the€telephone€was€ð ðnot€tactful,€.€.€.€€impatient,€and€.€.€.€callous.ðð€€HeÏcriticized€her€ð ðtone€and€.€.€.€€brashnessðð€œon€the›€PA€system,€and€stated€that€he€had€counseled€herÏð ðseveral€timesðð€about€these€concerns.€€He€also€referred€to€inappropriate€questions€on€referenceÏchecks€and€problems€with€cutting€callers€off.Ìà àTo€rebut,€Pruett€submitted€the€affidavits€of€Karen€Crook€and€Sarah€Scott,€who€testified€thatÏPruett€had€been€a€good€employee€in€domestics€in€the€late€1980's.€€This€may€be€relevantÏbackground,€because€Hillis€indicates€in€his€affidavit€and€his€depositions€that€Pruettððs€problems€onÏthe€telephones€were€consistent€with€complaints€heððd€received€about€her€when€she€worked€in€otherÍdepartments.€€However,€Crookððs€and€Scottððs€affidavits€do€not€address€Wal„Martððs€core€assertion,Ïthat€is,€that€Pruettððs€performance€in€the€telephone€position€was€unacceptable.̜Ǜà àPruett€also€submitted€the€affidavit€of€George€Hobson,€who€likewise€asserts€that€Pruett€wasÏa€good€employee€in€the€domestics€department.€€Like€Crookððs€and€Scottððs€affidavits,€this€is€relevantÏbackground€but€does€not€address€Pruettððs€performance€in€the€telephone€position.€€Hobson€alsoÏdisputes€Hillisðð€statements€that€Hillis€had€received€complaints€about€Pruett€from€Hobson.€€This€isÏrelevant€regarding€Hillisðð€overall€credibility,€but€again€does€not€refute€Wal„Martððs€primary€reasonÏfor€its€action,€that€Pruettððs€performance€in€the€telephone€position€was€not€acceptable.€Ìà àIn€her€own€affidavit,€Pruett€does€not€dispute€problems€ð ðcutting€offðð€callers,€but€asserts€thatÏunnamed€others€had€similar€problems€and€that€the€telephone€system€was€the€reason.€€She€admitsÏbeing€told€in€years€prior€that€her€voice€on€the€PA€system€was€ð ðtoo€loud.ðð€€She€states€that€she€wasÏnever€counseled€or€warned€regarding€other€problems,€and€that€she€was€never€told€that€herÏquestions€on€reference€checks€were€inappropriate.€€Finally,€Pruett€states€that,€ð ðto€her€knowledge,ððÏshe€was€never€rude€or€abrupt€with€anyone€on€the€telephone.Ìà àTherefore,€at€the€focus€of€the€issues€in€this€case€is€Hillisðð€subjective€assessment€that€PruettÏwas€ð ðnot€tactful,€.€.€.€impatient,€and€.€.€.€callous,ðð€had€a€ð ðpiercing€toneðð€on€the€PA€system,€had€anÏunacceptable€ð ðtone€and€.€.€.€brashness,ðð€and€that€he€had€counseled€her€about€these€concerns€severalÏtimes.€€Juxtaposed€œagainst€this€assessment€is›€Pruettððs€assertion€that€she€was€never€told€of€suchÏproblems€and€that,€to€her€knowledge,€she€was€never€ð ðrudeðð€or€ð ðabruptðð€with€anyone€on€theÏtelephone.€Ìà@ àò òFEDERAL€AGE€DISCRIMINATIONó óÌà àPruett€claims€that€she€presented€sufficient€evidence€to€rebut€Wal„Martððs€claim€that€her€poorÏperformance€while€working€the€telephones€justified€managementððs€decision€to€assign€the€job€toÏsomeone€else.€€The€only€relevant€evidence€that€Pruett€submits€to€directly€refute€Wal„MartððsÏassertion€that€she€was€not€qualified€for€the€telephone€position€is€her€own€affidavit,€œin›€which€sheÏasserts€that€she€was€never€rude€or€abrupt€and€states€that€she€was€never€criticized€for€herÏperformance€on€the€phones€and€on€the€public€address€system€until€she€was€denied€the€permanentÏposition.€€Ìà àIn€an€employment€discrimination€action,€the€plaintiff€must€first€present€evidence€to€establishÏa€ò òòòprima€facieóóó ó€case€of€discrimination.€€Once€the€plaintiff€establishes€a€òòò òprima€facieó óóó€case,€theÏburden€of€proof€shifts€to€the€defendant€to€rebut€the€presumption€of€discrimination€by€articulating€aÏlegitimate,€non„discriminatory€reason€for€the€adverse€employment€decision.€€If€the€defendant€meetsÏthe€burden€of€€production,€the€burden€of€proof€shifts€again€to€the€plaintiff,€who€must€presentÏevidence€that€the€defendant€employerððs€reason€is€pretextual€or€that€the€reason€given€for€the€decisionÏis€not€believable€or€not€the€real€reason€for€the€decision.€ò òòòTexas€Department€€of€CommunityÏAffairs€v.€Burdineóóó ó,€450€œU.S.›€248,€256,€101€œS.€Ct.›€1089,€1095,€67€œL.€Ed.€2d›€207€(1981).€AtÏthis€point,€ð ðthe€plaintiff€must€produce€sufficient€evidence€from€which€the€jury€may€reasonablyÏreject€the€employerððs€explanation.ðð€ò òòòManzer€v.€Diamond€œShamrock€Chemicals€Co.óóó ó,›€29ÏF.3d€1078,€1083€(6th€Cir.€œ1994)›€œò òòò€(citing›€Gaworski€v.€ITT€Commercial€Finance€Corp.óóó ó,Ï17€F.3d€1104,€1109€(8th€Cir.€œ1994)).›€€The€plaintiff€may€discredit€the€employerððs€explanation€byÏshowing€that:€(1)€the€proffered€reasons€had€no€basis€in€fact;€(2)€the€proffered€reasons€did€notÏactually€motivate€the€employment€decision;€or€(3)€the€proffered€reasons€were€insufficient€toÏmotivate€the€employment€decision.€ò òòòManzeróóó ó,€29€œF.3d€at€1084›€(6th€Cir.€1994)€(quotingÏò òòòMcNabola€v.€Chicago€Transit€Authorityó óóó,€10€F.3d€501,€513€(7th€Cir.€1993)).€Ìà àPrior€to€1993,€some€courts€held€that€a€plaintiff€ð ðmust€do€more€than€simply€refute€or€castÏdoubt€on€the€companyððs€rationale€for€the€adverse€action.€€The€plaintiff€must€òòalsoóó€show€aÏdiscriminatory€animus€based€on€age.ðð€€ò òòòManzeró óóó,€29€F.2d€at€1082€(quoting€œò òòòMedina„Munoy›€v.ÏR.J€Reynolds€Tobacco€Co.ó óóó,€896€F.2d€5,€9€(1st€Cir.€1990)).€€œò òòòSee,›€e.g.,€€Woods€v.ÏFriction€œMaterials,€Inc.ó óóó,›€30€F.3d€255,€260€(1st€Cir.€1994)€(ð ðthe€plaintiff€cannot€avertÏsummary€judgment€if€the€record€is€devoid€of€adequate€direct€or€circumstantial€evidence€ofÏdiscriminatory€animus€on€the€part€of€the€employerðð);€òòò òManzer€v.€Diamond€Shamrockó óóó,€29€F.3dÏ1078€(6th€Cir.€1994);òòò ò€Kralman€v.€Illinois€Department€of€œVeteransðð€Affairsó óóó,›€23€F.3d€150Ï(7th€Cir.€1994);€òòò òAnderson€v.€Baxter€Healthcare€Corp.óóó ó,€13€F.3d€œ1120,€1125›€(7th€Cir.€1994)Ï(ð ðThe€mere€submission€of€materials€from€a€co„worker€or€supervisor€indicating€that€an€employeeððsÍperformance€is€satisfactory€.€.€.€does€not€create€a€material€issue€of€fact.ðð);€€ò òòòLeBlanc€v.€GreatÏAmerican€Insurance€Co.ó óóó,€6€F.3d€836€(1st€Cir.€1993);€ò òòòIrvin€v.€Airco€Carbideóóó ó,€837€F.2dÏ724€(6th€Cir.€1987).€€This€has€been€termed€the€ð ðpretext€plusðð€standard:€in€order€to€surviveÏsummary€judgment,€the€employment€discrimination€plaintiff€must€show€evidence€of€pretext,€òòplusóóÏdirect,€indirect,€or€circumstantial€evidence€of€discriminatory€animus€on€the€part€of€the€employer.Ïòòò òSee€Manzer€v.€Diamond€Shamrock€œChemicals€Co.óóó ó,›€29€F.3d€1078,€1082€(6th€Cir.€1994)Ï(citing€œò òòòMedina„Munoz,óóó 󛀜896€at›€œ9›€and€œò òòòAndersonóóó ó,›€13€œF.3d€at€1123„24;›€òòò òLeBlancó óóó,€6€F.3d€at€œ842„43.›€€ÌœÇ›à àThe€appropriate€standard€was€clarified€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€in€€ò òòòSt.€MaryððsÏHonor€Center€v.€Hicksóóó ó,€œ509€U.S.502,›€113€S.€Ct.€2742,€2748„49,€125€L.€Ed.€2d€407€œ(1993):›Ïð ðEven€œthough€.€.€.›€rejection€of€the€defendantððs€proffered€reasons€is€enough€at€law€to€òòsustainóó€aÏfinding€of€discrimination,òò€there€must€be€a€finding€of€discriminationóó.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€œ2749€n.4.›€€Once€the€Ïdefendant€articulates€a€legitimate,€non„discriminatory€reason€for€its€decision,€the€ultimate€burdenÏthen€shifts€back€to€the€œplaintiff.€€In›€order€to€defeat€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€plaintiffÏmust€produce€evidence€from€which€a€jury€could€reasonably€infer€that€the€employerððs€actions€wereÏbased€on€her€protected€characteristic,€ð ðor€that€defendantsðð€proffered€legitimate,€nondiscriminatoryÏreason€for€adverse€employment€action€is€a€pretext€for€unlawful€discrimination.ðð€€ò òòòDouglas€v.ÏPHH€Fleet€America€Corp.ó óóó,€832€œF.€Supp.›€1002,€1009€(D.€œMd.›€œ1993)€(citing›€ò òòòSt.€MaryððsÏHonor€Centeró óóó).€€ð ðDirect€or€indirect€evidence€of€discriminatory€motive€may€do,€but€ððthe€evidenceÏas€a€whole€.€.€.€must€be€sufficient€for€a€reasonable€œfactfinder›€to€infer€that€the€employerððs€decisionÏwas€motivated€by€age€animus.ðððð€ò òòòWoods€v.€Friction€Materials,€œInc.ó óóó,€30›€F.3d€255,€260€(1stÏCir.€1994)€(quoting€ò òòòGoldman€v.€First€Natððl€Bank€of€Bostonó óóó,€985€F.2d€1113,€1117€(1stÏCir.€œ1993)).›€€Without€adequate€direct€or€circumstantial€evidence€of€the€employerððs€discriminatoryÏanimus,€the€plaintiff€cannot€avoid€summary€judgment.€€ò òòòWoodsó óóó,€30€F.2d€at€260.€Ìà àWe€must€first€determine€whether€Pruett€has€adequately€rebutted€Wal„Martððs€articulation€of€aÏlegitimate,€non„discriminatory€reason€for€its€action.€As€noted€above,€the€focus€must€be€on€whetherÏPruett€was€ð ðqualifiedðð€for€the€telephone€position,€that€is,€whether€her€performance€in€that€positionÏfrom€June€27€to€July€1,€1994€was€inadequate.€€Hills€testified€regarding€his€subjective€impressionsÏthat€Pruettððs€ð ðtoneðð€and€ð ðbrashnessðð€on€the€PA€system€were€unacceptable,€that€she€was€ð ðnotÏtactful,ðð€ð ðimpatientðð€and€ð ðcallousðð€on€the€telephone.€€He€also€noted€that€others€complained€to€himÏof€Pruett€cutting€them€off.€€Wal„Mart€did€not€present€evidence€of€specific€incidents;€HillisÏrecounted€primarily€his€subjective€assessment€of€her€performance.Ìà àThe€affidavits€by€others,€such€as€George€Hobson,€do€not€rebut€Hillisðð€assertions.€The€onlyÏevidence€rebutting€Hillisðð€testimony€is€Pruettððs€affidavit,€asserting€that€she€was€not€ð ðrudeðð€orÍð ðabruptðð€to€callers,€that€she€was€never€counseled€about€problems€with€her€performance.€€She€didÏnot€dispute€problems€cutting€off€callers,€but€asserted€that€it€was€not€her€fault.€€ÌœÇ›à àIn€employment€discrimination€actions,€the€plaintiff€must€come€forward€with€materialÏevidence€that€at€the€time€she€was€removed€from€the€position€in€question,€she€was€performing€theÏjob€in€a€manner€which€met€the€employerððs€legitimate€expectations€and€that€she€was€replaced€byÏsomeone€of€comparable€qualifications€outside€the€protected€group.€€ò òòòDouglas€v.€PHHÏœFleetAmerica›€Corp.ó óóó,€832€œF.€Supp.›€1002,€1009€(D.€œMd.›€1993).€€The€court€will€not€review€theÏemployerððs€business€judgment€as€to€employeesðð€relative€qualifications.€€ò òòòWileman€v.€Frankó óóó,€979ÏF.2d€30,€37„38€(4th€Cir.€1992).€€ò òòòSee€œalsoó óóó›ò òòòKralman€v.€œIllinois›€Dept.€of€œVeteransððÏAffairsó óóó,›€23€œF.3d›€150,€156€(7th€Cir.€1994).€€ð ðThe€self„perception€of€a€plaintiff€.€.€.€as€to€.€.€.€herÏœother€qualifications›€is€irrelevant;€what€matters€is€ððthe€perception€of€the€decision„maker.ðð€ððÏò òòòDouglasó óóó,€832€œF.€Supp.›€at€œ1010›€(quoting€ò òòòSmith€v.€Flaxó óóó,€618€F.2d€1062,€1067€(4th€Cir.Ï1980)).€€In€some€situations,€however,€the€plaintiffððs€own€uncorroborated€testimony,€standingÏalone,€may€be€sufficient€to€create€a€disputed€issue€of€material€fact.€€ò òòòWeldon€v.€Kraftó óóó,€896€F.2dÏ793,€799€(3rd€Cir.€1990).Ìà àIn€this€case,€Hillis€asserts€in€part€that€his€perception€of€Pruettððs€performance€was€based€onÏcomplaints€from€others€that€Pruett€had€ð ðcut€them€offðð€on€the€telephones.€€Pruettððs€affidavit€on€thisÏissue€is€inadequate€to€rebut€this€assertion.€€Pruett€does€not€dispute€that€she€ð ðcut€offðð€callers€butÏasserts€in€effect€that€it€was€ð ðnot€her€fault.ðð€€This€is€insufficient€to€create€a€disputed€issue€of€fact€onÏthis€point.€€ò òòòSee€Anderson€v.€Baxter€Healthcare€Corp.ó óóó,€13€F.3d€1120,€1125€(7th€Cir.Ï1994).€Ìà àHillisðð€other€assertions,€regarding€Pruettððs€tone,€brashness,€lack€of€tact,€impatience€orÏcallous€manner,€are€not€supported€by€examples€of€such€behavior;€the€record€contains€only€HillisððÏsubjective€impressions.€€Pruettððs€affidavit,€in€effect,€says€œð ðno,›€I€wasnððt.ðð€€Ìà àIn€some€instances,€as€where€the€employer€cites€specific€incidents€to€support€œits›€subjectiveÏjudgment,€the€plaintiff€cannot€admit€the€factual€incidents€and€yet€create€a€disputed€issue€of€fact€byÏmerely€disagreeing€with€the€subjective€conclusion€drawn€from€the€incidents.€€For€example,€inÏò òòòManzeró óóó,€the€plaintiff€was€fired€because€he€was€ð ðobnoxious€and€unreliable.ðð€€ò òòòManzeró óóó,€29€œF.3d›€atÍ1082.€€The€plaintiff€did€not€dispute€the€factual€incidents,€but€instead€asserted€that€the€employerððsÏexplanations€were€ð ðphonyðð€and€that€his€good€performance€evaluations€belied€the€employerððsÏconclusion€that€he€was€ð ðobnoxious€and€unreliable.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€1084„1085.€€Ìà àIn€this€case,€however,€Hillisðð€subjective€assessment€is€not€supported€by€specific€incidents,Ïnor€does€he€compare€Pruettððs€qualifications€with€those€employees€assigned€to€the€telephoneÏpositions.€€Under€these€circumstances,€Pruett€may€create€a€disputed€issue€of€material€fact€byÏsubmitting€her€testimony€denying€such€behavior.€€ò òòòSee€Weldon€v€Kraftó óóó,€896€F.2d€at€800€œ(›Ï[T]here€is€no€rule€of€law€that€the€testimony€of€a€discrimination€plaintiff,€standing€alone,€can€neverÏmake€out€a€case€of€discrimination€that€could€withstand€a€summary€judgment€motion.ðð)€Therefore,ÏPruettððs€affidavit€is€barely€sufficient€to€rebut€Wal„Martððs€asserted€legitimate,€non„discriminatoryÏreason€for€its€decision€not€to€assign€Pruett€to€the€telephone€position.Ìà àHowever,€once€we€conclude€that€the€plaintiff€has€submitted€enough€evidence€to€rebut€theÏemployerððs€articulated€reason,€we€must€examine€the€evidence€ð ðas€a€wholeðð€to€determine€if€it€isÏð ðsufficient€for€a€reasonable€fact€finder€to€infer€that€the€employerððs€decision€was€motivated€by€ageÏanimus.ðð€€ò òòòWoods€v.€Friction€Materialsó óóó,€30€F.3d€at€œ260€(citing€ò òòòGoldmanó óóó,€985€F.2d€atÏ1117).›€€Although,€for€purposes€of€summary€judgment,€Wal„Mart€has€conceded€that€Pruett€hasÏestablished€a€prima€face€case€of€age€discrimination,€this€does€not€remove€our€responsibility€toÏexamine€whether€overall€the€plaintiff€has€presented€sufficient€evidence.€€In€this€case,€it€isÏundisputed€that€Pruett€was€hired€by€Wal„Mart€at€age€51,€well€into€the€protected€age€category.€ÏPruett€has€proffered€no€evidence€of€remarks€indicating€age€bias€or€statistical€evidence€indicating€aÏpattern€of€age„biased€actions.€€Pruett€herself€submitted€proof,€from€her€testimony€and€the€affidavitÏof€Patricia€œDotson,›€that€Wal„Mart€had€scheduled€her€to€work€in€the€telephone€position€in€June,Ï1994,€at€age€60.€€She€was€transferred€only€after€she€had€performed€in€this€position€several€days.€ÏMoreover,€Pruett€was€not€œdischarged,€but›€merely€not€assigned€to€the€telephone€position,€and€theÏrecord€indicates€that€she€continues€to€be€employed€by€Wal„Mart.€€There€is€no€indication€that€Wal„Mart€has€sought€to€place€Pruett€in€job€positions€in€which€she€would€not€come€in€contact€with€theÍpublic,€as€where€an€employer€seeks€to€project€a€ð ðyouthfulðð€image€to€the€public.€€The€only€evidenceÏproffered€by€the€plaintiff€is€the€age€difference€between€Pruett€and€the€employees€who€wereÏassigned€to€telephone€positions.€€At€the€time€she€was€transferred€from€the€telephone€position,ÏPruett€was€60€years€old.€€The€employees€in€the€telephone€positions,€Mary€Morphis€and€TinyÏPittman,€were€50€years€old€and€53€years€old,€respectively,€both€well€into€the€protected€ageÏcategory.Ìà àUnlike€race€or€gender,€age€is€not€ð ða€discreet€[sic]€and€immutable€characteristic€of€anÏemployee€which€separates€the€members€of€the€protected€group€indelibly€from€persons€outside€theÏprotected€group.€€œRather,›€age€is€a€continuum€along€which€the€distinctions€between€employees€areÏoften€.€.€.€œrelative.›€.€.€œ.ðð€›€ò òòòGoldstein€v.€Manhattan€Industries,€Inc.ó óóó,€758€F.2d€1435,€1442Ï(11th€Cir.),€œòòcert.›€deniedóó€474€U.S.€1005,€106€œS.€Ct.›€525,€88€œL.€Ed.€2d›€457€(1985).€€Therefore,€aÏplaintiffððs€inability€to€demonstrate€that€the€job€position€was€filled€by€someone€under€forty€is€not€ð ðanÏabsolute€bar€to€the€establishment€of€a€prima€facie€case.ðð€€ò òòòCarter€v.€City€of€Miamióóó ó,€870€F.2dÏ578,€œ583›€(11th€Cir.€1989).€€However,€the€plaintiff€cannot€make€out€a€prima€facie€case€by€showingÏthat€the€job€was€filled€by€someone€only€ð ða€miteðð€younger.€€ò òòòBienkowski€v.€AmericanÏAirlines,€Inc.ó óóó,€851€F.2d€1503,€1506€(5th€Cir.€1988).€€The€plaintiff€must€show€that€the€workerÏwho€filled€the€position€was€ð ðsufficiently€younger€in€the€context€of€his€employment€to€permit€anÏinference€of€age€discrimination.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóóÌà àThis€case€presents€a€close€question,€whether€the€seven„year€difference€in€age€betweenÏPruett€and€Pittman,€taken€alone,€is€sufficient€evidence€for€a€jury€to€reasonably€infer€ageÏdiscrimination,€given€the€undisputed€surrounding€circumstances,€and€assuming€that€the€jury€rejectsÏWal„Martððs€asserted€reason€for€its€decision.€€In€most€cases€involving€a€comparison€betweenÏemployees€in€the€protected€age€category,€where€the€difference€in€age€is€modest,€the€plaintiffÏsurvives€summary€judgment€in€part€because€there€is€other€evidence€of€age€animus,€such€as€biasedÏremarks€or€a€pattern€of€discriminatory€behavior.€€ò òòò€œSee,›€e.g.,€Bienkowskió óóó,€851€F.2d€at€œ1506„7›Ï(five„year€age€difference€plus€mildly€age„biased€comments€plus€specific€denial€of€incidents€formingÍthe€basis€for€the€œemployerððs›€decision);€ò òòòCarter€v.€City€of€Miamió óóó,€870€F.2d€at€œ579„80›€œ(four„year›Ïage€difference€plus€age„biased€remark);€ò òòòGoldsteinó óóó,€758€F.2d€at€1440€(several€employees€replacedÏby€younger€workers,€with€an€age€difference€of€5„10€years,€showed€a€pattern€of€discrimination).€€AtÏleast€one€court€has€found€that€a€modest€age€difference,€in€and€of€itself,€is€sufficient€to€permit€theÏfact€finder€to€infer€age€discrimination.€€œò òòòSee,›€œe.g.,›€Sempier€v.€Johnson€&€Higginsó óóó,€46€F.3dÏ724,€œ729„730›€(3rd€Cir.€œ1995)›€(plaintiffððs€job€responsibilities€assumed€by€two€employees,€one€fourÏyears€younger€and€the€other€ten€years€younger).€€In€another€œcourt,›€a€ten„year€age€difference,Ïwithout€further€evidence,€was€deemed€insufficient€to€survive€a€motion€for€summary€judgment.€Ïò òòòSee€OððConnor€v.€Consolidated€Coin€œCaterers€Corp.ó óóó,›€829€œF.€Supp.›€155,€158„59Ï(W.D.N.C.€1993)€(ten„year€age€difference,€alleged€biased€remarks€had€no€nexus€to€the€decision€toÏterminate€plaintiff).Ìà àViewing€the€evidence€as€a€whole,€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€plaintiff,€we€mustÏconclude€that€the€evidence€is€not€sufficient€for€the€fact€finder€to€reasonably€infer€that€Wal„Martððs€œÇdecision›€not€to€assign€Pruett€to€the€telephone€position€resulted€from€age€animus.€€The€decision€ofÏthe€trial€court€on€Pruettððs€age€discrimination€claim€is€affirmed.€€ò òòòManzeró óóó,€òòò òsupraó óóó,€at€1083.Ìà@ àò òFEDERAL€DISABILITY€CLAIMS€ó óÌà àPruett€claims€that€she€was€discriminated€against€because€of€her€disability€when€Wal„MartÏrefused€to€transfer€her€to€the€telephone€operator€position.€€This€claim€involves€two€theories:€(1)Ïdisability€discrimination,€œi.e.,›€Pruett€was€not€given€the€job€because€of€Wal„Martððs€discriminatoryÏanimus;€and€(2)€failure€to€accommodate;€that€Pruett€was€denied€an€accommodation,€a€sedentaryÏjob,€œwhich€the›€federal€disability€statutes€€required€Wal„Mart€to€provide.€€Ìà àThe€analysis€for€Pruettððs€claim€under€the€ADA€of€discrimination€on€the€basis€of€herÏdisability€is€very€similar€to€the€analysis€of€her€age€discrimination€œclaim.€€ò òòòSee€Rizzo€v.ÏChildrenððs€World€Learning€Centers,€Inc.ó óóó,€84€F.3d€758,€762€(5th€Cir.€1996).€€›€œPruett›€mustÏestablish€a€prima€facie€case€by€producing€evidence€œthat:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à1)€he€is€an€individual€with€a€disability;€2)€he€is€ð ðotherwise€qualifiedððÏto€perform€the€job€requirements,€with€or€without€reasonableÏaccommodation;€and€3)€he€[suffered€adverse€employment€action]Ïsolely€by€reason€of€his€handicap.ÌÌÓÓò òòòMonette€v.€Electronic€Data€Sys.€Corp.óóó ó,€90€F.3d€1173,€1178€(6th€Cir.€1996)€(citing€cases).€ÏWhere€€the€employerððs€discriminatory€intent€is€disputed,€courts€have€applied€ð ða€burden„shiftingÏanalysis€roughly€equivalent€to€that€set€forth€by€the€Supreme€Court€in€ò òòòMcDonnell€Douglasóóó óððforÏother€employment€discrimination€claims.€ò òòòMonetteóóó ó,€at€1178.€€Once€Pruett€establishes€a€prima€facieÏcase,€the€burden€shifts€to€the€defendant€to€articulate€a€legitimate,€nondiscriminatory€reason€for€itsÏaction.€ò òòòRizzoó óóó,€4€F.3d€at€761.€€The€plaintiff€must€then€produce€evidence€from€which€a€jury€couldÏreasonably€infer€that€the€employerððs€actions€were€based€on€her€disability,€or€that€the€employerððsÏarticulated€reason€is€a€pretext€for€unlawful€discrimination.€€ò òòòSee€id.óóó óÌà àAs€discussed€above€in€the€context€of€Pruettððs€age€claim,€Pruett€has€submitted€evidenceÏbarely€sufficient€to€rebut€Wal„Martððs€asserted€legitimate€non„discriminatory€reason€for€its€actions.€ÏConsequently,€as€with€Pruettððs€claim€of€age€discrimination,€we€must€examine€whether€€ð ð€ððtheÍevidence€as€a€whole€.€.€.€[is]€sufficient€for€a€reasonable€factfinder€to€infer€that€the€employerððsÏdecision€was€motivated€by€.€.€.€animusðð€on€the€basis€of€her€disability.ðð€ðð€€ò òòòWoodsó óóó,€30€F.3d€at€260Ï(quoting€ò òòòGoldmanó óóó,€985€F.2d€at€1117).€€ÌÇà àIn€this€case,€the€plaintiff€has€no€direct€evidence€of€discriminatory€animus€on€the€basis€ofÏPruettððs€disability.€€The€only€circumstantial€evidence€appears€to€be€that€the€other€employees€inÏtelephone€positions€did€not€have€disabilities.€€However,€Pruettððs€own€proof€indicates€that€one€ofÏthe€employees€in€a€telephone€position,€Tiny€Pittman,€had€a€physical€disability.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€Moreover,€it€isÏundisputed€that,€when€Pruett€previously€experienced€foot€problems,€she€was€transferredÏtemporarily€to€a€telephone€position€and,€on€June€27,€1994,€it€is€undisputed€that€Pruett€wasÏassigned€to€the€telephone€position€òòbecause€ofóó€her€foot€disability.€€Under€the€circumstances€as€aÏwhole,€the€evidence€is€simply€insufficient€for€a€jury€to€reasonably€conclude€that€Wal„Mart€thenÏturned€around€and€removed€Pruett€from€the€telephone€position€because€of€her€foot€disability.€Ìà àTherefore,€the€trial€court€did€not€err€in€granting€Wal„Mart€summary€judgment€on€PruettððsÏclaim€of€discrimination€on€the€basis€of€her€disability€under€the€ADA.€€Ìà àUnder€Pruettððs€second€theory,€an€employer€is€guilty€of€discrimination€under€the€AmericansÏWith€Disabilities€Act€when€it€has€not€made€ð ðreasonable€accommodations€to€the€known€physical€orÏmental€limitations€of€an€otherwise€qualified€individual€with€a€disability€who€is€an€.€.€.€employee,Ïunless€[the€employer]€can€demonstrate€that€the€accommodation€would€impose€an€undue€hardshipÏon€the€business€of€such€[employer].ðð€42€U.S.C.A.€ðð12112(b)(5)(A)€(1995).€€Pruett€is€classified€asÏan€ð ðindividual€with€a€disabilityðð× ƒ3 ××  ×€because€her€physical€inability€to€stand€for€long€periods€of€timeÏhas€substantially€limited€her€ability€to€perform€her€job€at€her€previous€position€of€sales€clerk.ò ò€Ïó óð ðReasonable€accommodationðð€may€include€reassigning€the€handicapped€employee€to€a€vacantÏposition.€42€U.S.C.A.€ðð€12111(9)(B)€(1995).€€However,€the€ADA€does€not€require€an€employerÏto€search€for€another€job€the€employee€can€perform.€ò òòòMiller€v.€Department€of€Correctionsóóó ó,Í916€F.€Supp.€863,€870€(C.D.€Ill.€1996).€€In€these€cases,€the€employee€bears€the€burden€of€Ïð ðproducing€evidence€sufficient€to€establish€that€accommodation€by€reassignment€was€possible.ððÏò òòòId.óóó ó€Ìà àIn€July€1994,€Pruettððs€physician€informed€Wal„Mart€that€she€needed€to€be€reassigned€to€aÏposition€that€allowed€her€to€sit€while€working.€€Wal„Mart€was€required€to€make€a€good€faith€effortÏto€accommodate€Pruettððs€disability€unless€it€could€show€that€such€accommodation€would€create€an€Ïundue€hardship.€42€U.S.C.A.€ðð12112(b)(5)(A)€(1995).× ƒ4 ××  ×€€It€was€not€required€to€transfer€Pruett€to€aÏsedentary€position€if€there€were€no€vacancies€or€if€Pruett€was€not€qualified€for€a€particularÏsedentary€position.€€Ìà àAfter€being€informed€of€Pruettððs€disability,€Hillis€offered€her€a€position€hanging€apparel€€inÏthe€stockroom€with€the€accommodation€of€a€stool.€€This€position€required€standing,€however,€andÏPruett€could€not€perform€the€job.€€She€then€requested€the€telephone€position.€€Pruett€testified,€thatÏafter€Hillis€informed€her€that€she€would€not€receive€the€job€answering€phones,€she€told€him€that€sheÏwould€appreciate€his€informing€her€if€any€other€sitting€position€became€available.€€In€his€affidavit,ÏHillis€states€that€ð ð[a]lthough€Pruett€was€not€offered€the€telephone€position,€she€was€offered€severalÏalternative€jobs€and€a€part€time€work€schedule€that€would€not€affect€her€foot€problems.€€PruettÏrefused€these€jobs€and€work€schedules€because€she€claimed€she€could€make€more€money€byÏreceiving€short€term€disability.ðð€€Hillis€did€not€identify€any€other€job,€aside€from€the€stockroomÏposition,€that€he€offered€Pruett.€€Pruett€alleges€that€after€she€was€refused€the€telephone€position,Ïshe€was€not€offered€another€sitting€position€until€one€year€later,€and,€that€she€would€have€acceptedÏany€sedentary€position€had€one€been€offered.€€From€August€1,€1994,€until€August€28,€1995,€PruettÏdid€not€work€for€Wal„Mart.€€During€this€time€she€received€Social€Security€disability€benefits.€Ìà àOn€August€12,€1995,€Pruett€submitted€a€letter€of€resignation€stating,€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓÓà8 àI€am€not€aware€of€any€positions€at€Wal„Mart€that€I€am€presently€capable€ofÍperforming,€with€the€exception€of€the€job€of€answering€the€telephone.€.€.€.Ï[B]ecause€I€am€in€financial€straits€at€this€time€.€.€.,€I€am€compelled€to€resign€myÏemployment€in€order€to€receive€what€is€due€me€under€Wal„Martððs€profit€sharingÏplan.ÌÌÓÓAfter€receiving€this€letter,€Wal„Mart€offered€Pruett€a€sitting€position€as€cashier€in€the€cosmeticsÏdepartment,€a€position€which€allowed€her€to€work€while€sitting.€€Pruettððs€evidence€indicated€thatÏthis€€position€had€not€existed€at€the€old€Wal„Mart€store.€€The€cosmetics€position€reasonablyÏaccommodated€Pruettððs€disability.€€She€accepted€the€position€and€returned€to€work€on€August€28,Ï1995.€€€€Ìà àThus,€the€record€establishes€that€disputed€issues€of€material€fact€remain€as€to€Pruettððs€claimÏthat€Wal„Mart€failed€to€accommodate€her€disability.€€These€issues€include€Pruettððs€qualifications€forÏthe€telephone€position€(i.e.,€whether€she€performed€adequately€in€the€position€form€June€27,€1994Ïto€July€1,€1994),€whether€Wal„Mart€had€vacant€positions€for€which€Pruett€was€qualified€that€wouldÏhave€accommodated€her,€whether€these€positions€were€offered€to€Pruett,€whether€Pruett€refusedÏthem€and,€if€so,€whether€Pruett€was€justified€in€refusing€them.€€Ìà àRegardless€of€these€factual€issues,€Wal„Mart€argues€that€the€doctrine€of€judicial€estoppelÏshould€bar€Pruett€from€claiming€that€she€was€ð ðotherwise€qualifiedðð€for€a€position€under€the€ADA.€ÏWal„Mart€bases€this€claim€on€Pruettððs€sworn€statement€submitted€to€receive€Social€SecurityÏdisability€benefits.€€It€argues€that€Pruett€cannot€claim€on€one€hand€to€be€totally€disabled× ƒ5 ××  ×€in€order€toÏreceive€disability€benefits,€and€on€the€other€hand€assert€that€Wal„Mart€failed€to€assign€her€to€aÏsedentary€job€that€she€could€perform.€€However,€Wal„Mart€points€to€no€place€in€the€record€inÏwhich€€it€raised€this€issue€before€the€trial€court.€€Consequently,€it€will€not€be€considered€on€appeal.€Ïò òòòIndemnity€Ins.€Co.€v.€Blackwelló óóó,€653€S.W.2d€262€(Tenn.€App.€1983).€€Ìà àTherefore,€Wal„Mart€is€not€entitled€to€summary€judgment€on€Pruettððs€claim€of€failure€toÏaccommodate€her€disability.€€As€to€this€claim,€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€must€be€reversed€andÍthe€case€remanded€for€trial.Ìà@ àò òTHRA€CLAIMSó óÌà àThe€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€(THRA)€prohibits€age€and€handicap€discrimination€inÏemployment.€ò òòòSee€ó óóóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€8„50„103(a)€(1993)€and€4„21„401(a)€(1991).€€TennesseeÏutilizes€federal€decisions€construing€parallel€employment€law€to€determine€the€standard€by€whichÏTennessee€courts€will€weigh€the€evidence€in€these€types€of€cases.€òòò òBruce€v.€Western€AutoÏSupply€Co.ó óóó,€669€S.W.2d€95€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€In€age€discrimination€actions,€THRA€sectionsÏand€their€federal€counterparts€are€similarly€interpreted.€€Accordingly,€the€standards€mentionedÏabove€apply,€and€we€find€that€Pruettððs€claim€for€age€discrimination€under€state€law€was€properlyÏdisposed€of€by€the€trial€court.Ìà àUnlike€its€federal€counterpart,€the€portion€of€the€THRA€that€prohibits€discrimination€on€theÏbasis€of€disability€does€not€require€employers€to€provide€disabled€workers€with€reasonableÏaccommodations.× ƒ6 ××  ×€€ò òòòSee€Tuck€v.€HCA€Health€Services€of€Tennessee,€Inc.ó óóó,€7€F.3d€465,Ï474€(6th€Cir.€1993);€òòò òTurner€v.€Eagle€Distributing€Co.óóó ó,€No.€03A01„9209„CH„0338,€1993ÏWL€88365,€at€*2€(Tenn.€App.€March€29,€1993)€(holding€that€Tennessee€law€does€not€require€anÏemployer€to€accommodate€a€handicapped€employee€by€reassignment);€ò òòòAbraham€v.ÏCumberland„Swan,€Inc.óóó ó,€No.€01A01„9201CH00032,€1992€WL€207775€(Tenn.€App.€Aug.Ï28,€1992);€Tenn.€Atty.€Gen.€Op.€No.€94„028.€€Therefore,€Pruett€has€no€claim€for€failure€toÏaccommodate€her€disability€under€Tennessee€law.€€The€trial€courtððs€decision€as€to€Pruettððs€THRAÍclaims€is€therefore€affirmed.€Ìà@ àò ò€ERISA€CLAIMó óÌà àPruett€claims€that€Wal„Mart€violated€ðð€510€of€ERISA€when€it€denied€her€a€job€which€she€Ìcould€perform€full„time.€€The€relevant€ERISA€section€provides€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓÓà8 àIt€shall€be€unlawful€for€any€person€to€discharge,€fire,€suspend,€expel,€discipline,€orÏdiscriminate€against€a€participant€or€beneficiary€.€.€.€for€the€purpose€of€interferingÏwith€the€attainment€of€any€right€to€which€such€participant€may€become€entitledÏunder€the€plan.€.€.€.€ÌÓÓÌ29€U.S.C.A.€ðð1140€(1997).€€A€section€510€violation€involves€three€elements:€(1)€plaintiffÏparticipated€in€a€protected€plan;€(2)€the€defendant€engaged€in€prohibited€action€(3)€ð ðfor€the€purposeÏof€interfering€with€the€plaintiffððs€receipt€of€benefits€under€the€plan.€.€.€.ðð€€€òòò òSee€Watkins€v.ÏShared€Hospital€Services€Corp.óóó ó,€852€F.€Supp.€640,€643€(M.D.€Tenn.€1994).€€As€a€result€ofÏWal„Martððs€actions,€Pruett€lost€her€medical€benefits€for€approximately€one€year.€Ìà àPruett€asserts€that€Wal„Mart€intentionally€reassigned€her€from€the€job€answering€telephonesÏto€a€position€that€required€her€to€stand€constantly,€therefore€limiting€the€amount€of€hours€she€couldÏwork€each€day.€€Because€Wal„Martððs€medical€insurance€plan€covered€only€those€employees€whoÏworked€twenty„eight€(28)€hours€or€more€per€week,€Pruettððs€transfer€resulted€in€her€loss€of€benefitsÏunder€the€plan.€€Ìà àTo€state€a€claim€under€ERISA,€the€plaintiff€must€show€specific€intent€to€violate€the€statute.€Ïòòò òSee€Watkinsóóó ó,€852€F.€Supp.€at€643;€ò òòòFolz€v.€Marriott€Corp.ó óóó,€594€F.€Supp.€1007,€1014Ï(W.D.€Mo.€1984).€Pruett€can€point€to€no€discriminatory€remarks€or€pattern€of€behavior€by€Wal„Mart€or€other€evidence€indicating€such€intent.€€Accordingly,€we€find€that€the€trial€court€was€correctÏin€granting€summary€judgment€for€Wal„Mart€on€this€claim.Ìà@ àò òòòCONCLUSIONó óóóÌà àIn€sum,€Pruett€has€presented€evidence€barely€sufficient€to€rebut€Wal„Martððs€articulatedÏlegitimate€nondiscriminatory€reason€for€refusing€to€assign€her€to€the€telephone€position.€€However,Ïthe€evidence€as€a€whole€on€Pruettððs€age€discrimination€claim€is€insufficient€for€a€jury€to€reasonablyÍinfer€that€Wal„Martððs€actions€were€the€result€of€age€bias.€€Therefore,€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€ofÏPruettððs€age€discrimination€claim,€under€the€federal€and€state€statutes,€is€affirmed.€€Likewise,€theÏevidence€as€a€whole€on€Pruettððs€claim€of€disability€discrimination€is€insufficient€for€a€jury€toÏreasonably€infer€that€Wal„Martððs€decision€resulted€from€bias€against€her€because€of€her€footÏdisability.€€Consequently,€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€Pruettððs€disability€discrimination€claim,Ïunder€both€federal€and€state€statutes,€is€affirmed.€€However,€on€Pruettððs€claim€that€Wal„Mart€failedÏto€make€a€good€faith€effort€to€accommodate€her€disability,€under€the€ADA,€disputed€issues€ofÏmaterial€fact€remain.€€The€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€Pruettððs€failure„to„accommodate€claim€isÏreversed€and€the€cause€remanded€for€trial€on€this€claim.€€On€Pruettððs€claim€under€ERISA€that€Wal„Mart€refused€to€assign€her€to€the€telephone€position€in€order€to€avoid€paying€her€medical€benefits,Ïthe€evidence€as€a€whole€is€insufficient€for€a€jury€to€reasonably€find€that€Wal„Mart€had€the€requisiteÏspecific€intent.€€Therefore,€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€Pruettððs€ERISA€claim€is€affirmed.Ìà àThe€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€in€part,€reversed€in€part,€and€remanded€forÏproceedings€consistent€with€this€Opinion.€€Costs€are€taxed€equally€to€Appellant€and€Appellee,€forÏwhich€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.€ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àò òóóHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ìó óà àò òÌCONCUR:ÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.€J.,€W.S.ÌÌó óòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìóóò òDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ó ó€€€€€€€€€€€à8 à